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Billie H. Hix

BILLIE H. HIX
Chief, Technical Systems Branch
The Albert F. Simpson Historical
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M-28441
Vol. III

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Auth: CG, V Corps
Date: 10 Jan 1945
Init: OCM

HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, U.S. Army

M-28441-S
Vol-3

319.1

4 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.

TO : The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

THROUGH: The Commanding General, First United States Army, APO 230, U.S. Army.

1. In compliance with Paragraph 10 (Change 4), Army Regulations 345-105, and Letter, Headquarters, First United States Army, same subject and file, dated 13 July 1944, this Report After Action Against the Enemy by the V Corps, U.S. Army, for the period 1 December 1944 to 31 December 1944, inclusive, is submitted.

2. This report consists of the following sections:

SECTION I - OPERATIONS
SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE
SECTION III - PERSONNEL
SECTION IV - LOGISTICS
SECTION V - MILITARY GOVERNMENT

which are annexed hereto.

For the Commanding General:

Orlando C. Mood
ORLANDO C. MOOD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, U.S. Army

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY
1 December 1944 to 31 December 1944

SECTION I
OPERATIONS

1. 1 December 1944 to 8 December 1944 - Limited Objective Attacks.

On 1 December 1944 V Corps was operating in the HURTGEN Forest, in the northern part of the Corps zone of operations. The mission was the capture of HURTGEN, KLEINHAU, BRANDENBERG and BERGSTEIN, and the intervening areas, in a series of limited objective attacks ordered during the latter part of November. HURTGEN had been captured on 28 November and KLEINHAU was taken on 30 November. The 8th Infantry Division and Combat Command "R" of the 5th Armored Division conducted the operations. Other Corps elements were holding positions to the south in sectors which had remained quiet.

Beginning on 1 December the attacks continued towards BRANDENBERG and BERGSTEIN. German resistance to these drives was heavy and the advances by the elements of the V Corps were slow but steady. Combat Command "R", 5th Armored Division, reached BRANDENBERG at 031115A December. German resistance in the area was cleared up by the armor and infantry elements of the 8th Division. BERGSTEIN was captured on 5 December by Combat Command "R", 5th Armored Division. In continuing operations to clear up the area to the east to the ROER River and the Corps boundary, heavy resistance was encountered. Enemy counterattacks were met but were repulsed after heavy fighting. All objectives were taken by 8 December and the commanding high ground and the "noses" in the BERGSTEIN area were occupied.

Elsewhere on the V Corps front the situation had remained quiet throughout the period. Patrol activity from defensive positions had been the only activity by our forces. There had been some shifting of units.

V Corps Artillery gave continuous support for the attack in the 8th Infantry Division sector. The 187th Field Artillery Group was in direct support, in addition to divisional artillery. Corps Artillery units fired an average of about 3,000 rounds per day during the period, of which the 187th Field Artillery Group fired about 1,500 rounds. Engineer operations during the period were mainly in support of the attack in the 8th Division sector, with the units improving road nets to facilitate movement of supplies, clearing minefields to permit infantry and armored elements to advance. Routine duties were performed in other parts of the Corps sector. Armored elements were active in support of the attack but were inoperative in other parts of the sector. Tank Destroyer units supported the attack, both in indirect harassing firing roles and from direct fire anti-mechanized positions. There was more enemy air activity over the V Corps zone during this period than at any time since the early days of the NORMANDY invasion. Antiaircraft Artillery units engaged 44 planes on three days, claiming 20 of these as destroyed with 10 others probably destroyed. There were 290 pilotless aircraft (robot bombs) spotted over the V Corps area, of which 88 were engaged with claims

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and STRAUCH and the high ground southeast of SCHMIDT. The final objective was Dam No. 3. The 8th Division was to aid the attack of the 78th Division by maintaining pressure against the KALL River line and further was to be prepared to advance on Corps order into the KOMMERSCHEIDT - SCHMIDT area or to attack south from BERGSTEIN along the ROER River. The terrain through which the attack was to be made was very difficult.

As preparations were made for the attack, the 8th Infantry Division continued clearing and strengthening its positions along the ROER and KALL Rivers on the Corps north flank. Movement of the Corps units to attack positions was accomplished from 8 December until 12 December.

The attack commenced as scheduled on the morning of 13 December. The 99th Division reached its initial objective. Other attacking units met stubborn German resistance and the advance was slow. The 78th Division captured SIMMERATH and BICKERATH but was unable to secure KESTERNICH until 15 December. The 2nd Division made progress slowly but was still short of its initial objectives on 15 December. The 8th Division exerted pressure against the enemy.

The attacks continued on 16 December but were slowed down and finally stopped by increasing German resistance and what appeared to be a series of counterattacks, delivered all along the line against the southern part of the V Corps sector and the northern part of the VIII Corps area.

V Corps Artillery averaged less than 500 rounds per day until the start of the attacks on 13 December. During the remainder of the period much heavier artillery fire was given in support of the operations. From 13 to 16 December approximately 18,000 rounds were fired by Corps Artillery units alone, with heavy firing by the divisional artillery units also. Corps Engineer units provided normal support during the period 8 to 12 December but gave direct support through road work and mine and obstacle removal during the later period while the attacks were in progress. Armored elements supported the attacks as did the Tank Destroyer units of the Corps. There was little enemy air activity over the Corps zone and the number of pilotless aircraft was reduced to almost nothing, resulting in a lessening of operations by the Antiaircraft Artillery units. Air support was given by the IX Tactical Air Command with effective bombing and strafing attacks upon villages and towns in the Corps zone of advance. The bridge at NIDEGGEN was bombed and attacks were made on EUSKIRCHEN, STECKENBORN, ROLLESBROICH, STRAUCH, EICHERSCHEID, KONZEN, HEIMBACH, WOLLSEIFEN, HARPERSCHEID, BLUMENTHAL, DEDENBORN and HERHAHN. Signal units maintained communications throughout the period.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
776 FA Bn - 11 Dec	11th AAA Gp - 090600A Dec
CC "B", 9th Armd Div - 12 Dec	134 AAA Gun Bn - 090600A Dec
Co A, 811 TD Bn - 12 Dec	413 AAA Gun Bn - 090600A Dec
Btry B, 482 AAA AW Bn - 12 Dec	440 AAA AW Bn - 090600A Dec
2nd Inf Div - 112345A Dec	639 AAA AW Bn - 9 Dec
741 Tk Bn - 112345A Dec	16 Inf Regt (1st Div) - 11 Dec
462 AAA AW Bn - 112345A Dec	Co A, 1st Engr Bn - 11 Dec

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612 TD Bn - 112345A Dec
Det E, 165 Sig Photo Co - 112345A Dec
2nd CIC Det - 112345A Dec
2 Cos, 6 Belgian Fusilier Bn - 12 Dec
Det R, 165 Sig Photo Co - 13 Dec
Btry A, 987 FA Bn - 160600A Dec
751 FA Bn - 160600A Dec
Co A, 1st Med Bn - 11 Dec
Co C, 643 TD Bn - 11 Dec
Co A, 745 Tk Bn - 11 Dec
Btrys A & B, 103 AAA AW Bn - 11 Dec
Asslt Gun Plat, 745 Tk Bn - 11 Dec
Det I5D2, 2nd RCA Regt - 10 Dec
CC "B", 9th Armd Div - 161030A Dec
Co A, 811 TD Bn - 161030A Dec
7th FA Bn - 15 Dec.

During this period the V Corps began a coordinated attack to capture the dams and lakes, and commanding ground along the ROER River. Enemy resistance was strong and the advance was slow but steady until 16 December when increased enemy resistance and a series of heavy counterattacks developed.

3. 16 December 1944 to 31 December 1944 - The German Breakthrough.

The counterattacks which the Germans had launched at the close of the last period developed rapidly into a major enemy thrust, directed at the junction of the V and the VIII Corps. The Germans had massed very strong forces in the rear areas and committed them in an all-out drive to the west. Identifications early in the counterattacks indicated that six infantry and five panzer divisions were committed by the enemy in his initial thrust.

The main spearhead of the enemy drive appeared to be aimed at the junction of the 99th Division in the V Corps sector and the 106th Infantry Division in the VIII Corps zone. Captured documents indicated this attack to be an all-out drive by the best forces available to the German army. The first assault hit our lines at 160615A December and others continued throughout the day.

Our forces fought desperately throughout the day of 16 December but the enemy was in overwhelming force and the lines were forced back. Paratroopers were dropped by the enemy behind our lines during the night 16-17 December in an effort to cause confusion, capture supply installations, disrupt communications and hold key terrain features until the advancing German armored and infantry elements could relieve them. Most of these paratroop forces were quickly rounded up and captured.

The enemy rolled back the V Corps to the north, while the VIII Corps units were rolled back towards the south and west, creating a gap between the two Corps through which the German attack pushed on.

In a regrouping of forces to hold against the strong enemy thrust, the 1st Infantry Division, the 30th Infantry Division, and the 9th Infantry Division were attached to V Corps and quickly moved into the battle area. After the initial rolling back along the boundary between the V and VIII Corps areas, forces of the V Corps held against enemy attempts to turn north into the Corps sector. Repeated attempts to move north to capture EUPEN and LIEGE were made and repulsed. After the initial assault, little ground was lost by the V Corps, while held its defensive positions while higher headquarters regrouped forces. The enemy penetrated further west into our territory along the inter-Corps boundary. Numerous attacks were made by the Germans in the MONSCHAU area without success.

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612 TD Bn - 112345A Dec
Det E, 165 Sig Photo Co - 112345A Dec
2nd CIC Det - 112345A Dec
2 Cos, 6 Belgian Fusilier Bn - 12 Dec
Det E, 165 Sig Photo Co - 13 Dec
Btry A, 987 FA Bn - 160600A Dec
751 FA Bn - 160600A Dec

Co A, 1st Med Bn - 11 Dec
Co C, 643 TD Bn - 11 Dec
Co A, 745 Tk Bn - 11 Dec
Btrys A & B, 102 AAA AW Bn - 11 Dec
Auto Gun Plat, 745 Tk Bn - 11 Dec
Det 1SEM, 2nd MDA Regt - 10 Dec
CC "B", 9th Armd Div - 161030A Dec
Co A, 811 TD Bn - 161030A Dec
7th FA Bn - 13 Dec.

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Throughout the remainder of the period the V Corps forces held the enemy and made minor attacks to improve positions. Constant pressure was exerted by V Corps against the northern edge of the breakthrough. Elsewhere on the V Corps front our forces held firm and exerted pressure that stopped several German attempts to widen the base of their breakthrough.

V Corps Artillery fired heavy schedules throughout the early part of the German counterattack. Missions were fired against counterattacking troops, troop assembly areas and against German strong points. Roads being used by the enemy were placed under very heavy fire and much enemy equipment was destroyed. Unrestricted artillery fire was continued throughout the period. Engineers were very active. They engaged in a great deal of support work, laying and extending minefields and wire defenses, preparing bridges for demolition, and in many instances went into the line as infantry to hold defensive positions. Our armored elements were active against the German armor and suffered heavy losses, while inflicting extremely heavy losses upon the enemy. Tank Destroyer units also were active, firing both direct antimechanized and indirect harassing and interdiction missions to support the units to which they were attached. Both armored and tank destroyer elements accounted for the destruction of much enemy materiel. Antiaircraft Artillery units were especially active against the increased enemy air support activity which appeared over the Corps zone in support of the attack. A large number of enemy aircraft were destroyed by the AAA fire and others were prevented from carrying out their missions of bombing, strafing and reconnaissance. Antiaircraft units also were used as direct firing ground weapons for antimechanized defense with good results. During the early part of the breakthrough period unfavorable weather kept our air forces grounded but when the weather improved the air forces were our in great strength. They knocked down huge numbers of German aircraft, bombed and strafed the enemy columns and provided general air support with excellent results. Great quantities of enemy equipment and vehicles were destroyed by the allied air forces operations during this period. Late in the period weather again became unfavorable and fewer missions were flown. Signal units, under most unfavorable conditions, maintained communications.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
639 AAA-AW Bn - 162200A Dec	Co B and Recn Plat, 703 TD Bn - 20 Dec
1st Inf Div - 162400A Dec	8th InfDiv - 18 Dec
745 Tk Bn - 162400A Dec	709 Tk Bn - 18 Dec
634 TD Bn - 162400A Dec	445 AAA AW Bn - 18 Dec
103 AAA AW Bn - 162400A Dec	8th CIC Det - 18 Dec
1st CIC Det - 162400A Dec	78th Inf Div - 18 Dec
18 AAA Gp - 171300A Dec	78th CIC Det - 18 Dec
134 AAA Gun Bn - 171300A Dec	CC "R", 5th Armd Div - 18 Dec
413 AAA Gun Bn - 171300A Dec	Co C, 628 [illegible] Bn - 18 Dec
602 AAA Gun Bn - 171300A Dec	Btry C, 387 AAA AW Bn - 18 Dec
463 AAA AW Bn - 171300A Dec	102 Cav Gp - 18 Dec
47 RCT (9th Div) - 171200A Dec	102 Cav Recn Sqdn - 18 Dec
Co C, 899 TD Bn - 171200A Dec	Tp A, 38 Cav Recn Sqdn - 18 Dec
Co A, 746 Tk Bn - 171200A Dec	76 FA Bn - 19 Dec
Btry D, 376 AAA AW Bn - 171200A Dec	Btry A, 285 FA Obsn Bn - 19 Dec
30th Inf Div - 17 Dec	119 RCT (30 Div) - 19 Dec
823 TD Bn - 18 Dec	Co B, 823 TD Bn - 19 Dec

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743 Tk Bn - 17 Dec
531 AAA AW Bn - 17 Dec
~~30th CIC Det - 17 Dec~~
205th CIC Det - 15 Dec
Btry C, 197 AAA AW Bn - 172200A Dec
Det X, 165 Sig Photo Co - 162400A Dec
703 TD Bn - 171200A Dec
CC "A", 3rd Armd Div - 18 Dec
Btry C, 486 AAA AW Bn - 18 Dec
400 Armd FA Bn - 18 Dec
9th Inf Div (-47 & 60 RCTs) - 18 Dec
899 TD Bn (-Cos B & C) - 18 Dec
746 Tk Bn (-Cos A & B) - 18 Dec
376 AAA AW Bn (-Btrys C & D) - 18 Dec
9th CIC Det - 18 Dec
18 FA Bn - 19 Dec
79 FA Gp - 19 Dec
552 FA Bn - 19 Dec
272 FA Bn - 19 Dec
Det C, 165 Sig Photo Co - 18 Dec
Det 1212, 167 Sig Photo Co - 18 Dec
60 RCT (9th Div) - 23 Dec
5th Armd Div - 23 Dec
387 AAA AW Bn - 23 Dec
Det M, 165 Sig Photo Co - 23 Dec
3907 QM Trk Co - 23 Dec
3912 QM Trk Co - 23 Dec
76 FA Bn - 21 Dec
863 QM Fum & Bath Co - 31 Dec
82nd Airborne Div - 171750A Dec

Btry C, 531 AAA AW Bn - 19 Dec
187 FA Bn - 210800A Dec
Btry C, 197 AAA AW Bn - 19 Dec
Det R, 165 Sig Photo Co - 18 Dec
30th Inf Div (-119 RCT) - 21 Dec
823 TD Bn - 21 Dec
531 AAA AW Bn (-Btry C) - 21 Dec
400 Armd FA Bn - 21 Dec
18 FA Bn - 24 Dec
CC "A", 3rd Armd Div - 21 Dec
Btry C, 486 AAA AW Bn - 21 Dec
817 TD Bn - 22 Dec
893 TD Bn - 22 Dec
Cos A & B, 86 Cml Bn - 22 Dec
743 Tk Bn - 21 Dec
703 TD Bn (-Cos B & C & Recn Plat) - 25 Dec
508 Engr L Pon Co - 24 Dec
552 FA Bn - 27 Dec
79 FA Gp - 27 Dec
Btry D, 639 AAA AW Bn - 20 Dec
82nd Airborne Div - 191500A Dec

During this period the Germans started a major counteroffensive which was directed at the junction of the V and VIII Corps. The overwhelming power of the enemy thrust rolled back the troops along the boundary, V Corps troop swinging north and VIII Corps retiring westward and southward. The thrust opened a gap between the two Corps through which the enemy forces advanced westward. Several attempts by the enemy to turn northward into the V Corps zone were blocked by the stubborn defenses put up by the elements of the Corps and V Corps stabilized its positions and held against the enemy penetration. Considerable regrouping of forces was made and the Corps lost very little ground while delaying the enemy advance and holding its defensive positions.

Through the month of December the V Corps operated two offensive periods, covering the first half of the month. In the first operation, in the northern part of the Corps sector, KLEINHAU, BRANDENBERG and BERGSTEIN, together with commanding terrain in those areas, were captured by the 8th Infantry Division and the Combat Command "B" of the 5th Armored Division. In the second offensive action V Corps began a coordinated assault to the east, aimed at the capture of the ROER River dams and lakes but German counterattacks developing on 16 December stopped the drive. During the latter half of the month the German counteroffensive began and continued through the month, forcing a gap between V and VIII Corps and driving westward along the Corps boundary. V Corps held defensive positions after being swung northward along the boundary initially. V Corps gave up very little ground and prevented the enemy from turning northward after the initial penetration.

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HISTORICAL RECORD
SECTION, HEADQUARTERS V CORPS

7 January 1945

Month of December

PART I - ENEMY SITUATION

Period 1-12 December

The organization of the enemy forces opposing the V Corps in its northern sector continued to remain obscure. Although it had suffered heavy losses since first meeting our attacking forces in the SCHMIDT-VOSSENACK area early in November, the 89th Infantry Division still kept its remaining forces on the line along with the remnants of the 275th Infantry Division left behind by its departed staff and cadre. These remnants had been organized into groups such as Kampfgruppe SCHMITZ and Kampfgruppe RAURETH. Under its command were also miscellaneous combat groups such as Kampfgruppe WEINEN, Kampfgruppe WENZEL, and 31 Fortress Machine Gun Battalion which were in the sector generally from the northern Corps boundary to about (F 05 32). Some of the units identified in this sector were used to bolster the strength of the two regiments of the 89th Infantry Division. The greater part of the V Corps front was held by two Volksgrenadier (infantry) divisions: 272nd Infantry Division, and 277th Infantry Division. The former division, which first appeared 9 November on the V Corps front from DOERMITZ (near BERLIN), had its infantry regiments disposed as follows from north to south: 980, 982, 981. The 272nd Infantry Division hold a sector extending approximately from (F 05 32) to the vicinity of ALZEN (K 96 15). With the exception of one battalion of 294 Infantry Regiment (18th Infantry Division) between NEUHOF (F 04 02) and FRAUENKRON (L 07 98), the 277th Infantry Division held the southern sector. Only 990 and 991 Infantry Regiments of the division had been identified, but it was believed that 989 Infantry Regiment was in reserve.

Only scant resistance to our advance of a few hundred yards along the ridge between KLEINHAU (F 05 37) and BRANDENBERG(F 06 34) was offered on 1 December by the enemy who had been outflanked. Enemy fire in this sector was from artillery and mortars only, and over one hundred P/W's were taken. In the VOSSENACK (F 04 32) area, the stubborn defense of strong points built around timber-bunkers and protected by wire entanglements prevented much advance by our troops. A new identification for the day was 272 Fuselier Company occupying positions in the vicinity of (K 99 27).

Our advance toward BRANDENBERG (F 06 34) continued to be slow, retarded by stiff resistance from the enemy and extensive mining on the KLEINHAU-BRANDENBERG road. BRANDENBERG itself was mopped up during the afternoon of 3 December, and an enemy pocket created by our advance into BRANDENBERG was also reduced. A number of prisoners were taken in this action. The enemy offered stiff resistance in the woods west of BRANDENBERG and along the VOSSENACK-BERGSTEIN road where, however, he was driven back about 500 yards. Also on 3 December approximately sixty enemy planes were over the area between 1357 and 1445 hours; nineteen planes were destroyed, with ten more possibly destroyed.

Enemy defenses in the BERGSTEIN sector (F 076 337) must have been surprised by our armored attack on 5 December, for ground opposition to our advance was light. The town of BERGSTEIN was mopped up by mid-afternoon, but, as soon as our forces entered the town, the enemy started shelling it. East of VOSSENACK, enemy elements were mopped up as far as the KALL River, but southeast of VOSSENACK enemy resistance

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determined and prevented our forces from advancing on 5 December.

Three definite counter-attacks were made against BERGSTEIN on 6 December, but the only ground gained was about 200 yards on the southern edge of the town. At 0730 hours 1, 2, and 4 Companies of 980 Infantry Regiment (272nd Infantry Division) participated in an attack from the south against our armored elements in BERGSTEIN. This attack was dispersed at about 1000 hours, but the enemy gained and retained a group of houses. Another attack at 1130 hours was made by the surviving troops of the previous encounter plus 3 Company; it was again supported by the fire of armored vehicles. Troops reported to have come into the BERGSTEIN battle from the vicinity of UNTERMAUBACH (F 09 37) were driven off by 1545 hours. Enemy artillery fire was very intense on BERGSTEIN throughout most of 6 December. Our forces took from the enemy a few hundred yards of ravine in the wooded area southeast of VOSSENACK which had been defended by infantry, mortars, and artillery.

On 7 December our capture of Hill 400 (F 087 338), among other objectives in the BERGSTEIN area, was opposed by only scant enemy resistance. The enemy defenses of the Hill had been entrusted to a special task force created from the companies of 1055 Infantry Regiment (89th Infantry Division). Shortly after 1800 hours, two counter-attacks were made against Hill 400 in each of which 150 enemy infantry participated. Both attacks were supported by considerable mortar and small arms fire, but were repulsed with no penetration by the enemy. The principal enemy force in the BERGSTEIN area was 980 Infantry Regiment, the six rifle companies of which had all been identified since 5 December.

Three more counter-attacks on 8 December were made by the enemy in the BERGSTEIN area. A force of approximately company size made each counter-attack. Heavy artillery and mortar preparations preceded the attacks which came at 0700, 0900, and 1700 hours, but all of them achieved no penetration of our lines, and were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. Stubborn fighting continued in the area southeast of VOSSENACK.

A P/W from 3/982 Infantry Regiment (272nd Infantry Division) who was captured 8 December at (K 987 266) identified I Battalion of the regiment in the HOLLERBROICH area, with the exception of 2 Company fighting in the BERGSTEIN area. Other new identifications made on the 8th U.S. Infantry Division front were 7/943 Infantry Regiment and the assault gun battalion (in reality, company) of the 277th Infantry Division. The 943 Infantry Regiment (353rd Infantry Division) appeared to be astride the V Corps - VII Corps boundary.

Stubborn resistance characterized the enemy's attitude on our northern front during the period 9 December to 12 December. The enemy gave up ground only when forced back after determined defense, and made numerous attempts to recapture points that had been lost. On 11 December he had to abandon his positions west of the ROER River in the vicinity of (F 081 345).

The identification on our northern front of two units (HQ Prcht-Pz Gren Repl Regt and 6 Prcht Regt) formerly under the command of the 85th Infantry Division when it was opposing the Canadians, together with other reports of its presence in the area, was a strong indication that the 85th Infantry Division controlled a sector along our northern front. A battalion of HERMANN GOERING Parachute Panzer Grenadier Replacement and Training Regiment appeared 12 December in the area (F 05 - 38). Of an estimated strength of 320 men, it was thought to have relieved 1055 Infantry Regiment (89th Infantry Division). Also on the same date identifications were made of 6 Parachute Regiment east of KLEINHAU (F 05 37). The number of P/W's taken during this period, from 1 to 12 December was 893.

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Period 13-15 December

The attack of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division along the road to DREIBORN (F 06 17) on 13 December stirred up no enemy resistance until 1200 hours when the main line of resistance was met at (F 001 124); elsewhere, the advance of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division made no contact with the enemy. An identification of 3/277 Field Replacement Battalion indicated that the battalion was holding a sector between I and II Battalions of 991 Infantry Regiment.

The thinly-held enemy lines in the 78th U.S. Infantry Division sector were completely surprised by our attack begun at 0600 hours 13 December without artillery preparation. The enemy defense, however, was stiff at strong-points, and minefields covered by mortar and artillery fire proved to be troublesome, delaying obstacles. Enemy troops largely from 982 Infantry Regiment (with elements of I/980 Infantry Regiment also identified) were cleared from the towns of SIMMERATH (K 98 24), WITZERATH (K 99 25), and ROLLESBROICH (K 995 268), and were forced to retreat over two miles at one point. On our northern front, increased patrolling, and artillery fire were the extent of enemy activity.

Increased enemy resistance and thick defenses of minefields, wire, and tank obstacles considerably limited our advance on 14 December. The most determined resistance was met in KESTERNICH (F 00 24) which was defended from strong-points, cellars, and pillboxes. The enemy likewise offered effective stubborn resistance to our efforts to breach his positions in the MAHLERSCHEID area (F 00 12). A small counter-attack, launched at 1620 hours by an estimated two platoons toward SIMMERATH from the southeast, was broken up by our artillery. Southeast of VOSSENACK, an aggressive enemy combat patrol infiltrated into our lines at (F 055 330) and recovered some ground.

KESTERNICH was cleared of the enemy, in spite of strong resistance, by 1430 hours on 15 December although a few isolated snipers still remained. The enemy soon attempted to regain this lost territory by a counter-attack toward SIMMERATH from the northeast. The counter-attack was made by I Battalion of 753 Infantry Regiment (326th Infantry Division). Prisoners taken during this first contact with the 326th Infantry Division said that their division had arrived in TRIER from Hungary three weeks before, and had marched north by slow stages. These statements corraborated the testimony of a P/W taken 7 December on the VIII U.S. Corps front that the 326th Infantry Division was then in the vicinity of LEUDERSDORF (L 29 44). During this short period from 13 to 15 December 262 P/W's were taken.

Period 16-23 December:

The enemy's counter-offensive directed chiefly against the V and VIII Corps began at 0530 hours on 16 December with a heavy artillery bombardment of both front-line troops and rear area installations.

The first attack in the V Corps sector came at 0530 hours in the vicinity of (F 03 03). It continued to increase in intensity during the day, but made a penetration of only 2000 yards when there was a renewal of the attack at 1700 hours. Enemy attacks in the (F 02 07) area during the morning achieved a penetration of two kilometers on a three kilometer front to a line (L 013 984) (L 016 990) where it probably linked up with enemy forces which had reached LANZERATH (L 00 97).

The counter-offensive was to be the effort of two panzer armies: Sixth SS Panzer Army commanded by SS General (Oberstgruppenfuehrer) Sepp DIETRICH, and Fifth Panzer Army of which the commander was General (Gen D. Pz Truppen) von MANTEUFFEL. The Sixth SS Panzer Army had for many weeks been known to be

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[illegible]entrating in the West, and the divisions composing it (1st SS, 2nd SS, 9th SS, [illegible] SS, and 12th SS Panzer Divisions) had been thought to be located generally between COLOGNE and DUREN although 1st SS Panzer Division was placed as far south [illegible] AUSKERCHEN. The Fifth Panzer Army had previously commanded a sector opposite the U.S. Army and Second British Army. The divisions which eventually appeared with the Fifth Panzer Army had, for the most part, been withdrawn from the line only [illegible] before, provided with some replacements, and refitted with new equipment. These divisions were: 116th Panzer Division, 130th Panzer Lehr Division (previously committed in the SAAR region), 2nd Panzer Division, 9th Panzer Division, and 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. The initial boundary between the two armies was given in a captured map as: (L 08 92) - (L 00 93) - (K 86 95).

The I SS Panzer Corps (12th SS Panzer Division on the north and 1st SS Panzer Division on the south) spear-headed the attack against the V Corps. The [redacted] estimate of the situation prepared by the G-2, 12th SS Panzer Division, indicates that the enemy was completely informed as to our most recent movements and dispositions.

Captured maps and overlays indicated that the proposed routes of advance for the Sixth SS Panzer Army were as follows:

Route A: ROLLER.TH, ROCHER.TH, ELSENBORN, CAMP ELSENBORN, SOURBRODT, MONTE RIGI, PETERSHAUS, Point 598, GALBACH (JALHAY), JEHANSTER, POLLEUR;

Route B: KRINKELT, WINTZFELD, BERG, WEYERTZ, ROBERTVILLE, OVIFAT, LONGFAIR, HOFERAIX, HOCKUI, COKERAYNE, PRIESVILLE, SART;

Route C: LOSHEIMERGRABEN, BULLINGEN, BUTGENBACH, ELSEES, MALMEDY, FRANCORCHAMPS, SPA;

Route D: LOSHEIM, LANZERATH, HONSFELD, SCHOPPEN, FAYMONVILLE, TIRIMONT, LIGNEUVILLE, BELLEVAUX, STAVELOT, [illegible]LEVE;

Route E: [illegible], KRONTHEL, LANDESFELD, [illegible]NDLER, HENNESBACH, HEPPENBACH, LINFELD, HOAN, RECHT, LOGSBELLE, WANNE, TROIS PONTS.

The 12th SS Panzer Division was to use routes A, B, and C, and the 1st SS Panzer Division routes D and E. These routes all proceeded to the MUSE River, but the 1st SS Division met too much resistance to take STAVELOT, and the 12th SS Division got no further than BULLINGEN.

A task force commanded by SS Lt. Colonel PEIPER led the attack by the 1st SS Panzer Division. It included a mixed battalion of tanks (1, 2, 6, and 7 Companies) from 1 SS Panzer Regiment, and men from the HERMANN GOERING Parachute Regiment No. 12 z.b.V. These latter were known definitely to belong to 150 Panzer Brigade commanded by SS Lt. Colonel SKORZENY, the notorious abductor of MUSSOLINI and Admiral HORTHY. The brigade, composed of men speaking English with an American accent had been trained at GRAFENWOEHR, and later provided with U.S. jeeps, C and R cars, trucks, and tanks. They wore American uniforms. The brigade had been divided into three groups, one of which apparently was operating with the 1st SS Panzer Division.

Infantry formations employed initially to support the armored thrusts by 1st SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions were the 18th and 12th Infantry Divisions respectively which, relying upon horse-drawn transportation, were soon not able to keep pace with the motorized columns.

While the progress of the enemy's elite divisions on our southern flank soon indicated the course of his main drive, numerous attacks were made by the Fifth Panzer Army across the OUR River on the VIII U.S. Corps front. The MONSCHAU area in the V Corps sector received heavy artillery concentrations, after which an enemy attack was made at 0615 hours by about 300 men; no penetration was made. Farther north counter-attacks were made at 1200 and 1630 hours on ROLLESBROICH and KESTERNICH, probably by elements of the 272nd Infantry Division, which were repulsed by artillery fire.

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The following divisions were identified for the first time on the VIII U.S. Corps front: 62nd Infantry Division, 116th Panzer Division, 560th Infantry Division, 2nd Panzer Division, and 276th Infantry Division. Divisions previously identified in the line which participated in the attack were: 18th, 26th, 352nd, and 212th Infantry Divisions

17 December

In the early morning hrs of 17 December, many groups of parachutists landed in the rear areas of the V and VII U.S. Corps. According to Lt. Colonel von der HEYDTE, commander, the parachutist force comprised six companies with a total estimated strength of 500 to 800 men. Their mission, which had been given by SS General Sepp DIETRICH, was to cut the EUPEN - MALMEDY highway, and prevent our reinforcements from moving south to block the advance of the enemy. This mission met with no success even at the beginning, for the strong winds so dispersed the men that 50% never reached their rallying point. Isolated groups were rounded up one by one.

Enemy tanks, which had been heard moving northwest along the LOSHEIM (L 03 98) - LOSHEIMERGRABEN (L 00 93) axis, attacked with infantry support at 0500 hours on 17 December, overrunning HONSFELD (P 968 992) at 0600 hours. Moving northwest out of HONSFELD, this force from the 1st SS Panzer Division captured BULLINGEN (K 95 02). Our forces then formed a defensive line approximately 1000 yards north of BULLINGEN - HUNNINGEN (K 97 00).

At the same time, a very strong attack was made at (F 03 07) by elements of the 12th SS Panzer Division which by 0920 hours had infiltrated as far as KRINKELT (K 976 045). Later strong armored thrusts, well supported by infantry, hit the ROCHERATH (K 98 05) - KRINKELT (K 97 04) area. Prior to his repeated attacks, the enemy fired brilliant illuminating flares which temporarily blinded our troops. One of the attacks against ROCHERATH was made at 1845 hours by at least ten Panther tanks from the 12th SS Panzer Regiment with infantry (probably from the 12th Infantry Division) riding in half-tracks. The attack was repulsed after several tanks had been knocked out.

In order to avoid complete encirclement by the advancing forces of the 1st SS Panzer Division, our troops who had held HUNNINGEN (K 97 00) until 1530 hours were withdrawn to a new defense line. After powerful attacks had failed to penetrate this line, enemy tanks moved west and south, by-passing BUCHENBACH (K 91 04).

In the HOFEN (K 95 16) area numerous enemy groups attempted to penetrate our lines by attack and infiltration. A convoy ten miles in length was reported moving through the GEUND - DREIBORN area during the afternoon, a possible indication of an intended thrust through the MONSCHAU (K 94 18) - HOFEN area with EUPEN as its objective. Our air force concentrated on the convoy with good results.

18 December

Having opened a corridor through the American lines during the previous period, the enemy continued to exploit his break-through by pouring armor and infantry through the gap via MURRINGEN (K 98 02) and HUNNINGEN (K 97 00).

The 1st SS Panzer Division, with its advance reconnaissance elements containing American-speaking Germans in U.S. uniforms riding in all types of captured vehicles, continued its drive westward along one of the routes designated to take them to the MEUSE River. Our fighter-bombers reported enemy columns as far west as STAVELOT (K 71 01) where traffic was fanning west and south.

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The 25 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and 12th SS Panzer Regiment of the 12th SS Panzer Division continued the attack against ROCHERATH during the night of 17/18 December. The situation within the town where elements of 990 Infantry Regiment (277th Infantry Division) were contacted remained confused until daylight. Three attacks were made during the morning; all were repulsed. A final attack on KRINKELT from the southeast (where 989 Infantry Regiment was identified) was broken up by artillery fire, and offensive action ceased by 1930 hours.

In the HOFEN - MONSCHAU area four attacks were made in the morning by I Battalion of 751 and I Battalion of 753 Infantry Regiments plus attached engineers; all were repulsed, one penetration made at (K 948 173) being wiped out by 1143 hours. No further offensive action followed until 2240 hours when tanks and infantry launched an unsuccessful attack. A small enemy attack against KESTERNICH (where major units of the 272nd Infantry Division were identified) was also unsuccessful.

Enemy parachutists were again reported dropped in the area, and approximately fifty enemy aircraft operated in the V Corps zone.

A shortening of the V Corps front line was effected on the north by the transfer to the VII U.S. Corps of the following units: 8th Infantry Division, 78th Infantry Division, and 102nd Cavalry Group, but with the attachment of the 30th U.S. Infantry Division and the 82nd U.S. Airborne Div., the Corps front was extended to the west as far as STOUMONT (K 630 027).

19 December

In the STAVELOT area, enemy forces (principally 1st SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment with about thirty tanks) attacked our positions, and captured the town. Heavy fighting continued in this area throughout the day in the course of which the enemy also occupied HOUAT (K 63 03).

Heavy pressure continued to be exerted by the enemy in the STAVELOT area (K 71 01) where he was, nonetheless, held south of the AMBLEVE River. Our troops were successful in blowing the bridge across the river at STAVELOT, and no ground was lost to the enemy. The 1st SS Panzer Division was being held up at STAVELOT in its expected line of advance northeast toward the MEUSE, and continued to push advance elements to the west as far as STOUMONT.

The 3rd Parachute Division, which had just recently been withdrawn from the line in the VII U.S. Corps area, appeared opposite the 1st U.S. Infantry Division. The 5 Parachute Regiment was dug in north of FALMONVILLE (K 869 060), with 8 Parachute Regiment south of MEMBRE (K 84 03). The several attacks and aggressive patrolling in this sector were primarily for the purpose, it was believed, of ascertaining our strength and dispositions.

The intensity of the enemy attacks decreased slightly in the ROCHERATH - KRINKELT area where the 12th SS Panzer Division was attempting to drive directly west through ELSENBORN. Throughout the day groups of 40 to 50 infantry reported by several tanks, repeatedly attacked this area from the east with little success. In each attack, enemy infantry moved with the tanks to a point [illegible] where the tanks stopped and endeavored to cover the infantry advance. Two attacks launched from the vicinity of BUELLINGEN (K 995 019) were also repulsed. Paratroopers, most probably from 150 Panzer Brigade, were fighting as infantry with the division. Only one enemy attack, unsuccessful, was made in the HOFEN area.

About twelve enemy parachutists were reported to have landed the preceding night at (K 923 231). It was believed that by [illegible], our forces had pretty well encircled the bulk of these groups [illegible] in the vicinity

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(K-827 206). Enemy planes were active in the vicinity of Camp Elsenborn (K-20 08) and southward.

At 1500 hours the 82nd U.S. Airborne Div. was attached to the XVIII Airborne Corps, thus relieving the V Corps for responsibility for the defense of the line West of the AMBLEVE River.

20 December

The enemy's determination to gain ground at the northern hinge of the gap he had made in our lines was revealed in the six attacks launched against our positions in that area on 20 December. The first attack which presumably formed in the vicinity of (K-952 020) came at 0615 hours in the vicinity of (K-94 02). Of an estimated company of tanks from 12 SS Panzer Regiment eight were knocked out. Strong attacks launched in the vicinity of (K-96 06) northwest of ROCHERATH were repulsed before any penetration could be made. By the end of 20 December, the III Battalion of 12 SS Panzer Regiment, according to a captured official report, had only ten Mark IV and three Jagdpanther tanks left.

Elements of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division which had massed at (K-9645 0742) made a two-pronged attack at 1730 hours. The strength of the attacking force was estimated at two battalions of infantry and twenty tanks (more likely assault guns since the armored component of the division consisted only of one battalion of assault guns). The attack had been repulsed by 2040 hours; its purpose, according to P/W's, had been to take the high ground around ELSENBORN.

The 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division, was apparently to be a mobile attacking force, and did not replace the 277th Infantry Division which furnished infantry support for the attacks.

Elements of the 3rd Parachute Division, just recently removed from the line in the north where it had suffered heavy casualties, made an attack from the south at (K-886 038). Their mission was to take OBERLEULERTZ (K-886 036), and then move to the west along the road to WEISLES (K-845 030). The attack was repulsed with heavy enemy losses.

On the front of the 30th U.S. Infantry Division (which passed to the control of the XVIII Airborne Corps at 1300 hours), the enemy maintained continuous pressure, especially in the ST.VELOT area where an enemy attack in considerable force was finally stopped.

21 December

A heavy attack, preceded by an intense artillery barrage between 0400 hours and 0415 hours, was launched against our forces in the BUTGENBACH area (K-927 020) by III/25 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and tanks from 12th SS Panzer Division. The initial attacking force suffered very heavy casualties, but other infantry supported by a platoon of tanks pressed on. By 1400 hours all our positions had been restored, and five enemy tanks which had penetrated our positions were destroyed. A possible attack was nipped in the bud when forty enemy infantry (most likely from the 3rd Parachute Division) were observed walking from FAYMONVILLE (K-869 021) toward friendly positions in WEISLES (K-845 030). They disappeared under intense fire.

Strong enemy pressure continued on the other sectors of the V Corps front, but no attacks were reported. Considerable movement including patrols, small groups of tanks, and groups of infantry, was observed throughout the day on the 99th U.S. Infantry Division front. A concentration of from six to twelve tanks with 200 enemy soldiers was observed at 1500 hours northeast of ROCHERATH in the vicinity of (K-967 061) where they were fired upon with good effect. There wa

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Little activity on the 9th U.S. Infantry Division front beyond frequent attempts at infiltration, none successful.

22 December

The commitment of the 2nd SS Panzer Division in the area originally assigned to the Fifth Panzer Army for exploitation indicated that the enemy's plan as known had been changed, perforce, due to the inability of the 1st SS Panzer Division to advance along its projected route. This commitment indicated that the efforts of the Sixth SS Panzer Army might be shifted south due to the failure during six days fighting to open up routes north of BULLINGEN (K-95 02).

The II SS Panzer Corps, composed of the 2nd SS and 9th SS Panzer Divisions, was to follow the initial attacking divisions of the I SS Panzer Corps comprising the 1st SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions. Neither the 9th SS Panzer Division nor 10th SS Panzer Divisions constituting the remainder of the Sixth SS Panzer Army had been identified in action.

The enemy's main effort of 22 December on the V Corps front was again directed against our forces south of BUTGENBACH. The badly battered 25 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment was succeeded in these fiercely fought attempts to break the line by 26 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment which, supported by 25 tanks, launched an attack toward the cross-road at (K-910 030). The enemy's seizure of the high ground at (K-907 034) required the remainder of the day for our troops to restore the position; during this action five enemy tanks were knocked out.

Two attacks on the 9th U.S. Infantry Division front at 1030 hours and at 1715 hours netted for the enemy in the latter attack the high ground in the vicinity of (K-945 115), but the first attack was dispersed by artillery. Both attacks were made by 29 Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division.

23 December

Shortly after daylight, the enemy was dislodged from the hill at (K-94 15) which he had occupied the evening before. In the course of this operation the three regiments of the 277th Infantry Division again suffered heavy casualties. An attempted infiltration and a diversionary attack carried out in the same area at dusk were not successful. Enemy activity in the area was apparently being motivated by two factors: a determination to cut the EISENBORN - KALTERHERBERG road, and ignorance of our exact locations and dispositions. Two lone tanks which moved toward our lines from BULLINGEN were destroyed. The only other enemy activity observed was vehicular movement on the 1st U.S. Infantry Division front. During the Period from 16 to 23 December 1352 P/W's were taken by the V Corps.

Period 24 - 31 December

After 22 December, no further attacks were made by the 12th SS Panzer Div and the sector roughly from MARTZFELD to south of DOM BUTGENBACH was held by 12th Infantry Division. The 12th SS Panzer Division was apparently withdrew the line at this time; it was identified 27 December in the northwestern the enemy salient south of HEUSCOL (P-476 903).

Another attempt at landing enemy parachutists on 24 December was a the men apparently were dropped within their own lines since there was Enemy planes were over the area on two days (24 and 25 December), their being reconnaissance, bombing and strafing; nineteen enemy planes wer

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A coordinated attack by elements of three divisions was launched early 28 December. The missions of the various units were to advance along the railroad to BUTGENBACH, seize the high ground West of WIRTZFELD, and drive us from our positions east of ELSENBORN. In addition to I/27 Infantry Regiment and I/48 Infantry Regiment, a new unit, 352 Infantry Regiment (246th Infantry Division) was identified as the attacking force on the north. A large scale artillery barrage preceded the attacks which were all ended prematurely by well-placed artillery fire. The second regiment of the 246th Infantry Division was identified on 29 December, and the appearance of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division West of BASTOGNE indicated that all armored units had left the V Corps sector where the enemy had apparently decided to hold defensive positions with infantry. During this last period of the month 104 P/W's were taken by the V Corps.

PART II - SECTION ACTIVITY

1 December

a. Captain Bartlett returned to duty with section after having spent several days with the G-2 Section, 8th U.S. Infantry Division.

2 December

a. Captain Teofani, S-2, 102nd Cavalry Group, visited the section.
b. SO, F-79, MIS Headquarters (Fwd), APO 887, dated 2 December attached MII Team 416-G to the G-2 Section, V Corps Headquarters. Members of the team are as follows:

1st Lt. Manuel J. Pamintuan	01305301
S/Sgt Carl J. Zotter	36130395
T/5 Kurt Haas	37131166
T/5 Lester C. Engelking	36303989
Pvt. Richard P Lachenauer	32985153

3 December

a. Captain Cook, S-2, 2nd Provisional Ranger Battalion, visited the section.
b. GO, 78, V Corps Headquarters, dated 3 December, awarded the Bronze Star to Captain Bartlett.

4 December

a. Colonel Ford, accompanied by Sgt Grigaitis, visited the 8th Infantry Division.

5 December

a. Colonel Carter, G-2, VII U.S. Corps, visited the section with Colonel Bishop.
b. SO, F-82, MIS Headquarters (Fwd), APO 887, dated 5 December, promoted the following personnel of IPW Team No. 11:

S/Sgt Mendel Weinberg to T/Sgt
T/3 Fred R. Zander to S/Sgt
T/5 John H. Horn to T/4
Pvt. Robert D. Pfeifer to T/5

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6 December

a. Lt. Col. Wilson, G-2, 78th Infantry Division, visited the section.
b. Lt. Col. Christensen, G-2, 2nd Infantry Division, visited the section.

7 December

a. Pfc. Howard H. Triest, ASN 36865227, was attached to MII Team No. 407-G.

9 December

a. Colonel Ford visited the 78th Infantry Division accompanied by Sgt Grigaitis

10 December

a. Colonel Ford, accompanied by Sgt Grigaitis, visited the 99th Inf Div.

12 December

a. Colonel Ford visited the 8th Infantry Division.
b. Colonel Batchelor, G-2, XXI U.S. Corps, and Captain Carr of the same headquarters began an extended period as observers.
c. M/Sgt Bjerke of PI Team No. 5 was hospitalized because of illnes, and was subsequently replaced.

14 December

a. Lt. Col. Low, First Army Headquarters, visited the section.

15 December

a. SO, F-92, MIS Headquarters (Fwd), APO 887, dated 15 December, assigned 2nd Lt. Fredrick G. Engelmann 0555151 AUS to MII Team No. 416-G.

16 December

a. M/Sgt Forczek was hospitalized because of illness.

17 December

a. Pvt. Jones and Pvt. Houdek were promoted to T/5.

19 December

a. SO, F-96, MIS Headquarters (Fwd), APO 887, dated 19 December, relieved 2nd Lt. John G. Lownds from MII Team No. 407-G, and assigned 2nd Lt. Otto Verber to the same team. Physical change, however, took place on 25 December.

20 December

a. The Commanding General of the 30th U.S. Infantry Division visited the section.

23 December

a. Lt. Col. McFarland, G-2, 5th U.S. Armored Division, visited the section.
b. Captain Cook, S-2, 2nd Provisional Ranger Battalion, visited the section.

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24 December

a. Colonel Batchler and Captain Carr of XXI U.S. Corps Headquarters departed after spending twelve days with the section as observers.

28 December

a. M/Sgt Forczek returned to duty with the section after having been hospitalized for eleven days.

THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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Auth: CG, V Corps
Date: 7 Jan 1946
Initials

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305, U.S. ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

G-1
OPERATIONS REPORT
No. 7

1 December - 31 December 1944.

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MAPS: GSGS 4042 - BRUSSELS-LIEGE, Sheet No. 3, 1/250000.

I. GENERAL.

1. Organization.

No change.

II. STATION LIST AND STRENGTH OF COMMAND.

1. Divisions.

Division	Period of Attachment or Assignment	Assigned Strength 1 Dec 44 O	Assigned Strength 1 Dec 44 EM	Assigned Strength as of 31 Dec or Last Strength O	Assigned Strength as of 31 Dec or Last Strength EM
1st Infantry Division	17 - 31 Dec	13214		807	13181
2nd Infantry Division	12 - 31 Dec	889	13248	791	11596
8th Infantry Division	1 - 18 Dec	809	12404	12946	
9th Infantry Division *	1-6 and 18-31 Dec	873	13160	833	13026
30th Infantry Division	17 - 19 Dec	14003		13913	
78th Infantry Division	5 - 18 Dec	801	13116	736	11417
82nd Airborne Division	19 Dec	12362		12362	
99th Infantry Division	1 - 31 Dec	826	12935	692	10031
CC "R", 5th Armored Div	1 - 21 Dec	168	2758	2410	
5th Armored Division	22 - 31 Dec	623	8852	612	9228
CC "A", 3rd Armored Div	19 - 20 Dec	3688		3661	
CC "B", 9th Armored Div	13 - 14 Dec	179	2903	179	2903

* 9th Inf Div relieved from attachment to V Corps 7 Dec and reattached 18 Dec.

2. Corps Troops.

Unit	Assigned Strength as of 1 Dec, or Date Joined O	Assigned Strength as of 1 Dec, or Date Joined EM	Date Joined	Assigned Strength as of 31 Dec or Last Strength O	Assigned Strength as of 31 Dec or Last Strength EM	Date of Relief
Hq & Hq Co, V Corps	107	389		101	341	
MP Plat						
Atchd Med Det						
V Corps Air Sup Party						
506th QM Car Co	1	25		1	24	
Flight A, 153rd Ln Sq	1	11		1	10	
16th Ord Bomb Disp Sq	1	6		1	6	
17th Ord Bomb Disp Sq	1	6		1	6	
63rd AGF Band	1	28		1	31	
Det D, 165th Sig Photo Co	1	16		1	17	
CIC Det 205	1	10		1	10	
APU 137	1	11		1	11	
APU 305	1	12		1	12	
264th MRU	3	40		3	45	
8th Fin Disb Sect	3	17		3	17	
15th Fin Disb Sect	3	17		3	18	
803rd MP Co (Corps)	5	172		5	171	
564th Signal Bn	37	898		38	910	
3250th Sig Service Co	7	128		8	117	
2nd Special Service Co	5	104		5	102	
289lst Engr T I T	1	3		1	3	
2nd Ranger Inf Bn	37	524		32	393	18 Dec
86th Chemical Bn	41	574		45	545	
V Corps Artillery, HqHq Btry	26	92		27	86	
17th FA Obsn Bn	26	488		28	477	
147th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	18	77		18	77	
190th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	15	76		16	78	
406th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	18	78		18	78	
18th FA Bn	31	441	1-3 and 20-24 Dec	31	438	
62nd Armd FA Bn	34	480		35	481	
764th FA Bn	33	448		31	453	
186th FA Bn #	32	548		32	478	
187th FA Bn #	32	484		32	487	21 Dec
180th FA Bn #	30	527		30	510	
200th FA Bn #	33	526		35	512	

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Unit	Assigned Strength as of 1 Dec, or Date Joined		Date Joined	Assigned Strength as of 31 Dec or Last Strength		Date of Relief
	Officers	Men		Officers	Men	
196th FA Bn	32	435	3 Dec	32	435	
268th FA Bn	26	456	27 Dec	28	436	
272nd FA Bn	29	492		29	492	2 Dec
285th FA Obsn Bn, Btry A	6	143	6 Dec	7	141	19 Dec
400th FA Bn (Armd)	35	484			515	19 Dec
70th FA Bn		478	17 Dec		478	18 Dec
751st FA Bn	32	447	17 Dec	31	445	
778th FA Bn	32	478	23 Dec	30	457	17 Dec
941st FA Bn #	32	487		32	484	
953rd FA Bn	37	487		36	490	
955th FA Bn #	33	486		32	486	
987th FA Bn	29	456		29	450	
997th FA Bn	29	542		29	541	
3rd TD Gp, Hq & Hq Co	15	55		17	61	
612th TD Bn	37	725	12 Dec	33	569	
628th TD Bn, Co C	6	143		7	145	24 Dec
634th TD Bn		623	17 Dec		611	
644th TD Bn	34	587		36	604	
703rd TD Bn		648	17 Dec		637	24 Dec
801st TD Bn	33	724		29	661	
811th TD Bn, Co A	7	148	13 Dec	7	148	16 Dec
817th TD Bn	35	712	5 Dec	35	727	18 Dec
823rd TD Bn		738	17 Dec		718	21 Dec
893rd TD Bn #	34	589		34	590	22 Dec
899th TD Bn	35	589	1-6 and 18-31Dec	36	589	
3rd Armored Gp, Hq & Hq Co	18	86		18	86	
7th Armored Gp, Hq & Hq Co		98	19 Dec		98	19 Dec
709th Tank Bn	43	663		45	659	18 Dec
741st Tank Bn	40	661	12 Dec	38	609	
743rd Tank Bn		720	17 Dec		714	21 Dec
745th Tank Bn		727	17 Dec		708	
746th Tank Bn	46	665	1-6 and 18-31Dec	38	627	
102nd Cav Gp (Mecz), HqtHq Tr	16	59		16	59	18 Dec
17th Cav Recon Sq (Mecz)		712	19 Dec		712	19 Dec
38th Cav Recon Sq (Mecz)	40	702		*34	551	
102nd Cav Recon Sq (Mecz)	44	710		42	705	18 Dec
11th AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	13	52		13	52	9 Dec
18th AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	11	55	17 Dec	11	55	
115th AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	11	53		11	52	
103rd AAA AW Bn		777	17 Dec		781	
134th AAA AW Bn	32	689	1-9 and 17-31Dec		723	
376th AAA Gun Bn	37	698	1-6 and 18-31Dec	39	752	
387th AAA Gun Bn	38	632		40	651	
413th AAA Gun Bn	30	694	1-9 and 17-31Dec		714	
440th AAA AW Bn	39	757		39	757	9 Dec
445th AAA AW Bn	36	748		37	748	18 Dec
460th AAA AW Bn #	38	756		37	731	
461st AAA AW Bn #	39	756		37	739	
462nd AAA AW Bn	40	750	12 Dec	40	750	
531st AAA AW Bn		777	17 Dec		776	21 Dec
535th AAA AW Bn	40	761		39	727	
602nd AAA Gun Bn		626	17 Dec		626	30 Dec
639th AAA AW Bn		785	27 Dec		774	
863rd AAA AW Bn		775	17 Dec		766	
1121st Engr Gp, Hq & Hq Co	16	66		16	65	
1171st Engr Gp, Hq & Hq Co	18	65		18	64	
20th Engr (C) Bn	29	595		33	595	
112th Engr (C) Bn #	32	598		32	584	
146th Engr (C) Bn	29	590		32	583	
254th Engr (C) Bn #	33	603		31	529	
1340th Engr (C) Bn	27	589		29	571	
502nd Engr L Pontoon Co	5	204		5	200	
508th Engr L Pontoon Co	6	205		6	200	24 Dec
610th Engr L Equip Co	4	135		4	132	
668th Engr Topo Co	5	114		5	115	
990th Engr Treadway Br Co	4	132		4	130	

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Unit	Assigned Strength as of 1 Dec, or Date Joined O	Assigned Strength as of 1 Dec, or Date Joined EM	Date Joined	Assigned Strength as of 31 Dec, or Last Strength O	Assigned Strength as of 31 Dec, or Last Strength EM	Date Relieved
Third Medical Bn, HqHHq Det	7	21		7	21	
[illegible] Medical Coll Co	5	97		5	95	
[illegible]rd Medical Coll Co	5	96		4	86	
[illegible]th Medical Clearing Co	13	100		13	99	
[illegible]th QM Bn, Hq & Hq Det	7	22		7	22	
[illegible]th QM Laundry Co	5	298		5	263	
[illegible]th QM Graves Reg Co	6	120		6	121	
[illegible]th QM Service Co	4	180		4	200	
[illegible]th QM Truck Co	5	126		5	135	
[illegible]nd QM Truck Co	5	129		5	129	
Prov Mil Govt Police Force Bn **						

* 38th Cav Recon Sq (Mech) less Troop "A" from 22 - 31 Dec.

** No assigned strength shown, inasmuch as strength of detachments comprising the Provisional Military Government Police Force Battalion is included in figures of parent units.

/ Denotes detachment with Provisional Military Government Police Force Battalion

III. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS.

1. Command Post.

1 December thru 31 December 1944 - Bupem, Belgium (K 806260)

2. Inclosures, Collecting Points, PWs and Stragglers - Corps.

a. Inclosures.

1 Dec 1944 - Vicinity Herbesthal (K 745335).
28 Dec 1944 - Vicinity Huy (K 229160).

b. Collecting Points.

1 Dec 1944 - Bupem (K 797275).

c. Straggler Lines.

No straggler lines were maintained. However, 228 stragglers were processed through the Corps Collecting Point during the period, which was located at Bupem (K 745335).

IV.. CASUALTIES AND RETURNS.

1. Consolidation of Estimated Losses.

a. Attack Phase - 1 December (D / 178) to 7 December (D / 184).

Unit	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Battle Casualties	Sick & Non-Battle Casualties	Total Casualties
8th Inf Div	97	996	106	57	1056	548	1604
9th Inf Div	3	18	0	0	21	172	193
99th Inf Div	11	60	-12	8	67	131	198
CC "R", 9th Armd Div	33	156	29	0	218	110	328
Corps Troops	49	129	2	1	181	232	413
TOTAL	193	1159	125	66	1543	1193	2736

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b. [illegible] – [illegible] (1 [illegible]) to [illegible] (1 [illegible])

	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
TOTAL	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

c. Defense Phase – 16 December (D + 103) to 31 December (D + [illegible])

1st Inf Div	41	340	86	0	466	48	[illegible]
2nd Inf Div	[illegible]	610	478	73	1162	[illegible]	[illegible]
8th Inf Div	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
9th Inf Div	48	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
106th Inf Div	9	42	38	0	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
78th Inf Div	[illegible]	245	447	0	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
87th Inf Div	44	1139	378	128	2149	[illegible]	[illegible]
82nd A/B Div	1	0	0	0	1	0	[illegible]
CC "A", 3rd Armd Div	0	2	11	0	13	3	[illegible]
CC "B", 9th Armd Div	0	2	1	0	3	[illegible]	[illegible]
5th Armd Div	22	71	19	0	112	154	[illegible]
CC "B", 9th Armd Div	0	0	0	0	0	0	[illegible]
Corps Troops	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
TOTAL	773	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

d. Consolidation of Published Losses – 1 December 1944 thru 31 December 1944

1st Inf Div	41	340	86	0	466	48	[illegible]
2nd Inf Div	137	1137	482	73	1829	1032	[illegible]
8th Inf Div	187	1278	277	97	1739	1132	[illegible]
9th Inf Div	28	223	34	1	286	578	[illegible]
106th Inf Div	9	42	38	0	87	38	[illegible]
78th Inf Div	101	730	238	0	1069	732	[illegible]
87th Inf Div	438	1635	371	136	2570	1140	[illegible]
82nd A/B Div	1	0	0	0	1	0	[illegible]
CC "A", 3rd Armd Div	0	2	11	0	13	3	[illegible]
CC "B", 9th Armd Div	42	177	38	1	260	212	[illegible]
5th Armd Div	22	71	19	0	112	154	[illegible]
CC "B", 9th Armd Div	0	0	0	0	0	2	[illegible]
Corps Troops	139	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
TOTAL	1172	4137	2134	287	9770	[illegible]	[illegible]

NOTE: 1st Infantry Division attached to V Corps, 13-31 Dec 1944.
2nd Infantry Division attached to V Corps, 15-31 Dec 1944.
8th Infantry Division attached to V Corps, 1-18 Dec 1944.
9th Infantry Division attached to V Corps, 1-5 and 16-31 Dec 1944.
106th Infantry Division attached to V Corps 19-31 Dec 1944.
78th Infantry Division attached to V Corps, 1-18 Dec 1944.
87th Infantry Division attached to V Corps, 1-31 Dec 1944.
82nd Airborne Division attached to V Corps, 19 Dec 1944, only.
CC "A", 3rd Armored Division, attached to V Corps, 16-31 Dec 1944.
CC "B", 9th Armored Division, attached to V Corps, 1-31 Dec 1944.
5th Armored Division attached to V Corps, 22-31 Dec 1944.
CC "B", 9th Armored Division, attached to V Corps, 13-16 Dec 1944.

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[illegible] AND REPORTS (cont'd)

[illegible] Casualty Reports.

Due to the large number of attachments and changes in assignments of units which have occurred during the current period, bubble casualty reports are not available at this time but will be attached as a supplement to this report.

[illegible] INTELLIGENCE.

1. General.

Ninth U.S. Army operated the only cavalry serving V Corps during the period, at Mont-Chapel, (E795952).

2. Collecting Points.

a. Collecting Points were as follows:

(1) CM Co, vicinity of [illegible] (E785325) from 1-12 December.
(2) CM Co, vicinity of [illegible] (E795295) from 12-31 December.
(3) Coll. Pt. #1, vicinity of [illegible] (E916040) from 1-17 Dec.
(4) Coll. Pt. #1, vicinity of [illegible] (E863110) from 17-31 Dec.
(5) Coll. Pt. #2, vicinity [illegible] (E920290) from 1-20 December.
(6) Coll. Pt. #3, vicinity Camp [illegible] (E961084) from 19-24 Dec.
(7) Coll. Pt. #3, vicinity [illegible] (E863039) from 24-31 Dec.

VI. [illegible].

1. Due to the unexpectedly heavy drain on the reinforcement stockage in November (see Operations Report No. 6) the available supply of reinforcements was depleted to such an extent that it was initially anticipated that no reinforcements would be available until 1 January 1945. However, subsequent to the German breakthrough which occurred on 16 December, reinforcements were made available during the latter part of the month:

2. The following table, based on information extracted from Daily Estimated Loss Reports, shows the number of reinforcements received during the month of December:

Division	1-7	8-15	16-31	TOTAL
1st Infantry Division			1999	1999
2nd Infantry Division		22	1708	1730
9th Infantry Division	143		1197	1340
8th Infantry Division	572	1516	95	2183
30th Infantry Division			9	9
78th Infantry Division			5	5
99th Infantry Division	49	44	280	373
5th Armored Division	74	158	624	856
CC "B", 9th Armored Division		2		2
TOTAL - DIVISIONS	838	1744	5917	8539
Corps Troops				
Hq & Hq Co, V Corps			4	4
Det D, 165th Sig Photo Co			3	3
V Corps Arty, Hq & Hq Btry		1	4	5
17th FA Obsn Bn	1	1	2	4
106th FA Bn	1			1
62nd Armd FA Bn	1			1
964th FA Bn	1	6	1	8
187th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry			2	2
196th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry		2	1	3
186th FA Bn		2	1	3
187th FA Bn	1	2	1	4
190th FA Bn			9	9
196th FA Bn	9	3	5	17
200th FA Bn			2	2
752nd FA Bn			2	12
953rd FA Bn		4	6	10

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Unit	1-7	8-15	16-31	TOTAL
[illegible]			4	4
[illegible]		2	5	7
[illegible] Bn, Army A		1		1
[illegible]	1	1	5	7
[illegible] Hq & Hq Co		4		4
[illegible]			30	30
[illegible]		24	11	35
[illegible]			14	14
[illegible]	16	12	56	84
[illegible]			4	4
[illegible]	1	7	6	14
[illegible]		19	23	42
[illegible]		6		6
[illegible]			10	10
[illegible]	26	32		58
[illegible]			23	23
[illegible]			22	22
[illegible]			32	32
[illegible]			11	11
[illegible]			7	7
[illegible]	1	7	1	9
[illegible]			12	12
[illegible]		2	8	10
[illegible]		1	5	6
[illegible]		2	5	7
[illegible] (c) Bn	18	11	8	37
[illegible] (c) Bn	3	1	9	13
[illegible] (c) Bn	15	2	14	31
[illegible] (c) Bn	2		5	7
[illegible] Eighth Pontoon Co	1		1	2
[illegible] Eighth Equip Co	1			1
[illegible] Army Air Co			2	2
[illegible] Hq, Hq & Hq Co	1			1
[illegible] (c) Bn	7	19	12	38
[illegible] Signal Bn	24	14	7	45
[illegible] Shell Co			2	2
[illegible] Air Co			1	1
[illegible] Bn	1			1
[illegible] Truck Co	1		2	3
[illegible] Truck Co			1	1
[illegible] Hq	14	78	9	101
[illegible] Hq	20	10		30
[illegible] Bn	7	7	46	60
[illegible] Ranger Inf Bn	1	6		9
TOTAL - CORPS TROOPS	184	298	470	952
GRAND TOTAL - DIVISIONS AND CORPS TROOPS	1042	2042	6387	9471

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VII. PRISONERS OF WAR.

UNIT	1-7 Dec	8-15 Dec	16-31 Dec	TOTALS
1st Infantry Division *			92	92
2nd Infantry Division **		1	270	271
8th Infantry Division ***	998	214	22	[illegible]
9th Infantry Division ****			231	231
30th Infantry Division *****			6	6
78th Infantry Division #		205	235	440
99th Infantry Division	6	24	171	201
82nd Airborne Division ##			1	1
CC "A", 3rd Armored Division ###			1	1
CC "B", 9th Armored Division ####				-
5th Armored Division	52		214	266
Corps Troops	8	7	214	[illegible]
TOTALS	664	451	1456	2571

* 1st Infantry Division attached to V Corps 17 Dec. 1944.
** 2nd Infantry Division attached to V Corps 12 Dec. 1944.
***8th Infantry Division relieved attachment to V Corps, 18 Dec. 1944.
****9th Infantry Division attached to V Corps, 1-6 Dec and 16-31 Dec 1944.
*****30th Infantry Division attached to V Corps, 17-21 Dec. 1944.
#78th Infantry Division attached to V Corps, 5-18 Dec. 1944.
82nd Airborne Division attached to V Corps, 19 Dec. 1944 (only).
CC "A", 3rd Armored Division attached to V Corps, 16-21 Dec. 1944.
CC "B", 9th Armored Division attached to V Corps, 12-16 Dec. 1944.

VIII. PROMOTIONS.

1. Status of Promotions and Appointments.

	Recd at Hq V Corps	Forwarded to First U.S. Army	Pending at Hq V Corps	Returned or Disapproved by Hq V Corps	Held by First US Army	Pending at Ninth US Army	Officers Promoted or Appointed
APPOINTMENTS 1-31 Dec 44							
Battlefield							
Corps less Divisions	29	25	3	5	1	7	23
Divisions	27	16	1	15	5	9	9
TOTAL	56	41	4	20	6	16	32
Regular							
Corps less Divisions	20	11	0	9	0	12	8
Divisions	19	19	0	0	0	19	0
TOTAL	39	30	0	9	0	31	8
PROMOTIONS 1-31 Dec 44							
Battlefield							
Corps less Divisions	36	36	1	3	0	14	33
Divisions	104	81	17	7	0	53	44
TOTAL	140	117	18	10	0	67	77
Regular							
Corps less Divisions	11	7	0	4	0	7	5
Divisions	48	44	0	4	0	45	3
TOTAL	59	51	0	8	0	52	8

2. Reclassification, Reassignment and Demotions.

	Brig Gen	Col	Lt Col	Maj	Capt	1st Lt	2nd Lt	WO	TOTALS
Reclassification			2		3*	5	1		11
Reassignments					NONE				
Demotions					NONE				
TOTAL	-	-	2	-	3	5	1	-	11

* One captain was sent to another Corps for processing of reclassification proceedings.

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II. MORALE.

1. Unit Citations.

a. Approved in December:

1st Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division.
Medical Detachment, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division.

b. Recommended in December: None.

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2. Decorations and Awards.

Unit	Medal of Honor		DSC		DSM		Legion of Merit		Silver Star		Bronze Star		Soldier's Medal		Air Medal		TOTALS	
	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded
V Corps, Hq & Hq Co					1		11				1	11					13	11
V Corps Arty					1							2			4		1	6
1st Inf Div	3	1	2		1		1			171		1279		2	4		7	1457
2nd Inf Div			1	6			2			37		95			16		3	154
4th Inf Div			1	1			6										7	1
5th Armd Div			2	1						20		58					2	79
9th Inf Div			1	4			1			62		116			4		2	186
28th Inf Div			2		1		3										6	
29th Inf Div							4										4	
99th Inf Div										11		58						69
2nd Ranger Inf Bn												2						2
3rd TD Gp												1						1
20th Engr (C) Bn								1				1						2
38th Cav Ron Sq												7						7
56th Sig Bn							1					6					1	6
58th Armd FA Bn										1								1
62nd Armd FA Bn											1	7			3		1	10
86th Cml Bn									1	2		11					1	13
102nd CAV Gp							1										1	
103rd AAA AW Bn										2		18						20
76th FA Bn															4			4
115th AAA Gp							1										1	
146th Engr (C) Bn			1	1						7		13					1	21
187th FA Gp										1					2			3
187th FA Bn										1		2			2			5
190th FA Gp										2								2
190th FA Bn															4			4
200th FA Bn												1		5				6
205th CIC Det												2						2
254th Engr (C) Bn											1	5					1	5
376th AAA AW Bn												22						22
400th FA Bn (Armd)				1						2		22			4			29
413th AAA Gun Bn												4						4
460th AAA AW Bn											1	1					1	1

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2. Decorations and Awards. (Cont'd)

Unit	Medal of Honor		DSC		DSM		Legion of Merit		Silver Star		Bronze Star		Soldier's Medal		Air Medal		TOTAL	
	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded
461st AAA AW Bn												2						2
628th TD Bn			1									1					1	1
612th TD Bn												4				1		5
629th TD Bn												1						1
634th TD Bn										17		21						38
741st Tank Bn			1									1					1	1
745th Tank Bn										7		37						44
746th Tank Bn												12						12
747th Tank Bn												1						1
751st FA Bn																1		1
773rd TD Bn	2																2	
801st TD Bn												1						1
893rd TD Bn										3	1	12					1	15
899th TD Bn										3		8						11
941st FA Bn												6				2		8
955th FA Bn																1		1
987th FA Bn			2							1		1				1	2	5
1340th Engr (C) Bn										4		1						5
3250th Sig Serv Co												1						1
TOTALS	5	1	14	14	4	-	31	1	1	354	5	1854	-	7	-	53	60	2284

NOTE: "Pending" columns as of 31 December 1944; "Awarded" columns are for the month of December 1944.

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IX. MORALE.

3. Postal.

a. During the period APO 305 serviced 82 units comprising approximately 28,000 troops from its location in LIMBOURG-DOLHAIN, BELGIUM. A Section was detached and sent to SUPRM to service the Recreation Center and V Corps Forward Echelon. This section (Army Postal Unit #167) provided excellent facilities to this large group and relieved the APO of considerable volume and permitted better operating facilities for both units.

b. The following summary indicates the scope of postal activity during the period of this report:

Received from the 26th PRS at LIEGE, BELGIUM, 12,932 sacks of parcel mail and 952 pouches of first class mail.

Dispatched 3,239 sacks of parcels and 733 pouches of first class mail.

1,002 pieces of registered mail was delivered and 633 pieces dispatched.

6,215 money orders were issued to the amount of $245,649.67.

438 money orders were paid to the amount of $20,233.26

Sale of stamped paper amounted to $18,625.23

c. By Organization Order No. 91, Hq. ETOUSA, dated 10 December 1944, the 305th APO was reorganized under T/O & E 12-605. This reorganization increased the strength of the unit eight men.

d. Due to the rush of Christmas package mail, first class matter was delayed. For the period a decrease of 50% was noted. This was held back and should be received during the next period.

4. Religious Activities.

a. At the close of the period of this report there were 88 Chaplains with units assigned or attached to this Corps. During the period two Chaplains were killed and four wounded and evacuated. At this time there are eight Chaplain vacancies within the command. Three vacancies are for Catholic and five for Protestant Chaplains.

b. The following compilation indicates the scope of Chaplains' activities during the month:

NUMBER	SERVICES	ATTENDANCE
1,001	Sunday Services	61,663
1,098	Weekday Services	30,690
13,339	Confessions	
12,453	Communions (all faiths)	13,043
753	Hospital Visits (patients contacted)	
3	Baptisms	
14,740	Personal Conferences	
4	Extreme Unctions given	
517	Funerals	1,810
16	Lectures	
578	Testaments distributed	
245	Jewish Scriptures distributed	
65	Group discussions	
1,352	Rosaries distributed	
690	Religious pamphlets distributed (all denominations)	

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5. Red Cross.

a. The main difficulty experienced by the Field Director, since the invasion of the continent, has been the lack of a "rotation" policy that would permit soldiers returning to the States in connection with family or dependency problems. In December a Theater policy was announced for the "rotation" of certain personnel to the States. The plan provided that one of the requisites for participation be over 6 months service in combat areas and adequate proof of serious emergency situations at home requiring the presence of the soldier.

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IX. MORALE (Cont'd)

5. Red Cross (Cont'd)

b. The Red Cross Field Director by advance planning and close liaison was able to furnish files of "adequate proof" to permit 20 of the more chronic cases to participate in the rotation plan. The total Corps quota for all types was 43.

c. The following statistics indicate the Field Director's activities in "home problems" work during the period:

110 cases brought forward from previous period.
156 new and reopened cases.
10 recurrent cases.
276 cases opened during the period.
123 cases closed by end of period.
153 cases pending at end of period.

d. An analysis of closed cases indicates the following types:

Personal Problems	10
Family Problems	27
Dependency Discharge	1
Parole	0
Financial	4
Health and Welfare	92
Furloughs	21
Medical	1
Allotments	5

e. The Red Cross Field Director distributed over 1,000 sweaters, 600 pair of gloves and 400 scarfs to needy personnel during the period. Priority in distribution was given to the Cavalry, Chemical Bn and Artillery units. Christmas boxes were distributed to personnel of all field hospitals in the Corps sector and a check made of distribution and supply available in the three evacuation hospitals in the sector.

6. Special Service.

During the first half of the month Special Service activities continued on a large scale with particular emphasis on the Recreation Center. Recreational activities at the Center were highlighted by guest appearances of Marlene Dietrich and a professional baseball group which included Mel Ott, Frankie Frisch, Dutch Leonard and Bucky Walters. On the 17th of December, the big push of the Germans caused a cessation of recreational activities necessitating the hasty evacuation of Marlene Dietrich, the Clubmobile Girls (ARC), the baseball group and the Share Show, and the closing of the Recreation Center. At the end of the month activities in this field were still dormant. On 20 December, one of the Clubmobile girls, Ann K. Cullen, was killed by enemy action while a patient in the 77th Evacuation hospital. Recreational trips to Aupem and Paris provided relaxation to a total of 7,082 officers and enlisted men until cancelled on the 18th by Army order. A breakdown of the allotments appears below:

Paris		Aupem	
8th Inf Div	942	8th Inf Div	1760
9th Inf Div	287	9th Inf Div	330
99th Inf Div	-	99th Inf Div	621
5th Armd Div	217	5th Armd Div	820
Corps Troops	434	Corps Troops	1450
TOTAL	2080		5002

Summarized below is a breakdown of Special Service activities during the period covered by this report:

MOVIES

SPECIAL SERVICE COMPANY

Number of shows	310
Number of titles	20
Total attendance	93,434

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IX. MORALE (Cont'd)

b. Special Services (Cont'd)

UNIT PROJECTORS AND FILM LIBRARY

Number of shows	1,244
Number of titles	34
Total attendance	198,300

TOTAL OF ALL MOVIES

Number of shows	1,554
Number of titles	54
Total attendance	291,731

USO SHOWS

Number of performances	45
Total attendance	29,350

G.I. SHOWS

Number of performances	43
Total attendance	11,975

CLUBMOBILES

Number of doughnuts served	390,174
Cups of coffee served	109,199

BAND CONCERTS

Number of concerts	31
Total attendance	29,500

EQUIPMENT ISSUED

Council books	660
Radios	3

X. PROVOST MARSHAL.

1. The following Military Police units were available to V Corps during the period of this report:

Military Police Platoon, Headquarters Company V Corps
803rd Military Police Company (Corps)
428th Military Police Escort Guard Company
Military Police Platoon, 99th Infantry Division (1 Dec to 31 Dec)
" " " 8th Infantry Division (1 Dec to 18 Dec)
" " " 9th Infantry Division (18 Dec to 31 Dec)
" " " 78th Infantry Division (7 Dec to 18 Dec)
" " " 2nd Infantry Division (12 Dec to 31 Dec)
" " " 1st Infantry Division (17 Dec to 31 Dec)
" " " 5th Armored Division (21 Dec to 31 Dec)

2. There were no serious problems in the enforcement of order and discipline encountered by the Corps Military Police during the period.

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2. PROVOST MARSHAL (Cont'd)

3. Consolidated report of delinquencies for the period:

UNIT	Off Limits	Transporting Civilians	Fraternizing	Speeding	No Pass	Wrong Direction One-Way Road	Passing Convoy	Officer Driving Vehicle	Parking on MSR	No Trip Ticket	Unattended Vehicle	In Town After Curfew	AWOL	TOTALS
V Corps	1	2		10	8	14	2	1	13	21	15	3	1	91
3rd Armd Div										1				1
4th Inf Div													2	2
9th Armd Div						6			2	14	6			28
8th Inf Div	1					17				7	1	1	6	33
28th Inf Div	1			2					5		2	1	2	13
78th Inf Div						2					2			4
99th Inf Div	2			1										3
1st US Army	2		3	12		4	1		3	10	16	11	3	67
TOTALS	7	2	3	25	8	43	2	1	23	53	43	16	16	246

4. Location of Corps Rear and Forward Boundaries for the period were:

a. 1 December 1944 - Corps Forward Boundary - Corps left (North) boundary at EUPEN along M-28 and M-27 at (K 831035) thence M-27 to M-32 vicinity of WAIMES, all exclusive to divisions. M-32 through BUTGENBACH to RJ at (K 931022) to RJ at (K 931008), thence M-27 to Corps right (South) boundary, all inclusive to divisions.

b. 23 December 1944 - Corps Forward Boundary - Corps left (North) boundary at (K 852261) - SW to (K 831240) - SW to Hwy M-28 (K 801235) - South along Hwy M-28 to junction with Hwy M-27 (K 805162) - SW to SART (K 720150), all inclusive to Corps.

c. 1 December 1944 - Corps Rear Boundary - From left (North) boundary at VERVIERS along main road to HEUSY - THEUX - SPA - FRANCORSHAMPS - STAVELOT - (towns and road exclusive to Corps) - thence along STAVELOT - VIELSALM road (town and road inclusive to Corps) - as far as Corps right (South) boundary.

d. 10 December 1944 - Corps Rear Boundary - From Corps left (North) boundary at EUPEN along M-28 to MALMEDY (towns and road inclusive to Corps) - thence along HAUSTA - MISTA - STAVELOT road (towns and road exclusive to Corps) - thence TROIS PONTS - GRAND HALLEUX - VIELSALM road (town and road inclusive to Corps) as far as Corps right (South) boundary.

e. 25 December 1944 - Corps Rear Boundary - EUPEN (inclusive to Corps) - VERVIERS (towns and road exclusive to Corps).

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6. FINANCE.

1. Operations: The following chart shows disbursements and collections for the month of December 1944.

	V Corps Finance Sect.	8th Finance Disb. Section	15th Finance Disb. Section
TOTAL CREDITS For Pay and Allowances (Excluding Travel)	$270,407.41	$1,002,260.23	$1,154,154.14
ADD: Repayment of Soldiers' Deposits Including Interest	1,032.78	725.00	4,856.20
(1) TOTAL CREDITS	$271,440.19	$1,002,985.23	$1,159,010.34
LESS: ALLOTMENTS			
Class "B"	$ 10,746.25	$ 51,220.00	$ 55,170.00
Class "E"	89,224.25	324,428.80	389,264.39
Class "F"	23,581.00	118,660.72	120,264.87
Class "X"	546.75	155.00	1,391.14
Class "D"	194.23	108.64	171.75
Class "M"	16,462.57	69,250.18	83,554.16
(2) TOTAL ALLOTMENTS	$140,755.05	$ 563,823.34	$ 649,816.31
(2a) PARTIAL PAYMENTS OFFICERS (Debits)	$ 390.00	$ 785.00	$ 455.00
(2b) TOTAL ITEMS (2) and (2a)	$141,145.05	$ 564,608.34	$ 650,271.31
(3) GROSS AMOUNT CHARGEABLE TO APPROPRIATIONS (Item (1) less Item (2b)	$130,295.14	$ 438,376.89	$ 508,739.03
LESS: VOUCHER COLLECTIONS			
PTA - Funds	$ 2,526.80	$ 19,887.92	$ 25,888.25
War Bonds	— — —	— — —	— — —
Soldier's Deposits	4,110.00	5,458.00	23,424.00
Other Collections	6,294.00	18,517.07	20,396.19
(4) TOTAL VOUCHER COLLECTIONS	$ 12,930.80	$ 43,862.99	$ 69,708.44
(5) NET DISBURSEMENTS FOR PAY AND ALNS (Item (3) less Item (4))	$117,364.34	$ 394,513.90	$ 439,030.59
LESS: CASH COLLECTIONS			
PTA - Funds	$231,061.98	$ 139,041.75	$ 38,013.25
War Bonds	3,351.25	13,318.50	13,724.25
Soldier's Deposits	5,596.00	21,817.00	35,567.00
Other Collections	21,444.11	16,972.85	3,663.52
(6) TOTAL CASH COLLECTIONS	$261,453.34	$ 191,150.10	$ 90,968.02
NET CASH RETAINED (Item (5) less Item (6))	($-144,089.00)	$ 203,363.80	$ 348,062.57

2. Savings: Following is a summary of savings for December 1944:

a. Total Number of Payees: 24,045.
b. Total Credits for Pay and Allowances: $2,426,821.78.
c. Percentage of Allotments to Total Credits: 55.8 %.
d. Percentage of Net Cash Retained to Total Credits: 16.7 %.
e. Percentage of Net Cash Retained to Net Disbursements: 42.8 %.
f. Average Amount Retained by Each Payee: $16.94.
g. Commercial Vouchers Paid: Number - 10, Amount - $1,205.28.
h. Total Number of PTA's: 2,675.
i. Obligations - Commanding General's Official Entertainment Fund: None.
j. Obligations - Military Intelligence and C.I.C. Fund: None.
k. Total Number of Individual War Bond Sales: 5,282.

3. 6th War Loan Drive: The 6th War Loan Drive took place between 20 November and 16 December 1944. The results of this drive are reflected in the following figures showing War Bond Sales for Cash made to organizations paid thru this headquarters. Figures for purchases by payroll deductions for the period of the drive are not presently available and will be included in the next Operations Report:

Cash War Bond Sales: October 1944 - $4,800.00; November - $5,628.75; December - $30,394.00.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, US Army

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SECTION IV - G-4 LOGISTICS REPORT

1 December to 12 December 1944

In this period, V Corps began building up forces and materiel for a sustained effort to seize the Roer River dams, key points in the terrain leading to the Cologne Plain and the Rhine. Starting with the 8th and 99th Infantry Divisions, plus CCR of the 5th Armored Division and normal Corps troops, we quickly added the 2nd and 78th Infantry Divisions and the 16th RCT of the 1st Infantry Division.

Every effort was made to rehabilitate CCR of the 5th Armd Div, which had been badly mauled supporting the 8th Div in the Hurtgen Forest area. When it became apparent that this unit could not be refitted prior to D-day, 13 December, CCB of the 9th Armd Div was made available by Army for the forthcoming attack.

The extremely limited road net and gumbo-like consistency of the terrain made necessary the issuance of track extensions (Duckbills) for Tank Bns, and M29 cargo carriers (Weasels) for the infantry service units. Pack horses and packboards were also obtained to overcome supply difficulties foreseen in pending operations. Permission was obtained from Army to dump ammunition in excess of basic loads on positions, and Army further facilitated ammunition supply by making ASP 129 available to units in the northern portion of the Corps sector, while ASP 126 continued to supply units in the southern part. Rationing of ammunition continued throughout this period, although allocations were in sufficient quantities to support the scheduled attack.

Spot checks and unit inspections by the Corps Ordnance Officer revealed that the condition of ordnance material was excellent. The performance of 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance by all Corps units was rated as very satisfactory by the inspecting teams.

G-4 compiled and published an Administrative SOP for Supply and Evacuation. In this publication were embodied all instructions of a permanent nature, including notes

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on supply discipline from this and higher headquarters, supply and evacuation procedures, traffic control, missions of service units, personnel matters, and administrative reports required by this headquarters. Henceforth, Corps Administrative Orders will only contain instructions of a temporary nature, making bulky files unnecessary in lower units. The SOP was published in booklet form for ease of reference and subsequent additions.

At the end of this period just prior to the attack to the East, the overall supply picture was the best it had been in months. Some overshoes in the larger sizes were still in short supply, but shortages of Prestone had been alleviated by the issue of alcohol in quantities sufficient to protect all vehicles requiring antifreeze.

13 December to 16 December

The attack to the East jumped off as scheduled on the morning of the 13th with very little resistance being met for the first two hours by the 78th Inf Div on the northern sector and the 99th Inf Div on the southern sector. As this was the first engagement for both of these divisions, the results were most gratifying. Later in the day enemy resistance stiffened but our forces continued to make progress toward the objective dams, pushing considerably beyond Monschau on the north and Krinkelt on the south flank. The 2nd Inf Div in between the 78th and 99th Divs, and the 9th Inf Div on the extreme left flank of the Corps also made advances as the attack progressed into the second and third days. Due to the careful prior planning for this operation, no supply difficulties proved insurmountable. By evening of the 16th, German resistance had stiffened considerably on our front and VIII Corps on our south flank reported a penetration in strength of their lines.

17 December to 31 December 1944

It became apparent in the early morning hours of 17 December that the enemy

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was making a large scale attack at the junction of V and VIII Corps. Some 500 para-troops were dropped in the vicinity of Bupem as flank protection to a projected armored thrust through Kleinborn and Verviers. This attack was foiled due to the opportune arrival in the drop area of the 26th RCT of the 1st Inf Div en route to strengthen our defenses in the Bullingen area. Strong Panzer units were reported probing all along our southern flank with penetrations being made on the extreme right front of the Corps.

By 0800 on the 17th, the enemy had penetrated to within 1½ miles of our truckhead at Butgenbach. Every available truck of the Corps Quartermaster was dispatched to evacuate the truckhead, which evacuation was successfully accomplished by the 18th. Trucks were then dispatched to ASP 126 in the vicinity of Waimes and evacuation of ammunition stocks was begun with additional help from Corps and Division artillery trucks. On order of the Assistant Army Ammunition Officer at the ASP, some 60 tons of engineer demolitions were blown up to prevent their falling into enemy hands. However, this action proved unnecessary as the enemy was held short of the ASP and all but about 1,000 tons of ammunition was successfully evacuated within the next two days. The ASP remained in our hands throughout the engagement and as the period closed only about 100 tons of ammunition remained to be evacuated.

The Corps Collecting Co. situated two miles west of Bullingen successfully evacuated all of its 160 ~~odd~~ patients to the vicinity of Malmedy. Some heavy tonnage was lost to the enemy and the Corps Surgeon reported some ambulances and personnel of the Collecting Co. missing as a result of this evacuation. By the end of the period the Corps Surgeon reported practically all of the missing personnel had filtered back through the enemy lines to their parent unit.

Reinforcements began to pour into the Corps sector and by nightfall of the 18th V Corps had the 1st and 30th Inf Divs and 82nd Airborne Div holding the enemy along the general line Butgenbach - Malmedy - Stavelot. By this time, the German break-

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through had reached the proportions of a major counter offensive, but as the Corps prevented the attempted northwestward penetration toward Liege, the enemy's major effort was directed westward toward the Meuse. Readjustment of Corps boundaries found the 8th and 78th Divs relieved from Corps and attached to VII Corps, while the 30th Inf and 82nd Airborne Divs were released to XVIII Airborne Corps on our right (west) flank. The 9th Inf Div joined V Corps and took up positions astride the Monschau - Eupen road on the new left (north) flank of the Corps.

The rapid penetration on the South sector of the Corps resulted in heavy losses of equipment by the 2nd and 99th Divs. Losses of men and material were so great in the latter unit that it was attached for operations to the 2nd Div. Corps special staff set about the task of re-equipping these two divisions and by the end of the period had made considerable progress along these lines. Rocket launchers (bazookas) were taken from Corps service units and issued to combat units as replacement items. G-4 instituted a daily report to the Commanding General on status of supply, with all the supply services reporting on the progress of resupplying combat losses.

G-4 directed that insofar as practicable all service and rear echelon elements of Divisions and Corps troops would move to an area to the north of the Eupen - Verviers road which Army had announced as the new Corps rear boundary. Class I and III truckheads were established in the vicinity of Herbesthal and Class V was drawn from ASP 125 in the vicinity of Herve.

As the road net was extremely limited and as traffic was extremely heavy, severe traffic control measures had to be enforced. On 24 December a system of radio linked traffic control points was set up to regulate the flow of traffic over the MSR between the Eupen - Verviers service areas on the north and the combat troop concentrations in the Sourbrodt - Elsenborn areas on the south. This system was later modified to control only the critical portion of road between the north and south junctions of Highways N-27 and N-28, with control posts at each junction linked by

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telephone and both posts linked to Traffic Control Hq at the Corps CP by radio.

To reduce traffic congestion to the minimum, Division and Corps ordnance units were directed to evacuate wrecked materiel only from 0700 to 0900 hours and 1700 to 1800 hours daily, at which time traffic on the MSR was light. Late in the period an hour from 1200 to 1300 was granted for additional ordnance evacuation. Divisions also set up intermediate ordnance repair points in the division areas to take care of minor repairs and to eliminate, wherever possible, the longer hauls of ordnance maintenance establishments north of the Corps rear boundary.

Army made available to Corps two companies of a Belgian Fusilier Battalion to assist guarding vital supply establishments in the rear area. Close of the period saw the German spearhead blunted before the Meuse and the buildup of Allied forces preparatory to a resumption of our drive to the east. V Corps had lost a little ground to the enemy, some considerable individual and organizational equipment, but no supply installations. Our divisions were re-equipping for the offensive action which must inevitably follow.

THOMAS F. TAYLOR,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-4.

7 Incls:
Incl No 1 - QM Report (in quad)
" No 2 - Ord Report "
" No 3 - Engr Report "
" No 4 - Surg Report "
" No 5 - Sig Report "
" No 6 - PM Report "
" No 7 - Operations Journal - Dec., File VII

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Quartermaster

QUARTERMASTER REPORT - AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY

~~1 December 1944 to 31 December 1944~~

1. On 16 December the Germans launched an offensive in the direction of Butgenbach and preparations were made by this office to evacuate the class I and class III truckheads located there, if it became necessary. Sixty-one (61) trucks from the two Quartermaster truck companies attached to this Corps were being used for priority troop movements and could not be released for evacuation of the truckheads. All Corps units were contacted as to availability of trucks and trailers and 72 trucks 2½-ton, 11 trucks 3/4-ton Weapons Carriers, and 32 trailers were placed on a 15-minute alert.

2. It became necessary to evacuate the truckheads on the morning of 17 December and the trucks previously alerted and additional 40 trucks borrowed from the Army Quartermaster were dispatched to Butgenbach. Evacuation was begun to the vicinity of Malmedy but as it appeared that this location would become untenable, the supplies were transported further to the rear to an Army Depot.

3. The road from Butgenbach to the Army Depot was cut by enemy forces making it necessary to evacuate the remainder of the supplies to Camp Elsenborn where they were issued to Divisions.

4. Evacuation of the truckheads was completed 18 December 1944. All the supplies at the truckheads were successfully evacuated including approximately 3 tons of salvage previously turned in to the class I truckhead. The only losses sustained were one truck 1/4-ton and two trailers 1-ton.

5. The enemy breakthrough caused many units to withdraw leaving much equipment behind, which, had not the essential items been rapidly replaced, would have greatly impaired the combat efficiency of these units. The Army class II and IV depot was in the process of moving to the rear and could not make issues of the required items. Approval was obtained for the Corps Quartermaster to send vehicles to Communications Zone to obtain replacement for lost items from available stocks. Three hundred thirty-five (335) truck tons of Quartermaster supplies were obtained in this manner and re-issued to Divisions and Corps troops by the Corps Quartermaster, necessary labor being supplied by the Service Company.

6. The Quartermaster laundry was used almost exclusively to clean clothing and equipment obtained from battlefield recovery and excess items obtained from other units just prior to the breakthrough. A detail each, from the Quartermaster Service Company and from an Army Salvage Collecting Company, were temporarily attached to the Laundry Company to sort all clothing and equipment prior to laundering and to re-size clothing after being laundered. Battle losses of clothing were replaced in this manner as well as much individual equipment. Sufficient facilities for laundering socks and other selected items were always available to Division Quartermasters as desired. Inability to furnish units with laundry service, due to the above, was countered by the establishment of clothing exchange points at Eupen and at Camp Elsenborn. Each of these points had 3000 complete sets of clothing available daily.

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7. Terrain features of some sectors precluded the use of trucks for supplying certain units, therefore, 40 horses were procured for use in transporting supplies to these units. Three trucks were converted into "horse vans" in order to deliver the horses from rear areas to the using units.

8. The 3275th QM Service Company furnished the following details during the period:

a. One squad to the 5th Armored Division Quartermaster to assist in the handling of supplies.

b. One section to the 2nd Infantry Division to collect salvage.

c. One section to 595th QM Laundry Company to sort clothing and equipment and prepare same for re-issue.

d. One squad to Camp Elsenborn clothing exchange point.

e. Two platoons to receive and issue class II and IV items.

f. One platoon for evacuation of truckhead #55.

9. Class I truckhead #55 located at Butgenbach serviced units of the Corps until 18 December (date truckhead was evacuated). Units drew rations from Army depot until 20 December at which time truckhead #56 was opened at Herbesthal.

Rations issued during period - 1,943,954.

10. Class III truckhead #55 located at Butgenbach serviced units of the Corps until 18 December (date truckhead was evacuated). Units drew class III from Army depots and decanting points until 28 December at which time truckhead #56 was opened at Herbesthal.

Gallons of gasoline issued	-	1,041,790
" " diesel oil "	-	49,060
" "assorted oils "	-	19,110

11. The 606th QM Graves Registration Company operated a total of 7 collecting points during the period. One of these points was being operated at Butgenbach at the time of the breakthrough. The operating platoon evacuated all the equipment possible on 17 December, returned and picked up the few remaining items of equipment and 6 American and 2 German bodies that were being processed.

Bodies processed:

American	-	790
Allied	-	2
German	-	296
Total	-	1088

Bodies processed since 6 June 1944:

American	-	4822
Allied	-	25
German	-	2287
Total	-	7134

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12. The 863rd QM Fumigation and Bath Company continued servicing units of the Corps. One platoon operated in Rotgeh servicing the 8th Infantry Division and units in that area until 16 December at which time it was returned to Eupen. Two shower points were operated at Eupen and 2 additional clothing exchange points were operated.

Number of men showered	- 29,789
Number of sets of clothing exchanged	- 43,555
Average daily hours of operation	- 5½

(Unit was closed from 18 December to 22 December and personnel performed guard and outpost duties in the defense of the city of Eupen.)

13. The 595th Quartermaster Laundry Company continued normal operations until 17 December at which time it was moved to the rear area due to the tactical situation. Operations from 19 December 1944 to 31 December were as described in paragraph 6, supra.

Number pieces laundered	- 874,090
Number pounds laundered	- 1,048,739
Average daily hours of operation	- 20

14. One section, 216th QM Salvage Repair Company continued servicing units of the Corps.

Shoes repaired	- 718 pairs
Shoes salvaged	- 411 pairs
Leggings repaired	- 85 pairs
Tents repaired	- 3

15. The 3604th and 3892nd QM Truck Companies furnished transportation for hauling ammunition, troop movements, Quartermaster supplies and other Corps trucking requirements. Division transportation was augmented by these companies as required.

Total operational miles:

3604th QM Truck Company	- 54,700
3892nd QM Truck Company	- 56,787
Total	- 111,487

M. C. RHODES,
Colonel, QMC,
Quartermaster.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

ORDNANCE SECTION HQ V CORPS

1 Dec 1944 - 31 Dec 1944

Incl #2

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AFTER ACTION REPORT
ORDNANCE SECTION HQ V CORPS
DURING THE MONTH OF DECEMBER
1944

I. Tactical Resume.

1. In the early part of December the V Corps was in general conducting a a limited offensive in support of the main thrust of VII Corps on the left in the Duren area. On 13 December V Corps started an offensive action aimed at clearing its front to the Roer River and capturing the dams with their highways intact. This action included the 8th, 78th, 2d, and 99th Infantry Divisions arranged in that order from left to right. The 8th Infantry was largely holding, having previously reached the Roer. The 78th Infantry Division initiated the attack followed later by the 2d Infantry Division with strong demonstrations by the 99th Infantry Division. The attack commenced auspiciously with the taking of Simmerath although further advances were strongly contested in both the 78th and 2d Infantry Division areas. Mines and wire were particularly heavy.

2. While engaged in this action, a major German break through occurred starting the 16th of December. The attack overran the 99th Infantry Division as well as portions of the 2d Infantry Division. Serious losses of equipment occurred when roads were blocked. The southern part of the V Corps sector was rolled back with Butgenbach as a pivot. Holding of this intersection saved a gasoline dump at Butgenbach and about 3600 tons of ammunition near Weismes. On the 17th reinforcement of the northern flank of the thrust had commenced. All units were encouraged to withdraw as much ammunition as possible from ASP 126 since the tactical decision had been made to abandon the ASP. Transportation was not available to evacuate the ASP. An attempt was made to evacuate critical demolitions, but trucks never arrived, partly due to congestion on the roads. Primers and some fuses for separate loading artillery were evacuated. Demolitions were prepared for destruction and the decision was made by Army to blow them up to prevent them falling into enemy hands. About 250 tons of explosive were fired at 1550A on the 17th of December.

3. The remainder of the period was devoted to stabilizing the north flank of the break through. By 31 December only 150 tons of ammunition were left in ASP 126. Evacuation of American materiel in the salient was successful toward the immediate front. Large quantities could not be reached deeper in the salient. Some of this equipment was blown up by patrols and some by our own artillery to prevent use by the enemy.

II. Supply - General.

1. The T/O and E supply status of V Corps units was excellent prior to the time of the German offensive on 16 December. Reserve items, however, were short in supply, particularly general purpose vehicles and sighting equipment. All divisions were well supplied to the T/O and E, save for requirements due on 60mm Mortars, 81mm Mortars, BAR's, 57mm Guns, and Rocket Launchers.

2. Subsequent to 16 December the following items were in short supply throughout First Army:

Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4 Trailer, ¼ ton, 2 whl cargo

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Truck, 3/4 ton, W/C, 4x4	Trailer, 1 ton, 2whl cargo
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6	Truck, 1½ ton, 6x6
Gun, mach., cal.30, M1919A4	Gun, mach., cal.30, M1919A6
Gun, mach., cal.30, M1917A1	Mount, triped, cal.50, M3
Rifle, auto., cal.30, Brg., M1918A2	Launcher, grenade, M8
Gun, 57mm, M1A3	Gun, 3", M5-M6
Howr., 105mm, M3	Mortar, 60mm
Mortar, 81mm	

3. The supply of combat and track laying vehicles was sufficient throughout the month. Tank battalions were still operating on a fifty (50) tank level instead of the T/E authorization of 54. Shortages existing on 60mm Mortars were somewhat reduced by giving the Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons in First Army 81mm Mortars which they have always desired, and withdrawing their T/E 60mm Mortars. Issue was based on two 81mm Mortars for every three 60mm Mortars. 81mm Mortars involved were picked up from units having M31 Tank Recovery Vehicles (T2), which are equipped with this weapon.

4. Losses on the 3" towed gun were so severe that it was necessary to reorganize one towed TD unit into a SP organization. This resulted in V Corps receiving the first M18 Motor Carriages issued by First Army.

5. Throughout the month the shortages of brake lining, brake hose and brake fluid increased unit deadlines and seriously curtailed the combat efficiency of this command. GMC engines (SN32230) were still being issued on a controlled basis by First Army. The supply at no time had been sufficient for V Corps requirements.

6. The supply status on tires and tubes was most discouraging. Many units were required to operate vehicles without spares and in many instances tires were stripped from trailers to keep vehicles in action. All sizes were concerned in the shortage.

7. Other than tires, tubes, brake accessories and engine assemblies mentioned above, the parts and accessory supply was satisfactory for the period up to 16 December. Subsequent to 16 December V Corps Ordnance units had no depot company support. The depot company serving V Corps had to vacate its location due to the tactical situation and was on the move continually up to 29 December. This resulted in low stocks of parts and assemblies in all Ordnance units. Consequently, the deadline is at this writing greater than ever before. The effect of this will undoubtedly be felt for at least two weeks as all Army base supply organizations were also undergoing the difficulties encountered by the forward depot company. Local purchases were continued through December and helped reduce unfilled parts common and accessory shortages.

8. Major item resupply was aggravated in a similar manner as First Army Headquarters changed its location twice during the period 16-24 December which was a distinct disadvantage. In order to fill losses due to the tactical emergency the Corps Ordnance Officer resupplied major items to divisions insofar as stocks were available. Major items in hands of First Army Ordnance units in V Corps area were given the Corps Ordnance Officer for his disposition. This was in effect from 17 to 20 December inclusive.

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9. The following components of 2d echelon tool sets remained in short supply:

Charger, battery, port., 12 V, gas eng, driven 2000 W	17-C-9635
Charger, battery, port., 12 V, gas eng. driven, 300 W	17-C-8760
Compressor, air, port., 4 cu. ft., gas eng. driven	66-C-1380
Hydrometers, anti freeze	18-H-940
Hydrometers, battery testing	18-H-1240
Gage, cyl. compression, V/type	41-G-124

10. The following "Parts Common" remained in a critical state of supply:

Element, oil filter	8-E-1000
Spark plugs J-8	17-F-5375
Tires and tubes	600 x 16
" " "	750 x 20
" " "	825 x 15
" " "	900 x 16
Point Sets, Dodge	592477
Prestone (only 50% of requirements on hand)	
Brake fluid, hydraulic	
Solder, acid core #1	
Cap, tire, valve	
Tube, repair outfit, cold patches	
Cement, gasket permatex	

11. Listed below are shortages of parts and assemblies peculiar to major items that are presently increasing the duration of our deadlines:

a. Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4 (C/R - W/C), 1½ ton, 6x6

Arm, steering, gear (1½ ton)	928951
Case, transfer (1½ ton)	927382
Shaft, propellor, front rear axle	926716
Gauge, oil	919891
Bearing, connecting rod set	951291
Differential & carrier ass'y	927833
Breaker points	592477
Master cylinder brake	920817
Brake lining front & rear w/rivets	996447
Core, radiator ass'y	G121-01-59900

b. Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo

Engine	SN3230
Lining set, rear brake shoe	605380
Cylinder, hydrovac ass'y (2154113)	2185936
Ring set, piston, standard	2104771
Shaft, to rear axle front unit	2120687
Shaft, transfer case to intermediate axle	2146020
Kit, main bearing	SN3246
Transmission ass'y	2140096
Transfer case (banjo)	3659994
Transfer case (split)	2182395

c. Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4

Shaft, steering arm	3165
Thermostat, ass'y	10883

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Axle, front	3001
Fan ass'y	8600
Bearing, steering gear cam (SSZ-31210	3171
Engine	8005
Core, radiator	8005A

d. Tractor, high speed, 18 ton, M4

Hose, torque oil (R283249	03-38843
Clutch (C139414)	01-38269
Coil, ignition ass'y	01-39787
Radiator	01-40087
Kit, repair, carburetor (A294677)	6158-02-61038

e. Howitzer, 155mm, M1
Recoil mechanism, M6

f. Gun, 155mm, M1
Recoil mechanism, M3
Equilibrator ass'y

g. Howitzer, 240mm, M1
Recoil mechanism, M8

12. In order to permit a free flow of traffic in the combat areas First Army withdrew the back-up battalion and the depot company serving this command west of the Meuse River. This action slowed the tempo of resupply considerably due to the distances of V Corps Ordnance units from this back-up. (The effect on maintenance and evacuation will be enumerated under Section III of this report.) Movement of major items from Army bases to forward units now consumes three (3) full days as compared with former average of one (1) to one and a half (1½) days as a result of the above mentioned move.

III. Maintenance - Evacuation.

1. The German offensive interrupted the normal spot check inspection and refitting program. All available personnel were diverted to maintain equipment in action. Partial refitting projects were accomplished on the following units:

2d Ranger Bn.	746 Tank Bn. (M)
254 Engr C Bn.	146 Engr C Bn.
112 Engr C Bn.	86 Cml. Bn.

2. Despite availability of certain parts, assemlies and accessories the status of maintenance within V Corps is adjudged as follows:

Small arms	Excellent
General purpose vehicles	Very Satisfactory
Tanks and TD vehicles	Excellent
Heavy artillery	Excellent
Light and medium artillery	Very satisfactory
Fire control	Excellent

3. In order to reduce traffic on the congested and insufficient road net work in the Corps area all service units both corps and divisional, were ordered placed north of Eupen. This resulted in divisional LM companies being located in Eupen and their support units and Corps maintenance organizations setting up

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in vicinity of Verviers. This created a far flung contact and support arrangement which necessitated the establishment of a forward emergency repair station (vicinity Sourbrodt). This station has recovery facilities and personnel who are equipped to undertake maximum repairs of all types in place and consequently reduce evacuation traffic on the Sourbrodt - Eupen road. Evacuation to Eupen or Vervier is limited to three (3) hours a day. The nearest forward Army Collecting Point available for evacuation from front line Corps troops is situated in vicinity of Liege.

IV. Bomb Disposal Squads.

Enemy activity in the Corps sector increased activities of the two Bomb Disposal Squads during the month of December. There were approximately 57 UXB and Shell incidents acted upon.

V. Ammunition.

1. The following new types were received for the first time during December:

3" Illuminating
155mm Gun Flash Reducer, M1
2.36" WP Rockets
Posit Fuses for artillery

2. The following types were in short supply:

M48-49 Trip Flares
57mm HE
3" and 76mm HVAP
60mm Mortar Illuminating
57mm HVAP

VI. Materiel Deficiencies.

1. Lands of the 105mm Howitzer, M2 gun continue to break away from the tube. The appearance of the metal under the lands gives an impression that the metal was compressed to form the lands. Tubes have not yet been condemned for this failure although it is anticipated that some tubes may reach an unserviceable condition in the near future. Trouble in loading has occurred repeatedly due to lifting of a land in the vicinity of the forcing cone. In one case a round was reported as oversize due to this trouble.

2. Three 105mm Howitzers, M2 tubes were reported blown up within the last month. Breaks appeared to initiate in the vicinity of the locking ring. All tubes were manufactured by Vilter Manufacturing Co. and had fired between 3500 to 4000 full service rounds. Destruction occurred on first or second round of the day in each case.

VII. General.

1. The tandem hitch recently issued all AAA AW battalions is considered by units of V Corps as impractical and unnecessary. Troubles encountered with this device in braking, turning with towed loads and driver coordination are the objectionable features.

2. TD battalions operating in wooded areas of the V Corps sector express their need for overhead cover for their motor carriages. Many casualties have

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occurred recently from air bursts. It may be interesting to note that this is the first requirement of this type to come from TD units during this campaign, although many instances have been reported of their use of log and sand bags. Such protection is not suitable when positions must be changed frequently.

For the Ordnance Officer:

C. J. WILLIAMS
Lt. Col., Ord. Dept.,
Ass't Ordnance Officer.

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For the Ordnance Officer:

C. J. Williams

C. J. WILLIAMS
Lt. Col., Ord. Dept.,
Ass't Ordnance Officer.

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Auth: CO, V Corps
Date: 1 Jan 1945
Init: _____ LOP

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Engineer
APO 305

1 January 1945

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Report After/After Action, December 1944.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Through Channels).

1. The Engineer Section, Headquarters V Corps, continued its normal functions and duties during the month of December 1944, advising the staff on matters of engineer concern, supervising the activities of the two Engineer Groups and coordinating engineer work between the Divisions and Groups.

2. V Corps continued its offensive with a drive on the HURTGEN-BERGSTEIN ridge. The 1171st Engineer Combat Group was placed in direct support of the 8th Infantry Division in this operation, with the mission of opening and maintaining the divisional supply road net. 1121st Engineer Combat Group supported the remainder of the Corps. Wet weather and continuous heavy traffic increased pressure on the Corps engineers and it became necessary to request the Army Engineer to move his maintenance boundary forward. The priority mission of all Corps engineers was to keep the Corps supply road net open at all costs. Forestry operations of ADSEC engineers in the Corps forward area were halted because of damage being done to roads and interference with the heavy traffic load being carried on the Corps road net.

3. Following the offensive on the northern portion of the Corps front, preparations were made for engineer support of the 2nd, 8th, 78th and 99th Infantry Divisions on an all out attack, the objective being the Roer river dams. The 1121st Engineer Combat Group was placed in support of the 2nd, 78th, and 99th Infantry Divisions, and the 1171st Engineer Combat Group supported the remainder of the Corps. The first phase of the operation was executed. During this time, the Corps engineers constructed two bridges, and were employed on removal of mines and road blocks in addition to their continuous close support with road work.

4. The enemy launched a counter-attack on the night of 16-17 December which halted our offensive. The 1121st Engineer Combat Group had been alerted for a possible enemy break-through. The 610th Engineer Light Equipment Company, the 990th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, and the 508th Engineer Light Pontoon Company were withdrawn during the night. The 254th Engineer Combat Battalion evacuated their heavy equipment and then dug in to form a defensive position on the right flank of the 99th Infantry Division. The Battalion fought off enemy tank and infantry attacks in the vicinity of BULLINGEN until relieved by elements of the 1st Infantry Division, thus depriving the enemy access to our dumps located West of the town and making it possible for the 99th Infantry Division to withdraw and readjust their lines. Loss of equipment by Corps engineers was relatively light due to precautions taken. A large share of that dropped under the pressure of the enemy's rapid advance was later recovered after he had been forced to withdraw.

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5. Loss of personnel during operations of the month by the 2nd and 99th Infantry Division engineers, who were heavily engaged with the enemy, averaged 19%. The average for the five Corps engineer battalions was 7%. Lt. Colonel Carl J. Raley, Commanding Officer, 146th Engineer Combat Battalion, was wounded by enemy artillery fire and evacuated.

6. Enemy paratroops were dropped throughout the Corps rear area and the 146th Engineer Combat Battalion was called upon to take the role of infantry and assisted in mopping up the area between EUPEN and MONSCHAU.

7. Immediately after the enemy break-through on the night of 16-17 December, the Engineer Section started preparation of a barrier defense plan. Within a few hours a complete detailed plan was presented to the Corps G-3 and the Commanding General. The plan was approved and put into operation. Execution of the plan was assigned to the Division and Corps engineers in their respective areas. Control and recording of barrier was assigned to the Corps Engineer. Since our troops would be required to pass through the mined areas, the recording of minefields became the chief concern of the Section. Each report was checked and rechecked to make sure that no lives would be lost through carelessness. A total of 37,100 AT mines and 1,249 AP mines were installed. Shortage of concertina made it necessary to employ the 990th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company in their construction.

8. The Corps Topographic Company was called on during the month to reproduce a total of 318,000 map sheets. The loss of the First Army Map Depot made the map supply situation critical and the only means available for map supply of new units moving into the V Corps area was through the Corps Topographic Company. Although the Company was on an alert status, they were able to operate and fill all requirements of the Corps, as well as some work for First Army.

9. During the latter part of the month the Corps road system, a limited net of two main roads, became the chief concern of the Corps engineers. The Commanding General issued an order that the Corps road net would be kept open at all costs, as the success of our holding operations depended on a continuous flow of traffic. Road patrols were organized and periodic reports submitted to the Corps Engineer to keep him advised of the latest developments. The heavy and continuous traffic greatly increased maintenance problems and it became necessary to request Army to ship rock via rail to the Corps. A total of 1,000 tons of rock were shipped immediately and Army is to continue shipping 200 cu. yds. of rock daily until Corps has received its required needs.

10. A total of 2,923,368 gallons of water was purified and distributed to Corps troops during the month of December. Freezing weather hampered the purification of water, but this was overcome by constructing heating units between the source of water and the purification unit.

11. The supply of field fortification material became critical during the latter part of the month. Army was unable to fill our requests for stockage of AT and AP mines and wire in Corps dumps to meet demands of the tactical situation.

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Distribution of mines to Corps was set up on a daily allocation basis. Although the amounts did not meet our demands, the Corps was able to continue the execution of its barrier plan.

12. Inclosure No. 1 shows bridging activities during the month of December.

LEWIS C. PATTILLO,
Colonel, C. E.,
Corps Engineer.

1 Incl.
Report of Bridging, V Corps
December 1944

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BRIDGING - V CORPS ENGINEERS - DECEMBER 1944

Coordinate	Stream	Nearest Town	Characteristics: Type	Characteristics: Class	Characteristics: Span	Installed By: Unit	Installed By: For	Date
F014348	Weisser Weh	Hurtgen	Timber	40	26'	1340 Eng C Bn	1171 Gp	6 Dec
K982265	Kall R.	Lammersdorf	Treadway	30	48'	112 Engr C.Bn	1121 Gp	13 Dec
K928284	Schlee R.	Rotgen	Timber	24	10'	303 Engr C Bn	78 Div	13 Dec
K975248	Kalb R.	Bickerath	Bailey DS	70	40'	112 Engr C Bn	1121 Gp	16 Dec
K752230	La Bache	Goe	Bailey DD	40	130'	112 Engr C Bn	1121 Gp	21 Dec
K867061	Warche	Champagne	Bailey TS	40	110'	20 Engr C Bn	1171 Gp	25 Dec
K995330		Zweifall	Culvert			20 Engr C Bn	1171 Gp	1 Dec
K947021		Bullingen	Culvert			254 Engr C Bn	1121 Gp	1 Dec
K964307		Rotgen	Culvert, 12"		54'	112 Engr C Bn	1121 Gp	6 Dec
K867040		Gueu Zaine	Culvert		16'	254 Engr C Bn	1121 Gp	6 Dec
K936037		Rotgen	Culvert			146 Engr C Bn	1121 Gp	7 Dec
K948058		Wirtzfeld	Culvert			146 Engr C Bn	1121 Gp	7 Dec
K906082		Camp Elsenborn	Culvert		18'	254 Engr C Bn	1121 Gp	7 Dec
K910064		Elsenborn	Culvert		20'	254 Engr C Bn	1121 Gp	7 Dec
K954301		Rotgen	Culvert			112 Engr C Bn	1121 Gp	13 Dec
K998348		Dossenach	Culvert			20 Engr C Bn	1171 Gp	14 Dec
K983099			Box Culvert			2 Engr C Bn	2 Div	14 Dec

Inclosure No. 1

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Surgeon

1 January 1945

AFTER ACTION REPORT

Surgeon's Section, Hq. V Corps

1 December 1944 to 31 December 1944, inclusive.

ARMY INSTALLATIONS SUPPORTING CORPS

Corps Medical installations received excellent medical support from Army units during this period. When possible, Army Medical Units were stationed well forward and in easy access of Division Clearing Stations. One Field Hospital lost approximately seventy percent of its equipment during the evacuation of its stations in vicinity of Waimes and Dom Butgenbach. Some of this equipment was later recovered. The organic transportation of these units is not sufficient to enable them to move on short notice. All patients and hospital personnel were gotten out in sufficient time to prevent capture.

EVACUATION

The overall evacuation rate, all causes, for the Corps during this period was moderate. During the early part of the month the evacuation rate of trench foot casualties was excessive, due primarily to the receipt of inexperienced units into the Corps. The incidence of these cases has been reduced considerably by instruction in the care of the feet and supervision of the application of appropriate control measures. The issue of overshoes has also contributed greatly to the reduction of the number of these cases.

MEDICAL SUPPLY

Stocks in Army Medical Depot and in the advance sections of this depot, in general, have been adequate, although, from time to time, there was a shortage in some items. However, in most cases suitable substitutes were available and proper medical care of the sick and wounded was not adversely affected.

PERSONNEL

Replacements received, officer and enlisted, were satisfactory as to qualification and physical condition. Replacements were not made available rapidly enough to meet the needs of divisions. Loan personnel was used to fill in until replacements could be obtained. This system is not satisfactory because it disrupts the operation of the unit from which the loan is made, and it necessitates the "breaking in" of personnel who will serve for a short period only (until the regular replacements arrive to relieve them).

For the Surgeon:

HOWARD GOODMAN,
Major, M. C.,
Assistant.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Signal Officer

2 January 1945

AFTER ACTION REPORT, SIGNAL SECTION V CORPS, 1 DECEMBER - 31 DECEMBER 1944

1. Herewith a Summarization Signal Supply Activities for the period 1 December - 31 December 1944 inclusive:

a. Period 1 - 16 December 1944. Signal supply within V Corps was very satisfactory. During this period some new units including 78th Division moved into line. Some of these units came to V Corps not fully equipped with signal equipment. First Army furnished much signal equipment under authority of Army Project of 29 March 1944 to these units in addition to their T/E. By 17 December 1944 it may be stated that all units of V Corps were in excellent condition for offensive operations from a signal supply point of view. The major item which approached the critical point during this period was Wire W-110 and Wire W-130.

b. Period 17-31 December 1944. This period included a major enemy attack on the V Corps front and counter attacks and defensive measures by V Corps. During the initial phase of the German attack, the southern part of the V Corps front was pushed back by the enemy causing enormous losses of Signal equipment. The major losses were in the 99th Infantry Division and attached units who were overrun on the southern flank of the V Corps front. Many of the units in this sector lost as high as 60 percent of their essential signal equipment. The 2d Infantry Division and attached units were next in line with major losses of signal equipment. Strong enemy attacks along other sectors of the V Corps front, even though they were repulsed, caused high rates of combat losses in equipment. During this period it became necessary for First Army to make several rapid movements of their headquarters, signal depots, and 4th echelon signal repair shops. During these movements the re-equipping of V Corps troops was facilitated by Army giving the V Corps Signal Supply Officer authority to release equipment directly on Army depots. This authority was withdrawn on 27 December except for a few non-restricted items. Movement of depots to rear areas made rapid replacement of most types of signal items very difficult. These movements finally placed signal depots and fourth echelon signal repair shops over 100 miles to the rear of V Corps Signal Supply and Repair Section. In general by the end of December replacement of all critical items of signal equipment lost in combat had been accomplished for all V Corps units except the 99th infantry division. Complete replacement of signal equipment depends upon rate of replacements of personnel and other equipment as well as availability of signal equipment.

c. From 29 November 1944 to 27 December 1944, a repair team from 175th Signal Repair Company composed of seven men and one shop truck were attached to the V Corps Signal Repair Section. The splendid work of this team helped to increase the capacity of the V Corps Signal Repair Service. The following is a summation of the work done during December 1944 by the V Corps Signal Repair Section:

(1)	No. of job orders accepted since "D" Day	3,307
(2)	No. of job orders accepted during December	670
	(a) No. of items handled by direct exchange	447
	(b) No. of items turned over to higher ech repair	37
	(c) No. of items repaired in less than 3 days	586
	(d) Total no. of items not repaired at end of december including 1c(2)(b)	53

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(3) List of major items requiring repair during month of December:

Case, CS-79
Cord, CD-501
Generator, GN-45
Handset, TS-9, TS-13, and TS-15
I-107 and other meters
Microphone, T-17
Power Units: PE-43, PE-75, PE-97, PE-103, PE-106, PE-104, PE-110, PE-117 and PE-214.
Radios, Receivers and Transmitters: SCR-300, SCR-625, BC-191, BC-312, BC-603, BC-604, BC-611, BC-620, BC-653, BC-654, BC-659, BC-683, BC-684, BC-728 and BC-669.
Special Service sets.
Reel, RL-26
Remote Control, RM-29
Rubber cable 5 pr.
Switchboards, SB-71 and SB-72
Switchboard Unit, BT-2-C
Telephone, EE-8-( )

(4) Critical items - availability of which hindered rapid repair of equipment during December.

Transformers for PE-104
Armatures for DM-34 and DM-35
Tubes, VT-147, VT-164, VT-165, VT-171, and VT-185
Lamps, 110V for Repair trucks.

HASKELL M. GRAVES,
Colonel, Signal Corps,
Signal Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Provost Marshal
APO 305, U. S. Army

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:Auth: CG, V CORPS :
:Date: 1 January 45:
:Initials: [illegible] :
:.....:

1 January 1945

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports for the Period 1 December 1944 to 31 December 1944.

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, V Corps.

I. General: Traffic during the month of December was heavier than any other month of operations on the Continent. This is accounted for primarily in the grouping of large forces on V Corps front preparatory to attack on 13 December, and in the rapid shifting of troops to counter the German breakthrough in the St. Vith area on 15 December.

II. Troop Movements:

(a) Movements prior to concentration of attack forces. (1 December to 8 December.)

1. 60th RCT of the 9th Infantry Division moved under Corps control from Camp Elsenborn to vicinity of Lammersdorf on 1 December, relieving the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion of CC "B", 5th Armored Division, then attached to VII Corps. This move was accomplished with no interference to normal traffic and the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion rejoined its organization in the vicinity of Rotgen. 16th RCT of the 1st Infantry Division relieved 60th RCT on 5 - 6 December, and the 60th RCT rejoined the 9th Infantry Division in VII Corps area.

2. During this period the 47th RCT and 39th RCT were moved from Camp Elsenborn to VII Corps area; the 413th AAA Battalion and 440th AAA Battalion moved into the Bullingen - Honsfeld area; and two battalions of the 272nd Field Artillery Battalion (240mm Hov.) moved from Bullingen to Rott. 4th Infantry Division of VII Corps changed position with the 83rd Infantry Division of VIII Corps and these convoys passed through the city of Eupen. Movement was completed on 10 December 1944.

(b) Concentration of troops for V Corps attack. (9 December to 12 December.)

1. 78th Infantry Division moved into Corps assembly area, 9th, 10th, [illegible] December; one RCT bivouacking NE of Eupen; the second RCT relieving elements [illegible] the 8th Infantry Division; and the third RCT assembling due East of Eupen in [illegible] vicinity of Rotgen. The limited road net available to this division necessitat[illegible] a new traffic circulation plan which was published and became effective upon the [illegible]ival of the division. (See Document No. 1). The move was well planned and con[illegible]lled, and was executed without any undue delays. Part of the first RCT made a [illegible]ng turn in the one-way road net causing some confusion and delay, but this error [illegible] quickly rectified by the Military Police officer in charge of the traffic detail.

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Some difficulty occurred in assembling the Quartermaster trucks for the return trip to Tongres; however, by dark all trucks had been assembled and dispatched. To eliminate this difficulty, an officer and special Military Police details were assigned to guide empty trucks to the return route during the move of the second and third RCT's.

2. 2nd Infantry Division began its shift to the North into Corps area upon relief by elements of the 106th Infantry Division. The time of this relief was so indefinite as to preclude proper coordination of the movement with V Corps Traffic Headquarters. As a result, traffic in the Butgenbach area was very congested on Sunday 10 December, the date of the move of the first RCT of the 2nd Infantry Division. Route selected by Division was as follows: St. Vith to Butgenbach on Highways N27 and N32, thence North to Elsenborn and West to Camp Elsenborn. Route prescribed by V Corps Traffic Headquarters and used by the 2nd Division on 11th and 12th December was as follows: Highway N27 from St. Vith to Sourbrodt and East on unnumbered road from Sourbrodt to Camp Elsenborn. Special precautionary measures to insure the smooth flow of traffic over this route included: (a) a Military Police traffic detail consisting of one officer and 24 enlisted men, (b) operation of snowplows over entire section of route before 0900 hours each day, and (c) location of five wrecker stations at critical points along the route.

3. Other units shifted to combat positions during this period included the 709th Tank Battalion; 817th TD Battalion; 644th TD Battalion; 893rd TD Battalion; "A", "C", and "D" Companies of the 86th Chemical Battalion; and a battalion of Belgian Fusiliers who moved to assembly area near Ovifat. CC "R" of the 5th Armored Division was relieved from attachment to the 8th Infantry Division and assembled near Walhorn, preparatory to supporting the attack of the 78th Infantry Division in the Lammersdorf area. CC "B" of the 5th Armored Division vacated its assembly area West and North of Rotgen and rejoined the Division in VII Corps on 9 - 10 December. 16th RCT of the 1st Infantry Division was relieved by elements of the 78th Infantry Division on 11 - 12 December and assembled in the Division rest area near Heartcappel. 5th Armored Division trains cleared the Raymonville - Modersheid area by 0900 hours on 11 December in order to make room for CC "B", 9th Armored Division, scheduled to arrive in V Corps area on D day, attached on arrival to the 2nd Infantry Division. This movement took place beginning at 0730 hours 13 December and the combat command closed at 1200 hours. An escort and guide detail of one officer and 18 enlisted men of the 863rd Military Police Company handled route marking and traffic control for the move.

(c) V Corps attack, and breakthrough by German Armored Forces. (13 December [illegible] December.)

1. CC "R" of the 5th Armored Division moved from its assembly area at [illegible]horn to vicinity Rotgen during the afternoon 16th December, for future employ[illegible] by the 78th Infantry Division. This movement necessitated rerouting of traffic [illegible] both Rotgen to Eupen and Eupen to Rotgen over roads in VII Corps area. Some [illegible]t delays to routine traffic occurred due to the fact that the column remained [illegible]d on the road for nearly and hour while the Commanding Officer received instru[illegible]s as to the employment of his command. The 2nd Ranger Battalion moved from [illegible]th Infantry Division area and joined CC "R" at Rotgen late in the afternoon.

2. The 26th RCT was attached to V Corps effective 2400 hours 16 December,

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and started movement from Battice to Camp Elsenborn at 0130 hours 17th December. While enroute the 26th RCT encountered German parachute troops in the vicinity of the North junction of Highways N27 and N28, but suffered no delays from this cause.

3. On the same night (16 - 17 December) CC "B" of the 9th Armored Division rejoined its organization, clearing V Corps area by 0300 hours.

4. The remainder of the 1st Infantry Division (less rear echelon) completed its movement into V Corps at 1955 hours 17 December, the 16th RCT proceeding to Camp Elsenborn, and the 18th RCT assuming defensive position in the vicinity of Eupen. 47th RCT of the 9th Infantry Division moved into defensive positions along the Eupen - Monschau road. 30th Infantry Division, attached to V Corps by First U. S. Army, began movement to assembly area NE of Eupen. 117th RCT (reinforced) of this division moved through Eupen in the early morning hours of 18 December enroute to Malmedy. The 119th RCT and 120th RCT passed through Eupen later in the day, proceeding respectively to Malmedy and Stavelot. 1600 vehicles of the 7th Armored Division passed through Eupen on 17th December enroute to VIII Corps.

5. CC "A" of the 3rd Armored Division was attached to V Corps and closed in its assembly area, vicinity Walhorn, 2330 hours 18th December. CC "A" relieved the 18th RCT of the mission of defense of Eupen the following day, and the 18th RCT proceeded to Camp Elsenborn, sweeping its route for parachute troops. 9th Infantry Division (-47th and 60th RCT) closed vicinity of Camp Elsenborn at 1930 hours 19 December.

6. CC "B" of the 5th Armored Division, detached from V Corps upon change of boundaries, was re-attached effective 1500 hours, 21 December, and moved from Rotgen to Eupen to relieve CC "A" of the 3rd Armored Division, which became attached to XVIII Airborne Corps at the same date and hour. CC "A" cleared Eupen at 1755 and CC "B" cleared at 2215. Although a portion of these two columns crossed, no delay was experienced in either move. 3200 vehicles of the 2nd Armored Division passed through Eupen enroute to VII Corps.

(d) Defense of Monschau, Butgenbach, Malmedy line. (22 December to 31 December)

1. During this period troop movements consisted mainly of regrouping of AAA, Field Artillery, Engineer and Ordnance units. 60th RCT rejoined the 9th Infantry Division, and closed in division area at 2000 hours 23 December. The 9th Armored Division (-CC "B") assembled in vicinity of Verviers on 24 December.

III. Supply and Evacuation Traffic.

(a) During the period 1 December to 18 December, Truckhead #65 at Butgenbach and ASP #126 near Waimes accounted for the movements of approximately 300 vehicles daily each way on Highway N32. For the same period, approximately 250 vehicles daily moved into and out of this area over Highways N27 and N28 from Eupen and Verviers. Likewise, the location of several Ordnance Battalions and the 471st Quartermaster Battalion in Eupen resulted in the daily movement of approximately 1000 vehicles per day through the city.

(b) German armored thrusts toward Butgenbach and Malmedy made it necessary

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to completely remove Truckhead #65 to rear areas. This movement was accomplished 17 - 18 December without loss of either rations or gasoline. Its removal was made extremely difficult by the large volume of traffic of tactical and service troops moving from this area into new locations in the Corps rear area.

(c) Upon the completion of troop movements into the Monschau - Butgenbach - Malmedy line, and evacuation of disabled vehicles into rear areas, traffic on N27 and N28 settled to routine division supply and evacuation movements amounting to approximately 3000 vehicles per day during daylight hours. Maximum hourly peak was reached during the period 1500 - 1700, varying from 160 to 200 vehicles per single lane per hour.

IV. Traffic Control.

(a) During the period 1 December to 21 December the following traffic control posts were in operation:

1. Eupen: Nine traffic control posts; four motorcycle traffic posts; and one vehicular mounted motor patrol; and one Traffic Information Center.

2. Rotgen: One traffic control post.

3. Highways N27 and N28: Two traffic control posts and two motor patrols operating to division rear boundary.

4. One-way road net: One traffic control post at L-893294; one control post at L-862278; and one traffic control post at L-813269.

(b) During the period 22 December to 31 December the posts mentioned in 2 and 4 above were withdrawn due to boundary changes; the motor patrols on Highways N27 and N28 were reinforced by four additional motor patrols; and additional posts became operative in Jalhay and Goe-Bethane. (See Document No. 2)

(c) The operation of security patrols on the 18th December in the rear areas by the Corps Military Police Company, in conjunction with the Corps Security, materially reduced the number of men available for traffic control. At the request of the Provost Marshal, V Corps, twelve men of the 518th Army Military Police Battalion were assigned to traffic duty on the Butgenbach - Malmedy road and eighteen men of the 509th Army Military Police Battalion were assigned to traffic and police duty within the city of Eupen. Twenty men of the Corps Military Police Company were released from security duty before noon on 18th December to reinforce road patrols in the Corps area and all men were released before nightfall.

(d) On 22 December, representatives from Traffic Section and Military Police Platoons of each of the divisions attached to V Corps attended a meeting in the office of the Provost Marshal. Purpose of this meeting was to familiarize officers and enlisted men with "Traffic Control Plan," dated 22 December 1944, and effective 24 December 1944. (See Document No. 3) The equipment necessary was furnished by 1st, 2nd, 9th and 99th Infantry Divisions, and by the 612th, 634th and 899th TD Battalions. Equipment and all personnel of TCP's No's 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8, were relieved on 27th December, while TCP's No. 2 and 7 remained in operation. Other stations were alerted to reopen on call.

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V. Conclusions.

(a) Whenever possible, units contemplating movement should consult Traffic Headquarters at the earliest possible moment in regard to available road-space time and the most suitable route.

(b) Radio controlled Traffic Posts are practical and in the future should be included in the Corps Traffic Plan. However, since sufficient operating personnel is not available to Traffic Headquarters, some provisions must be made to incorporate the equipment and operators into the Corps Military Police Company.

VI. Traffic Statistics.

(a) During the month of December, 91 convoys involving a movement of 10,532 vehicles over a total of 1282.2 miles within the Corps area were released by Corps Traffic Headquarters. During the same period, 141 convoys involving 25,851 vehicles travelled 1350.7 miles within the Corps area and were cleared by other traffic headquarters with the traffic headquarters of V Corps. (See Document No. 4)

JESSE G. POINTER
Lt. Col., F.A.,
Provost Marshal

5 Inclosures:
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Document No. 2
Document No. 3
Document No. 4

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

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

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

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ANNEX B TO LETTER
"TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN"

TRAFFIC CONTROL
RADIO NETWORK

Map GSGS 4416 Scale 1:100,000
Sheet 5.1



ANNEX B
TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN
TRAFFIC CONTROL
RADIO NETWORK

AM NET (2044 KC)

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CRITICAL	CR	CORPS
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DOUBT(ED)(S)(ING)	ESTIMATE(D)(S)	EXPECT(ING)(S)
HAIRTRACK	HEAD	HEAVY
II	TCP #2	LOST
MILE(S)	MINUTE(S)	MOVE(D)(S)(MENT)
MONTH	NUMBER(ED)(S)	OBSERVE(D)
PATROL(ING)(S)	POINT(S)	POST(ED)(S)
RAILHEAD	RAILROAD	RATE MARCH
RESERVE(D)(S)	SPA	RETURN(ED)(S)
SHIP	SITUATION	SIGNAL
TELEPHONE	TODAY	TOMORROW
SWITCH OFF	TEMPORARY	ZONE(S)
GASOLINE	VICTOR	SWITCH ON

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MONTH December 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHC.	NO. W.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. D.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
V - 1	30 Nov.	40	2	1	Roetgen	Walhorn	Roetgen-Eupen-Walhorn	"D" Co, 85 Ren Sqdn	15.9
V - 2	2 Dec	30	1	1	Bullingen	Vic Rott	N27, to Butgenbach, Elsenborn, N27, N28, Eupen to RJ (K-817605), Houdorf, Roetgen,	272 FA Bn	24.1
V - 3	2 Dec	25	1	1	Bullingen	" "	N32 to Butgenbach, Elsenborn, East to N27 N27, N28 to Eupen, Eynatten, right to	272 FA Bn	24.1
V - 4	1 Dec	100	4	1	Camp Elsenborn	Vic RJ (K-940263)	Kornelimunster to Dest. N27, N32 to RJ (K-809256) right on unnumbered route to Roetgen to Vic RJ (K-940263)	60 Inf Rot	29.0
V - 5	1 Dec	80	3	1	Camp Elsenborn	" "	" " " " " " " (1Bn)	60 Inf Rot	29.0
V - 6	1 Dec	80	3	1	" "	Vicinity Monschau	N27, N28, N31, to Vic Monschau	(3Bns) 60 Inf Rot.	29.0
V - 7	1 Dec	60	4	4	" "	Vicinity RJ (K-940263)	N27, N28, To RJ (K-809256) right to Houdorf Roetgen to Vic RJ (K-940263)	(AT, Cannon Co., Hq & Engr 60 Rot)	15.9
V - 8	1 Dec	116	3	1	" "	Vicinity Monschau	N27, N28, N31, to Vic Monschau.	60 FA Elements	29.0
V - 9	1 Dec	180	7	4	" "	Vicinity RJ (K-940263)	N27, N28, to RJ (K-809256) right to Houdorf to Roetgen to Vic RJ (K-940263)	(Med. Tk. Tk. 34 FA) 60 Inf Rot.	15.9
V - 10	3 Dec	30	3	1	" "	Eupen	Camp Elsenborn, N27, N28 to Destination.	3178 (MW) Ord Co.	26.0
V - 11	3 Dec	18	1	1	" "	Verviers	Camp Elsenborn, on N27, RJ N27, N28, N28 to Dest.	96FA Bn.	20.0
V - 11(2)	3 Dec	27	2	1	" "	Verviers	Camp Elsenborn, N27, N28, N27 & N28, N27 to Dest.	47 Inf.	20.0
V - 11(3)	3 Dec	12	1	1	" "	Verviers	Same as above	15 Engr.	20.0
V - 12	6 Dec	80	4	1	Mantzen	Vic Kalterherberg	Mant on to N3, Herbesthal, N28, N27 to RJ 851097, Camp Elsenborn, Elsenborn, to Dest.	196 FA	18.0
V - 13	8 Dec	163	5	1	Eupen	Eupifel	N28, Route "A" Bruinig, to Dest.	400 Amml. FA.	13.9

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC REGULATIONS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

70

MONTH ~~December 1944~~

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
~~V-14~~	~~8 Dec~~	~~126~~	~~4~~	~~1~~	~~Eupen~~	~~Stolberg~~	~~N28, Route A, Breinig to Destination.~~	~~126 Ord (MM)~~	~~5~~
~~V-15~~	~~10 Dec~~	~~96~~	~~4~~	~~1~~	~~978355~~	~~640291~~	~~978355 to Mullartschutte, Rotgen to Destination.~~	~~709 TK Bn.~~	~~8~~
~~V-16~~	~~10 Dec~~	~~33~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~Rott~~	~~Camp Elsenborn~~	~~Rott, Roetgen, N28, Eupen, N28 to Elsenborn~~	~~86 Cml Bn "C"~~	~~50.~~
~~V-17~~	~~10 Dec~~	~~33~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~Rott~~	~~Butgenbach~~	~~Rott, Roetgen, N28, Eupen, N28 Malmedy, N 32 to Butgenbach~~	~~86 Cml Bn "D"~~	~~43.1~~
~~V-18~~	~~13 Dec~~	~~20~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~Mappenbach~~	~~Roetgen~~	~~IP to Mirfeld to Butgenbach, N32 Malmedy, N28, Eupen, N Bte to Roetgen~~	~~508 Engr LP Co.~~	~~43.1~~
~~V-20~~	~~11Dec~~	~~100~~	~~2~~	~~1~~	~~Camp Elsenborn~~	~~St Vith~~	~~N27 to Waimes, N23 south to St Vith~~	~~QM Trks~~	~~9.6~~
~~V-21~~	~~12 Dec~~	~~90~~	~~4~~	~~1~~	~~974345~~	~~Vicinity Butzenich~~	~~Zweifal, Mulartschutte, Rott, Merols, Eupen, N28, 27 to Dest.~~	~~941 FA~~	~~33.5~~
~~V-19~~	~~12 Dec~~	~~160~~	~~6~~	~~1~~	~~Jct. N27, N32~~	~~Roetgen~~	~~N27, N28, Eupen, (Northern Route) to Roetgen~~	~~463 AAA~~	~~10.~~
~~V-22~~	~~12 Dec~~	~~20~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~Eupen~~	~~Namur~~	~~N31 & N17.~~	~~3604 QM Trk~~	~~1~~
~~V-23~~	~~13 Dec~~	~~20~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~Namur~~	~~Orifat (8409)~~	~~N17, N31 & N27 to Destination~~	~~3604 QM Trk~~	~~13.1~~
~~V-24~~	~~13 Dec~~	~~65~~	~~4~~	~~2~~	~~889038~~	~~Eupen~~	~~N32, N27, N28 to Eupen~~	~~526 Ord~~	~~28.3~~
~~V-25~~	~~13 Dec~~	~~130~~	~~5~~	~~1~~	~~Roetgen~~	~~Chaineaux~~	~~Roetgen, Eupen, Herbestahl, N3, Battice, Dest.~~	~~74h FA Bn~~	~~10.~~
~~V-26~~	~~13 Dec~~	~~90~~	~~1~~	~~4~~	~~Roetgen~~	~~Henri-Chapel~~	~~Roetgen Eupen-Henri-Chappel~~	~~5 FA Bn~~	~~10.~~
~~V-27~~	~~13 Dec~~	~~18~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~Vicht~~	~~Butgenbach~~	~~Vicht-Zweifal-Rott-Roetgen-Eupen, N28 N27, N32 to Destination~~	~~987 FA Bn~~	~~53.1~~

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MONTH December 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. W.U.'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
V-28	18 Dec	200	8	2	Walhorn	Mutzenich	Rotgen-Eupen, N28, N27 to Destination.	CC "B" 5 Armd	19.3
V-29	18 Dec	20	1	1	Assembly Area		Rotgen-Lammersdorf	2nd Ranger Inf. Bn.	5.6
V-30	19 Dec	50	2	1	Eupen	Herve	Eupen-Herbesthal-N3 to Destination.	56 Signal	1.
V-31	19 Dec	90	5	1	Camp Elsenborn	Verviers	IP, Sourbrodt, N27 to Destination.	776 FA	13.2
V-32	19 Dec	26	1	1	Zweifal	Jalhay	IP-Rotgen-Eupen-N28-N27	1171 Engr Group	10.
V-33	19 Dec	138	4	1	Zweifal	Jalhay	IP-N28- N29 to Destination.	1340 Engr Bn.	10.
V-34	19 Dec	75	3	1	Schmidtheff	Jalhay	IP-Rotgen-Eupen-N28-N27	502 Engr LP Co.	10.
V-35	20 Dec	28	1	1	Schmidtheff	Jalhay	IP-Rotgen-Eupen-N31-N29	990 Engr TB Co.	10.
V-36	20 Dec	25	1	1	Schmidtheff	Jalhay	IP-Rotgen-Eupen-N31-N29.	610 Engr LF Co.	10.
V-37	20 Dec	132	5	1	Zweifal	Spa	IP-Rotgen-E pen-N31-N32	20 Engr Group	10.
V-38	20 Dec	160	5	1	Rotgen	Jalhay	IP-Eupen-N29 to Destination.	112 Engr Bn 508 Engr LP Co.	1.
V-39	20 Dec	10	1	1	Eupen	Aachen	N-28	738 TK Bn.	1.
V-40	20 Dec	58	3	1	Rotgen	Tiege	IP-Eupen, N29 to Destination.	987 FA Bn.	10.
V-41	20 Dec	58	3	1	Eupen	Tiege	IP-N29 to Destination.	987 FA Bn.	1.
V-42	20 Dec	25	1	1	Raeren	Limbourg	N28, N31.	506 Engr LP Co.	10.

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December 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. V.T'S	NO. SERIES	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	VOL. MAN CONVOY
V-43	21 Dec	40	2	1	Eupen	East	N27, N28, Eupen, N31, East to Dest.	9th Inf Div.	1.0
V-44	21 Dec	60	2	1	Eupen	East	N27, N28, Eupen, N31, East to Dest.	9th Inf Div.	1.0
V-45	21 Dec	40	2	1	Eupen	East	N27, N28, Eupen, N31, East to Dest.	9th Inf Div.	1.0
V-46	21 Dec	30	1	1	Eupen	East	N27, N28, Eupen, N31, East to Dest.	9th Inf Div.	1.0
V-47	21 Dec	30	1	1	Rotgen	Jalhay	Rotgen, Eupen, N29, Destination.	112 Engr. (C) Bn.	11.0
V-48	21 Dec	96	5	1	Rotgen	Sart	Rotgen, Eupen, N31, Verviers, southwest to Dest.	18 FA Bn.	11.5
V-49	21 Dec	200	8	2	Rotgen	Eupen	Rotgen-Eupen	CCR	10.
V-50	25 Dec	45	2	1	Eupen	Sghaze	Herbesthal, N3-left on N-3 to Dest	614 Ord.	1.
V-52	21 Dec	29	1	1	La Reid	Stoloul	La Reid, N29 to Jalhay, N27 to Jot. N27 & N28, N27 to Destination.	20 Engineer	9.
V-53	22 Dec	29	1	1	La Reid	Stoloul	Same as Above	20 Engineer	9.
V-54	23 Dec	35	1	1	Eupen	Jot N3 & N40	Herbesthal, N3, left on N3 to Destination.	557 Ordnance	1.
V-55	22 Dec	14	1	1	Delhain	Camp Elsenborn	IP, N29, RJ N27 & N28, N27, N28, N27, Sourbredt, right on unnumbered rte to dest.	99 GM	18.
V-56	22 Dec	72	4	1	Camp Elsenborn	Verviers	N27	Ivanhoe Service Btry.	
V-57	22 Dec	40	2	1	Balen	Henri-Cappele	N31, Eupen, North to N3 left to Dest.	508 Engr LP Co.	
V-58	22 Dec	30	1	1	Balen	Henri-Cappele	N31, Eupen, north to N3 left to Dest.	610 Engr Lt EQ Co.	

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[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
V-59	22 Dec	38	2	1	Goe Bethane	Henri-Chappelle	Goe Bethane, Limburg, to dest.	990 Engr Co.	1.0
V-60	22 Dec	32	1	1	Jalhay	Henri-Chappelle	Jalhay, N27, Battice, N3 to dest.	608 Engr LP Co.	8.0
V-61	22 Dec	30	1	1	Jalhay	Henri-Chappelle	Jalhay, Limburg, dest.	990 Engr. Co.	8.0
V-62	23 Dec	90	8	1	948304	Sart	Rotgen, Eupen, N29, Sart.	Victoria	22.1
V-63	22 Dec	20	1	1	Kettenis	X-739128	IP-Eupen-N29 to dest.	461 AAA AW "C"	12.0.
V-63A	23 Dec	22	1	1	977344	Vic of Eupen	Rotgen-Eupen	190 FA Bn.	10.0
V-64	23 Dec	20	1	1	Kettenis	RJ-62[illegible]	IP-Eupen-N29 to dest.	461 AAA AW "D"	12.0.
V-64A	23 Dec	22	1	1	977344	Vic of Eupen	Rotgen-Eupen	190 FA Bn	10.0
V-65	25 Dec	22	1	1	977344	Vic of Eupen	Rotgen-Eupen	190 FA Bn.	10.0
V-66	25 Dec	22	1	1	Eupen	Sourbrodt	N29 to N27 to dest.	200 FA Bn.	17.0
V-68	23 Dec	22	1	1	Eupen	Sourbordt	N29 to N27 to dest.	200 FA Bn.	10.0
V-69	24 Dec	575			Zweifall	West of Eupen	Zweifall-Rott-Rotgen-Eupen-N51	CCA 6th Armd Div.	10.9
V-70	24 Dec	135			Zweifall	West of Eupen	Zweifall-Rott-Rotgen-Eupen-N51	"	10.9
V-71	24 Dec	560			Zweifall	West of Eupen	Zweifall-Rott-Rotgen-Eupen-N51	CCB 6th Armd Div.	15.6
V-72	24 Dec	14	1	1	Camp Elsenborn	Verviers	IP-Sourbrodt-N27 to dest.	QM 2nd Inf Div.	10.5

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
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MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH December 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
[illegible]	[illegible]	24	1	1	Verviers	Gray Kleinborn	[illegible]	[illegible] Inf Div.	16.5
[illegible]	[illegible]	20	1	1	Stolberg	Aachen via Jülich	[illegible]	Hotrie 16	1.0
[illegible]	[illegible]	20	1	1	Stolberg		[illegible]	872 FA	1.0
[illegible]	[illegible]	120	6	1	Eupen	Verviers	[illegible]	506 Ord.	1.0
[illegible]	[illegible]	20	1	1	Stolberg	Eupen	[illegible]	661 FA	2.5
[illegible]	[illegible]	40	2	1	Aachen	Sur Ourthe	[illegible]	102 Cml	4.7
[illegible]	[illegible]	12	1	1	Eupen	Bergenbach	[illegible]	480 AAA	11.5
[illegible]	[illegible]	7	1	1	Eupen	Vieuxr		480 AAA (1 btry)	1.5
[illegible]	[illegible]	15	1	1	Bitburg	Eupen	[illegible] to Eupen	10 Tk Bn.	12.0
[illegible]	[illegible]	207	16	6	Malmedy	Poperinge	[illegible] to dest.	5 Armd Div. Trans.	
[illegible]	[illegible]	18	1	1	Bitburg	Bergen	[illegible]	805 TD (12th)	11.0
[illegible]	[illegible]	18	1	1	Bitburg	Bergen	[illegible]	480 AAA(2 btrs)	10.0
[illegible]	[illegible]	18	1	1	Bitburg	Bergen	[illegible]	805 TD (1 Bn)	11.0
[illegible]	[illegible]	60	3	1	Eupen	Verviers	[illegible]	639 AAA AW Bn	10.0
[illegible]	[illegible]	40	2	1	Pot 107 & 108	Eupen	[illegible]	126 AAA	7.5

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
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TRAFFIC REGULATIONS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH December 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHC.	NO. MAJ'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
V-83	30 Dec	54	3	1	Eupen	Verviers	N-31	602 AAA	9.3
V-84	30 Dec	36	1	1	Julhay	Verviers	N-27	602 AAA	7.8
	10 - 11 12 Dec	2000			St. Vith	Cp. Elsenborn	N-27	2nd Inf Div	18.0
	13 Dec	650			VIII Corps	Waimes	N-23 & N-27	CC "B" 9th Armd	18.5
	17 Dec	450			Battice	Cp. Elsenborn	N-31, N-28, N-27	CT 16, 1st Inf Div	18.4
	17 Dec	450			Battice	Eupen	N-28	CT 18, 1st Inf Div	1.0
	17 Dec	450			Eupen	Sourbrodt	N-28, N-27	CT 18, 1st Inf Div	18.5
TOTALS		10632	217	106					1282.2

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MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. W.M'S	NO. SEMI'S	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	WEIGHT IN CONVOY
M-78	11/30	111	5	1	Eupen	Holzheim	Eupen, N28, Malmedy, N32, Bullingen, Honsfeld to destination.	413 AAA	35.0
M-79	11/30	122	5	1	Eupen	Heppenbach	Eupen, N28, Malmedy, N32, CR(918988), to destination	440 AAA	32.8
J-82	11/30	47	2	1	Eupen	Camp Elsenborn	N27 and N28 to Camp Elsenobrn.	47 Inf Regt.	15.9
E-21	12/2	158	6	2	St Vith	VII Corps	Malmedy, N32, Francorchamps, Sart, Polleur, Verviers, N31, Eupen, N28&N29, Eynatten, Kornelmünster, to dest.	629 TD Bn (Sp)	38.8
J-83	11/30	34	2	1	VII Corps	Verviers	N28&N29 to Eupen, N31 to Verviers.	47 Inf Regt.	1.0
J-85	12/1	24	3	1	Eupen	Camp Elsenborn	N28&N29, Eupen, N28&N27 to RJ(N27&N32) N32, Butgenbach, Camp Elsenborn.	Cannon Co. 47 Inf Regt.	15.9
J-86	12/1	115	4	1	Eupen	Camp Elsenborn	N28&N29, Eupen, N28&N27 to RJ(N27&N32) N32, Butgenbach, Camp Elsenobrn.	84 FA Bn.	15.9
J-88	12/1	20	1	1	Eupen	Camp Elsenborn.	N28&N29, Eupen, N28&N27 to RJ(N27&N32) N32, Butgenbach, Camp Elsenborn.	Co B 47 Inf Regt	15.9
J-87	12/1	51	2	1	Eupen	Camp Elsenborn	N28&N29, Eupen, N28&N27 to RJ(K852907) left to dest.	1st Bn 47 Inf Regt	15.9
J-89	12/1	20	1	1	Eupen	Camp Elsenborn	N28&N29, Eupen, N28&N27 to RJ(K852907) left to dest.	Co B 47 Inf Regt	15.9
J-90	12/2	70	3	1	Neudorf	VII Corps	Neudorf, Rotgen, NR 258 to dest.	Hq 5th Armd Division	4.1
J-1	12/2	30	1	1	Rotgen	VII Corps	Neudorf, Rotgen, NR 253 to dest.	Hq 5th Armd Division	4.1
J-2	12/2	140	5	1	Eupen	VII Corps	N31, Eupen, N28&N29 to dest.	Rcn Sqd. 5th Armd Div.	1.5
J-3	12/3	50	3	1	Eupen	Spa	N31 to dest	2nd Ord MM Co.	1.0

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December 1944

WITHDRAWAL TRAIN	DATE	NO. VEH.	NO. W'N'S	NO. SERVICE	L. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILES IN COMPANIES
E-22	12/2	490	24	6	Eupen	Vicinity of Aachen	N28 and N29 to Dest.	330 HOT	3.4
E-23	12/2	25	1	1	Ettelbruck	VII Corps	St Vith, Malmedy, N32, Francorchamps Sart, Polleur, Verviers, N31, Eupen N28 & N29, Eynatten, Kornelmunster, Dest.	728 Ord.	19.6
J-12	12/3	80	4	1	Eupen	929124	N28 & N27, Camp Elsenborn to dest.	196 FA Bn.	19.3
J-4	12/4	400	14	5	Eupen	Luxembourg	N28 and N31	22 Inf (CT 22)	18.5
E-24	12/4	488	18	6	Eupen	Jayhawk	N31 to Dest.	83 Inf Div.	4.6
Doc/Adv 2/	12/4	60	2	1	Francorchamps	Butgenbach	N32, Malmedy, to dest.	863 AW	17.D
E-25	12/5	51	1	1	Eupen	Rotgen	N31 to Dest.	286 FA Obsn Bn.	10.0
J-	12/4	48	2	1	Rott	Camp Elsenborn	Rott on route "B" to Eupen to Camp Elsenborn	CM Trk Cos.	28.3
J-20	12/5	150	15	6	890087	Jayhawk Area	West on N 27, right on N 27 to Eupen to Dest.	CT 39	20.9
J-8	12/5	50	2	1	Rott	Luxembourg	Route B, N28, Eupen N31 to Dest.	4th Div Trains	19.6
E-21	12/5	175	6	2	Eupen	VII Corps	N31, Eupen, N31 to Destination.	83 Inf Div.	4.6
M-2	12/5	30	4	2	Eupen	VII Corps	N31, Eupen, N31 to Destination.	83 Inf Div.	4.6
E-32	12/5	185	6	1	Eupen	VII Corps	N31, Eupen, N31 to Destination.	83 Inf Div.	4.6
	12/5	38	1	1	Verviers	Camp Elsenborn	N27 to Destination.		18.7

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MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

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MONTH December 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
J-34	12/7	195	5	1	Elsenborn	Jayhawk	N28 and N27 to destination	84 FA Bn. 47 Inf Regt	8.4
J-35	12/7	385	12	4	Elsenborn	Jayhawk	N28 and N27 to destination	34 FA Bn. 47 Inf Regt	8.0
J-5	12/8	550	19	9	Eupen	Luxembourg	N28 to dest.	12 Inf RCT	18.5
M-5	12/8	560	20	4	Eupen	Vicinity of Rotgen	N31 to Destination.	309 RCT	10.0
J-37	12/8	25	1	1	Rotgen	VII Corps	NR 258 to destination.	5th Armd Div Arty	2.8
J-48	12/8	150	5	1	Rotgen	9236	NR 258	71 Armd FA Bn	1.0
J-49	12/8	45	2	1	Rotgen	9135	NR 258	628 TD Bn.	1.0
C-291	12/8	36	2	1	Eupen	Malmedy	N28 to destination	556 Amb Co.	18.5
C-292	12/8	17	1	1	Verviers	Malmedy	N27 to destination	422 Coll Co.	20.0
[illegible]	12/9	40	2	1	Eupen	Vicinity of Rotgen	N31 to destination	Adv 329 RCT	10.0
M-6	12/9	524	20	1	Eupen	Vicinity of Rotgen	N31 to destination	78 Inf Div 311 RCT	10.0
J-40	12/9	100	3	1	Eupen	VII Corps	N27 and N28 to Destination.	9 Inf Div Rear	4.5
C-311	12/9	150	6	2	Verviers	St Vith	N27, N28, Malmedy to destination.	820 TD Bn	20.0
G-2	12/8	125	5	1	0437	Walhorn	021384, Hurtgen, Zweifall, Rott, Heudorf to destination.	CC "B"	8.0
G-5	12/13	160	5	1	Eupen	990355	N28, Kornelimunster, Zweifall, to destination.		4.0

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MONTH December 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
G-6	12/11	75	3	1	005359	Scurbrodt	Zweifall, Mulartshutte, Rott, to Merols, N28, Eupen, N27 to dest.	644 TD Bn.	31.5
J-60	12/11	100	5	1	Eupen	Henri-Capelle	NW on unnumbered road to N3, N3 to dest.	16 Inf.	1.0
/Dex	12/11	20	1	1	Via of Hurtgen	Hurtgen	051367 to 047360	1 Btry Misc.	3.0
A-58	12/11	100	5	1	Eupen	Henri-Capelle	NW on unnumbered road to N3, N3 to dest.	16 Inf.	1.0
K-59	12/11	40	2	1	Rotgen	N929326	N258, Rotgen to dest.	QM Trk Co.	8.3
D-3	12/11	70	5	1	Eupen	Rotgen	Eupen, N28 to dest.	DIXON	10.0
D-4	12/11	25	1	1	Eupen	Rotgen	Eupen, N28 to dest.	DIXON	10.0
D-7	12/11	50	3	1	Eupen	Rotgen	Eupen, N28 to dest.	308 FA Bn.	10.0
E-4	12/12	17	1	1	Rotgen	Eupen	Rotgen, North route to dest.	8 Div Reg.	10.0
A-31	12/12	31	2	1	Eupen	Aachen	N31, Eupen, N28 to dest.	785 Ord.	1.0
J-65	12/12	40	2	1	Eupen	883207	N31 to dest.		1.0
Dea/ c/77	12/12	37	2	1	Malmedy	Butgenbach	N32 to dest.	776 FA Bn.	9.3
Dea/ c/78	12/12	68	3	1	Malmedy	Butgenbach	N32 to dest.	776 FA Bn.	9.3
J-63	12/12	100	4	1	Mutzenich	Battice	N31, Eupen, Herbestahl, Henri-Capelle, N3 to dest.	16 Inf Regt	1.0
G-8	12/15	17	1	1	Rotgen	Paris	Rotgen, N31, Eupen, Verviers to dest.	8 Div Reg.	10.0

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MONTH December 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
M-14	12/9	92	6	2	Malmedy	St Vith	N32 to Malmedy, N23 to dest.	476 CM Bn.	13.0
[illegible] 63	12/10	204	12	2	Corps Bdry. N32	Bullingen	N32 to dest.	639 AAA	19.0
B-29	12/10	304	20	5	Eupen	Eschweiller	N31 to dest.	329 GT (Adv)	1.0
G-5	12/10	17	1	1	Rotgen	Paris	Rotgen, Eupen, N31, Verviers.	Granite Rec.	14.6
M-12	12/10	24	1	1	Malmedy	St Vith	N32, N23 to Dest.	634 AAA	1.0
M-13	12/10	65	5	1	Stavelot	St Vith	N33 to Dest.	634 AAA	1.0
M-19	12/10	14	1	1	N27	VII Corps N27	N27 to dest.	965 FA Bn.	10.5
J-54	12/10	48	2	1	Rotgen	VII Corps	NR 258 to dest.	3891 CM Trk Co.	21.0
D-1	12/10	90	5	1	Eupen	Rotgen	N-28 to dest.	307 FA Bn.	10.0
J-9	12/10	20	1	1	Eupen	Luxembourg	N28 to dest.	8th Inf Div.	18.5
J-10	12/10	20	1	1	Eupen	Luxembourg	N28 to dest.	8th Inf Div.	18.5
J-11	12/11	20	1	1	Eupen	Luxembourg	N28 and N31 to dest.	8th Inf Regt.	18.5
J-12	12/11	50	2	1	Eupen	Luxembourg	N28 and N31 to Dest.	70th Tank Bn.	18.5
J-50	12/11	295	15	4	Heismes	Zweifall	N32, Malmedy, N28, Eupen, N26, to destination.	5 Armd Div Trns.	5.0
J-7	12/12	500	20	4	Eupen	Luxembourg	N28 to dest.	8th Inf Regt	18.5

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MONTH December 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
[illegible]	12 Dec	[illegible]	12	6	Eupen	Anahen	[illegible], Eupen, [illegible] to destination	72 Ord Bn.	1.0
[illegible]	12 Dec	10	1	1	Eupen	Eupen	[illegible] to Eupen	554 Engineers	1.0
[illegible]	12 Dec	10	1	1	Eupen	Eupen	[illegible] to Eupen	554 Engineers	1.0
[illegible]	12 Dec	50	5	1	Eupen	VII Corps	[illegible], [illegible]	FA Bn.	1.0
[illegible]	16 Dec	37	1	1	Roetgen	Eupen	Roetgen, Eupen	Granite	10.0
[illegible]	16 Dec	36	1	1	Roetgen	Berle	Roetgen, Eupen, [illegible], to Dest.	Granite	10.0
[illegible]	16 Dec	12	1	1	Roetgen	Eupen	Roetgen, Eupen	Granite	10.0
[illegible]	16 Dec	84	1	4	Schmidlar	Roetgen	E-Stolberg-Vlein-Smithli-Roet-to destination.	7th FA	10.0
Rep/1	17 Dec	168	1	1	[illegible]-[illegible]	Kleinhern	[illegible],[illegible], [illegible], unnumbered road to dest.	143 AAA	9.6
[illegible]	17 Dec	[illegible]			[illegible], [illegible]	Comp Kleinhern	[illegible] & unnumbered Rte to dest.	26 Inf Regt.	9.6
[illegible]	17 Dec	[illegible]			[illegible]	VIII Corps	[illegible] to Malmedy to destination.	7 Armd Div.	30.2
[illegible]	17 Dec	1000			Twin Bunks	Vienna	[illegible] to destination	7 Armd Div.	6.4
[illegible]	18 Dec	30	1	1	Eupen	[illegible]	Eupen-[illegible]-Dest	205 FA O Bn.	1.0
[illegible]	19 Dec	[illegible]			Eupen	Comp Kleinhern	Eupen-[illegible]-[illegible] to dest.	9th Inf Div.	10.0

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

(9) 42

MONTH December 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
[illegible]	[illegible]	110	1	1	Rupen	Bolgen	Rupen-Bolgen	882 AAA Bn	10.0
[illegible]	21 Dec	24	1	1	Bolgen	Hurtin	Bolgen, Rupen, Verviers, Theux, HSI Eupenbenge, Aywaille, HIS to Dest.	187 FA Bn.	11.5
[illegible]	21 Dec	20	1	1	Rupen	Hockay	HSI A HSD, Rupen, HSI to Destination.	193 FA Bn.	1.0
[illegible]	21 Dec	20	1	1	Rupen	Hockay	HSI A HSD, Rupen, HSI to Destination .	963 FA Bn	1.0
Rup/22	22 Dec	27	2	1	Batt	Via Kleanberg	Batt-Bolgen-Rupen HSD, HSI to Destination TD		32.0
[illegible]	22 Dec	108	1	1	Rupen	VII Corps	HSD, HSD to Rupen to Destination	4 Cavalry Group	1.0
[illegible]	23 Dec	48	1	1	Rupen	VII Corps	HSD, HSD to Rupen to Destination	420 AAA	1.0
[illegible]	24 Dec	24	1	1	Rupen	VII Corps	HSD, HSD to Rupen to Destination.	176 AAA	1.0
[illegible]	24 Dec	24	1	1	Rupen	VII Corps	HSD, HSD to Rupen to Destination.	116 AAA	1.0
[illegible]	24 Dec	20	1	1	Smithfall	Mons(BOSCOTS)	Smithfall-Bolgen-Rupen-HSD-HSI-HSD to Destination.	76 FA	17.0
[illegible]	24 Dec	24	1	1	Rupen	Aywaille	Verviers-Theux-Jemeppine-Remonbenge-dest.	628 TD "C"	1.0
[illegible]	24 Dec	20	1	1	Rupen	Aywaille	SAME	240 FA	1.0
[illegible]	24 Dec	100	4	1	Rupen	Hasse	HSD-HSI	629 TD	13.0
[illegible]	25 Dec	6	1	1	Verviers	Camp Kleanberg H27		25 Inf.	18.0
[illegible]	25 Dec	60	1	1	[illegible]	Verkennt	[illegible] H-27	708 TD (1 Co)	15.0

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH [redacted]

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH December 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
M-122	28 Dec	77	4	1	Eupen	Pilot	N-31	552 FA	1.0
M-123	28 Dec	23	1	1	Eupen	Pilot	N-31	552 FA	1.0
M-124	28 Dec	20	1	1	Eupen	Master	N-31	79 FA Gp.	1.0
I-7	28 Dec	16	1	1	Camp Elsenborn	Eupen	N-31	34 FA	3.0
I-8	29 Dec	30	1	1	Camp Elsenborn	Z27216	IP-Sourbrodt-N27	812 TD	19.6
	18 Dec	[illegible]			Eupen	Malmedy	B-27 & B-28	83 Inf Div	[illegible]
	23 Dec	[illegible]			Eupen	VII Corps	B-31	8th Armd Div	[illegible]
	18 Dec	375			Eupen	Vic Eupen	B-31 (Emph)	CC "A" 8 Armd Div	6.0
	18 Dec	375			Eupen	VII Corps	B-31	CC "A" 8 Armd Div	6.0
	23 Dec	450			Eupen	Nutgeulch	B-31	47th RCT	11.0
	23 Dec	[illegible]			Eupen	Cp. Elsenborn	B-31, B-32, B-27	60th RCT	18.0
	27 Dec	[illegible]			Tongres	VIII Corps	B-27 & B-28	CC "B" 9th Armd	18.5
TOTALS		[illegible]	810	175					1550.7

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-5
APO 305, U. S. Army

: SECRET :
:Auth: CG, V Corps :
:Date: 4 Jan 45 :
:Init: :

4 January 1945.

ACTION AGAINST ENEMY, REPORTS AFTER/AFTER ACTION REPORTS

Section V - G-5 Military Government Report.

1. OPERATIONS

1 - 7 December 1944 - Offensive

a. Map References:

1/100,000 Sheet S 1 - BONN.

b. The CA/Mil Gov Detachments attached to this Corps on 1 December 1944 were: (See Annex A).

D7C1	MALMEDY	Capt Welsh	Attached to V Corps
I11D2	MALMEDY	Lieut Banigan	Attached to V Corps (Under D7C1)
I10G2	WAIMES	Capt Spitler	Attached to V Corps (Under D7C1)
I5D2	STAVELOT	Capt Ryherson	Attached to V Corps (Under D7C1)
D4G1	EUPEN	Capt Cannon	Attached to V Corps
H6H2	EUPEN (Kreis)	Maj Stasts	Attached to V Corps
I4G2	MONSCHAU (Ger.)	Capt Goetcheus	Attached to V Corps
I4H2	BULLINGEN	Capt Hill	Attached to 99th U.S. Inf Div
G1H2	ROETGEN (Ger.)	Maj Boney	Attached to 8th U.S. Inf Div

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Major Asa B. Gardiner reported to the 99th U.S. Infantry Division on 1 December 1944 completing personnel of the Military Government Section of that Division.

Upon direction of the Corps Commander, in order to conserve on personnel, the Corps Military Government Police were streamlined to an irreducible minimum and all other personnel were returned to their units. The new directive is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

Verbal authority was received that review of Summary Military Government Court cases by the Appointing Authority was no longer necessary. All cases received will be held 10 days pending filing of Petition for Review in which case actual review would be necessary. If no Petition is filed and no review is in fact deemed necessary the case is forwarded by covering letter to the next higher echelon. This procedure was confirmed later in the month by receipt of "Directive for Military Government of Germany" of 23 November 1944 from Twelfth Army Group. This directive was received by Corps and Division without indorsement of any kind from First U.S. Army and confusion existed as to the effect of previous instructions from Corps as to disposition of these cases until eliminated by the revocation of Corps instruction in conflict with the Twelfth Army Group directive.

Corporal Rodney L. Stahl assigned this Section was placed on DS with G-5 Section, Headquarters First U.S. Army and orders transferring him to that organization were later received. Private First Class Berney Ewing of Headquarters V Corps was placed on temporary duty with this Section.

Russian Nationals from the Displaced Persons Center at VERVIERS, which is unguarded, were apprehended in EUPEN on a number of occasions. These persons had left the Center without permission. This emphasizes the need for close guarding of Displaced Persons Centers if occupants are to be effectively restrained.

Three British War Correspondents were encountered by Lt Col Pharr in the course of a Staff Visit to Mil Gov Detachment I402 at MONSCHAU. These Correspondents had failed to contact Corps prior to making their visit and each submitted derogatory stories on Mil Gov operations in MONSCHAU which, when investigated proved untrue and their stories were held up by the Censor at First U.S. Army.

The 78th U.S. Infantry Division newly arrived on the Continent was attached to this Corps. On investigation it was learned that the Division had no Military Government Section although a requisition had been submitted through Headquarters Ninth Army. Since no definite information could be obtained as to the prospective arrival date of this personnel, steps were taken in conjunction with the Personnel Section, G-5, First U.S. Army to supply the personnel. Capt Cannon and three enlisted men of CA Detachment D401 were furnished. Capt Cannon subsequently expressed himself as feeling he was not qualified to be a Regimental Mil Gov Officer and was returned to the Military Government Center of First U.S. Army. Subsequently a complete Staff Section of Officers and men arrived and the improvised personnel was returned.

Billeting was a continuing problem using one-half to three-fourth s of the time of all Detachments under this Corps. It was necessary for Major Roberts of this Section to proceed to ROETGEN to assist in the billeting of the Headquarters of the 78th U.S. Infantry Division. Additional space was made by arranging for the return of all AACHEN refugees to that city.

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(2) 8 - 15 December 1944 - Offensive

(a) Map References:

1/100,000, Sheet S 1 - BONN

(b) On 8 December 1944, Capt Hancock, Archives Officer of G-5 Section, First U.S. Army advised this Headquarters that in response to repeated requests from this Section arrangements had been completed for the removal of the archives at AMBLEVE or their transfer to the Burgermeister of AMBLEVE. A copy of a letter submitted by him for dispatch from the G-5 Section at First U.S. Army was furnished this Headquarters but the original was never received, nor were the Archives ever removed nor the responsibility of this Section for their safekeeping relieved. As a consequence, a guard detail of six MGP's was maintained throughout the period. Two additional MP's were sent to rescue this detail on 17 December 1944 when AMBLEVE was captured by the Germans. None have been heard of since. It is reported that some or all were among the Allied prisoners massacred by the Germans.

Violation of chain of command by officers of higher echelons in failing to coordinate with Corps and Divisions prior to visiting in their area continued. In one instance a spy scare was investigated caused by the obscure actions of a Major Sperlin of the G-5 Section, Twelfth Army Group.

On 9 December 1944, a systematic house to house search was conducted by CIC at MONSCHAU to discover what irregularities might exist, indicative of subversive activity or violation of Military Government Laws. The investigation revealed no violations of any consequence. This represented a tribute to the efficiency of Capt Goetchsus' Mil Gov Detachment I4G2. This investigation further belied the derogatory reports made by the British War Correspondents as mentioned above.

Consumption of power in the EUPEN area was required to be reduced by 50% because of the unavailability of rail transportation, under the control of the highest echelon, to haul coal to the central power plant at LIEGE. Detachment H6H2 made a survey of civilian requirements and reduced them to an absolute minimum and a survey of military needs was made by Corps personnel. As a result, better than 35% reduction was effected which satisfied the civilian power officials and the threat of loss of all civilian power which would have closed railroad terminals being used exclusively by the military, hospitals and other essential activities was avoided.

Request that a Claims Officer from Advance Section, Communication Zone, come forward to pass on claims while units responsible and evidence are both present was made but had not been acted upon at the end of the month.

The 2d U.S. Infantry Division returned to the Corps for the first time since the early days in Normandy. This Division's very efficient Mil Gov Section under Lt Col Keller, participated in an exchange of experiences in Military Government operation in Germany in a conference called by this Section and attended by MGO's of 8th, 99th, and 78th U.S. Infantry Divisions. Parts of the 5th Armored Division were with the Corps during the period.

Capt James M. Roberts, Jr., O-387809, Infantry, G-5 Section, Headquarters V Corps was promoted to the rank of Major on 12 December 1944. Colonel Pendleton, C.O. European Civil Affairs Division in response to inquiry from this Headquarters stated that all Second Lieutenants serving in CA/Mil Gov Detachments would be automatically promoted to First Lieutenants. At the end of the month none

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under this Corps had been projected.

The coordination of Staff Visit from the various branches of G-5 Section, First U.S. Army and specialist officers attached thereto, a source of constant interruption to smooth operation of CA/Mil Gov Detachments was undertaken by Lt Col Thurmond, First U.S. Army. After conference with Colonel Moroney, Corps G-5, a simple and long needed method of control was announced and duplication and needless time-consuming excursions were forbidden.

(3) 16 - 31 December 1944 - Defensive

(a) Map References:

1/100,000, Sheet S I - BONN

(b) During the early morning hours of 16 December 1944, the city of EUPEN was subjected to long range artillery fire. Fragments turned in to Detachment H6H2 indicated shells were manufactured on 1 October 1944. A general attack on a 60 mile front running from MONSCHAU south was initiated by the Germans on this date. As a result a general readjustment of U.S. Forces was necessary. This movement together with enemy shelling, renewal of air attack and rumors caused great unrest and excitement among civilians throughout the Corps Zone. For security reasons all circulation into or out of EUPEN was frozen. Military Government Police were called upon to effectively control this policy.

The trial by General Military Government Court of Karl Arno Punseler, a mature German National 16 years old and head of the 125[illegible] Hitler Jugend Members of MONSCHAU, for conveying military information to a German patrol and to carry food to German outposts began in EUPEN on 16 December 1944. The case was continued once to 19 December 1944 and resulted in a conviction and sentence of death which was approved by the Corps Commander. At the end of the month no disposition had been made by the First U.S. Army as confirming authority. One reason ascribed for the delay was the lack of an executioner to behead the prisoner in accordance with German Law as provided in the Military Government directives.

During the early morning hours of 17 December 1944, the enemy overran BULLINGEN where Mil Gov Detachment I4H2 was located. Capt Hill and his Detachment escaped capture but lost personal and organic equipment.

An alert was received by this Section at 0430 hours on 17 December 1944 that widespread landings of German parachutists had been made in this area. All Detachments were notified excepting I1OG2 at WAIMES to whom there was no connection. Lt Col Pharr departed for the area and on arrival at MALMEDY learned that Detachment I1OG2, Capt Spitler, had departed from WAIMES at 1205 hours five minutes before the arrival of the enemy. WAIMES is about 4 miles east of MALMEDY and no known combat units remained between WAIMES and MALMEDY. After conferring with the local medical units which were the remaining military units in MALMEDY and learning that they planned to evacuate, Lt Col Pharr approved Capt Welsh's plan to withdraw his Detachment, D7C1 (with female American Red Cross Workers attached) and Lt Banigan's Detachment, I11D2. The courage of Dr. Van Anchers, woman Belgian Red Cross Doctor who had been attending the six thousand (6000) odd refugees remaining in MALMEDY, was outstanding. She was offered transportation by the Detachment to evacuate herself in view of her close collaboration with the Allied Forces. On learning that the two male civilian doctors in MALMEDY were fleeing, she declined the opportunity and remained knowing full well the fate awaiting her on the arrival of the Germans.

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Military Government Police Detachments 460 and 461 did not withdraw and upon departure of Capt Welsh these two Detachments did heroic work in maintaining law and order among the civilians until the 30th U.S. Infantry Division arrived beginning 19th December 1944. This Division protested vehemently against the withdrawal of these V Corps MGP after 30th Division passed to the XVIII Airborne Corps and a temporary delay was granted to permit their improvisation of a similar unit.

When the enemy paratroopers were dropped in the early morning hours of the 17th and again on the 18th, the first call was to Mil Gov Police to maintain outposts around the city, send out searching parties for paratroopers and other tactical uses pending organization of combat and service troops to take over these functions which are very foreign to their primary mission of civilian control. However, the response of Mil Gov Police to this emergency was highly commendable and their effectiveness was only diminished by their recently reduced strength. Many paratroopers were captured by Mil Gov Police and by their continual presence alone gave reassurance to the civilian population that the U.S. Forces were not withdrawing.

Corps boundaries made sudden changes due to the changing tactical situation. The 8th and 78th U.S. Infantry Division passed to XIX Corps. The 1st and 9th U.S. Infantry Division joined the Corps and the 30th U.S. Infantry Division was with the Corps for 24 hours. Detachment G1H2 at ROETGEN, D7C1 and I11D2 at MALMEDY, I5D2 at STAVELOT were lost to the Corps due to changes in boundaries.

No Civ Aff/Mil Gov personnel attached to the Corps were wounded or captured in the course of the break through.

Particular heroic action by Capt Goetchsus of Mil Gov Detachment I4G2 at MONSCHAU reflected credit upon himself, his Detachment and Mil Gov as a whole. MONSCHAU, GERMANY was the northern objective of the German attack and was relatively lightly held by U.S. troops. When the attack began, many Headquarters which were billeted in the town, withdrew to more strategical positions for the conduct of the defense. Seeing these units moving out amid an intense shelling, the civilians became panicky. Capt Goetchsus, when faced with the decision of remaining at great personal risk in the event of capture or withdrawing with the tactical troops, chose to stay to prevent a flood of refugees on the one road by which reinforcements were being brought to MONSCHAU. No civilians left MONSCHAU. However, 453 persons left voluntarily or were ordered out of MUTZENICH by tactical units. They proceeded westward, collected in a farm on the outskirts of EUPEN on being stopped by Corps Mil Gov Police outposts. These persons, by arrangements with MASTER G-5, were placed under the supervision of CA Displaced Persons Detachment D2E1. Attached as exhibits C through C are samples of a notice to civilians in MONSCHAU and pictures of a Mil Gov Summary Court trial held by Detachment I4G2.

One hundred fifty (150) political prisoners were moved by civilians with CA assistance from EUPEN to BRUSSELS. Authority was also received to permit any civilians who had collaborated with U.S. Forces to evacuate themselves in the event of withdrawal of U.S. Forces from any area.

On 22nd December 1944, Capt Goetchsus of I4G2 at MONSCHAU received a letter of surrender from Lt Col Von der Heydte, Commanding Officer of the paratroopers who dropped in the EUPEN-MALMEDY area. Such was the control by this Detachment over the civilian population that when the German officer who sought aid of a fellow German national presented himself at midnight at the civilian house, this man waited until the moment curfew lifted and reported the presence

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of the officer and delivered the surrender letter. A total of 25 other paratroopers were similarly turned in by civilians of MONSCHAU.

The presence of German nationals in the very front lines of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division caused a request for permission to evacuate approximately 300 of them. Arrangements were completed and they were placed in the Displaced Persons Center at HOMBURG which is run by First U.S. Army.

The Corps Commander entertained the idea of evacuation of the city of MONSCHAU for security reasons and a personal inspection was made by Colonel Gunn, the Army G-5, and preliminary indications were that First Army would not approve the action in view of the facts found by the investigating officer. The Corps Commander later discarded the idea for the present.

Belgian Armee Blanche personnel, the Resistance Group who refused to surrender their arms, showed up in this area stating they had been sent out by their Commander in BRUSSELS. Investigation showed them to be irregulars adn after holding their officers overnight they were directed to return to their place of origin.

The 5th and 6th Companies of the 6th Belgian Fusiliers Battalion were attached to the Corps and operate under the Corps Security Officer, who also commands the Mil Gov Police. These authorized Belgian Army troops were put on static guard posts and further relieved Mil Gov Police to perform their normal functions.

The status of CA/Mil Gov Staffs and Detachments at the end of the period was as indicated in the attached overlay. (Exhibit M).

2. Recommendations:

The recommendation contained in the report of this Section for November 1944 that a Battalion of Mil Gov Police be made available to Corps is renewed.

T. J. MORONEY,
Colonel, GSC,
A C of S., G-5.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305, U. S. ARMY

320 2 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Military Government Police.

TO : See Distribution.

1. The V Corps Provisional Military Government Police Force is reorganized as follows:

PERSONNEL:

Hq 3rd TD Group	Hq PMGP
Det 893rd TD Bn	1 Officer - 15 EM
Det 112th Engr Bn	1 Officer - 15 EM
Det 254th Engr Bn	1 Officer - 15 EM
Det 460th AAA Bn	1 Officer - 15 EM
Det 461st AAA Bn	1 Officer - 15 EM
Det 190th FA Bn	1 Officer - 15 EM
Det 200th FA Bn	1 Officer - 15 EM

Overstrength of the above Detachments will be returned to their respective organizations.

2. The following cadres consisting of 1 officer and 4 EM each from Detachments returned to their parent organization will remain on duty with the Military Government Police for current operations and be prepared to reorganize the original detachments from previously trained or other personnel, when required for Military Government duty.

186th FA	941st FA
187th FA	955th FA

3. MGP Detachments which have been returned to parent organizations or detachments from units to be designated will be made available, with equipment, for Military Government Police duty, as required, and when directed by the Corps Commander.

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EXHIBIT "B"

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4. The reduction in strength will place increased emphasis on mobility. To meet this requirement, transportation will be provided by parent organization as follows:

a. For each Detachment of 1 officer and 15 EM:

1 - ¼ Ton Truck Total - 7
2 - 3/4 Ton Weapons Carrier Total - 14

b. For each Detachment of 1 Officer and 4 EM:

1 - ¼ Ton Truck Total - 4

By command of Major General GEROW:

Sam F. Teague, Jr.
SAM F. TEAGUE, JR.,
Major, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. General.

DISTRIBUTION: Special.

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NOTICE
to the Population of Monschau

1. Allied troops are forbidden to fraternize with German Nationals.

2. German Nationals are forbidden to fraternize with Allied troops.

   a. Violations by civilians will be punished under Par 43, Article II, of Military Government Ordnance No. 1.

3. Definition.

   a. Fraternization with Allied Military Personnel may, among other things, consist of:

      (1) Conversations of other than an official nature.

      (2) Offering, giving or receiving any gift.

      (3) Entertaining of soldiers in the homes or places of business of civilians.

      (4) Any other relations which bring civilians and soldiers into close contact.

4. a. If Allied Military Personnel demands entrance into a home or other premises for the purpose of conducting a search or other official business, they will be admitted.

   b. If articles other than those forbidden to civilians by Military Government order are taken, report may be made to the Military Government Office with full description of the alleged offender.

5. Alleged acts of misconduct towards civilians by Allied Military personnel may be reported to the Military Government, giving identifying information such as name, description, insignia, identification, by unit markings, numbers of motor vehicles or other facts which will aid in apprehending the responsible person.

6. Specific attention is called to the following paragraphs of Article II, Military Government Ordnance No. 1: **OFFENSES**

   a. "(31) Unauthorized possession, control or disposition of property belonging to the Allied Forces or to a member of the Allied Forces."

   b. "(34) False assumption of authority from the Allied Forces; wrongful posesssion or control of any part of an Allied uniform, whether genuine or false."

   c. Possession of Allied clothing, food or other supplies or material by civilians will be presumed to be unlawful, and will be punished by Military Government Court.

By order of Military Government.

This Notice will be posted in a prominent place inside the main entrance of every dwelling and place of business in the city of Monschau.

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Bekanntmachung

für die Bevölkerung von Monschau !

1. Verbrüderung mit der deutschen Bevölkerung ist den Alliierten Truppen verboten.

2. Verbrüderung mit den Alliierten Truppen ist der Deutschen Bevölkerung verboten.

   a Vergehen von Zivilisten werden unter § 43, Artikel II, Militärregierungsverordnung Nr. 1 bestraft werden.

3. Bestimmung.

   a Verbrüderung mit den Mitgliedern der Streitkräfte der Vereinigten Nationen ist, unter anderem

   (1.) Andere Unterhaltungen als dienstlicher Natur.

   (2.) Anbieten, Geben oder Empfangen irgendwelcher Geschenke.

   (3.) Aufenthalt von Soldaten in Wohnungen oder Geschäften.

   (4.) Irgendwelche Verbindungen, die die Zivilbevölkerung in engen Kontakt mit den Soldaten bringen.

4. a Wenn Mitglieder der Alliierten Streitkräfte notgedrungen in ein Haus oder Geschäft zur Haussuchung oder anderer offizieller Geschäfte hineinmüssen, so ist dies erlaubt.

   b Wenn noch andere Sachen als die, die durch die Militärregierung der Zivilbevölkerung verboten sind, weggenommen werden, soll sofort ein Bericht der Militärregierung geschickt werden, mit voller Beschreibung des Täters.

5. Gesetzwidrige Handlungen von den Angehörigen der Alliierten Streitkräfte gegenüber der Zivilbevölkerung soll der Militärregierung gemeldet werden, mit Personalbeschreibung, wie Namen, Körperbeschreibung, Abzeichen, Einheitsnummern, Wagennummern und alle andern Angaben, die zur Festnahme des Schuldigen führen könnten.

6. Spezielle Beobachtung ist angebracht für die folgenden Paragraphen des Artikels II, Militärregierungsverordnung Nr. 1: **Strafbare Handlungen !**

   a „(31) Unbefugter Besitz von Verfügungsgewalt oder Verfügung über Eigentum der Alliierten Streitkräfte oder eines Angehörigen derselben."

   b „(34) Fälschliche Anmaßung einer von den Alliierten Streitkräften erteilten Amtsgewalt; unbefugter Besitz von oder Verfügungsmacht über irgend ein Stück einer Alliierten Uniform, einerlei ob echt oder falsch."

   c Besitz von Alliierten Bekleidung, Lebensmitteln oder anderer Ausrüstung oder Material von Zivilisten ist gesetzwidrig gemeint, und wird durch die Militärregierungs-Gerichte bestraft werden

Im Auftrag der Militärregierung

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S E C R E T

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Auth: CG, V Corps
Date: 2 Dec 1944
Init: OCM

HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, U.S. Army

319.1 2 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.

TO : The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

THROUGH: Commanding General, First U.S. Army, APO 230, U.S. Army.

1. In compliance with Paragraph 10 (Change 4), AR 345-105, and Letter, Headquarters, First United States Army, same subject and file, dated 13 July 1944, this Report After Action Against the Enemy by the V Corps, U.S. Army, for the period 1 November 1944 to 30 November 1944, inclusive, is submitted.

2. This report consists of the following sections:

Section I - OPERATIONS
Section II - INTELLIGENCE
Section III - PERSONNEL
Section IV - LOGISTICS
Section V - MILITARY GOVERNMENT

which are annexed hereto:

For the Commanding General:

ORLANDO C. HOOD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305, U.S.Army

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY
1 November 1944 to 30 November 1944

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

1. 010001A November 1944 to 092400A November 1944 - SCHMIDT-VOSSENACK Action.

Late in October V Corps, as regrouped, prepared for offensive operations in the SCHMIDT - VOSSENACK area, to begin early in November. The attack was to be made by the 28th Infantry Division in the northern part of the V Corps sector, in the area in which the 28th Infantry Division had relieved the 9th Infantry Division.

The 109th Infantry, on the left of the 28th Division, was to attack to secure the high ground northwest of SCHMIDT. The 112th Infantry was to attack along the VOSSENACK - SCHMIDT road to secure the town of SCHMIDT. The 110th Infantry was to secure objectives south of its position along the KALL River west of SCHMIDT. The operation was to be followed by an attack to the south and west to capture the town of STECKENBORN and to clear resistance north of ROLLESBROICH.

The attack started at 020900A November. Enemy resistance was light to moderate. Good progress was made. The attack continued on 3 November. The 112th Infantry entered SCHMIDT during the afternoon but did not succeed in clearing the town during the night. Other units met heavier resistance as the operation progressed, but continued to advance towards their objectives. Enemy counterattacks were launched against the forces in SCHMIDT but were repelled. Because of the terrain conditions and the limited road net in the area it was extremely difficult to supply and reinforce the SCHMIDT area. A series of counterattacks on 4 November overran the positions in SCHMIDT and drove the 112th Infantry elements out of the town and back to positions near KOMMERSCHEID. The enemy infantry was supported by armor, while the poor roads prevented most of our armor from reaching positions to assist the elements in SCHMIDT.

On 7 November enemy counterattacks drove the 112th Infantry units out of KOMMERSCHEID. Other units held their positions or made small advances. No further gains were made during the period.

Losses were extremely heavy during this action, both in personnel and equipment. At the close of the period the 28th Division was holding positions and preparing to continue the action.

On other portions of the V Corps front there was little activity, either friendly or enemy. The action was concentrated in the 28th Division sector.

V Corps Artillery was very active during the period. Most of the battalions had been displaced to positions from which they could support the 28th Division attack. Harassing and interdiction fires were laid down with good effect, as well as heavy counterbattery schedules and other missions. Several forming counterattacks were broken up by artillery fire. The 1171st Engineer Combat Group were in direct support of the 28th Division and constructed roads. This work was greatly hampered by the unfavorable weather. During a counterattack on VOSSENACK the Corps Engineers went into action as infantry and restored the

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VOSSENACK position against heavy resistance. Armored elements were active in support of the attack but were held back by the inadequate road net and the poor condition of the roads. They suffered heavy losses during the SCHMIDT action. Tank Destroyer units were active both in anti-mechanized defense and in ground firing roles in support of the attack. They also had extremely heavy losses. Antiaircraft Artillery units fired effectively at ground targets. The IX Tactical Air Force supported the attack with air cover, armed reconnaissance, bombing and strafing missions during the few hours the weather allowed operations. The air cover was effective in breaking up a number of enemy counterattack attempts. Signal units maintained communications under extremely difficult conditions.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
595 QM Laundry Co (2 Nov)	4th Inf Div (8 Nov)
2nd Ranger Inf Bn (3 Nov)	70th Tk Bn (8 Nov)
803rd MP Co (Corps) (activated 5 Nov)	801st TD Bn (8 Nov)
99th Inf Div (9 Nov)	377th AAA AW Bn (8 Nov)
801st TD Bn (9 Nov)	Det G, 165th Sig Photo Co (8 Nov)
	4th CIC Det (7 Nov)
	CC "R", 5th Armd Div (092250A Nov)
	Btry A, 987th FA Bn (092250A Nov)

During this period the 28th Division attacked to secure SCHMIDT and objectives in that area. Strong resistance developed and the division could not hold SCHMIDT but at the close of the period had stabilized a line near VOSSENACK and along the KALL River and was preparing to continue operations to capture SCHMIDT.

2. 100001A November 1944 to 202400A November 1944 - Readjustment of Positions and Defensive Phase.

The enemy defense of SCHMIDT had prevented the forces of V Corps from regaining the town and the Corps Commander, on 9 November, verbally instructed the Commanding General, 28th Infantry Division, to suspend operations for its capture. This order was confirmed by Letter of Instructions issued on 10 November.

V Corps discontinued the attack so as to bring units to full strength, reequip and regroup them, and prepare for future operations. Plans were prepared to repel any enemy thrust into our positions and for immediate counterattacks against any penetration of our lines. In the V Corps zone the enemy had been driven from the entire SIEGFRIED Line position north of LANGERSDORF but the Germans continued to defend the original line south of that point. Terrain in front of V Corps favored the enemy's defensive forces with thick woods running parallel to most of the line. The road net was inadequate for operations or supply. Weapons emplacements, pillboxes and road blocks covered the few roads. Portions of four infantry divisions and one Panzer division had been identified on the V Corps front.

The 99th Infantry Division relieved the 9th Infantry Division in the Corps front line and the latter division assembled in Corps reserve near CAMP ELSENBORN. Limited attacks were made in the northern part of the Corps zone but progress was difficult and enemy counterattacks prevented our forces from gaining much ground.

In the regrouping of forces in preparation for resumption of offensive operations the 28th Division was relieved by the 8th Infantry Division, then a

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part of VIII Corps. The 28th Division, which had suffered very heavy casualties in the SCHMIDT action, became part of VIII Corps. The details of this change were ordered by V Corps Field Order No. 32, 141100A November 1944. The 8th Division was to undertake operations to clear the KALL River line in the south portion of its zone. One Battalion, attached to Combat Command "R", 5th Armored Division, was to be used to secure the HURTGEN - BRANDENBERG road. The relief was completed on 19 November.

Enemy activity was relatively light during this period. Major part of the activity was by patrols. Artillery fire was quite heavy on the 28th - 8th Division front.

V Corps Artillery was less active during this period than during the offensive action of the previous period. However, many harassing and interdiction missions were fired. At 111100A November, in commemoration of ARMISTICE DAY, all available Corps Artillery, the 28th Division Artillery, and the 32nd Field Artillery Brigade, fired a TOT mission on enemy batteries. Corps Engineers were active during this period in supporting roles. The weather made the roads very poor and most of the engineer activity was in improvement and extension of the road net. Armored battalions were attached to the infantry divisions and were not active during the defensive phase. They engaged in rehabilitation and training in preparation for the forthcoming operations. The 5th Armored Division held the central part of the line during the early part of the period but took up reserve positions during the middle part of the period, upon relief by the 99th Division. Combat Command "R" was attached to VII Corps for most of the period. The 3rd Tank Destroyer Group units were in supporting positions and gave effective indirect fire support throughout the period as well as engaging enemy vehicles and personnel by direct fire, with good results. The 102nd Cavalry Group held a portion of the front. The 115th Antiaircraft Artillery Group engaged no enemy aircraft. During the early part of the period the AAA Automatic Weapons units were active in ground firing roles, placing .50 caliber machine gun and 40mm fire on enemy targets with good effect. During the latter part of the period the units were inactive but were emplaced to provide AAA Protection if necessary. Increased enemy air activity was anticipated but did not appear during this period in the V Corps sector. Air support was very light because of unfavorable weather. On most days no missions were flown and on the few days when missions were flown weather conditions made it impossible to observe results. Signal units maintained communications, a difficult task in the mud and snow.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
Det J, 165th Sig Photo Co (11 Nov)	28th Inf Div (18 Nov)
8th Inf Div (19 Nov)	630th TD Bn (18 Nov)
644th TD Bn (19 Nov)	447th AAA AW Bn (18 Nov)
445th AAA AW Bn (19 Nov)	707th Tk Bn (18 Nov)
709th Tk Bn (19 Nov)	Det O, 165th Sig Photo Co (18 Nov)
CC "R", 5th Armd Div (20 Nov)	28th CIC Det (18 Nov)
18th FA Bn (20 Nov)	

V Corps, during this period, held defensive positions ~~and~~ along the SIEGFRIED Line. It regrouped forces in preparation for resumption of offensive operations at a later date.

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3. 210001A November 1944 to 302400A November 1944 - Limited Attack Phase.

A Letter of Instructions is ued at 192230A November directed an attack by the 8th Infantry Division to secure HURTGEN and KLEINHAU, and the road center between these towns. The 121st Infantry Regiment of the 8th Infantry Division attacked towards HURTGEN at 210900A November. Enemy resistance was heavy and progress was difficult through the HURTGEN Forest against strongly dug-in and emplaced infantry, mine fields, heavy artillery and mortar fire. Steady but slow progress was made. The 121st Infantry, with the 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry, attached, secured HURTGEN on 27 November. Following consolidation of the position the attack continued northward with continuing slow progress until the end of the period. Combat Command "R", 5th Armored Division, attached to the 8th Infantry Division, captured KLEINHAU on 29 November.

In other sectors of the V Corps front there was little activity. Units held and improved defensive positions and prepared to move against any enemy counter-attacks. Enemy activity against these positions was limited.

V Corps Artillery was very active during the period, with most of the firing in support of the 8th Infantry Division attack. More than 26,000 rounds of ammunition were expended by the Corps Artillery battalions, not including the expenditure by division artillery. Engineers were active in supporting roles, building and improving roads, clearing mine fields, and demolishing captured enemy positions. Armored elements, except those supporting the 8th Division operations, were in reserve positions. Tank Destroyer units were in positions for both direct and indirect supporting fire and were very active, particularly with indirect harassing and interdiction fire. Antiaircraft Artillery units engaged nine enemy aircraft in three raids, claiming three destroyed and three others probably destroyed. A very large number of Pilotless Aircraft (robot bombs) were over the area during the period and AAA Units were sent into the area and sited in a suitable position to fire upon them. Good results were achieved. Out of 514 over the V Corps area, 198 were engaged in the defended belt with 37claimed destroyed in a period of five days. Air support was effectively provided for the 8th Division operations by the IX Tactical Air Force when weather conditions permitted. Signal units maintained communications.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
11th AAA Gp (230600A Nov)	5th Armd Div (- CC "R") (29 Nov)
134th AAA Gun Bn (230600A Nov)	628th TD Bn (29 Nov)
535th AAA AW Bn (230600A Nov)	387th AAA AW Bn (29 Nov)
Det I5D2, 2nd ECA Regt (25 Nov)	Det M, 165th Sig Photo Co (29 Nov)
Det I6D2, 2nd ECA Regt (25 Nov)	505th CIC Det (29 Nov)
Det M6H2, 2nd ECA Regt (25 Nov)	
413th AAA Gun Bn (300600A Nov)	
440th AAA AW Bn (300600A Nov)	

During this period operations were undertaken in the northern part of the V Corps sector which resulted in the capture of HURTGEN, Germany, on 27 November, and KLEINHAU, Germany, on 29 November, and continued slow advance to the north through the remainder of the month.

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During the month of November V Corps began operations to capture SCHMIDT. The town was taken but German counterattacks drove our forces back to the KALL River after serious and costly operations. Late in the period operations were started to capture HURTGEN and KLEINHAU and were successful. At the close of the period V Corps was holding defensive positions along the greater part of its front with a slow advance to the northeast being made in the 8th Division sector.

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Historical Record
G-2 Section, Headquarters V Corps

7 December 1944

Month of November

PART I - ENEMY SITUATION

Period 1-10 November

The enemy's front line opposite the V Corps sector which had undergone little alteration for some time was essentially as follows on 1 November: (L-020 974) - (F-03 07) - (K 95 15) - (K-95 24) (inclusive HOFEN) - (F-029 343) - (F-01 35). A demonstration preparation by the artillery of the 4th U.S. Infantry Division and the V Corps on 1 November brought forth an increased amount of enemy shelling on the southern front. Otherwise there was little change in enemy activity over the preceding day.

The attack of the 28th U.S. Infantry Division on our northern front 2 November met at first with only moderate resistance in driving the enemy eastward beyond VOSSENACK (F-040 328). To the south, pillboxes in the KALL River valley offered very strong resistance, but the enemy had to yield ground in the SIMONSKALL area (F-04 33). Moderate enemy defenses first encountered in our zone of advance were generally of the hasty type: minefields, barbed wire, trenches, and road blocks.

Information from prisoners of war and captured documents indicated that the 275th Infantry Division was still in the process of being reorganized. Identifications were initially made of all three regiments, although 984 Infantry Regiment later had to be carried as unlocated due to lack of identifications. The II Battalion of 983 Infantry Regiment (which had been 328 Infantry Replacement Battalion until its reorganization 2 October) opposed our advance in the SIMONSKALL area. Its total strength on this date, as given by official documents later captured, was 8 officers and 319 men. The I Battalion was encountered north of II Battalion in the SCHMIDT - KOMMERSCHEIDT area; it had been reorganized 27 October from 1412 Infantry Fortress Battalion with a strength of 8 officers and 276 men.

The 985 Infantry Regiment which had been north of the Corps sector moved to the south of HURTGEN, and its two battalions were both contacted on 2 November. Other units opposing our forces in the HURTGEN area were: Kampfgruppe WEGELEIN, 275 Fusilier Battalion, and 20 GAF Fortress Battalion. The total number of prisoners of war for the day was 306, and the heaviest casualties were suffered by I Battalion of 983 Infantry Regiment and 275 Fusilier Battalion.

An enemy force estimated to be an infantry battalion supported by at least four enemy tanks launched a counter-attack against the 109th Infantry south of HURTGEN (F-023 357) at about 0800 hours, 3 November. An artillery barrage of 45 minutes duration preceded the attack, some which fell short on the enemy. Enemy artillery from the VII Corps front appeared to be firing into the wooded areas occupied by this regiment. This attack was repulsed/

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and enemy forces were driven back slightly on the center and left flank. In the SCHMIDT area, enemy resistance was very strong from pill-boxes and dug-in positions.

The 253 Engineer Battalion, including elements of two other engineer battalions, was known to be in the area, but was contacted fighting as infantry. Otherwise, enemy forces opposing the 28th U.S. Infantry Division remained the same. Additional troops, however, were observed moving north from the SIMMERATH area (K-98 24). Prisoners of war from the 89th Infantry Division controlling that area had stated that they were to be relieved 3 November by a Volksgrenadier division. Three enemy tanks were disabled in the HURTGEN area, and 66 prisoners of war were captured.

The first counter-attack of 4 November began at 0810 hours at (F-021 320). Another counter-attack which began at 1115 hours by II Battalion, 1055 Infantry Regiment (89th Infantry Division) and which was supported by eight tanks and four self-propelled guns resulted in the enemy's recapture of the town of SCHMIDT. The III Battalion, 1055 Infantry Regiment, attacked through II Battalion in the direction of KOMMERSCHEIDT (F-05 31), but was repulsed by our forces. Then I Battalion of the same regiment attacked from the south, coming out of the woods to the west of SCHMIDT. As a result of these attacks, our forces were pushed back to KOMMERSCHEIDT. It later developed that 1055 Infantry Regiment, having been relieved from its position in the MONSCHAU area, had just passed through SCHMIDT on its way to a rest area when our forces took the town. The regiment was assembled in the woods near HARSCHEIDT where it remained overnight waiting for tank and assault gun support. This armored support was from the 116th Panzer Division which had come south from its rest area at MUENCHEN-GLADBACH; its two panzer grenadier regiments, 60 PGR and 156 PGR, were identified late in the period in the VOSSENACK and SCHMIDT areas respectively. The two tank battalions of the division, as later learned from P/W's, had thirty tanks each with an additional twenty-three tanks loaned them from an SS unit. Ten of these tanks were destroyed by air and artillery action. The amount of enemy artillery fire indicated that a large number of batteries had been concentrated to fire into the area. In addition to the organic artillery of the 275th Infantry Division (two battalions only), there were three battalions from the 116th Panzer Division, two from the 89th Infantry Division, six from two GHQ Artillery Regiments, plus two heavy batteries of 210-mm howitzers and a regiment of rocket projectors.

South of the SCHMIDT area, resistance was stubborn from pillboxes in the KALL River valley, but the enemy was forced back about a kilometer in the BEHARDI area (F-02 31). Several small counter-attacks were repulsed in the HURTGEN area, and the enemy was driven back slightly in the wooded area just south of HURTGEN. The number of prisoners taken during the day totalled 201.

All along the 28th U.S. Infantry Division front enemy resistance on 5 November was strong and determined; it limited our forces to a 400 meter advance just north of SCHMIDT. A counter-attack in the KOMMERSCHEIDT area was repulsed in the morning. Artillery fires were heavy to intense throughout most of the day. Of an estimated 40 tanks in actual operation against the 28th U.S. Infantry Division, five were believed destroyed during the period, and 125 prisoners were captured.

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Enemy action against the 28th U.S. Infantry Division was continuous throughout the day on 6 November with the strongest action against VOSSENACK and KOMMERSCHEIDT. There was intense artillery fire in the VOSSENACK area, and on our line of communications north of KOMMERSCHEIDT.

Several attempts were made to penetrate our positions at KOMMERSCHEIDT, but, although tanks made numerous stabs, no penetrations were effected. In the VOSSENACK area (F-04 32) I Battalion of 60 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, supported by heavy artillery fire, exerted considerable pressure against our forces. When our forces later withdrew from the eastern edge of the town, the enemy followed up closely.

Additional miscellaneous units were identified in the fighting of 6 November: 18 GAF Fortress Battalion moved south from the VII Corps front, and 600 Engineer Battalion (GHQ), formerly in the DUREN area, was identified fighting as infantry. Enemy dead found at (K-941 197) by the 102nd U.S. Cavalry Group was identified as belonging to 2 Company of 981 Infantry Regiment. Later information revealed that the regiment was part of the reconstituted 272nd Volksgrenadier Division which had replaced the 89th Infantry Division. Prisoners of war taken on 6 November totalled 57, and four enemy tanks were destroyed.

The main enemy effort of 7 November was directed against KOMMERSCHEIDT; enemy infantry supported by about 30 tanks forced our troops out of the town in the late afternoon. Artillery and mortar fire in this area was intense, both against forward elements, and against our line of communications across the KALL River valley. At 1705 hours an enemy attack which appeared to be a diversion was made against VOSSENACK from the direction of BRANDENBERG (F-064 344), but it was repulsed principally by artillery fire. Enemy pressure against the other sectors of the 28th U.S. Infantry Division front continued to be strong, and there was no noteworthy action to report from the remainder of the V Corps front.

From the numerous identifications it was evident that the 116th Panzer Division constituted the principal enemy force opposing the 28th U.S. Infantry Division. Additional identifications made during the day were of 116th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion and of I AA Assault Regiment which, according to P/W's, had only six batteries in this sector. Eighty two prisoners of war were taken during the day.

Enemy infantry, estimated at one company, attacked our forces west of KOMMERSCHEIDT at (F-017 307) at 1400 hours on 8 November. Although the attack was launched from well-fortified pillboxes after a heavy mortar and artillery barrage, no ground was gained. A concentration of tanks forming for a counter-attack against our position north of KOMMERSCHEIDT was broken up by our artillery fire. Due to heavy artillery and mortar fire against our line of communications across the KALL River valley our forces were withdrawn from their positions in the KOMMERSCHEIDT area on the night of 8-9 November. The enemy was driven back about 300 yards in a small sector west of HURTGEN, but elsewhere on the 28th U.S. Infantry Division front, stiff enemy resistance prevented our forces from advancing.

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Most of the prisoners taken during the day were from three battalions of the 116th Panzer Division. Except for a slight increase in enemy artillery and mortar fire on the 4th Cavalry front, only sporadic artillery fire and a few enemy patrols were reported elsewhere on the V Corps front.

Enemy activity on the following day, 9 November, consisted chiefly of of mortar and artillery fire although considerably decreased due to poor visibility. In the VOSSENACK area, vicinity of (F-032 314), the enemy resisted our advance with automatic weapons and mortar fire, but was nonetheless driven back 600 yards. Five prisoners taken from two companies of 981 Infantry Regiment confirmed the suspected relief on 3 November of the 89th Infantry Division by the 272nd Volksgrenadier Division: another division destroyed in France and refurbished with available personnel from the air force, navy, convalescent units, and previously deferred men.

The enemy's loss of a pillbox at (F-006 301) on the morning of 10 November called forth a violent counter-attack which regained some ground. The counter-attacking force had an unusual allotment of automatic weapons, and there was considerable support by 105-mm howitzers and assault guns. In the woods north of VOSSENACK, enemy forces offered only moderate resistance to our advance, and were pushed back 1000 yards to the vicinity of (F-044 343).

A new temporary boundary running south of HURTGEN at about (F-044 343) between V and VII Corps placed almost one-half the 275th Infantry Division in the VII Corps sector. A total of 1040 prisoners of war were taken during the period from 1 to 10 November inclusive.

No identifications were made of the 116th Panzer Division which apparently remained in local reserve. Elements of both the 275th Infantry Division and 89th Infantry Division constituted the enemy opposition to the 28th U.S. Infantry Division. The second regiment of the 272nd Volksgrenadier Division was identified on the central V Corps front by a P/W from 6 Company.

Period 11-19 November

With the great decrease in enemy activity on the shortened 28th U.S. Infantry Division front, it became apparent that small goups of enemy replacements were arriving to replace some of the heavy losses. Units mentioned by P/W's as having recently received new men were as follows: I/156 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, II/983 Infantry Regiment, and 11 GAF Fortress Battalion. In the RAFFELSBRAND area (F-015 305) strong enemy resistance was met from a house and a pillbox; however, the enemy was forced back a short distance.

Another enemy counter-attack launched 12 November in the area west of SCHMIDT (F-01 30) at 1520 hours gained some ground, but by 1700 hours our original positions had been restored. Enemy artillery fire in the VOSSENACK - GERMETER area was heavy; there was considerable mortar fire all along the 28th U.S. Infantry Division front. Only light enemy activity occurred on the remainder of the V Corps front. The third regiment of the 272nd Volksgrenadier Division, 982 Infantry Regiment, was identified through a P/W from an advance party whose mission had been to reconnoiter for the relief of the 983 Infantry Regiment (by now greatly depleted) in the SIMONSKALL area (F-02 32).

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From 13 November to 20 November there was no stronger ground action by the enemy than the attempt of large combat patrols to penetrate our lines. The VOSSENACK - GERMETER area continued to attract the enemy's attention, and it received a substantial proportion of the enemy's artillery and mortar fire. Enemy patrols were also active in the VOSSENACK area.

The identification on 16 November of a P/W from the 277th Volksgrenadier Division at (F-008 073) who stated that his unit was relieving 77 Infantry Replacement Battalion indicated that the other battalions under the control of the 347th Infantry Division might also be replaced. The P/W stated that his unit, 990 Infantry Regiment, had arrived 13 November at HELLENTHAL (F-08 11). This division which had been reformed in HUNGARY after its destruction in FRANCE had three infantry regiments of two battalions each, and four artillery battalions each with two six-gun batteries. An increased number of aggressive patrols marked the enemy activity of 16 November. Artillery fire was still scattered along the front although it fell with some intensity in the VOSSENACK area.

Fourteen men were captured 17 November after a fire fight between a friendly and an enemy patrol of undetermined size in the VOSSENACK area (F-04 32). On the following day an enemy patrol of six men from 6 and 7 Companies of 981 Infantry Regiment were captured intact at (K-95 23). An enemy patrol estimated at 75 men sought to infiltrate north of VOSSENACK at (F-050 343) on 19 November, but 15 men were killed or wounded and 12 taken prisoner. Artillery fire was scattered all along the front although a considerable amount continued to be reported from west of GERMETER. On the same date, the first identification of 989 Infantry Regiment (277th Volksgrenadier Division) was obtained from a P/W taken at LOSHEIM (L-03 96). Another identification was that of I Battalion, 990 Infantry Regiment of the same division. 223 prisoners of war were taken by the V Corps from 11 to 19 November inclusive.

Period 20-25 November

With the relief of the 28th U.S. Infantry Division by the 8th U.S. Infantry Division on 20 November, the northern boundary of the V Corps was moved north and the following additional enemy units in the HURTGEN area then opposed our forces: Kampfgruppe WEINEN, remnants of 983 Infantry Regiment, 985 Infantry Regiment, and probably elements of such depleted units as 253 Engineer Battalion and 275 Fuselier Battalion.

The heaviest artillery fire again fell in the VOSSENACK - GERMETER area, but elsewhere on the V Corps front it was light and scattered. An enemy patrol estimated at 75 men strong attempted to penetrate our positions in the HURTGEN area at (F-040 347), but withdrew after a fire-fight which resulted in an undetermined number of enemy casualties.

The advance of the 121 (U.S.) Infantry Regiment to the south of HURTGEN (F-03 35) on 21 November was resisted by numerically weak infantry soldiers. Anti-personnel mine-fields and enemy artillery and mortar fire, however, occasioned considerable delay to our forces. The enemy had set up machine-guns to fire down the lanes in the forest. A group of about 70 enemy, presumably

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From 13 November to 20 November there was no stronger ground action by the enemy than the attempt of large combat patrols to penetrate our lines. The VOSSENACK - GERMETER area continued to attract the enemy's attention, and it received a substantial proportion of the enemy's artillery and mortar fire. Enemy patrols were also active in the VOSSENACK area.

The identification on 16 November of a P/W from the 277th Volksgrenadier Division at (F-008 073) who stated that his unit was relieving 77 Infantry Replacement Battalion indicated that the other battalions under the control of the 347th Infantry Division might also be replaced. The P/W stated that his unit, 990 Infantry Regiment, had arrived 13 November at HELDENTHAL (F-08 11). This division which had been reformed in HUNGARY after its destruction in FRANCE had three infantry regiments of two battalions each, and four artillery battalions each with two six-gun batteries. An increased number of aggressive patrols marked the enemy activity of 16 November. Artillery fire was still scattered along the front although it fell with some intensity in the VOSSENACK area.

Fourteen men were captured 17 November after a fire fight between a friendly and an enemy patrol of undetermined size in the VOSSENACK area (F-04 32). On the following day an enemy patrol of six men from 6 and 7 Companies of 981 Infantry Regiment were captured intact at (K-95 23). An enemy patrol estimated at 75 men sought to infiltrate north of VOSSENACK at (F-050 343) on 19 November, but 15 men were killed or wounded and 12 taken prisoner. Artillery fire was scattered all along the front although a considerable amount continued to be reported from west of GERMETER. On the same date, the first identification of 989 Infantry Regiment (277th Volksgrenadier Division) was obtained from a P/W taken at LOSHEIM (L-03 96). Another identification was that of I Battalion, 990 Infantry Regiment of the same division. 223 prisoners of war were taken by the V Corps from 11 to 19 November inclusive.

Period 20-25 November

With the relief of the 28th U.S. Infantry Division by the 8th U.S. Infantry Division on 20 November, the northern boundary of the V Corps was moved north and the following additional enemy units in the HURTGEN area then opposed our forces: Kampfgruppe HEINEN, remnants of 983 Infantry Regiment, 985 Infantry Regiment, and probably elements of such depleted units as 253 Engineer Battalion and 275 Fuselier Battalion.

The heaviest artillery fire again fell in the VOSSENACK - GERMETER area, but elsewhere on the V Corps front it was light and scattered. An enemy patrol estimated at 75 man strong attempted to penetrate our positions in the HURTGEN area at (F-040 347), but withdrew after a fire-fight which resulted in an undetermined number of enemy casualties.

The advance of the 121 (U.S.) Infantry Regiment to the south of HURTGEN (F-03 35) on 21 November was resisted by numerically weak infantry soldiers. Anti-personnel mine-fields and enemy artillery and mortar fire, however, occasioned considerable delay to our forces. The enemy had set up machine-guns to fire down the lanes in the forest. A group of about 70 enemy, presumably

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from Kampfgruppe WEINEN, contacted our forces north of VOSSENACK shortly after 1200 hours. It withdrew only after dark when almost half the men had been captured or had become casualties. Heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire, with a preponderance of mortar fire, were experienced throughout the day in the VOSSENACK area.

Definite confirmation of the relief of the 347th Infantry Division from the southern sector of the Corps was provided by the identification of elements of the division on the Third U.S. Army front. The third regiment of the 277th Volksgrenadier Division which replaced it was identified in the former sector of 4 GAF Fortress Battalion. Two patrols, however, constituted the only activity on our southern front during 21 November.

The enemy's defense of the terrain in our northern sector continued to consist of extensive anti-personnel mine-fields and considerable mortar and artillery fire. The VOSSENACK area continued to be under heavy enemy artillery fire. There was little enemy ground action until 1647 hours on 23 November when an enemy counter-attack launched against 121 (U.S.) Infantry Regiment was completely repulsed. Enemy resistance was much stronger on that day, and our forces encountered heavy mortar and artillery fire. The liquidation of a large pocket close to the Corps northern boundary resulted in the capture of 94 prisoners of war.

Enemy opposition continued to be strong in the HURTGEN area, and particularly stiff against our attacking forces on 25 November. There was some patrol activity in connection with these defensive operations, and enemy tanks were observed near HURTGEN, KLEINHAU, and SCHMIDT. One enemy tank was destroyed by artillery fire, and a second from the air.

The 985th Infantry Regiment (275th Infantry Division) suffered many casualties during the fighting of this period, and, although it absorbed units such as 20 GAF Fortress Battalion to maintain its fighting strength, it was finally reduced to less than adequate battalion. Remnants of 983 Infantry Regiment, after our attacks in the SIMONSKALL and KOMMERSCHEIDT areas early in the month, were later committed farther north with 985 Regiment. Repeated statements by P/W's that the staff of the 275th Infantry Division had gone to FLENSBURG (SCHLESWIG - HOLSTEIN) to organize a new division, and that some elements of the division had come under the command of the 91st Infantry Division were good evidence that the 275th Infantry Division, as a combat unit had ceased to exist. Prisoners of war taken from 20 to 25 November inclusive totalled 254.

Period 26-28 November

After making two small-scale counter-attacks early in the morning of 26 November in the vicinity of (F-040 345), the enemy withdrew into the town of HURTGEN. According to prisoners of war, the town would be defended. During the afternoon our reconnaissance elements attempted to enter HURTGEN six different times, but were driven back each time. Our attempt to advance into the town from the south was stopped at 2000 hours when a fire fight developed. From other sectors of the V Corps front came numerous reports of small groups milling around behind the enemy lines and of a few small vehicular movements. There was evidence that a small group of new men was moving into the line.

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The enemy defense of HURTGEN was stubborn. Although our forces reached the northern edge of the town from the west on 27 November, the enemy controlled the road running northwest out of HURTGEN on which troops were observed moving, and stiff resistance was offered in the northern part of the town. By the close of the period, our troops who had entered HURTGEN from the southwest had advanced as far as the church, but the enemy had to be cleared out one by one from the cellars, and from the rubble and ruins of the town. Men from Kampfgruppe WEINEN were defending the town, and elements of 1055 Infantry Regiment were encountered in the same area. Enemy patrols were active in the KOMMERSCHEIDT area (F-05 31), but none was reported elsewhere, and little movement was observed behind the lines.

Our forces which crossed the HURTGEN - KLEINHAU - BRANDENBERG road early on 28 November evidently surprised the enemy, for he offered only light resistance. However, at 1530 hours the enemy launched a counter-attack from KLEINHAU against our forces on this road. This enemy force, estimated as one company of infantry supported by one assault gun, suffered heavy casualties upon being repulsed. The remnants of Kampfgruppe WEINEN (still called WEINEN even though Major WEINEN had been wounded and replaced) continued their stubborn defense of HURTGEN from its cellars and ruins until the last resistance was mopped up at 1800 hours. During this short three-day period 266 prisoners of war were taken and Kampfgruppe WEINEN (formerly WEGELEIN) was probably completely destroyed.

Period 29-30 November

Advancing into KLEINHAU, our forces encountered stubborn resistance in the town, and fighting was bitter until organized resistance ceased at 1600 hours on 29 November; mopping-up operations continued afterwards. In the wooded areas southeast of HURTGEN (F-04 35) also, the enemy offered strong resistance, but was forced back about one kilometer eastward to approximately (F-050 350). Heavy artillery fire fell in the KLEINHAU - HURTGEN area throughout this period. Also on 29 November, considerable movement behind the enemy lines north of SIMMERATH (K-98 24) was reported during the afternoon, and four patrols were reported on our southern front, but all were driven back.

In the sector southeast of HURTGEN on 30 November, the enemy was forced back about 200 yards in the woods although he put up a strong defense with small arms and mortar fire. Enemy reaction to our own patrols was strong; four enemy patrols which attempted to penetrate our lines in the HURTGEN area were thrown back; nor did three patrols observed on the 99th Division front succeed in penetrating our lines. The last two days of November yielded 235 prisoners of war.

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PART II - SECTION ACTIVITY

1 November

a. Lt. Colonel Hansen, G-2, 4th Infantry Division, visited the section.

b. Colonel Ford, accompanied by T/3 St. Peter, visited the 28th Infantry Division.

3 November

a. Capt. Cook, S-2, 2nd Provisional Ranger Battalion, visited the section.

5 November

a. Capt. Cook, S-2, 2nd Provisional Ranger Battalion, visited the section.

6 November

a. Colonel Silvey, with G-2 Section of First U.S.Army, visited the section.

7 November

a. Colonel Ford accompanied by Capt. Bartlett visited the 5th Armored Division.

8 November

a. Major St. Clair, G-2, 99th Infantry Division, visited the section.

10 November

a. T/Sgt Maurice Donnell of FMII Team No. 407 returned to duty with the G-2 section after having been hospitalized since 23 September.

11 November

a. Colonel Ford visited the 28th Infantry Division accompanied by Capt. Bartlett and T/3 St. Peter and began a study of intelligence operations in this division during the period 2-8 November.

12 November

a. Colonel Ford visited the 28th Infantry Division accompanied by T/3 St. Peter.

b. Capt. Bartlett visited the 28th Infantry Division.

13 November

a. Colonel Dickson, G-2, First U.S. Army, visited the section during the afternoon.

b. Colonel Ford visited the 28th Infantry Division.

c. Capt. Bartlett visited the 28th Infantry Division.

d. S/Sgt Harf was promoted to T/Sgt.

14 November

a. Lt. Colonel McFarland, G-2, 5th Armored Division, visited the section.

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17 November

a. Lt. Colonel McFarland, G-2, 5th Armored Division, visited the section. Later Lt. Colonel McFarland and Major Abernathy traveled by plane to Charleville, France, in order to visit the 107 Reconnaissance Squadron.

b. Capt. Cook, S-2, 2nd Provisional Ranger Battalion, visited the section.

18 November

a. Lt. Colonel Messic, G-2, 28th Infantry Division, visited the section.

b. T/Sgt. Harf was promoted to 2nd Lt.

20 November

a. Colonel Ford visited the 8th Infantry Division.

21 November

a. Sgt. Zotter was promoted to S/Sgt.

b. The following members of the G-2 Section were transferred to MIS; the group, under the command of 1st Lt. Pamintuan (formerly with an IPW Team) is to be attached to the section as a GMII Team by Headquarters, MIS (fwd) A.P.O. 887.

S/Sgt. Zotter
T/5 Lester Engelking
T/5 Kurt Haas
Pvt. Richard Lachenauer

25 November

a. Colonel Ford visited the 8th Infantry Division accompanied by Sgt. Grigaitis.

b. Colonel Dickson, G-2, First U.S. Army, visited the section.

c. Capt. Bartlett visited the 8th Infantry Division.

d. FMII Team No. 407 was relieved from duty with the V Corps, and returned to Headquarters, MIS (fwd), at Paris. Members of the team were as follows:

Capt. Charles Henderson
1st Lt. Pierre Burke
T/Sgt Maurice Donnell
T/3 Arias
T/3 Smith
T/3 Carey
T/3 Finkelbrand

e. In addition to the above mentioned members of FMII Team 407, S/Sgt Neil H. Powell of GMII Team 407 also returned to Paris.

27 November

a. Colonel Ford, accompanied by Sgt. Grigaitis, visited the 102nd Cavalry Group and the Corps Artillery.

b. Lt. Colonel McFarland, G-2, 5th Armored Division, visited the section.

28 November

a. SO - F-75, Headquarters, MIS (fwd), relieved S/Sgt Powell from duty with GMII Team No. 407.

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[illegible] Colonel [illegible] accompanied by Sgt. Colgatis, visited the [illegible] Group, visited the [illegible] [illegible] was awarded the Bronze Star.

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Date: 7 Dec, 1944
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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305, U.S. ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

G-1
OPERATIONS REPORT
No. 6

SECRET

1 November - 30 November 1944.

-1-

7 December 1944.

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MAPS: GSGS 4042 - BRUSSELS-LIEGE, Sheet No. 3, 1/250000.

I. GENERAL.

1. Organisation.

No change.

II. STATION LIST AND STRENGTH OF COMMAND.

1. Divisions.

Division	Period of Attachment or Assignment	Assigned Strength 1 Nov '44 O	Assigned Strength 1 Nov '44 EM	Assigned Strength as of 30 Nov or Last Strength O	Assigned Strength as of 30 Nov or Last Strength EM
4th Inf Div	1 - 8 Nov	866	13944	868	13953
8th Inf Div	16 - 30 Nov	874	13260	826	12565
9th Inf Div *	1 - 30 Nov	649	9878	684	9850
28th Inf Div	1 - 18 Nov	828	13134	776	12919
99th Inf Div	9 - 30 Nov	804	13168	824	12933
5th Armd Div **	1 - 29 Nov	656	9977	686	10051
CC "R", 5th Armd Div	29 - 30 Nov	174	2863	174	2859

* 9th Inf Div is less 47th Inf, 84th FA Bn, 1 Co, Med Bn and 1 Plat Engrs.
**5th Armd Div, less CC "R", was relieved from atchmt to V Corps 29 Nov 1944.

2. Corps Troops.

Unit	Assigned Strength as of 1 Nov, or Date Joined O	Assigned Strength as of 1 Nov, or Date Joined EM	Date Joined	Assigned Strength as of 30 Nov or Last Strength O	Assigned Strength as of 30 Nov or Last Strength EM	Date of Relief
Hq & Hq Co, V Corps	134	577		104	332	
MP Plat						
Atchd Med Sec						
V Corps Air Sup Party						
506 [illegible] Car Co, 4th Plat	1	33		1	25	
Flt A, 153rd [illegible] Sq	1	11		1	11	
16th Ord [illegible] Sqd	1	6		1	6	
17th Ord [illegible] Sqd	1	6		1	6	
63rd AAF Band	1	31		1	28	
Det D, 163th Sig Photo Co	1	16		1	16	
CIC Det No. 203	1	12		1	10	
APU 137	1	11		1	11	
APU 305	1	12		1	12	
28th [illegible]	3	40		3	40	
8th Fin Disb Sec	3	17		3	17	
15th Fin Disb Sec	3	17		3	17	
503rd MP Co (Corps)	5	171		5	172	
84th Cml Bn (Mtz)	38	587		40	576	
2nd Ranger Inf Bn	37	545	3 Nov	37	522	
56th Signal Bn	37	898		37	898	
3250th [illegible] Serv Co	7	128		7	128	
2nd Spec Serv Co	5	103		5	104	
V Corps Arty, Hq & Hq Btry	27	102		26	92	
17th FA Bgd Bn	27	492		26	488	
187th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	18	96		18	77	
190th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	16	94		17	77	
400th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	18	81		17	78	
188th FA Bn	31	446	20 Nov	31	446	
82nd Armd FA Bn	30	501		33	483	
74th FA Bn	33	451		32	447	
186th FA Bn S	32	548		32	548	
187th FA Bn S	31	523		32	484	
190th FA Bn S	29	612		30	527	
200th FA Bn S	35	653		33	526	
272nd FA Bn	28	492		29	492	
400th FA Bn (Armd)	36	489		35	485	
941st FA Bn	30	525		32	487	
953rd FA Bn	37	577		37	482	
955th FA Bn S	33	529		33	485	

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2. Corps Troops (Cont'd)

Unit	Assigned Strength as of 1 Nov, or Date Joined		Date Joined	Assigned Strength as of 30 Nov, or Last Strength		Date of Relief
	O	EM		O	EM	
997th FA Bn	29	600		29	541	
987th FA Bn	29	458		29	456	
3rd TD Gp, Hq & Hq Co %	15	61		15	55	
628th TD Bn	36	609		36	607	
630th TD Bn	32	696		31	648	18 Nov
644th TD Bn	37	600	19 Nov	35	592	
801st TD Bn	35	737		33	724	
893rd TD Bn	37	590		33	589	
899th TD Bn (less Co A)	30	474		31	499	
3rd Armd Gp, Hq & Hq Co	18	86		18	86	
70th Tank Bn	44	683		44	682	8 Nov
707th Tank Bn	42	677		43	678	18 Nov
709th Tank Bn	45	678	19 Nov	44	672	
746th Tank Bn (less Co A)	35	529		39	527	
102nd Cav Gp, Hq & Hq Tr	16	59		16	59	
38th Cav Ron Sq	43	695		40	689	
102nd Cav Ron Sq	42	704		40	697	
115th AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Co	11	61		11	53	
11th AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Co	13	52	23 Nov	13	52	
134th AAA Gun Bn	32	689	23 Nov	32	689	
376th AAA AW Bn (less Btry D)	33	566		32	546	
377th AAA AW Bn	39	761		39	755	8 Nov
387th AAA AW Bn	39	637		38	632	
413th AAA Gun Bn	30	694	30 Nov	30	684	
440th AAA AW Bn	39	757	30 Nov	39	757	
445th AAA AW Bn	36	738	19 Nov	36	748	
447th AAA AW Bn	37	753		36	754	18 Nov
460th AAA AW Bn %	38	772		38	760	
461st AAA AW Bn %	34	781		37	756	
535th AAA AW Bn	40	762	23 Nov	40	762	
2891st Engr Tech Intell Team		3			3	
1121st Engr (C) Gp, Hq/Hq Co	18	71		17	66	
1171st Engr (C) Gp, Hq/Hq Co	17	67		17	65	
20th Engr (C) Bn	32	613		28	591	
112th Engr (C) Bn %	31	598		32	599	
146th Engr (C) Bn	32	600		32	590	
254th Engr (C) Bn	33	614		33	603	
1340th Engr (C) Bn	32	620		27	589	
502nd Engr L Pon Co	5	206		5	204	
508th Engr L Pon Co	6	192		6	205	
610th Engr L Equip Co	5	114		4	135	
668th Engr Topo Co	5	117		5	114	
990th Engr Trdwy Br Co	4	135		4	132	
993rd Engr Trdwy Br Co	4	135		4	134	27 Nov
53rd Med Bn, Hq & Hq Det	7	22		7	21	
382nd Med Coll Co	5	97		5	97	
383rd Med Coll Co	5	96		5	96	
684th Med Clr Co	14	102		13	100	
97th QM Bn, Hq & Hq Det	7	21		7	21	
595th QM Ldry Co	5	258	2 Nov	5	258	
606th QM GR Co	7	117		7	117	
3275th QM Serv Co (Cld)	4	180		4	180	
3604th QM Trk Co	4	125		5	127	
3892nd QM Trk Co	5	129		5	129	
3907th QM Trk Co	5	120		5	120	29 Nov
3912th QM Trk Co	6	109		6	109	29 Nov
Prov Mil Govt Police Force Bn *						

Co A, 507th MP Bn disbanded and activated as 803rd MP Co (Corps) 5 Nov 44.
% Denotes detachment with Provisional Military Government Police Force Battalion.
* No assigned strength shown, inasmuch as strength of detachments comprising the Provisional Military Government Police Force Battalion is included in figures of parent units.

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III. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS.

1. General Data.

1 November thru 30 November, 1944 — Rupen, Belgium (R 996260)

2. Inclosures, Collecting Points, PW and Stragglers - Corps.

a. Inclosures.

(1) The Army PW Inclosure was located at Herbesthal (R 745335) during the entire period.

b. Collecting Points.

(1) V Corps PW and Straggler Collecting Point was located at Rupen (R 797275) during the entire month.

3. Straggler Lines.

No Straggler Lines were maintained. However, 69 stragglers were processed through the Corps Collecting Point. Of this number 22 were hospitalized personnel attempting to return to their units.

IV. CASUALTIES AND RATIOS.

1. Consolidation of Estimated Losses.

a. Attack Phase - 1 Nov (R ≠ 148) thru 8 Nov (R ≠ 155)

Unit	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Captured		Total Battle Casualties		Non-Battle Casualties		TOTAL	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
*4th Inf Div	0	2	1	9	0	2	0	0	1	13	10	138	11	151
9th Inf Div	0	1	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	7	2	224	2	231
28th Inf Div	12	238	76	1609	4	120	1	10	93	1977	13	609	106	2586
5th Armd Div	1	6	0	16	0	0	0	0	1	22	1	60	2	82
Corps Troops	6	18	15	135	1	22	0	0	22	181	23	[illegible]	45	406
TOTALS	19	265	92	1775	5	150	1	10	117	2200	49	1274	166	3474

* 4th Infantry Division relieved from attachment 8 Nov. 1944.

b. Defense Phase - 9 Nov (R ≠ 156) thru 20 Nov (R ≠ 167)

Unit	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
*8th Inf Div	0	7	5	46	1	1	0	0	6	54	3	157	9	211
9th Inf Div	0	2	1	14	0	0	0	0	1	16	0	658	1	674
**28th Inf Div	13	81	44	576	33	693	12	222	102	1577	41	907	143	2484
***99th Inf Div	0	12	8	69	2	19	0	0	10	80	4	359	14	439
5th Armd Div	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	93	15	93
Corps Troops	5	37	2	217	2	60	-1	-5	16	311	-11	-1[illegible]	4	172
TOTALS	18	139	67	924	38	773	11	220	134	2054	47	2033	181	4104

* 8th Infantry Division attached to V Corps 19 Nov 1944.
** 28th Infantry Division relieved from attachment V Corps 1 Nov 1944.
*** 99th Infantry Division attached to V Corps 9 Nov 1944.
/ Caused by reduction in figures reported by 99th Div, which has been included non-evacuated sick in figures reported hereunder. Readjustment total was 2 officers and 412 EM.

c. Attack Phase - 21 Nov (R ≠ 168) thru 30 Nov (R ≠ 177)

Unit	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
8th Inf Div	7	137	44	764	0	55	0	0	51	956	23	621	74	1577
9th Inf Div	0	4	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	20	3	472	3	492
99th Inf Div	1	7	5	71	0	7	0	0	6	85	[illegible]	442	14	527
*5th Armd Div	1	7	6	72	0	27	0	0	7	106	4	182	11	288
Corps Troops	1	4	8	71	1	1	0	0	10	76	2	[illegible]	12	366
TOTALS	10	159	63	1014	1	90	0	0	74	1263	43	1837	117	3100

* 5th Armored Division, less Combat Command "B", relieved from attachment to V Corps 29 November 1944.

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d. Total Estimated Casualties for Divisions and Corps Troops
(1 Nov 1944 thru 30 Nov 1944)

*4th Inf Div	0	2	1	9	0	2	0	0	1	13	10	136	11	149
**8th Inf Div	7	144	49	810	1	56	0	0	57	1015	28	778	83	1724
9th Inf Div	0	7	1	36	0	0	0	0	1	43	7	1374	8	1417
***28th Inf Div	25	319	120	2185	37	818	13	232	195	3554	54	1518	249	5072
#99th Inf Div	1	19	13	140	2	12	0	0	16	171	12	801	28	972
##5th Armd Div	2	13	6	88	0	27	0	0	8	128	15	255	23	383
Corps Troops	12	69	32	443	4	98	-1	-2	47	698	17	299	64	997
TOTALS	47	573	222	3711	44	1013	12	230	325	5527	141	5161	466	10688

* 4th Infantry Division relieved from attachment to V Corps 6 Nov 1944.
** 8th Infantry Division attached to V Corps, 19 Nov 1944.
*** 28th Infantry Division relieved from attachment to V Corps 18 Nov 1944.
\# 99th Infantry Division attached to V Corps 9 Nov 1944.
\## 5th Armored Division, less Combat Command "B", relieved from attachment to V Corps 29 Nov 1944.

2. Battle Casualty Reports.

a. Battle Casualties Sustained by Divisions and Corps Troops during November by Type of Casualty.

(1) Attack Phase - 1 Nov (D + 148) thru 8 Nov (D + 155)

Unit	KIA	DOW	DOI	SWA	SIA	WIA	MIA	NIA	CAP	NET TOTAL	NYD	FNG	GRAND TOTAL
4th Inf Div	2			3	2	42	4	1		54	12		66
5th Armd Div	6	5		2		10	2			25	2	3	30
9th Inf Div	2	4		3		27	3	2		41	16	9	66
28th Inf Div	73	47	1	186	3	1076	147	948		2481	91		2572
Corps Troops	39	6		24	1	97	13	55	1	236	8		244
TOTAL	122	62	1	218	6	1252	169	1006	1	2837	129	12	2778

(2) Defense Phase - 9 Nov (D + 156) thru 20 Nov (D + 167)

5th Armd Div						1			1	1		2
8th Inf Div	9		3		31	6	14		63	4		67
9th Inf Div	20	3	72	2	122	19	44		292	82		374
28th Inf Div	30	15	75		584	764	356		1825	114		1939
99th Inf Div	10		16	5	57	69	11		168	2		170
Corps Troops	15	5	17	3	56	52	18		166	14		180
TOTAL	94	24	183	10	850	911	443		2515	217		2732

(3) Attack Phase - 21 Nov (D + 168) thru 30 Nov (D + 177)

5th Armd Div	41		22		173	28	4		268	1		269
8th Inf Div	72	7	80		623	166	175		1123	109		1232
9th Inf Div	47	5	87	2	161	38	84		424	155		579
99th Inf Div	6	2	22		29	22	7		88	13		101
Corps Troops	7	3	25	10	47	18			110	11		121
TOTAL	173	17	236	12	1033	272	270		2013	289		2302

(4) Total for November 1944.

4th Inf Div	2		3	2	42	4	1		54	12		66
5th Armd Div	47	5	24		183	31	4		294	4	3	301
8th Inf Div	81	7	83		654	172	189		1186	113		1299
9th Inf Div	79	12	162	4	310	60	130		757	253	9	1019
28th Inf Div	103	63	1 261	3	1660	911	1304		4306	205		4511
99th Inf Div	16	2	38	5	86	91	18		256	15		271
Corps Troops	61	14	66	14	200	83	72	1	512	33		545
TOTAL	389	103	1 637	28	3135	1352	1719	1	7305	635	12	8012

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IV. CASUALTIES AND RETURNS (Cont'd)

2. Battle Casualty Reports (Cont'd)

b. Battle Casualties Sustained by Divisions and Corps Troops during November by Arm or Service.

Unit	Inf	FA	CAC	MD	CE	SC	CAV	MC	MAC	JMC	CAS	NO	TOTAL
(1) Attack Phase - 1 Nov thru 8 Nov 1944.													
4th Inf Div	54	9	1	1		1							66
5th Armd Div	9	8	2	3	3		5						30
9th Inf Div	57	3		6									66
28th Inf Div	2408	68	1	75	17			3					2572
Corps Troops	1	60		15	155		5	1			7		244
TOTAL	2529	148	4	100	175	1	10	4			7		2978
(2) Defense Phase - 9 Nov thru 20 Nov 1944.													
5th Armd Div	1	1											2
8th Inf Div	62		2	2	1								67
9th Inf Div	346	14	3	8	3								374
28th Inf Div	1830	30	8	36	33		1		1				1939
99th Inf Div	156	7		4	3								170
Corps Troops	18	36		3	101		17			1	4		180
TOTAL	2413	88	13	53	141		18		1	1	4		2732
(3) Attack Phase - 21 Nov thru 30 Nov 1944.													
5th Armd Div	241	8	6	7	5		2						269
8th Inf Div	1136	22		39	32		2	1					1232
9th Inf Div	534	16	1	19	5		1	2				1	579
99th Inf Div	89	3		1	8								101
Corps Troops	39	11	18	2	40		9				2		121
TOTAL	2039	60	25	68	90		14	3			2	1	2302
(4) Total for November 1944.													
4th Inf Div	54	9	1	1		1							66
5th Armd Div	251	17	8	10	8		7						301
8th Inf Div	1198	22	2	41	33		2	1					1299
9th Inf Div	937	33	4	33	8		1	2				1	1019
28th Inf Div	4238	98	9	111	50		1	3	1				4511
99th Inf Div	245	10		5	11								271
Corps Troops	58	107	18	20	296		31	1		1	13		545
TOTAL	6981	296	42	211	406	1	42	7	1	1	13	1	8012

V. GRAVES REGISTRATION.

1. Cemeteries.

First U.S. Army operated the only cemetery servicing V Corps during the period at Henri-Chapel, (K 705352).

2. Collecting Points.

a. Collecting Points were as follows:

(1) 2nd Plat, 606th QM GR Co - Vicinity of Butchenbach, (K 916040), (Class 1 Truck Head No. 55).
(2) 3rd Plat, 606th QM GR Co, Vicinity of Rotgen, (K 920290).

VI. REPLACEMENTS.

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1. The demand for replacements during the month was heavier than at any comparable period since June. The 9th Inf Div was relieved from the northern sector of the corps zone where it had been engaged in severe fighting and had suffered heavy casualties. This sector was then taken over by the 28th Inf Div which undertook an of-

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VI. REPLACEMENTS. (Cont'd)

fensive operation against extremely severe opposition. The casualties sustained by the 28th Inf Div were exceedingly heavy. Toward the latter part of the month the 28th Inf Div was relieved by the 9th Inf Div which took over the same vector and continued the offensive, also suffering heavy losses. By the last week in November the supply of replacements available to the Corps became exhausted and, thereafter, such replacements as were received were limited to former members who returned to duty at the conclusion of hospitalization.

2. The following table, based on information extracted from Daily Estimated Loss Reports, shows the number of replacements received during the month of November:

Divisions	1 - 8 Nov	9 - 20 Nov	21 - 30 Nov	TOTALS
4th Inf Div	100			100
8th Inf Div		124	914	1038
445th AAA AW Bn		13	6	19
644th TD Bn		3	13	16
709th Tank Bn			15	15
9th Inf Div	24	13	713	750
746th Tank Bn		1	15	16
899th TD Bn			20	20
28th Inf Div	1718	2791		4509
447th AAA AW Bn	5	3		8
630th TD Bn	10	9		19
707th Tank Bn	16	70		86
99th Inf Div		74	473	547
801st TD Bn			2	2
5th Armd Div	69	26	88	183
387th AAA AW Bn	1		1	2
628th TD Bn	1			1
Sub-Total	1944	3127	2260	7331
Corps Troops				
2nd Ranger Inf Bn	2	31	17	50
V Corps Arty		1		1
17th FA Obsn Bn			1	1
62nd FA Bn (Armd)	2	12	8	22
76th FA Bn	2	8	1	11
187th FA Bn	2			2
190th FA Bn		7		7
272nd FA Bn			3	3
953rd FA Bn	3	7	3	13
955th FA Bn		7		7
987th FA Bn	4	1	9	14
997th FA Bn	8			8
893rd TD Bn	19	34	15	68
20th Engr (C) Bn		2	72	74
112th Engr (C) Bn	3	11	2	16
146th Engr (C) Bn		16	16	32
254th Engr (C) Bn		4		4
502nd Engr L Pon Co			1	1
508th Engr L Pon Co		13		13
990th Engr Trdwy Br Co		1		1
111st Engr (C) Gp	1			1
1340th Engr (C) Bn		13	79	92
38th Cav Recn Sq (Mecz)	17		5	22
102nd Cav Recn Sq (Mecz)	12	18	9	39
86th Cml Bn (Mtz)		19	12	31
382nd Med Coll Co		5	1	6
3604th QM Trk Co		1		1
Sub-Total	75	211	254	540
TOTAL REPLACEMENTS - DIVISIONS AND CORPS TROOPS	2019	3338	2514	7871

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VII. PRISONERS OF WAR

UNIT	1-8 Nov	9-20 Nov	21-30 Nov	TOTALS
4th Infantry Division *	13			13
8th Infantry Division **		17	637	654
9th Infantry Division	5	13		18
28th Infantry Division ***	702	215		917
99th Infantry Division ****		11	24	35
5th Armored Division *****	4	7	63	74
Corps Troops	175	104	28	307
TOTALS	899	367	752	2018

* 4th Infantry Division relieved from attachment to V Corps 8 Nov 1944.
** 8th Infantry Division attached to V Corps 19 Nov 1944.
*** 28th Infantry Division relieved from attachment to V Corps 18 Nov 1944.
**** 99th Infantry Division attached to V Corps 9 Nov 1944.
***** 5th Armored Division, less Combat Command "B", relieved from attachment to V Corps 29 Nov 1944.

VIII. PROMOTIONS.

1. Status of Promotions and Appointments.

	Recd at Hq V Corps	Forwarded to First U.S. Army	Pending at Hq V Corps	Disapproved by Hq V Corps	Retd by First US Army	Pending at First US Army	Officers Promoted or appointed
APPOINTMENTS 1-30 Nov 44							
Battlefield							
Corps less Divisions	18	16	4	0	1	7	8
Divisions	19	15	5	2	5	7	13
TOTAL	37	31	9	2	6	14	21
Regular							
Corps less Division	0	2	0	0	1	1	3
Divisions	4	0	0	4	0	2	0
TOTAL	4	2	0	4	1	3	3
PROMOTIONS 1-30 Nov 44							
Battlefield							
Corps less Divisions	52	51	4	3	1	11	46
Divisions	88	88	1	0	1	17	86
TOTAL	140	139	5	3	2	28	132
Regular							
Corps less Divisions	5	5	0	0	0	5	13
Divisions	59	57	0	2	0	57	11
TOTAL	64	62	0	2	0	62	24

2. Reclassification, Reassignment and Demotions.

	Brig Gen	Col	Lt Col	Maj	Capt	1st Lt.	2nd Lt.	EO	TOTAL
Reclassification				1	1	6	3		11
Reassignments				NONE					
Demotions				NONE					
	-	-	-	1	1	6	3	-	11

IX. MORALE

1. Unit Citations Recommended.
Battery A, 461 AAA AW Bn
1st Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division
Battery C, 95th Armored FA Bn, 5th Armored Division
1st Signal Company, 1st Infantry Division
Medical Detachment, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, 9th Inf Div.

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2. Decorations and Awards.

Unit	Medal of Honor		DSC		DSM		Legion of Merit		Silver Star		Bronze Star		Soldier's Medal		Air Medal		TOTALS	
	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded
Hq & Hq Co, V Corps					1		11	1			3*	11					15	12
V Corps Arty					1						1	9					2	9
1st Inf Div	4	1	1	9	1		1	2			2**						9	12
2nd Inf Div			7	2			2	2									9	4
4th Inf Div %			2	5			6										8	5
5th Armd Div #			2	1					13		78				4		2	96
[illegible] Inf Div @									57		72		4		3			136
[illegible] Inf Div			4				1		125		148				7		5	280
[illegible] Inf Div #	1		1	4	1		3										6	4
29th Inf Div							4										4	
3 rd Armd Gp									1									1
3 rd TD Gp											1							1
99th Inf Div %%									1		14							15
20th Engr (C) Bn							1		3								1	3
38th Cav Rcn Sq									1		1	3					1	4
53rd Med Bn												4						4
56th Sig Bn							1	1			3						4	1
62nd Armd FA Bn												11						11
86th Cml Bn			1						1	1	4	10					6	11
102nd Cav Gp							1				1	1					2	1
102nd Cav Rcn Sq				1								1						2
76th FA Bn															2			2
115th AAA Gp							2										2	
[illegible]th Engr (C) Bn			2						6		7	1					15	1
[illegible]6th FA Bn												2			1			3
[illegible]7th FA Gp												6			1			7
[illegible]th FA Bn												5			2			7
190th FA Bn															1			1
254th Engr (C) Bn				1														1
200th FA Bn															1			1
400th Armd FA Bn			1														1	
953rd FA Bn															1			1
959th FA Bn									1						3			4
997th FA Bn															2			2
387th AAA AW Bn									2		5							7
461st AAA AW Bn				1							8							9
628th TD Bn			1						5		8						1	13

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2. Decorations and Awards. (Cont'd)

Unit	Medal of Honor		DSC		DSM		Legion of Merit		Silver Star		Bronze Star		Soldier's Medal		Air Medal		TOTALS	
	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded
629th TD Bn			1							5								6
741st Tank Bn									1	1								2
803rd MP Co										1								1
893rd TD Bn										8								8
941st FA Bn										1								1
7th FA Bn									2	10					7			19
171st Engr (C) Gp									2	3								5
40th Engr (C) Bn									3	1							3	1
250th Sig Serv Co										1								1
644th TD Bn										1								1
709th Tank Bn										6								6
776th AAA AW Bn													1					1
746th Tank Bn									6	8								14
899th TD Bn									4									4
TOTALS	5	1	22	25	4	-	33	6	10	225	22	444	-	5	-	35	96	741

* One (1) Bronze Star Award pending for French Liaison Officer.
** Two (2) Bronze Star Awards pending for U.S. Navy personnel.
* 4th Inf Div relvd fr atchmt to V Corps 8 Nov 44.
\# 5th Armd Div (less CC "B") relvd fr atchmt to V Corps 29 Nov 44.
8th Inf Div atchd to V Corps 19 Nov 44.
28th Inf Div relvd fr atchmt to V Corps 18 Nov 44.
** 99th Inf Div atchd to V Corps 9 Nov 44.

NOTE: "Pending" columns as of 30 Nov 44; "Awarded" columns are for the month of November 1944.

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IX. MORALE (Continued)

3. Postal.

a. At the beginning of the period, APO No. 305 was furnishing postal service to 82 units of V Corps, approximating 28,000 troops. This figure represents a decrease of 7,000 troops over the last period (October) and was due to the establishment by First Army of a separate APO for medical units formerly serviced by APO No. 305. Mail was picked up from the 26th Postal Regulating Station at LIEGE, BELGIUM.

b. The following summary indicates the scope of postal activity during the period of this report:

Received from the 26th PRS 4,469 sacks of parcel mail and 1,409 sacks of first class mail.

1,027 pieces of registered mail were received and 601 dispatched.

9,006 money orders were issued in the amount of $357,550.72.
438 money orders were paid in the amount of $12,628.67
Sales of stamps and stamped paper amounted to $20,693.28

4. Religious Activities.

a. At the close of the period of this report there were 65 assigned and attached chaplains with V Corps. One vacancy exists. Due to troop assignments, 39 assigned and 2 attached chaplains have been dropped and 30 assigned and 1 attached chaplains have been picked up during the month of November. Two chaplains were evacuated sick, and one replacement was received. One chaplain previously on detached service has been assigned.

b. A consolidation of religious activities during the month follows:

Number	Services	Attendance
420	Sunday services	25,170
591	Weekday services	13,381
5,322	Confessions	
10,117	Communions (all faiths)	
187	Hospital visits (patients contacted)	1,307
5	Baptisms	
3,105	Personal conferences	
39	Extreme unctions given	
13	Funerals	
6	Lectures	
451	Testaments distributed	
65	Jewish scriptures distributed	
92	Group discussions	
302	Scapulars distributed	
165	Rosaries distributed	
1,154	Religious pamphlets distributed (all denominations)	

5. Red Cross Field Director.

a. During the period of this report, the Red Cross Field Director handled 140 new cases, 7 recurrent cases and brought forward 120 cases from last month, making a total of 267 open cases during November. The cases were broken down as follows:

Personal Problems	11
Family Problems	28
Home Condition Reports	1
Financial	5
Health and Welfare	90
Emergency Furlough	20
Allotments	2

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II. MORALE (Cont'd)

5. Red Cross Field Director (cont'd)

b. It is the opinion of the field director that the increase in home problems is due to the length of time this unit and most of its personnel have been overseas. The present theater plans do not permit of the return of personnel to the states except in rare and unusual cases. A plan is in the process of formulation, however, for the month of December that will permit 15 officers and 168 enlisted men to return to the States for a short period. One of the priorities to be considered is domestic problem cases. The needy cases may be ~~recommended by the Red Cross Field Director.~~

6. Special Service.

a. Special Service activities for the period were grouped as follows:

(1) Recreation Center.

(a) During the early part of the month the operation of the Corps Recreation Center was made the responsibility of the C.O., 115th AAA Group. After a trial a definite operating staff will be formed to operate the center, if and when the Group Headquarters may be relieved for operational reasons.

(b) For the period covered by this report, the following personnel attended the Recreation Center on 46 hour pass:

Divisions	6007
Corps Troops	1708
Total	7715

In addition, by a mutual agreement with the VII Corps, 3049 members of the 9th Infantry Division were recreated at the VII Corps Recreation Center.

(2) Paris Recreation Trips.

During the period of the report 3045 members of the Corps, to include divisions, were sent on a recreational trip to Paris. Of this total, 2779 were allocated to divisions.

(3) Donut Dugout

A donut dugout, operated by the American Red Cross, was opened during the period at the Recreation Center. This proved to be a feature of the Center and relieved the Clubmobile Group for service to personnel not on pass status.

(4) Summary

The following activities of the Special Service Section were enjoyed by personnel of the command during the period of this report.

UNIT PRODUCTION AND FILM LIBRARY

No. of Shows	1,176
No. of titles	34
Total attendance	239,080

TOTAL OF ALL SHOWS

No. of Shows	1,815
No. of Titles	34
Total Attendance	439,240

USO SHOWS

No. of Performances	81
Total Attendance	21,780

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H. MORALE (Cont'd)

6. a. Special Service (cont'd)

USO SHOWS

No. of Performances	37
Attendance	35,000
Jam Sessions	23
Attendance	5,250
Total Performances	60
Total Attendance	40,250

CLUBMOBILES

No. of doughnuts served	255,180
Cups of Coffee Served	57,365

BAND CONCERTS

No. of Concerts	47
Total Attendance	31,300

EQUIPMENT ISSUED

25,000 sheets writing paper
24 dozen packs playing cards
12 dozen packs pinochle cards
18 radios
100 assorted magazines

I. PROVOST MARSHAL

1. The following Military Police units were available to V Corps during the period of this report:

Military Police Platoon, Headquarters Company V Corps
803rd Military Police Company (Corps)
428th Military Police Escort Guard Company
4th Infantry Division, Military Police Platoon (1 Nov 44 - 9 Nov 44)
28th Infantry Division, Military Police Platoon (1 Nov 44 - 19 Nov 44)
99th Infantry Division, Military Police Platoon (Atchd 9 Nov 44)
8th Infantry Division, Military Police Platoon (Atchd 19 Nov 44)
9th Infantry Division, Military Police Platoon
5th Armored Division, Military Police Platoon

2. There were no serious problems in the enforcement of order and discipline encountered by Corps Military Police during the period. It was found that the operation of the Recreation Center caused no marked increase in the delinquencies of military personnel.

3. Consolidated Report of Delinquencies for the Period.

	Off limits	Violation of Traffic SOP	Unatt. Vehicle	Speeding	Drunk and/or Disorderly	No Pass	Officer Driving Vehicle	No Trip Ticket	Driv. Wrong Way One-Way Road	Out of Uniform	TOTALS
V Corps	10	21	16	5			1	1	4	4	62
4th Inf Div	2		4		2			1			9
5th Armd Div	6	4	5	1		7		2			25
9th Inf Div	8		6			14			1	2	31
28th Inf Div		2	1								3
First U.S. Army	54	18	17	12	2		3	2			108
12th Army Group			2								2
TOTAL	80	45	51	18	4	21	4	6	5	6	240

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X. PROVOST MARSHAL (cont'd)

4. Locations of Corps Rear and Forward Boundaries for the period were:

a. 1 November 1944 - Forward - N 28 from Corps left Boundary to N-27 at K-830135, thence N-27 to N-32 vicinity WAIMES all exclusive to Divisions. N-32 through HUTGENBACH to NJ at K-931008, thence N-27 to Army Boundary, all inclusive to Divisions.

b. 15 November 1944 - Rear - From Corps Left (North) boundary at VERVIERS along main road to HERVE - THUIN - SPA - FRANCORCHAMPS - STAVELOT (towns and road exclusive to Corps) and thence along STAVELOT - VIELSALM road (town and road exclusive to Corps) as far as Corps right (South) Boundary.

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XI. FINANCE.

1. Operations: The following chart shows disbursements and collections for the month of November 1944:

	V Corps Finance Sect.	8th Finance Disb. Section	15th Finance Disb. Section
TOTAL CREDITS For Pay and Allowances (Excluding Travel)	$275,692.03	$1,086,351.64	$1,328,339.08
ADD: Repayments of Soldiers' Deposits (Including Interest)	1,328.66	208.62	3,306.01
(1) TOTAL CREDITS	$277,020.69	$1,086,560.26	$1,331,645.09
LESS: ALLOTMENTS			
Class "B"	$ 10,421.25	$ 97,221.25	$ 42,897.75
Class "E"	88,414.73	345,997.72	445,961.98
Class "F"	24,174.00	130,425.00	134,606.42
Class "Y"	721.75	180.00	1,443.14
Class "D"	193.03	143.80	238.25
Class "N"	16,691.69	76,823.13	94,517.34
(2) TOTAL ALLOTMENTS	$140,616.45	$ 610,460.90	$ 719,654.88
(2a) PARTIAL PAYMENTS OFFICERS (Debits)	$ [illegible]	$ [illegible]	$ [illegible]
(2b) TOTAL ITEMS (2) and (2a)	$140,[illegible]	$ [illegible]	$ [illegible]
(3) GROSS AMOUNT CHARGEABLE TO APPROPRIATIONS (Item (1) less Item (2b))	$136,364.24	$ 474,931.33	$ 590,673.18
LESS: VOUCHER COLLECTIONS			
PTA - Funds	$ 3,469.90	$ 26,494.23	$ 56,427.22
War Bonds	—	—	—
Soldiers' Deposits	5,231.00	10,381.00	28,569.00
Other Collections	5,513.96	18,017.92	20,703.28
(4) TOTAL VOUCHER COLLECTIONS	$ 14,214.86	$ 54,893.15	$ 105,699.50
(5) NET DISBURSEMENTS FOR PAY AND ALWS (Item (3) less Item (4))	$122,149.38	$ 420,038.18	$ 484,973.68
LESS: CASH COLLECTIONS			
PTA - Funds	$351,252.67	$ 29,098.40	$ 87,602.30
War Bonds	1,815.00	810.00	3,003.75
Soldiers' Deposits	15,242.00	17,827.00	52,507.00
Other Collections	29,965.02	10,673.84	1,823.73
(6) TOTAL CASH COLLECTIONS	$398,274.69	$ 58,369.24	$ 144,936.78
NET CASH RETAINED (Item (5) less Item (6))	($-276,125.31)	$ 361,668.94	$ 340,036.90

2. Savings: The following is a summary of savings for the month of November 1944:

Total Number of Payees: 27,817
Total Credits for Pay and Allowances: $2,690,382.75
Percentage of Allotments to Total Credits: 55.3 %
Percentage of Net Cash Retained to Total Credits: 15.7 %
Percentage of Net Cash Retained to Cash Actually Disbursed: 41.2 %
Average Amount Retained by Each Payee: $15.29

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XXI. DISCIPLINE.

1. Courts Martial.

a. The following is a summary of court martial cases for Corps Troops and attached divisions for the month of November 1944.

	GENERAL	SPECIAL	SUMMARY
Corps Troops (under court-martial jurisdiction of V Corps)	6	11	21
5th Armored Division	24	8	9
8th Infantry Division	7	51	53
9th Infantry Division	2	27	17
99th Infantry Division	0	0	3
* Totals	39	97	103

b. The following is an analysis of the types of offenses for which Corps Troops were tried:

OFFENSE	GENERAL	SPECIAL	SUMMARY
Allow EM to trade rifle	1		
Induce EM to conceal facts	1		
False official statement	1		
Involuntary manslaughter	1		
Negligently injure EM	1		
Sleeping on post	3		
Speeding			1
Disobedience, striking or disrespect NCO			4
Statutory Rape		1	
Pillaging		2	
Failure to obey orders of competent authority		2	9
AWOL and other violations of AW 61		3	6
Breach of restriction			1
Misbehavior of sentinel		1	
Wrongful using, loss or damage to Gov't property		1	
Drunkenness		1	
** Totals	8	11	21

Notes: * Totals for commands under this headquarters for whole month of November.
** These totals include cases where accused has in one trial been found guilty of two or more different types of offenses, hence the total offenses analyzed by type is necessarily greater than the number of cases tried as shown in par. 1 a, above.

c. Following is a summary of General, Special and Summary Court-Martial cases for the V Corps Troops:

ORGANIZATION	GENERAL	SPECIAL	SUMMARY
254th Engr (C) Bn	1		
993rd Engr Treadway Bridge Co	1		
112th Engr (C) Bn	2		
3250th Signal Service Co	1		
Hq Co, V Corps	1	1	
1340th Engr (C) Bn			4
502nd Engr Light Ponton Co			2
272nd FA Bn		1	1
38th Cav Ron Sq (Mecz)		2	
460th AAA (AW)Bn		1	1
382nd Med Coll Co			2
383rd Med Coll Co			1
508th Engr Light Ponton Co			1
56th Signal Bn		1	2
595th QM Laundry Co			1
461 AAA (AW) Bn			3
17th FA Obsn Bn			1
953rd FA Bn			1
2nd Special Service Co			1
941st FA Bn		2	
1464th Engr (C) Bn		1	

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ORGANIZATION	GENERAL	SPECIAL	REMARKS
115th AAA Gp		1	
387th AAA Av Bn		1	
TOTALS	6	11	21

R. V. LEE,
Colonel, GSC,
A C of S, G-1.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, U.S.ARMY

SECTION IV - G-4 LOGISTICS REPORT

1 November to 10 November

The supply difficulties noted in the previous month carried over into this period, with Prestone and overshoes being the chief problem. Army could not give any definite assurance on the total availability of Prestone, but estimated that by the end of the month all Corps units should have a part of their requirements. The problem of procuring overshoes was made the subject of a command channel letter, as the lack of this protective footgear was seriously endangering the health of the command. Army gave assurance that the shortages of this item would be met by withdrawing overshoes from service troops in the UK for redistribution to combat units. Towards the end of this period, partial requirements of overshoes were made available by Army, and distribution was made on priorities set up by G-4.

The restrictions on ammunition expenditure continued, but did not seriously affect the operations of the Corps. Due to the transportation difficulties occasioned by the limited road net, permission was obtained from Army to dump certain types of artillery ammunition on gun positions, in excess of basic loads. The 28th Inf Div and attached Corps troops in the northern sector continued to draw from the VII Corps ASP. The old question of mixed lot numbers on artillery ammunition cropped up again, and was made the subject of a command channel letter. Army has attempted to improve this situation by directing the ASPs to issue lots by truck loads insofar as practicable.

Rationing of tires and tubes in certain sizes, chiefly for ¼-ton and 2½-ton trucks, became necessary during this period, as Army stocks on these items became critical. Allocations were made by Corps Ordnance office based on actual needs, with units being allowed vehicle spares but no organizational spares in the critical sizes. Supporting Ordnance units reported a continued shortage of GMC sub-assemblies, chiefly differential and engine assemblies, a situation which may become critical. Class A

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inspections and refittings continued for all Corps units, and the general state of Ordnance materiel was considered excellent.

During this period, the 28th Div launched an attack calculated to strengthen our left (North) flank positions in the Hurtgen Forest, preliminary to the main effort towards the Rhine by the VII Corps on our left. The attack met with fanatic resistance and only limited advances were made, with resultant heavy losses of men and materiel. A study was made of the G-4 aspects of the attack, covering the supply and evacuation of the division and supporting troops for the period November 2-8.

11 November to 20 November

In the southern sector of the Corps zone, the 99th Inf Div took over the 9th Inf Div positions in the line, while the latter unit went into Corps reserve. The 99th Div had recently arrived in the theater, and the Corps Special Staff was directed to assist this unit in every way possible during the division's orientation period.

To enable the build-up of ammunition stocks in the VII Corps ASP, our units in the northern sector stopped drawing from this installation, and resumed the long haul from the regular Corps ASP in the southern sector. Units were again authorized to dump ammunition in excess of basic loads on positions, to minimize transportation difficulties and to insure sufficient stocks being on hand for our supporting role in VII Corps' D-day. Restrictions on ammunition expenditures were continued by Army, while D-day allocations for planning purposes were transmitted to all units concerned.

Continued bad weather, with considerable snowfall, increased the problem of road maintenance despite the continued efforts of Corps and Army engineers. Restrictions on speed and passing were imposed on one particularly bad stretch of the Corps MSR in an effort to prevent a complete breakdown of two-way traffic flow. The roads in the northern sector, which had to be shared with VII Corps traffic, became increasingly difficult to maintain, so that it became necessary to impose a one-way circulation plan.

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Winter weather conditions also resulted in increasing demands above T/E for combat clothing from Corps units, but due to the limited availability of these very desirable garments, Army rejected all such demands. Corps recommended to Army that consideration be given some form of winter camouflage clothing for patrols operating in snow-covered areas. The overshoe shortage was materially alleviated during this period by additional supplies from Army and by shifting stocks from service to combat units within Corps, but the total requirements were still not met.

Towards the close of this period a limited amount of Prestone was made available to the Corps, and distribution was begun on a proportionate rationing basis. Corps requested that a supply of "Duckbills", traction devices for tank treads, be made available for separate tank battalions, but Army stated that separate battalion requirements would not be met until all armored divisions had been equipped with these devices.

The 28th Div was relieved from assignment to Corps, and its position in the northern sector was taken over by the 8th Inf Div. The relief was effected over a six-day period, with combat teams and attachments being switched between V and VIII Corps on alternate days. The necessary transportation to implement the move was furnished from the Corps QM truck companies augmented by the AA and Arty Provisional Trk Cos. In accordance with standard procedure, the Special Staff contacted their opposite numbers on the 8th Div staff, and reported no unusual supply problems involved. To aid the supply operations of the division, Corps obtained 20 cargo carriers, M29 (Weasels) from Army, as it was felt that only these tracked vehicles could negotiate the forest trails in the division's sector.

21 November to 30 November

An investigation of local procurement in the city of EUPEN, Belgium, was made for the purpose of checking compliance with theater procurement directives. It was discovered that due to the Town Major's ignorance of the technicalities involved, and the desire for cooperation at all costs on the part of the Burgomeister, many irregularities were taking place. A representative of G-4 enlightened the officials concerned

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as to the proper procedure to be followed in requisitioning local materiel and services, and made certain that past mistakes along these lines would not be repeated. A letter on proper procurement procedure, in amplification of the theater directives on this subject, was sent to all unit commanders of the Corps.

During this period, the VII Corps on our left (North) flank, in conjunction with the American Ninth and British Second Armies, jumped off on an attack towards the Rhine. Our 8th Inf Div and CCR of the 5th Armored Division supported VII Corps by launching further attacks in the Hurtgen Forest area, making steady gains against determined enemy resistance.

By the end of the period our main supply problems, overshoes and Prestone, had been relieved considerably, although by no means completely solved. Distribution of overshoes met approximately 80% of requirements throughout the Corps, while the percentage of completeness ran considerably higher in the combat units. The distribution of Prestone was made to all units on a pro rata basis calculated to fill 50% of the total requirements of the Corps. Additional stocks of both Prestone and overshoes were promised by Army as soon as they became available from the Communication Zone.

THOMAS F. TAYLOR,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
A.C. of S., G-4.

7 Incls:
Incl No 1 - QM Report (in quad)
Incl No 2 - Ord Report (in quad)
Incl No 3 - Engr Report (in quad)
Incl No 4 - Surg Report (in quad)
Incl No 5 - Sig Report (in quad)
Incl No 6 - PM Report (in quad)
Incl No 7 - Operations Journal - Nov., File VI

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Quartermaster

QUARTERMASTER REPORT - AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY

1 November 1944 to 30 November 1944

1. A continued critical shortage of large-size overshoes for units within the Corps resulted in consolidation of requirements and issue, from available stocks, by the Corps Quartermaster. Issues were made to units on priorities established by G-4. This plan worked exceedingly well and insured that all tactical units received first consideration.

2. a. Units were directed to turn in all drums, inflammable, 5-gallon, in excess of T/E allowances due to an alarming shortage of this item in rear areas.

b. A detail from the 3275th QM Service Company policed the roads and fields within the Corps area for discarded empty gas cans. Thirty-six hundred (3600) cans were obtained in this manner and turned in to the class III truckhead.

3. The 560th QM Railhead Company continued operation of class I truckhead #55 servicing this Corps.

Rations issued during period - 1,814,194

4. The 3815th QM Gasoline Supply Company continued operation of class III truckhead #55 servicing this Corps.

Gallons of gasoline issued during period	-	1,283,160
" " diesel oil " " "	-	56,320
" " assorted oil " " "	-	27,835

5. The 606th QM Graves Registration Company operated three Corps Graves Registration collecting points.

Bodies processed during period:

American	-	413
Allied	-	5
Enemy	-	92
Total	-	510

Bodies processed since 6 June 1944:

American	-	4032
Allied	-	23
Enemy	-	1991
Total	-	6046

6. The 863rd QM Fumigation and Bath Company continued servicing units of the Corps. The 9th, 28th and 99th Infantry Divisions and certain Corps troops were furnished clothing exchange and priorities for use of the shower unit at specified times during the period. Approximately 1000 sets of Class "A" clothing were issued at the Victor Recreation Center. This clothing exchange was operated by one officer and

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six enlisted men.

Number of men showered during period - 30,749
Number of sets of clothing exchanged - 8,357
Average daily hours of operation - 8

7. The 595th QM Laundry Company continued servicing units within the Corps area.

Number pieces clothing laundered during period - 487,457
Number pounds clothing laundered during period - 626,370
Average daily hours of operation - 12

8. One section, 216th QM Salvage Repair Company continued servicing units within the Corps area.

Shoes repaired during period	- 1,328	pairs
Shoes salvaged during period	- 499	pairs
Leggings repaired during period	- 216	pairs
Tents repaired during period	- 17	
Tarps repaired during period	- 12	

9. The 3604th and 3892nd QM Truck Companies furnished transportation for hauling ammunition, troop movements, and normal Corps trucking requirements.

Total operational miles during period:

3604th QM Truck Company -	64,202
3892nd QM Truck Company -	63,390
Total -	127,592

10. Weather conditions made it imperative that standings and surfaced roads be provided for all service installations. Side roads and fields were not satisfactory for truckheads, laundries, baths, and truck parks, making it necessary that all such installations be established in or around towns and cities. The terrain features and the lack of suitable towns and surfaced roads (other than MSR's) within the Corps sector dictated that service installations be placed either near the Corps right or left flank. The bulk of the Corps troops were on the south (right) flank and the class I and III truckheads were operated in this area. Units near the Corps north (left) flank were serviced from the VII Corps class I and III truckheads. All other Quartermaster service installations were established on the Corps north (left) flank near the Corps Forward Command Post in order to more easily provide operational control by the Corps Quartermaster.

M. C. RHODES,
Colonel, QMC,
Quartermaster.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT
HEADQUARTERS REPLACEMENT DEPOT, V CORPS
DURING THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER
1944

TACTICAL RESUME

1. The V Corps took the offensive on 2 November after about a month of comparative inactivity. The offensive was restricted to one division on a narrow front with limited objectives to be followed by an enveloping movement. The object was to protect the right flank of the VII Corps in its proposed attack toward Duren and to open up a main supply route to V Corps by taking a portion of the Siegfried Line from the rear. Action to the front in support of the VII Corps still continues but the supply route has not yet been cleared. Action has been largely of a hand to hand nature with movement restricted by lack of roads, woods and ravines. Natural obstacles have been reinforced with mines and barbed wire to make the offense difficult and expensive.

2. From a supply standpoint the early action was particularly severe as to loss of major items. This resulted largely from troops being caught in exposed positions and being unable to make an orderly retreat. Loss of tanks and tank destroyers were especially numerous at this time.

3. The slow advance has permitted the purchase of many manufactured, critical accessories and parts by the Corps Ordnance Office.

4. Due to the lack of a direct main supply route, the attacking division was much closer to the VII Corps ASP then the V Corps ASP. Arrangements were made for the division to be supplied from the VII Corps ASP. A tremendous load was thus placed on ASP 127 when the VII Corps attack was fully enjoined.

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SUPPLY - GENERAL

1. Shortages existed on the following types of general purpose vehicles:

Truck, ¾ ton, 4x4
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, dump
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 whl cargo

Previous shortages on the 6 ton and 7½ ton trucks were entirely reduced.

2. The following items were again made available through usual supply channels both on battle replacement and maintenance exchange:

Carriage, motor, 3" Gun, M10
Carriage, motor, 75mm How., M8
Car, Armored, light, M8
Tank, light, M5A1

3. The supply of combat and track laying vehicles was sufficient throughout the month. All medium tank battalions were still operating on a level of fifty (50) tanks instead of fifty-four (54) per medium battalion.

4. The shortage of the following major items increased as a result of the tactical situation outlined in Par 2 of the Tactical Resume of this report:

Rifle, auto., cal.30, Browning, M1918A2
Gun, mach., cal.30, Browning, M1917A1
Gun, mach., cal.30, Browning, M1919A4
Gun, mach., cal.30, Browning, M1919A6
Mortar and Mount, 81mm, M1
Mortar and Mount, 60mm, M2
Launcher, grenade, M7
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M9
Gun, 57mm, M1
Bayonet, M1 & M1905

5. The following components of 2d echelon tool sets were critical:

Charger, battery, port., 12 V, eng. driven, 2000 W	17-C-9635
Charger, battery, port., 12 V, gas eng. driven, 300 W	17-C-8760
Compressor, air, port, 4 cu. ft., gas eng. driven	66-C-1330
Hydrometers, anti-freeze	18-H-940
Hydrometers, battery testing	18-H-1240
Gage, cylinder compression, universal type	41-G-124

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6. The following "Depot Demand" items in a critical state of supply:

Element, oil filter	[illegible]
Spark plugs, JN	[illegible]
Tires and tubes	[illegible]
Tires and tubes	[illegible]
Tires and tubes	[illegible]
Point sets, Dodge	[illegible]
Point sets, GMC	[illegible]
Fractions (Only 80% of requirements on hand)	
Brake fluid, hydraulic	

7. Listed below are shortages of parts and assemblies peculiar to major items of equipment that increase the duration of our deadlines:

Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4 (T/U or G/H)	
Differential and carrier ass'y	987885
Breaker points	992477
Hose, fuel filter to pump ass'y	661408
Master cylinder brake	920817
Gasket fuel filter bowl	919446
Carburetor ass'y	922880
Brake shoe, front or rear	
Kit, lining w/rivets	999447
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, Cargo	
Valves, exhaust	2137274
Valve cover gasket	6107400
Transfer Case (banjo)	2688994
Transfer Case (split)	2162868
Exhaust manifold ass'y	2159490
Point set, distributor	1855780
Engine	3230
Transmission Ass'y	2140096
Housing & jacket ass'y	867880
Gasket set, intake and exhaust manifold	3067384
Lining set ass'y, rear brake	606280
Brake shoe and lining	366048
Lining set ass'y, front brake shoe	608979
Lining set ass'y, front	2145001
Shoe front brake forward ass'y	2090968
Tractor, High Speed, M4	
Transmission ass'y	A3348B2
	0150-04-06080
Hose, torque converter	0150-08008845
Howr., 155mm, M1	
Mechanism, recoil, M8	0001-01-00888

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[illegible]

[illegible] Class of trucks ass'y . [illegible]

9. The supply of radial engines, R975-C1 were available in excess of requirements for the first time since August 15. The only bottleneck shortages on tank equipment was that on C2-C2 Spark plugs. Tracks were in abundant supply.

MAINTENANCE

A class "A" inspection equivalent and refitting program was completed on the following units:

9th Infantry Division minus 47th RCT
[illegible]th QM truck Co.
3915 QM truck Co.
[illegible] TD Bn.
[illegible] Armd'd FA Bn.
[illegible] AAA AW Bn.
[illegible] FA Bn.
[illegible] Tank Bn. (M)
[illegible] FA Bn.
[illegible] TD Bn.
[illegible] FA Bn.
[illegible] FA Bn.
[illegible] FA Bn.
[illegible] FA Bn.
[illegible] FA Bn.
[illegible] AAA AW Bn.
[illegible] Recn Sqdn.

In general, the condition of Ordnance Materiel within V Corps remains excellent. This situation can still change quickly for general purpose vehicles and artillery if the supply of major item assemblies cannot be increased to provide for anticipated larger requirements. (See Par 7 - Supply - General)

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[illegible], [illegible], [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] Officer, 5th Armored Division, reports that excess breakage is occurring on the right end of the track body of these links. Experience of the 5th Armored Division indicates that the track blocks on the Ford engine equipped tanks have been more susceptible to breakage up to 1,000 miles than on tanks powered with radial engines up to 1,500 miles. Adjustments in all cases have been reported as proper. It may be interesting to note that this trouble has not been experienced with the Carriage, Motor, 105mm Sev., M7. Listed below is a tabulation of breakages occurring on 67 tanks on a 180 mile trip as reported by the 5th Armored Division.

Engine Model	Approx. track miles	Miles traveled	No. of breakages
"	[illegible]	70	[illegible]
"	[illegible]	180	6
Ford	[illegible]	120	7
"	[illegible]	180	14
"	[illegible]	70	8
"	[illegible]	70	4
"	[illegible]	100	6
"	[illegible]	100	8

It is not possible at this time to check other tank units of this command, as the 5th Armored Division is the only V Corps unit that has had the M4A3 tank for an appreciable period.

[illegible], [illegible] Sev., [illegible].

The 26th Infantry Division Ordnance Officer reports that three of these tubes were condemned because of bulges averaging one inch to two inches, appearing on certain portions of the tracks. The bulges were stoned down and guns put back into service. No definite explanation can be furnished on the cause. In some cases bulged portions have dropped out leaving cavities in the tube. The bulge appears to be rough with fine cracks and usually occurs within a short distance of the forging seam. Gun books revealed that between (13)

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[illegible] and [illegible] rounds had been fired.

[illegible] (U//S)

Six (6) [illegible] twenty [illegible] this command have had defective elevating racks. The deficiency consisting in that there is too much play between pinion and sector gears causing "whip" in the tube when the gun was fired. This difficulty was overcome by moving the sector gear forward so it would mesh with the pinion gear. Complete details on this deficiency were forwarded through Ordnance Technical Channels.

BOMB DISPOSAL SQUADS

Experience has shown that EO Squads operating in forward areas should have a working knowledge of disposal methods for general types of enemy ammunition other than bombs.

AMMUNITION

1. The following types of ammunition were in short supply:

4.5" Gun	8" How.
155mm How.	240mm How.
155mm Gun	

2. The following new types were received for the first time during November:

a. Colored Rifle Smoke grenade
b. Cal..50 AP1 & T (4 to 1)

3. Steel cartridge storage cases for the 240mm Howitzer propelling charge are not withstanding field storage conditions. Cases are easily dented by rough handling or merely by cross stacking, resulting in difficulty to remove the propellant as well as moisture in the case.

4. There has been an increasing objection by the Field Artillery on receipt of mixed lots of ammunition from ASP's. An early solution is essential since ammunition can not be segregated at ASP's when received in

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large quantities of small sized lots. To date the V Corps ASP's have received one truck load of artillery ammunition containing a single lot of ammunition.

C. J. WILLIAMS,
Lt. Col. Ord. Dept.,
Assistant Ord. Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Engineer
APO 305

1 December 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Report After/After Action, November 1944.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Thru Channels)

1. GENERAL. The Engineer Section, Hea quarters V Corps, continued its normal functions and duties during the month of November 1944, advising the staff on matters of engineer concern, supervising the activities of the two Engineer Groups and coordinating engineer work between the Divisions and Groups.

2. TACTICAL. The attachment of the 1171 Engineer Combat Group to the 28 Infantry Division for operations during the early part of the month wrote a new page in the history of the Corps engineers. The Group was assigned certain normal engineer work, predominate of which was the opening of a road between VOSSENACK and SCHMIDT. It was considered necessary to give the Group additional assistance, and the 146th Engineer Combat Battalion was attached to them for the operation. During the early phases, the engineers performed their work as usual, but when the infantry was forced back by the enemy's fierce counterattacks, all three combat battalions were thrown into the line. Outstanding was the performance of the 146th Engineer Combat Battalion, which, with elements of the 20th and 1340th Engineer Combat Battalions, was given the mission of retaking VOSSENACK. The job was accomplished. Casualties in the three (3) battalions (less 1 company) were 12 officers and 225 enlisted men. This action demonstrated again the inadequacy of light weight transportation in engineer battalions. Supply and evacuation proved to be extremely difficult.

3. ROADS. Unusually heavy traffic over the Corps and Division roads created increased pressure on the engineers in the way of maintenance. A number of divisions, including armored, were passed across the entire rear area of the Corps. This heavy traffic, together with snow, incessant rainfall, and freezing weather taxed the ability of men and equipment alike. Every available truck was put in use for hauling road material. Approximately 7,000 cu. yds. of road metal was consumed during the month for the maintenance of 150 miles of road. The heavy rainfall caused a rapid rise of streams and reservoirs. Several improvised bridges and culverts were washed out, necessitating immediate action in replacement. Several reservoirs reached their maximum stage and careful control became necessary in order to prevent damage from overflow.

4. WATER SUPPLY. Water supply presented no unusual problems during the month. An average of 86,000 gallons per day was dispensed.

5. LOCAL PROCUREMENT. The importance of local procurement was made more apparent with the approach of winter. The lack of numerous miscellaneous items necessary for repair and maintenance in connection with the use of billets brought an increased strain on the Corps Purchasing and Contracting Officers.

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Authorization was requested and granted for the designation of Battalion and Group S-4's as Purchasing and Contracting Officers in addition to the Corps Officer.

6. STUDIES. Information on ROER Valley dams and their possible effect on military operations was collected and disseminated to the staff and units. Special maps designed to illustrate graphically areas of observation of enemy held ground from certain selected points, were prepared. Several formal terrain studies were also prepared for use by the Corps Staff.

7. MAPS. 1:10,000 scale assault maps were prepared and distributed to units. No particular mapping problems were encountered during the month. Field check was made of 1:25,000 scale topographic map for the Army Engineer regarding certain numbers appearing thereon. Inclement weather greatly curtailed survey work of the Topographic Company.

8. A summary of bridging constructed during the month is attached as Annex "A".

LEWIS C. PATRILLO,
Colonel, C. E.,
Corps Engineer.

1 Incl.
Annex "A"

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Surgeon

1 December 1944.

AFTER ACTION REPORT
Surgeon's Section, Hq., V Corps

1 November 1944 to 30 November 1944 Incl.

Casualties during this period were light. Demands on the medical services were not excessive.

EVACUATION AND FIELD HOSPITALS

Army hospital installations supported corps medical units in an excellent manner. They were maintained well forward and easily available to Division Clearing Stations.

EVACUATION

Although the rate of evacuation (all causes) remained moderate, the evacuation rate of trench foot cases was considered excessive. This was corrected to some extent during the latter part of the period by the issue of overshoes and by careful attention to preventive measures.

PERSONNEL

The personnel replacement system continued to operate in a satisfactory manner. Retention of company grade officers, over 38 years of age, between combat units and Army hospitals was continued throughout the month. Prior to June of this year, replacement of all company grade officers over 38 years of age was completed.

Replacements received were, in general, qualified and physically fit. The exception was a medical corps captain, 44 years of age, in poor physical condition and without field experience or training for field duty. This officer was required for assignment to a corps combat unit. He was obviously unfit for such duty and was evacuated out of the Corps.

MEDICAL SUPPLY

Army supply installations continued operation in locations well forward and easily accessible to troops. Stocks were very good. Shortages of a few items

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items were spotty for short periods of time. These shortages were in every case attributable to failure of stocks in excess of the Army Medical Depot to arrive from the U.S. and were corrected in some instances by air shipment.

G. E. Brenn
G. E. BRENN,
Colonel M. C.,
Surgeon.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER

2 DECEMBER 1944

AFTER ACTION REPORT, SIGNAL SECTION, V CORPS, 1 NOVEMBER - 30 NOVEMBER 1944

1. HEREWITH A SUMMARIZATION OF SIGNAL SUPPLY ACTIVITIES FOR THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER - 30 NOVEMBER 1944 INCLUSIVE:

A. NOVEMBER PRESENTED COMPARATIVELY FEW UNUSUAL AND ABNORMAL DEMANDS FOR COMBAT SIGNAL SUPPLY. HEAVY COMBAT LOSSES OF SIGNAL EQUIPMENT DID OCCUR IN V CORPS ENGINEER UNITS ATTACHED TO 28TH DIVISION FROM 2 NOVEMBER 1944 TO 15 NOVEMBER 1944, AND CAVALRY UNITS OF THIS CORPS. NO DIFFICULTY WAS FOUND IN SECURING IMMEDIATE REPLACEMENTS FROM THE FIRST U S ARMY. AMONG THE MAJOR COMBAT LOSSES FOR THESE UNITS WERE RADIOS SCR-300, RADIOS SCR-284, RADIOS SCR-536, MINE DETECTORS SCR-625 AND TELEPHONES EE-8-A. MELTING SNOWS AND CONTINUED RAINS DURING THE FIRST PART OF NOVEMBER CAUSED THE DEEP MUD TO ANNOY OPERATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS EVEN MORE THAN IT HAD IN PREVIOUS MONTHS. DURING THE LAST PART OF THE MONTH, THE WEATHER IMPROVED EVEN THOUGH MUCH MUD STILL REMAINED.

B. DAMAGED SPIRAL-4 CABLE WAS RECEIVED FROM DEPOTS IN QUANTITIES AVERAGING ABOUT 15%. THIS FACT WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE ARMY SIGNAL SUPPLY OFFICER AND WITH AN INVESTIGATING OFFICER FROM COMMUNICATION ZONE HEADQUARTERS. EVEN THOUGH HAULING BAD CABLE DID WASTE TRANSPORTATION AND TIME FOR TESTING BY THE USING UNITS, MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE SUCH THAT THIS EXTRA WORK AND DELAY DID NOT GREATLY AFFECT THE IMMEDIATE TACTICAL PICTURE.

C. AMONG THE VERY CRITICAL ITEMS OF SIGNAL SUPPLY WERE W-110 AND W-130. EVEN THOUGH THE QUANTITY OF WIRE ON HAND BY UNITS OF THIS CORPS WAS DANGEROUSLY LOW AT TIMES, SLOWNESS OF MOVEMENT DURING THIS PERIOD LIMITED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS WIRE AFTER INITIAL INSTALLATIONS WERE MADE. REQUISITIONS FOR WIRE WERE OFTEN REDUCED BY ARMY, BUT THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS WERE ALWAYS FURNISHED. BY STRICT RATIONING OF THE WIRE, THE CRISIS HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COPED WITH.

D. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF WORK DONE BY THE V CORPS SIGNAL REPAIR SECTION DURING THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER:

(1)	NO. OF JOB ORDERS ACCEPTED SINCE "D" DAY	2[illegible]
(2)	NO. OF JOB ORDERS ACCEPTED DURING NOV	490
	(A) NO. OF ITEMS HANDLED BY DIRECT EXCHANGE	370
	(B) NO. OF ITEMS TURNED OVER TO HIGHER ECH REPAIR	[illegible]
	(C) NO. OF REPAIRED OR EXCHANGED IN LESS THAN 3 DAYS	407
	(D) TOTAL NO. OF ITEMS NOT REPAIRED AT END OF MONTH INCLUDING D&B)	27

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(3) INITIAL INSTALLATIONS OF RADIOS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ABOVE FIGURES.

(4) LIST OF MAJOR ITEMS REQUIRING REPAIR DURING MONTH OF NOVEMBER:

(A) BC-191, BC-603, BC-604, BC-611, BC-620, BC-654, BC-659, BC-684, BC-728, AND BC-1000.
(B) POWER UNITS, PE-43, PE-75, PE-103, PE-104, AND PE-117.
(C) MINE DETECTOR, SCR-625.
(D) SWITCHBOARD UNIT, EE-2-C.
(E) OUTPUT METERS FOR I-56 AND I-107.
(F) TELEPHONE, EE-8-A.
(G) CABLE, CC-345.
(H) SWITCHBOARD BD-72.
(I) HANDSET, TS-13 AND MICRIPHONE T-17.
(J) GENERATOR, GN-45.

HASKELL H. CLEAVES,
COLONEL, SIGNAL CORPS,
SIGNAL OFFICER.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Provost Marshal
APO 305 U. S. ARMY

SECRET
Path: CO, V CORPS
Date: 1 December 44
Initials:

1 December 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports for the Period 1 November 1944 to 30 November 1944.

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, V Corps.

I. The following report of traffic operations of the V Corps Traffic Headquarters during the month of November 1944 is divided into three phases.

1. The Schmidt Attack Phase. (1-8 November 1944)
2. Readjustment and Defensive Phase. (9-20 November 1944)
3. Attack for Limited Objectives. (21-30 November 1944)

II. The Schmidt Attack Phase. (1-8 November 1944)

a. On the 1st of November, V Corps Traffic Headquarters was maintaining the following Military Police traffic posts within the Corps Zone; at Eupen, there were seven (7) Traffic Posts and one (1) Traffic Control Point; at Malmedy, there were four (4) Traffic Posts; at Stavelot, there was one (1) Traffic Post. In addition to the Traffic Posts; three (3) motorcycle patrols were maintained on the routes N-28 and N-32 while five (5) motorcycle patrols covered Eupen and routes N-28 and N-31 and the secondary road between Eupen and Retgen. As there was no change in the Corps Zone during the month, these traffic posts and patrols remained the same except for the four (4) traffic posts at Malmedy which were withdrawn on 8 November when relieved by the First United States Army, Military Police.

b. The Traffic Headquarters was concerned on the 1st of November with the coordination of the movement in connection with the relief of CC "B", 8th Armored Division by CC "B",5th Armored Division. Notification of this move had been received by Traffic Headquarters late on the previous evening and the first march units of CC "B" started moving at 0700 of the 1st of November. Two (2) routes were used to effect the relief. CC "B" moved North from WAIMES along N-32 to BUTGENBACH, then left to ELSENBORN and KALTERHERBERG. CC "B" moved South from KALTERHERBERG to RJ (K-925142) then right along secondary road to HEYWERTZ, N-32, WAIMES, then left to vicinity ONDENVAL. A shuttle system was used to accomplish this movement. Units of CC "B" did not move until the relief unit of CC "B" arrived.

c. CC "A", 8th Armored Division moved North on the following day.This movement was routed by Traffic Headquarters as follows: Secondary road from MODENSCHEID to FAYMONVILLE and WAIMES,N-32, N-27, N-28 to EUPEN, N-28&N-29 to CR at MERCLS, then right to NEUDORF.

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d. The next large movement was the 4th Infantry Division's move to an assembly area in VII Corps. It was divided into sixteen (16) serials which started on the morning of the 8th of November and completed the movement on the 9th of November. March serials which moved during the day, travelled by the infiltration method whereas those which moved by night went in closed convoys. The route selected for this movement was from an IP at RJ east of BULLINGEN, BUTGENBACH, N32, N27, N28, RUPEN, N28, then right on unnumbered road at RJ(K-825325) to ROTGEN then north and east to assembly area vicinity (K-990310). An alternate route out of RUPEN was planned by Traffic Headquarters in conjunction with V Corps G-3 and VII Corps G-3 to be used in case of CC"A" 5th Armored Division moved from its assembly area in the vicinity of MEUDORF to combat positions southeast of ROTGEN during this period. (See Document for the 4th Infantry Division FO 52)

e. On the 8th of November, Corps G-4 published in Change 6 to V Corps Administrative Order No. 7, a directive restricting traffic through the ASP 126. According to the directive, Highway N27 through ASP from South end of Robertsville Bridge (K-858068) to junction with Highway N32 at K-855037 was closed to traffic other than ammunition vehicles effective 102400A November 1944. It provided that this road could be used in cases of tactical necessity only on clearance by Traffic Headquarters V Corps.

III. Readjustment and Defensive Phase. (9-20 November 1944)

a. The first large movement for this period was the movement of the 99th Infantry Division into the Corps Sector which was initiated on the 9th of November. Plans for coordination of this movement were begun on the previous afternoon by Traffic Headquarters in conjunction with Corps G-3 and First U.S.Army Traffic Headquarters. The route scheduled was as follows: AUBEL then along unnumbered road to BASTICN, N27 to VERVIERS, and along N27 to vicinity of CAMP ELSENBORN. One (1) Regimental Combat Team was moved each day; 395th RCT on the 9th; 393rd RCT on the 10th; 394th RCT on the 11th. The movement was completed on the 12th when the last combat elements closed into their assembly area.

b. There were no serious breakdowns in the movement of the 99th Infantry Division although generally during the period there was a wet snow falling which covered the roads.

c. On the 10th of November, the 102nd Cavalry Group was also moved. The route they followed was N32, N27, N28, RUPEN, MERSOLS, MEUDORF, to vicinity of ROTGEN. On the following day the 38th Cavalry Recon Squadron from FAYMONVILLE along the same route to vicinity of ROTGEN.

d. At the request of the Traffic Headquarters and in view of weather conditions, on the 10th of November, the Ordnance Section reinforced the Ordnance Wrecker Station at RJ(N27&N28) and another Wrecker Station was located at CR (N27 and unnumbered road leading from CAMP ELSENBORN) and another at WALMPDY. Additional jeeps were assigned to the patrolling of the principal roads of the Corps road net. This cooperation of the Ordnance Section greatly assisted the

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movements of large convoys and the normal flow of traffic during the inclement weather experienced throughout the month.

e. During the period from the 14th to the 20th of November the planning and coordination of the movements of the 28th Infantry Division South and the 8th Infantry Division North was accomplished. As each Division was relieving the other, a shuttling movement was made so that only one (1) Regimental Combat Team was in the process of moving at one time. The movement started with the 112th RCT moving South on the evening of the 14th. It was a pitch black night and cats-eyes were barely discernable. Lead vehicles had to use black-out driving lights in order to see the road.

f. With the 121st RCT closing into its new assembly area in the VII Corps Sector on the 20th November this shuffling of two (2) Infantry Division was completed. They had used the following route for the movement; ROTGEN, MALMEDY, ST VITH, MALSCHEID, ALLERBORN, WILTZ.

g. At the same time of the above mentioned movements, on the 17th November CC "B", 5th Armored Division was again moved to an assembly area in the North of the Corps Sector. This move was routed from WAIMES along N32 to RJ(N27AN32), N27, N28, EUPEN, N28AN29 to EYNATTEN, to RAEREN, to vicinity of ROTGEN.

IV. Attack for Limited Objectives Phase. (21-30 November 1944)

a. Plans were formulated at the beginning of this phase for the routing of the combat elements of CC "B" from their assembly area at WALHORN to battle positions in the 8th Infantry Division front, west of HURTGEN. In case of day movement the following route was to be used: WALHORN to N28-N29 (AACHEN-EUPEN road), North to EYNATTEN, then southeast on secondary road to RAEREN continuing southeast to ROTGEN where it would proceed to the vicinity of HURTGEN. For a night movement, the vehicles would be routed northeast from EYNATTEN to KORNELMUNSTER then southeast to the vicinity of HURTGEN via BREINIG and ZWEIFALL. The day route was not recommended by the Engineers for night movement due to road conditions caused by heavy rains while the night road was not recommended for daylight movement as this route was used by VII Corps for their MSR and such a movement would result in delays for both the tactical and supply traffic.

b. Traffic Headquarters received notification of the CC"B" movement about 241400A November 44. Clearance with VII Corps for the use of their roads and all other arrangements for the movement except for the time had been made prior to the movement, so, on receiving notification, it was only necessary to transmit the time of movement to parties concerned. A half an hour later at 1430, the movement of CC"B" combat elements was initiated and at 1730 that same afternoon they closed at ROTGEN.

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c. The Provost Marshal found on inspection that unit directional signs were not being uniformily constructed and were being posted and maintained in such a haphazard manner that they were causing more confusion than assistance in the direction of traffic. This condition was reported to G-4 who directed that an administrative order be published calling attention of the command to this condition and directing each unit to police its directional signs.

d. The latter operational phase was a quiet period for the Traffic Headquarters in comparison to the previous activity of the month. With the exception of CC "R", 5th Armored Division and some minor tactical convoys, the Traffic Headquarters was concerned with routing of administrative convoys toward the end of the month.

e. During the month of November 40 convoys involving a movement of 6744 vehicles over a total of 1137.5 miles within the Corps area were released by Corps Traffic Headquarters. During the same period 50 convoys involving 4654 vehicles travelled 1088.66 miles within the Corps area and were cleared by other traffic headquarters. with the traffic headquarters of V Corps. The movements of the 4th Infantry Division and the 99th Infantry Division comprising the movement of a total of 3708 vehicles over a total of 48.7 miles of the Corps road net were not included in the above figures.

f. From operations during the month the following conclusions were drawn:

(1) Tactical troop movements during the hours of darkness should be avoided whenever possible during winter months. Several scheduled convoys moved during the hours of darkness and the results were invariably the same, namely;
   a. Lost vehicles, which had to be traced and assembled during daylight hours.
   b. Wrecks due to slippery or narrow roads.
   c. Stalled vehicles creating road blocks.

(2) Unit guides and Military Police must be placed at every place possible to make a wrong turn.

(3) March discipline must be stressed continously. Maintenance of proper interval, inspection at halts, and safeguarding halted convoys does much to eliminate wrecks and stalled vehicles. During rain or snow, deviation from correct march procedure results in long delays and the creation of road blocks and other serious traffic hazards.

(3) When vehicles other than organic are assigned to troop movement duty, the unit Motor Officer should make a thorough inspection to determine if such assigned vehicles are properly serviced. Out of one group of 90 trucks assigned to the 4th Infantry Division for a convoy, 8 ran out of gasoline before completion of the movement.

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(4) Traffic Headquarters must maintain close liaison with Engineer and Ordnance Section. The Corps Engineer should be notified immediately of critical conditions and should be warned beforehand as to the volume of traffic expected on the road net. Ordnance section should coordinate with its supporting battalions the placing of wrecker stations along convoy routes. During one divisional move this month, seven wrecker stations were spotted along 15 miles of road. These wreckers, in addition to 15 wreckers from the unit moving, were busy continuously day and night for three days clearing stalled and wrecked vehicles. Snow was falling, throughout the period.

ARTHUR E. CAMPBELL
Colonel, Infantry
Provost Marshal

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H, 4TH INF DIV
VIA BULLINGEN, BELGIUM
(R-931004)
060800A Nov 44

FO #62 (NOT TO BE TAKEN FORWARD OF REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS)

THIS ORDER SUPERSEDES FO #61

MAPS: GERMANY, 6509, SCALE: 1/25,000.

2. 4th I nf Div will move by motor from present bivouac areas to areas indicated Overlay (FO #61) beginning 060700A Nov 44.
Route 4
IP - RJ at R-931022.
Rate of March - Night, 8-10-15 MPH; Day, Maximum 25 MPH; All local traffic regulations will be observed.
Traffic Circulation - See Overlay accompanying FO #62.

3. a. March Serial #1 - Column Commander, CO 4th Engr C Bn.
4th Engr C. Bn.
Head of column passes IP at 060700A Nov 44.
Clear IP by 061300A Nov 44.
Type of Movement - Infiltration.
Density - 30 vehicles per hr.

b. March Serial #2 - Column Commander, CO 8th Inf.
March Groups #1 to #4 Incl -
Two (2) Truck Companies, furnished by V Corps and First Army, transporting foot elements 8th Inf.
March Groups #5 to #13 Incl -
Organic vehicles 8th Inf
March Group #14 -
Co "A" 4th Med Bn
March Groups #15 to #18 Incl -
29th FA Bn and atchd AA
Head of column passes IP at 062200A Nov 44.
Clear IP by 070045A Nov 44

c. March Serial #3 - Column Commander, CO 4th Rcn Tr (Mez).
March Groups #1 and #2 -
4th Rcn Tr (Mez).
Head of Column passes IP at 070045A Nov 44.
Clear IP by 070115 A Nov 44.

d. March Serial #4 - Column Commander, CO 20th FA Bn.
March Groups #1 to #3 Incl -
20th FA Bn & atchd AA
Head of column passes IP at 070115A Nov 44.
Clear IP by 070300A Nov 44.

e. March Serial #5 - Column Commander designated by CO 4th Med Bn.
1 Plat Co "D" 4th Med Bn.
Head of column passes IP at 070800A Nov 44
Clear IP by 070830A Nov 44.
Type of Movement - Infiltration.
Density - Thirty (30) vehicles per hour.

f. March Serial #6 - Coordinated by Lt Col Walter L. Gewalt, Hq Commandant, 4th Inf Div
March Groups #1, #2 & #3 -
4th Inf Div Hq & Hq Co.
Head of column passes IP at 070930A Nov 44
Clear IP by 071130A Nov 44
Type of Movement - Infiltration
Density - Thirty (30) vehicles per hour
March Group #4 -
4th Div Arty Hq & Hq Btry
Head of column passes IP at 071130A Nov 44
Clear IP by 071230A Nov 44
Type of Movement - Infiltration.
Density - Thirty (30) vehicles per hour.

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g. March Serial No. 7 - Column Commander, designated by CO 22nd Inf
Fifty (50) general purpose vehicles of 22nd Inf transporting
personnel to be used for tactical reconnaissance 08 Nov 44.
Half-tracks, 105mm Gunnen and 57 mm AT Guns will not be included
in this serial.
Head of column passes IP at 071230A Nov 4
Clear IP by 071245A Nov 44.
Type of movement - infiltration
Density - Thrity (30) vehicles per hour.

h. March Serial No. 8 - Column Commander, designated by CO 12th Inf.
Fifty (50) general purposes vehicles of 12th Inf transporting
personnel to be used for tactical reconnaissance 08 Nov 44.
Half-tracks, 105mm Gunnen and 57mm AT Guns will not be included
in this serial.
Head of column passes IP at 071345A Nov 44
Clear IP by 071400A Nov 44
Type of movement - infiltration
Density - Thrity (30) vehicles per hour.

i. March Serial No. 9 - Column Commander, CO 22nd Inf.
March Groups No. 1 to 4 Incl -
Two (2) Truck Companies, furnished by VII Corps transporting
foot elements 22nd Inf.
March Groups No 5 to 11 Incl - March Group No. 12
Organic Vehicles 22nd Inf. Co "D" 4th Med Bn.
March Groups No. 13 to 17 Incl -
44th FA Bn and attchd AA
Head of column passes IP at 072200A Nov 44.
Clear IP by 080030A Nov 44.

j. March Serial No. 10 - Column Commander, C O, 801st TD Bn.
March Groups No. 1 to 5 Incl -
801st T D Bn.
Head of column passes IP at 080030A Nov 44
Clear IP by 080200A Nov 44.

k. March Serial No 11 - Column Commander, CO, 277th AAA (AW) Bn.
277th AAA (AW) Bn less 4 Btrys.
Head of column passes IP at 080230A Nov 44.
Clear IP by 080930A Nov 44.
Type of movement - infiltration.
Density - Thirty (30) vehicles per hour.

l. March Serial No 12 - Column Commander, CO, 704th Ord LR Co.
704th Ord Co.
Head of column passes IP at 080930A Nov 44.
Clear IP by 081100A Nov 44.
Type of movement - Infiltration.
Density - Thrity (30) vehicles per hour.

m. March Serial No. 13 - Column Commander, designated by CO 12th Inf.
Fifty (50) general purpose vehicles of 12th Inf transporting
personnel to be used for tactical reconnaissance 09 Nov 44.
Half-tracks, 105mm Gunnen and 57mm AT Guns will not be included
in this serial.
Head of column passes IP at 081100A Nov 44.
Clear IP by 081245A Nov 44.
Type of movement - Infiltration.
Density - Thrity (30) vehicles per hour.

n. March Serial No. 14 - Column Commander, CO 4th M Co.
4th M Co.
Co "D" (less 1 Pl-1) 4th Med Bn.
4th Sig Co. (less Fwd elms)
Head of column passes IP at 081245A Nov 44.
Clear IP by 081200A Nov 44.
Type of movement - Infiltration.
Density - Thrity (30) vehicles per hour.

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o. March Serial No. 14 - Column Commander, CO 12th Inf.
March Groups No. 1 to No. 4 Incl -
Two (2) Truck Companies furnished by VII Corps transporting foot elements 12 Inf.

March Groups No. 5 to No. 9 Incl -
Organic vehicles 12th Inf
March Group No. 10
Co "B" 4th Med. Bn.
Head of column passes IP at 082200A Nov 44
Clears I P at 082400A Nov 44.

March Groups No. 11 to 15 Incl -
42nd FA Bn and atchd AA

p. March Serial No. 14 - Column Commander, CO, 704th Tank Bn.
March Groups No. 1 to 5 Incl -
704th Tank Bn.
Head of column passes IP at 082200A Nov 44.
Clears IP by 080200A Nov 44.

2. (1) Night driving will be conducted with cat-eye lights only. An inspection will be conducted prior to movement to verify that lights are in working order.

(2) All road guides will wear a white vertical cross on helmets, made of 4" strip of 1" adhesive tape.

(3) "RED WING" will be the code name to identify 4th Inf Div vehicles by road guides and MP's. All drivers and vehicle commanders will be instructed prior to movement in the use of code name.

(4) Twenty (20) men from each infantry regiment report to Provost Marshal, 4th Inf Div, at 061300A Nov 44, at MP Plat Hq (P.916992), with full field equipment and three (3) days rations, to act as road guides from IP to unit breakdown points.

(5) Security measures as outlined in Ltr of Instructions, this Hq, 4 Nov 44, and Annex No. 1 to Warning Orders, this Hq, 3 Nov 44, will be observed.

(6) Each traffic post will be equipped with two (2) flashlights, the lens of which will be colored half-red and half-blue for night identification.

(7) It will be the responsibility of units to place guides from the unit breakdown point to new unit assembly areas.

(8) Infantry transported by V and VII Corps, and First Army vehicles will detruck on main roads in new unit areas. Trucks will be released immediately to AG of S, G-4, 4th Inf Div.

(9) Combat vehicles of Inf Regts may remain on roads until daylight if the arrival of these vehicles is during the hours of darkness. However, these vehicles will clear the roads as soon as practicable upon entry into the new area.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS:

a. Arrangements for trucks to transport foot elements of Inf Regts will be made by AG of S, G-4, 4th Inf Div.
b. Supply Installations - Details later.

5. a. Div GP will open vicinity DRIFFALL (K-9836), 7 Nov 44.
b. Other G O's to be reported.
c. Radio silence will be continued in new areas.
d. Reference Point "X" - K-9934 will be used to designate locations in new areas after 011600A Nov 44.

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Locations of Army Prisoner of War Enclosures and V Corps Prisoner of War and Straggler Collecting Points during November 1944.

a. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure.

1 November 1944 - HERBESTHAL - (K-745335)

b. V Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure and Straggler Collecting Point.

1 November 1944 - EUPEN - (K-797275)

Locations of Army and Corps Stockades for U. S. Military Prisoners.

a. Army Stockade.

1 November 1944 - MICHEROUX - (K-570270)

b. V Corps Stockade and Civilian Detention Camp.

1 November 1944 - EUPEN - (K-794278)

Locations of Corps Rear and Forward Boundaries for the month of Nov. 1944.

a. 1 November 1944 - Forward - N-28 from Corps Left Boundary to N-27 at K-830135 thence N-27 to N-32 vicinity WAIMES all exclusive to Divisions. N-32 through BUTGENBACH to RJ at K-931008, thence N-27 to Army Boundary, all inclusive to Divisions.

b. 15 November 1944 - Rear - From Corps Left (North) boundary at VERVIERS along main road to HEUSY - THEUX - SPA - FRANCORCHAMPS - STAVELOT (towns and road exclusive to Corps) and thence along STAVELOT - VIELSALM Road (town and road exclusive to Corps) as far as Corps right (South) Boundary.

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E. [illegible] V CORPS
[illegible] 305
TRAFFIC [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] NOVEMBER 44

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. W.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILES IN CONT. AREA
V- 1	11/1	681	20	4	Waimes	Kalterherberg	N32, Butgenbach, Elsenborn to dest.	CC "B" 5th Armd Division.	11.5
V- 2	11/1	561	20	5	Kalterherberg	Ondenval	Kalterherberg to RJ (K-928142), right to Hyversts, N32, Waimes left to dest.	CC "B" 5th Armd Division.	23.5
V- 3	11/2	561	19	4	Hoderscheid	Heudorf	Faymonville, Waimes, N32, N27, N28, Rupen, N28 to Merols, right to dest.	CC "A" 5th Armdl Division.	25.0
V- 4	11/3	62	2	1	Bullingen	Heudorf	N32 to Malmedy, N28 to Rupen, right to Heudorf.	112th Engr Bn.	30.0
V- 5	11/3	30	1	1	Hoderscheid	Heudorf	Hoderscheid to Ambleve, N27, N33, N27, N28 to Merols to destination.	Hq 5th Armd Div.	29.5
V- 6	11/3	25	1	1	Junction N27 Elsenborn Road.	Heudorf	N27, N28, Merols to destination.	Co D 10th Tnk Bn.	13.5
V- 7	11/3	12	1	1	Butgenbach	Heudorf	N32, N27, N28, Rupen, N28 and N29 to Merols, tright to destination.	893 TD Bn.	24.6
V- 8	11/4	50	2	1	RJ(N27 and N32)	Elsenborn	N27, N32 to Butgenbach to destiation.	3604 QM Trk Co.	8.0
V- 9	11/6	19	1	1	Butgenbach	Rupen	N32, N27, N28 to Rupen to Gl XI Dp.	3604 QM Trk Co.	23.4
V-10	11/7	15	1	1	Camp Elsenborn	Rott	Unnumbered road to N27, N27 and N28 to Rupen Merols, to Heudorf, Rotgen to Rott.	Co H 893 TD Bn.	29.0
V-11	11/9	21	1	1	Sourfall	Camp Elsenborn	Rott, Rotgen, Rupen, N28, N27 to dest.	Co B 801 TD Bn.	28.2
V-12	11/10	611	24	6	Butgenbach	Vicinity of Rotgen	N32, N27, N28, Rupen, Merols, Heudorf, to vicinity of Rotgen.	102 Cav Grp.	2317
V-13	11/10	70	7	2	Monschau	Heubach	N32 to Rupen, N23 to destination.	26 Cav Rcn Sqd.	16.0
V-14	11/11	260	8	2	Waimes	Rotgen	Faymonville, Waimes, N32, N27, N28, Rupen, RJ (K-827206), Heudorf, Rotgen.	85 Cav Rcn Sqd.	35.5
V-15	11/11	42	2	1	Sourfall	Camp Elsenborn	Rott, Rotgen, Rupen, N28 to RJ(N28 and N27) N27 to GR(N27 and Dam Road) then left to Camp Elsenborn.	Co "A" and "C" 801 TD Bn.	28.2

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH [illegible]

MOVEMENT CODE	DATE	No. VEH.	NO. MILES	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH [illegible] 1944.

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	L. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
[illegible]	11/[illegible]	35	1	1	Bulgan	Valmunsach	Bulgan, Bupon, Malmedy, 86 Vith, Malschaid, left to destination.	103 G Engr Bn. Co. E	[illegible]
[illegible]	11/[illegible]	35	1	1	Bulgan	Spielbrook	Malmedy to Spielbrook	109 Inf Regt. (Kitchen Train)	[illegible]
[illegible]	11/[illegible]	20	1	1	Bulgan	Spielbrook	Bupon, Malmedy, 86 Vith, Malschaid, Allerborn, Elbe to dest.	28 Inf Div Spt.	[illegible]
[illegible]	11/[illegible]	462	17	6	Bulgan	Spielbrook	Bupon, Malmedy, 86 Vith, Malschaid, Allerborn, Elbe to dest.	109 Inf REC.	[illegible]
[illegible]	11/[illegible]	35	1	1	Bulgan	Bupon	Bulgan, Malmedy, [illegible] Bupon, Spielbrook/ dest.	Co A 116th Engr Bn.	[illegible]
[illegible]	11/[illegible]	107	15	4	Bulgan	Elbe	Bulgan, Bupon, Malmedy, 86 Vith, Malschaid, Allerborn, dest.	109 Inf (1st Bn) [illegible] 707 Tnk Bn.	[illegible]
[illegible]	11/[illegible]	15	1	1	Bulgan[illegible]	Bupon	[illegible] to Malmedy, [illegible] to Bupon	3006 QM Trk Co.	38.70
[illegible]	11/[illegible]	100	4	1	Bulgan[illegible]	Bupon	[illegible], Bupon, [illegible] Spielbrook, Bupon to dest.	297 FA Bn.	[illegible]
[illegible]	11/[illegible]	[illegible]	8	1	Bulgan	Elbe	Bulgan, Bupon, Malmedy, 86 Vith, Malschaid, Allerborn, Elbe	Det Sabaln 28 Inf Div	[illegible]
[illegible]	11/[illegible]	100	6	2	Bulgan	Bulgan	Bulgan/ dest. to Spielbrook to Bulgan	[illegible] Inf Div.	[illegible]
[illegible]	11/[illegible]	15	1	1	Bulgan[illegible]	Spielbrook	[illegible] to Malmedy, [illegible] to Bupon, [illegible] Spielbrook, to Bulgan/dest. to dest.	[illegible] Co.	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]					[illegible]

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY REPORT

MONTH NOVEMBER 44

DATE	TIME	No. TRUCKS	No. MAN	No. SERIALS	I. D.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH NOVEMBER 44

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. MEN	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
2-45	11/10	25	1	1	Monschau	1st US Army	H31 to Eupen to dest.	294 Engr C Bn.	15.1
2-43	11/10	26	1	1	Theux	1st US Army	H32, H35, H19 to dest.	3509 Ord MAM Co.	10.0
2-44	11/10	110	6	2	Eupen	Aachen	H39 and H29	415 AA Gun Bn.	1.0
2-45	11/11	40	2	1	Eupen	Aachen	H38 and H29	18 Ord MAM Co.	1.0
2-46	11/11	240	24	8	Fayenneville	K-7929	Malmedy, H32, H27, H26, Eupen, North on H39 to dest.	CO "A" 9th Armd Division.	22.0
2-54	11/15	120	5	1	Aubel	Blomberg	Aubel, Battice, H27, Verviers, H27 to dest.	29 Inf Div Trns.	20.4
2-52	11/14	20	1	1	Eupen	VII Corps	Enter Eupen on H31 & leave on H39ANE29	297 Engr Bn.	1.0
2-53	11/14	20	1	1	Eupen	VII Corps	Enter Eupen on H31 & leave on H39ANE29	298 Engr Bn.	1.0
2-50	11/14	40	2	1	Arnville	Vielmitzroof Theux	H39, H39ANE29 (H39 & Vmx route)	3509 Ord MAM Co.	10.0
2-49	11/14	30	1	1	Spa	Verviers	H39 to H39(INTERSECT) left to dest.	23 Gas Treat Bn.	11.0
2-7	11/16	180	20	7	Weismenach	Sweifall	Malschield, 84 Vith, Malmedy, Eupen, H39& H39 to RJ(K-817305) to Rotgen to dest.	18 Inf RCT	44.05
2-8	11/17	120	5	3	Wilts	Sweifall	Wilts, 84 Vith, Malmedy, Eupen, H39ANE29 RJ(K-817305), Heudorf, Rotgen, dest.	8 Inf Div Actv.	44.05
2-9	11/18	440	24	6	Ulflingen	Sweifall	Malschield, 84 Vith, Malmedy, Eupen, H39& H39, RJ(K-817305), Heudorf, Rotgen, dest.	28 Inf RCT	44.05
2-14	11/18	25	1	1	Wilts	Sweifall	84 Vith, Malmedy, Eupen, H39ANE29, RJ(K-817305), Heudorf, Rotgen, dest.	9th QM Co.	44.05
2-15	11/18	25	1	1	Roch	Rotgen	84 Vith, Malmedy, Eupen, H39ANE29, RJ(K-817305), Heudorf, Rotgen.	708 Ord Co.	44.05.
		1524	103	32					309.70

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

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MONTH NOVEMBER 1944.

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
G-10	11/19	113	4	1	Wilts	Zweifall	Allerborn, Malscheid, St Vith, Malmedy, Eupen, N28&N29, RJ(K-817305), Neudorf, Rotgen, to dest.	8th Inf Div Fwrd Gp and Div Arty Elements.	44.06
G-10A	11/19	87	4	1	Bttelbruck	Zweifall	Wilts, St Vith, Malmedy, Eupen, N28&N29, RJ(K-817305), Neudorf, Rotgen, dest.	3rd Battalion, 121 Inf Regt.	44.06
G-10B	11/19	17	1	1	Wilts	Zweifall	St Vith, Malmedy, Eupen, N28&N29, RJ(K-817305), Neudorf, Rotgen, dest.	8th Med Bn.	44.06
G-11	11/19	187	6	2	Ulflingen	Zweifall	Malscheid, St Vith, Malmedy, Eupen, N28& N29, RJ(K-817305), Neudorf, Rotgen, dest.	709 Tnk Bn.	44.06
G-16	11/19	30	1	1	Rotgen	Bastogne	Rotgen, Eupen, Malmedy, St Vith, dest.	3598 QM Trk Co.	36.6
G-12	11/20	263	14	5	Bttelbruck	Zweifall	Wilts, Allerborn, Malscheid, St Vith, Malmedy, Eupen, N28&N29, RJ(K-817305), Neudorf, Rotgen to dest.	121 Inf RCT	44.06
G-12A	11/20	110	6	2	Bttelbruck	Zweifall	Wilts, St Vith, Malmedy, Eupen, N28&N29 RJ(K-817305), Neudorf, Rotgen, dest.	56 FA Bn.	44.06
G-13	11/22	38	2	1	Wilts	Rotgen	Wilts, St Vith, Malmedy, Eupen, Dest.	8 Inf Div Rear	44.06
M-70	11/23	98	4	1	Malmedy	Butgenbach	N32	555 AAA AW Bn. (-1 Btry)	9.3
M-71	11/23	20	1	1	Malmedy	Butgenbach	N32	11 AAA Grp.	9.4
M-72	11/23	111	5	1	Malmedy	Butgenbach	N32	134 AAA Gun Bn.	9.3
M-73	11/24	24	1	1	Malmedy	Butgenbach	N32	555 AAA AW Bn. (1 Btry)	9.4
M-74	11/27	15	1	1	Eupen	Eupen	N21 to Eupen	493 Med Coll Co.	1.0
			50	17					

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH NOVEMBER 1944.

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
M-75	11/23	60	2	1	K-905310	Verviers	RR 258 to Rotgen, Left on unnumb road to Eupen, N31 to dest.	993 Engr TB Co.	22.25
S-12	11/26	16	1	1	Verviers	Venwengen	N31 to Eupen, N28&N29, Eynatten, rt on unnumb route to Kornelmunster to dest.	3598 QM Trk Co.	21.87
Nov 13	11/28	10	1	1	Malmedy	VII Corps	N28 to Eupen, N28&N29 to dest.	9 Armd Div Trks.	18.12
J-71	11/29	100	4	1	Eupen	Verviers	N31	47 Inf Regt.	9.4
J-73	11/30	89	4	1	Verviers	Camp Elsenborn	~~xxxx~~ N27 to destination.	47 Inf Regt.	17.8
J-74	11/30	40	2	1	Camp Elsenborn	Eschweiler	West on secondary route to N27, N27,N28, Eupen, N28&N29 to dest.	47 Inf Regt.	15.9
J-75	11/30	275	11	3	Eupen	Camp Elsenborn	RJ(K-852907), left to dest. N28&N29 to Eupen, N28, N27 to /	47 Inf Regt.	15.9
TOTALS:		4,654	210	73					1,038.66

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Provost Marshal
APO 305, U.S. Army

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CONSOLIDATED REPORT OF DELINQUENCIES
ACCOMPLISHED BY MILITARY POLICE FOR
MONTH ENDING 30 Nov 1944.

1 December 1944

	Off Limits	Violation of Traffic SOP	Unatt. Vehicle	Speeding	Drunk and/or Disorderly	No Pass	Officer Driv. Vehicle	No Trip Ticket	Driv. Wrong Way One-Way Road	Out of Uniform	TOTALS
V Corps	10	21	16	5			1	1	1	1	62
1 Inf Div.	2		1		2			1			9
5 Armd Div.	6	1	5	1		7		2			25
9 Inf Div.	8		6			14			1	2	31
28 Inf Div.		2	1								3
First U.S. Army	54	18	17	12	2		3	2			108
12 Army Gp.			2								2
TOTAL	80	45	51	18	4	21	4	6	5	6	240

JESSE G. POINTER
Lt. Col., F.A.,
Asst. Provost Marshal

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The 28th U. S. Infantry Division was transferred out of the Corps and replaced by the 8th U. S. Infantry Division. Major Croft was the Military Government Officer and he had a fully trained staff. The Division, however, had never functioned in Germany and no provision for Mil Gov Police had been made. A system similar to that followed by the 28th Division was improvised. Two factors caused undue hardship in the creation of these provisional units: first, the order that all units reduce to T/O strength and second, difficulties in procuring equipment for provisional units when the only source is from organizational material needed for organic functional purposes. Tactical units found themselves with a specialized mission to perform, the support and maintenance of Military Government, with neither personnel nor equipment to accomplish it with, except at the expense of the combat efficiency of another arm or service. Each Division found its own solution but all agreed that such improvisation in combat troops is highly undesireable.

21 November - 30 November - Offensive Phase.

a. Map References:

1/100,000 Sheet S 1 BONN.

b. The cold weather caused units to flock to towns such as EUPEN and MALMEDY and many requests were made that civilians be evicted from their homes in order to provide billets for troops. The policy on billeting was announced in Circular 48 of this headquarters and stated that no civilian would be entirely deprived of shelter in order to make accomodation for troops. (See Annex No. A).

Operations Section of G-5 First U. S. Army was anxious for Detachments in the Pool at the Military Government Center to get field experience and requested that three additional Mil Gov Detachments be attached to the units of this Corps. Accordingly the following Detachments were received and dispersed as follows:

I5D2	STAVELOT	Capt Rynerson	Attached to D7C1
I6D2	SCHERBRODT	Capt Fox	Attached to 9th Division
H5H2	EUPEN	Major Staats	Attached to D4G1

(Responsible for Canton of EUPEN outside of the city of EUPEN).
(See Annex No. H).

Orders were issued designating the following officers as Summary Military Government Courts in the Artillery Groups of the Corps:

Maj Frederick L. Kopff, 187th FA Gp
Maj Howard H. Hildreth, 190th FA Gp
Capt Theodore A. Zunt, 406th FA Gp.

Civilian PAD matters were discussed in conjunction with the Corps PAD Officer, particularily with reference to EUPEN in view of the location of the Corps Recreation Center at that place.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

The continual failure of the Belgian Government to reconstitute its Courts made control of civilian circulation extremely difficult as no punishment could be administered in the absence of the Belgian Courts.

An official dinner was given by the Burgermeister of EUPEN to which the Corps Commander and certain members of his staff were invited. Brigadier General Helmick, the Corps Artillery Commander, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, G-5 and lesser staff members who had been in close contact with the city officials attended. A total of 18 U. S. Army personnel were present and approximately the same number of the leading citizens. A very warm speech was made by the Burgermeister, Herr Zimmermann (see Annex No. J) and an appropriate reply was made by General Helmick.

Lt Col Robert W. Pharr, 0309783 GSC (FA) Executive Officer of this Section was awarded the Bronze Star for "Meritorious action against an enemy from 12 June to 14 Sept in France" by GO 76 Hq V Corps dated 25 Nov 1944.

Further reductions in the Corps Military Government Police were in discussion as the month ended.

2. Recommendations.

a. It is recommended that higher echelons take cognisance of the fact that maintenance of Military Government can be accomplished more efficiently by the allocation of a group of specially trained and equipped personnel. The problem requires full time attention and specialized training. Improvisation from organic units does not accomplish this and prior to capitulation of the enemy actually tends to retard that day by reducing the effective strength of combat units pro tanto. Following capitulation such troops would in no sense be rendered surplus as the vastly increased area to be policed would call for their continued employment plus large numbers of tactical troops. Allocation of a regiment of Occupational Police per Army, with sub-allocation of one battalion per Corps would provide a flexible force which could be shifted as are Tank Destroyer Battalions to locations where the need is most acute. For example, Divisions responsible for large cities would require temporary attachment of companies of Occupational Police from the Battalion attached to the Corps.

b. Operational experience has shown clearly that security and control of civilian population requires all civilians to be registered and carry with them at all times a uniform registration card. This, too, must originate from the highest echelon to be uniform. Many persons are honestly without registration or identification cards of any kind, others are valueless as they merely show residence in a place hundreds of miles away on a date usually several years past. Uniform registration, if authorized, would be done through Burgermeisters under the supervision of Military Government personnel.

T. J. MORONEY,
Colonel, GSC,
A. C. of S., G-5.

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HEAD QUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305, U. S. Army

23 November 1944

CIRCULAR)
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NO....48)

BILLETING

1. Letter Hq V Corps, file 620, Subject: "Reservation and Clearance of Bivouac and Assembly Areas" dated 11 November 1944, is rescinded. The following procedure will be followed by all V Corps Troops in securing buildings and facilities in the Corps Zone.

2. REFERENCES:

a. Letter Hq. First U. S. Army, file 680.3/444, Subject: "Procedure for Obtaining Buildings and Facilities for the Occupancy of Troops in Rear of the Division Rear Boundary", dated 4 November 1944.

3. POLICIES.

a. Use of housing and buildings as shelter for troops is permitted.

b. No civilian will be left entirely without shelter to provide billets for troops except in direst military necessity.

c. Priority of allotment to:

(1) Hospitals.

(2) Headquarters.

(3) Shops.

(4) Space for items requiring inside storage.

(5) Personnel.

d. Commanders of units in actual combat will exercise due judgement in the use of buildings as shelter for troops and will do so only when the tactical situation permits, and the combat mission of troops is not adversely affected thereby.

e. Real estate will be occupied in the following priorities, consistent with the tactical situation:

(1) Property of the German Government.

(2) Abandoned private property.

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(3) Occupied private property.

f. Governmental buildings essential for continuing civil administration, religious buildings, museums, libraries and official historic monuments will not be occupied by troops. Political party buildings will not be used until any records they contain have been properly safeguarded.

g. A minimum of 35 sq ft space per man will be allocated where practicable.

4. PROCEDURE.

a. By G-1 - For tactical troops.

(1) Assign areas to units in Corps Zone when necessary.

(2) Grant written authority to occupy premises in a given locality (subject to availability).

b. By G-4 - For service troops.

(1) Assign areas to units in Corps Zone.

(2) Same as G-3 for tactical troops.

c. By G-5.

(1) Cause a survey to be made of available housing in the Corps Zone in rear of Divisional Rear Boundaries. Full-est use will be made of Civil Authorities in procuring information.

(2) Supervise allocation of available space to units in accordance with letter, Hq First U. S. Army, file 680.3/44, subject: "Procedure for Obtaining Buildings and Facilities for the Occupancy of Troops in Rear of Division Rear Boundary". Relocations, while undesirable, will be made when necessary.

(3) Establish procedure for efficient and economical use of available space.

(4) Supervise the operations of CA/Mil Gov Detachments and Mil Gov Police Detachments, in accordance with this procedure.

d. By units desiring billets. (Over 15 persons)

(1) Designate unit billeting officer, who will:

(a) Procure permit from Corps G-3 Troop Movements Section for tactical troops or G-4 for service troops.

(b) Present written permit to G-5.

(c) Execute application for billets containing essential

-2-

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information. (Form attached).

(d) Inspect property (inventory where practicable) in presence of Resources Officer and Civil Authority, where available, prior to occupancy and prior to vacating.

(e) Execute Certificate of Occupancy in quintuplicate.

(f) Obtain clearance from the Division prior to contacting Corps if Corps Troops are to be billeted in a Division Area.

(2) Units of less than 15 individuals will contact Resources Officer and present written authority of that Officer to owner or manager as credential.

(a) Execute Certificate of Occupancy in quintuplicate.

(b) Upon vacating notify Resources Officer and furnish information on space occupied and duration.

(3) Units may request specific properties thought to be suitable for their units.

e. CA/Mil Gov Detachments.

(1) Designate a Resources Officer who will:

(a) Procure a survey of billeting potentialities of area of responsibility.

1. The fullest use will be made of Civil Authorities for this purpose.

(b) Assist units in finding suitable billets where available.

(c) Evacuate or consolidate civilians where practicable, to provide billets.

(d) Accompany unit Billeting Officer on inspection of selected premises prior to occupancy and upon vacating of same.

(e) Provide Certificate of Occupancy forms, receive and distribute the executed copies.

f. Mil Gov Police Detachments.

(1) Designate a Resources Officer.

(2) Function as prescribed for Resources Officer of CA/Mil Gov Detachments when so directed by Corps G-5.

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5. Allocation of Buildings and Facilities in a Division Area will be controlled by Division.

By command of Major General GEROW:

O. C. MOOD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

R. B. Patterson
R. B. PATTERSON,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION: "C"

1 Incl:
Application For Billet.

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APPLICATION FOR BILLET

_____ Applicant
(Unit)

	Received	Billeted	Evacuated
Date:			

(Where billeted, if scattered make map)

1. Strength:

a.

	General Officers	Field Grade	Co Grade (Inc WO)	Total		
Officers:					x 35 sq ft=	sq ft

b. EM x 35 sq ft= sq ft

Total Area required to billet sq ft
sq meters

c.

	Track	Half-Track	Others	Total		
Vehicles:					x 200 sq ft=	sq ft

Total Area required for vehicles= sq ft
sq meters

Clearance for vehicles (Shops Only)
Heighth_____ Width_____

d. Office Space for _____ Officers _____ EM.

2. Requirements:

	Essential Office Billets	Desirable Office Billets	Unnecessary Office Billets	Unit can Furnish Office Billets
(Check) Heat				
Water				
Lights				

Others (Specify Details)

3. It is understood that no permanent alterations will be made in property without approval of G-5. Abuse of property, tamp ring with or wastage of electricity may result in loss of billets.

(Name) (Rank)

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305

092.

17 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Military Government Courts.

TO : Commanding General, 5th U.S. Armored Division, APO 255.
9th U.S. Infantry Division, APO 9.
99th U.S. Infantry Division, APO 449.
V Corps Artillery.
8th U.S. Infantry Division, APO 8.

REFERENCES: SHAEF Handbook for Military Government in Germany, 1 September 1944.
Interim Directive and Instructions for Military Government of Germany, Hq. Twelfth Army Group, 7 September 1944.
SHAEF Technical Manual for Legal and Prison Officers.

1. A review of recent Military Government Court findings in this Corps indicates a lack of understanding of the prime purpose and importance of these courts and the necessity for adequate sentences which will act as a deterrent to those inclined to regard Proclamations and Ordinances with little or no respect. Swift and certain trial for all offenders with severe punishment for the violators will enhance respect for Military Government and greatly aid in the enforcement of its laws. A weak or vacillating attitude on the part of Military Government Courts is not commensurate with the Military Authority imposed on the German people.

2. Appropriate Military Government Courts should be appointed immediately and be prepared to function without delay. Conditions may arise where Military Government Courts will be necessary on a considerable scale, and for this purpose, the utmost use should be made of legally trained officers who should be thoroughly instructed in their duties.

3. Attention is invited to the special functions of SUMMARY MILITARY GOVERNMENT COURTS which will not only try persons charged with lesser offenses but will also be the courts before which all persons charged with offenses against the Military Government will be brought for preliminary hearings, except where a case has been expressly referred for trial by higher court. Where a case has been referred to a SUMMARY Military Government Court and in the opinion of that court a higher sentence should be imposed than it has power to impose, the court will report the case to the appointing authority for reference to the appropriate INTERMEDIATE or GENERAL Military Government Court for trial.

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4. If a defendent cannot or will not pay a fine imposed it may be served out by imprisonment, computed at the rate of ten (10) marks for each day of confinement. The payment of a cash fine may be a less effective form of punishment than imprisonment. Military Government Courts should carefully consider the severity of the punishment deserved.

By command of Major General GERO :

Sam F. Teague Jr.
SAM F. TEAGUE, JR.,
Major, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. General.

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Date: 10 Nov 1944
Init: _____ SJT

HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, U.S.Army

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY
1 October 1944 to 31 October 1944

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

1. 010001A October 1944 to 052400A October 1944.

At the start of this period forward elements of the V Corps were in GERMANY. They were faced by strong German opposition in the SIEGFRIED Line defenses. Limited penetration of the line with several complete break throughs had been made in many places during September. Patrolling into the enemy defenses was the main activity at the start of this period. First U.S. Army, by Letter of Instructions issued 25 September, had ordered V Corps relieved in its present positions early in October by the VIII Corps of the Ninth U.S. Army, with V Corps to move to a new sector to the north. In the new area the V Corps was to prepare to make a coordinated attack in the direction of BONN.

Patrolling was continued by the divisions under V Corps control until the movement to the new area was completed. There were small enemy counterattacks which were repulsed. Disposition of our forces was unchanged. Relief of V Corps units by VIII Corps units started 3 October and, as relieved, the V Corps elements moved to assembly areas. The relief was completed on 5 October. In the new sector V Corps relieved elements of the VII Corps and took over positions in front of the SIEGFRIED Line defenses. Patrols were sent into the German defenses to determine enemy positions and strength.

While awaiting relief in the old area, V Corps Artillery fired heavy harassing and interdiction missions, as well as missions against pillboxes and troop concentrations as called for by divisions. When moved to the new area, Corps Artillery units went on a silent policy for the remainder of the period. Engineers of V Corps supported front line units with normal engineer activity, mainly road improvement, and moved north to the new area late in the period. Armored elements were not active during the period. Tank destroyer units were attached to divisions and provided effective fire against enemy positions. The 102nd Cavalry Group screened the movement and assembly of V Corps in its new sector. The 115th AAA Group had no engagements with enemy aircraft during the period. There was no air support activity over the V Corps sector during the period. Communications were maintained by the signal units of the Corps.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during the period were:

Attached (or Agd)	Detached
Det I412, 2nd EOA Regt (4 Oct)	741st Tank Bn (3 Oct)
Det G112, 2nd EOA Regt (5 Oct)	Det D7C1, 1st EOA Regt (5 Oct)
Det I402, 2nd EOA Regt (5 Oct)	
137th AFU (5 Oct)	

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During this period the V Corps was relieved in its positions by elements of the VIII Corps, Ninth U.S. Army, and moved to a new zone of action to the north, relieving elements of the VII Corps.

2. 060001A October 1944 to 232400A October 1944.

The SIEGFRIED Line in the new V Corps sector consisted of two lines of prepared defenses: one generally parallel to the border from SCHEID to RAMSCHEID to MONSCHAU; the other along the east bank of the OLEF River from SCHNORRENBURG to GEMUND. These were not continuous lines but were mutually supporting. The terrain was rugged and thickly wooded. The bulk of the enemy defense forces were thought to be occupying the SIEGFRIED Line positions.

The divisions made limited advances against stiff opposition early in the period to gain improved positions for the planned coordinated attack towards BONN. This attack was postponed from time to time and did not occur during this period. Upon securing the improved positions V Corps elements dug in in front of the SIEGFRIED Line and engaged in aggressive patrolling activities for the remainder of the period. The enemy resistance continued to be stiff.

Combat Commands "A" and "B" of the 5th Armored Division, with the 2nd Battalion, 110th Infantry Regiment (28th Division), were ordered to First U.S. Army reserve at 110600A October and were moved to the zones of the XIX and VII Corps, respectively.

A program of training in rear areas was begun during the mid part of the period and was carried on throughout the remainder of the period. Front line units were rotated so that all troops could receive this training, which included assault of a fortified position, river crossings, hardening of personnel, and personal hygiene for winter.

V Corps Artillery, after movement to the new sector, remained on silent policy until 11 October. During this time nine enemy battery locations had been confirmed. All Corps and division artillery battalions registered one gun per battalion on these locations during the morning of 11 October. Beginning at 1320A TOT missions were fired on each of these locations by every available artillery piece, both Corps and division artillery. All these concentrations were observed and results were excellent. Following this opening activity, Corps Artillery fired heavy harassing and interdiction missions, TOTs on division request, and general support throughout the remainder of the period. Engineers gave normal support, mainly through road improvement and maintenance which was made more difficult by the extremely rainy weather. Some enemy mines were removed. The Engineers also assisted in training units in river crossing. Tank destroyer units were especially active in supporting roles under attachment to divisions. They fired harassing missions and missions against pillboxes. Armored elements were not very active but were prepared for use as necessary. Advantage was taken of the quiet period for rest and rehabilitation. The 102nd Cavalry Group maintained a Cavalry screen protecting the north flank of the Corps. The 115th AAA Group engaged no enemy air-

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craft as there was little activity over the Corps zone. Some robot bombs were sent over the V Corps zone and several fell in the Corps area. Antiaircraft units attached to divisions provided effective ground fire on many occasions. Air support activity over the V Corps front was limited. Targets elsewhere on the First U.S. Army front were given priority. Signal units maintained communications.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during the period were:

Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
78th FA Bn (101200A Oct)	Btry B, 285th FA Obsn Bn (061320A Oc
Det E1062, 2nd ECA Regt (8 Oct)	Det D761, 1st ECA Regt (16 Oct)
Btry A, 196th FA Bn (130900A Oct)	CC "A", 5th Armd Div (121800A Oct)
508th Engr L Pon Co (14 Oct)	Det D601, 1st ECA Regt (11 Oct)
990th Engr Trdy Br Co (22 Oct)	CC "B", 5th Armd Div (15 Oct)
	2nd Bn, 110th Inf (15 Oct)
	Det E161, 1st ECA Regt (17 Oct)
	Det D661, 1st ECA Regt (17 Oct)
	Det D5B1, 1st ECA Regt (17 Oct)
	Det E1F1, 1st ECA Regt (17 Oct)
	996th Engr Trdy Br Co (20 Oct)

During this period V Corps took over a new sector and prepared for an attack towards BONN. The attack was not ordered during the period and the Corps held its positions. The SIEGFRIED Line defenses were probed with strong and aggressive patrols. V Corps units conducted training in preparation for future operations throughout the last half of the period.

3. 240001A October 1944 to 312400A October 1944.

Field Order No. 30, Headquarters, V Corps, was issued at 212000A October 1944. Under it, V Corps was to take over part of the VII Corps sector to the north, relieving the 9th Infantry Division with the 28th Infantry Division. The 9th Division was to move to an assembly area as part of V Corps. The 4th Infantry Division was to be relieved from V Corps and attached to VII Corps after 1 November. It was to be replaced on the V Corps front by the 9th Division. The 28th Division was to attack in the former 9th Division sector with a target date of 1 November.

The 4th Infantry Division relieved elements of the 28th Division in their positions beginning on 23 October. The 28th Division assembled and moved to the north where the 9th Division was relieved beginning 25 October and completed on 27 October. The 9th Division moved to assembly areas near CAMP ELSENBORN where it assembled for rest and rehabilitation, remaining there for the rest of the period. The 4th Division remained in the southern sector of the V Corps front line, awaiting orders to move to the VII Corps zone under Field Order No. 30. Patrol activity, probing the SIEGFRIED Line defenses, was carried out by the front line troops as preparations were made to begin the attack under Field Order No. 30 early in November.

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V Corps Artillery fired many counterbattery, interdiction and harassing missions throughout this period with good results. Engineer work consisted mainly of road repairs and improvement and extension of the road net. The Engineers also trained in stream crossing exercises in preparation for a crossing on the ROER River. Armored elements, except the 5th Armored Division, were attached to infantry divisions and were in supporting roles. They trained in infantry-tank coordination but there was little occasion to use them in operations during the period when activity at the front was limited to patrolling. Tank destroyer units, attached to divisions, fired direct and indirect support missions at ground targets with good effect. Cavalry elements screen the Corps movements and hold the center sector of the front line, using aggressive combat patrols. The 119th AAA Group engaged no enemy aircraft but those units attached to divisions were used with good effect against ground targets in harassing and interdiction fires. Both 40mm guns and multiple mount machine guns on halftracks were used. Only air support activity over the V Corps front was on 24 October when two groups of the IX Tactical Air Force operated in the Corps zone. One group cut rails west of the ROER and the other bombed a supply dump. Signal units maintained communications.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Assd)	Detached
5th Armd Div (25 Oct)	Hdqs A, 196th FA Bn (25 Oct)
9th Inf Div (less [illegible] (25 Oct)	Det Hdqs, 2nd EGA Regt (26 Oct)
899th TD Bn (less Co C)	Det 17th, 2nd EGA Regt (26 Oct)
746th TK Bn (less Co A)	
376th AAA Bn (less Btry B)	
Det C, 165th Sig Photo Co	
CC "A", 5th Armd Div (25 Oct)	
CC "B", 5th Armd Div (25 Oct)	
2nd Bn, 110th Inf (25 Oct)	
4th Cav Gp (25 Oct)	

During this period the V Corps assumed the responsibility for the 9th Division sector in the former VII Corps zone. It relieved the 9th Division with the 28th Division, moving the 9th Division to assembly areas. The Corps prepared for an attack which was scheduled to start early in November.

During October V Corps took over two new sectors of the front line, accomplishing both changes without difficulty. An attack scheduled for mid-month was cancelled but at the end of the month plans had been made and preparations were being completed for an attack by the 28th Infantry Division in the former 9th Infantry Division zone. The attack was scheduled to start early in November.

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Historical Record
G-2 Section, Headquarters V Corps

7 November 1944

Month of October

PART I - ENEMY SITUATION

Period 1-4 October.

The enemy forces on 1 October were disposed generally along the line LOSHEIM (L-03 97) - OLZHEIMER (L-06 88) - KESFELD (P-92 74) - RODERSHAUSEN (P-84 61) - DILLIGEN (P-97 41). On the northern V Corps front, the 2nd SS Panzer Division DAS REICH controlled a sector from about (L-04 68) to (P-89 70). In addition to its organic units repeatedly bolstered by assorted replacements, 2nd SS Panzer Division apparently had command of several fortress battalions (11,31,6,1); two security battalions (1031,526), not identified for some time; 78 Training Battalion; and several kampfgruppen of battalion size or larger (FUERST, GOMBEL, and SCHALKE Marsch Battalion). Kampfgruppe DREFENTHAL, first identified 29 September, consisted of five companies of the 1st SS Panzer Division LEIBSTANDARTE ADOLF HITLER. According to a P/W, men from the 669 Eastern Battalion in the BRANDSCHEID (P-98 81) area were sent in groups of 3 to 5 to help man pillboxes occupied by other units. Kampfgruppe KENTNER, composed of officer candidates from WIESBADEN was one of the larger groups identified on the V Corps front. It had eight companies, and was located in the vicinity of ESCHFELD (P-90 69). Together with Kampfgruppe WEGELEIN, it was thought to be controlled by the 2nd Panzer Division before that unit left the area. Kampfgruppe WEGELEIN, east of DAHNEN (P-88 65), was said by a P/W to have been expanded to about 2500 by the arrival of 700 to 800 replacements and by the absorption of 38 Fortress Battalion. That these kampfgruppen were not intended to control large sectors was indicated by the formation of Kampfgruppe HORN from two battalions of Kampfgruppe WEGELEIN. The former unit was located farther south in the vicinity of (P-91 57). Other small units in the southern sector were under the command of the staff of 5th Parachute Division. From north to south these units were as follows: 1 Security Regiment, Kampfgruppen WITTLICH and APPEL, DRESDEN GAF Battalion, and Kampfgruppen PAUL, MOHR, and THIEME. Kampfgruppe WITTLICH, which may have taken the name of a town in Wehrkreis XII, was said to include Kampfgruppe HUBNER as well as elements from 105 Infantry Training Battalion. At least two units were subordinate to Kampfgruppe APPEL: 124 Infantry Training Battalion and Kampfgruppe SCHMIDT. Kampfgruppe THIEME was composed of 212 Home Guard Battalion and Kampfgruppe KAMMERER.

Enemy activity during the short period 1 to 4 October inclusive was characterized by aggresive patrolling and a limited amount of artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. Considerable information was received concerning enemy minefields, and it was apparent from observation that the enemy was engaged in digging foxholes, entrenchments and other defensive works.

Although the enemy front line had remained comparatively stabilized for some time, the enemy displayed considerable aggressive activity on the first day of the month. In the KESFELD area at (K-920 736) an enemy company supported by flame throwers on half-tracks took two pillboxes, but our forces restored the situation in the morning at 0900 hours. An unsuccessful attack was staged in the same sector (P-887 709) at 0100 hours. A reinforced platoon drove our forces from the hill at (L-035 834), but the position was later reoccupied.

The capture of two pillboxes at (K-920 736) indicated tactics worthy of notice. Forty men had been chosen to receive one day's special assault training. The time chosen for the assault was after dark, and artillery and mortar fire softened up the defenses. Assault troops then rode half-tracks to within 300 yards of the objective,

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the II Battalion of that regiment, and later it was established that the I Battalion of 193 Security Regiment also contributed personnel. It therefore became evident that although the 89th Infantry Division had been virtually destroyed in Belgium early in September, it was being reformed out of the miscellaneous units already on the front line. The 253 Engineer Battalion was apparently operating under the 89th Infantry Division as the unit in charge of preparing minefields, and erecting defense obstacles. That the enemy's defense line had become much stronger was made evident by reports that the pillboxes had a full complement of men and 8000 rounds of ammunition for five machine guns. Patrolling was aggressive. Not all the troops had been committed on the front line defenses however; 24 GAF Fortress Battalion, identified 10 October in the GERMETER area (F-02 33), had previously been located at GEMUND (F-12 20).

Activities of the enemy were centered chiefly upon the improvement of his defenses. Artillery, mortar, and small arms fire was generally light and sporadic, and while some small patrols used aggressive tactics in attempting to penetrate our lines, the total number of patrols was small. The activity observed in the construction of defenses consisted of installing concertina wire between pillboxes, laying new minefields, and constructing more road blocks. A meadow at (F-053 026) was reported mined with S-mines. Detachments from the 253 Engineer Battalion were engaged in laying minefields and constructing defenses. All these reports indicated that, even though there was little hostile action, there was no let-up in improvements of existing defenses.

Although there had been no other evidence to indicate the replacement of the 526th Division by a new division on our southern front, P/W's indicated that a reorganization was going on since they stated that 77 Infantry Replacement Battalion and 412 Infantry Replacement Battalion made up the Von Rochow regiment.

With further identifications of organic units, the story of the reorganization of the 89th Infantry Division began to be clarified. After the appearance of the II Battalion of 1056 Infantry Regiment, prisoners were taken from 2 Company of the regiment who were transferred from Home Guard Battalion "B" to 46 Infantry Replacement Battalion before the latter was finally absorbed into the division. The III Battalion of the regiment was first identified 21 October; it was formed from personnel taken from the other two battalions, and occupied positions somewhat to the rear.

At the same time other units appeared on the VII Corps front to the north. One battery of 189 Artillery Regiment was identified at (K-997 238); however, the regiment was said to be composed of only five batteries, and was equipped with four 122-mm Russian howitzers per battery. Two companies, at least, of I Battalion/1055 Infantry Regiment were formed from 18 Infantry Replacement Battalion; they were located in the ROLLESBROICH area (F-00 23). It became evident both from P/W's statements and from its position in the line that 58 Infantry Replacement Battalion had contributed to the formation of the I Battalion of 1055 Infantry Regiment.

A captured map which, unfortunately, lessened its credibility through several errors in numbering, nevertheless showed a disposition of troops which was later confirmed. Thus 347th Infantry Division, with headquarters at SCHMIDTHEIM (F-164 028), controlled the units on the southern half of the V Corps front. One regimental CP, that of 860 Infantry Regiment, was (F-07 07), the other at (F-07 02). The division controlled the following battalions on the V Corps sector (only part of the division faced the VIII Corps): 7 GAF Fortress Battalion, 276 Infantry Replacement Battalion, 412 Infantry Replacement Battalion, and 77 Infantry Replacement Battalion. The first confirmation of the presence of the 347th Infantry Division was given by a P/W from 103 AA Battalion (GHQ) who stated that his unit was attached to the division. The organic division artillery, according to his statement, was the 76 Artillery Regiment (probably composed of two training battalions).

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The headquarters of the [illegible] Division [illegible] apparently had [illegible] the 89th and 347th [illegible] returned [illegible] intrusion of military [illegible] SCHMIDT, at one time [illegible] commander of the 275th Infantry Division. During this period the V Corps captured 402 prisoners of war.

Period 25-31 October. [illegible]

An additional sector of the front [illegible] the control of V Corps and in the process of [illegible] responsibility, the 28th (U.S.) Infantry Division took over the new sector. This change in our northern boundary brought the V Corps in contact with elements of the 89th Infantry Division and [illegible] number of units assigned to the 275th Infantry Division. The enemy front on this date was constituted approximately as follows: [illegible] the southern boundary at (F 98 04) to approximately (F 03 02) the line was held by 9 GAF Fortress Battalion. From [illegible] (F 03 02) to UDENBRETH (F 047 038) the 328 Infantry Replacement Battalion (occupied) the sector [illegible] the west. [illegible] that point, the enemy front line followed the edge of the woods north to [illegible] (F 04 07), thence to (F 00 12) thought to be the southern boundary of the 89th Infantry Division. The miscellaneous battalions just mentioned were under the command of the 347th Infantry Division, with Genlt TREBENBERG GG, and headquarters at SCHMIDTHEIM (F 165 029).

The sector occupied by the 89th Infantry Division was from (F 00 12) to (K 965 255). The various replacement and home guard units previously occupying this sector had been absorbed into the two organic regiments of the division, and the battalions were disposed as follows from south to north: II, I, and III Battalions of 1056 Infantry Regiment; II and I Battalions of 1055 Infantry Regiment. No identification of III Bn of 1055 Regiment had been made, but it was presumed to exist. In this sector the enemy line ran approximately as follows: from (F 00 12) to just east of ALZEN (K 96 15), thence east of HOFEN at (K 98 16) and MONSCHAU to (K 95 24). The enemy line then continued northeast to (K 98 24), (K 99 30), (F 02 31), (F 03 34), and to the northern boundary of the V Corps at (F 01 36).

On this northern portion of the front, battalion sectors of the 275th Infantry Division were not clearly defined. However, the general dispositions of these units from south to north were as follows: 328 Infantry Replacement Battalion, 24 GAF Fortress Battalion, 5 GAF Fortress Battalion, 1412 GAF Fortress Battalion, Kampfgruppe WEGLEIN, and 275 Fuselier Battalion.

During the six days of this latter period there was no unusual enemy activity of note. Enemy patrolling was light although several aggressive patrols were encountered on 29 October, one of which was quite large and made an unsuccessful attempt to penetrate our lines after dark. Enemy artillery fire throughout the period was light and sporadic. Thirty P/W's were taken by the V Corps during this last period of October. The total for the month was 616.

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PART II SECTION ACTIVITY

3 October

a. PMII Team #413 was relieved from duty with the V Corps Headquarters, G-2 Section, and departed for the MIS Headquarters at Paris.

b. Lt. Colonel Cristensen, G-2, 2nd Infantry Division, visited the section during the evening.

c. S/Sgt. Maurice Donnell of PMII Team #407 was promoted to T/Sgt.

d. 2nd Lt. Manual Chapiro was promoted to 1st Lt.

4 October

The G-2 section moved with the Corps Headquarters to the vicinity of MIRFELDER BUSCH (X 876 015), Belgium, and was in operation at 1345 hours.

6 October

a. Lt. Colonel McFarland, G-2, 5th Armored Division, visited the section.

7 October

a. Colonel Ford visited the CP of the 28th Infantry Division with Colonel Mood.

b. Lt. Colonel McFarland, G-2, 5th Armored Division, visited the section.

9 October

a. Colonel Ford visited the Corps Artillery Headquarters, and the 28th Infantry Division.

b. Lt. Colonel Hansen, G-2, 4th Infantry Division, visited the section.

c. Lt. Colonel Messac, G-2, 28th Infantry Division, visited the section.

10 October

a. Lt. Colonel Hansen, G-2, 4th Infantry Division, visited the section.

b. Lt. Chapiro of IPW #11 departed for Paris in order to assume command of a German MII team which was to be attached to the G-2 Section, V Corps.

c. T/3 Paul Smith of PMII Team #407 reported for duty after having been hospitalized since 19 August 1944.

d. Pvt. Robert D. Kreifer, 32610467 was attached to IPW team #11.

13 October

a. Colonel Ford visited the CP of the 4th Infantry Division.

b. Major Cavins visited the CP and P/W Cage of the 28th Infantry Division.

14 October

a. Lt. Colonel Hansen visited the G-2 Section.

15 October

a. Colonel Ford, accompanied by Captain Bartlett and T/3 St. Peter, visited the CIC Headquarters at Malmedy.

b. Pvt. Paul Eisler, 39129139, was attached to the G-2 Section from Twelfth Army Group for IPW duties.

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c. T/5 Charles Levielle, 31378903, was attached to the G-2 Section from the 3rd MRB Company as assistant to Pvt. Eisler.

d. Captain Teofani, S-2, 102nd Cavalry Group, visited the section.

18 October

a. Lt. Colonel Messac, G-2, 28th Infantry Division visited the Section.

b. Lt. Colonel Hansen, G-2, 4th Infantry Division, visited the Section.

19 October

a. Colonel Ford, accompanied by WO Schwartz, visited the CIC Headquarters at Malmedy.

20 October

a. German MII Team #407 reported for duty with the G-2 Section, having been attached to V Corps Headquarters by Special Order number F-34, Headquarters MIS, ETOUSA, A.P.O. 887, dated 18 October. The Team is composed of the following personnel: (S/Sgt Rudolf Meisel had been retained from FMII Team #413).

1st. Lt. Manuel Shapiro	01591438 QMC
2nd Lt. John C. Lownds	0552570 AUS
T/Sgt Rudolf F. Meisel	33580649
S/Sgt Neil H. Powell	11099672
PFC Marcelli Jaeger	32590320
Pvt Ernest Schaper	32566313

22 October

a. Lt. Colonel Houston, G-2, 9th Infantry Division, visited the Section.

b. Lt. Colonel Hansen, G-2, 4th Infantry Division, visited the Section.

c. T/5 Horn and Pvt Pfeifer of IPW #11 were involved in a traffic accident, and were both hospitalized for a short period of time.

23 October

a. Colonel Ford visited the CP of the 28th Infantry Division.

b. Colonel Dolph, Commanding Officer, 102nd Cavalry Group, visited the Section.

25 October

a. Lt.Colonel Messac, G-2, 28th Infantry Division, visited the Section

b. Lt. Colonel Hansen, G-2, 4th Infantry Division, visited the Section.

26 October

a. Colonel Dickson, G-2, First Army, visited the Section.

27 October

a. Lt. Colonel Hansen, G-2, 4th Infantry Division, visited the Section.

28 October

a. The G-2 Section moved with the V Corps Headquarters to the city of EUPEN (K 80 27), and was in operation at 1200 hours.

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30 October

a. Lt. Colonel Messec, G-2, 28th Infantry Division, visited the Section.

31 October

a. Colonel Ford visited the 9th Infantry Division.

THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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Auth: CG, V Corps
Date: 7 Nov. 1944
Initials NYL

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305, U.S. ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

G-1
OPERATIONS REPORT
No. 5

1 October - 31 October 1944.

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7 November 1944.

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MAPS: GSGS 4042 - HAMM-LUXEMBOURG, Sheet No. 6, 1/250000
BRUSSELS-LIEGE, Sheet No. 3, 1/250000

I. GENERAL.

1. Organization.

No change.

II. STATION LIST AND STRENGTH OF COMMAND.

1. Divisions.

Division	Period of Attachment or Assignment	Assigned Strength 1 Oct 1944 O	Assigned Strength 1 Oct 1944 EM	Assigned Strength 31 Oct 1944 O	Assigned Strength 31 Oct 1944 EM
4th Inf Div	1-31 Oct	805	13356	842	13962
9th Inf Div (less Dets) *	25-31 Oct	638	9090	(25 Oct 44)654	9944
28th Inf Div	1-31 Oct	786	12432	807	13191
5th Armd Div	1-31 Oct	664	9574	657	9980

* The following units detached from 9th Inf Div: 47th Inf Regt, 84th FA Bn, Co B, 9th MedBn and 1 Plat, Co B, 15th Engr (C) Bn.

2. Corps Troops

Unit	Effective Strength as of 1 Oct, or Date Joined O	Effective Strength as of 1 Oct, or Date Joined EM	Date Joined	Assigned Strength as of 31 Oct or last Strength O	Assigned Strength as of 31 Oct or last Strength EM	Date of Relief
Hq & Hq Co, V Corps	151	572		134	577	
MP Plat						
Atchd Med Sec						
V Corps Air Sup Party						
506th AM Gun Co, 4th Plat	1	32		1	33	
Flight A, 153 Ln Sq	1	11		1	11	
16th Ord BombDisposal Sqd	1	6		1	6	
17th Ord Bomb Disposal Sqd	1	6		1	6	
IPW No. 11	2	4		2	4	
63rd AGF Band	1	31		1	31	
Det D, 165th Sig Photo Co	1	16		1	16	
2nd Special Service Co	5	102		5	103	
CIC Det No. 205	1	12		5	12	
56th Signal Bn	37	902		37	898	
3250th Signal Service Co	8	131		7	128	
Co A, 507th MP Bn	5	174		5	172	
26th MHU	3	40		3	40	
8th Fin Disb Section	3	17		3	17	
15th Fin Disb Section	3	17		3	17	
137th APU	1	11	5 Oct 1944	1	11	
305th APU	1	12		1	12	
V Corps Arty, Hq & Hq Btry	28	102		27	102	
17th FA Obsn Bn	27	488		27	492	
187th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	18	93		18	93	
190th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	15	94		16	93	
406th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	16	81		19	81	
62nd Armd FA Bn	542		25 Oct 1944	36	503	
76th FA Bn	34	453	10 Oct 1944	33	451	
186th FA Bn *	29	509		32	548	
187th FA Bn *	30	477		31	523	
190th FA Bn *	30	614		30	613	
196th FA Bn, Btry A	6	142	13 Oct 1944	6	142	23 Oct 1944
200th FA Bn *	34	618		35	656	
272nd FA Bn	28	487		28	492	
285th FA Obsn Bn, Btry B	6	142		6	142	6 Oct 1944
400th FA Bn	28	427		36	490	
941 FA Bn *	33	480		30	525	
953rd FA Bn	36	583		37	577	

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2. Corps Troops (cont'd)

Unit	Effective Strength as of 1 Oct, or Date Joined		Date Joined	Assigned Strength as of 31 Oct, or Last Strength Prior to Inactivation		Date of Inactivation
	O	EM		O	EM	
955th FA Bn *	31	493		33	519	
997th FA Bn	29	606		29	600	
987th FA Bn	27	406		29	438	
3rd TD Gp, Hq & Hq Co	15	65		15	61	
628th TD Bn	38	600		36	609	
629th TD Bn *	33	551		36	599	28 Oct 1944
630th TD Bn	33	666		32	697	
801 TD Bn	36	744		35	737	
893rd TD Bn *	34	555		37	590	
899th TD Bn (less Co C)	33	591	25 Oct 1944	30	474	
3rd Armd Gp, Hq & Hq Co	18	86		9	63	
70th Tank Bn	42	654		44	680	
741st Tank Bn *	37	677		37	677	3 Oct 1944
746th Tank Bn (less Co A)	687		25 Oct 1944	34	536	
102nd Cav Gp, Hq & Hq Troop	16	59		16	59	
38th Cav Recon Sq (Mecz)	38	685		42	705	
102nd Cav Recon Sq (Mecz)	40	650		44	707	
115th AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	12	60		11	61	
376th AAA AW Bn (less Btry D)	38	751	25 Oct 1944	32	596	
377th AAA AW Bn	39	756		39	761	
387th AAA AW Bn	33	632		38	638	
447th AAA AW Bn	38	755		37	752	
460th AAA AW Bn *	39	776		38	772	
461st AAA AW Bn *	31	669		34	781	
2891st Engr Tech Intell Team	1	3		1	3	
1121st Engr (C) Gp,Hq&Hq Co	17	69		18	70	
1171st Engr (C) Gp,Hq&Hq Co	16	66		17	66	
20th Engr (C) Bn *	28	567		32	615	
112th Engr (C) Bn *	29	563		31	598	
146th Engr (C) Bn *	30	559		32	600	
254th Engr (C) Bn	27	576		33	614	
1340th Engr (C) Bn *	29	570		32	621	
502nd Engr Light Pon Co	6	205		5	206	
508th Engr Light Pon Co	6	192	14 Oct 1944	6	192	
610th Engr Light Equip Co	5	114		5	114	
668th Engr Topo Co	6	114		5	117	
990th Engr Trdwy Bridge Co	4	135	22 Oct 1944	4	135	
993rd Engr Trdwy Bridge Co	3	130		4	135	
996th Engr Trdwy Bridge Co	4	143		4	143	20 Oct 1944
86th Chemical Bn	38	587	28 Oct 1944	38	587	
53rd Med Bn, Hq & Hq Det *	7	22		7	22	
382nd Med Coll Co	5	97		5	97	
383rd Med Coll Co	5	96		5	96	
684th Med Clearing Co	14	102		14	102	
97th QM Bn, Hq & Hq Det	7	21		7	21	
606th QM G R Co	6	120		7	117	
3275th QM Service Co (Cld)	4	205		4	180	
3604th QM Truck Co	5	126		4	125	
3892nd QM Truck Co	5	133		5	129	
3907th QM Truck Co	5	120		5	120	
3912th QM Truck Co	6	109		6	109	
Provisional Military Government Police Force Battalion #	49	793		—	—	

* Less detachment with Provisional Military Government Police Force Battalion.
\# Assigned strength for 31 October not shown, inasmuch as strength of detachments comprising this group is included in figures of parent units.

III. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS.

1. Command Post.

October

041245 Section closed at Wilwerdingen, Luxembourg (P 787737)
041515 Section opened at Moderscheid, Belgium (P 901987)
280945 Section closed at Moderscheid, Belgium (P 901987)
281245 Section opened at Eupen, Belgium (K 806260)

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III. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS (cont'd).

2. Inclosures, Collecting Points, PWs and Stragglers - Corps.

a. Inclosures.

(1) The Army PW Inclosure was located at Herbesthal (K 745335) during the entire period.

b. Collecting Points.

(1) V Corps PW and Straggler Collecting Points were as follows:

1 October 1944 - Wilwerdingen (P 787737)
4 October 1944 - Ambleve (P 888962)
28 October 1944 - Eupen (K 800270)

3. Straggler Lines.

No Straggler Lines were maintained. However, 75 stragglers were processed through the Corps Collecting Point.

IV. CASUALTIES AND RETURNS.

1. Consolidation of Estimated Losses.

a. Movement Phase - 1 Oct (D + 117) thru 5 Oct (D + 121)

Unit	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Captured		Total Battle Casualties		Sick & Non-Battle Casualties		TOTAL CASUALTIES	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
4th Inf Div	0	4	0	39	0	5	0	0	0	48	7	116	7	164
28th Inf Div	1	27	4	119	0	2	0	0	5	148	5	111	10	259
5th Armd Div	0	3	1	11	0	0	0	0	1	14	2	40	3	54
Corps Troops	0	1	0	9	0	2	0	0	0	12	5	43	5	55
TOTALS	1	35	5	178	0	9	0	0	6	222	19	310	25	532

b. Defensive Phase - 6 Oct (D + 122) thru 23 Oct (D + 139)

4th Inf Div	1	32	13	165	1	10	0	0	15	207	25	566	40	773
28th Inf Div	0	13	3	91	0	4	0	0	3	108	18	448	21	556
5th Armd Div	0	2	3	5	0	1	0	0	3	8	7	136	10	144
Corps Troops	1	15	0	31	2	1	0	5	3	52	22	167	25	219
TOTALS	2	62	19	292	3	16	0	5	24	375	72	1317	96	[illegible]

c. Movement Phase - 24 Oct (D + 140) thru 31 Oct (D + 147)

4th Inf Div	0	5	6	30	0	7	0	0	6	42	10	197	16	[illegible]
9th Inf Div*	0	1	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	170	0	[illegible]
28th Inf Div	0	6	1	40	0	1	0	0	1	47	6	163	7	[illegible]
5th Armd Div	0	0	1	8	0	0	0	0	1	8	7	144	8	[illegible]
Corps Troops	0	1	0	6	0	1	0	0	0	8	3	78	3	[illegible]
TOTALS	0	13	8	92	0	9	0	0	8	114	26	752	34	[illegible]

* 9th Infantry Division attached to V Corps 25 Oct 44.

d. Total Estimated Casualties for Divisions and Corps Troops (1 Oct 1944 thru 31 Oct 1944)

4th Inf Div	1	41	19	234	1	22	0	0	21	297	42	879	63	[illegible]
9th Inf Div*	0	1	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	170	0	[illegible]
28th Inf Div	1	46	8	250	0	7	0	0	9	303	29	722	38	[illegible]
5th Armd Div	0	5	5	24	0	1	0	0	5	30	16	320	21	[illegible]
Corps Troops	1	17	0	46	2	4	0	5	3	72	[illegible]	288	33	[illegible]
TOTALS	3	110	32	562	3	34	0	5	38	711	[illegible]	2379	155	[illegible]

* 9th Infantry Division attached to V Corps 25 Oct 44.

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IV. CASUALTIES AND RETURNS (cont'd)

2. Battle Casualty Reports.

a. Battle Casualties Sustained by Divisions and Corps Troops during October by Type of Casualty.

(1) Movement Phase - 1 Oct thru 5 Oct 1944.

Unit	KIA	DOW	DOI	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	CAP	NET TOTAL	SUS	RTD	GRAND TOTAL
4th Inf Div	7			2		27	11	3		50	20	75	145
28th Inf Div	31	5		24		97	33	51		241	12	44	297
5th Armd Div	1	1				10	1			13		2	15
Corps Troops	2	1		2		8	1	3		17	2	4	23
TOTAL	41	7	-	28	-	142	46	57	-	321	34	125	480

(2) Defensive Phase - 6 Oct thru 23 Oct 1944.

4th Inf Div	26	8		19		125	47	20		245		73	318
28th Inf Div	13	5		11		79	160	9		277		54	331
5th Armd Div	3			2		6	1	2		14		2	16
Corps Troops	4			9	1	9	4			27		1	28
TOTAL	46	13	-	41	1	219	212	31	-	563	-	130	693

(3) Movement Phase - 24 Oct thru 31 Oct 1944.

4th Inf Div	6			5	1	21	6	2		41		34	75
9th Inf Div	17	1		17	1	21	2	1		60			60
28th Inf Div	4	1		7		30	16	2		60		26	86
5th Armd Div				1		6				7			7
Corps Troops	2			2		9	1	1		15		1	16
TOTAL	29	2	-	32	2	87	25	6	-	183	-	61	244

(4) Total for October 1944.

4th Inf Div	39	8		26	1	173	64	25		336	20	182	538
9th Inf Div	17	1		17	1	21	2	1		60			60
28th Inf Div	48	11		42		206	209	62		578	12	124	714
5th Armd Div	4	1		3		22	2	2		34		4	38
Corps Troops	8	1		13	1	26	6	4		59	2	6	67
TOTAL	116	22	-	101	3	448	283	94	-	1067	34	316	1417

b. Battle Casualties sustained by Divisions and Corps Troops during October by Arm or Service.

Unit	Inf	FA	CAC	MD	CE	SC	CAV	TOTAL
(1) Movement Phase - 1 Oct thru 5 Oct 1944.								
4th Inf Div	138	3		2		2		145
28th Inf Div	288	1		5	3			297
5th Armd Div	11	2					2	15
Corps Troops		6			2	1	14	23
TOTAL	437	12	-	7	5	3	16	480
(2) Defensive Phase - 6 Oct thru 23 Oct 1944								
4th Inf Div	294	7	3	7	6		1	318
28th Inf Div	311	5		4	6	1	4	331
5th Armd Div	7						9	16
Corps Troops	1	9			7		11	28
TOTAL	613	21	3	11	19	1	25	693
(3) Movement Phase - 24 Oct thru 31 Oct 1944								
4th Inf Div	72	1		2				75
9th Inf Div	52	7			1			60
28th Inf Div	80	3	1				2	86
5th Armd Div	2						5	7
Corps Troops	1	7			2		6	16
TOTAL	207	18	1	2	3	-	13	244

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IV. CASUALTIES AND RETURNS (cont'd)

(4) Total for October 1944

Unit	Inf	FA	CAC	MD	CE	SC	CAV	TOTAL
4th Inf Div	504	11	3	11	6	2	1	538
9th Inf Div	52	7			1			60
28th Inf Div	679	9	1	9	9	1	6	714
5th Armd Div	20	2			2		14	38
Corps Troops	2	22			11	1	31	67
TOTAL	1257	51	4	20	29	4	52	1417

V. GRAVES REGISTRATION.

1. Cemeteries.

First U.S. Army operated the only cemetery servicing V Corps during the period at Henri-Chappel, (K 705352).

2. Collecting Points.

a. Collecting Points were as follows:

1 to 5 October - Ettelbruck (P 802738)
5 to 31 October- Butgenbach (K 916040)

b. An additional collecting point was available during the period of 5 to 26 October at Rotgen (K 915290).

VI. REPLACEMENTS.

1. Training.

a. The need for familiarization training for replacement personnel has long been apparent. In collaboration with the Commanding Officer, 41st Replacement Battalion and with the direct concurrence of the Commanding General, GPRS, arrangements were made to place both officer and enlisted replacements on detached service with front line divisions during quiet periods. For details see letter, Hq V Corps, Subject: "Familiarization Training of Replacement Personnel", 19 October 1944, attached hereto as Exhibit A.

b. Reports from divisions indicate that, from their point of view, the plan works satisfactorily and imposes no undue hardship on the division. The effectiveness of the plan insofar as the replacements are concerned can best be expressed in the words of the Commanding Officer, 41st Replacement Battalion, that the replacements are extremely grateful of an opportunity to find out what it is all about before their turn comes to go into the line.

c. On one occasion the 28th Infantry Division had a number of such trainees on detached service with it when it was committed to the attack on a three combat team scale. The trainees were withdrawn to the division casual company prior to the jump off. During the first day of the attack casualties suffered by the division were in excess of the trainees on hand. Clearance was obtained by telephone from the Replacement Battalion and from First Army. The trainees were released to the division and fed into the combat teams during the first night after the initial attack, so that combat elements were able to renew the attack on the second day at full strength.

2. The following table, based on information extracted from Daily Estimated Loss Reports, shows the number of replacements received during the month of October:

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VI. REPLACEMENTS (Cont'd)

Divisions	1 - 5 Oct	6 - 23	24 - 31 Oct	TOTALS
4th Infantry Div	448	491	218	1157
70th Tank Bn		18	10	28
377th AAA AW Bn		8	8	16
9th Infantry Div			166	166
746th Tank Bn			4	4
28th Infantry Div	656	607	202	1465
447th AAA AW Bn		1		1
629th TD Bn	2	21		23
630th TD Bn	6	25	23	54
707th Tank Bn		30	3	33
5th Armored Div	105	704	52	861
387th AAA AW Bn	1	2		3
400th FA Bn (Armd)			5	5
628th TD Bn	13	9		22
Sub Total	1231	1916	691	3838
Corps Troops				
V Corps Artillery		1		1
17th FA Obsn Bn		3		3
76th FA Bn		3		3
406th FA Gp		1		1
186th FA Bn		1		1
187th FA Bn			2	2
190th FA Bn		1		1
272nd FA Bn		5		5
953rd FA Bn		2		2
987th FA Bn		12		12
893rd TD Bn		5	1	6
20th Engr (C) Bn	1	5	1	7
112th Engr (C) Bn	1	2		3
146th Engr (C) Bn	1	3	1	5
254th Engr (C) Bn	4	4	3	11
993rd Engr Trdwy Br Co		7		7
996th Engr Trdwy Br Co		1		1
1340th Engr (C) Bn	1	2	3	6
38th Cav Recon Sq (Mecz)	4	34	2	40
56th Signal Bn	1			1
382nd Med Coll Co		1		1
Sub Total	13	93	13	119
TOTAL REPLACEMENTS - DIVISIONS AND CORPS TROOPS	1244	2009	704	3957

VII. PRISONERS OF WAR

UNIT	1 - 5 Oct	6 - 23 Oct	24 - 31 Oct	TOTALS
4th Infantry Division	92	89	22	203
9th Infantry Division *			11	11
28th Infantry Division	63	50	7	120
5th Armored Division	11	24	4	39
Corps Troops	51	177	15	243
TOTALS	217	340	59	616

NOTE - * 9th Infantry Division attached to V Corps, 25 Oct 44.

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VIII. PROMOTIONS.

1. Status of Promotions and Appointments.

	Recd at Hq V Corps	Forwarded to First U.S. Army	Pending at Hq V Corps	Disapproved by Hq V Corps	Retd by First US Army	Pending at First US Army	No. of Appointments Made and No. of Officers Promoted
APPOINTMENTS 1-31 Oct 44							
Battlefield							
Corps less Divisions	7	6	2	0	1	0	8
Divisions	40	32	3	8	2	10	28
TOTAL	47	38	5	8	3	10	36
Regular							
Corps less Divisions	2	3	2	1	0	3	1
Divisions	4	2	0	2	0	2	1
TOTAL	6	5	2	3	0	5	2
PROMOTIONS 1-31 Oct 44							
Battlefield							
Corps less Divisions	49	45	5	3	0	6	52
Divisions	138	147	3	0	4	15	170
TOTAL	187	192	8	3	4	21	222
Regular							
Corps less Divisions	13	13	0	0	0	13	12
Divisions	11	11	0	0	0	11	13
TOTAL	24	24	0	0	0	24	25

2. Reclassification, Reassignment and Demotions.

	Brig Gen	Col	Lt Col	Maj	Capt	1st Lt	2nd Lt	WO	TOTAL
Reclassification				2	4	13	6		25
Reassignments					NONE				
Demotions					NONE				
TOTAL	-	-	-	2	4	13	6	-	25

IX. MORALE.

1. Unit Citations Recommended.

None.

2. Units Cited in General Orders, First U.S. Army.

None.

3. Decorations and Awards.
(See following chart)

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II. 3. DECORATIONS AND AWARDS:

Unit	Medal of Honor		DSC		DSM		Legion of Merit		Silver Star		Bronze Star		Soldier's Medal		Air Medal		TOTAL	
	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded
Hq & Hq Co, V Corps					1		3				1*						5	
V Corps Arty															2			2
1st Inf Div	3	1	11		1		3				2 **						20	1
2nd Inf Div			9				4	1									13	1
2nd Armd Div							1										1	
4th Inf Div			8	6	1		5		3	102		335	1				17	444
5th Armd Div	1		1	2						16		61			3		2	82
9th Inf Div #										57		263			7			327
28th Inf Div			6		1		1			34		277			24		8	335
29th Inf Div							4										4	
2nd Ranger Bn										1								1
3rd Armd Gp												3						3
20th Engr (C) Bn							1						1				1	1
38th Cav Rcn Sq									1	5		5	1				1	11
41st Repl Bn												3						3
53rd Med Bn												4						4
56th Sig Bn							1					2					1	2
70th Tank Bn										2		7						9
102nd Cav Gp											1						1	
102nd Cav Rcn Sq			1														1	
112th Engr (C) Bn												1	10					11
115th AAA Gp							1					1					1	1
146th Engr (C) Bn	1																1	
186th FA Bn															1			1
187th FA Gp															3			3
187th FA Bn												1			3			4
190th FA Gp															2			2
190th FA Bn															1			1
196th FA Bn															2			2
200th FA Bn															1			1
205th CIC Det												1						1
254th Engr (C) Bn										2		17						19
376th AAA AW Bn										1								1
377th AAA AW Bn												1						1

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IX. 3. DECORATIONS AND AWARDS (CONTINUED):

Unit	Medal of Honor		DSC		DSM		Legion of Merit		Silver Star		Bronze Star		Soldier's Medal		Air Medal		TOTAL	
	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded
406th FA Gp																1		1
447th AAA AW B n												11						11
460th AAA AW Bn									1								1	
461st AAA AW Bn			1							6	8	4					9	10
606th QM GR Co												3						3
629th TD Bn			1									2					1	2
630th TD Bn												7						7
741st Tank Bn									1	1	8	4					9	5
743rd Tank Bn				1														1
745th Tank Bn										1								1
747th Tank Bn										5		5						10
773rd TD Bn	2																2	
801st TD Bn												29						29
893rd TD Bn			1						1	1	1	2 1					3	22
899th TD Bn										2								2
941st FA Bn															2			2
953rd FA Bn															6			6
987th FA Bn															1			1
997th FA Bn															2			2
1121st Engr (C) Gp												1						1
3604th QM Trk Co												1						1
3 [illegible]2nd QM Trk Co												2						2
TOTALS	7	1	39	9	4	-	24	1	7	236	21	1072	-	13	-	61	102	1393

NOTE: Pending columns as of 31 Oct 1944. Awarded columns are for the month of October 1944.

* One (1) Bronze Star Award pending for French Liaison Officer.
** Two (2) Bronze Star Awards pending for Navy personnel.
\$ Two (2) Silver Star Awards pending for Navy officers.
# 9th Infantry Division attached to V Corps 25 Oct 1944.

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IX. MORALE (cont'd)

4. Postal.

a. At the beginning of the period, APO 305 was furnishing postal service to 104 units of V Corps, approximating 35,000 troops. No substantial change in units or servicing personnel occurred during the period.

b. During the period parcel post arrived through Cherbourg, and over Omaha and Utah beaches. V-Mail and Air Mail arrived for the most part by plane direct to Paris.

c. Following is a summary of postal services for the period:

(1) Received from 26th PRU, 3,638 sacks of parcel post and 1,185 sacks of first class matter.
(2) Dispatched 1,433 sacks of parcel post and 657 pouches of first class matter.
(3) Received 699 pieces of registered mail and dispatched 663.
(4) Sales of stamps and stamped paper amounted to $18,601.09.
(5) Total money order business was $383,335.52, of which $371,384.80 was outgoing.

5. Religious Activities.

a. During the month of October, six (6) chaplains were dropped from V Corps units, four (4) through reassignment, one (1) evacuated sick and one (1) as a result of an automobile accident. Twenty-one (21), plus one (1) on detached service, were added by troop assignment and replacement. At the close of the month, the total number of chaplains assigned to V Corps was eighty (80).

b. A consolidation of the Chaplains activities follows:

Number	Services	Attendance
789	Sunday services	53,286
1,033	Weekday services	27,783
20,044	Confessions	
35,744	Communions (all faiths)	
8,555	Hospital visits (patients visited)	34,784
6	Baptisms	
7,865	Personal conferences	
147	Funerals	
4	Sex lectures	880
132	Testaments distributed	
61	Jewish Scriptures distributed	
27	Scapulars distributed	
13	Rosaries distributed	
321	Religious pamphlets distributed (all denominations)	

6. Red Cross Field Director.

a. During the period of this report, the Red Cross Field Director handled 138 new cases, six recurrent cases and 83 cases carried forward from the previous month. The breakdown of cases follows:

Personal problems	11
Family problems	14
Home condition reports	1
Financial	4
Health and welfare	75
Emergency furlough	11
Allotments	2

The general trend during the period indicates a reduction in unfavorable home conditions, believed to be due in part to the semi-static tactical situation which permitted men to give these matters more attention.

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II. MORALE (cont'd)

b. The following supplies were distributed as comfort items to military personnel during the period:

Cigarettes	10,000	packages
Chewing tobacco	60	plugs
Pipe tobacco	100	packages
Tooth paste	122	tubes
Tooth brushes	300	
Shaving cream	100	jars
Razors	75	
Razor blades	2,000	
Soap, 4 oz. bar	144	
Towels	75	
Handkerchiefs	1	dozen
Lighter flints	1	dozen
Chewing gum	400	packages
Boot laces	200	strings
Sewing kits	150	
Candy	300	bars
Stationery	40,000	sheets
Envelopes	60,000	

c. On the opening of the V Corps Recreation Center, the following supplies were made available to the men by the Red Cross Field Director:

Stationery	40,000	sheets
Envelopes	50,000	
Cigarettes	2,000	
Pipe tobacco	1	case
Tooth paste	1	case
Tooth brushes	144	
Shaving cream	60	jars
Razors	60	
Razor blades	1,000	
Face soap	1	case
Towels	100	
Combs	50	
Chewing gum	1	case
Sewing kits	36	
Playing cards	36	decks

7. Special Service.

a. During the month of October a policy was announced by Hq. First U.S. Army, providing for the establishment of Recreation Centers within the Corps area for recreating and resting front line troops. On the 27th of October this headquarters opened a recreation center at Spen, Belgium, for all Corps troops, to include Divisions. Facilities were provided initially for 250 men and within three days the quota was raised to 300. During the initial stages, the center was reserved for Division troops only. Later, plans will be provided for rear area troops. Passes are for 46 hour periods and offer the men visiting the center hotel rooms, restaurant facilities, public baths, and two theaters. No charge is made for the operation and civilian staffs are used exclusively.

b. A War Department letter received during the month reduced the strength of the Special Service Section to one officer and three enlisted men, as well as proportionately reducing the grades. Likewise Education was made a responsibility of G-3 rather than Special Service. It is anticipated that with the rising impetus on recreation, additional personnel will have to be added to the section irrespective of T/O.

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IX. MORALE (cont'd)

e. A summary of Special Service activities for the month appears below:

MOVIES

SPECIAL SERVICE COMPANY

No. of shows	871
No. of titles	20
Attendance	177,270

UNIT PROJECTORS AND FILM LIBRARY

No. of Shows	1,052
No. of titles	31
Attendance	136,760

TOTAL OF ALL MOVIES

No. of Shows	1,930
No. of titles	51
Attendance	314,030

LIVE SHOWS

No. of Performances	79
Attendance	37,675

CLUBMOBILES

No. of Doughnuts Served	246,700
Cups of Coffee Served	82,527

BAND CONCERTS

No. of concerts	32
Attendance	26,400

EQUIPMENT ISSUED

Radios	225
Projectors	8
2 "A" Kits	
2 "B" Kits	
Playing Cards	1,956 doz.
Council Books	50 sets
V Disk Records	10 sets
Guitars	6 ea
Violins	1 ea
Ping Pong Tables	2 ea
Footballs	13 ea
Shoe Brushes	450 ea
Phonographs	2 ea

X. PROVOST MARSHAL.

1. The following Military Police units were available to V Corps during the period of this report for police functions:

(1) Military Police Plat., Hq Co, V Corps
(2) Security Detachment, Hq Co., V Corps
(3) Co. "A", 507th MP Bn
(4) 428th Escort Guard Co
(5) 4th Infantry Division MP Platoon
(6) 28th Infantry " " "
(7) 5th Armored Division " "
(8) 9th Infantry " " " (26-31 October)

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X. PROVOST MARSHAL (cont'd)

2. A directive was published by this headquarters on 1 October, as G.O. #58, clarifying Military Government in Germany, and subsequently, Circular No. 47, which clarified various staff functions, particularly as regards military police functions and relations within conquered Germany.

3. The location of Corps Forward and Rear boundaries for the period was as follows:

a. 1 October 1944 - Temporary, between First U. S. Army and Third U. S. Army. LONGUYON (U-4595) inclusive to First U. S. Army. VALFERDANGE (P-8418) BALLENDORF (L-0140) DAUN (L-3577) all inclusive to Third Army.

b. 18 October 1944 - Forward - Effective 182400A October 1944. N-28 from Corps left Boundary at K-808168 to N-27 at K-830135, thence N-27 to N-32 vicinity WAIMES, all inclusive to Divisions. N-32 through BUTGENBACH to RW at K 931008, thence N-27 to Army Boundary, all inclusive to Divisions.

c. 26 October 1944 - Division Rear Boundary effective 262400A October 1944. N-28 to new Corps left (North) Boundary, all exclusive to Divisions.

4. Consolidated Report of Delinquencies for Month of October 1944.

	Violation of Traffic SOP	Unattended Vehicle	Out of Uniform	Smoking while Driving	No Convoy Clearance	Fraternizing with Civilians	Speeding	Larceny	TOTALS
V Corps	7	7		1	2	27	8	4	56
4th Inf Div	1	2				48	6		57
28th Inf Div		2			1	9	1		13
5th Armd Div		6		1		7			14
9th Air Force							1		1
321st Ftr Sqd							1		1
ARC						7			7
First U.S. Army		24	5	1		121	25	1	177
12th Army Gp		1				4	1		6
TOTALS	8	42	5	3	3	223	43	5	332

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XI. FINANCE.

1. Operations: The following chart shows disbursements and collections for the month of October 1944:

	V Corps Finance Sect.	8th Finance Disb. Section	15th Finance Disb. Section
TOTAL CREDITS For Pay and Allowances (Excluding Travel)	$283,062.69	$980,843.60	$1,126,496.72
ADD: Repayments of Soldiers' Deposits (Including Interest)	45.12	1,502.79	1,795.06
(1) TOTAL CREDITS	$283,107.81	$982,346.39	$1,128,291.78
LESS: ALLOTMENTS			
Class "B"	$ 11,867.50	$ 49,668.75	$ 57,332.50
Class "E"	94,690.96	299,756.75	369,935.65
Class "F"	23,394.00	124,049.00	118,718.03
Class "X"	846.75	100.00	2,014.14
Class "D"	218.01	95.21	145.06
Class "N"	16,638.30	72,054.92	81,187.76
(2) TOTAL ALLOTMENTS	$147,655.52	$545,724.63	$ 629,333.14
(2a) PARTIAL PAYMENTS OFFICERS (Debits)	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
(2b) TOTAL ITEMS (2) and (2a)	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
(3) GROSS AMOUNT CHARGEABLE TO APPROPRIATIONS (Item (1) less Item (2b))	$134,878.26	$436,095.33	$ 498,581.61
LESS: VOUCHER COLLECTIONS			
PTA - Funds	$ 5,102.10	$ 33,478.94	$ 40,102.28
War Bonds	— — —	— — —	— — —
Soldiers' Deposits	3,515.00	10,889.00	22,207.00
Other Collections	6,296.57	17,365.19	18,285.21
(4) TOTAL VOUCHER COLLECTIONS	$ 14,913.67	$ 61,733.13	$ 80,594.49
(5) NET DISBURSEMENTS FOR PAY AND ALWS (Item (3) less Item (4))	$119,964.59	$374,362.20	$ 417,987.12
LESS: CASH COLLECTIONS			
PTA - Funds	$391,633.59	$ 40,130.17	$ 101,999.71
War Bonds	1,856.25	1,237.50	1,706.25
Soldiers' Deposits	13,825.00	23,481.00	55,058.00
Other Collections	23,794.20	4,179.60	663.17
(6) TOTAL CASH COLLECTIONS	$ 431,109.04	$ 69,028.27	$ 159,427.13
NET CASH RETAINED (Item (5) less Item (6))	($-311,144.45)	$305,333.93	$ 258,559.99

2. Savings: The following is a summary of savings for the month of October 1944:

Total Number of Payees: 24,926
Total Credits for Pay and Allowances: $2,390,403.01
Percentage of Allotments to Total Credits: 55.3 %
Percentage of Net Cash Retained to Total Credits: 10.6 %
Percentage of Net Cash Retained to Cash Actually Disbursed: [illegible]
Average Amount Retained by Each Payee: $10.14

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XII. DISCIPLINE.

1. Courts Martial.

a. The following is a summary of Courts Martial cases for the month of October:

	GENERAL	SPECIAL	SUMMARY
(1) Corps Troops (under court martial jurisdiction of V Corps)	54	37	42
(2) 4th Infantry Division	11	22	8
(3) 28th Infantry Division	5	18	44
(4) 5th Armored Division	11	1	2
*Sub-Total	32	78	96
(5) 9th Infantry Division	6	11	25
**Total	38	89	121

b. The following is an analysis of the types of offenses for which Corps Troops were tried:

OFFENSES	GENERAL	SPECIAL	SUMMARY
Misbehavior before the enemy	2		
Desertion	2		
AWOL and other violations of AW 61	1	18	10
Sleeping on post	1		
Conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman	1		
Assault and battery	1		
Drunkenness		4	1
Wrongful using, loss or damage to Gov't property		1	2
Failure to obey orders of competent authority		8	16
Improper uniform			4
Careless or wilful discharge of firearm		4	1
Disobedience, striking or disrespect to NCO		2	
Gamble with subordinate		2	
Breach of restriction			1
Disorderly			3
Disrespect to superior officer		2	
False official statement		2	
Pillaging			2
Speeding			1
Misbehavior of sentinel			1
***TOTALS	8	43	42

NOTE - # Does not include four (4) General Courts Martial cases tried during October, but not acted upon by Commanding General during month.
* Totals for commands under this headquarters for entire month of October.
** Totals including all October Courts Martial of 9th Infantry Division, attached to V Corps 25 October 1944.
*** These totals include cases where accused has in one trial been found guilty of two or more different types of offenses, hence the total offenses analysed by type is necessarily greater than the number of cases tried as shown in par a (1), above.

R. V. LEE,
Colonel, GSC,
A C of S, G-1.

1 Incl.
Incl 1 - Exhibit "A".
("Familiarization Training of Replacement Personnel.")

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305

: SECRET :
:Auth: CG V Corps:
:Date: 19 Oct 1944 :
:Init: RA :

19 October 1944

SUBJECT: Familiarization Training of Replacement Personnel.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Experience within this command has shown that it is desirable to afford replacement officers and enlisted men a brief period of familiarization training with lower combat units prior to their assignment to fill T/O vacancies within such units. Relatively quiet periods are particularly suited to the initial familiarization of such personnel. Such numbers of junior officers and enlisted men, as can be conveniently handled by divisions and corps combat units, will therefore be placed on detached service with these units by the 41st Replacement Battalion for periods of approximately one week.

2. Verbal instructions transmitted by the G-3 Section, this headquarters, to the effect that the following personnel be picked up and transported to the units concerned during the afternoon of 18 October 1944 are hereby confirmed.

4th Infantry Division - 15 officers and 150 enlisted men
28th Infantry Division - 15 officers and 150 enlisted men
5th Armored Division - 10 officers and 100 enlisted men
102nd Cavalry Ren Gp - 60 enlisted men.

3. Enlisted men placed on detached service with combat units will be employed, in so far as possible, in a manner to provide combat familiarization in duties prescribed under their respective specification serial numbers. Officers will be employed, in so far as practicable, in a manner to provide them with combat familiarization in duties appropriate to their respective grades and arms of the service. Personnel on detached service will not be employed in units committed to attack, but may be employed in patrols or in units engaged in maintenance of contact. The principal purpose of this familiarization training is to teach personnel by actual experience, how to function in a team in combat, how to conduct themselves in the presence of the enemy and how to take care of themselves physically under field conditions. A further purpose is to enable the individual to experience, and get over with, the initial shock of combat prior to actual engagement upon assigned duties as a member of the organization. It is necessary, however, to employ them in situations in which the probability of occurrence of battle casualties among them is relatively small.

4. In so far as practicable, personnel trained on detached service with divisions and corps combat units will be transferred to the same units as replacements to fill requisitions.

5. The Commanding Officer, 41st Replacement Battalion, will be notified immediately upon the occurrence of any casualty, regardless of type (battle or non-battle), to personnel on detached service, in order that proper action may

Exhibit "A"

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be taken. An Officer or enlisted man who becomes a battle casualty, regardless of how minor, will be transferred to the unit with which he is on detached service, as of one day prior to the occurrence of the casualty. An officer or enlisted man who becomes a non-battle casualty and requires evacuation rearward of an evacuation hospital will likewise be transferred to the unit as of one day prior to occurrence of the casualty. An officer or enlisted man who becomes a non-battle casualty but is returned to the unit for duty from the evacuation hospital or forward thereof, will not be transferred. All personnel on detached service will be carried on the morning reports of the unit with which serving but not on the G-1 or S-1 reports. Personnel transferred to units with which serving, by virtue of becoming casualties, will be reported by the unit concerned as casualties of that unit.

6. Direct coordination between the staff of the units concerned and the Commanding Officer, 41st Replacement Battalion, will contribute to the success of this project and be to the mutual benefit of all concerned.

By command of Major General GROW:

ORLANDO C. MOOD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

John G. Hill (R.A.)

JOHN G. HILL,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A C of S, G-3.

Dist: CG, 4th Inf Div (3)
CG, 28th Inf Div (3)
CG, 9th Armd Div (3)
CO, 102nd Cav Gp (2)
CO, 41st Replacement Bn (1)
C/S, V Corps (1)
G-1, V Corps (1)
G-3, V Corps (3)
AG, V Corps (1)

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, US Army

SECTION IV - G-4 LOGISTICS REPORT

1 October to 9 October 1944

At the beginning of this period the Corps was spread over a wide front in Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany, holding portions of the Siegfried Line. The VIII Corps of the Ninth US Army took over the V Corps sector and V Corps shifted north to an assembly area in the vicinity of BUTGENBACH, Belgium, preparatory to another attack on the Siegfried Line. The relief by VIII Corps of V Corps was accomplished within two days without serious traffic delays. During this two-day period, some 6,000 vehicles were handled under column control by Corps and Division MPs.

Prior to the movement of the Corps to the new assembly area, a directive was published for the protection of supply lines in all future operations. This directive provided for the establishment of Corps and Division service areas with supply installations grouped for mutual support and protection; for the establishment of designated protected supply routes between Corps and Division service areas and Army installations; and for the inauguration of unit supply convoys with armed guards and armed (armored, if possible) vehicles. The special staff made reconnaissance of the new assembly area and recommended locations of the Corps service area to G-4.

Concurrent with the concentration of the Corps in the new assembly area, G-4 made a daily check of the road net to observe traffic conditions and operation of the Military Police. The extremely limited road net in this area, coupled with a high proportion of one-way mud roads, presented a considerable traffic problem, but constant work by the engineers and vigilance on the part of the Military Police prevented serious obstructions to the traffic flow.

During this period of concentration, every effort was made to prepare men and materiel for the forthcoming assault. Overcoats, overshoes and extra blankets were issued from Army stocks as they became available with priorities going to the infantry

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divisions. The Ordnance Service continued their spot check policy of inspecting vehicles and weapons, with special attention being placed on first and second echelon maintenance performance of all units. The Ordnance Officer reported that the condition of Ordnance materiel was very satisfactory. The winterization of all vehicles was directed by Army. Limited stocks of anti-freeze and winter grade oils were made available by Army, and units progressed rather slowly on the winterization program. The Corps Engineer's recommendations for additional amphibious equipment (DUKWS, LCVPS, life belts) were submitted to Army in anticipation of the Rhine crossing.

At the end of this period, Army ordered a postponement of our assault on the Siegfried Line due to developments in the Aachen sector. Contact with the enemy was maintained by patrols and close observation.

10 Oct to 22 Oct

During this period, two combat commands of the 5th Armored Div were placed in Army reserve and sent north to the Aachen sector in anticipation of German counter-attacks. The 4th and 28th Inf Divs, plus the 102nd Cav Gp, maintained contact with the enemy, conducted training for future operations and underwent a program of rehabilitation. The Corps Artillery went off silent policy of the previous period and conducted active harassing, interdictory and counterbattery fire. The Engineer units of the Corps devoted this period to training in river crossing technique, using the lake at ROBERTVILLE for this purpose. A demonstration of rafts, ferries, and assault boats to be used in the Rhine crossing was given, with officers from all Corps units in attendance.

There were several instances of unscheduled Army supply convoys interfering with traffic within the Corps area. After a conference between Army and Corps Provost Marshals, a modification of the Army SOP for traffic control was put into effect providing that Army supply convoys would henceforth run in units of 15 vehicles under officer control, with a minimum of 15 minutes between units of the convoy. This system operated successfully with a minimum interference to Corps trafic and without unnecessairly

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delaying vital supply convoys.

In furtherance of the directive for protection of supply convoys and to conserve gasoline, the Corps Quartermaster inaugurated a system of weekly Class II and IV supply convoys for all Corps units. These convoys were operated under the direction of the Quartermaster Supply Officer between the Corps service area and the Army QM depot. Units consolidated transportation needs and the entire system of replenishing QM Class II and IV supplies was greatly expedited. Overcoats, overshoes, and extra blankets were made available to all Corps units and the Divisions received a limited supply of sleeping bags.

The 3rd Armored Group conducted a command maintenance inspection of all tank and tank destroyer battalions assigned and attached to Corps. This inspection showed that first and second echelon maintenance and driver training within the inspected units was excellent. Minor deficiencies of supply were noted on the inspection reports forwarded to Corps and the Corps special staff concerned took appropriate action to remedy these deficiencies.

During this period, First US Army requested assistance from Corps in stocking the Corps ASP. Accordingly, arrangements were made whereby the Corps Artillery and the Corps QM Truck companies furnished trucks for hauling ammunition from the Army depots to the Corps ASP, thereby relieving Army trucks for hauling from the communication zone.

Toward the end of the period, Corps received orders from Army for a lateral shift northward of the Corps boundary in preparation for a limited objective attack by V Corps in support of VII Corps on our left flank.

23 Oct to 31 Oct

The 28th Inf. Div. was moved to assembly area in the vicinity of MOETGEN, Germany, in preparation for a limited objective attack, taking over the sector held by the 9th Inf Div, while the 9th Inf Div was placed in Corps Reserve for rest and rehabilitation. The Corps special staff was directed to expend every effort to furthe

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this rehabilitation. The Corps CP moved to EUPEN, Belgium, for closer coordination of the attack to be launched by the 28th Inf Div. The bulk of the Corps remained in the BUTGENBACH area and therefore it was impracticable to move the Corps service area at this time. Arrangements were made by G-4, enabling the 28th Inf Div and supporting troops to draw supplies from VII Corps Truckheads and ASPs, thereby resulting in a saving in gasoline and vehicles, due to shortening of road distances involved.

Because of difficult terrain and poor road facilities within the 28th Inf Div zone of action, G-4 requested and obtained thirty-six (36) Carriers, Cargo, M29 (Weasels) on loan basis, to be used by the division in the forthcoming attack. First US Army also authorized a 50% increase of basic loads for the 28th Inf Div because of the difficulties foreseen in the re-supply of ammunition over the poor road net during the attack.

The Ordnance Officer reported excessive combat losses for units not normally engaged in direct contact with the enemy. These units were contacted and the commanding officers were directed to take the necessary measures to prevent these excesses in the interest of supply discipline.

There were no major supply difficulties, although anti-freeze continued to be a critical shortage. Except for overshoes of larger sizes, the Corps was clothed and equiped for winter weather.

For summary of activities of special staff sections on Supply, Evacuation, Maintenance and Traffic Control responsibilities, see the attached special staff reports (Inclosures Nos 1 to 6 inclusive).

THOMAS F. TAYLOR,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-4.

Incls:
Incl No 1 - QM Report (in quad)
Incl No 2 - Ord Report (in quad)
Incl No 3 - Engr Report (in quad)
Incl No 4 - Surg Report (in quad)
Incl No 5 - Sig Report (in quad)
Incl No 6 - PM Report (in quad)
Incl No 7 - Operations Journal - Oct., File V

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Quartermaster

QUARTERMASTER REPORT - AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY

1 October 1944 to 31 October 1944

1. In compliance with directive, this headquarters, regarding protection of supply vehicles enroute from Corps service area to Army service area, the following procedure was established for obtaining Quartermaster class II and IV supplies:

a. Divisions: Consolidated requisitions for Quartermaster class II and IV supplies will be prepared by divisions, to include attached units, and submitted to the V Corps Quartermaster to arrive not later than 1800A hours, on Fridays and Mondays. These requisitions will be turned over to the Army Quartermaster by the Corps Quartermaster and issues made on Sundays and Wednesdays, respectively. Supply convoys to pick up items requisitioned will be dispatched to the Army class II and IV dump on these days and in accordance with instructions contained in directive, Headquarters, V Corps, dated 29 September 1944. In the event the quantity of supplies being requisitioned is not sufficient to provide the minimum number of vehicles necessary for protected convoys, divisions are authorized to attach their vehicles to convoys drawing supplies for Corps units as outlined below. In these cases the Corps Quartermaster will be notified of such intentions.

b. Corps Troops (not attached to Divisions): Requisitions for Quartermaster class II and IV supplies will be submitted so as to arrive at the office of the Corps Quartermaster not later than 1900A hours on Saturdays, requisitions to be consolidated, insofar as practicable, by groups, battalions or largest possible units. These requisitions will then be turned over to the Army Quartermaster and issues made on Mondays. Necessary transportation for movement of supplies from the Army service area to the Corps service area will normally be provided by the Corps Quartermaster. Units are authorized to use their organic vehicles provided sufficient supplies are being requisitioned to make complete truckloads. A qualified noncommissioned officer will be furnished for each unit consolidated requisition. This personnel will report to the convoy assembly point, which will normally be in the vicinity of the class I truckhead, not later than 0800A hours on Mondays. Personnel will be available to the Corps Quartermaster for use as checkers and to receipt for supplies issued on unit requisitions at the Army class II and IV dump. They will also be expected to act as vehicle guards on convoys. Transportation of supplies from Corps service area to organizations will be the responsibility of the requisitioning unit. Units will immediately, upon notification that supplies are available at the Corps service area, dispatch the necessary transportation to effect pick up. No facilities are available for storage. Armed vehicles for the protection of convoys from the Corps service area to the Army service area and return will be arranged for by the Corps Quartermaster and convoy movement will be under his direction.

c. Requisitions for class II and IV supplies will not be honored on days other than prescribed above except in cases of recognized emergency.

2. 560th QM Railhead Company continued operation of class I truckhead servicing this Corps.

Rations issued during period - 2,513,037

3. A shortage within Corps units of certain critical items of Quartermaster class II and IV supply resulted in the preparation of a letter to the Commanding General, First U. S. Army, presenting an overall picture of current shortages.

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4. 3815th QM Gasoline Supply Company continued operation of class III truckhead servicing this Corps.

Gallons of gasoline issued during period - 1,665,275
" " diesel oil " " " - 65,290
" " assorted oils " " " - 63,310

5. The QM Graves Registration Company operated two Corps collecting points.

Bodies processed during the period:

American - 195
Allied - 0
Enemy - 86

Total - 281

Bodies processed since 6 June 1944:

American - 3619
Allied - 18
Enemy - 1899

Total - 5536

6. The Quartermaster Fumigation & Bath Company continued servicing units of the Corps. The 9th Infantry Division was re-habilitated, 2000 sets of class "A" clothing being made available for this purpose. 1000 sets of class "A" clothing were made available at the Victor Rest Center, clothing exchange being operated by one officer and six enlisted men of the Quartermaster Fumigation and Bath Company.

Number of men showered during period - 50,520
Average daily hours of operation - 8

7. The QM Laundry Company continued servicing units of this Corps.

Number of pieces of clothing laundered during period - 431,771
Number of pounds of clothing laundered during period - 568,910
Average daily hours of operation - 15

8. One Section, 216th QM Shoe Repair Company, continued servicing units of the Corps.

Shoes repaired during period - 1,765 pairs
Shoes salvaged during period - 294 pairs
Leggings repaired during period - 284 pairs
Tarps repaired during period - 10
Tents repaired during period - 2
Field Jackets repaired during period - 5
Rifle covers repaired during period - 2
Hospital chairs repaired - 3

9. Both QM Truck Companies handled normal Corps transportation requirements, such as hauling ammunition, replacements, evacuation of civilians, etc.

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Total operational miles during period:

3604th QM Truck Company - 62,229
3892nd QM Truck Company - 47,808

Total -110,037

M. C. RHODES,
Colonel, QMC,
Quartermaster.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

ORDNANCE SECTION HQ V CORPS

1 Oct 1944 - 31 Oct 1944

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AFTER ACTION REPORT
ORDNANCE SECTION HQ V CORPS
DURING MONTH OF OCTOBER 1944

TACTICAL SITUATION

1. During the entire month of October V Corps was in a defensive role while VII Corps on the left captured Aachen. Several changes in boundaries and organization of the Corps occurred resulting generally in a movement toward the north with a narrowing of the Corps sector. Plans for attack were repeatedly postponed.

2. Advantage was taken of the operational inactivity to stress all echelons of maintenance. As a result Ordnance equipment is generally in excellent shape. The lull also permitted reduction in major item shortages due to reduced combat losses while in the defensive role. There are a number of items which are critical or in short supply. They will be mentioned in detail in the body of the report.

SUPPLY-GENERAL

1. The employment of V Corps in a defensive mission during the month of October enabled this command to regain the majority of T/E shortages existant during September.

2. Shortages on general purpose vehicles were entirely reduced save for the 6 Ton and 7½ Ton Trucks.

3. Shortages existing in combat and track laying vehicles as of September 30th were entirely restored, with the exception of Medium Tanks, M4. In order to insure a safe replacement margin on the latter item until Army stocks were replenished, the Armored Officer of First U. S. Army set an operating level of fifty (50) tanks instead of 54 per medium battalion.

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4. The following items were no longer available for using unit maintenance exchange, but issued by Army allocation and directing:

Carriage, Motor 3" Gun, M10
Carriage, Motor, 76mm Gun,, M8
Car, Armored, Light, M8
Tank, Light, M5A1
Tank, Medium, M4

This policy is only a temporary expedient until Communication Zone replacements are received.

5. The following "Parts Common" were in a critical state of supply:

Element, oil filter	8-E-1000
Spark plugs (14mm)	17-P-5358
Spark plugs J8	17-P-18375
Acid, battery electrolyte	
Tires and tubes	600 x 16
Tires and tubes	750 x 20
Tires and tubes	900 x 16
Tires and tubes	825 x 15
Point Sets, Dodge	593477
Point Sets, GMC	188526

6. Listed below are parts and assemblies peculiar to major items of equipment that have definitely delayed maintenance and have increased the duration of dead line. Measures should be expedited for increasing sufficient resupply stockage of these items:

Truck, 4 Ton, 6 x 6 Cargo

Valves, exhaust	511345
Valves, intake	511357
Valve springs	111378

Truck, 3/4 Ton, 4 x 4 (W/C or C &R)

Differential and carrier Ass'y	927653
Breaker points	593477
Hose, fuel filter to pump Ass'y	651405
Master cylinder brake	920917

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Truck, 3/4 Ton, 6 x 6, Cargo

Valves, exhaust	2137874
~~Valve deflector gasket~~	6107603
Transfer case (Banjo)	3659994
Transfer case (Split)	2182396
Exhaust manifold Ass'y	2155490
Breaker points	1858720
Engines	3235
Transmission Ass'y	2140098
Housing and jacket Ass'y	267590
Gasket Set, intake and exhaust manifold	2087384

Truck, 1/4 Ton, 4x4

Pipe, exhaust	GPW-5246
Band hand brake	GPW-2648
Shock Absorber, Front	GPW-12045
Shock Absorber, Rear	GPW-12080
Breaker Points	GPW-13354
Gasket, head	GPW-6051

Tractor, High Speed, M4

Transmission Ass'y	1197382
Hose, torque converter	G-180-04-05050
	G-180-05-20645

Carriage, Motor, 3" Gun, M10

Valve, exhaust	0098-10-00480
Injector and case ass'y	G104-16-23531
Spring governor ass'y	G104-17-29625
Insulator, air heater ass'y	G104-15-32831
Spring, retracting, governor	G104-42-29624

Car, Armored, Light, M8

Generator, Ass'y	G134-01-06300
Regulator, Generator Ass'y	G166-05-07338

Tank Accessories

To date the expenditure of radial engines, R975-C1, are in excess of available replacement stocks. Status of track assemblies are now sufficient and good supply. An extreme shortage of G5-6 spark plugs exists and measures for possible local purchase are being effected.

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Miscellaneous

Prestone for winterizing equipment has been made available in sufficient quantities to meet 10% of the theater requirements for 15 October.

MAINTENANCE

1. The dormant tactical situation enabled the Corps support Ordnance Battalion and the Army back-up Battalion to refit and effect the equivalent of a Class "A" inspection on the majority of the units assigned and attached to V Corps.

2. Class "A" Inspection and refitting program was made on the 4th Infantry Division, 28th Infantry Division and CCR of the 5th Armored Division.

3. A refitting project was inaugurated on the 9th Infantry Division and was due to be completed around November 5th.

4. In general, the condition of Ordnance Materiel within V Corps is excellent. This status, however, can change quickly for general purpose vehicles if the supply of major item assemblies can not be increased to take care of anticipated larger requirements.

DEFICIENCIES OF MATERIEL

1. Howitzer, 155mm, M1

a. Operating lever latch spring appears weak. On a fast fire mission, the operating lever latch frequently fails to engage operating lever resulting in breakage of safety latch.

b. Several instances of breakage of the air brake diaphragm and the flexible air hose connection occurred when piece was towed over rough terrain. Using units suggest relocation of the air brake diaphragm to provide increased ground clearance.

2. Gun, 155mm, M1 with Carriage, M1, and Limber, Carriage, Heavy, M2

a. Excessive breakage of limber lifting screws continues after first

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U. S. Army modification has been made.

b. Leakage of equilibrators due to packing failure.

3. Tractor, High Speed, 18 ton, M4.

a. Excessive number of muffler failures.

b. Leakage of torque converter radiator. Cooling tubes have been breaking loose from end tanks, probably from vibration.

4. Tractor, High Speed, 13 ton, M5

a. Excessive cracking of engine flywheels.

b. Damage to starter switch has been reported due to leakage of acid from battery located above switch.

c. Several dual range engine clutches have failed. Specific parts are not known as maintenance personnel have replaced the major assembly without disassembling.

5. Carriage, Motor, 3" Gun, M10

a. Minor damage to radiators has been reported as caused by ejection of shells when the gun was being fired from maximum elevation during indirect fire missions.

b. Complaints are still being received relative to difficult turret traversing.

c. Extreme difficulty in maintaining a fully charged battery is being reported by units operating radio equipped M10's under tactical conditions when the operation of the power plant was inadvisable.

6. Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4.

a. Difficulties have been encountered in maintaining hand brake in proper adjustment

7. Car, Armored, Light, M8

a. Extensive failures of voltage regulators.

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b. Existance of moisture in shielded wiring.

c. Excessive failure of generators (Brush holders and armature wiring insulation.)

d. An express need is evident for an auxiliary generator when vehicle is used as a radio car.

8. Truck, 6 Ton, 6x6, Brockway.

Excessive number of cylinder head gasket failures.

9. Truck, 4 ton, 6x6, Diamond T.

a. Anumber of accessory shaft pulleys have been reported as wearing loose on the shaft.

b. Premature failure of exhaust valves.

10. Car, Half Track, M3.

Excessive failures of cylinder head gaskets.

LOCAL PURCHASE AND PROCUREMENT

It has been found desirable that Ordnance Officers of Division and Corps levels have an officer with contracting and purchasing authority. This arrangement does much to facilitate supply requirements. It has been the experience of this section that parts common and raw material have been available in fair quantities in all liberated countries for purchase or requisition.

DOING NEW COMMENTS ON MATERIEL

1. Truck, 3/4 Ton, 4x4, C & K.

70th Tank Battalion suggests that C & K vehicles used as radio cars be equipped with an engine hour meter as an aid to proper maintenance schedules.

2. Truck, 6 Ton, 6x6, Brockway.

a. 993rd Engineer Treadway Bridge Co. personnel relate that the clutch capacity is insufficient for the power and load of the vehicle.

b. Reports are forthcoming from all units having this vehicle that

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rapid evaporation of radiator coolant is prevelant. Suggest installation of condensation tank.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY

1. The following types of ammunition continued to be in short supply:

a. All types of Artillery HE.

b. 57mm HE.

2. For the first time since the invasion the stocks of 75mm How. became sufficient.

3. Other than the shortages mentioned above ammunition supply troubles were of a minute nature.

AMMUNITION DEFICIENCIES

Reports have reached this office that 76mm ammunition produces smoke in such large volumes as to completely obscure the gunner's vision unless a strong wind is blowing. As a result, observation of fire by the gunner is impossible either with sights or by the use of tracer. Some rounds give a large amount of flash in addition to the smoke. This deficiency is not confined to any certain lot as an inspection of lot numbers in the hands of the one unit using this type of ammunition in V Corps reveals a wide range.

T/O And E's

1. It is felt that T/O & E 100-1, dated 15 July 1943 for the Corps Ordnance Section should provide an additional Maintenance Officer, with rank of Captain.

2. Experience throughout this campaign has proven conclusively that the continuous refitting and inspection responsibilities, supervision of maintenance matters, proper liaison with "using arm" and ordnance units required of the Corps Ordnance Officer, could not have been fulfilled efficiently, had not

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this section been assigned an extra Maintenance Officer.

3. The Ordnance Section I/C has in all other respects been adequate.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Surgeon

31 October 1944.

AFTER ACTION REPORT
Surgeon's Section, Hq. V Corps

1 October 1944 to 31 October 1944 Incl.

Casualties during this period were relatively light and demands on the medical services were moderate.

PERSONNEL

The personnel replacement system operated in a very satisfactory manner during this period.

A program of rotation of officer personnel between Divisions and Army medical installations (Evacuation Hospitals, Field Hospitals, etc) was placed in operation at the beginning of the period with a view of the assignment of younger medical officers to combat units. At the close of the period almost all officers over 35 years of age, of company grade, had been relieved from duty in Division units and replaced by younger officers.

EVACUATION AND FIELD HOSPITALS

Army Evacuation and Field Hospitals were kept well forward and in easy access to front line units during this period.

Generally, a Field Hospital Platoon was operated in each Infantry Division Clearing Station area and received all non-transportable cases from the clearing station.

MEDICAL SUPPLY

During the latter part of this period, Army supply installations were well up front and easily available to divisions.

Stocks were very good in general. Some difficulty was met in securing certain types of vaccines. However, these shortages were being corrected at close of period.

EVACUATION

Army evacuation facilities (Field Hospitals, Ambulance Companies and Collecting Companies) operated under the 134th Medical Group, during the period. The service rendered by this group was excellent. Close liaison was maintained between this Section and Group Headquarters, and at all times willing cooperation was received, resulting in a considerable improvement in the rapidity of evacuation of Division Clearing Stations.

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Medical service to Corps Troops was rendered by the 55rd Medical Battalion. This service, as usual, was excellent.

Close liaison was maintained between this Section and medical installations of Division and Corps Troops during the period.

C. E. BRENN,
Colonel, M.C.,
Surgeon.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER

2 NOVEMBER 1944

AFTER ACTION REPORT, SIGNAL SECTION, V CORPS, 1 OCTOBER - 31 OCTOBER 1944

1. HEREWITH A SUMMARIZATION OF SIGNAL SUPPLY ACTIVITIES FOR THE PERIOD 1 OCTOBER - 31 OCTOBER 1944 INCLUSIVE:

A. 1 - 10 OCTOBER 1944.

UNIT MADE ONE LATERAL MOVEMENT FROM LUXEMBOURG NORTHWARD INTO BELGIUM. THIS REDUCED THE DISTANCE TO ARMY DEPOTS AROUND VERVIERS, BELGIU TO ABOUT 35 MILES AND, IN A LIKE MANNER, IT REDUCED THE STRAIN UPON SUPPLY CAUSED BY ELONGATED SUPPLY ROUTES. MUD SERIOUSLY HAMPERED THE USE OF ARMY DEPOT UNTIL THEY WERE MOVED OUT OF THE FIELD INTO WAREHOUSES AND BUILDINGS. THIS PERIOD CONSISTED MAINLY OF CONTINUED PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACKS ON THE SIEGFRIED LINE. AMONG THE MOST ACUTE SHORTAGES AT THIS TIME WHERE SPARE PARTS FOR POWER UNITS. DYNA...TORS, AND COMPONENTS OF SCR-284 AND SCR-508. 5 SCR-284'S AND 6 SCR-510'S AMONG OTHER EQUIPMENT WERE OBTAINED FROM ARMY TO SUPPLEMENT CORPS AND UNIT STOCKS AND EXPEDITE THE DIRECT EXCHANGE SYSTEM FOR REPLACING EQUIPMENT. SEVERAL INCOMPLETE RADIO SETS TURNED IN BY UNITS UPON RECEIPT OF NEW SETS MENTIONED ABOVE WERE CANNIBALIZED BY THE CORPS REPAIR SECTION IN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF SPARE PARTS. JUMPER WIRE (W-122) WAS NOT AVAILABLE IN ARMY DUMPS. A CAPTURED GERMAN DUMP PROVIDED AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF THIS ITEM. IN THE CONSTRUCTION CENTERS, W-130 WAS USED IN PLACE OF W-122. ELECTRIC LAMPS WERE NOT AVAILABLE IN ANY SIZE OR QUANTITY. THROUGH THE USE OF LOCAL PROCUREMENT VOUCHERS, A SUITABLE SUBSTITUTE WAS PURCHASED FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES IN BELGIUM. TWENTY-FIVE EE-8-A'S WERE OBTAINED FROM ARMY AND LOANED TO THE 102ND CAVALRY GROUP. THESE PHONES W RE USED FOR OUTPOSTS THROUGH THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN PLACES THAT WERE INACCESSIBLE TO RADIO VEHICLES.

B. 10 - 31 OCTOBER 1944.

UNIT MADE THE SECOND AND LAST MOVE FOR THE MONTH. ON 25 OCTOBER THE CORPS SIGNAL SUPPLY MOVED TO EUPEN, BELGIUM, A LATERAL MOV TO THE NORTH. UNTIL T IS MOVE HAD BEEN MADE, THE WEATHER AS A VERY CLOSE RIVAL TO THE GERMAN AS THE MAJOR ENEMY OF SUPPLY. THE MUD RESU FROM CONTINUED RAIN CAUSED MUCH DELAY IN MOVEMENT OF TROOPS AND SUPP AS WELL AS DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT. DURING THIS PERIOD OF THE MONTH AN I PORTANT ITEM, WIRE, W-110 WAS ADDED TO THE CRITICAL LIST. SCR-300'S ISSUED TO CAVALRY UNITS ON A LOAN BASIS FOR PURPOSES OF DISMOUNTED PA IN AND AROUND THE SIEGFRIED LINE. REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE USE OF T RADIOS FOR THIS PURPOSE WAS VERY SUCCESSFUL.

C. IN SUMMATION OF THE SUPPLY STORY FOR OCTOBER, IT MAY STATED THAT, EVEN THOUGH MANY ITEMS OF SIGNAL SUPPLY BECAME VERY CRI FROM A DEPOT POINT OF VIEW, SIGNAL SUPPLY WAS VERY SATISFACTORY AS V BY THE CONSUMING TROOPS.

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D. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF WORK DONE BY THE V CORPS IGNAL REPAIR SECTION DURING THE MONTH OF OCTOBER:

(1) NO. OF JOB ORDERS ACCEPTED SINCE "D" DAY 2204
(2) NO. OF JOB ORDERS ACCEPTED DURING OCTOBER 491
  (A) NO. OF ITEMS HANDLED BY DIRECT EXCHANGE 351
  (B) NO. OF ITEMS TURNED OVER TO HIGHER ECH REP 51
  (C) NO. OF ITEMS REPAIRED IN LESS THAN 3 DAYS 395
  (D) TOTAL NO. OF ITEMS NOT REPAIRED AT END OF MONTH INCLUDING 1D(2)(B) 58
(3) INITIAL INSTALLATION OF RADIOS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ABOVE FIGURES 5
(4) LIST OF MAJOR ITEMS REQUIRING REPAIR DURING MONTH OF OCTOBER:

  (A) BC-312, 342, 603, 604, 611, 620, 653, 654, 659, 728, AND 1000.
  (B) CABLE, 345.
  (C) CONVERTOR, M-209.
  (D) POWER UNITS PE-43, PE-75, PE-87, PE-103-A, PE-104, AND PE-117.
  (E) REEL UNIT, RL-26-A.
  (F) DETECTOR, SCR-625.
  (G) HAND SET, TS-13.
  (H) MICROPHONE, T-17.
  (I) TELEPHONE, EE-8-A.

(5) CRITICAL ITEMS AVAILABILITY OF WHICH HINDERED RAPID REPAIR OF EQUIPMENT DURING OCTOBER:

  (A) PARTS FOR PE-75; RODS, ENGINE HEAD, GASKETS, PISTONS, CARBURETORS, AND VALVES, INTAKE AND EXHAUST.
  (B) BRUSHES AND CARBURETORS FOR PE-43.
  (C) POWER UNIT, PE-104.
  (D) POWER UNIT PE-117 (CHOKE CH-4 AND RESISTOR R-7)
  (E) CABLES FOR CS-70.
  (F) CABLES AND METER FOR SCR-625.
  (G) METER AND THERMOCOUPLES FOR BC-104.
  (H) DISCRIMINATOR, FUSES, SWITCH, AND VOLUME CONTROL METERS FOR BC-620.
  (I) MAST SECTIONS, MS-50, MS-51, AND MS-52.
  (J) ANTENNAS, AN-130 AND AN-131.
  (K) HANDSETS, TS-13 AND TS-15.
  (L) CARBON TETRACHLORIDE

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HASKELL H. CLEAVES,
COLONEL, SIGNAL CORPS,
SIGNAL OFFICER.

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Auth: CO, V Corps
Date: 31 Oct 1944

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Engineer
APO 305

31 October 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Report After/After action, October 1944.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Thru Channels).

1. During the month of October 1944, the Eng neer Section, Headquarters V Corps, continued its normal functions and duties, advising the Staff on matters of engineer concern, supervising the activities of the two Engineer Groups and coordinating engineer work between the divisions and Groups.

2. The Corps tactical situation during the month of October was inactive and this created a major problem of road-maintenance for the Corps Engineer. A barely adequate road net received continuous traffic which was hampered by heavy rains throughout the month. The Corps road net was kept open only by continuous maintenance through an extensive program initiated by both Groups. New roads were built using corduroy and large amounts of rock, slate and gravel. Quarry operations were over-taxed and assistance had to be obtained from the Army Engineer Group in support of Corps.

3. A stream crossing school was established at Robertville, Belgium, to train and refresh engineer troops in assault and ferrying operations with a view of future assault crossing of the Rhine River. Various type rafts were tested in order to determine load capacities and capabilities of rafts, and a program was initiated whereby a large number of power boat operators were trained in anticipation of future requirements.

4. Extensive studies of the proposed zone of advance relative to roads, bridges and natural obstacles was carried out. A study was made of the Roer River with special attention to the possibilities of flooding the valley. Study of the Rhine River crossing was completed and plans were formulated and submitted for approval. A scale terrain model of a selected site on the Rhine River was constructed as an experiment. Materials on hand had to be used as a substitute for the required materials and results were satisfactory. Scale of model was 1/5,000 horizontal, 1/500 vertical.

5. A summary of bridging constructed during the month by Corps Engineers is appended.

LEWIS C. PATTILLO,
Colonel, C. E.,
Corps Engineer.

Incl: 1
Summary of Bridging,
October 44.

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[illegible]

[illegible] Railway

[illegible] 1944

[illegible] Railroad

Coordinates	Road	Nearest Town	Construction				Completed by		Completed		REMARKS
			Span	Type	Load	Length	Unit	Date	Unit	Date	
P993035	[illegible]	Fritzfelt	Timber	70	15'	126 m	1121 Gp	4 Oct			Construction, steel beam with wood decking. Changed from Cl 40 to Cl 70 on 6 Oct. One-way.
P994040	[illegible]	Fritzfelt	Timber	40	30'	20 m	1121 Gp	13 Oct			
P900981	[illegible] Land	Kolp-[illegible]	Timber	9	11'	[illegible]	1121 Gp	13 Oct			2 bridges at site.
P966067	[illegible]	Roberts-ville	Bailey	40	60'	20 m	1121 Gp	10 Oct			Maintenance taken over by 1111th Group (Army troops) 22 Oct.
P95 [illegible]	[illegible]	Isenberg	Timber	24	15'	126 m	1121 Gp	17 Oct			
P97010	[illegible]	Murrington	Trestle	24	60'	[illegible]	1121 Gp	20 Oct	9 Tr Bn	21 Oct	Placed over existing bridge
P984140	[illegible]	[illegible]	Timber	30	60'	2 m	15 m	25 Oct			

Inclosure
to ltr [illegible] Chief Eng, [illegible] Corps/[illegible],
[illegible] 1944
dated 31 [illegible] 44

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Provost Marshal
APO 305, U. S. Army

.....SECRET.....
:Auth: CG, V Corps :
:Date: 1 Nov 1944 :
:Initials: :
:.....:

1 November 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports for the Period 1 October 1944 to 31 October 1944.

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, V Corps.

I. The following report of traffic operations of the V Corps Traffic Headquarters during the month of October is divided into three phases.

1. Relief of V Corps by VIII Corps and Movement of V Corps North to Assembly Areas. (1 - 5 October 1944).

2. Static Operational Situation. (6 - 22 October 1944).

3. Regrouping and Move North to Attack Positions. (23 - 31 October 1944).

II. Relief of V Corps by VIII Corps, and movement of V Corps North to assembly areas. (1 - 5 October 1944).

1. Traffic Headquarters continued to assist G-3 Troop Movement Section in the planning and coordination of the movement of VIII Corps troops relieving V Corps in its present location, and the movement of V Corps units North to new assembly areas. Plans and orders for this move had been prepared and published prior to 1 October 1944. Routes assigned to VIII Corps were as follows:

(a) Route 1. Bastogne to Ettelbruck to Diekirch. (N-15 and N-7)
(b) Route 2. Bastogne to Malscheid to St. Vith. (N-12 and N-26)
(c) Route 3. Bastogne to Houffalize to St. Vith. (N-15 and N-26)
(d) Route 4. From railhead at Longuyon to Luxembourg or Arlon, thence to Ettelbruck for elements of the 8th Infantry Division, or to Bastogne for elements of the 2nd Infantry Division.

2. Units of V Corps furnished vehicles to transport foot elements of VIII Corps from railhead at Longuyon to their new positions. By special arrangement with First U. S. Army Traffic Headquarters, convoy clearance was not required for these vehicles, inasmuch as it would have been very difficult to assemble all the necessary transport and dispatch it under column control. This arrangement was contrary to recommendation of Traffic Headquarters, V Corps. However, no serious congestion of traffic resulted

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even though MSR's were occasionally blocked for short periods of time when unscheduled troop convoys met or preceded scheduled movements at road intersections.

3. V Corps moved to new assembly areas on 3rd, 4th, and 5th October over two routes, as follows:

(a) Route 1. Diekirch, Ettelbruck, Wilts, Allerborn, Wilwerdange, Bullange, Salmchateau, Vielsalm, Recht, and Lignerville to Geismes. (N-7, N-15, N-12, N-33, N-23, and N-32).

(b) Route 2. Diekirch, Walscheid, Burfanne, St. Vith, and Neubeck to Bullange, Buttenbach, and Camp Elsenborn. (N-16, N-26, N-27, and N-32).

(c) Feeder routes from Division areas entered this route at Ouller.

4. On the recommendation of Traffic Headquarters, V Corps, Corps Engineer removed a Class 12 wooden bridge at Salmchateau, and installed a Class 40 DS Bailey Bridge capable of withstanding heavy Division traffic. 9th Armored Division moved over route 2 and part of Route 1, joining route 1 at Bullange. The 28th Infantry Division and Corps troops, with the exception of a small detachment of the 56th Signal Battalion were directed to assembly areas via route 1.

5. Vehicles entering highways from main-traveled roads left a film of mud-slick on road surfaces, creating an extremely hazardous driving condition. Despite slippery roads and intermittent rain, the Military Police, assisted by guides from Military Police Platoons of the 2nd, 8th and 28th Infantry Divisions, controlled traffic so well that no accidents, and no serious congestion resulted from a movement involving approximately 8300 vehicles in the five day period over the very limited road net.

6. Five battalions of VIII Corps Field Artillery, and one battalion of anti-aircraft Artillery attached to move into positions over routes neither proper nor approved by V Corps Traffic Headquarters. These organizations were ordered off the roads into assembly areas until roads were cleared of other traffic.

7. Report of movement of Corps Troops to Assembly Area, [illegible] No. 23, was submitted to Corps [illegible] upon completion of this movement. (See Document No. 1).

8. From the operations for this period the following conclusions were drawn:

(a) Traffic movement should not be made out of [illegible] with the Traffic Headquarters directing the movement of the convoys and the number of vehicles in each convoy. Exceptions may be made in [illegible] emergencies, but such movements will interfere with and upset previously scheduled movements using the same route and prevents the Traffic Headquarters from planning to

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utilized the [illegible]

(b) The need for [illegible] is [illegible] by the unauthorized convoy [illegible] area was [illegible] with movements [illegible]

(c) [illegible] ed officer [illegible] necessary [illegible] as on the [illegible] traffic conditions [illegible] personnel). This was [illegible] an unauthorized convoy from [illegible] crowded with [illegible] movements. [illegible] would have [illegible] would have [illegible] of [illegible] operations.

III. [illegible] Situation. ([illegible] October 1944).

1. In consideration of the [illegible] were established throughout [illegible] and at principal road [illegible] were assigned to the Divisions, traffic [illegible] areas was delegated to Division Military Police, [illegible] military police maintained all other posts.

2. Officer patrols were sent out daily by Traffic [illegible] to observe the enforcement of traffic [illegible] particular attention to convoys operating without [illegible] violations of the provisions of [illegible] for Control [illegible] of Traffic were observed [illegible], or reported delinquency reports for corrective [illegible] against offenders.

3. From the first of the month there was [illegible] in the number of vehicles in supply convoys. [illegible] all forms of trucks had been discovered [illegible] intervals of time, but at this time [illegible] fixed to sixty vehicles were operating in the [illegible]. Numerous reports of delinquency were forwarded [illegible] to offending units and the matter was brought to the attention of Traffic Headquarters, First U. S. Army. G-4, First U. S. Army, on 8th October, issued verbal instructions that the maximum number of vehicles in any supply convoy would be fifteen, and that each such convoy would be commanded by a responsible officer. G-4, V Corps, was informed of the situation by report, "Violations of SOP for Control and Administration of Traffic, dated 9 October 1944. (See Document No. 2).

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4. G-3, V Corps, assisted by Traffic Headquarters, published, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, the letter, "Violations of Traffic SOP," dated 11 October 1944. (See Document No. 2).

5. On 10 October 1944, CC "A" and CC "B" of the 9th Armored Division and 110th MGT (less 1 Bn) were placed on alert status for employment as Army reserve. CC "B" of the 9th Armored Division moved to positions in the North sector of Corps zone of action on 11 October. On this date, Corps G-3 requested recommendations for two routes over which to move CC "A" and CC "B", reinforced by 110th MGT (less 1 Bn) to Army reserve positions. Recommendations were as follows:

(a) Route 1. Vicinity of Veimes to RJ E-32 and E-27 to Eupen, to destination. (E-32, E-27, and E-28).

(b) Route 2. Veimes to Malmedy to Verviers to destination. (E-32 and E-27).

6. Route 1 required the repair of one section of the bridge at E-896066 (vicinity of Robertville), blown by the Germans on 5 September. On recommendation of Traffic Headquarters, Corps Engineer constructed a 60' DS Bailey Bridge, Class 40, thus opening this route to traffic 121145A October. CC "A" moved over this route on that day and CC "B", reinforced by 2nd Battalion, 110th Infantry Regiment, moved on 15 October. Change in the tactical situation obviated the necessity of using Route 2.

7. Traffic Headquarters planned and supervised the execution of traffic circulation plan for River Crossing Demonstration held Saturday, 21 October, at the bridge, E-896066. (Vicinity of Robertville).

8. From the operations for this period the following conclusions were drawn:

(a) Supply convoys which are not cleared with Corps Traffic Headquarters should be limited to 15 vehicles or less and should be dispatched at a minimum of 15 minute intervals. It was observed that small supply convoys could be worked in the breaks of large convoys without too much interference, but that any supply convoys over 15 vehicles would cause unnecessary traffic delays. Also it was observed that small convoys which were dispatched at shorter time intervals would tend to close with one another because of normal traffic halts.

(b) Commissioned officers should be placed in charge of convoys whenever possible. Many supply convoys were observed on the roads during the month where this practice had not been followed. In general, these convoys showed poor march discipline and in most instances were violating traffic regulations.

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IV. Regrouping and Move North to Attack Positions. (23 - 31 October)

1. A period of planning and effecting troop movements began again for the Traffic Headquarters upon publication of V Corps F.O. No. 30 which required the moving of the 28th Infantry Division North, and the 9th Infantry Division south. Coordination of these movements had to be made with VIII Corps as the new F.O. entailed the taking over of part of the VII Corps sector and moving of the 9th Infantry Division from VII Corps control to V Corps control.

2. Army returned CC "A" and CC "B" of the 5th Armored Division to Corps control to further augment the strength of the Corps. CC "A" moved back to its Corps assembly area on 26 October and CC "B" moved back to its assembly area on 28 October. In planning the movement of CC "A", Army did not allow sufficient time for the movement of this armored column to reach the Corps zone. It arrived in the Corps area over an hour late and threatened traffic congestion at a cross roads where convoys of the 9th Infantry Division were moving south along the route of CC "A". The congestion was avoided by clearing one convoy between breaks of the other.

3. It was observed at the time of these movements that Military Police guards of the units were taking over control stations in some instances and directing the traffic for the benefit of their units' convoy and other traffic waiting unnecessarily. This practice was corrected by having the Corps Military Police keep control of the stations and keeping the convoy guides to one side to watch for their own vehicles only.

4. Quartermaster ammunition and supply vehicles were also observed causing congestion by double banking when convoys would be stopped for traffic reasons. The drivers had a misconception of their priority on the roads. Double banking at any time these vehicles are stopped for traffic reasons will invariably cause congestion with vehicles coming from the opposite direction and further delays the movement of all the vehicles concerned.

5. From the operations for this period the following conclusions were drawn:

(a) Units having large convoys on the roads should not put guides at critical points along the [illegible] to assist the Corps Military Police in [illegible] ing and routing their vehicles. They should [illegible] take control of the traffic post, as [illegible] Military Police are found to be [illegible] ing traffic flowing through such [illegible] been observed directing their own [illegible] expense of other traffic on the road [illegible]

(b) Convoys in motion should never [illegible] halted convoys [illegible]

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off the road. Even when a convoy is off the road the commander of the moving convoy should determine from guides of the halted convoy whether the road ahead is clear or blocked.

V. Traffic Statistics.

1. During the month of October, 39 convoys involving a movement of 3,878 vehicles over a total of 823.1 miles within the Corps area were released by Corps Traffic Headquarters. During the same period, 42 convoys involving 3,493 vehicles travelled 953.1 miles with the Corps area and were cleared by other traffic headquarters with the Traffic Headquarters of V Corps.

ARTHUR E. CAMPBELL
Colonel, Infantry
Provost Marshal

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ANNEX

HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Provost Marshal
Traffic Headquarters
APO 305, U. S. Army

SECRET
Auth: CG, V CORPS
Date: 4 Oct 1944
Initials: _____

4 October 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Movement of Corps Troops to Assembly Areas, Field Order No. 28.

TO : G-3, V Corps.

1. Herewith is a report covering the movement of Corps Troops to assembly areas specified in Field Order #28, and the movement of VIII Corps Units effecting relief of V Corps. This report includes personal observations of officers of Traffic Headquarters, V Corps, and reports of Military Police officers and enlisted men of the Corps Military Police Company.

2. Troop Movement of V Corps Troops.

a. For purposes of simplicity of control, and also to facilitate rapid movement of troops, each Unit had been assigned a block of road space time, with limiting points as specified in G-3 Troop Movement Orders. (Annex 1 & 2)

b. Physical Limitations. Road conditions for the past two days have been bad. Due to the long period of intermittent rain, and extremely heavy traffic entering the highways from adjacent fields, road surfaces are coated with very slick mud and extreme caution has been necessary on the part of each and every driver in order to avoid serious accidents and resulting road blocks.

c. Corps Troops (3 & 4 October)

(1) 180 Field Artillery Group. Movement and march discipline, excellent.

(2) 99th Infantry Division. Movement and march discipline, very good. March unit and serial spacing were not observed. This was to a great extent due to road conditions and to the interference by unauthorized convoys.

(3) 6th Armored Division. Movement and march discipline of Combat Commands, excellent. Division trains moved slowly, and by no apparent grouping of march units and serials. This possibility might be accounted for by road conditions, as they moved during the time rain was falling, and their route crossed and followed one of the most heavily travelled Corps Main Supply Routes.

(4) 4th Infantry Division. Movement not observed by officers of Traffic Headquarters. Military Police report movement and march discipline, excellent.

(5) V Corps Headquarters and Attached Troops. Military Police report movement and march discipline very good.

b. Troop Movement of VIII Corps Troops

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a. As in the case of V Corps Units, VIII Corps troops were also allotted blocks of road space time.

b. The same physical limitations applied.

c. Corps Troops (3 & 4 October)

(1) 8th Infantry Division. Movement not observed.

(2) 2nd Infantry Division. Road space time from 0700 - 1200 hours 3 October was allotted to one combat team of this division. Despite this limitation, elements of the 23rd Infantry, 37th Field Artillery, and 38th Field Artillery, continued to move during the afternoon. This caused considerable interference with the convoys of the 28th Infantry Division, although no critical road blocks developed. In addition to the continued movement of the above mentioned units, G-3 (Troop Movements) 2nd Infantry Division, scheduled the movement of the 13th Field Artillery Battalion without clearing with V Corps Traffic Headquarters. Thus it was necessary for a Field Artillery Battalion of VIII Corps Artillery cleared through V Corps Traffic Headquarters to delay its movement.

(3) VIII Corps Artillery. Five Battalions of VIII Corps Artillery moved into rendezvous areas during the afternoon 3 October over routes cleared with Traffic Headquarters, First U. S. Army, or V Corps, despite the fact that a different route and time had been cleared by a representative of VIII Corps Artillery through Traffic Headquarters and G-3 (Troop Movements) V Corps. In addition, two of the battalions attempted to send reconnaissance parties of respectively two, twelve, and fifteen vehicles into their new position areas, cutting into convoy on the road and properly cleared. Five vehicles of each battalion were allowed to proceed and the remainder were ordered off the road until properly cleared.

(4) 462nd AAA Battalion. This battalion was dispatched to a point within the Corps Area by Ninth U. S. Army, with no coordination through First U. S. Army or V Corps. It was stopped before crossing wither convoy route and ordered off the roads into rendezvous area until it could be properly cleared.

(5) Other Units. A group of twenty one vehicles of 168th Engineer Battalion cut into the convoy of the 28th Infantry Division south of RT. VIII, and further added to road congestion. This organization had no convoy clearance.

4. Following violations of S.O.P. for Control and Administration of Traffic were also observed:

a. A group of thirteen vehicles of 3702nd QM Truck Company, First U. S. Army, were observed proceeding south through OUDLER at 1320 hours 3 October, at an excessive rate of speed and not correctly spaced. This unit had not obtained a convoy clearance from Traffic Headquarters, V Corps.

b. A group of forty five vehicles of 429th and 430th QM Truck Companies, First U. S. Army, were lined up on highway at the exit from Truckhead #54, (Class III) south of BEMO. Trucks were bumper to bumper and were completely blocking northbound traffic lane. It was the intention of the convoy commander to return to his station through RT. VIII, but he was ordered to use a different route. This organization had no convoy clearance.

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8. Despite all interference, slick roads, and unavoidable weather conditions, approximately six thousand vehicles have moved under column control in the past two days in addition to routine traffic, always extremely heavy during the displacement of a complete Corps, with no serious delays or long road blocks. Full credit must be given Corps and Division Military Police for their excellent work in the control of this movement.

ARTHUR H. CAMPBELL
Colonel, Infantry
Provost Marshal

Incl: 2
Annex 1 (Movement Schedule, 3 October)
Annex 2 (Movement Schedule, 4 October)

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Provost Marshal
APO 305, U. S. Army

9 October 1944

SUBJECT: Violations of SOP for Control and Administration of Traffic.

TO : G-4, V Corps.

1. In the initial phase of military operations on the Continent of Europe, it soon became apparent that movement of supplies from Army installations to Truckheads and ASP's in Corps areas by large convoys would not be satisfactory. The unpredictable times of arrival of supplies at the beaches and the more unpredictable availability of trucks dictated the policy of dispatching small march units of trucks (always less than ten (10) and usually only five (5)) at intervals of not less than fifteen minutes.

2. This system was highly satisfactory and, to the knowledge of this headquarters, no serious congestion has ever developed due to the interference of the movement of supplies with the tactical movement of troops.

3. About 1 October 1944, Traffic Headquarters began observing supply convoys moving within the Corps area consisting of from fifteen to fifty vehicles. Such convoys had not been cleared with Traffic Headquarters, V Corps, and the march discipline and the observance of the provisions of SOP for Control and Administration of Traffic were very poor.

4. A great many Reports of Delinquency covering these violations have been forwarded through channels to commanding officers of units involved, stating the violation of SOP for Control and Administration of Traffic.

5. On 8 October 1944, the Traffic Officer, First U. S. Army, informed this headquarters that G-4, First U. S. Army, at a conference with his special staff, had decided that supply convoys would now consist of fifteen vehicles, each convoy to be commanded by an officer. The minimum time interval between convoys will be fifteen minutes. Traffic Officer, First U. S. Army, requested this headquarters to observe these movements for a period of five days, and to report to him whether or not the system is satisfactory and whether the increased number of trucks in supply convoys interferes with other traffic in the Corps area.

6. It is interesting to note that 5th Armored Division has requested a blanket clearance for its supply traffic to move over specified routes at specified times each day. It appears that a blanket clearance for the routine movement of supplies may be the solution to many problems, not only from the standpoint of traffic control, but for convoy protection as well.

ARTHUR M. CAMPBELL
Colonel, Infantry
Provost Marshal

Copies to G-3, G-5, QM, Ord and Surgeon.
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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305

SECRET

370.5 11 October 1944

SUBJECT: Violations of Traffic S. O. P.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Observation of troop movements in the V Corps Area during the period 3-5 October 1944 by members of the V Corps Staff revealed a number of violations of the current Traffic S. O. P. Major violations were as follows:

a. Intervals between serials and march units were not maintained.

(1) Par. 4, a, Traffic S. O. P. specifies the following convoy control regulations:
(a) March units will not exceed thirty (30) vehicles unless specific permission is received from this headquarters to exceed that number. Such permission will be granted only to maintain tactical entity of a unit or organization.
(b) Serials will not exceed five (5) march units.
(c) Intervals between march units will be three (3) minutes.
(d) Intervals between serials will be eight (8) minutes.

b. Traffic control for vehicles or convoys stopped on the road was not provided.

(1) Par. 4, f, Traffic S. O. P. specifies the following procedure at halts:
(a) Single Vehicles: When a vehicle is halted wholly upon, or partially upon, a road, it is the responsibility of the driver of that vehicle to take position so that he can direct traffic approaching from either direction. The driver may designate another individual to perform this duty, but cannot delegate this responsibility. This procedure applies to all halted vehicles, regardless of the cause for the halt.
(b) Vehicles in Convoy: In addition to having each driver or his delegate in position to direct oncoming traffic, as in 1, above, each halted convoy will have a responsible officer or noncommissioned officer at the rear of the convoy to give information to overtaking vehicles. At halts caused by obstructions, demolitions, etc., necessary action will be taken to insure that overtaking convoys are halted in rear and are not allowed to move into the intervals of the halted convoy.

c. Intervals between individual vehicles were not maintained, particularly when the vehicles halted on the road.

(1) Par. 4, e, Traffic S. O. P. specifies:
(a) Vehicles in convoy will maintain a minimum distance of 75 yards during daylight; at night, a minimum distance commensurate with safety. These distances will be maintained at halts.

d. Other minor violations were observed such as failure to give prescribed passing signals and failure of drivers to pull to the edge of the road when halted.

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c. Lead vehicles in convoy exceeded the maximum speed allowed. Lead vehicles in convoy must not exceed 25 miles per hour at any time and must not exceed 15 miles per hour through towns.

2. To facilitate determination of what unit is passing at any time front and rear bumpers of all vehicles will be kept clean at all times. Unit designation will be painted on the vehicles as prescribed unless direct orders to the contrary are issued from this headquarters.

3. To make movement easy and safe for all concerned, and to prevent major traffic problems, it is vital that all commanders and all officers enforce the provisions of our Traffic S. O. P. The provisions of S. O. P. for control and Administration of Traffic, and current directives cited in paragraph 4 below will be brought to the attention of all officers and drivers by commander concerned.

4. Current directives not included in S. O. P. for Control and Administration of Traffic are as follows:

a. Unnumbered Memorandum, Hq V Corps, dtd 23 June 1944, Subject: Control and Administration of Traffic.

b. Letter, Hq V Corps, dated 2 July 1944, Subject: Restricted Use of Vehicles.

c. Circular #95, Hq First U. S. Army dated 19 July 1944, Par III, Safeguarding of Motor Vehicles (Ord-71); Par IV, Driving of Vehicles by Officers (Ord-72); and Par V, Drivers Smoking While Driving (Ord-72).

d. Memorandum No. 64, Hq First U. S. Army, dated 23 August 1944, Subject: Control and Administration of Traffic.

By command of Major General GEROW:

R. B. Patterson Jr

R. B. PATTERSON,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

DIST: "D"

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Provost Marshal
APO 305, U. S. Army

SECRET
Auth: CG, V CORPS
Date: 1 Nov 1944
Initials: _____

1 November 1944

CONSOLIDATED REPORT OF DELINQUENCIES ACCOMPLISHED BY MILITARY POLICE FOR MONTH ENDING 31 Oct 1944.

	Violation of Curfew	Violation of Blackout	Violation of Traffic Regs	Violation of Sanitary Regs	Violation of Fire Regs	Violation of Gasoline Regs	Violation of Pass Regs	Violation of Leave Regs	Violation of Liquor Regs	Violation of Gambling Regs	Violation of Miscellaneous Regs	TOTALS
V Corps	[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
2nd Div	[illegible]	[illegible]						[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]
99th Inf Div		[illegible]				[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]
2nd Armd Div		[illegible]			[illegible]			[illegible]				[illegible]
9th Air Force									[illegible]			[illegible]
[illegible] Tgt Sq									[illegible]			[illegible]
[illegible]								[illegible]				[illegible]
[illegible] 10 Army		[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible] Army Gp		[illegible]						[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]
TOTALS	8	42		5	3	3		23	43	5		[illegible]

ARTHUR E. CAMPBELL
Colonel, Infantry
Provost Marshal

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Locations of Army Prisoner of War Enclosures and V Corps Prisoner of War and Stragglr Collecting Points during October 1944.

a. Army Prisoner of War Enclosures:

1 October 1944 - KREUZTHAL - E-745286

b. V Corps Prisoner of War and Straggler Collecting Points:

1 October 1944 - WILHELMSHAVEN - 707787
4 October 1944 - ACHLEWE - P-888962
28 October 1944 - HUFEN - E-800270

Locations of Corps Rear and Forward Boundaries for the month of October 1944:

a. 1 October 1944 - Temporary, between First U. S. Army and Third U. S. Army. LORGUTON (E-4888) inclusive to First U. S. Army. WALPERANGE (P-8418) BALLENDORF (L-0140) BAUH (L-3877) all inclusive to Third Army.

b. 18 October 1944 - Forward - Effective 182400A October 1944. E-28 from Corps Left Boundary at E-808188 to E-27 at E-820128 thence E-27 to E-32 vicinity WAINES, all exclusive to Divisions. E-32 through BUTGENBACH to BJ at E-931000, thence E-27 to Army Boundary, all inclusive to Divisions.

c. 26 October 1944 - Division Rear Boundary effective 262400A October 1944. E-28 to new Corps Left (North) Boundary, all exclusive to Divisions.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

244

SS: Note- V-30 was not included in Sept/44 Report.

MONTH October 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
V- 1	10/1	100	4	1	St Vith	Longwy	St Vith, Bastogne, Arlon, Longwy(Via N26, N12, N26, N4 and N18	2nd Inf Div Prov Trk Co.	24.25
V- 2	10/2	200	20	4	Bastogne	St Vith	N16 to RJ(N16-N26) N26 to St Vith and Destination.	VIII Artillery	23.75
V-20	9/28	90	18	-	Malmedy	Kleinlf	N26 to St Vith thence rt on N26 to Schonberg thence rt on unnumbered route dest.	186 FA Bn.	22.50
V- 3	10/3	200	10	2	Eupen	Hochscheid	N26 to St Vith to Oudler thence left on unnumbered road to destination.	2nd Inf. Div.	17.50
V- 4	10/3	27	-	-	Schmiede	Vicinity of Heppenbach	N32 to Malmedy N26 to St Vith thence rt on unnumbered road to destination.	55 Med. Bn.	22.50
V- 5	10/3	19	1	1	Bastogne	Vicinity of Schonberg	Bastogne, Houffalize, Bohe, St Vith,Dest.	3rd Platoon 55 Fld Hosp	38.75
V- 6	10/3	20	1	1	Baldenge	Butgenbach	N33 to Wielsalm thence rt to Recht thence to Lignellville, N23,N32 to destination.	127 Ord. Med.	35.43
V- 7	10/7	24	1	1	Elsenborn	Vicinity of Faymonville	Elsenborn, Butgenbach, N32 to destination.	400 FA Bn.	07.00
V- 8	10/7	90	5	1	Wirtzfeld	" " " " "	Wirtzfeld, Bullange, Butgenbach, N32 to destination.	400 FA Bn.	09.37
V- 9	10/7	135	6	1	Hofen	Waimes	Hofen to N32, to Elsenborn, Butgenbach, thence Waimes.	85 Cav Rec Sqd.	13.75
V-10	10/8	100	5	1	Vicinity of Odenval	Vicinity of Bullange	N27 to Ambleve thence to Bullange	272 FA Bn.	10.00
V-11	10/8	26	1	1	Vicinity of Faymonville	Vicinity of Elsenborn	North to N32 thence to Butgenbach thence left to Elsenborn.	(1 Btry) 987 FA Bn.	6.25
V-12	10/8	75	3	1	" " " " " "	Vicinity of Richelsbusch	North to N32 to Butgenbach thence right to Richelsbusch.	987 FA Bn.	7.20
V-13	10/12	875	21	5	892033	XIX Corps	N32 to N8 on N27 to Eupen to XIX Corps	CCA 5th Armd.	25.00
V-14	10/12	22	1	1	982063	943113	N32 to unnumbered road, North to dest.	10 Tk Bn Co"D"	15.00

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HQ DJUNITED V CORPS
APO 305
TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
MONTHLY TRANSPORTATION REPORT

MONTH October 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
V-15	10/13	22	2	1	Waimes	Heerlen	West Route of VOLCANO	127 Ord (Co"A")	32.20
V-16	10/14	50	2	1	St Vith	Elsenborn	N27 to Bullange, N32 to Butgenbach thence right to Elsenborn.	2 Ord. Co.	12.21
V-17	10/13	50	2	1	X-027108	Waimes	N31 to Elsenborn to Butgenbach thence right on N32 to vicinity of Waimes.	85 Cav Rcn Sqd. (1 troop)	9.37
V-18	10/16	21	1	1	Vicinity of Butgenbach	Eupen	N32 to Malmedy, N28 to Eupen.	3604 QM Trk Co.	17.50
V-19	10/15	20	1	1	Vicinity of Faymonville	Vicinity of Elsenborn	Faymonville to N32 to Butgenbach thence left to vicinity of Elsenborn.	Prov Trk 461 AAA Co.	6.25
V-20	10/15	576	21	5	RJ Vic Bruyeres	VII Corps	N32 to right on N27 to Eupen to VII Corps.	CC "B" 5th Armd. Division.	23.00
V-21	10/16	42	2	1	Waimes	Hymettes	N32 to Malmedy, N28 to destination.	127 Ord. MM Bn.	15.62
V-22	10/16	50	2	1	Bullingen	Kalterherberg	N32 to Buttenbach, to Elsenborn to dest.	Troop "B" 106th Cav Rcn Sqd.	4.06
V-23	10/23	22	1	1	Butgenbach	Eupen	N32 to Malmedy, N28 to Eupen.	3604 QM Trk Co.	27.50
V-24	10/24	20	1	1	Krinkelt	Zweifall	N32 to N27, N28 to Eupen, Roetgen, RR to Zweifall.	Btry A 77 FA Obsv Bn. Btry "A".	26.88
V-25	10/24	42	2	1	Kaiserbaracke	Butgenbach	N28, N32 to Waimes, Butgenbach.	5th Armd Div Trs.	12.81
V-26	10/24	48	2	1	Bullange	Elsenberg	N32 to Butgenbach to Vic of Elsenborn.	3692 QM Trk Co.	6.56
V-27	10/25	40	2	1	Medersheid	Eupen	N32, N28, N27 to Eupen	85 Sig Cobat Bn.	24.38
V-28	10/28	206	11	2	Butgenbach	Roth	N28, N27, N28 to RJ(E-025817) thence right to Roetgen to destination.	190 FA Grp.	24.05
V-29	10/27	20	1	1	Bullingen	Zweifall	N32, N27, N28, Eupen, Roetgen to dest.	Hq Btry 17 FA Obsvn. Bn.	21.25

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

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MONTH October 1944.

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
V-30	10/27	20	1	1	Bullingen	Sweifall	N32, N27, N28, Eupen, Rotgen to dest.	Hq Bty V Corps Arty.	26.25
V-31	10/28	80	3	1	Vicinity of Nederscheid	Eupen	N32, Butgenbach, N27, N28 to Eupen	56 Sig Bn.	24.40
V-32	10/28	130	4	1	Sweifall	Eisenborn	Rotgen, Eupen, N28, Malmedy, N32 to Butgenbach, left to destination.	746 Tank Bn.	26.25
V-33	10/28	25	1	1	Nederscheid	Eupen	N32, Butgenbach, N27, N28 to Eupen	3250 Sig Serv Co.	24.40
V-34	10/28	100	4	1	Merscheck	Kalterherberg	N27, N32 to Butgenbach, right to dest.	987 FA Bn.	9.70
V-35	10/28	130	5	1	Eisenborn	Roth	Unnumbered road to N27, N27, N28, Eupen, Rotgen, then left on unnumbered road.	76 FA Bn.	31.25
V-36	10/28	110	4	1	Nederscheid	Roth	N27, N32, N27, N28, Eupen, Rotgen, Roth.	895 TD Bn.	34.40
V-37	10/30	140	5	1	Hulartshutte	St Vith	Roth, Rotgen, Eupen, N28, N27, N32, N27	629 TD Bn (Sp)	40.30
V-38	10/30	26	1	1	Butgenbach	Kettenis	N32, N27, N28, Eupen, Kettenis	3604 QM Trk Co.	16.25
TOTALS		2670	179	52					823.10

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
DETAILED MOVEMENT REPORT
MONTHLY MOVEMENT REPORT

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MONTH October 1944.

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
B-4	10/18	24	1	1	St Vith	Eupen	St Vith, N23 to Malmedy, N32 to Eupen.	2nd Div Prov Trk Co.	26.6
B53	10/18	29	1	1	Verviers	Liege	N31 to Liege.	Displacement Bureau.	2.4
M-71	10/20	108	4	1	RJ (N31 and N15)	Dolhain	N31 to Dolhain.	3472 Ord MAM Co.	23.4
M-87	10/21	58	2	1	Spa	Malmedy	N32 to Malmedy.	3512 Ord MAM Co.	11.9
M-81	10/21	83	3	1	Vicinity of Pepinster	Bastogne	N32, N29, N15, N18, N64, N4	996 Engr Trdwy Bridge Co.	17.8
M-102	10/22	26	1	1	Verviers	Vicinity of Francorchamps	N31 and N32	558 Med Coll Co.	17.2
M-110	10/25	41	2	1	Verviers	Spa	N31 and N32	3473 ORD MAM Co.	11.6
M-117	10/30	30	1	1	Herbomont	Vicinity of Stavelot	N23 to Stavelot then left on unnumbered road to Stavelot.	49 AAA Brigade.	20.0
A-127	10/25	164	6	2	Verviers	Butgenbach	Verviers, N29, N32 to destination.	62 Armd FA Bn.	30.3
A-121	10/26	561	19	4	Verviers	Vicinity of Modersbeids	N27, N28, Malmedy, N32, Waimes to dest.	CC "A" 5th Armd. Division.	28.8
C-120	10/27	15	1	1	Beaufays	Maastricht	N32 to Maastricht	47 Field Hosp	7.5
C-121	10/28	15	1	1	Maastricht	Herbomont	Maastricht, N32, Theux, Herbomont.	47 Field Hosp.	44.1
C-122	10/29	15	1	1	Herbomont	Maastricht	Theux, N32, Maastricht	47 Fipld Hosp.	44.1
J-14	10/28	581	20	4	Chr-Forstbach	Faymonville	Eynatten, Eupen, N28, Malmedy, N32 to Waimes and destination.	CC "B" 5th Armd. Division.	32.5
B-6	10/28	165	5	1	Aywaille	Rotgen	N29 to Remonchamps, Louviegne, Theux, Pepinster, N31 to Eupen to Rotgen.	86 Chem Bn.	35.9

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A C of S, G-5
APO 305, U. S. Army

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:AUTH: CC V Corps :
:DATE: 4 Nov 44 :
:INIT: :

4 November 1944

ACTION AGAINST ENEMY, REPORTS AFTER/AFTER ACTION REPORTS

Section V - G-5 Civil Affairs/Military Government Report

1 October - 5 October Movement Phase

1. OPERATIONS

a. The Corps made preparation for turning over to Ninth U. S. Army the remainder of its sector in Northern Luxembourg and Southern Belgium not previously turned over to Third U. S. Army. The exchange became effective at 1200 hours on 4 October 1944 and the Corps displaced laterally to the North into territory formerly occupied by the VII Corps.

As a result of the move the following Detachments passed from control of V Corps to the VIII Corps of Ninth U. S. Army:

H/G1 Captain Greene, ST VITH
D/G1 Captain Johnson, CLERVAUX
D/E1 Major Twill, WILTZ
E/F1 Major Matthews, DIEKIRCH

The Corps Evacuation Center at ST VITH passed to VIII Corps at the same time.

V Corps acquired from VII Corps the following Detachments:

D/C1 Captain Walsh (Capt Prendeville) MALMEDY, Belgium.
I/G2 Captain Goetchens MONSCHAU, Germany.

Captain Prendeville was relieved for inefficiency within two days and was succeeded by Captain Walsh.

b. At 1400 hours on 3 October the Chief of Staff indicated the desire of the acting Corps Commander (Major General Brooks) that the entire assembly area of the Divisions be evacuated of civilians for security reasons.

Corps G-5 recommended to the contrary but it was directed that the evacuation be made in view of proposed operations. Estimates of population by Divisional areas (see overlay Annex A) were:

4th Inf Div	3000
28th Inf Div	6000
5th Armd Div	6000
	15000

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This operation continued throughout the period and for the sake of continuity is being related without regard to phases.

A survey was conducted of available facilities for housing the evacuees. The Kaserne in MALMEDY was selected as the Evacuation Center and its capacity was estimated at 800 to 1000 evacuees. The town of MALMEDY with a population of 14,000 was the principle town available for billeting on the people. In addition towns within the area were surveyed as far west as SPA. This survey was conducted by American Red Cross personnel attached to CA Detachment D701 by Public Welfare Section of First U.S. Army. They were of great assistance in the operation.

Divisions evacuated by truck directly to the Kaserne in MALMEDY where those not screened in the Division area were checked by CIC. All were given a Medical inspection and registered. (See Annex C and D) The German Nationals were segregated and billeted in the Kaserne, the others were taken in transportation furnished by the Corps QM to various communities where they were housed in facilities provided by the local Burgermeister. These facilities were not always acceptible from the standpoint of health or fire hazard. Approximately 600 were relocated in the Kaserne at SPA after inspections showed their locations as being dangerous to health or life. These people, all from the area East of MALMEDY that had long been German and annexed to Belgium by the Versailles Treaty only to be "liberated" by Hitler in 1940, were not accepted by persons West of MALMEDY as Belgians. The most polite name they received was "New Belgians". Arrangements were made by Burgermeisters only when pressure was exerted. The area evacuated contained a large number of German Nationals and many families were bi-national. Only a few spoke anything but German. So many German Nationals were found that after the population reached 2000 at the Kaserne in MALMEDY, 100% over estimated capacity, authority was requested and received from CIC to release certain screened Germans to live with friends and relatives in the town of MALMEDY. Those in the Kaserne at MALMEDY were under 24 hour guard by two Detachments of Military Government Police. The population at the MALMEDY Kaserne hovered at 2000 German Nationals as long as it was in use.

The actual figures on evacuees were:

In MALMEDY (town)	3500	
In Kaserne, MALMEDY	2000	(German Nationals only)
In other towns	2500	
In Kaserne, SPA	2600	
	10600	

Three to four hundred of those in other towns were self-evacuated in anticipation of transportation being furnished by Divisions. The word spread quickly as to the area which was being evacuated and several hundred near the borderline moved into adjoining hamlets just over the line.

The area geographically covered a 20 Km front, 10 to 15 Kms deep. In order to preserve the livestock remaining, cow-handlers were screened by CIC and left behind based on the official lists of livestock registered with the Burgermeister. These lists proved to be less than the actual number of cattle on hand and additional cow-handlers and caretakers of the sick were left behind. In the zone of the 28th Infantry Division nearly 500 persons were so designated.

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CCR of 9th Armored Division moved into the KALTERHERBERG area and the C O decided that all civilians should be moved out of the area. These individuals were evacuated to the Kaserne at MALMEDY as they were German Nationals. This left some 450 cattle unattended. A solution was reached by having the Military Government Detachment at MONSCHAU evacuate the cattle to the north. The tactical unit reported that sporadic raids which the enemy had been making into the area ceased after the evacuation of the civilians.

The feeding of the evacuees was from captured enemy stocks and from a regular pick up and delivery schedule developed whereby the civilians left in the area collected meat and produce in a central area and it was picked up on regular schedule by screened drivers under MGP guard from the Kaserne in MALMEDY. Breakdown and redistribution took place from there. Regular food delivery routes to outlying evacuee locations were made. Food procurement and distribution was by personnel of CA Detachment D7C1. Evacuee feeding and operation of soup kitchens was done by Miss Thomas of the American Red Cross. Miss Faulk of the same organisation was of material assistance in the reception and registration of the evacuees and Belgian Red Cross in the administration of the MALMEDY Kaserne. Mr. Brady, also of the American Red Cross was most helpful in procuring of billeting space and general coordination of Red Cross personnel, both American and Belgian. The latter group under Count Jacques DeKerchove composed of Mme Detry and several assistants were given operational control of the German Nationals in MALMEDY and performed their functions in a most meritorious manner.

The movement of so large a group entailed much hardship to the very old and very young. Some deaths occured among both, whether attributable to the movement cannot be determined with certainty. There were few able bodied men as they had all been previously conscripted into the German Army. Only the women, aged, infirm and infants were left among the evacuees with few exceptions. The attitude was of stoical submission for the most part and no incident of rebellion or disturbance occurred during the whole operation.

The evacuation was completed by 12 October and necessary relocations made by 14 Oct. On 16 October Army G-5 called at 1330 hours stating that the Army Deputy Chief of Staff directed that the 2600 evacuees in the Kaserne at SPA (in the Corps Zone) be evacuated that day. This, in spite of the fact that by agreement the Kaserne was being operated by Army. Conferences were held in which the Corps Commander and G-2 participated which resulted in the Corps Security line being advanced to permit the return of several thousand refugees to their homes and they in turn could accomodate others. Approximately 2000 of these were so returned and the remaining 600 were housed in space vacated by other evacuees returning to their homes west of the Security Line. The evacuation was completed by 17 October and an Army Convalescent Hospital moved in. The Office of the Army Surgeon was located there a few days later.

Military Government Detachment 1402, Captain Hill, which had been called forward from Army Pool was attached to Captain Welsh to perform CA functions in the Canton of MALMEDY and assist Captain Welsh whose Detachment consisted of himself and one 2nd Lt. His executive, Captain Whittal, (Br) was recalled by Army and the Lieutenant was confined to his bed with a heavy cold. This gave valuable practical operational training to the Military Government Detachment.

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On 23 October 1944 the Army G-5 called and stated that the Army Commander directs that the MALMEDY Kaserne be vacated at once for an Army Medical Unit. Pursuant to the directive, a survey was made and arrangements completed to install a tent camp in which to house them. However, after conferences with the Corps Commander and G-2, the Corps Security Line was further advanced and additional persons permitted to return to their homes or the home of friends west of the new Security Line, including German Nationals. (see Annex B) Those remaining took over space vacated by those leaving MALMEDY and over 100 aged and the sick continued to be cared for in the Hotel Jacob, in MALMEDY, requisitioned for this purpose. In addition about 400 were housed in a Convent in the same town under crowded but tidy conditions.

The return of evacuees to the East toward the Security Line from those remaining in SPA and other places continued until the end of the month.

G-2 reports that as the result of the screening of the civilians incident to the movement some 200 suspected War Criminals were apprehended. Whether the same or greater number could have been obtained by careful check with all persons in place in their home communities is not known, although several Division CIC personnel expressed this opinion. The period closed with some 4000 evacuees out of their homes. In the meantime with colder weather coming on some Divisions permitted Division troops to billet in houses of the evacuees and much confusion resulted when the evacuee returned and found his house filled with American troops. No policy on priorities had been furnished from G-5 Section First U.S. Army by the close of the month and practical solutions by readjustments were being made locally.

6 October - 24 October Defensive Phase

a. During the phase the evacuation incidents reported above were of primary interest.

It was determined that for security reasons the armed members of various Belgium underground forces currently roaming the Corps Zone and requisitioning food from civilians, in at least one case at pistol point should be removed. The organized groups withdrew on orders of their commanders and the disorganized ones soon followed suit.

Civil Affairs Detachments which had been attached to Divisions and label "Spearhead Detachment" were redesignated "Specialists" and the following day were recalled to the Pool at Army. No replacements were furnished.

On 14 October 1944 - letter covering allotments of grades and ratings to "Civil Affairs Sections" (Redesignated as Military Government a month previously allotted this Section the following grades and ratings:

1 - Colonel	1 - Grade 2
1 - Lt Col	1 - Grade 3
1 - Major	1 - Grade 4
	1 - Grade 5

These were a confirmation of grades previously allotted but fortunately provided that these grades were not to be used for other than this Section. Since activation of the Section promotion of enlisted personnel had been stymied by pooling the grades allotted this Section with those of the Headquarters which was already badly overstrength with the result that the men of the Section were

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in much lower grades than in other Sections. Staff Sgt. Genito was promoted to Technical Sgt, Cpl Allen to Sgt and Pvt O'Donnell to Corporal. In addition Corporal Stahl and Pfc Schwaller attached to the Section were assigned to G-5.

On 15 October 1944 this Section was notified that French Authorities had decided to grant one Croix de Guerre to a Civil Affairs Detachment and that Army had determined that it be bestowed upon Capt. Jerrold Owen, C.O. of CA Detachment D2C1, who operated under the Corps at CORMOLAIN, LITTEAU, ST. AMAND and TORIGNY in FRANCE, for a period of over two months. A commendation of Capt. Owen was furnished to Army to complete their files for the receipt of the award.

Mil Gov Detachment I10G2, Capt. Spitler, was called forward for SCHLEIDEN and staged with G1H2 at BULLINGEN. This relieved Capt. Goetchens of I4G2, at MONSCHAU of any responsibility other than the LANDKREIS of MONSCHAU. Capt. Hill and his Detachment I4H2 was attached to Capt. Welsh of D7C1 to assist in the operation of Civil Affairs and evacuees in MALMEDY.

October 25 - 31 Movement Phase

The Corps CP moved to the town of EUPEN on 28 October 1944, and the Zone of the Corps was widened. Civil Affairs Detachment D4G1, Capt. Laprade, Commanding, was acquired from VII Corps. In addition, Displaced Persons Detachment I9G2, 1st Lt. Howard, Commanding, located in EUPEN assigned to First U.S. Army, was directed by that echelon to "cooperate" with this Headquarters. This vague and un-military status of this Detachment in relation to this Corps was most unsatisfactory but on inquiry of First U.S. Army no clarification of their status was obtainable.

The decision of Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops to go into buildings caused innumerable demands upon CA Detachment D4G1 for available billets. Only limited information was available and reports of lack of cooperation on the part of the Detachment Commander were received which lead to his relief at a later date.

Throughout the period the Corps Provisional Military Government Police Battalion was active in the control of circulation of civilians and assisted in the evacuation. In addition a 24 hour guard was maintained over the German Nationals in the Kaserne in MALMEDY. A directive was received from First U.S. Army that a light artillery battalion be used in lieu of groups from each of the separate Corps Battalions. On the protest of the Corps Commander to the Army Commander the prevailing system was retained. (See Annex E)

2. Conclusions and Recommendations.

a. The previous plan of evacuation of civilians as announced in V Corps GO 58 which was found to be effective in the liberation of 3 3/4 million persons from the Beach through FRANCE, part of BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG, contemplated the evacuation only short distances rearward behind regimental command posts. Under this plan doubling up on local civilians is practicable and livestock may be walked reasonable distances and saved. A no-man's land results in which troops can assume any civilian who enters is there for no good purpose and act accordingly. Under a mass evacuation as large as was undertaken by the Corps, the security value is nullified by the necessity of leaving back large groups of caretakers for livestock, the sick, etc. (500 in one division area alone). There can be no

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evacuation of Sorrento by their presence, on the contrary the evacuation appears to be just the reverse. Statements were made by GIS officers of the Division that they could get better results [illegible] and attitudes of Italian women are usually well [illegible] in a general displacement it is difficult to find people who have this information regarding others. Local survivals are easily identified and can be given special attention.

b. In spite of all efforts to the contrary much personal hardship was involved. Because of the need, infirm and children to survive in open areas in the rain and later housing in unventilated and often unheated buildings with little or no sanitary facilities was necessary to accomodate a large group. It seems reasonable that no epidemic resulted. The fact that they did not occur in which great multitude [illegible] could have resulted was only by attributed to fortuitous and [illegible] efforts on the part of the personnel concerned to maintain order [illegible]. Disregarding the personal hardship, the disruption of the agricultural cycle just at the harvest season when potatoes were to be dug from the ground or yet still [illegible] require importation of foodstuffs to replace this basic element in the civilian diet.

c. While 200 corpses of war criminals were made from among the 10,243 evacuees, this is only 2% and might have been increased had such [illegible] been forwarded and self-[illegible] by the [illegible] members of the crew to be affected. While it is true that [illegible] to the Italian [illegible] the evacuation was made this only due to further support the Italian evacuation provided in GO 58 and to very justifiable evacuation to a depth of 30 to 35 km as was done.

d. It is therefore recommended that in the future the provisions of GO 58 be followed and that no more mass evacuation of civilians be undertaken.

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[illegible]
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Sample

HQ 28th Div

NOTICE

Because of military necessity you must evacuate your house at once. You may take with you two (2) blankets, 1 knife, fork, spoon, 1 plate, cup and one small piece of hand baggage per person. Assemble at _____ at _____ hours _____ (Date). Transportation will be provided from _____ _____.

No live stock will be taken but they will be cared for while you are away. Do not lock doors or windows of your house. Dress warmly. Special transportation will be provided for the sick.

By order of Military Commander.

ANORDNUNG

Für Gründe militärischer Not wendig Keit müssen Sie Ihren Wohnsitz sofort verlassen..

Sie dürfen die folgenden Sachen mitnehmen. 2 Decken, 1 Messer, 1 Gobel, 1 Löffel, 1 Teller, 1 Becher. 1 Kleines Handgepäck.

Versammeln Sie sich um _____ (Zeit) _____ (Platz) am _____ (Datum) Fahrgelegenheit wird von _____ (Platz) gestellt werden.

Vieh und Haustiere dürfen nicht mitgenommen werden, aber werden während Ihrer Abwesenheit verpflegt werden. Fenster und Türen aller Gebäude dürfen nicht verschlossen werden.

Tragt warme Kleidung. Besondere Fahrgelegenheiten werden für kranke Personen gestellt werden.

Auf Befehl des Militärischen Kommandanten.

ANNEX D

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HQ DEPUTY V CORPS
APO 305
TRANSPORTATION DEPUTIES
CONTROL OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS

MONTH ~~October 1944~~

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. MJU'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
M-224	10/1	19	1	1	Bastogne	Limgeuville	N28, N12, N26 to St Vith thence to N23 to Limgeuville	1111 Engr Grp	38.0
M-225	10/1	72	3	1	" " " "	" " " "	" " " " " " " "	629 Engr Lt Equip.	39.0
M-226	10/1	105	4	1	" " " "	" " " "	" " " " " " " "	291 Engr Bn.	39.0
M-227	10/1	105	4	1	" " " "	" " " "	" " " " " " " "	61 Engr Bn.	39.0
M-6	10/6	80	3	1	Aywaille	Elsenborn	N29, N33, N28, N32 to Butgenbach to dest.	707 Tank Bn.	40.3
M-9	10/8	122	5	1	Verviers	Aywaille	N32, Spa, N29 to Aywaille	557 AAA Bn.	8.4
J-7	10/8	12	1	1	Remscheid	Hunsange	No. 258 to Wahlerscheid thence South to Krinkelt to Bullange to Hunsange.	61 Cml. Bn.	23.7
M-18	10/10	75	5	1	K-808165	Butgenbach	N28 to Malmedy, N32 to Butgenbach.	76 FA Bn.	20.0
M-24	10/10	65	2	1	Beaufays	Spa	N15, N32 to Spa	3512 Ord. Bn.	15.0
M-31	10/12	22	1	1	Jct N28and N27	K-913014	N28, N32, N27	Btry A 196 FA Bn.	23.0
M-33	10/15	135	4	1	Verbomont	Meppenbach	N.3, N28 to Malmedy, Bullange to dest.	508 Engr L Pon Co.,	31.8
M-34	10/15	25	1	1	K-808168	Stavelot	N32 to Francorchamps to destination.	1st US Army Map Dep.	19.4
M-35	10/15	25	1	1	" " " "	" " " "	" " " " " " " "	" " " "	19.4
M-45	10/17	117	4	1	Verviers	Clervaux	N27, N31, N32 to N23, N26, N16, N18	168 Engr C Bn.	28.1
M-46	10/18	47	2	1	Aywaille	Theux	N41, N38, N29 and N32	767 Engr Trk Co.,	12.5

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC DIVISION
OFFICE OF PUBLIC WORKS

NOTE: _____

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First US Army

October 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	COMP AREA
M-128	10/29	23	1	1	Pepinster	Spa	N32 to Spa	91 Gas Treatment "B" Bn.	7.8
M-129	10/30	25	1	1	Eupen	Vicinity of Grand Halleux	N28 to destination	91 Gas Treatment "C" Bn.	32.2
M-133									
M-137	10/29	100	5	1	Eupen	Spa	N29 to Spa	68 Med Grp.	15.6
M-138	10/31	111	5	1	Liege	Verviers	N31 to destination	413 AAA Gun Bn.	18.7
J-21	10/30	26	1	1	Eupen	Francorchamps	N33 and N32	873 TD Bn.	24.4
J-26	10/31	70	3	1	Eupen	VIIICorps	N28 and N29	183 FA Bn.	1.0
J-22	10/31	79	5	1	Verviers	Liege	N31	298 Engr Bn.	18.75
J-23	10/31	17	1	1	Verviers	Liege	N31	507 Engr L F Co.	18.75
J-24	10/31	28	1	1	Verviers	Liege	N31	988 Engr T H Co.	18.75
J-25	10/31	25	1	1	Verviers	Liege	N31	191 Engr Hv P Co.	18.75
M-143	10/31	45	2	1	Malmedy	Arlon	M-26, M-23, M-15, M-4	3612 Ord MAW Co	20.0
TOTALS		3493	135	52					953.10

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305

19 October 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Evacuees (except German Nationals) may return to their homes WEST of line indicated. Residents EAST of line may be billeted with residents WEST of Security Line. NO civilians, except those currently cleared as livestock caretakers, will be permitted EAST of Security Line.

2. Corps PWGP Force will patrol roads along Line.

By command of Major General GERON:

O.C. MOOD,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

LEGEND
Map: Central Europe - BONN
1:100,000 Sheet # 1

OFFICIAL:

T. J. MORONEY,
Colonel, GSC,
A C of S, G-5,

DISTRIBUTION:

1 ea Div
1-D/C1
1-G-2
1-File
1-PWGP Force

C O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

ANNEX B

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305, U.S. Army

SECRET
Auth: C.G., V Corps
Date: 5 Oct 1944
Init: _____SFT

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY
1 September 1944 - 30 September 1944

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

1. 010001B September 1944 to 032400B September 1944.

On 1 September 1944 the V Corps was advancing rapidly against a withdrawing enemy to the northeast of PARIS. At the start of the month V Corps was on a line which ran generally along the north edge of the FOREST de HALATTE, the south edge of the FOREST de COMPIEGNE, and the north edge of the FOREST DOMAINIALDIER. Armored elements of the Corps had penetrated to the center of the FOREST de COMPIEGNE and to the AISNE River on the right.

The advance continued under V Corps Field Order No. 24, which had been issued on 31 August. Crossings were made over the AISNE River against stiff rear-guard opposition but the main German forces were not in contact. The enemy attempted to delay the advance to permit time for withdrawal and a reorganization of his forces.

As a result of a directive received from First U.S. Army on 2 September, elements of the V Corps were ordered to continue their northeastward advance to the general line LANDRECIES (6177) - CAMBRAI (7965). No advance was to be made beyond this line, except for patrols. The limit of advance line was reached on 3 September. Reconnaissance elements of the 5th Armored Division advanced to the Corps final objectives of Field Order No. 24 (ATH-1932; and Le AUZE-0630), because the stop order had not reached these advance units.

On 3 September units of the Corps assembled on the limit of advance line to reorient and face east under First U.S. Army order.

Corps Artillery units had no firing missions during this period of rapid movement. Divisional artillery and battalions attached to divisions provided general supporting fires for the advance. Corps Engineers performed routine engineer duties. Bridges over both the AISNE and OISE Rivers were destroyed by the enemy as he retreated. Engineers constructed bridges across both rivers to permit continuation of the advance. Armored elements were in the front of the advance and maintained contact with the retreating enemy. Tank destroyer units were attached to divisions and gave direct support under command of the division artillery. The 102nd Cavalry Group provided reconnaissance and patrol elements and operated as a reserve force. Air support for V Corps was limited during this period although some missions to harass the enemy in his withdrawal were flown in the V Corps front. There was no enemy air activity over the V Corps zone and antiaircraft units were not active during the period. They were in positions to provide protection for Corps installations, bridges and other critical points. The 81st Chemical Battalion was attached to the divisions and gave support to the advance. Signal units maintained communications despite the rapid movement.

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Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
Det H1F1, 1st ECA Regt-31 August	439th AAA AW Bn-010600
3907th QM Trk Co-29 August	462nd AAAAW Bn -010600
3912th QM Trk Co-29 August	1st Plat,1501st Engr Wat Sup Co-1 September
996th Engr Trdy Br Co-011200	8th Fin Dish Sect-1 Sept (rescinded)
Det D2H1, 1st ECA Regt-2 September	2nd French Armd Div-021800
Det H1B1, 1st ECA Regt-3 September.	

During this period the V Corps advanced rapidly in a zone northeast of PARIS, maintaining contact with an enemy who was in swift withdrawal. The Corps crossed the AISNE and OISE Rivers, and reached a line LANDRECIES - LEGATEA - CAMBRAI, where it halted on First U.S. Army order.

2. 040001B September 1944 to 112400B September 1944.

V Corps Field Order No. 25, issued at 0323000B September 1944, provided for the new mission assigned the Corps by First U.S. Army. It stated V Corps would begin operations in a new zone of action at daylight, 4 September. It would face east and advance with all possible speed, 5th Armored Division and 4th Infantry Division abreast, to the line of the MEUSE River. The 28th Infantry Division would follow. Crossings were to be secured over the MEUSE River by bothloading divisions, which were to be prepared to continue the advance eastward.

In this change of direction V Corps, which had been on the left of the First U.S. Army sector, passed through the rear areas of theVII and XIX Corps and became the right flank Corps of the First U.S. Army.

V Corps began operations under this Field Order at daylight, 4 September. The 5th Armored Division captured SEDAN on 6 September. By Letter of Instructions issued at 0717300B September, the Corps Commander ordered an advance into LUXEMBURG, with patrols to the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN border.

The advance continued against scattered resistance and the LUXEMBURG border was crossed at 0913300B September. Combat Command "A" of the 5th Armored Division captured the City of LUXEMBOURG at 1009450B September. The advance was pushed ahead and patrols neared the German border.

On 11 September 1944 the LUXEMBURG-GERMAN border was reached. Patrols were sent into Germany. The first entry into German soil was made by reconnaissance elements of the 85th Reconnaissance Squadron, attached to Combat Command [illegible] 5th Armored Division. Patrols of all three divisions of V Corps entered [illegible] before the end of 11 September. Crossings into the enemy homeland were [illegible] a number of places. Little opposition was encountered by any of the [illegible] Most were unresisted. The divisions were in assembly areas west of [illegible] border, preparing for attacks against the SIEGFRIED line.

Corps Artillery had not been engaged during this period but dis[illegible] to assembly areas behind the advance. Support was fired by di[illegible] and Corps battalions attached to divisions. Engineers [illegible] normal engineer duties and constructed bridges across the [illegible] elements were in the front of the advance. Tank destroyer [illegible] to divisions and fired in direct support under division artil[illegible]

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102nd Cavalry Group provided a screen for the advance of the 4th Division. No enemy air activity was reported over the V Corps front but antiaircraft units were in positions to provide defense as necessary for important installations and locations. The 51st Chemical Battalion was attached to divisions and operated under division control in supporting roles. The signal units maintained communications.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were as follows:

Attached (or Assd)	Detached
18th AAA Gp - 070600	Det BAM, 1st BGA Regt - 4 Sept
110th AAA Gun Bn - 070600	Det BGAL, 1st BGA Regt - 4 Sept
116th AAA Gun Bn - 070600	Det BJM, 1st BGA Regt - 4 Sept
552nd AAA AW Bn - 090600	Det BKM, 1st BGA Regt - 4 Sept
	Det BLAL, 1st BGA Regt - 6 Sept
	Det ALFL, 1st BGA Regt - 5 Sept
	993rd FA Bn - 6 Sept
	194th FA Bn - 6 Sept
	76th FA Bn - 6 Sept
	2nd Inf Div - 5 Sept
	240th FA Bn - 072035
	499th AAA AW Bn - 010600
	446nd AAA AW Bn - 010600

During this period the V Corps turned eastward, became the right element of the First U.S. Army, and continued its advance, reaching the German border and sending patrols from its three divisions into the enemy homeland, these being the first U.S. or allied Army units to cross to German soil.

3. 120000B September to 302400A September 1944.

Patrols of all three divisions of V Corps had entered Germany on 11 September. One Rifle Company (Reinf) of the 28th Infantry Division was firmly established on German soil at MARSPELT. The Corps Commander ordered the Divisions to be prepared to attack through the SIEGFRIED Line defenses on Corps order. Many of these defenses were not manned at the early part of the period and our units penetrated the line without difficulty. A coordinated attack upon the SIEGFRIED Line positions was delayed from 120600B September but pressure was maintained. The infantry divisions captured many enemy defenses and held them through the remainder of the month. Others were destroyed. German resistance grew stronger about mid-month and heavy resistance and numerous counterattacks were maintained throughout the period. The counterattacks were repulsed. The 9th Armored Division sent Combat Command "B" into the SIEGFRIED Line with the 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry RCT of the 28th Division attached. It reached the vicinity of Hill 402 northeast of WEYLINGEN, on 16 September. Heavy counterattacks and heavy, accurate artillery fire pinned the unit down here. Combat Command "B" and the 1st Battalion, 112th RCT moved into the positions to enlarge the break-through. German troops closed in behind and to the sides of these forces and on 17 September they began fighting a withdrawing action, dropping back to positions on the west bank of the OUR River, near WALDBECKF, where for a few days they protected the bridge across the river.

Enemy opposition was heavy throughout all but the first few days of the period. Counterattacks were strong and artillery fire was heavier than at any other time since the early days of the campaign of "Western Europe". Our forces

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captured or destroyed a large number of German pillboxes and prepared defenses in the SIEGFRIED Line.

Corps Artillery fired heavy concentrations upon the German positions and supported the attacks made by the divisions against enemy defenses. It also assisted in breaking up counterattacks by "request" missions. Engineers have supported the infantry attacks, built bridges over the OUR River, and performed routine duties. The poor road net in the 32-mile wide Corps area was improved and maintained under extremely difficult conditions. Rain and fog during much of the period turned roads into quagmires, but the routes were kept open. Armored elements supported the infantry attacks while the 5th Armored Division was engaged on the right of the Corps front. Tank destroyer units were used to great advantage in support of the infantry and armor attacks, and were active against the pillboxes in the SIEGFRIED Line. The 102nd Cavalry Group was attached to the 4th Infantry Division, during the early part of the period, and covered the left flank of the division with patrol action to the Corps left boundary. The 102nd Cavalry Group, less the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized) later assumed the central portion of the Corps front and by patrol action covered a front of approximately 10,000 meters along the SIEGFRIED Line, until relieved at the end of the period. There was no enemy air activity over the V Corps front but antiaircraft units were used as defense against ground attack in several instances with good results. Air support was provided when favorable weather permitted and German communications behind the SIEGFRIED Line as well as defenses within the line were bombed. The 81st Chemical Battalion was attached to the divisions in a supporting role. Signal units maintained communications.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were as follows:

Attached (or Assd)	Detached
Det B1B1, 1st ECA Regt - 15 Sept	Det D1F1, 1st ECA Regt - 15 Sept
Det C1A1, 1st ECA Regt - 15 Sept	Det D6G1, 1st ECA Regt - 15 Sept
Det D6B1, 1st ECA Regt - 16 Sept	18th AAA Group - 130600
Det D2C1, 1st ECA Regt - 15 Sept	110th AAA Gun Bn - 130600
Det D7G1, 1st ECA Regt - 15 Sept	116th AAA Gun Bn - 130600
997th FA Bn (8" How) - 171200	552nd AAA AW Bn - 130600
272nd FA Bn (240mm How) - 171200	Det B1D1, 1st ECA Regt - 15 Sept
953rd FA Bn (155mm How) - 181200	Det D5G1, 1st ECA Regt - 16 Sept
Btry B, 285 FA Obsn Bn - 18 Sept	Det G1A1, 1st ECA Regt - 16 Sept
Det D1G1, 1st ECA Regt - 18 Sept	Det D4E1, 1st ECA Regt - 16 Sept
707th Tank Bn - 26 Sept	Det D5E1, 1st ECA Regt - 16 Sept
	Det D5G1, 1st ECA Regt - 16 Sept
	81st Cml Bn - 13 Sept
	Det D2G1, 1st ECA Regt - 16 Sept
	747th Tank Bn - 26 Sept.

During this period the V Corps penetrated the SIEGFRIED Line, met heavy resistance, but repulsed numerous counterattacks. The Corps held positions within the SIEGFRIED Line defenses, awaiting orders for a major attack. Local attacks were made to capture enemy pillboxes which were destroyed when taken.

During September the V Corps advanced northeast from PARIS, [illegible] eastward on First U.S. Army order. It crossed BELGIUM and LUXEMBURG and entered German territory on 11 September. Since that date it has been meeting greatly increased enemy opposition in the SIEGFRIED Line but has penetrated the line in many places, destroying a large number of enemy fortifications.

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S E C R E T

SECRET
Auth: C.G., V Corps
Date: 7 October 1944
Initials: ____

Historical Record
G-2 Section, Headquarters, V Corps

7 October 1944.

Month of September

PART I - ENEMY SITUATION

Period 1-3 September.

The enemy forces on 1 September were disposed generally along the line LASSIGNY MUIRANCOURT - NOYON - BRETAGNY - CHAUNY and north of SOISSONS. On the Corps left flank in the LASSIGNY area the enemy offered almost no resistance to our advance. In the NOYON area elements of 864 Infantry Regiment (348th Infantry Division) offered slight resistance. Elsewhere along the line contact was only sporadic, and nowhere were there to be found strong enemy forces. Other enemy forces, of which only scattered identifications were made, were apparently making a rapid withdrawal to the northeast. At PASSEL (55 17), however, heavy enemy resistance was met at about 2100 hours. Units contacted during the day were 512 Mobile Battalion and elements of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions.

By the end of the following day the enemy front line along the V Corps front had been withdrawn to the CAMBRAI - LE CATEAU road, thence from south of CATEAU northeast to LANDRECIES on the CANAL de SAMBRE (O-11 79). In the area south of this line, however, there remained scattered enemy groups that had been by-passed. The only unit identified in strength was I Battalion of 864 Infantry Regiment.

There was also little contact with the enemy on the following day, although scattered and disorganized enemy elements did trickle in between ST QUENTIN (N80 84) and PERUWELZ (J07 20) in our western sector. In our left zone of action there was no definite enemy front line, but our forward elements were generally along the line ST QUENTIN (N80 84), LA VALLE MULATRE (O-02 66), and POMMEREUIL (O-04 76). Elements of V Corps advanced just over the BELGIAN border south of PERUWELZ (J07 20) during the morning of 3 September.

More significant than the several small units identified on the V Corps front during the period 1 - 3 September was the fact, made evident from diverse identifications and from statements of civilians and prisoners of war, that a number of enemy divisions were trying to cross the front of V Corps. These units were withdrawing eastward in an attempt to escape being trapped by the British Second Army which was rapidly pushing to the north from AMIENS. The rapid advance of the V Corps caused many of these units to change their direction northward, but they remained out of close contact with our forces. However, escape northward proved as difficult to accomplish because of the advance of the VII Corps toward MONS across the enemy's route of forced withdrawal. By 4 September, when the V Corps was withdrawn from this sector, a considerable enemy force had been pushed into the FORET de MORMAL; lesser enemy forces were south and west of MONS. This pocket was later reduced by the VII and XIX Corps, and about 35,000 prisoners of war and large quantities of materiel were captured by these Corps. The total number of prisoners of war taken by V Corps during the period 1 - 3 September was 991.

Period 4 - 10 September.

Upon reaching the line CAMBRAI (N79 85) - LANDRECIES (O-61 77), V Corps was pinched out and assigned a new sector along the MEUSE River in the vicinity of CHARLEVILLE (O-82 35). Units of V Corps displaced to the MEUSE, and our forward-

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elements crossed the MEUSE River. No organized enemy resistance was encountered in the new area although our reconnaissance along the MEUSE River and in the vicinity of MEZIERES (0-83 34) drew small arms fire.

On 5 September our forces were across the MEUSE River at several points. Resistance was not at GIVET (0-83 62) and at various points along the east bank of the MEUSE River. SEDAN (0-99 27) was reported still in the hands of the enemy. Prisoners were taken from 506 Mobile Battalion, its first identification in combat, and there were indications that the other two battalions (503 and 504 Mobile Battalions) of the Von FRITSCHEN Regiment were also in the area. Also identified was Kampfgruppe HOLZEN, which was reported to comprise remnants of the 2nd Panzer Division. In general, prisoners were from such a variety of units that it was only possible to conclude that stragglers and ad hoc formations made up our fleeing opposition.

SEDAN was liberated by our troops on 6 September, but the enemy made the greatest withdrawal on our left flank. Near CHARLEVILLE, however, the enemy remained along the east bank of the MEUSE River. Reliable sources indicated that elements, at least, of the 130th Panzer LEHR Division were in the vicinity.

The enemy continued his withdrawal east of the MEUSE River during the period 7 - 10 September. It had been anticipated that the enemy would take advantage of the rugged terrain throughout the ARDENNES area for the organization of a strong line of defense; however, our forces continued their swift advance, and the enemy was not given the time to collect his forces and organize the necessary ground defenses. Enemy action against our advancing columns throughout the ARDENNES area was limited to the defense of hastily prepared road blocks. These consisted principally of felled trees and crudely placed anti-personnel mines. Our forces rapidly envelopped each of these roadblocks, and the enemy was kept continually on the move without an opportunity to stop and organize the terrain still under his control. In this rapid advance, many enemy groups were by-passed in the woods and ravines and these later attacked friendly columns and vehicles. At 0945 hours on 10 September our forces, having passed through the area of difficult terrain, entered the city of LUXEMBOURG.

Identifications made during this period indicated that the enemy was opposing us in much greater strength than heretofore. Elements of 2nd SS Panzer Division DAS REICH and 130th Panzer LEHR Division, 49 SS Panzer Grenadier Brigade, 12, 769, and 1006 Landeschuetzen Battalions, and remnants of the Von FRITSCHEN Regiment were all identified. On our southern front identifications of prisoners of war taken on 10 September indicated the presence of the 48th Infantry Division, last contacted by the XII (U.S.) Corps in the vicinity of NANCY.

Period 11 - 14 September.

The first V Corps troops crossed the German border (898 53) at 1810 hours on 11 September. Within a short space of time the enemy had been driven across BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG. He had been kept continually on the move ever since he had been first contacted along the MEUSE. When he finally reached the much vaunted SIEGFRIED line, he had had no opportunity to take advantage of its defensive facilities. The forces at his disposal were badly disorganized, and were lacking in the equipment necessary to man the SIEGFRIED Line. The result was that when our reconnaissance elements first reached the SIEGFRIED Line, they found its defenses occupied only along main avenues of approach and on a few key terrain features. Extensive reconnaissance and probing of the SIEGFRIED Line indicated that, without numerous, well equipped soldiers to man the installations, it would not prove to be the formidable obstacle anticipated. However, before our troops could be brought up

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in force to pass through the SIEGFRIED Line, the enemy was able to organize his forces and occupy the Line in strength.

On the southern sector, the 5th Parachute Division was believed to be in control of the following miscellaneous units: 503 and 504 Mobile Battalions, and a battalion of 199 Security Regiment. A number of identifications made by XX Corps from the 19th Infantry Division indicated that by 12 September the entire division had moved up from the south, and was located on our right flank in the vicinity of REMICH (P98 06). The first prisoner of war taken by our units from 106th Panzer Brigade, apparently formed from remnants of the 60th Panzer Grenadier Division "FELDHERRNHALLE".

An attack by tanks was made in the vicinity of (P94 00) on 13 September, and the enemy obtained slight gains against our reconnaissance elements. This aggressive action and determined resistance in the area (P92 73) - (P86 64) indicated a bolstering of the enemy's defensive line. In some cases enemy troops had moved back into fortifications of the SIEGFRIED Line that had previously been abandoned. Notwithstanding the increasing enemy resistance along the SIEGFRIED Line, our forces made strong penetrations of this line in the SCHNEE - EIFFEL area (L02 85), in the vicinity of HECHNUSCHEID (L92 76), and across the OUR at WALLENDORF (P96 43), and in front of these penetrations the enemy was forced into hastily prepared entrenchments. Enemy reaction to these penetrations came principally in the form of local counterattacks with whatever forces he could make available. During this period these attacks were generally weak and ineffective. Enemy infiltrations, crossing the river chiefly at WORRIDANGE (L03 13), harassed our troops continually. During these four days, 564 prisoners of war were captured.

Period 15 - 22 September.

By 15 September, the enemy had gradually occupied all of the SIEGFRIED Line with which our forces were in contact; practically all pillboxes were manned by at least six men each. New formations which had been hastily organized by HITLER to man the WEST WALL began to be identified: Kampfgruppe KENTHER composed of OCS students from WIESBADEN, 80 Infantry Training Battalion, and 14 Artillery Observation Battalion. It soon became evident that these miscellaneous units generally constituting the front line defense of Germany were under the command of the headquarters of several divisions that had been destroyed in NORMANDY. The 2nd SS Panzer Division DAS REICH, in addition to its remaining organic units, apparently controlled a number of miscellaneous battalions in a sector north of ESCHFELD (P90 69) and HERZFELD (P900 705). Remnants of the 12th SS Panzer Division HITLER JUGEND, identified from prisoners of war, were also under the command of the 2nd SS Division. South of the ESCHFELD (P90 69) - HERZFELD (P900 705) line in the center of the V Corps front, the 2nd Panzer Division controlled, in addition to the remnants of its organic units, several additional miscellaneous units. The 5th Parachute Division which had no more than three companies of its own was the controlling headquarters for the various combat groups holding the southern part of the V Corps sector. The 130th Panzer LEHR Division, remnants of which comprised Kampfgruppe HAUSER, was in command also of some of these battalions along the front before its withdrawal for reorganization about 15 September.

Although enemy forces had to withdraw east of the general area HAUSTERT (L
BETTINGEN (L04 50) - and FEMPIEGEN (L04 46), they staged a number of counter
ttacks on 16 September, one of which was broken up southeast of BETTINGEN (L
our artillery fire. There were five other such counterattacks of less th
ttalion size during the day. Except in those areas where our forces had
he SIEGFRIED Line, the enemy fully utilized its fortifications. Where our

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were in possession of SIEGFRIED Line fortifications, the enemy prepared dug-in defenses in front of them as fast as the situation permitted. There was increased patrolling, and attempts were made to reoccupy pillboxes previously taken by our forces. The familiar mouse-trap tactics characterized the enemy's defense against our widening bridgehead. By 17 September all three infantry regiments of the 36th Infantry Division had been identified opposing the right flank of the 5th (U.S.) Armored Division in the following order south to north: 87, 110, 165 Infantry Regiments.

The enemy displayed strong aggressive action in a number of counterattacks on 19 and 20 September against the salient into German territory held by the 5th (U.S.) Armored Division. The first attack at 0200 hours on 19 September was preceded by an extremely heavy artillery barrage, and was supported by 11 tanks. Attacks directed against the bridge at WALLENDORF (P93 45) were made by elements of two battalions of 73 Infantry Regiment (19th Infantry Division) and a platoon from the 119th Engineer Battalion. These units were supported by an estimated two battalions of horse-drawn artillery from the 19th Infantry Division. It was later confirmed that the entire 19th Infantry Division had been brought up from the vicinity of RENICH (P98 08) on the night of 17 - 18 September for the purpose of reducing the WALLENDORF Bridgehead.

A counterattack of about two infantry battalions, elements of the 19th Infantry Division, and five tanks was launched on 20 September. Another unit identified in action during the day was I Battalion of 3 SS Panzergrenadier Regiment in the vicinity of WASCHEID (L06 84). A battalion of 165 Infantry Regiment from the 36th Infantry Division was also identified in action in the attack against the bridgehead of the 5th (U.S.) Armored Division. Pressure against the bridgehead increased and casualties from enemy artillery were heavy. It was therefore decided to withdraw the 5th (U.S.) Armored Division to the west bank of the River OUR. Artillery fire harassed the withdrawal from the bridgehead during the night of 21 - 22 September, but there was no enemy attack. In the north, Kampfgruppe KUEHNE, of reduced battalion size and first identified on the front 17 September, made an attack on 21 September in an attempt to get in rear of our troops, but this attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. West of TRIER, identification was made of 106 Panzer Brigade. During this period 58 enemy tanks were knocked out in the vicinity of WALLENDORF, the majority by ground forces. The total number of prisoners of war taken during this period of attack against the SIEGFRIED Line was 2379.

Period 23 - 30 September.

The enemy front lines during this period of little change, generally followed the SIEGFRIED Line. The enemy held a sector west of the SIEGFRIED Line extending south from ROTH (L04 91) to (L05 89). SCHNEE EIFEL within Germany from (L05 89) to (P99 82) was held by our forces. South of this penetration the enemy was in possession of the SIEGFRIED Line pillboxes as far south as HASSELKID (P96 78). Another short sector which included KESFELD (P98 74) was held by Allied Forces. South of this point, the enemy generally occupied the entire SIEGFRIED Line; the line of contact followed the OUR and SAUER Rivers to the V Corps southern boundary at MACHEM (L05 18).

By the end of September, it became evident that the enemy had built up considerable strength on the front of the V Corps. The total number of troops estimated to be in the front lines was approximately 25,000. In the north sector, the 2nd SS Panzer Division DAS REICH controlled an estimated 9,000 in its organic units and thirteen miscellaneous battalions. South of t and operating in the general area (P93 43) to (L11 24), the 2nd Panzer

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controlled an estimated 5,500 troops including 900 organic to the division. Under the command of the 5th Parachute Division were eleven formations of varying size occupying the southern sector; the size of this force was estimated at 4,900. The 19th Infantry Division, operating in the (P96 44) area, had a strength of about 5,000 and was thought to be used as a mobile reserve.

Three additional enemy groups, with unrevealing names (7 Fortress Battalion, 11 Fortress Battalion, and 124 Marsch Battalion), were identified on the Corps front after the estimate mentioned above. There was aggressive patrolling along our northern front on 23 September, but enemy activity was on the decrease during the following days. Presumably the enemy was glad to occupy his prepared positions, and to make use of the time to improve his defensive organization.

LUTZKAMPEN (P89 73), in the central sector, and GREVENMACHER (L07 21) were reported free of the enemy. Contact was made on the north with 6 G.A.F. Fortress Battalion, a new unit, while in the southern sector Kampfgruppe THIEME, composed of 212 Landeschuetzen Battalion and Kampfgruppe KAMMERER (a company), was reported to be subordinate to the 5th Parachute Division.

There were indications that the 2nd Panzer Division, the organic units of which had formed only two small Kampfgruppen, had been withdrawn from the line. The 18 Fortress Battalion was identified 28 September on the 4th (U.S.) Infantry Division front. On the same day the enemy launched a counterattack at about 1700 hours against a position (L035 835) occupied by our troops.

The first appearance of additional SS troops was noted on 29 September when a company commander of Kampfgruppe DIEFENTHAL was captured. This Kampfgruppe was composed of five companies from the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte ADOLF HITLER. The prisoner stated that no other elements of the 1st SS Panzer Division were on the V Corps front. Enemy activity increased on the last two days of the month. Considerable artillery fire landed in the area of the 28th (U.S.) Infantry Division. Patrols, some of which had as many as thirty men, were very aggressive, and the enemy seemed anxious to determine our intentions. Prisoners of war captured during this more or less static period from 23 September to 30 September numbered 276.

PART II - SECTION ACTIVITY

1 September.

a. The G-2 Section moved with the Corps Headquarters to (S33 74) near ERNENONVILLE.

b. MIR Team No. 407 received the following replacements:
T/3 Myron Finkelbrand, 32795771,
T/3 John C. Carey, 32709758.

c. The personnel stationed at the City Headquarters in PARIS joined the section at the above mentioned CP location.

d. M/Sgt. John M. Lowenstein, 32428118, was detached from IPW Team No. 11 and attached to the IPW Team at the 5th Armored Division.

2 September.

a. The G-2 Section moved with the Corps Headquarters to (S61 87) near HARAMONT and was in operation at 1130 hours.

b. S/Sgt. M. Weinberg, 32442235, was attached to IPW Team No. 11.

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3 September.

a. Colonel Ford visited the CP of First Army.

4 September.

a. The G-2 Section moved with the Corps Headquarters to (0-306 268) near ROZOY.

5 September.

a. The G-2 Section moved with the Corps Headquarters to (0-785 363) northwest of MEZIERES and was in operation at 1230 hours.
b. Colonel Dickson, G-2 of First Army, visited the section.
c. Lt. Col. Messec, G-2 of 28th Infantry Division, visited the section.

8 September.

a. Colonel Ford visited the CP of the 4th Infantry Division.

9 September.

a. The G-2 Section moved with the Corps Headquarters to (P122 485) just west of PALISEUL.

11 September.

a. The G-2 Section moved with the Corps Headquarters to BASTOGNE, Belgium (P55 58) and was in operation at 1700 hours.

12 September.

a. The G-2 Section moved with the Corps Headquarters to (P533 613) northwest of BASTOGNE, Belgium, and was in operation at 1930 hours.

15 September.

a. The G-2 Section moved with the Corps Headquarters to (P787 734) near WILTZ-DINGEN, Luxembourg about 5 kilometres from the German frontier and was in operation at 1830 hours.
b. T/4 Byron St. Peter was promoted to T/3.

16 September.

a. Colonel Ford visited the CP of the 5th Armored Division and accompanied Lt. Col. McFarland on an inspection of SIEGFRIED Line defenses near WALLENDORF.
b. The first members of the section to enter Germany on various missions were: Colonel Ford, Capt. Bartlett, Lt. Ryan, Lt. Shapiro, Lt. Goldsmith, M/Sgt Forczek, and M/Sgt. Gangelo.

19 September.

a. Colonel Ford visited the 4th Infantry Division CP with Colonel HOOD.

21 September.

a. Colonel Dickson, G-2 of First Army, visited the section.
b. T/5 Haas, 37131166, was attached to IPW Team No. 11 from First Army.

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22 September.

a. T/3 Rudolph F. Meisel, 33580649, was promoted to T/Sgt.

22 September.

a. S/Sgt. Maurice A. Donnell of MII Team No. 407 was hospitalized because of illness.

26 September.

a. Colonel Ford visited the CP of the 4th Infantry Division.

28 September.

a. Colonel Reeves, G-2 of VIII Corps, visited the section.

30 September.

a. Colonel Ford visited the Corps Artillery Headquarters.

Thomas J. Ford
THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, US Army

[redacted]

1 September to 3 September 1944

During this period the Corps moved from the vicinity of PARIS in a northeasterly direction. The movement was rapid and on 3 September the Divisions were approaching the Belgian border.

The first indications of a gasoline shortage developed during this period when Army failed to stock the Class III truckhead supplying the Corps with sufficient gasoline to meet daily expenditures.

During the enemy flight many of his stores of supplies and ammunition were abandoned together with some trains that had been loaded but were left intact on the railroads. These dumps were investigated by members of the Corps special staff, their contents noted and reported to First Army. In many cases it was necessary to place military police guards from the Corps company on dumps that were undiscovered until after the passage of the Divisions. Army was requested to take over these captured supplies and ammunition as early as possible thereby relieving the Corps of the responsibility of keeping guards on them.

The rapid movement of the Corps required the forward displacement of Class I and III truckheads and ASPs.

At the end of this period a change in the Army plan required Divisions to be assembled in the vicinity of LAON, and preparations were made to move east from that area.

4 September to 11 September

During this period the Corps moved eastward through BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG at a very rapid pace and at the close of the period Divisions were in assembly areas on the German border preparing to assault the Siegfried Line.

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The gasoline supply situation became increasingly critical and it became necessary for the Corps G-4 to take centralized control of issues. Allocations were made by G-4 based upon receipts at the truckhead and tactical missions of the Divisions and Corps troops. The reserve gasoline in the hands of troops was consumed and most units operated on partially filled gasoline tanks. In spite of the critical shortage, and by employment of a ration system, no unit was stopped from fulfilling its assigned mission by the lack of gasoline.

The practice of displacing the Army truckhead forward on Corps order was stopped by Army with the explanation that Army could not supply the Class III truckhead and have it moved forward in support of the Corps at the same time. This brought about the extension of supply lines to a distance of approximately a 260 mile round trip haul for the Divisions. To partially relieve the situation, the Corps Quartermaster established a Class III relay point in the vicinity of the Corps CP, and utilizing available truck transportation within the two (2) Corps truck companies, stocked sufficient gasoline to supply Corps troops and assist the Divisions by the issue of a portion of their requirements.

During the latter part of the period sufficient gasoline was brought forward to the Army truckhead to permit Divisions and Corps troops to replenish their supply in gasoline tanks and spare cans. The assigned mission of the 5th Armored Division during the latter part of this period assisted in building up the gasoline supply in that the Division's daily expenditures were low.

Although ammunition expenditures were light, the Army ASP for the supply of the Corps was not moved forward to satisfactory supporting distance. A 120 mile round trip was necessary for the resupply of ammunition to Divisions. As an expedient, Army relaxed their policy on holding to basic loads of ammunition and permitted Divisions and Corps troops to draw additional basic load.

In anticipation of the assault on the fortifications of the Siegfried Line, the

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availability of portable flame throwers was investigated and it was found that sufficient flame throwers and fuel were available in Army depots to provide 90 for each Division in the Corps.

The width of the Corps sector and ample road net facilitated the movement of traffic without circulation being prescribed.

In order to meet the transportation requirements for troop movement, it was necessary to form four provisional truck companies from Corps units; Corps Engineers furnishing two and Corps AAA Group furnishing two.

11 September to 19 September

During this period each of the Divisions assigned to the Corps made penetrations of the Siegfried Line, but due to tactical situation elsewhere and the uncertainty of the supply situation the advance of the Corps was held up.

The Class I and III supply situation improved and the Army truckhead moved to the vicinity of the Corps command post.

Based on an estimate of the tactical situation confronting the Corps, Corps G-4 requested the Army G-4 to increase the quantity of ammunition stocked at the ASP in immediate support of the Corps, or, in lieu thereof, to permit the artillery units with the Corps to transport an additional basic load of ammunition from the Army depot to their organizations. Although Army G-4 stated that he did not believe it would be necessary for Corps units to transport the ammunition from the depot, a request was received from the Corps Ordnance Officer at the request of the Army Ammunition Officer to dispatch 90 trucks to the Army depot for the purpose of hauling ammunition to the ASP in immediate support of the Corps. Corps Artillery and Quartermaster trucks were dispatched for this purpose.

Estimated requirements of explosives and demolition materials furnished by Corps Engineer revealed that insufficient quantities were on hand at the ASP and the Army depot. An urgent request made upon the Army Ammunition Officer resulted in Army

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obtaining and stocking at ASP No. 120 thirty (30) tons of materials. Army Ammunition Officer also secured from Engineer Officer, Third US Army, an allocation of approximately eight (8) tons of materials together with an offer of three or four truckloads of German material. Corps trucks were dispatched to Third US Army depots and U.S. materials were hauled to ASP No. 120.

A later report from Corps Engineer indicated that expenditures were in greater quantities than was anticipated and a further request was made on Army Ammunition Officer for additional stocks which were transported by Army to ASP No. 120.

Toward the close of the period the weather turned cold and urgent requests were made upon Army for provision of woolen outer clothing, woolen underwear, socks and overcoats.

20 September to 30 September Inclusive

During this period Divisions continued to hold portions of the Siegfried Line previously captured until a change in the overall tactical plan effected a change of boundaries and regrouping of the Corps preparatory to a coordinated attack on a much narrower front.

The Class III supply situation remained adequate although a warning was received from Army that supplies might be limited.

The ammunition supply situation improved and sufficient tonnage was moved forward to insure a reasonable resupply for the using troops. Rationing of artillery ammunition was reinstituted, and late in the period 105mm Howitzer M3 and 81mm Mortar ammunition were also rationed.

A recommendation for the protection of lines of communication within the Corps was submitted to G-3.

A recommendation was also made to the Chief of Staff by G-4 to insure that planned operations would provide clearance of an area through which it would be necessary to establish a Corps MSR.

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First US Army assumed control of the two (2) quartermaster truck companies operating with the Corps, and agreement was reached whereby the Corps Quartermaster would dispatch these trucks on orders from the Army. The two (2) truck companies were released to Corps control on 30 September 1944.

Organic vehicles of Corps units were made available to transport replacements and personnel of VIII Corps moving in area to relieve units of this Corps.

An urgent request was forwarded to First Army to make available the supplementary subsistence items authorized in ETO Circular 77, the coffee issue in particular with the "C" and "K" ration being insufficient for the climatic conditions now encountered.

Another urgent request was made upon G-4, First US Army, by Corps G-4 to make immediately available items of winter clothing to include overshoes, overcoats, woolen gloves, knitted caps.

For summary of activities of special staff sections on Supply, Evacuation, Maintenance, and Traffic Control responsibilities, see the attached special staff reports (Inclosures Nos 1 to 6 inclusive).

C. C. HOOD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-4.

7 Incls:
Incl No 1 - QM Report (in quad)
Incl No 2 - Ordnance Report (in quad)
Incl No 3 - Engineer Report (in quad)
Incl No 4 - Surgeon Report (in quad)
Incl No 5 - Signal Report (in quad)
Incl No 6 - PM Report (in quad)
Incl No 7 - Operations Journal - Sept.,
File IV

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Quartermaster

QUARTERMASTER REPORT - AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY

1 September 1944 to 30 September 1944

1. a. Long supply lines and a shortage of transportation resulted in the "freezing" of Class I and III Truckheads by Army in an effort to stock the truckheads with necessary supplies. The Corps continued its rapid advance and shortly after the "freezing" of truckheads, it became necessary for units to haul Class I and III supplies a round trip of approximately 250 miles. In view of this distance, a Class III Corps Relay point was established in the forward area by the Corps Quartermaster, operating personnel being provided by the Quartermaster Service Company. Class III supplies were transported from the Army truckhead to the Relay Point by the Corps Quartermaster Truck Companies. Due to the limited amount of Class III being received, priorities for gasoline issues to Corps units were established by G-4 and controlled accordingly by the Corps Quartermaster.

b. Army truckheads were moved forward during the latter part of the month, but Corps Truck Companies continued to haul the bulk of both Class I and III supplies.

2. Small percentages of winter clothing and extra blankets were made available by the Army Quartermaster with priorities being given to Divisions. Corps Truck Companies hauled these items from Army dumps direct to Division Quartermasters. Requisitions for Corps troops were consolidated by the Corps Quartermaster, items picked up by Corps Truck Companies and breakdown and issue were made by the Corps Quartermaster Service Company.

3. The Graves Registration Company operated collecting points at the Army truckhead and at the Corps Class III Relay Point.

Bodies processed during the period:
American - 443
Allied - 0
German - 154
Total - 597

Bodies processed since 6 June 1944:
American - 3424
Allied - 18
German - 1813
Total - 5255

4. The 2nd Platoon of the 863rd QM Fumigation and Bath Company was made available to the Corps during this period giving the Corps a complete Quartermaster Fumigation and Bath Company. One platoon was used to service Corps Troops, the other platoon being rotated among the Divisions.

Number of men showered during period - 51,379
Average daily hours of operation - 9

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5. The 595th QM Laundry Company continued operations by "leapfrogging" platoons.

Number of pieces of clothing laundered during period - 154,858
Number of pounds of clothing laundered during period - 219,698

6. One Section, 216th QM Shoe Repair Company continued servicing units of the Corps.

Shoes repaired during period - 455 pairs
Shoes salvaged during period - 71 pairs

7. In addition to hauling all classes of Quartermaster supply mentioned above, both QM Truck Companies handled normal Corps transportation requirements, such as hauling ammunition, replacements, salvage, and prisoners.

Total operational miles during period:

3604 QM Truck Co.	-	137,896
3892 QM Truck Co.	-	146,077
Total	-	283,973

N. C. RHODES,
Colonel, QMC,
Quartermaster.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

ORDNANCE SECTION HQ X CORPS

1 Sept 1944 - 30 Sept 1944

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TACTICAL SUMMATION

During the month of September V Corps consisted of the 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions and the 5th Armored Division with the normal Corps troops.

The tactical situation was at first essentially a rapid pursuit of the Germans from the Seine to the northeast along the general line Paris to Mons with the XIX Corps on the left and the VII Corps on the right. After elements of the Corps had crossed the Belgian border the general direction of movement of the First Army was changed to a more easterly direction. V Corps thereupon was ordered to pass through the VII Corps sector to become the right Corps and continued the pursuit along the general line Laon, Charleville, Sedan, Bastogne with Coblenz as the Rhine objective. Elements of V Corps crossed the German frontier on September 12th and were the first Allied troops to reach Germany in force. All three divisions succeeded in penetrating sizable portions of the Siegfried Line before it could be strongly manned by the Germans.

The tactical decision had been made to advance rapidly at the expense of supplies. Infantry elements were motorized at the expense of basic loads. It was further known that Army depots would be unable to keep up to the fast rate of advance contemplated.

Upon reaching the Siegfried Line the V Corps front was 65 miles across. Supplies were thinly scattered from the Seine to Germany and the using troops were running out of basic loads of gasoline, rations and ammunition with little in sight for literally hundreds of miles. First priority was given to bringing up gasoline and rations which were doled out, particularly the gasoline, for specific missions only. Units were not permitted to fill tanks much less their spare gasoline cans. In the mean time ammunition was brought up from the rear as promptly as possible by utilizing Artillery trucks for the purpose as well as all possible Ordnance vehicles. This was in addition to Truck Companies

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available to Army. At this time the total amount of First Army ammunition between the Seine and the Siegfried Line amounted to approximately 7500 tons of which 700 tons was scheduled for delivery at Corps ASP's as a target.

Under the above conditions the Corps was unable to advance. During the remainder of the month it remained practically staticmary with the exception of the 5th Armored Division which, while holding a 35 mile front, was forced to evacuate its penetration of 15 miles beyond the Siegfried Line. The delay permitted the Germans to reinforce the Siegfried Line with men and materiel as well as to improve its supply situation, including performance of maintenance made impossible by rapid advance. By the end of the month it was necessary to reduce the V Corps front to permit advance through the strengthened line. This strengthening was in its initial stages at the end of the month. In effect it contemplated the displacement of the V Corps to the north by the VIII Corps of Ninth U. S. Army, and 83rd Division of Third U. S. Army with a necessary new breach through of the Siegfried Line.

AMMUNITION

Other than the supply exigencies mentioned in the tactical summation above, there were no new problems encountered in present doctrine of ammunition supply.

From the technical aspect there were no complaints or criticisms focused on existing standard items. No malfunctions were reported to this office. Field Artillery requirements for WP ammunition continued to exceed the supply.

GENERAL SUPPLY

Supply purposely assumed a secondary role due to the pursuit of the German Army across France, Belguim and Luxembourg. Communication facilities proved inadequate during the rapid advance. This condition was anticipated by the Army Ordnance Officer who provided the Ordnance Section with a SCR 193 radio at the beginning of the invasion. This proved to have insufficient range as

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Army Ordnance Headquarters and main depots were sometimes 100 miles from the front lines. Army Ordnance Corps has subsequently equipped the Corps Ordnance Section with a SCR 399 radio. It is felt that the supply deficiencies existing at the end of the rapid advance would have been more promptly solved had this more powerful radio not been available at that time. Combat, general purpose and truck laying vehicles were in short supply for the first time.

MAINTENANCE OF MATERIEL

1. Truck, ½ ton, 4x4 still presents the time immemorial failure of the flexible metal hose connection between the motor and and the muffler. This deficiency continues to occur but no flexible tubing is provided for repairs. This failure is serious on vehicles used for reconnaissance missions at night.

2. Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, Dodge is subject to malfunctions of carburetion. Difficulties are experienced in maintaining correct fuel and air mixture at low and idle speeds.

3. Equilibrators on the 155mm Gun and 8" Howitzer M1 carriages are giving considerable trouble at this time. Trouble encountered has been in the packing.

4. Track expenditure has been exceedingly heavy. Trouble encountered was with poor adhesion to and bonding of the blocks to the pins. Also chevron impressions on blocks were discovered to be hollow and the blocks blew prematurely.

5. Tank engine (R975-C1) life is less than the expected and assumed longevity data brought out in training and maneuvers. The only explanation offered at this time is the "lugging" at slow speeds and RPM when tanks are employed as a tank-infantry attack team.

MAINTENANCE TROOPS

As a recommendation for training of future field force medium maintenance

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units we wish to bring out the necessity of having unit personnel trained to do work away from the parent unit. The need for third echelon maintenance away from the company is normal.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Engineer
APO 305

4 October 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Report After/After Action September 1944

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Thru Channels)

1. The Corps Engineer Section during the month of September 1944 performed its normal duty of advising the Corps Staff on engineer matters, supervising the activities of the two Corps Engineer Groups and coordinating the work of Corps engineers within the Division area with the Division Engineers. Extensive studies of the proposed zone of advance relative to roads, bridges and natural obstacles was carried out, terminating with a study of the Rhine River.

2. The Corps advance into Southern Belgium and Luxembourg was hampered by the very effective and thorough destruction of existing bridges by the retreating enemy. A series of floating and fixed bridges constructed over the Aisne River and various small streams and canals marked the beginning of the biggest "bridging" month of the campaign. During periods of rapid advance, bridging units were attached to divisions to alleviate time lost in transporting equipment to sites where it was required. Group commanders were instructed "to get on the tail of the divisions and stay there".

3. When the zone of advance was shifted toward Luxembourg, the immediate obstacle became the Meuse River. Here the heavy ponton bridge was first used in this campaign by V Corps. Non-military bridges such as railroad and damaged highway bridges were put to use because of the limited amount of floating equipment available, and the necessity of keeping the treadway bridging up with the forward elements of the Corps.

4. After crossing the Meuse River advance was rapid with the Corps engineers again ordered in close support of the Divisions. The Our River was of little consequence as numerous fords were available. To facilitate traffic, treadway, Bailey and timber trestle bridges were constructed, the wooden bridges replacing the military bridge equipment as rapidly as possible. On the south, or right flank, 2 treadway and one timber trestle bridges were destroyed by the enemy when the 5th Armored Division was ordered to reorganize west of the Our. Here Corps engineers took up their dual role as combat soldiers at the two Hallendorf bridges, with one company of 254th Engr C Bn holding off the attacking enemy for two days. It was only after the Armored Division had completed its crossing and the engineers had been relieved by infantry that the enemy finally succeeded in destroying the bridges.

5. The crossing of the Our River was synonomous with reaching the Siegfried Line. Engineer received orders to destroy all pillboxes. The problem of securing the necessary amount of [illegible] required was solved

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by use of captured enemy ammunition and explosives in conjunction with our own demolition material.

6. Heavy rains during the latter part of the month greatly increased the problem of keeping the roads open. Large quantities of stone was expertly blasted from quarries in such manner that crushing was not necessary before being placed on roads.

7. The formation and use of Provisional Trucking Companies from the Engineer Battalions during this period placed units under a severe handicap in continuing with their normal engineer work. The five (5) Corps Engineer Bns furnished a total of 1356 truck days during the month. The truck companies were employed in moving elements of the divisions which each Group was supporting, and during latter part of month in assisting the movement of 2nd and 8th Divisions of VIII Corps from railhead to assembly area. Repeated and often unexpected demands for trucking services have, in many cases, seriously handicapped Corps Engineer troops in the execution of essential engineer work.

8. A summary of bridging constructed during the month of September by Corps Engineers is appended.

LEWIS C. PATTILLO,
Colonel, C. E.,
Corps Engineer.

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Coordinate	Stream	Nearest Town	Characteristics Type	Class	Span	Installed By Unit	Gp or Div	Date	Removed Unit	Date	Remarks
S274909			Tdwy		210'	103	28 Inf Div	1 Sep	1340	4 Sep	
N441030		Compiegne	"		240'	22	5 Armd Div	1 Sep	20	3 Sep	
S257804			DS BB	40	50'	20	1171 Gp	1 Sep	20	4 Sep	
N698997			Tdwy		120'	112	1121 Gp	1 Sep	146	2 Sep	
N573004			Tdwy		120'	112	1121 Gp	1 Sep	146	2 Sep	
N665189		Bretigny	DD BB	40	120'	112	1121 Gp	2 Sep			
N681190			SS BB	30	50'	112	1121 Gp	2 Sep			
N641374			Tdwy		30'	22	5 Armd Div	3 Sep	20	4 Sep	Replaced - Bailey Bridge.
N480043			DS BB	40	80'	20	1171 Gp	2 Sep			
N684190			SS BB	40	30'	112	1121 Gp	3 Sep			
N641374			DS BB		30'	20	1171 Gp	4 Sep			To replace Tdwy.
0037295			Tdwy	40	45'	996	1121 Gp	5 Sep	993	10 Sep	
0842328	Meuse	Mohon	Tdwy		156'	22	5 Armd Div	5 Sep	1340	7 Sep	
0868308	Meuse	Charleville	Hv Pon	40	300'	)1340)	1171 Gp	5 Sep			
N684190		Qwergy		35		(86)					Damaged bridge rebuilt by 112th.
0830595		Fumay	Tdwy	40	300'	146	1121 Gp	5 Sep	254	11 Sep	
0847476		Meutberne	Tdwy	40	165'	146	1121 Gp	5 Sep	146	8 Sep	
0076728		Catillion	Tdwy	40	45'	146	1121 Gp	5 Sep	993	10 Sep	
0840347	Meuse	Charleville									RR bridge repaired - converted to military traffic by 20 Engrs.
0982254	Meuse	Sedan	Hv Pon	40	190'	1340	1171 Gp	7 Sep			
0910598	La Houille		DS BB	40	80'	112	1121 Gp	7 Sep			
0910600	La Houille		Tdwy	40	30'	4	4 Inf Div	6 Sep			
0982268	Meuse	Sedan	Tdwy	40	200'	22	5 Armd Div	7 Sep	20	8 Sep	
0996228		Pont Maugis	Tdwy		168'	993	5 Armd Div		20	11 Sep	
P251607	L'Homme		T/Tres	40	44'	112	1121 Gp	10 Sep			
P083362	Semois	Bouillon	TS BB	40	160'	20	1171 Gp	10 Sep			Taken over by 1111 Gp 12 Sep.
P985265	Meuse	Sedan	Fl BB		200'	20	1171 Gp	10 Sep			Taken over by 1111 Gp 12 Sep.
P331251	La Vierre	Les Bulles	TS BB	40	110'	1340	1171 Gp	10 Sep			Taken over by 1111 Gp 12 Sep.
P251607			T/Tres	40	44'	112	1121 Gp	11 Sep			
P216128	La Marche R	Margut	Tdwy	40	48'	22	5 Armd Div		254	14 Sep	
P380110	de Berchave	Houdrigny	Tdwy	40	48'	22	5 Armd Div		254	14 Sep	
P505695	L'Ourthe		Tdwy	40	75'				146	11 Sep	

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Coordinate									
P893832		Lommersmille	DS BB	40	80'	146	1121 Gp	13 Sep	146 16 Sep
P893832		Lommersmille	T/Tres		53'	146	1121 Gp	15 Sep	
084 19		Walferdonge	Timber	20		254	1121 Gp	15 Sep	
P963428	Sauer	Wallendorf	Tdwy	40	72'	22	5 Armd Div	15 Sep	Captured by enemy 21 Sep.
P963428	Sauer	Wallendorf	T/Tres						" " "
P958455	Gay B	Niedersgegen	T/Tres	40	24'	254	1121 Gp	18 Sep	Destroyed to repel enemy attacks 21 Sep.
P871778	Our	Weweler	TS BB	40	80'	20	1171 Gp	19 Sep	27 Sep converted to 110' Cl 40 by 502nd.
P865744	Our	Welchenhausen	Tdwy	40	30'	996		19 Sep	21 Sep changed to 45' Cl 18 by 112 (2M C[illegible])
P865764		Stupbach	Log/Tres			1340	1171 Gp	19 Sep	Replaced by 50' Cl 40 Timber Trestle.
P857725			Timber			20	1171 Gp	19 Sep	
P953890	Our	Schonberg	T/Tres	40	27'	112	1121 Gp	19 Sep	23 Sep - widened to 18'-1".
P970911	Our		T/Tres		34'	4	4 Inf Div	21 Sep	
P868725						1340	1171 Gp	21 Sep	
P953890		Schonberg	2 culverts			112	1121 Gp		Turn-around at WP
P862718			Culvert			1340	1171 Gp		Repaired
P775916	RR	Poteau	RR Br			146	1121 Gp	22 Sep	Began decking
P840349			RR Br			254	1121 Gp	23 Sep	Removed demolition
P82 29		Mersch	RR Br			254	1121 Gp	23Sep	Improved approaches
L018882			3 culverts			112	1121 Gp	24 Sep	Installed (3 - 12"x30')
P858725			Culvert			1340	1171 Gp	25 Sep	Repaired.
P962852			2 culverts			112	1121 Gp	25 Sep	Installed at U-turn.
P934817			—			4	4 Inf Div	26 Sep	Repaired
P807723		QM Dump	Culvert			20	1171 Gp	26 Sep	Installed
P970911	Our		Culvert			4	4 Inf Div	27 Sep	Replaced
P862415			Footbridge			22	5 Armd Div	27 Sep	Repaired
L000888			Culvert			112	1121 Gp	28 Sep	Repaired
P875790			Log crib		40	1340	1171 Gp	29 Sep	Built
P967905			T/Tres		40	112	1121 Gp	30 Sep	Reinforced and retreaded.
P987930			T/Tres			112	1121 Gp	30 Sep	" " "
P967910	Our		T/Tres		40	112	1121 Gp	1 Oct	" " "

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Surgeon

2 October 1944.

AFTER ACTION REPORT
Surgeon's Section, Hq. V Corps

1 September 1944 to 30 September 1944

PERSONNEL

The personnel replacement program in general was very good during the month of September. On one occasion however, a Medical Corps officer evacuated because he was physically unfit for field duty was returned through replacement channels to a Division under this Corps.

Sanitary Corps officers, in grade of 2nd Lieutenant, were received for assignment as Division Medical Inspectors to replace Medical Corps officers who previously filled these positions. This assignment has the advantage of freeing Medical Corps officers for other assignment, although there is some doubt as to whether or not Sanitary Corps officers are desired in these positions, since knowledge of preventive medicine relating to disease control is needed.

The replacement of officers of the Medical Corps by Medical Administrative Corps officers in the positions of Assistant Battalion Surgeon continued through September. The Medical Administrative Corps officers thus assigned performed this duty in a most satisfactory manner.

In many instances the age of Medical Corps officers with front line units is too advanced. Early in September certain data (age, qualification, etc.) in reference to all Medical Corps officers over thirty-five years of age was given to the First Army Surgeon for the purpose of making some adjustment of personnel between front line units and Army Medical installations with the view of assigning younger officers to Division units. At the close of the period covered by this report there had been no particular action in the matter.

EVACUATION AND FIELD HOSPITALS

During the early part of September, Field Hospitals were being used by Army to replace Evacuation Hospitals in the chain of evacuation. This use of Field Hospitals in this capacity was highly unsatisfactory, but during the latter part of the month this effort was discontinued, in favor of the plan outlined below.

Effective 20 September 1944, Army placed a Medical Group in support of each Corps. This Group is composed of two Battalion Headquarters Detachments, one Clearing Company, four Ambulance Companies, two Collecting Companies and two Field Hospitals. A Hospital Platoon of one of the Field Hospitals is

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placed in the vicinity of each Division Clearing Station in this Corps for the purpose of receiving all non-transportable surgical cases. Transportable cases from the Division Clearing Station and the Field Hospital Platoon are transported to the most available Evacuation Hospital for further treatment when required. During the latter part of this period Evacuation Hospitals were kept forward in easy access to the Divisions. This evacuation is operated by the 134th Medical Group, under command of Colonel Lee R. Wilhite, M.C. Since its assignment to support this Corps, excellent service and full cooperation has been given by this group. Close liaison has been maintained between the Group Headquarters and this Section.

MEDICAL SUPPLY

Medical Supply installations continued to operate too far in rear of Divisions throughout this period. A shortage of transportation made it difficult to keep Advance Depot Sections forward in easy access of the Divisions, however an attempt should have been made to use forward Medical Dumps. This would have involved the use of less transportation, and at the same time would have gotten the most needed and most used supplies in the areas immediately behind the divisions. This matter was discussed with Army Medical Supply personnel.

Stocks were generally quite complete. At one time during this period, an acute shortage of blankets resulted due to a breakdown in property exchange (at ADSEC level) in evacuation channels. This was corrected promptly and no unnecessary suffering of sick or wounded resulted.

CORPS MEDICAL BATTALION

The need of an Ambulance Company in the 55rd Medical Battalion was apparent throughout the early part of the month. Its principal value is to give prompt assistance to Division Medical Battalions in emergencies where the need of additional ambulance transportation can not be foreseen in time to make necessary requests upon Army. This defect was partly alleviated during the latter part of this period by the assignment of a Medical Group in support of the Corps, and by placing Army ambulance units more accessible to front line units.

G. E. BREWI,
Colonel, M.C.,
Surgeon.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER

3 OCTOBER 1944

AFTER ACTION REPORT, SIGNAL SECTION V CORPS, 1 SEPTEMBER-30 SEPTEMBER 1944

1. HEREWITH A SUMMARIZATION OF SIGNAL SUPPLY ACTIVITIES FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPTEMBER - 30 SEPTEMBER 1944 INCLUSIVE:

A. THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER WAS A VERY TRYING AND DIFFICULT PERIOD FOR SIGNAL SUPPLY. THERE ARE FIVE REASONS MAINLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CONDITION:

(1) RAPIDITY OF MOVEMENT FROM THE PARIS AREA THROUGH NORTHWESTERN FRANCE AND BELGIUM TO GERMAN BORDER.
(2) MOVEMENT OF ARMY DEPOTS CAUSING PERIODS DURING WHICH REQUISITIONS COULD NOT BE FILLED AT DEPOTS ON WHICH SUPPLIES HAD BEEN RELEASED.
(3) EXTENDED DISTANCES TO ARMY DEPOTS.
(4) NON-AVAILABILITY OF SPARE PARTS IN THIS ENTIRE THEATRE.
(5) HEAVY COMBAT LOSSES CAUSED BY MOVEMENT TO AND ASSAULT ON THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN GERMANY.

IN GENERAL SIGNAL SUPPLY WAS VERY SATISFACTORY DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE PERIOD.

B. 1-20 SEPTEMBER 1944. DURING THIS PERIOD V CORPS MOVED FROM THE PARIS AREA THROUGH FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND LUXEMBURG TO THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN GERMANY. BY THE SIXTEENTH OF SEPTEMBER THE NEAREST ARMY SIGNAL DUMP WAS 60 MILES FROM V CORPS HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER SIGNAL DUMPS SERVING THIS HEADQUARTERS WERE APPROXIMATELY 125 AND 320 MILES RESPECTIVELY. SEVERAL TRIPS TO DEPOTS IN EFFORT TO OBTAIN SPARE PARTS AND OTHER SIGNAL SUPPLIES REQUIRED FROM 3 TO 5 DAYS. ENORMOUS AMOUNTS OF WIRE WERE USED DURING THE MONTH DUE TO RAPIDITY OF MOVEMENT AND HIGH RATE OF COMBAT LOSSES. ON 16 SEPTEMBER 1944 TRANSPORTATION BECAME SO CRITICAL THAT 5 TRUCKS WERE OBTAINED FROM CORPS QM TO HAUL SPIRAL FOUR AND W-110 WIRE FROM THE ARMY DEPOT TO THE CORPS DUMP.

C. 21-30 SEPTEMBER 1944. THIS PERIOD WAS MUCH MORE STATIC THAN THE PREVIOUS PERIOD. ARMY SUPPLIES WERE AVAILABLE IN GREATER QUANTITIES AS ARMY DEPOTS HAD MOVED TO THE VICINITY OF LIEGE, BELGIUM, APPROXIMATELY 60 MILES FROM V CORPS, HEADQUARTERS. ALTHOUGH COMBAT LOSSES CONTINUED TO BE HEAVY, AVAILABILITY OF SUPPLIES ADEQUATELY PROVIDED FOR ALL ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS. SPARE PARTS WERE STILL CRITICAL BUT ENOUGH PARTS WERE AVAILABLE TO TAKE CARE OF CURRENT REQUIREMENTS. SPARE PARTS WERE OBTAINED BY THE FOLLOWING MEANS:

(1) REDUCING UNIT STOCKS.
(2) REDUCING CORPS SIGNAL REPAIR STOCK.
(3) CANNIBALIZATION OF PARTS FROM SALVAGED EQUIPMENT.
(4) REQUISITIONING FROM ARMY DUMPS.

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D. THE SIGNAL REPAIR SECTION DID ONLY LIMITED AMOUNTS OF REPAIR WORK DURING THE FIRST PART OF THE MONTH DUE TO NUMEROUS MOVEMENTS REQUIRING MUCH TIME FOR PACKING, UNPACKING, AND MOVING. DURING THIS PERIOD COMPLETE SETS OF SIGNAL EQUIPMENT FROM THE CORPS SIGNAL DUMP WERE EXCHANGED DIRECTLY FOR EQUIPMENT TO BE REPAIRED. STOCKS OF REPAIRED EQUIPMENT WERE ALMOST EXHAUSTED BY 16 SEPTEMBER. DURING THE LAST PART OF SEPTEMBER THE REPAIR SECTION WAS STATIONED IN ONE LOCATION FOR A LONG PERIOD. THIS PRESENTED THE MUCH NEEDED OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR ITEMS FOR DIRECT EXCHANGE AND STOCKS WERE SOMEWHAT REPLENISHED. BY THE END OF THE MONTH THE REPAIR SECTION HAD SUCCESSFULLY OVERCOME A VERY CRITICAL PERIOD AND WERE IN GOOD SHAPE TO TAKE CARE OF ANTICIPATED NEEDS FOR THE FUTURE OPERATIONS OF THIS CORPS.

E. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF WORK DONE BY THE CORPS SIGNAL REPAIR SECTION DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER:

(1) NO. OF JOB ORDERS ACCEPTED SINCE "D" DAY - 1,641
(2) NO. OF JOB ORDERS ACCEPTED DURING SEPTEMBER- 527
(A) NO. OF ITEMS HANDLED BY DIRECT EXCHANGE- 303
(B) NO. OF ITEMS TURNED OVER TO HIGHER ECHELON REPAIR - 75
(C) NO. OF ITEMS REPAIRED IN LESS THAN 3 DAYS - 427
(D) TOTAL NO. OF ITEMS NOT REPAIRED AT END OF MONTH INCLUDING 2B - 57
(3) INITIAL INSTALLATIONS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN PAR. 2 ABOVE:
13 EA SCR-506 IN ARMOURED CARS.
2 EA SCR-506 IN 1/4-TON TRUCK, 4x4, C & R.
13 EA SCR-508 IN ARMOURED CARS.
1 EA SCR-610 IN ARMOURED CAR.
(4) NO. OF "CURB SERVICE" JOBS OF WHICH NO RECORD WAS MADE - APPROXIMATELY 50.
(5) THE MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT REQUIRING REPAIRS DURING SEPTEMBER 1944 WERE:

SCR-625	SCR-284	PE-75	PE-43
BC-603	BC-604	BC-620	BC-659
PE-104	GN-45	BD-71	BC-191
BC-653	BC-652	PE-97	PE-117
EE-8A	BD-72	CD-501A	BC-342
BC-312	T-17	PE-103A	BC-728

RUBBER CABLE, AND METERS FOR I-56 AND WE-13.
(6) CRITICAL ITEMS AVAILABILITY OF WHICH HINDERED RAPID REPAIR OF EQUIPMENT DURING SEPTEMBER:
(A) DYNAMOTORS (PRACTICALLY ALL TYPES)
(B) GENERATOR SPARE PARTS (ESPECIALLY PISTON RODS F/PE-75)
(C) COMPONENTS OF SCR-284 (ESPECIALLY PE-103-A, PE-104 AND CD-501A)
(D) MALE CABLE FOR SCR-625.

HASKELL H. CLEAVES,
COLONEL, SIGNAL CORPS,
SIGNAL OFFICER.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Provost Marshal
APO 305, U. S. Army

SECRET
Auth: CG, V CORPS
Date: 2 Oct 1944
Initials:

2 October 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Reports After/After Action for the Period, 1 September to 30 September 1944.

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, V Corps.

1. During the V Corps advance to the AISNE River (1 Sept - 3 Sept), the advance to the MEUSE River (4 Sept - 9 Sept), the advance to the SIEGFRIED Line (10 Sept - 21 Sept), and the period of limited objectives, consolidation, and regrouping of Corps Divisions along the WESTWALL of Germany (22 Sept - 30 Sept), V Corps Traffic Headquarters was confronted with the following traffic problems:

a. Extended Corps Zone of Action.
b. Forward Evacuation.
c. Refugee Restriction.

2. Extended Corps Zone of Action.

a. During the period, 1 Sept - 6 Sept, V Corps had advanced from the vicinity of ST DENIS, France, to the line of the MEUSE River and had covered a distance of approximately 120 miles.

b. A rear boundary was established for the Corps on 4 September and was changed twice prior to 30 September, and from 4 September to the nineteenth, the Corps zone of action was extended over an area approximately seventy miles wide and ninety miles deep.

c. On 11 September, the Corps Provost Marshal requested of the Provost Marshal, First U. S. Army, that when Army advanced its forward boundary, the Army MP's should include manning of MP posts up to and including the MEUSE River.

d. On 12 September, a Corps rear boundary and Army Right Wing was established along the MEUSE River and on 16 September this boundary was advanced to the line, WERDONGWT, HOUFFALIZE, BASTOGNE, MARTELANGE, ARLON, to inter-Army boundary, all exclusive to Corps.

e. Traffic Posts were maintained at such divergent points as HOUFFALIZE, BASTOGNE, NEUFCHATEAU, NEUFBRIANT, RECOGNE, BARRIERE de CHAMPLON, ST HUBERT, and LIBRIN until First U. S. Army MP's took over these posts on or about 16 September. Traffic posts in BOUILLON were not relieved until 18 September because First U. S. Army MP's made no attempt to correlate relief of Corps posts.

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f. On 16 September, the Corps Provost Marshal arranged with Corps

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G-4 to establish a Division Rear Boundary along the general line ST VITH - ETTELBRUCK - LUXEMBOURG, all exclusive to the Divisions. This boundary was maintained through the end of September.

g. Due to the extended width and length of the Corps Zone of Action and limited routes of approach, V Corps could maintain properly only one Main Supply Route.

h. During this period, the following conclusions were formed:

(1) As the Corps Zone of Action became extended, Traffic Posts were at times approximately 35 miles in rear of Traffic Headquarters with the only means of communication being a motorized messenger. Frequency modulated radio sets, even if available to the Corps Military Police Company, would not cover this range for traffic control purposes. Telephone communications in rapidly moving situations were not available. The need for a radio receiver and transmitter set, capable of being installed in a ¼ ton truck and with a voice range of about 35 miles became apparent. These radios could not be used without the necessary ¼ ton trucks, operators, and maintenance being furnished the Corps Military Police Company.

(2) During this period also, the following essential factors were closely adhered to and contributed greatly toward the proper flow of traffic and in the prevention of traffic congestion and jams:

(a) Close liaison between Corps Engineer, G-3, G-4, and Traffic Headquarters was maintained in planning and execution of movement.

(b) Maximum use of alternate routes and daily road reconnaissance of such routes was made for convoy movements in preference to Main Supply and Main Lateral Routes.

3. Movement Priorities.

a. For the advance to the AISNE River, the question of movement priorities arose and it was decided that the 4th Infantry Division should have first priority on all roads in the Corps Zone of Action until the objective was reached. In the advance and until bridges were constructed over the AISNE River, the 28th Infantry Division was given priority on roads in its sector. After bridges were constructed, priority passed to the 5th Armored Division which had second priority on roads in the left half of the Corps Zone of Action north of the AISNE River.

4. Bridge Destruction.

a. In addition to the problem of an extended Corps Zone of Action and limited routes of approach, Traffic Headquarters was confronted with the problem of enemy destruction of bridges of all types, many of which had no tactical value.

b. During the month, each time First U. S. Army advanced Corps Rear, the need for accurate bridge and road information of the area taken over became apparent in planning convoy movements to the rear, for bridges which Corps Engineers had built were removed as the Corps rear boundary was advanced. In

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offset this, Corps Traffic Headquarters arranged with First U. S. Army Engineer Section for the latter to include Corps Traffic Headquarters in its distribution of its overprints showing road and bridge status of Army road net under development.

4. Over the MEUSE River, Traffic Posts were maintained at FUMAY, MONTHERME, REVIN, CHARLEVILLE, MEZIERES, and SEDAN. Railroad bridges intact, and fords, were used to full advantage in the crossing of the MEUSE River as well as smaller streams in the Corps area.

5. From 22 September through 30 September, Traffic Headquarters assisted Corps G-3, G-4, and Engineer Section in planning the regrouping of the Corps Divisions along the WESTWALL of Germany. On 26 September, the 112th Infantry Regiment was relieved from attachment to the 5th Armored Division and returned to its parent organization, 28th Infantry Division. The movement of this unit was coordinated by Corps Traffic Headquarters between the 28th Infantry Division and 5th Armored Divisions and for the move, transportation other than organic was used to transport the Regiment from ETTELBRUCK through WILTZ to MALSCHEID in the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG. In observing this movement for march discipline, Traffic Headquarters concluded that whenever motor transportation other than organic is used, convoy commanders should have drivers briefed as to V Corps SOP for Traffic Control - especially, as to maintaining intervehicular distance, time interval between march units and serials, rate of march, route of march, and destination. For enforcement of march discipline, column commanders, control, and posting officers should be appointed.

6. Adverse weather during the latter part of the month had created muddy road conditions - especially along the Corps Main Supply Route. The use of R4 Angle Dozers by Corps Engineers was necessary to eliminate this hazardous road condition and in addition, Routes N-16, N-12, and N-26 were posted with traffic signs reading "10 MPH".

7. Civilian traffic throughout the month as in previous months has never been a serious problem to Corps Traffic Headquarters. In the evacuation of civilians on any large scale, Traffic Headquarters has coordinated with Corps G-5 the planning and movement of evacuees along secondary routes. On 28 September, 1800 civilians were successfully evacuated to CLERVAUX, Luxembourg from towns in vicinity of HEIDERSCHEID, KALBORN, and the OUR River. Corps MPs were used to control movement of any traffic moving through the civilian groups which moved under supervision of civilian authorities.

8. During the month of September, 29 convoys involving movement of 4577 vehicles over a total of 1262.6 miles within the Corps area were cleared by Corps Traffic Headquarters and for the same period 12 convoys involving [illegible] vehicles that traveled 326.7 miles within V Corps area were cleared by [illegible] traffic headquarters with the V Corps Traffic Headquarters.

Arthur E. Caldwell
ARTHUR E. C[illegible]
Colonel, In[illegible]
Provost Ma[illegible]

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Locations of Corps Rear and Forward Boundaries for month of September 1944:

1 September 1944 - Rear -- Effective 011800B Sept 44, Corps rear boundary and Army light line as follows: Meuse River from Corps left boundary, St Denis, Route 186 to RJ N3 to Corps right boundary, all exclusive to Corps.

4 September 1944 - Rear -- Corps rear boundary and Army light line effective 041800B Sept 44: Laon N44- Corps right (South) boundary, all exclusive to Corps:

9 September 1944 - Rear -- Boundary and Army light line as follows: Douai- Route N17- Cambrai- Route N39- Le Nouvian- Route N365- Etreunt- Route N364-Anor-Route N363-Chimon-Route N39- Bellevue- Route C05- Brunehamel- Route N377-Rocroy- Route N464- Rethel-All exclusive to Corps:

12 September 1944 - Fwd- Effective 121200B Sept 44 Division rear boundaries as follows: Corps left (North) boundary- Route N15 through Houffalize and Bastogne- South on route N4 to Arlon- South on N18 to Longwy- Southeast on N52 to Corps (Right) South boundary, all exclusive to Divisions:

16 September 1944 - Rear- Effective 121200B Sept 44, Corps rear boundary as follows: Namur, along the Meuse river to the Third Army boundary, all exclusive to Corps:

16 September 1944 - Fwd - Effective 161800B Sept 44, Division rear boundary as follows: Corps left (North) boundary N23- St Vith- N26- Bitburg- N7- Luxembourg- Corps right (South) boundary all exclusive to Divisions. Division units are authorized to remain in Corps Area if [illegible]

16 September 1944 - Rear- Effective 161800B Sept 44 rear boundary and Army light lines: Verbomont- Houffalize- Bastogne- Arlon- to inter-army boundary, all exclusive to Corps:

25 September 1944 - Temporary between First U. S. Army and Third U. S. Army Longuyon, (U4595) inclusive to First U. S. Army Walfersdange (P6418) Bailendorf (L0140) Dann (L3977) all inclusive to Third Army:

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT

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MONTH September 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. MEN	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
M-74	8/9	115	5	1	Rethel	Charleville	Rethel M51 to Charleville	110 AAA (Gun)Bn	30.0
[illegible]	9/9	122	5	1	Rethel	Charleville	Rethel M51 to Charleville	552 AAA(Gun) Bn	30.0
M-101	10/9	19	1	1	BJ 362385	Chatelet	N385 to BJ N378 to left on N386	1111 Engr Cbt Grp	28.0
M-102	10/9	72	5	1	Brunehamel	Sermonne	N377 to destination	1111 Engr Cbt Grp	34.0
M-147	17/9	72	4	2	Bastogne	Gruflange	N26 and N12	272 FA Bn.	27.0
M-148	17/9	27	1	1	Bastogne	Gruflange	N26 and N12	272 FA Bn	27.0
M-149	17/9	72	1	3	Bastogne	Gruflange	N26 and N12	997 FA Bn.	27.0
M-150	17/9	20	1	1	Bastogne	Gruflange	N26 and N12	997 FA Bn	27.0
M-160	17/9	66	5	1	Bastogne	St Vith	N26 and N12	963 FA Bn.	31.3
M-161	17/9	23	1	1	Bastogne	St Vith	N26 and N12	963 FA Bn.	31.3
M-190	24/9	32	2	1	Bastogne	Vicinity of Corps CP	N26 and N12	285 FA Bn.	19.1
M-202	25/9	169	6	1	P-893764	Vicinity of Maastracht	Hessler-Oudler-N16 to Gruflange, N26 to N15, N15 to N29 to N3, N3 to N43, N43 to destination	747 Tank Bn.	25.0
TOTAL:		809	34	15					328.7

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH September 1944

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
V-1	2/9	420	15	3				106 Cmbt [illegible]	[illegible]
V-2	3/9	154	6	1	Ermenonville	Dohain	[illegible]-330 Senlis N32 Nam N30 St Quentin [illegible]	177 Cmd Bn.	[illegible]
V-3	3/9	100	5	1	Ermenonville	Dohain	[illegible]-330 Senlis N32 Nam N30 St Quentin [illegible]	177 Cmd Bn.	[illegible]
V-4	6/9	782	58	14	Compiegne-Soissons	Signy l'Abbaye	Assembly route 5 (N31-N32-N33	V Corps Arty.	[illegible]
V-5	5/9	35	2	1	Noise Pin	Coutenval	N3145, N13SpN2 Varvins N2S1, [illegible], N2S48	146 Engr Bn.	[illegible]
V-6	1/9	230	9	3	(195646)	Mont-l'Eveque	N17 to Senlis, N330 to destination.	187 FA Grp.	[illegible]
V-7	1/9	120	1	5	(114151)	Fontaine	N2, GC 16, N322, GC128, to Fontaine	V Corps Arty and Violet	[illegible]
V-8	1/9	300	12	3	(132491)	Fontaine	GC 50, GC 84, N2, N330	190 FA Grp.	[illegible]
V-9	1/9	350	15	4	(279483)	Montlognon	GC 84, N2, GC 100	406 FA Grp.	[illegible]
V-10	1/9	230	9	3	Paris	Rarey	N3, N17, N32, GC 100 to Rarey	33 Cav Rec Sqd	[illegible]
V-11	8/9	34	1	1	Sedan	Sedan Paris	N61 to Rieze, N330, S83 to Meux to Paris	461 Trans Tkr Co.	[illegible]
V-12	8/9	69	1	5	Aubigny	Riezes	N378, N385, N2 S2, N61 to destination	240 FA Bn.	[illegible]
V-13	12/9	225	10	2	Lonny	Sibret	(N47, N77, N26) N26, N28 to Recogne, N47 to Neufchateau, N15 to dest. N61 to Mezieres, N34 to Sedan, N77 to Bj	377 Cmd Bn.	[illegible]
V-14	12/9	220	10	2	Labrimont	Gouvy	N26	190 FA Grp.	[illegible]
V-15	12/9	120	5	1	Labrimont	Gouvy	N26	406 FA Grp.	[illegible]

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH September 1945

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
V-16	15/9	180	4	1	(560682)	(790818)	N24, N28 to Cherain, left unnumbered rd to destination.	787 Tank Bn	25.0
V-17	16/9	60	1	2	Bastogne	Malscheid	N12	Prov Mil Govt Bn Hq	21.0
V-18	17/9	65	4	1	RJ N15 and N16	Malscheid	N12	1340 Engr Bn	9.0
V-19	20/9	225	10	2	(526562)	(777767)	N12 and N35	177 Ord Bn	57.0
V-20	20/9	24	1	1	Malscheid	Anor	N12, N15, N45, N26, N77, N54, N51, N39, N363	190 FA Grp Prov	30.0
V-21	20/9	25	1	1	Malscheid	Anor	N12, N15, N45, N26, N77, N54, N51, N39, N363	406 FA Grp Prov	30.0
V-22	21/9	97	5	1	Schonberg	Diekirch	N26, N16, N15, N7	968 FA	49.0
V-23	21/9	26	1	1	Trois Vierges	Hirson	N12, N15, N45, N26, N77, N54, N51, N39 to Hirson	9 ID Grp	17.0
V-24	21/9	25	1	1	Diekirch	Hirson	N7, N15, N34, N15, N39, N26, N77, N54, N51, N39 to Hirson	406 FA Trk Bty	30.0
V-25	21/9	24	1	1	Malscheid	Liege	N25 to Beho, Cherain, N15 and N26 change on N15 to Liege.	190 FA Trk Bty	30.0
V-26	22/9	202	11	2	(2020428)	Hinsfeld	N17 to Diekirch, N7 to Bitburg, N15 to Andernach, N12 to det N12 Trois Vierges	187 FA Grp.	30.0
V-27	22/9	15	1	1	Malscheid	Junglister	N12, N15, N7 (Unnumbered rd to dest.)	CCA, 5th Armd.	25.1
V-28	25/9	65	1	3	Bastogne	Vicinity of Beho	N15 to Houffalize, N26 to RJ at Cherain left to N26, vicinity of RR trestle.	228 Ord Dep Co.	24.0
V-29	25/9	18	18	0	Bastogne	Vicinity of Beho	N15 to Houffalize, N26 to RJ at Cherain left to N26, vicinity of RR trestle.	86 Ord Bn	24.0
TOTALS		46 CS	204	60					1040.0

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HEADQUARTERS [illegible]
APO 305, U. S. ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

G-1
OPERATIONS REPORT
No. 4

1 September - 30 September 1944.

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7 October 1944.

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MAPS: GSGS 4042 - France, Belgium and Holland, 1/250,000: Sheets 6 and 8.

I. GENERAL.

1. Organization.

No change.

II. STATION LIST AND STRENGTH OF COMMAND.

1. Divisions.

Division	Period of Attachment or Assignment	Strength Shown First Periodic Report O	Strength Shown First Periodic Report EM	Date of First Periodic Report	Strength Shown Last Periodic Report O	Strength Shown Last Periodic Report EM	Date of Last Periodic Report
4th Inf Div	1-30 Sept	844	14314	3 Sept 1944	795	13378	30 Sept 1944
28th Inf Div	1-30 Sept	13654		3 Sept 1944	12852		30 Sept 1944
5th Armd Div	1-30 Sept	671	9703	3 Sept 1944	638	9731	30 Sept 1944

2. Corps Troops.

Unit	Strength Shown First Report O	Strength Shown First Report EM	Date of First Report	Strength as of 30 Sept., or Last Strength if Relieved O	Strength as of 30 Sept., or Last Strength if Relieved EM	Date of Relief
Hq & Hq Co, V Corps	141	483	3 Sept 1944	148	487	
MP Platoon	3	78	" "	3	76	
506 QM Car Co, 4 Plat	1	32	" "	1	32	
63rd AGF Band	1	31	" "	1	31	
Det A, 153 Liaison Sq	1	12	" "	1	11	
16th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	1	6	" "	1	6	
17th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	1	6	" "	1	6	
IPW Team #11	2	4	" "	2	4	
CIC Det No. 205	1	14	" "	1	13	
2nd Special Service Co	5	104	" "	5	102	
81st Chemical Bn	43	593	" "	40	593	13 Sept 1944
56th Signal Bn	39	912	" "	37	907	
3250th Signal Service Co	8	129	" "	8	127	
Co A, 507th MP Bn	5	172	" "	5	174	
26th MRU	3	39	" "	3	40	
15th Finance Disb Sect	3	17	" "	3	17	
205th APU	1	11	" "	1	12	
Det D3B1, 1st ECAR	2	4	" "	2	4	
Det D7G1, 1st ECAR	2	4	" "	2	4	
53rd Medical Bn *	7	23	" "	6	23	
382nd Med Coll Co	5	96	" "	5	96	
383rd Med Coll Co	4	98	" "	4	81	
684th Med Clr Co	14	100	" "	13	99	
97th QM Bn, Hq & Hq Det	7	21	" "	7	21	
606th QM G R Co	5	121	" "	5	121	
3275th QM Serv Co (Cld)	4	198	" "	4	199	
3604th QM Truck Co	5	127	" "	4	125	
3892nd QM Truck Co	5	132	" "	5	131	
3907th QM Truck Co	5	118	" "	5	105	
3912th QM Truck Co	3	120	" "	3	113	
V Corps Arty,Hq&Hq Btry	30	134	" "	30	134	
17th FA Obsn Bn	26	490	" "	26	487	
187th FA Gp,Hq&Hq Btry	18	95	" "	18	92	
190th FA Gp,Hq&Hq Btry	18	93	" "	17	93	
406th FA Gp,Hq&Hq Btry	15	81	" "	17	81	
76th FA Bn	32	453	" "	32	452	6 Sept [illegible]
186th FA Bn *	30	549	" "	30	505	
187th FA Bn *	30	525	" "	27	479	
190th FA Bn *	29	612	" "	26	532	
196th FA Bn	31	468	" "	31	468	6 Sept [illegible]
200th FA Bn *	37	654	" "	30	573	

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Unit	Strength Shown First Report		Date of First Report		Strength as of 30 Sept., or last tre-ath if relieved		Date of relief
	O	E			O	E	
400th FA Bn	26	500	3 Sept 1944		27	498	5 Sept 1944
472nd FA Bn	28	479	17 "	"	28	477	
185th FA Obsn Bn, Btry B	6	142	24	"	6	142	
400 FA Bn (Armd) *	32	488	3	"	27	412	
941st FA Bn *	30	528	"	"	29	475	
933 FA Bn	37	586	"	"	36	583	
955th FA Bn *	34	535	"	"	27	448	
987th FA Bn *	28	457	"	"	23	395	
997th FA Bn	29	606	17	"	29	607	
3rd TD Gp, Hq & Hq Co	15	65	3	"	15	60	
628th TD Bn	642		"	"	36	577	
629th TD Bn *	671		"	"	625		
630th TD Bn	723		"	"	701		
801st TD Bn	34	754	"	"	34	749	
893rd TD Bn *	39	624	"	"	34	552	
3rd Armd Gp, Hq & Hq Co	18	86	"	"	18	84	
70th Tank Bn	41	663	"	"	43	662	
741st Tank Bn *	38	617	10	"	38	610	
747th Tank Bn	42	669	"	"	37	593	26 Sept 1944
102nd Cav Gp, Hq&Hq Tr	15	60	3	"	14	59	
38th Cav Recon Sq (Mech)	39	709	"	"	34	682	
102nd Cav Recon Sq (Mech)	40	705	"	"	41	684	
18th AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	13	68	10	"	13	68	13 Sept 1944
115th AAA Gp, Hq&Hq Btry	13	71	3	"	16	64	
110th AAA Gun Bn	32	693	10	"	33	696	" "
116th AAA Gun Bn	31	696	"	"	31	696	" "
377th AAA AW Bn	38	740	3	"	38	750	
387th AAA AW Bn	36	649	"	"	33	614	
447th AAA AW Bn	794		"	"	793		
460th AAA AWBn *	39	774	"	"	36	690	
461st AAA AW Bn *	37	741	"	"	29	686	
552nd AAA AW Bn	37	742	10	"	37	748	13 Sept 1944
2891st Engr Tech Intel Team	1	3	"	"	1	3	
1121st Engr (C)Gp,Hq&Hq Co	17	65	"	"	17	69	
1171st Engr (C)Gp,Hq&Hq Co	18	69	"	"	17	67	
80th Engr (C) Bn *	31	623	"	"	29	568	
112th Engr(C) Bn *	32	603	"	"	29	566	
146th Engr (C) Bn *	32	595	"	"	28	516	
234th Engr (C) Bn *	33	644	"	"	27	581	
1340th Engr (C) Bn *	32	643	"	"	30	592	
22nd Engr (L) Pon Co	6	206	"	"	6	206	
110th Engr (L) Equip Co	4	136	"	"	4	133	
46th Engr Topo Co	5	116	"	"	5	114	
73rd Engr Treadway Br Co	4	134	10	"	4	131	
74th Engr Treadway Br Co	4	142	3	"	4	143	
V Corps Provisional Military Government Police Force Bn	48	793	24	"	48	793	

Less detachment on temporary duty with V Corps Provisional Military Government Police Force Bn.

Composed of detachments from units marked with asterisk (*) above.

III. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS.

1. Command Post.

September

010915 Section closed at St. Denis (S 066512)
011130 Section opened at Chaalis (S 318733)
020915 Section closed at Chaalis (S 318733)
021115 Section opened at Haraumont (S 606834)
040915 Section closed at Haraumont (S 606834)
041215 Section opened at Rosoy (O 396292)
060915 Section closed at Rosoy (O 396292)

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1. Command Post. (cont'd)

September
061145 Section opened at vicinity Mezieres (U786354)
091215 Section closed vicinity Mezieres (U786354)
091600 Section opened vicinity Paliseul, Belgium (P 121481)
111515 Section closed at Paliseul, Belgium (P 121481)
111800 Section opened at Bastogne (P 555586)
121830 Section closed at Bastogne (P 555586)
121930 Section opened vicinity Longchamps (P 532613)
151615 Section closed vicinity Longchamps (P 532613)
151815 Section opened vicinity Wilwerdingen, Luxembourg (P 787737)

2. Inclosures, Collecting Points, PWs and Stragglers - Corps.

1 Sept 1944 - Vicinity of Armenonville, France (S 300725)
2 " " - Vicinity of Haramont (S 605862)
4 " " - Mozoy (O 396292)
6 " " - Vicinity of Granges Bertólet (O 775345)
9 " " - Vicinity of Paliseul, Belgium (P 138482)
11 " " - Vicinity of Bastogne (P 555586)
15 " " - Vicinity of Malscheid, Luxembourg (P 787737)

3. Straggler Lines.

No Straggler Lines were maintained by Corps during the period.

IV. CASUALTIES AND RETURNS.

1. Consolidation of Estimated Losses

a. Offensive Phase - 1 Sept (D + 87) thru 3 Sept (D + 89).

Unit	Killed O	Killed EM	Wounded O	Wounded EM	Missing O	Missing EM	Captured O	Captured EM	Total Battle Casualties O	Total Battle Casualties EM	Sick & Non-Battle Casualties O	Sick & Non-Battle Casualties EM	TOTAL CASUALTIES O	TOTAL CASUALTIES EM
4th Inf Div	0	8	2	23	0	4	0	0	2	35	5	31	7	86
28th Inf Div	1	14	1	45	0	14	0	0	2	73	1	29	3	102
5th Armd Div *		24		58		12		7		101		24		125
2nd Armd Div** (Fr)		0		18		0		0		18		5		23
Corps Troops	1	0	0	5	1	1	0	0	2	6	1	12	3	18
Totals	2	46	3	149	1	31	0	7	6	233	7	121	13	354

* No breakdown available; all casualties shown as enlisted men.
** 2nd Armd Div (Fr) relieved from attachment 021800B Sept 1944.

b. Offensive Phase - 4 Sept (D + 90) thru 11 Sept (D + 97)

4th Inf Div	1	16	2	89	1	26	0	0	4	131	3	160	7	291
28th Inf Div	1	26	5	59	0	16	0	0	6	101	5	106	11	207
5th Armd Div *		12		86		12		26		136		50		[illegible]
Corps Troops	2	5	1	34	0	3	0	12	3	54	2	23	5	[illegible]
Totals	4	59	8	268	1	57	0	38	13	422	10	339	23	[illegible]

* No breakdown available; all casualties shown as enlisted men.

c. Offensive Phase - 12 Sept (D + 98) thru 30 Sept (D + 116)

4th Inf Div	14	123	55	872	2	149	0	0	71	1144	62	1160	133	[illegible]
28th Inf Div	10	178	75	1630	1	110	3	60	89	1978	26	804	115	[illegible]
5th Armd Div	0	71	4	362	2	50	0	3	6	486	7	332	13	[illegible]
Corps Troops	5	51	24	234	2	23	2	11	33	319	10	258	43	[illegible]
Totals	29	423	158	3098	7	332	5	74	199	3927	105	2554	304	[illegible]

d. Total Estimated Casualties for Divisions and Corps Troops (1 Sept 1944 thru 30 Sept 1944)

4th Inf Div	15	147	59	984	3	179	0	0	77	1310	70	1371	147	[illegible]
28th Inf Div	12	218	81	1734	1	140	3	60	97	2152	32	939	[illegible]	[illegible]
5th Armd Div	0	107	4	506	2	74	0	36	6	723	7	406	13	[illegible]
2nd Armd Div (Fr) *		0	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	0	[illegible]	0	[illegible]
Corps Troops	8	56	25	273	3	27	2	23	38	379	13	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
TOTALS	35	528	169	3515	9	420	5	119	218	4582	122	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

* 2nd Armd Div (Fr) relieved from attachment 021800B Sept 1944.

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2. Actual Casualties by Week as Shown by G-1 (S-1) Periodic Reports.

Period	Killed In Action	Wounded, Battle Injured & Gassed	Non-Battle, Sick, Injured & Deceased	Missing	Captured	TOTAL
4th Infantry Division						
27 Aug - 3 Sept	28	180	123	30		361
3 Sept - 10 Sept	12	63	84	13		172
10 Sept - 17 Sept	40	334	290	15		679
17 Sept - 24 Sept	88	611	675	149		1523
24 Sept - 1 Oct	12	95	299	3		409
Total	180	1283	1471	210	-	3144
28th Infantry Division						
27 Aug - 3 Sept	9	39	98	33		179
3 Sept - 10 Sept	16	92	103	3		214
10 Sept - 17 Sept	70	523	276	52		921
17 Sept - 24 Sept	81	800	373	193	63	1510
24 Sept - 1 Oct	39	242	226	11		518
Total	215	1696	1076	292	63	3342
5th Armored Division						
27 Aug - 3 Sept	8	32	50	6		96
3 Sept - 10 Sept	17	73	33	9		132
10 Sept - 17 Sept	10	44	35	4		93
17 Sept - 24 Sept	54	254	104	18		430
24 Sept - 1 Oct	5	119	35	5		164
Total	94	522	257	42	-	915
Corps Troops						
27 Aug - 3 Sept	12	42	33	6		93
3 Sept - 10 Sept	10	46	31	3		90
10 Sept - 17 Sept	11	64	56	2		134
17 Sept - 24 Sept	38	165	101	24	2	330
24 Sept - 1 Oct	7	37	98	9		151
Total	78	354	320	44	2	798
Actual Casualties - Divisions and Corps Troops						
RESUME						
27 Aug - 3 Sept	57	293	304	75		729
3 Sept - 10 Sept	55	274	251	28		608
10 Sept - 17 Sept	131	965	658	73		1827
17 Sept - 24 Sept	261	1830	1253	384	65	3793
24 Sept - 1 Oct	63	493	658	28		1242
Total	567	3855	3124	588	65	8199

Note: No report was received from the 2nd Armd Div (Fr), relieved from attachment to V Corps 021800B Sept 1944.

3. Battle Casualty Reports.

Due to the fact that the 26th MKU, attached to this headquarters, processes Battle Casualty Reports during the month of August for the 1st Infantry Division, the 2nd Infantry Division and the 2nd Armored Division (U.S.) only, it was impossible to obtain Battle Casualty Reports for the divisions operating under V Corps for the month of August in time for inclusion in the August report. The following tables of battle casualties, therefore, include those for the month of August as well as September.

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a. Battle Casualties Sustained by Divisions and Corps Troops During August by Type of Casualty.

(1) Offensive Phase - 1 Aug thru 4 Aug 1944.

Unit	KIA	DOW	DOI	SBA	SIA	LBA	LIA	MIA	CAF	NET TOTAL	BUS	RTD	GRAND TOTAL
2nd Inf Div	119	12		45	1	741	55	173		1146	2	94	1242
4th Inf Div		5		1		14	9			29		13	42
35th Inf Div	78	13		30		376	45	34		576		63	639
Corps Troops	24		1	21	3	64	15	10		138		9	147
Total	221	30	1	97	4	1195	124	217	-	1889	2	179	2070

(2) Defensive Phase - 5 Aug thru 9 Aug 1944.

Unit	KIA	DOW	DOI	SBA	SIA	LBA	LIA	MIA	CAF	NET TOTAL	BUS	RTD	GRAND TOTAL
2nd Inf Div	14	10		25		168	31	18		266		54	320
35th Inf Div	33	3		8		93	20	71		228		20	248
Corps Troops	4	1		4		32	3	3		47		5	52
Total	51	14	-	37	-	293	54	92	-	541	-	79	620

(3) Offensive Phase - 10 Aug thru 16 Aug 1944.

Unit	KIA	DOW	DOI	SBA	SIA	LBA	LIA	MIA	CAF	NET TOTAL	BUS	RTD	GRAND TOTAL
2nd Inf Div	79	9	-	76	1	654	106	108		1033		83	1116
Corps Troops	20	7		10		65	5	1		108		5	113
Total	99	16	-	86	1	719	111	109	-	1141	-	88	1229

(4) Offensive Phase - 17 Aug thru 25 Aug 1944.

Unit	KIA	DOW	DOI	SBA	SIA	LBA	LIA	MIA	CAF	NET TOTAL	BUS	RTD	GRAND TOTAL
80th Inf Div	82	1		299	7	91	10	47		497		34	531
90th Inf Div	75	1		232	8	138	33	28		515		368	883
Corps Troops	11	3	2	7	7	15	11	3	1	60		1	61
Total	168	5	2	498	22	244	54	78	1	1072	-	403	1475

(5) Offensive Phase - 26 Aug thru 31 Aug 1944.

Unit	KIA	DOW	DOI	SBA	SIA	LBA	LIA	MIA	CAF	NET TOTAL	BUS	RTD	GRAND TOTAL
4th Inf Div	18			63	6	45	19	2		153			153
28th Inf Div	1	1		5		48	5	14		74			74
5th Armd Div	1	2		10		23	12	2		50		6	56
Corps Troops	3			2		1	2	2		10		3	13
Total	23	3	-	80	6	117	38	20	-	287	-	9	296

(6) Total for August 1944.

Unit	KIA	DOW	DOI	SBA	SIA	LBA	LIA	MIA	CAF	NET TOTAL	BUS	RTD	GRAND TOTAL
2nd Inf Div	212	31		146	2	1543	192	299		2445	2	231	2678
4th Inf Div	18			63	6	45	19	2		153			153
5th Inf Div		5		1		14	9			29		13	42
28th Inf Div	1	1		5		48	5	14		74			74
35th Inf Div	111	16		38		469	65	105		804		83	887
80th Inf Div	82	1		299	7	91	10	47		497		34	531
90th Inf Div	75	1		232	8	138	33	28		515		368	883
5th Armd Div	1	2		10		23	12	2		50		6	[illegible]
Corps Troops	62	11	3	44	10	177	36	19	1	363		23	[illegible]
Total	562	68	3	798	33	2568	381	516	1	4930	2	758	[illegible]

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b. Battle Casualties Sustained by Divisions and Corps Troops During August by Arm or Service.

(1) Offensive Phase, 1 Aug thru 4 Aug 1944.

Unit	INF	FA	CAC	ED	TD	MC	CE	SIG C	QMS	ORD	CAV	AC	CM	MC	CHAF	TOTAL
2nd Inf Div	1123	55	1	35		1	10	2			14				1	1242
5th Inf Div	35			3			1			1	2					42
35th Inf Div	613	5		19			2									639
Corps Troops	31	11	6	6			15	3	7		70	1	2	1		147
Total	1802	71	7	57	-	1	28	5	7	1	86	1	2	1	1	2070

(2) Defensive Phase, 5 Aug thru 9 Aug 1944.

2nd Inf Div	295	6	1	12			1	2		1	1		1			320
35th Inf Div	218	10		6			11	1			2					248
Corps Troops	10	32	2		2		1				2			3		52
Total	523	48	3	18	2	-	13	3	-	1	5	-	1	3	-	620

(3) Offensive Phase, 10 Aug thru 16 Aug 1944.

2nd Inf Div	1020	33		46		2	9	2			4					1116
Corps Troops	7	48		3			3		6		44		1	1		113
Total	1027	81	-	49	-	2	12	2	6	-	48	-	1	1	-	1229

(4) Offensive Phase, 17 Aug thru 25 Aug 1944.

80th Inf Div	492	11	-	17	-	2	8	1								531
90th Inf Div	814	27	-	17			13	6			2	-	3		1	883
Corps Troops	1	21						1			36		2			61
Total	1307	59	-	34	-	2	21	8	-	-	38	-	5	-	1	1475

(5) Offensive Phase, 26 Aug thru 31 Aug 1944.

4th Inf Div	142	3	-	2			4				2					153
28th Inf Div	63	9	1				1									74
5th Armd Div	40	4		1							11					56
Corps Troops	1	8					1	1			2					13
Total	246	24	1	3	-	-	6	1	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	296

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(6) Total Battle Casualties Sustained by Divisions and Corps Troops - 1 Aug thru 31 Aug 1944.

Unit	INF	FA	CAC	MD	FN	MC	CE	SIG C	CWS	ORD	CAV	AC	QM	MO	CHAP	TOTAL
2nd Inf Div	2438	94	2	92		3	20	6		1	19		1		1	2678
4th Inf Div	142	3		2			4				2					153
5th Inf Div	35			3			1			1	2					42
28th Inf Div	63	9	1				1									74
35th Inf Div	831	15		25			13	1			2					887
80th Inf Div	492	11		17		2	8	1								531
90th Inf Div	814	27		17			13	6			2		3		1	883
3th Armd Div	40	4		1							11					56
Corps Troops	50	120	8	3	2		20	5	13		154	1	5	5		386
TOTAL	4905	283	11	161	2	5	80	19	13	2	192	1	9	5	2	5490

Note - It was impossible to secure any information on the casualties of the Second French Armored Division. Casualty reports were sent to First U.S. Army Headquarters but were not processed there, being forwarded to Free French Headquarters.

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c. Battle Casualties Sustained by Divisions and Corps Troops During September by Type of Casualty.

(1) Offensive Phase, 1 Sept thru 3 Sept 1944.

Unit	KIA	DOW	DOI	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	CAF	NET TOTAL	RTD	RUS	GRAND TOTAL
4th Inf Div	3			15	1	6	5	2		32	24		56
28th Inf Div	12			3	1	10	3	2		31	7		38
5th Armd Div	20	4		13	1	24	10	5		77	5		82
Corps Troops	8			8		6	1	1		26	1		27
Total	43	4		39	3	46	19	12	-	166	37	-	203

(2) Offensive Phase, 4 Sept thru 11 Sept 1944.

Unit	KIA	DOW	DOI	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	CAF	NET TOTAL	RTD	RUS	GRAND TOTAL
4th Inf Div	13	1		42	6	25	7	8		102	18	3	123
28th Inf Div	25	7		8		82	9	11		142	14		156
5th Armd Div	13	4		5	1	74	18	4		119	5		124
Corps Troops	13	3		13	1	35	7	4	4	80	5		85
Total	64	15	-	68	8	216	41	27	4	443	42	3	488

(3) Offensive Phase, 12 Sept thru 30 Sept 1944.

Unit	KIA	DOW	DOI	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	CAF	NET TOTAL	RTD	RUS	GRAND TOTAL
4th Inf Div	174	31		426	15	362	153	88		1249	668		1917
28th Inf Div	133	26		160	3	943	119	320		1704	225		1929
5th Armd Div	94	20		56		329	51	12		562	72		634
Corps Troops	30	2		46	3	105	7	15	2	210	14		224
Total	431	79	-	688	21	1739	330	435	2	3725	979	-	4704

(4) Total for September 1944.

Unit	KIA	DOW	DOI	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	CAF	NET TOTAL	RTD	RUS	GRAND TOTAL
4th Inf Div	190	32		483	22	393	165	98		1383	710	3	2096
28th Inf Div	170	33		171	4	1035	131	333		1877	246		2123
5th Armd Div	127	28		74	2	427	79	21		758	82		840
Corps Troops	51	5		67	4	146	15	22	6	316	20		336
TOTAL	538	98	-	795	32	2001	390	474	6	4334	1058	3	5395

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d. Battle Casualties Sustained by Divisions and Corps Troops During September by Arm or Service.

(1) Offensive Phase, 1 Sept thru 3 Sept 1944.

Unit	FA	INF	CE	CAV	CAC	AMC	SC	MC	MD	CWS	ORD	MP	DC	TOTALS
4th Inf Division	3	47	1			2			3					56
28th Inf Division	2	33							3					38
5th Armd Division	6	61	1	9			1	1	2				1	82
Corps Troops	10	10	4	2					1					27
Total	21	151	6	11	-	2	1	1	9	-	-	-	1	203

(2) Offensive Phase, 4 Sept thru 11 Sept 1944.

4th Inf Division	15	85	18		1	2	1		1					123
28th Inf Division	1	134	3	12					6					156
5th Armd Division	7	97		17					3					124
Corps Troops	7	2	12	59						5				85
Total	30	318	33	88	1	2	1	-	10	5	-	-	-	488

(3) Offensive Phase, 12 Sept thru 30 Sept 1944.

4th Inf Division	52	1780	15	1	7	1	3	2	52		2	2		1917
28th Inf Division	49	1825	20	1			3	1	30					1929
5th Armd Division	88	417	41	28	39		1		16		1	3		634
Corps Troops	92	33	25	39	20	5	3	1	2	4				224
Total	281	4055	101	69	66	6	10	4	100	4	3	5	-	4704

(4) Total for September 1944.

4th Inf Division	70	1912	34	1	8	5	4	2	56		2	2		2096
28th Inf Division	52	1992	23	13			3	1	39					2123
5th Armd Division	101	575	42	54	39		2	1	21		1	3	1	840
Corps Troops	109	45	41	100	20	5	3	1	3	9				336
Total	332	4524	140	168	67	10	12	5	119	9	3	5	1	5395

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V. GRAVES REGISTRATION.

1. Corps operated no cemeteries during the period. All evacuations were made to the following collecting points or cemeteries along the Corps axis of advance:

a. Collecting Points.

(1) 2 September 1944 - S 890675; O 395082.
(2) 4 September 1944 - F 125465; F 080412; F 539612.
(3) 17 September 1944 - P 802738.
(4) 28 September 1944 - P 802738.

b. Cemetery (First U.S. Army).

(1) 7 September 1944 - S 301187.
(2) 24 September 1944 - J 839049.
(3) 28 September 1944 - K 705352, vicinity of Henri-Chappel.

VI. REPLACEMENTS.

The following table, based on information extracted from G-1 (S- 1) Periodic Reports, shows the number of replacements received during the month of September:

Divisions	27 Aug - 2 Sept	RTD	3-9 Sept	RTD	10-16 Sept	RTD	17-23 Sept	RTD	24-30 Sept	RTD	TOTALS	RTD
4th Inf Div	33		38		36		1108		859		2074	
28th Inf Div	203		38		364		1971		776		3352	
5th Armd Div	240	10	131	7	121		470		202		1164	17
70th Tank Bn	25						26		13		64	
377th AAA AW Bn					12		5		12		29	
801st TD Bn					1						1	
630th TD Bn							21		18		39	
447th AAA AW Bn							2		1		3	
							Sub Total				6726	17
Corps Troops												
112 Engr (C) Bn		1										1
3rd TD Gp, Hq	1											
81st Chem Bn			1	2							1	
564th Sig Bn			2		1				2		1	2
747th Tank Bn			21			1					5	
33rd Med Bn			1				1		2		21	1
143rd Med Coll Co			1								4	
17 FA Obsn Bn					1						1	
7 Corps Arty, Hq					1				2		3	
146 Engr (C) Bn					2		4		4		1	
20 Engr (C) Bn					1				3		10	
460th AAA AW Bn					1						4	
461st AAA AW Bn					1				2		1	
497th FA Bn							1		1		3	
41st FA Bn							1		5		2	
82 Engr (L)PonCo							1				6	
41st Tank Bn							31		2		1	
2d Cav Ren Sq							2				33	
4th Med Clr Co							1				2	
7 Corps PMMFF Bn							1				1	
33rd FA Bn							1				1	
77th FA Bn											1	
44th FA Bn									2		2	
4 Engr (C) Bn									2		2	
13 Engr TR Br Co									1		1	
5 Engr TR Br Co									1		1	
40 Engr (C) Bn									1		1	
2 TD Bn									1		1	
25 QM G R Co									2		2	
79 QM Trk Co									1		1	
1 [illegible] Bn									3		3	
							7		2		9	
								Sub Total			125	4
								TOTAL			6851	21

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VII. PRISONERS OF WAR.

Unit	1 - 3 Sept	4 - 11 Sept	12 - 30 Sept	TOTALS
4th Inf Division	191	2591	1135	3917
28th Inf Division	408	327	872	1607
5th Armd Division	397	1018	558	1973
*2nd Armd Division (Fr)	-	-	-	-
[illegible]	466	755	509	1730
Totals	1462	4691	3074	9227

* 2nd Armored Division (French) relieved from attachment, 021800B Sept 44.

VIII. PROMOTIONS.

1. Status of Promotions and Appointments.

	Recd at Hq V Corps	Forwarded to First U.S. Army	Pending at Hq V Corps	Disapproved by Hq V Corps	Retd by First US Army	Pending at First US Army	No. of Officers Promoted
APPOINTMENTS 1-30 Sep 44							
Battlefield							
Corps less Divisions	7	6	1	0	2*	3	5
Divisions	33	27	3	3	2**	8	18
Total	40	33	4	3	4	11	23
Regular							
Corps less Division	6	1	3	2	0	1	0
Divisions	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Total	7	2	3	2	0	2	0
PROMOTIONS 1-30 Sep 44							
Battlefield							
Corps less Divisions	70	68	3	0	0	13	72
Divisions	165	150	12	3	2	42	117
Total	235	218	15	3	2	55	189
Command							
Corps less Divisions	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Divisions	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Regular							
Corps less Divisions	13	11	0	2	0	14***	17
Divisions	13	13	0	0	0	13***	2
Total	26	24	0	2	0	27	19

* 1 EM killed in action; 1 MO evacuated for wounds. Recommendations returned, no action.

** 1 EM killed in action. Recommendation returned, no action.

*** 2 recommendations for 41st Repl Bn forwarded to Ground Force Replacement System [illegible] First US Army in August. Neither this headquarters or 41st Repl Bn has received [illegible] announcing promotions.

**** 10 recommendations for promotion for personnel of MI Teams attached to the 1st [illegible] Inf Divs have been dropped from the pending column as orders have never been [illegible] announcing promotions, and Hq., ETOUSA, recently advised that promotions for [illegible] personnel are held in abeyance and that only battlefield promotions are being [illegible] sidered.

2. Reclassifications, Reassignments and Demotions.

	Brig Gen	Col	Lt Col	Maj	Capt	1st Lt	2nd Lt	[illegible]	TOTAL
Reclassification		1	1	2	3*	13	7		27
Reassignments							1		1
Demotions					None				
Total	-	1	1	2	3	13	8		28

NOTE: * One Captain recommended for reclassification was [illegible] held at Corps headquarters, pending explanation of duty officer [illegible] performing with view of reassignment.

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IX. MORALE.

1. Unit Citations Recommended.

Battery C, 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 5th Armored Division.

2. Units Cited In General Orders, First U.S. Army.

The following elements of the 5th Engineer Shore Brigade have been cited in General Orders, First U.S. Army, for outstanding performance of duty while that Brigade was under the command of this headquarters:

37th Engineer Combat Battalion.
1st Platoon, 30th Chemical Decontamination Company.
1st Platoon, Company A, 203rd Quartermaster Gas Supply Battalion.

3. Decorations and Awards.
(See following charts)

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3. DECORATIONS AND AWARDS

Unit	Medal of Honor		DSC		DSM		Legion of Merit		Silver Star		DFC		Bronze Star		Soldier's Medal		Air Medal		TOTALS	
	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded
Hq Hq Co V Corps*					1		1						1	2					4	2
V Corps Arty								1						3			2			6
1st Inf Div	4		9	1	1		2	1											16	2
2nd Inf Div			9				6												15	
2nd Armd Div							3												3	
4th Inf Div**			14		1				2	82				197					17	279
5th Armd Div			9							68				250		1		6	9	325
28th Inf Div			3							62				206		17			3	285
29th Inf Div							4												4	
35th Inf Div			1																1	
17th FA Obsn Bn														1						1
20th Engr (C) Bn							1												1	
38th Cav Recn Sq										3				6	1				1	9
53rd Med Bn														5						5
56th Sig Bn							1							1					1	1
81st Cml Bn														4						4
102nd Cav Gp														1						1
102nd Cav Recn Sq								4						1						5
115th AAA Gp							1												1	
146th Engr (C) Bn	1																		1	
186th FA Bn														7			2			9
187th FA Gp														2						2
187th FA Bn																	2			2
190th FA Gp														3			4			7
190th FA Bn																	1			1
200th FA Bn																	1			1
406th FA Gp																	1			1
447th AAA Bn										2				3						5
606th QM GR Co									1										1	
628th TD Bn			1																1	
629th TD Bn			1											2						2
630th TD Bn														1						1
741st Tank Bn			1							1									1	1
743rd Tank Bn			1																1	
745th Tank Bn			1																1	

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DECORATIONS AND AWARDS (CONTINUED)

Unit	Medal of Honor		DSC		DSM		Legion of Merit		Silver Star		DFC		Bronze Star		Soldier's Medal		Air Medal		TOTALS	
	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded
747th Tank Bn										8				8						16
893rd TD Bn										2				12						14
941st FA Bn																		2		2
953rd FA Bn														11				2		13
955th FA Bn																		3		3
War Department														1						1
TOTALS	5	-	50	1	3	-	20	6	3	228	-	-	1	727	1	18	-	26	83	1006

NOTE: * One (1) Bronze Star Award pending for French Liaison Officer.
** Two (2) Silver Star Awards pending for Naval Officer.

"Pending" columns as of 30 September 44; "Awarded" columns are for the month of September 1944.

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4. Postal.

a. Army Postal Unit 137 arrived and joined APO 305 at Moussy Le Vieux, France, 1 September. This unit was absorbed into APO 305, which was servicing approximately 32,000 troops. The change was accomplished without changing the address of any of the V Corps units.

b. At Moussy Le Vieux, France, mail was received for V Corps through the 26th Postal Regulating Station at Dreux, France.

c. Major Hejowski, Postal Inspector from Postal Division headquarters, made an inspection of Division APOs in V Corps, regarding their methods of handling casualty mail.

d. On 5 September, APO 305 moved to Magny, France, a distance of 110 miles. One unit left at 0730 hours and was in operation at 1430 hours. The other unit remained back in Moussy Le Vieux, France, in full operation. On 6 September, APU 137 rejoined APO 305 in Magny, France. At that location mail was being received from the 26th Postal Regulating Station which had moved up to Compeigne, France, a distance of 60 miles. Very little mail was received on the 9th and 10th of September, due to shortage of gas and transportation from the beaches to the 26th Postal Regulating station.

e. Moved to Carlsbourg, Belgium, on 10 September by the same method of leaving one unit at the old station in operation. In Carlsbourg mail was picked up from the 26th Postal Regulating station at Namur, Belgium.

f. On 14 September, APO 305 moved to Recogne, Belgium. Another large shipment of mail arrived at the 26th Postal Regulating station in Namur, Belgium.

g. On 19 September, APO 305 moved to Wilwerdingen, Luxemburg. On 20 September, 12 carloads of mail, which had left Cherbourg, France, on 9 August, arrived at the 26th Postal Regulating station in Namur, Belgium.

h. APO 305 received, during the month of September, 1,993 pouches of first class mail and 4,368 sacks of parcel mail for distribution to V Corps units; dispatched 827 pouches of first class mail and 2,044 sacks of parcels; issued 5,469 money orders and paid 377 money orders for a total money order business of $259,673.14; sold $17,689.55 worth of stamps and stamped airmail envelopes; received and delivered to V Corps units 781 registered pieces of mail and dispatched 651 pieces.

i. The 26th Postal Regulating station, acting as the regulating station for V Corps and other First U.S. Army elements in this vicinity, has adequate facilities and trained personnel to handle the mail destined to V Corps efficiently. APO 305, with the addition of APU 137, has been able to service all V Corps troops and an additional number of units who are serving Corps troops. At no time has there been a delay in the delivery of mail for V Corps units, either at the 26th Postal Regulating station or at APO 305.

5. Religious Activities.

a. With the beginning of September, the total number of chaplains assigned to V Corps was sixty-nine (69). During the month there were two (2) chaplains added to the separate units under Corps jurisdiction, and the loss of one (1). Total at the end of the month was seventy (70).

b. At the end of the month, the total number of chaplains [illegible] as follows:

Protestants - 46; Catholics - 32; Jewish - 2.

c. The number of services, tabulated, is based on [illegible] previously submitted:

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5. Religious Activities (Cont'd).

Number	Services	Attendance
420	Sunday Services	25,170
991	Weekday Services	13,381
5,322	Confessions	
10,117	Communions (All Faiths)	
187	Hospital Visits (Patients Visited)	1,307
4	Baptisms	
3,105	Personal Conferences	
39	Extreme Unctions Given	
13	Funerals	
6	Sex Lectures	
451	Testaments distributed	
65	Jewish Scriptures distributed	
92	Group Discussions	
302	Scapulars distributed	
165	Rosaries distributed	
1,154	Religious pamphlets distributed (all denominations)	

d. Mileage for the month for all chaplains is upwards of 46,000 miles in pursuance of their official duties.

6. Red Cross.

a. The field director for Corps troops handled 70 new cases and five (5) recurrent cases, together with 46 cases brought forward from the month of August, making a total of 121 cases opened during the month.

b. The report reflects a marked increase in family problems between the service men and their wives at home.

c. The following supplies were distributed by the Red Cross field director to personnel of the Corps excluding divisions:

ITEM	AMOUNT
Cigarettes	15,000 packages
Chewing tobacco	48 plugs
Pipe tobacco	100 packages
Tooth paste	48 tubes
Tooth brushes	300
Shaving cream	50 jars
Razors	100
Razor blades	1,000 double edge
Soap, 4 ounce bar	200 bars
Towels	300
Handkerchiefs	50
Lighter flints	12
Chewing gum	240 packages
Boot laces	100 strings
Sewing kits	48
Candy	300 bars
Stationery	15,000 sheets
Envelopes	5,000
Writing tablets	500

To expedite this distribution, the field director was moved from the Corps Rear echelon to the Forward echelon.

d. During the period, one German Stalag, containing 63 British Colonial troops, was investigated by the G-1 Section. Several loads of Red Cross equipment were traced, and reports were forwarded to First U.S. Army.

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7. Special Service.

[illegible] September, 1944, found the cycle of demand for Special Service completed. In the early days of the campaign in Normandy, when troops were in a static condition, everyone demanded a large and varied amount of Special Service activities. As divisions were relieved for short periods of rest, large concentrations of services were given to them in order to relax the minds of the soldiers and allow them to rest.

Then came the major breakthrough into the open, in which the Germans withdrew rapidly, and in which our troops advanced through untouched territory, being wildly greeted by happy, liberated Frenchmen. The men found their relaxation in the towns they liberated. Special Service became a side issue when the American soldier was treated like a king by the people he had set free from bondage.

The advance continued through the built-up area of France and back into the rural areas of Belgium and Luxemburg, and as the enthusiasm of the people waned the demand for Special Service became a little heavier. But the lengthened supply lines made the furnishing of gasoline to our combat troops a critical problem, and the demands of the troops could not be met. Many units, which could otherwise have been serviced, had to forego the shows and clubmobiles. However, many units brought their own gasoline and some service was given.

The troops then came up against the Siegfried Line, just inside the border of Germany, and the rapid advance stopped. The opposition became tougher, and the casualties mounted. Immediately there came a great demand for Special Service activities. Divisions, with combat teams resting, were given priority, and service became a question of who was more deserving of what we had to offer, just as in Normandy.

b. Equipment.

(1) The critical problem in Special Service at the end of September, 1944, was the supply of spare parts for radios and projectors. The following table shows the condition of projectors in this Corps:

Unit	Total Projectors	Broken Projectors
28th Infantry Division	6	4
5th Armored Division	5	4
Corps Troops	24	16
2nd Special Service Company	17	5
Total	52	29

(2) Equipment received was as follows:

Corps Troops	2 "A" Kits. 2 "B" Kits. 4,200 Council Books.
Each Division	2 "A" Kits. 2 "B" Kits. 4,200 Council Books.

c. 2nd Special Service Company.

(1) When the gasoline shortage was alleviated, the 2nd Special Service company was able to carry out a very extensive program. The breakdown of unit projectors made it necessary to send out teams from the company for three [illegible] at a time. It was found unwise to let them stay away for any longer period. [illegible] GI shows were active, and the repair service of the company was kept very busy.

(2) During the early part of the month, the movement of the Corps Rear echelon from one CP to another became a very crucial problem, due to lack of transportation. The 2nd Special Service company made available all of its organic transportation for the purpose. The drivers had to shuttle between the CPs several times, and the 2nd Special Service company was delayed in moving for at least a [illegible] each time.

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(3) The total number of movies and shows given by the 2nd Special Service company follows:

(a) Movies.

Number of shows	420
Number of titles	20
Total attendance	53,669

(b) G.I. Shows.

Number of performances	25
Total attendance	10,750

d. Unit Projectors.

(1) The film library was not enlarged during the month, but films were traded with Divisions, Army Headquarters and the 2nd Special Service company. Films are becoming worn out due to inadequate exchange facilities with higher echelons, and lack of new supply of film.

(2) The following statistics disclose the amount of unit projector activity:

Number of shows	874
Number of titles	23
Total attendance	107,502

e. Clubmobiles.

(1) During the first two weeks of September, the Clubmobiles were able to do very little work because of the frequent moves of the Corps Headquarters and the lack of gasoline. During the last two weeks of the month, the gasoline shortage was alleviated, and the group had to work night and day to answer the demands made upon them. On three separate occasions, groups of two to four Clubmobiles were dispatched to Divisions, where they stayed two or three days.

(2) Because of the proximity of Germany, all units calling for Clubmoviles must provide an armed guard for the Red Cross trucks, and give adequate protection to take care of any exigency that may arise. Clubmobiles have been in Germany several times. During the month several meetings were held with the group and they were informed of the necessity to abide by the uniform regulations, and the various other regulations governing security, occupation of enemy territory, treatment of civilians and the other regulations which every soldier must know in order to get along in Germany. The girls are anxious to stay with the Corps and have abided fairly well by the regulations. The few violations noted have been brought to the attention of the Group Captain.

(3) The total amount of services rendered by Group G, American Red Cross Clubmobiles, for the month of September, 1944, is as follows:

Doughnuts served	174,385
Cups of coffee served	54,194

f. 63rd Army Ground Force Band.

(1) The 63rd Army Ground Force band's activities were curtailed by the gasoline shortage. However, the band played 23 engagements to 57,400 attendees.

g. Stars and Stripes.

(1) The First U.S. Army, during the month of September, 1944, issued a letter directing Corps to handle the circulation of Stars and Stripes for all divisions, as well as Army and Corps Troops within Corps boundaries. This system had been in effect in V Corps several weeks prior to the issuance of the directive.

(2) At present the Corps receives approximately 20,000 papers per day. They are distributed in the following manner:

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(a) Papers are broken down into bundles according to the strength of every Corps and Army unit, on the ratio of one (1) paper per five (5) men.

(b) Papers are distributed through APO or picked up at the Special Service section, according to the individual arrangements made by each unit.

(c) Each division picks up 4,000 papers at the Special Service section each afternoon at 1700 hours.

(d) Papers sent through APO are dropped by a man from the Special Service section into the unit mail bag. If a unit which is supposed to pick up the papers at the section fails to do so, the papers are held for two days and then sent to the unit through APO.

(3) Delivery of papers to the section is made by special messenger each day from the Stars and Stripes circulation department. Promptness of delivery is varied. Five or six days will go by with delivery on the day of publication, and then a period of a week will elapse with delivery a day late, ending up with two issues on one day and another period of good delivery. All in all, circulation has been very good.

h. Unit Exchanges.

(1) Supply of the various items for the Exchanges has been very spotty, and thoroughly inadequate. Operational priorities, gasoline shortages and the speed of advance of allied troops made it impractical for most units to get supplies. When the Class II and IV dump moved close enough, the sudden demand by all units of the Army completely exhausted the supply in short order.

i. Summary.

(1) Following is a summary of statistics for the month:

MOVIES

SPECIAL SERVICE COMPANY

Number of shows	420
Number of titles	20
Total attendance	53,669

UNIT PROJECTORS AND FILM LIBRARY

Number of shows	874
Number of titles	23
Total attendance	107,502

TOTAL OF ALL MOVIES

Number of shows	1,294
Number of titles	43
Total attendance	160,171

LIVE SHOWS

Number of performances	25
Total attendance	10,750

CLUBMOBILES

Number of doughnuts served	174,385
Cups of coffee served	54,194

BAND CONCERTS

Number of concerts	23
Total attendance	55,600

EQUIPMENT ISSUED

"B" Kits	
Council Rooms	
"A" Kits	20,4[illegible]

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X. PROVOST MARSHAL.

1. Personnel Available.

a. Military Police units available to V Corps from 1 Sept 44 to 30 Sept 44 were as follows:

(1) Military Police Platoon, Headquarters Company, V Corps.
(2) Security Detachment, Headquarters Company, V Corps.
(3) Company A, 507th Military Police Battalion.
(4) 425th Escort Guard Company.
(5) 4th Infantry Division, Military Police Platoon.
(6) 28th Infantry Division, Military Police Platoon.
(7) 5th Armored Division, Military Police Platoon.
(8) 2nd French Armored Division Military Police (1 Sept to 2 Sept).

2. Civilians.

a. Special efforts were made during September to enforce prohibition against civilians riding in government vehicles. The Corps Military Police company and Division Provost Marshals were instructed to remove on the spot any civilians found improperly in a government vehicle and to report the name of the driver.

b. There were 42 passes issued by the Provost Marshal to civilian inhabitants living within the area occupied by the Corps CP during the month of September. These inhabitants were interrogated by the Corps G-2 prior to the issuance of the passes.

3. Stragglers, AWOL's and Deserters.

a. There were 59 stragglers and 20 AWOL's processed through the Corps Collecting Point during the month of September. Those belonging to units attached or assigned to V Corps, who could be contacted by phone, were returned to their respective organizations by their parent units. When the units could not be contacted by phone, stragglers were returned by the Corps Company. All other stragglers were evacuated to First U.S. Army Collecting points.

b. Headquarters, First U.S. Army advised that commencing 27 September 1944, a daily list of all stragglers and absentees reported by the Provost Marshal, First U.S. Army, would be published. One list was received before the end of September. Procedure was established in Corps Provost Marshal section to contact the Corps units that had stragglers listed and if stragglers had not already been returned, for the Corps Military Police Company to secure them from First U.S. Army and bring to Corps Straggler Collecting Point, where they would be secured by the division or other unit involved.

4. Escapers and Evaders.

a. On arrival at Charleville, 6 September 1944, 63 wounded British soldiers were discovered in an ex-German concentration camp.

5. Consolidated Report of Delinquencies for Month of September, 1944.

	Speeding	Off Limits	Unattended Vehicle	Fraternizing w/civilians	Traffic Violation	Drunk and/or Disorderly		TOTAL
V Corps	4	76	5	11	12		-	108
4th Inf Div	1	7	2	5	8			23
28th Inf Div	6	22	3	9	10			48
5th Armd Div	3	54	9	46	11			125
First US Army	10	30	2	16	3	1		62
Total	- 24	- - 189	21	87	44	1	-	366

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XI. FINANCE.

1. Operations: The following chart shows disbursements and collections for the month of September 1944:

	V Corps Finance Sect.	8th Finance Disb. Section	15th Finance Disb. Section
TOTAL CREDITS for Pay and Allowances (Excluding Travel)	$ 270,752.65	$1,337,853.29	$1,237,115.35
ADD: Repayments of Soldiers' Deposits (Including Interest)	— — —	162.44	350.00
(1) TOTAL CREDITS	$ 270,752.65	[illegible]	[illegible]
LESS: ALLOTMENTS			
Class "B"	$ 12,347.50	$ 68,948.95	$ 68,287.50
Class "E"	92,541.29	423,990.13	425,213.97
Class "F"	22,817.00	150,870.00	147,326.82
Class "X"	1,081.31	1,363.14	1,197.00
Class "D"	235.57	84.20	315.81
Class "N"	16,510.81	99,603.55	85,539.54
(2) TOTAL ALLOTMENTS	$ 145,513.48	$ 749,859.97	$ 727,880.64
(2a) PARTIAL PAYMENTS OFFICERS (Debits)	$ 241.12	$ 105.00	$ 707.42
(2b) TOTAL ITEMS (2) and (2a)	$ 145,754.60	$ 749,964.97	$ 728,588.06
(3) GROSS AMOUNT CHARGEABLE TO APPROPRIATIONS (Item (1) less (2b))	$ 124,998.05	$ 588,050.76	$ 508,877.27
LESS: VOUCHER COLLECTIONS			
PTA - Funds	$ 9,359.95	$ 132,068.63	$ 59,357.37
War Bonds	318.75	1,387.50	600.00
Soldiers' Deposits	6,906.00	27,037.00	15,531.00
Other Collections	6,646.40	21,630.22	18,992.21
(4) TOTAL VOUCHER COLLECTIONS	$ 23,231.10	$ 182,123.35	$ 94,480.58
(5) NET DISBURSEMENTS FOR PAY AND ALLOWANCES (Item (3) less (4))	$ 101,766.95	$ 405,927.41	$ 414,396.69
LESS: CASH COLLECTIONS			
PTA - Funds	$ 191,960.23	$ 96,059.77	$ 76,310.87
War Bonds	1,196.25	3,810.50	1,893.75
Soldiers' Deposits	5,865.00	25,463.00	20,236.00
Other Collections	12,938.28	59.65	3,545.20
(6) TOTAL CASH COLLECTIONS	$ 211,959.76	$ 125,392.92	$ [illegible]
NET CASH RETAINED (Item (5) less (6))	($ 110,192.81)	$ 280,534.49	$ [illegible]

2. Savings. The following is a summary of savings for the month of September 1944:

Total Number of Payees: 27,970
Total Credits for Pay and Allowances: $2,845,721.29
Percentage of allotments to Total Credits: 57 %
Percentage of Net Cash Retained to Total Credits: 17 %
Percentage of Net Cash Retained to Cash Actually Disbursed: 52 %
Average amount retained by each payee: $17.15

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3. Class "B" Allotments. (Purchase of War Bonds by Pay Deductions)

a. W. D. Circular No. 290, 11 July 1944, radically changed the system of issuing bonds purchased by Class "B" Allotment. Instead of an automatic issuance of the bond in the U. S., the new provisions call for issuance of the bonds by the War Bond office in Chicago, only after receipt of a schedule in which the disbursing officers certify to the deduction on payrolls or vouchers.

b. Preliminary information was received on these changes early in August, but W. D. Circular No. 290 was not reproduced in this Theater and complete information was not received until 14 September 1944. The new system became effective 1 September 1944 and the slowness in issuing the circular has seriously hurt War Bond sales by allotments. A teletype as late as 9 September 1944 stated the new plan would not be operative in this Theater so there was much confusion as to how the bonds would be issued. Payrolls and vouchers were delayed and a general feeling of dissatisfaction was noted since this was the third method of purchasing bonds by payroll deduction that has been initiated.

4. Transmission of Funds to the U.S.A. via P.T.A.

a. Figures were compiled for August and September, 1944, on the amount of cash P. T. T.'s and the amount of funds turned in by the Army Post Office for money order sales. These figures are as follows:

July 1944 - Cash P.T.T.'s - $364,000.00; Money Order Cash - APO - $362,000.00
Aug 1944 - Cash P.T.T.'s - $436,000.00; Money Order Cash - APO- $512,000.00

b. There has been a definite trend away from P.T.A. The main reason seems to be the time now required for funds to reach the U.S. via P.T.A. Many factors enter into the matter, but the average soldier can purchase a money order and by sending it air-mail it will reach the U.S. in 14 days or less. Now P.T.T.'s are requiring from three to five weeks for delivery, as compared to the 10 to 14 days when the plan was begun.

c. There is also a personal element which contributes to the increase in the use of money orders. The individual who buys a money order has something tangible to handle and to send home. When a money order is sent home, the sender can write definite instructions as to the disposition of the money. When funds are transmitted via P.T.A, the sender secures a receipt but he must write his instructions and be faced with the fact that the payee will receive the check and the instructions at possibly a wide interval.

d. These facts are being given to the Fiscal Director, ETOUSA, in the hope that interest may be revived in P.T.A.

XII. DISCIPLINE.

1. Courts Martial.

a. The following is a summary of Court Martial convictions for the [illegible] of September:

	GENERAL	SPECIAL	SUMMARY
(1) Corps Troops (under court-martial jurisdiction of V Corps)	5	48	[illegible]
(2) 4th Infantry Division	7	11	[illegible]
(3) 28th Infantry Division	1	9	[illegible]
(4) 5th Armored Division	1	0	[illegible]
Totals	14	[illegible]	[illegible]

b. The following is an analysis of the types of offenses for which [illegible] Troops were tried:

OFFENSES	GENERAL	SPECIAL	SUMMARY
Murder	1		
Assault with intent to do bodily harm with a dangerous weapon	1		

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1. Courts Martial (Cont'd).

OFFENSES	GENERAL	SPECIAL	SUMMARY
Housebreaking	1		
Assault and Battery	1		
AWOL and other violations of A 61	2	34	86
Drunkenness	3	8	
Disrespect to or threatening Superior Officer	2	4	
Disobedience, striking or disrespect to NCO	1	5	2
Wrongful use, sale or destruction of property	2	3	
Careless or wilfull discharge of firearms	1	1	4
Conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman	1		
Wilfull disobedience of superior officer	1		
Wrongful detention of enlisted man	1		
Failure to obey orders of competent authority		4	6
Misbehavior of sentinel		2	
Improper uniform			1
Totals*	18	61	99

NOTE: * These totals include cases where accused has in one trial been found guilty of two or more different types of offenses, hence the total offenses analyzed by type is necessarily greater than the number of cases tried as shown in paragraph a (1), above.

R. V. LEE,
Colonel, GSC,
A C of S, G-1.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A.C. of S., G-3
APO 305, U. S. Army

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Auth: CG V Corps
Date: 3 Oct 44
Initl:

3 October 1944.

ACTION AGAINST ENEMY, REPORTS AFTER/AFTER ACTION REPORTS

Section V - G-3 Civil Affairs Report

1. OPERATIONS

1 September - 3 September - Drive North of PARIS

a. Map References:

Michelin Guide 1/1,000,000, Annex No. 1, attached.

b. This phase started on 29 August following the capture of PARIS and two Detachments were called forward for SENLIS and COMPEIGNE at the close of the month. These Detachments D3B1, Lt. Manno and D7C1, Capt. Porter arrived on 1 September and were briefed and sent forward to COMPEIGNE and SENLIS, respectively, with instructions to place especial emphasis on keeping the roads clear for military traffic, locating available beds for civilian casualties now in Army hospitals and location of captured enemy supplies. The drive progressed rapidly except for temporary delays incident to replacement of destroyed bridges so that by September 2nd a "B" Detachment had been called forward and attached to the 28th Division and held temporarily with the Division scheduled for another town (RETHEL) in the next operation. Additional Detachments were called forward and placed in ST. QUENTIN (C1D1, Maj. O'Connell) and two "D" type Detachments (D5D1, Capt. Hansborough - D6D1, Capt. Kelly) arrived in lieu of a "B" type which had been requested. They were merged under the senior officer Capt. Hansborough and sent forward by forced march at night to VALENCIENNES in response to an urgent request from the SGAO 5th Armored Division. The Detachments at SENLIS and COMPEIGNE reverted to Corps control on 2nd September and passed in turn to Army on 4 September together with the ST. QUENTIN and VALENCIENNES Detachments.

The area as a whole was generally only lightly damaged by the war, essential utilities were functioning and food supply was adequate. Greatest shortage was in transportation which had been confiscated by the Germans to accelerate their retreat. Bread ration was short and meat also but no starvation conditions existed anywhere.

3 September - 11 September - Drive East across BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG to GERMANY

a. Map References:

Michelin Guide - MONS-LUXEMBOURG - Annex 6A, attached.
Overlay - Scale 1/250,000, Annex No. 6, attached.

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b. From the drive North of PARIS that carried the Corps to VALENCIENNES and the BELGIAN border, during which four CA Detachments were placed in as many Arrondissements, the tactical situation changed to a drive due east into BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG. The same divisions were retained in the Corps, namely, the 5th Armored, 4th and 28th Infantry Division.

Policies for Civil Affairs in BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG were received from First U.S. Army through G-5 VII Corps on 5 September 1944.

The drive towards LUXEMBOURG progressed according to plan both tactically and from a Civil Affairs point of view. A total of five Detachments were employed in the remainder of FRANCE. CA Detachment D2D1 was called forward and attached to the 28th Division and was installed by the latter in RETHEL just as soon as it was uncovered. In view of the lack of communications and shortage in gas the Division passed control of this Detachment to Corps immediately and within 24 hours it was in the Army [illegible] due to the drawing of the Corps rear boundary in advance of RETHEL. Detachment B1D1, Major Haginnis, was called forward and installed by Corps in CHARLEVILLE on 5 September 1944. It was planned to place this Detachment in MEZIERES, the twin city of CHARLEVILLE, but it was discovered that the governmental offices had been bombed out and moved across the river to CHARLEVILLE. Detachments D5G1, D5E1, D6E1, D5G1 and G1A1 were called forward and staged in CHARLEVILLE for periods of 24 to 72 hours pending uncovering of towns as follows:

Det.	C.O.	Location	Date Installed
D5E1	Maj. Smith	SEDAN (FRANCE)	7 Sept 44
D5G1	1st Lt. Cunningham	BASTOGNE, ST.HUBERT, HEUFCHATEAU (BELGIUM)	8 Sept 44
D5E1	Capt. Webb	MONTMEDY, STENAY (BELGIUM)	9 Sept 44
D6E1	Capt. Fuller	LONGWY, LONGUYON (FRANCE) (Moved to HEUFCHATEAU)	11 Sept 44 27 Sept 44
G1A1	Maj. Beck	ARLON, VIRTON (BELGIUM)	10 Sept 44

In the above table the first town is the place where the Detachment located and a part time office is maintained in the second.

SEDAN passed to the control of Army on the drawing of the new b on 11 September 1944.

The Corps plan for Civil Affairs contemplated the using of only Detachment for the whole of LUXEMBOURG but on the receipt of information from First U.S. Army saying that all town officials had been removed by the Germans several years ago, five Detachments were called forward and staged at CHARLEVI Those Detachments were all placed under the supervision of Lt. Col. Jett, the of Detachment A1G1 and were assigned and took stations as follows:

A1G1	LUXEMBOURG	Lt. Col. Jett	National Level
D1F1	LUXEMBOURG CITY	Capt. Ehrenclau	City Level
B1B1	BASH	Lt. Col. Hobson	[illegible]

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D6G1	CLERVAUX	Capt. Johnson	Canton and northern portion of country
B1F1	DIEKIRCH	Maj. Matthews	Arrondissement

The position of Lt. Col. Jett as the officer responsible to the Corps Commander through G-5, for Civil Affairs throughout LUXEMBOURG was clouded by the presence of the SHAEF LUXEMBOURG MISSION, whose head, Colonel Frank E. Fra[illegible] allowed himself to be introduced as the representative of the United States Govern[illegible] in LUXEMBOURG in charge of all Civil Affairs. This placed Lt. Col. Jett in a secondary position which was detrimental to his real position as head of Civil Affairs in LUXEMBOURG. This situation was clarified by Corps G-5. Col. Frazer had no written instructions from SHAEF on his duties and responsibilities. The confused state of the Mission was primarily due to a lack of proper instructions from SHAEF and was further accentuated by the fact that it was neither assigned nor attached to any lower echelon, including the Hq. V Corps which was responsible for the Civil administration of the area as the senior tactical unit present. Due to the unsatisfactory situation which resulted, it is recommended that future Missions not be sent to countries without coordinating their arrival with the tactical commander and that they come with written instructions. Later the situation was further confused by they arrival of a British Military Mission as is reported herein.

11 September - 30 September - SIEGFRIED LINE

a. Map References:

Michelin Guide - MONS-LUXEMBOURG.
Overlay - Scale 1/250,000, Annex No. 7, attached.

b. During this period Colonel Thomas J. Moroney, Corps G-5, was awarded the Bronze Star for meritorious service for the period 1 February 1944 to 5 June 1944, based on his exceptional work in preparing the Corps Civil Affairs Plan for Operation "HEPTURE".

c. The following Detachments were called forward on 12 September and staged as follows:

D2C1	Capt. Greene	REDANGE	for RENICK (Later Spearhead for 4th Division)
D6H1	Maj. Ewill	WILTZ	for GRAVENMACHEN (Retained as Refugee Det at WI[illegible])
D7U1	Capt. Porter	MERSCH	for ESCHTERNACH (Later Spearhead for 9th Armd [illegible])

On the evening of the 9th September, the Corps Commander, contemplating an attack which would carry the Corps into GERMANY, directed Corps G-5 to take the necessary action to be prepared to establish Military Government in the Corps Zone on entry into GERMANY. General Orders No. 51, Hq. V Corps was accordingly prepared by G-5 and coordinated with the other Staff Sections. No Proclamations, Ordinances, Handbooks or other policies on Military Government in Germany were available from Army at that time. G.O. No. 51 was delivered to units on the early morning of 11 [illegible] On 12 September 1944, SHAEF Handbooks, Proclamations, Laws Nos. 1 & 5 and Ordinances Nos. 1 & 2 for Germany were received. (Annexes 23 through 27 inclusive) These superseded the "Military Orders to Civil Authorities" and "Regulations" attached as Appendices Nos. 1 & 2 to the General Order and they were rescinded by letter of 1[illegible]

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September 1944, Annex No. 12 hereto. The first Proclamation was reported posted in Germany by Lt. Col. Stone of the 4th U.S. Infantry Division in the village of ELCHENMATH at 1930 hours 12 September 1944.

The first posters were inadequate as they failed to cover such routine matters as blackout, gathering of groups, etc. The 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions cured this defect by publishing additional instructions shown in Annexes Nos. 21 and 22 attached.

First U.S. Army recognized the need for coverage of these factors issued the Ordinances attached as Annex No. 28. Additional notices covering Historical Monuments and military routes were received from First U.S. Army on 16 September. See Annex No. 29.

A substantial supply of forms was received on 21 September and breakdown was made to Divisions. Other necessary forms, particularly Court forms were not received at the end of the month.

All CA Detachments in LUXEMBOURG were retained directly under Corps control. In the course of a routine staff visit on 19 September, the presence of a platoon of 25 FFI was discovered at DIEKIRCH who had been brought in by a Lt. De Vaulx of the French FFI. The presence was reported to C-3 and the Chief of Staff stated there was no objection to their presence so long as they were willing to kill Germans. This became material at a later date as will be disclosed.

On 19 September the Corps Chief of Staff expressed the wish that there were on central leader in the LUXEMBOURG Resistance from whom he could obtain accurate information as to forces available and their disposition so that missions could be assigned them. As a result a conference was held between Col. Fraser and Major Konstanek of the LUXEMBOURG MISSION, Lt. Col. Jett, C.O. CA Det AIC1, Lt. Col. Pharr, Asst. G-5 V Corps and six surviving leaders of the LUXEMBOURG Resistance who had bound themselves into an organization called D'Union. Absent was Dr. Koents, lead of D'Union who was captured by the Germans two days previously and presumed to be dead. In addition to agreeing not to issue any more proclamations to the people an agreement to recognize Major Ensch, of the LUXEMBOURG MISSION as head of the Armed Forces of Luxembourg was signed. Annex No. 30. Major Ensch was furhter recognized by the Mission as the head of these forces and cleared as loyal CIC V Corps and Twelfth Army Group "T" Force. A conference between Maj. Ensch and the Corps Chief of Staff of First U.S. Army was held on the subject of Arms for his forces. As a result 1000 captured rifles were furnished by Army and of these 500 were made serviceable by Corps Ordnance. These together with 90,000 rounds of ammunition were delivered to the LUXEMBOURG MISSION on 29 September.

On 21 September a report was received by CA Detachment AIC1 that Lt. De Vaulx, the French FFI Officer mentioned above, was about to issue a Proclamation proclaiming Martial Law and proposed to return to France for additional forces. Some D'Union leaders were under the impression that Lt. De Vaulx had the backing of the U.S. Forces as he was originally introduced by an unidentified American Officer. The Resistance leaders quickly withdrew their support when Lt. De Vaulx's unauthorized action was explained and after a brief conference with Corps FFI Liaison Officer, Lt. De Vaulx denied all connection with French FFI Forces in LUXEMBOURG and was reported to have returned to France on 23 September. The potential coup d'etat was frustrated and no further complaints on his activities were received thereafter.

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Following a conference of Corps G-5s and Division MGOs at First Army Hq on 25 September, the following detachments with the Corps were relieved and attached to Divisions as "spearhead" Detachments.

D2C1	Capt. Owen	4th Infantry Division
D1F1	Capt. Ehrenclou	28th Infantry Division
D7G1	Capt. Porter	5th Armored Division

These Detachments were in effect an augmentation of Division Military Government staffs by French trained Civil Affairs Detachment personnel. The lack of linguists was expected to be detrimental and only partially offset by the advantage of their Civil Affairs training.

On 26 September the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division determined that it would be necessary for security reasons to evacuate German civilians from certain towns in forward areas of the Division. Arrangements were completed and approximately 400 individuals were evacuated to ST. VITH where Detachment D1G1, Capt. Green, was designated to operate a Corps Evacuation Center. Two days later an additional 160 were added. The German Nationals were guarded by members of the Corps Military Government Police Battalion.

To provide training for the Provisional Military Government Police Battalion of the Corps, the Chief of Staff approved their assignment to duty in towns in conjunction with Civil Affairs Detachments to test their supply echelon and orient the Detachments on their work. This proved very beneficial to both Military Government Personnel and Civil Affairs Detachments.

On 27 September 1944, the Commanding General, 28th Infantry Division determined it desireable for security reasons to evacuate civilians from an 8 Km area in LUXEMBOURG running from KALBORN on the North to HOSINGEN on the South along highway N16. Corps Chief of Staff approved late that day and by 1800 hours on 28 September a total of 782 civilians from 14 communities had been evacuated together with livestock by the Military Government Staff of the 28th Division in conjunction with CA Detachment D6G1, Capt. Johnson, CLERVAUX. All were absorbed within CLERVAUX Canton by civilians therein.

On 28 September 1944, Colonel Moroney discovered on a Staff Visit to A1C1, Lt. Col. Jett, LUXEMBOURG CITY, that a British Brigadier had arrived in that city with orders from SHAEF designating this group of 6 officers and 23 other ranks SHAEF Military Mission of LUXEMBOURG nothwithstanding the presence of the V Corps, 83rd Infantry Division of XX Corps then in the process of relieving elements of V Corps and the fact that this city is far within the American sector. This third "Authority" confused the already muddled situation caused by the presence of the LUXEMBOURG MISSION representing SHAEF and the Civil Affairs Detachments responsible to the CG, V Corps for the same area. An understanding was reached that neither of the Missions nor the Detachment would take any action on a National Level without coordinating with the other so as to preserve a semblance of order in a thoroughly scrambled situation. At that point due to a change in Army boundaries the CA Detachments at ESCH and LUXEMBOURG passed from the responsibility of V Corps.

Capt. James M. Roberts, Inf., Reported to duty with the section on 23 September. Capt. Roberts, a qualified glider infantryman formerly aide-de-camp to Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, who left the Corps to return to the States on special war Department orders.

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Under a new Corps policy in occupied territory to place the Corps CP in the most suitable cover, a G-5 officer was designated to join the bivouac party of the Hq. Comdt in selecting new CPs prepared to arrange for evacuation of civilians if necessary. Capt. Roberts made the first such trip on 29 Sep[illegible]er.

On 29 September instructions were received from First U.S. Army to the effect that since official Military Government Proclamations, Laws and Ordinances had been received from SHAEF it would be appreciated to rescind Corps G.O. No. 51. Accordingly G.O. No. 51 was rescinded and replaced by G.O. No. 58, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex No. 46.

In addition a letter of instructions to Military Government Detachments was prepared by the Section anticipating the arrival of these Detachments. ANNEX No 47

In order to clarify who wil do the things prescribed by G.O. No. 58, A Corps Circular was in the course of preparation and being coordinated with interested Staff Sections when the month closed.

2. Summary.

Civil Affairs functions as distinguished from Military Government were performed by V Corps from 6 June 1944 to 30 September 1944, [illegible] a total of 3 countries employing 45 CA Detachments and assisting in re-establishing indigious governments over a total population of 3,730,834 individuals.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations:

a. Based on observations in LUXEMBOURG CITY, it is recommended as follows:

(1) That Missions coming sponsored by SHAEF be furnished specific written orders as to their authority and duties.

(2) That such Missions be advised of the existence of other Missions emanating from the same Headquarters and that their activites be coordinated.

(3) That such Missions not be authorized to enter any country until the military situation has been completely clarified and the Mi[illegible] called forward by the tactical commander responsible for the area.

(4) That while in the area of the tactical commander, the Mission be attached to the tactical hq. concerned.

T. J. HORNER,
Colonel, [illegible]
A.C. of S., G-3.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A.C. of S., G-5
APO 305, U. S. Army

ANNEXES

1. Map of major efforts of Corps with CA Detachments indicated.
2. PARIS reports.
3. Statistical Information.
4. Overlay - Drive North of PARIS
   a. SHAEF Letter on CA in BELGIUM.
5. Belgian Proclamations.
   a. Unsigned letter on Civil Administration in Belgium.
6. Overlay - Driver Through BELGIUM.
7. Overlay - CA in LUXEMBOURG.
8. Map of LUXEMBOURG.
9. Letter on CA - LUXEMBOURG.
10. CA Handbook - LUXEMBOURG.
    a. LUXEMBOURG Information from First U.S. Army.
    b. Agreement with Resistance.
11. General Orders No. 51.
12. Letter Military Government in GERMANY.
13. Oath of Office.
14. Overlay of proposed Operations in GERMANY.
15. Assignments of Officers Military Government Police Force.
16. Instructions for V Corps - Military Government Police.
17. Instructional Data on Military Government issued by Military Government Police.
18. Instructional Data - German Government and Nazi Party.
19. Military Government Police Armbands.
20. Improvised Arrest Report Form.
21. Additional Proclamation by 4th U.S. Infantry Division.
22. Additional Ordinance issued by 28th U.S. Infantry Division.
23. SHAEF Military Government Proclamation No. 1-Establishing Military Government.
24. SHAEF Military Government Law No. 1-Abrogation of Nazi Law.
25. SHAEF Military Government Ordinance No. 1-Regulation for Civilians.
26. SHAEF Military Government Ordinance No. 2-Military Courts.
27. SHAEF Military Government Law No. 5 - Dissolution of Nazi Party.
28. First U.S. Army - Official Notice to the Public.
29. First U.S. Army - Historic Monuments.
30. SHAEF Ordinance No. 3 - Official Language.
31. SHAEF Signs - Military Route.
32. First U.S. Army - Letter- Administration of Military Government in Germany.
33. 28th U.S. Infantry Division - Warning to Civilians.
34. Letters in German on Banks.
35. " " " " "
36. " " " " "
37. " " " " "
38. " " " " "
39. Travel Restrictions.
40. Curfew.
41. Frontier Control.
42. Surrender of Firearms, etc.
43. Currency.
44. Ordinance No. 3 - Official Language.
45. Travel Restrictions.
46. V Corps G.O. No. 28.
47. Letter of Instructions to CA Detachment Commanders.

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SECTION I - G-3 Report of Operations

1. Operations.

0100001B August to 0424000B August 1944 - Offensive Period.

The enemy was in withdrawal along the V Corps front at the start of August but was fighting strong rearguard actions to delay the general allied advance. V Corps was meeting stiffening resistance north of the VIRE River.

General GEROW ordered the advance continued and a crossing of the VIRE River to be made by the 35th and 2nd Infantry Divisions. The 5th Division was in position on the Corps left, with the 2nd Infantry operating south of FORMIGNY 1(NW)2UE, temporarily in the British zone. The divisions pushed southward across the VIRE River.

First US Army Field Order No. 3, issued on 1 August, gave instructions for V Corps to immediately stop any forward movement by elements of the 5th Division in the British zone. These elements were to be withdrawn to within the V Corps boundary and the division was to assemble for movement to an unspecified area as directed by First Army. 2nd and 35th Divisions were to continue the Corps advance until they reached a point where the corps boundaries joined and the V Corps zone was temporarily pinched out north of VIRE.

Field Order No. 17, V Corps, was issued at 0120000B August to provide for carrying out the Army instructions. It provided for a continuation of the advance south.

Enemy resistance was strong but a steady advance was maintained by the 2nd and 35th Infantry Divisions until 5 August when General GEROW, at 0821, notified First US Army that all units of the Corps were on the objective, enabling an advance by the XIX Corps across the V Corps front.

Corps Artillery gave general support to the advance during this period but because of the rapidly moving situation most missions were fired by div[illegible] artillery. Counterbattery, interdiction and harassing missions were fired. Engineers supported the advance by opening roads behind the divisions and through normal engineer duties. As the period closed they constructed six bridges across the VIRE River. There was very little enemy air activity over the V Corps zone, only one enemy aircraft being engaged by Corps antiaircraft units. The 102nd Cavalry Group patrolled in front of and to the flanks of the divisions and maintained contact with the British. Armored units were in support of the infantry during the advance. Tank destroyer units were prepared for employment but the enemy withdrawal gave little need for them during this period. Armed reconnaissance missions were flown by the IX Air Support Command but no support missions were flown for the V Corps. The 51st Chemical Battalion gave support to the divisions with fog markers. Signal units maintained communications throughout the advance.

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Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Assd)	Detached
[illegible] Engr Brig Gp Hq	VIII TAC Gun Bn (Pt)
2nd Spec Serv Co	Det 399th, 1st ESA Bngt
	Det 882d, 1st ESA Bngt

During this period the V Corps maintained a steady advance against a withdrawing enemy who was fighting a strong covering action from successive positions. It had crossed the VIRE River and was holding positions north of the town of VIRE.

0700CB August to 0700CB August 1944 - Defensive Period. Occupation of VIRE.

V Corps occupied positions on the "limit of advance" on 5 and 6 August while the 29th Division of the XIX Corps moved across the V Corps front and captured VIRE. First US Army Field Order No. 5, issued on 5 August, relieved the 29th Division from V Corps attachment and attached the 29th Division after completion of its mission of capturing VIRE. When this was done, V Corps was to advance in column of divisions in a zone extending generally southwest from VIRE. It was to capture as its first objective the ridges and stream beds between VIRE-HERMAY and ST JEAN des BOIS.

On 7 August 1944, under instructions from First US Army, the 9th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division was sent into VIRE to relieve the 116th Infantry of the 29th Division for an attack to the south. The attack to the south by First Army was to turn eastward with a pivot on VIRE, which the 2nd Division was ordered to hold at all costs. V Corps continued its defensive mission through 9 August.

Corps Artillery continued active counterbattery and harassing missions during this period and fired a large number of interdiction missions. Great engineer duties were performed by Corps Engineer units, who improved roads and cleared as much of VIRE as possible in preparation for further movements. Corps antiaircraft units engaged only two enemy aircraft over the V Corps area during this period. The 102nd Cavalry Group was assembled in Corps reserve. Assigned forces were in assembly areas, performing maintenance in preparation for further operations. Tank destroyer units were spotted to provide protection against a mechanized attack but engaged in no action. No air support missions were flown for V Corps during this period. Signal units continued normal duties. The 63rd Chemical Battalion was in position to give support to the Infantry if required.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Assd)	Detached
None	VIII Tank Bn (L) - 06[illegible]
	104th FA Bn - [illegible]
	Det Bngt, 1st ESA Bngt - 6 August
	645th TD Bn (SP) - 7 August

V Corps had a defensive mission during this period. It held the position except for the relief of the 116th Infantry by the 9th Infantry of the 2nd Division in the occupation and defense of VIRE.

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[illegible] August to [illegible] August - Offensive Phase.

V Corps advance southward beginning on 10 August. The enemy was withdrawing his forces, fighting delaying actions on successive lines. Resistance met by V Corps varied from very slight to heavy, but the advance was steady toward the objectives assigned by First US Army's Field Order No. 5. The 29th Infantry Division (-116th RCT) was attached to V Corps on 12 August. V Corps Field Order No. 19, issued 13 August, ordered continuation of the advance to the southeast to capture TINCHEBRAY, which was to be taken by the 2nd Division. The Corps pushed forward and the objectives were captured on 15 August.

Meanwhile, large German forces were being encircled within a ring of allied troops. V Corps had turned east and was applying pressure against this pocket from the west. These positions were held through 17 August.

Active counterbattery and harassing policies were continued by V Corps Artillery, the also fired many support missions for the British advance on the left of the V Corps zone. Engineers continued normal support duties, increasing road note to the front line divisions. Antiaircraft artillery engaged only three enemy aircraft during this period. The 102nd Cavalry Group assisted in the 2nd Division action and conducted reconnaissance missions. Elements of this group captured TINCHEBRAY and held it until relieved by infantry. Armored forces supported the infantry in the advance. Tank destroyer units were not engaged but were prepared to provide anti-armored defense. Only air support for V Corps during the period was tactical reconnaissance on the period closed. Signal units maintained communications. The 81st Chemical Battalion used their mortars to support the infantry advance.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Assd)	Detached
[illegible] Bn - 10 August	[illegible] Bn - [illegible] August
[illegible] Bn - 10 August	[illegible] Bn - [illegible] August
[illegible] Inf Div (-116 RCT) - [illegible] Aug	3 Plat [illegible] Bn & Pon Co - [illegible] August
[illegible] Bn - [illegible] August	[illegible] Bn & [illegible] Co - [illegible] August
[illegible] Bn - [illegible] August	Bty A 37 FA Bn - 12 August
[illegible] AAA AW Bn (M) - [illegible] August	[illegible] Bn Trk Co - 12 August
[illegible], 1st [illegible] Regt - 12 August	[illegible], 1st [illegible] Regt - 14 August
[illegible] FA Bn ([illegible] Gun) - 14 August	
[illegible] FA Bn ([illegible] Gun) - 14 August	

V Corps during this period continued advancing to the southeast and occupied TINCHEBRAY, then provided pressure against a pocket in which large numbers of German groups were being trapped.

[illegible] August to [illegible] August 1944 - Offensive Period (Pocket Phase)

The Corps, V Corps, was called to First US Army headquarters at [illegible], 14 August, ordered to take command of the [illegible] Infantry Division and the 1st French Armored Division, which were [illegible] to the south of [illegible] and [illegible]. The mission was to capture [illegible] and [illegible] and to close the gap through which the enemy was [illegible] from the pocket by effecting contact with the British, [illegible] forces advancing southeast from the FALAISE area. The [illegible] was to be strongly defended and the U.S. units were out of [illegible]

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General GEROW assumed command of this force at 171430B August and ordered an attack to start at 180630 to accomplish his mission. Heavy German resistance slowed the advance but the 90th Infantry Division captured CHAMBOIS and made contact with an allied force there at 2015 hours, 19 August. ARGENTAN was captured by the 80th Division on 20 August.

The gap was bridged when the allied forces had made contact at CHAMBOIS on 19 August but there were holes to the north between CHAMBOIS and FALAISE through which the enemy was still escaping. In the American sector the enemy was making desperate attempts to escape but any major exodus was prevented. Heavy losses both in personnel and material were caused and a great number of prisoners of war were taken.

The U. S. forces under General GEROW's command were ordered to turn over the sector to the British as they advanced from the north and to withdraw to assembly areas south of the ARGENTAN - EXMES road. This was accomplished on 22 August.

During this period artillery supported the Corps advance and heavily pounded the enemy attempts to escape through the gap. Many enemy columns were destroyed by the artillery fire against the gap, which was under direct observation by our artillery. Hills ringed the gap in which the German forces had been trapped, and artillery was emplaced in positions giving full observation. A serious blow was dealt the enemy forces in the artillery pounding. A 2-hour artillery truce was declared by the 90th Division on 20 August to give the enemy an opportunity to surrender and 2,000 prisoners were taken during this period. Divisional engineer units supported the advance but Corps units were moving to the new Corps sector. Only enemy air activity during the period were small attempts to supply troops in the pocket from the air. Corps antiaircraft engaged one enemy plane that was attempting to parachute 88mm ammunition to the trapped units. The plane was seen to crash. The 102nd Cavalry Group was assembled and moved to the new Corps zone but was not committed. Armored units were attached to the divisions for the attack and provided fire against enemy strong points and vehicles. Tank destroyer units engaged enemy vehicles as they attempted to escape. Except for one tactical reconnaissance over the Corps front, no air support missions were flown for V Corps. The 81st Chemical Battalion was not committed. Signal units performed normal communications duties.

Attached (or Aggd)
2nd Armored Division - 180600
99th Inf Bn (Sep)(-Det A) - 180600
258th FA Bn (155mm Gun) - 180600 c
65th Armd FA Bn - 180600
702nd TD Bn (SP) - 180600
195th AAA AW Bn (SP) - 180600
196th FA Bn - 180600
Btry A 17 FA Obsn Bn - 181145
1121 Engr Gp Hq & Hq Co - 18 August
146th Engr C Bn - 18 August
112th Engr C Bn - 18 August
1 Plat 610 Engr L Equip Co - 18 Aug
1 Plat 1501st Engr Water Sup Co -18 Aug
413th AAA Gun Bn (M) - 182400
80th Inf Div - 17 August
90th Inf Div - 17 August
610th TD Bn - 17 August

Detached.
2nd Infantry Division - 182400
612 TD Bn - 182400
Det CCSL, 1st BSA Regt - 17 August
2nd CIC Det - 18 August
Det, 120 Cal Proc Co - 18 August
2nd Armd Div - 190900
702nd TD Bn (SP) - 190900
195th AAA AW Bn (SP) - 190900
65th Armd FA Bn - 190900
258th FA Bn (155mm Gun) - 190900
99th Inf Bn (Sep)(-Det A) - 190900
Det CCSL, 1st BSA Regt - 18 August
29th Inf Div (-116 Inf) - 19 August
821st TD Bn - 19 August

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702nd Tk Bn - 17 August
297th AAA AW Bn (M) - 17 August
207th TD Bn - 17 August
[illegible] TD Bn - 17 August
633rd AAA AW Bn (M) - 17 August
2nd French Armd Div - 17 August
90th CIC Det - 17 August
90th CIC Det - 17 August
Det GLDL, 1st ECA Regt - 20 August
Det MLKL, 1st ECA Regt - 20 August

During this period V Corps assumed command of US forces in the ARGENTAN - ERMES area and closed the gap around the pocket of German troops. CHAMBOIS was captured and contact made with allied forces from the north, after which V Corps turned the sector over to the British, withdrawing south of the ARGENTAN - ERMES road.

PHASE: August to 28 August 1944 - Advance to and capture of PARIS.

At 1440, 22 August, General KEAN, Chief of Staff, First US Army, ordered General GROW to The HQ, First US Army, for instructions. The 2nd French Armored Division and the 102nd Cavalry Group were alerted for a quick move to the east. At First Army The HQ, General GROW was informed that Resistance Groups in PARIS had begun fighting with the German forces in the city on 19 August. The Paris police force had joined the French Resistance Groups and the French Forces of the Interior had gained control of the capital. On 20 August the Germans had asked for an armistice during which they could pass troops then on the west of PARIS through the city to the east without fighting. This armistice was granted, to expire at noon 23 August.

However, the Germans did not in fact keep the armistice. Fighting continued through the period although some German troops did withdraw through the city. The F.F.I. was low on ammunition and supplies and needed reinforcement.

General GROW was ordered to take command of a force to march on PARIS, relieve the F.F.I. and assume control of the city. This force was to consist of the 2nd French Armored Division, the 4th US Infantry Division, and the 102nd Cavalry Group, to be followed by other Corps troops. Relief of the F.F.I. was to be effected immediately afternoon 23 August, if possible, but no troops were to enter the city until the armistice had expired. The city was to be entered only if the resistance could be overcome with light forces as General EISENHOWER did not desire heavy fighting within the city. The 4th Infantry Division was to take positions south and southeast of the city, seize crossings over the SEINE River and establish a strong bridgehead.

The march on PARIS by this force began by two routes during the night 22-23 August. General R. F. SERGER, commander of the F.F.I., was designated as the representative of General EISENHOWER, and General DeGAULLE, and was to take over the administration of civil government as military governor of PARIS.

The 2nd French Armored Division met strong resistance from enemy groups in the vicinity of TRAPES, VERSAILLES and the RAMBOUILLET Forest. It was unable to enter the city on 23 August. The 4th Infantry Division was stopped at the end of the day at [illegible], ESSAY, [illegible]-sur-ORGE and LEUVILLE-sur-ORGE. The 102nd Cavalry Group, with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop attached, had ad-

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[illegible] and had seized and held an airport.

On 24 August First US Army instructed General GEROW that V Corps must enter PARIS without delay. Both the 2nd French Armored Division and the 4th Infantry Division were instructed to advance vigorously, without regard to the other, to insure that the city was relieved. Orders not to become engaged in heavy fighting within the city were explained as not applying to its outer environs. No entry was made into the city on 24 August, however, because of the resistance encountered in the form of road blocks and enemy strong points.

First entry into the city was reported by CC "L" of the 2nd French Armored Division which crossed the PONT de SEVRE into PARIS at 250700B. No opposition was encountered in the entry but sporadic fighting developed as the march into the city continued. At 1000 hours the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron reported elements were entering the city, they were at NOTRE DAME Cathedral at 1120, and the squadron was at the center of the city at 1430. The Chamber of Deputies and the Ministry of Marine were taken by the 2nd French Armored Division at 1730. The Germans were reported to be surrendering easily after a show of force.

At 2045, General LeCLERC, commanding the 2nd French Armored Division, reported to General GEROW that General von CHOLTITZ, commanding the German forces in PARIS, had surrendered with his staff. Under the surrender terms General von CHOLTITZ dispatched staff officers to accompany allied elements to the enemy strong points and order them to surrender.

The 4th Infantry Division was clearing resistance in the southern part of the city and six companies of the 22nd Infantry had crossed the SEINE in the vicinity of BOURG, establishing a bridgehead. A Treadway Bridge was under construction. Only scattered resistance remained in PARIS, mostly from snipers.

Clearing the isolated resistance in PARIS continued on 26 August.

Field Order No. 22, V Corps, was issued at 262200B August, assigning missions of clearing the southwestern environs of PARIS. This task was begun on 27 August. The objectives were reached by both the 2nd French Armored Division and the 4th Infantry Division. LeBOURGET airfield was taken by the French after hard fighting. All Corps objectives well outside PARIS limits were reached during the day.

V Corps was preparing to continue the advance from PARIS. On 28 August the 28th Infantry Division and the 5th Armored Division were attached to the Corps. The 28th Infantry Division was ordered to assemble on the outskirts of the city to participate in a parade on 29 August, enroute to positions northeast of the city. The 5th Armored Division was assembled in the vicinity of VERSAILLES.

Corps Artillery was operating on a silent policy during this period and [illegible] placed all units to the vicinity of PARIS. Engineers performed normal duties and moved to the new Corps area. Antiaircraft units were moved to the vicinity of PARIS and were in defense of the city and the Corps units. Two engagements with enemy aircraft bombing PARIS were reported. The IX Tactical Air Force supported the Corps ops which with missions during this period. The 102nd Cavalry accompanied the two divisions in the advance to PARIS and the 38th Reconnaissance Squadron was the first U.S. unit to enter the city. Tank destroyer units provided antimechanized defense and moved to the new Corps sector. They

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engaged enemy armor on several occasions. Other Corps units gave normal support and moved to the new Corps zone.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Assd)	Detached
Det C2H1, 1st ECA Regt - 23 August	41st Repl Bn - 25 August
Det C1F1, 1st ECA Regt - 24 August	977 FA Bn (8" Howz) - 250600
629th TD Bn (SP) - 25 August	80th Inf Div - 25 August
Det R2H1, 1st ECA Regt - 26 August	90th Inf Div - 25 August
18th AAA Gp - 270600 August	
116th AAA Gun Bn - 270600 August	
28th Inf Div - 28 August	
447th AAA AW Bn - 28 August	
5th Armd Div - 281200B August	
387th AAA AW Bn - 281200B August	
628th TD Bn - 281200B August	
987th FA Bn - 281200B August	

During this period V Corps advance on PARIS, entered the city, and relieved the French Forces of the Interior who had gained partial control of the capital. The city was cleared of enemy resistance, the German forces surrendering on 25 August, after which only scattered resistance, mostly from snipers, was encountered. The Corps pushed to the northeastern environs of the city and prepared to assume a further mission.

290001B August to 312400B August 1944 - Offensive Phase-Advance to the Northeast.

Control of the City of PARIS and the suburbs was turned over by General GEROW to General KOENIG, Military Governor of PARIS at 281200B August. At the same time military control of the Paris area was turned over th the SHAEF Section, Communication Zone.

Field Order No. 23, V Corps, was issued at 281100B August 1944. It provides V Corps will advance rapidly to the northeast in its zone. Early on 29 August, 4th Infantry Division was to advance in its sector. Early on 30 August, 28th Infantry Division was to advance in its sector. The advance was to be by successive phase lines, six of which were assigned in the order. First phase line was a line running generally from the BOIS de BOMBY, FORET de GUISE, SENLIS, IERS, ATHIS, ROUVRES, MARGHEMONT, ST SAUFFLEUR, to BOMBY. After the attack was underway, 5th Armored Division was to pass through the infantry divisions and continue the advance. The 2nd French Armored Division was to remain in the vicinity of PARIS to clear remaining resistance and defend the area.

The 4th Infantry Division jumped off as ordered early 29 August. It advanced approximately 12 miles, gaining all objectives of phase 1. The 28th Division paraded through PARIS on the afternoon of 29 August enroute to positions northeast of the city, from which they would attack the following day. Together with armored and artillery units, the 28th Division was reviewed at PLACE de la CONCORD after a march down CHAMPS des ELYSEES, by Generals BRADLEY, HODGES, GEROW, DeGAULLE and KOENIG.

On 30 August the 4th Armored Division began passing through the infantry elements. The 4th Division advanced beyond phase line B and attained Le BOIS du ROI. The 28th Division penetrated the southern edge of the FORET de

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COMPIEGNE. The line reached by V Corps at the end of the month ran generally along the north edge of the FORET de HALATTE, the south edge of the FORET de COMPIEGNE, and the north edge of the FORET DOMANIALE RETZ. Armored elements penetrated to the center of the FORET de COMPIEGNE, and to the AISNE River on the right.

The Corps field artillery units supported the advances of the divisions during the period. Engineer units were attached to the divisions and gave support through performance of normal engineer duties. No enemy air activity was reported over the Corps zone during the period. Corps antiaircraft units were prepared to defend PARIS and Corps installations. Armored elements were in the attack, the 5th Armored Division pushing through the infantry divisions and led the advance. Tank battalions were attached to each infantry division. Tank destroyer units were assembled for use on any threatened sector of the Corps front. Signal units encountered difficulty maintaining communications because of the speed of the advance, but kept essential contacts open.

Attachments to and detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached or (lost)	Detached
None	None

During this period the V Corps advanced northeast from PARIS. The 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions started the advance and were passed through by the 5th Armored Division. At the close of the period the Corps had crossed the second phase line and was approximately 45 miles northeast of PARIS.

V Corps had been assigned several missions during August and had accomplished all of them. First, it had advanced southward as the month started, to a point just north of VIRE. After a short halt, it had again taken up the advance to the southeast, reaching and capturing FONTENAY. Turning eastward, it applied pressure against the German forces in the so-called ARGENTAN-FALAISE pocket. Assigned a task of closing the gap to this pocket, Corps moved to the ARGENTAN-ERMES area and closed the gap, capturing CHAMBOIS and encircling enemy elements. A new mission was given of advancing to PARIS and securing control of the city, which was accomplished, after which an advance to the northeast of PARIS was ordered. This advance was continuing as August ended.

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Historical Record
Section, Headquarters V Corps

Month of August 7 September 1944.

PART I - ENEMY SITUATION

Period 1 - 5 August

During this brief period at the beginning of the month, the enemy gradually withdrew in the direction of VIRE fighting a stubborn delaying action until on 5 August the V Corps was pinched out north of VIRE and contact with enemy was lost.

On 1 August the enemy forces opposing V Corps were identified as follows: units of 3rd Parachute Division still constituted the bulk of enemy opposition. On our western sector troops of 8 Parachute Rifle Regiment with a few from 895 Infantry Regiment, (265th Infantry Division), and 899 Infantry Regiment, (266th Infantry Division), offered the strongest resistance. In the center of the front, elements of the other two parachute rifle regiments, (5 and 9), together with 12 Parachute Reconnaissance Battalion, (II Parachute Corps), withdrew about 3,500 meters. A withdrawal of 2,500 meters was made on the eastern portion of the front where prisoners of war were taken from 752 Infantry Regiment, (326th Infantry Division), which had previously been identified in the British sector on our left.

The following day these enemy units strongly resisted our attempts to take the ridge just south of the Vire River, probably with the intention of protecting the withdrawal of enemy forces on the XIX Corps front to the west.

Early on 3 August enemy forces withdrew approximately 4 miles on our right front. However, the enemy line was stabilized later in the day on the high ground northeast of BEAUMESNIL (T-565 380) running down to ETOUVY (T-640 375). There were strong indications that enemy units were no longer organized on a regimental sector basis, and the capture of prisoners from miscellaneous headquarters units of 3rd Parachute Division and II Parachute Corps indicated that they had suddenly become front line troops. The 460 GHQ Artillery Battalion was identified on our front for the first time.

On 4 August, the 35th (U.S.) Infantry Division reached its objective south of the Vire River in the BEAUMESNIL area (T-57 37) to (T-60 35). In our left sector, however, the enemy forces continued to oppose us with considerable fire. That units were no longer fighting as independent cohesive bodies became apparent from the fact that 36 prisoners of war taken by the two divisions of V Corps represented 17 different units. The total number of P/W's taken during this period was 319.

Period 6 - 9 August

The V Corps was not in contact with the enemy during the period from 6 August to 9 August.

Period 10 - 16 August

When enemy forces were again contacted by units of V Corps on 10 August, southeast of VIRE, there were indications that the badly battered 363rd Infantry Division, for some time in operation against Allied Forces, was being relieved by 331st Infantry Division. Several P/W's were taken from 557 and 558 Infantry Regiments who said that their units had just arrived from the PAS DE CALAIS area.

On the first day of V Corps' reappearance on a narrow front, these enemy forces were driven back about 2,000 meters to the southeast beyond MAISONCELLES LA JOURDAN (T-66 27), not without offering stiff resistance. During the following two days enemy forces were pushed back approximately three miles except in the center of the V Corps front where resistance was stronger. The enemy gave no ground until definitely compelled to do so, and then only by making our advance as costly as possible. On our right enemy units had retreated to the vicinity of LA FOURERE (T-66 23) and LE MOIMERIE (T-67 23)

By 14 August the identifications of P/W's captured on the V Corps front indicated that enemy opposition consisted of a conglomeration of units pushed out from farther west. New identifications were: 4 Marsch Battalion, 195 Marsch Battalion, and 482 Ersatz Battalion. The prisoners from the Marsch Battalions had been on furlough, but were hastily organized into formations for front line duty.

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Although the enemy once more attempted to fix a line of defense, little resistance continued to be offered to our advance until the taking of the TINCHEBRAY sector once again pinched out the V Corps from the First Army front. The number of P/W's taken from 6 August to 16 August (inclusive) reached a total of 1044.

Period 17 August

The V Corps was assigned to a new sector north of SEES on 16 August and was therefore not in contact with the enemy until 18 August when operations in the new area began.

Period 18 - 21 August

By 2400 hours of the first day's operations on the new sector of V Corps, the enemy was generally disposed along the following line: from north of ECOUCHE (19 16) generally northeast to south of ARGENTAN, thence northeast through the eastern part of the FORET DE GOUFFIN and to the south of EXMES (44 45). East of EXMES as far as CROISIERES (52 44) and southward as far as LERLERAULT (52 38) enemy opposition consisted of scattered elements of various units. The flank guards of the ECOUCHE - LE BOURG ST. LEONARD line were composed principally of the two battalions of 60 Panzer Grenadier Regiment and 116 Reconnaissance Battalion, (116th Panzer Division), elements of 2nd SS Panzer Division DaS REICH, and 728 Infantry Regiment, (708th Infantry Division).

On the following day, 19 August, the enemy was forced back on our west flank to a point just north of SENTILLY (U-19 21). With the juncture of Canadian and American troops at CHAMBOIS (Q-41 51), at 1930 hours, enemy troops on the V Corps front west of CHAMBOIS as well as those opposing Allied Forces to the west and north were surrounded. Desperate efforts to escape were made by various small groups of tanks and infantry, but these were rapidly dealt with. To the east of CHAMBOIS, the enemy was established generally along the CHAMBOIS-GACE highway although in some places he had been driven several hundred meters north of the road.

The enemy did not seriously contest our entry into ARGENTAN on 20 August although the town itself was heavily mined. Just east of the town identifications of the enemy units were fairly definite and included: 675 Engineer Battalion, (116th Panzer Division), 33 Panzer Regiment, (9th Panzer Division), and 902 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, (130th Panzer Division).

Farther to the east, the enemy made extensive use of tanks and infantry, especially in the vicinity of GRENNES and Hill 172 (U-292 207), in an effort to stop our advance. Between FORET DE GOUFFERN and CHAMBOIS heavy 20-mm AA gun fire in the vicinity of BON MESNIL (U-32 23) forced our troops to withdraw temporarily.

An undetermined number of enemy troops succeeded in escaping to the east through the gap between CHAMBOIS and TRUN (U-31 29). Among those who did not escape were the commander of LXXXIV Corps and two staff officers captured by a Polish unit at ST. LAMBERT (U-34 27) and evacuated through V Corps. During this period when a total of 12,617 P/W's were taken, there were identifications of more than 21 divisions plus corps and independent units. However, from the identifications it became evident that the major portions of seven enemy divisions (3rd Parachute Division, 84th, 276th, 277th, 326th, 353rd, and 363rd Infantry Divisions) were caught in the trap and were largely destroyed. The confusion, disorganization and lack of communications among enemy units was such that most commanders within the pocket could have had little control over all the units in their commands.

Period 22 August

The corps was again pinched out and was given a new mission involving the capture of PARIS. Therefore, on 22 August units of V Corps were not in contact with the enemy.

Period 23 - 31 August: "The PARIS Campaign"

Enemy forces prepared to defend PARIS from the west in the TRAPPES (R-79 35) - VERSAILLES area and PALAISEAU (R-95 25). Their fortified positions in these areas consisted of small detachments of infantry, a few tanks, and a number of anti-tank guns. There was also considerable use of anti-aircraft units in a ground-support role.

Resistance around PALAISEAU was isolated late in the evening of 24 August since our troops had by-passed that area to the east and west. Pockets of resistance

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continued to be held by enemy detachments around the Chamber of Deputies, the Grand Palais, Ecole Militaire, Gare de L'Est, Gare du Nord, and Gare d'Austerlitz. Among the units identified were 190 and 192 Sicherungs Regiments, part of the 325th Sicherungs Division which apparently had a large share of the responsibility for defending PARIS, and elements of 48th Infantry Division and 6th Parachute Division.

At 1530 hours on 25 August General von Choltitz, in command of PARIS, was captured at his headquarters in the Hotel Meurice. He agreed to the unconditional surrender of the City, and members of his staff cooperated in putting the agreement into effect.

On the following day, there was some slight enemy activity within the city; with the capture of approximately 2,600 P/W's in the BOIS DE BOULOGNE resistance in that area ceased. Enemy infantry, said to be supported by tanks, stubbornly defended LE BOURGET airfield (S-15 50), and retook it after it had once been captured by our forces. East of central PARIS, strong enemy defenses were encountered in the NEUILLY-CHAMPIGNY area and at VILLERS SUR MARNE. Enemy forces still remaining in the PALAISEAU area were finally cleared out and about 2,000 enemy were taken prisoner.

LE BOURGET airfield was finally taken on 27 August from enemy forces which included elements of 115 Infantry Regiment, (47th Infantry Division), which had been in the PAS DE CALAIS area, and, according to P/W's testimony, had arrived in the PARIS area 26 August. Another new identification was that of 510 Mobile Battalion, part of 20th Mobile Brigade in HOLLAND.

The enemy's resistance varied from light to heavy during the last four days of the period. A small counter-attack against DUGNY (S-11 53) was easily repulsed on 28 August, and the next day the enemy was forced to withdraw from MONTMORENCY, his last point of defense in the PARIS suburbs. Two mobile battalions had been identified, (509, and 510), and with 511 Mobile Battalion were said to constitute the Regiment von GLASSOW.

Considerable machine gun fire met our armored troops at SENLIS (S-25 80) on 30 August and enemy forces were found to be dug in at RULLY (S-35 83). Elsewhere, however, there was but slight resistance.

Heavy resistance came in the FORET DE COMPIEGNE where several reports indicated the presence of 348th Infantry Division previously located in the DIEPPE area. West of the OISE River resistance consisted of artillery, tanks, and small arms. Only small arms fire was met along the AISNE River west of SOISSONS.

During these operations in PARIS and north of the city from 26 - 31 August, 13,556 prisoners of war were captured.

PART II - SECTION ACTIVITY

1 August

Colonel Ford accompanied by Lt. Goldsmith visited the 30th British Corps Headquarters.

2 August

The G-2 section moved with Corps Headquarters from its location at LA BAZOQUE to VILLUX CALAIS (T-59 56). The CP opened at 0900 hours.

3 August

T/3 Rudolph Meisel of MII Team #413 was hospitalized because of illness.

4 August

a. Colonel Ford and Capt. Bartlett visited the 35th Infantry Division CP.
b. The G-2's of the 30th and 35th Infantry Divisions visited the G-2 section.

5 August

On verbal orders of the CG, V Corps, 4 July, 1944, IPW Team #33 was relieved from attachment to the 5th Infantry Division and was attached to Headquarters V Corps. The team personnel are listed below:

1st Lt. Hans L. Trefousse	0-1590860
1st Lt. Manuel J. Pamintuan	0-1305301
M/Sgt Edgar Michaelis	33094012
S/Sgt Alfred Goodwin	39094012
T/3 Frank Bierenbach	33020317
T/3 Curt Upright	32747415

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6 August

a. 1st Lt. Pierre Burke went to the 29th Infantry Division to act as liaison officer pending the attachment of the division to V Corps.

b. 1st Lt. Wallace Ryan acted as liaision officer of V Corps to the 29th Infantry Division.

7 August

a. Lt. Col. Crystal, Ass't G-2 of XIX Corps, visited the G-2 section.

b. Colonel Ford visited the 29th Infantry Division during the afternoon.

8 August

a. The G-2 section moved with Corps Headquarters to an area Southeast of CARTIGNIES, (T-613 370), where the forward CP opened at 1000 hours.

b. An order dated 8 August 1944, Headquarters, ETO, awarded the Legion of Merit to Colonel Ford.

10 August

T/3 Matt Niska, member of PI Team #5, was awarded the Purple Heart for injuries sustained during the enemy shelling of the V Corps CP on 22 July 1944 in the vicinity of LA BAZOQUE, France.

14 August

T/3 Rudolph Meisel returned to duty with MII Team #413 after having been hospitalized for approximately 10 days.

15 August

Colonel Ford visited the CP of the 2nd Infantry Division.

16 August

a. The G-2 section moved with Corps Headquarters to the vicinity of LA COUR, (T-652 225). The section was in operation at 1530 hours.

b. At 2230 hours, Lt. Col. Gaynor left the V Corps CP with the CG, V Corps, and representatives of the staff sections, and went to the ALENCON area.

17 August

a. At 0830 hours, Colonel Ford, 1st Lt. Ryan, S/Sgt Haupin, Sgt St. Peter, and Pvt. Houdek left the V Corps CP and went to the ALENCON area in order to establish an advanced CP which was opened in the FORET D'ECOUVES southwest of SEES, (Q-289 984) at 1700 hours. Lt. Col. Gaynor spent the day contacting the 80th and 90th Infantry Divisions, and the 2nd French Armored Division in order to obtain the latest information about the enemy in the new V Corps sector of operations. At 1800 hours Lt. Col. Gaynor reported to the CP southwest of SEES. Colonel Ford and Sgt St. Peter departed from the CP at 2100 hours and established at 2130 hours an additional (Liberator) Tactical CP northeast of SEES, (Q-442 308), for operations during the night of 17 August.

b. The remainder of the G-2 section closed the CP in the vicinity of LA COUR at 2000 hours and by 2200 hours was on the road ready for movement to the advanced CP, (Q-289 984), southwest of SEES.

c. M/Sgt Francis Erville of MII Team #407 left the G-2 section at the LA COUR CP on an MII mission and failing to return that night was considered missing in action. (On 28 August word was received that M/Sgt Erville had been involved in a jeep accident, and, having suffered a broken arm, was hospitalized).

18 August

a. At 0900 hours Colonel Ford was relieved at the (Liberator) Tactical CP, northeast of SEES, by Lt. Col. Gaynor. During the morning Colonel Ford visited the G-2 and the G-3 of the 90th Infantry Division.

b. At 0003 hrs the remainder of the G-2 section, (having been ready for movement since 2200 hrs 17 August) left the CP in the vicinity of LA COUR and arrived at the V Corps CP in the FORET D'ECOUVES at 1030 hrs. During the same day, at 1900 hrs, the G-2 section left this CP location and arrived at the (Liberator) Tactical CP area Northeast of SEES, (Q442 308), at 2030 hrs and was in operation by 2130 hrs.

19 August

a. Colonel Ford visited the CP of the 2nd French Armored Division at approximately 1400 and later, the CIC detachment of V Corps at SEES.

b. IPW Team #33 was attached to the 2nd French Armored Division.

c. T/3 Paul Smith of MII Team #407 was hospitalized because of illness and later evacuated to England.

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20 August

a. Lt. Col. Gayner, Capt. Junter, S/Sgt. Launer, and T/3 Zander, conducted an informal interrogation at the V Corps P/W collecting point of Major General OTTO WEIDT, Commanding General, 84th Army Corps, and two other [illegible] officers, including the Chief of Staff and the G-3.

b. Colonel Rapiton, Intelligence Officer of the 2nd French Armored Division, visited the G-2 section during the afternoon.

c. Monsieur GALLOIS, Chief of the Resistance Movement in Paris, visited the Corps CP and gave Colonel Ford important information concerning the situation in Paris.

21 August

a. Colonel Ford and S/Sgt Haupin left the V Corps CP at 1900 hrs in order to report, with other staff section representatives, to the CP of First Army for a conference on special information concerning future operations in the Paris area. At First Army Headquarters, the V Corps Tactical group was informed that Col. Low would accompany the V Corps Intelligence Section in the capacity of Liaison Officer.

b. A special detachment of 200 intelligence specialists from 12th Army Group, under command of Colonel F.P. Tompkins, was attached to V Corps for counter-intelligence operations in Paris.

22 August

Colonel Ford and S/Sgt Haupin returned from the conference above mentioned at 0400 hrs. At 1515 hrs, Colonel Ford and S/Sgt Haupin departed for ST. FORGET, 3 miles northeast of CHARTRES, where an advanced CP was established. During the same day, Major Abernathy, Lt. Ryan, Mr. Schwartz, T/Sgt Forchenk, Sgt St. Peter, Pvt. Moon, and Pvt. Carter also departed for the above mentioned locality.

23 August

At 1830 hrs the entire group mentioned under 23 August, above, moved to LIMOURS (R84 20), where an advanced CP was established. Major Pettus and Sgt. Zotter arrived at this location at 2000 hrs. The Corps CIC detachment arrived at approximately the same time.

24 August

a. At 1830 hrs the advanced CP moved to MORANGIS, (S-015 238).

b. During the day, Major General von Choltitz, German military commander of the Paris area, was brought to the V Corps CP at MORANGIS where an informal interrogation was conducted by Major Abernathy and Sgt. Zotter who acted as interpreter.

26 August

The remainder of the G-2 section departed from the CP at (Q 442 308), northeast of SEES, and arrived at MORANGIS at 2000 hrs. During the morning, the Corps CIC detachment joined Corps Headquarters at this locality at 1100 hrs. Liaison was established with the special intelligence detachment in Paris. The CIC detachment was established in Paris for security around the City Headquarters of the Corps Commander. During the day Major Abernathy accompanied the Corps Commander to the City Headquarters at LES INVALIDES.

27 August

At 0800 hrs, Lt. Ryan, S/Sgt Haupin, T/3 Arias, and Pvt. Moon left the V Corps CP at MORANGIS and went to Paris to establish a forward tactical CP for the G-2 section at LES INVALIDES in the city of Paris. Major Abernathy headed the G-2 section at this locality. Other members of the section stationed at this Headquarters during the operations about Paris included: Lt. Shapiro, S/Sgt. Herf, and T/3 Zander, all of IPW Team #11.

28 August

a. Major J.H. Cavins, injured earlier in the campaign and evacuated to England, reported for duty at the G-2 section.

b. Lt. Col. MacFarland, G-2 of 5th Armored Division, and Lt. Col. Moseco, G-2 of 28th Infantry Division, visited the Corps G-2 section.

29 August

a. The Corps CP (with exception of the city headquarters) moved to ST. DENIS, (S-06 52), by infiltration. The G-2 section was in operation at 1030 hrs.

b. During the afternoon, Colonel Ford visited the CIC detachment at the city headquarters, and later attended a dinner given for the Commanding General, V Corps, in the city of Paris.

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31 August

Colonel Ford visited the city headquarters.

Thomas Ford
THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, GSC,
A. C. of S., G-2

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Headquarters Force
APO 305, U.S. Army
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

G-1
OPERATIONS REPORT
No. 3

1 August - 31 August 1944.

7 September 1944.

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[illegible] - France, 1/250,000: 2738 - Sheets 3 & 8.
4042 - Sheets 5, 7 & 8.

I. [illegible]

1. Organization.

No Change.

II. [illegible] STRENGTH OF COMMAND.

1. Divisions.

Division	Period of Attachment or Assignment	Strength Shown First Periodic Report O	Strength Shown First Periodic Report EM	Date of First Periodic Report	Strength Shown Last Periodic Report O	Strength Shown Last Periodic Report EM	Date of last Periodic Report
2nd Inf Div	1 - 16 Aug	792	12693	6 Aug 1944	782	13328	13 Aug 1944
4th Inf Div	23 - 31 Aug	849	14610	27 Aug 1944	849	14610	27 Aug 1944
5th Inf Div	1 - 3 Aug			No Report Received			
28th Inf Div	27 - 31 Aug			No Report Received			
29th Inf Div	13 - 16 Aug			No Report Received			
35th Inf Div	[illegible] - 4 Aug			No Report Received			
80th Inf Div	17 - 24 Aug	602	*9292	20 Aug 1944	602	*9292	20 Aug 1944
90th Inf Div	17 - 24 Aug	750	12554	20 Aug 1944	750	12554	20 Aug 1944
2nd Armd Div (U.S.)	17 - 18 Aug			No Report Received			
2nd Armd Div (French)	17 - 31 Aug			No Report Received			
5th Armd Div	27 - 31 Aug			No Report Received			

* 80th Inf Div. Less 1 RCT.

2. Corps Troops.

Unit	Strength Shown First Report O	Strength Shown First Report EM	Date of First Report	Strength as of 27 Aug., or Last Strength if Relieved O	Strength as of 27 Aug., or Last Strength if Relieved EM	Date of Relief
Hq & Hq Co, V Corps	139	473	6 Aug 1944	140	483	
MP Platoon	3	89	" " "	3	78	
506 MP Car Co	1	33	" " "	1	32	
63 MP Band	1	31	" " "	1	31	
Det A, 153 Liaison Sq	1	11	" " "	1	12	
16th Grd Bomb Disp Sqd	1	6	" " "	1	6	
17th Grd Bomb Disp Sqd	1	6	" " "	1	6	
Lt A Team 711	2	4	" " "	2	4	
Lt A Team 733	2	4	" " "	2	4	
CIC Det 423	2	14	" " "	2	14	
2nd Spec Serv Co	5	109	" " "	5	109	
81st Chemical Bn	43	728	" " "	43	595	
56th Signal Bn	38	920	" " "	31	667	
3250th Signal Serv Co	8	130	" " "	8	131	
Co A, 507th MP Bn	5	177	" " "	5	174	
26th MPU	3	39	" " "	3	39	
41st Replacement Bn	29	166	" " "	27	168	1[illegible]
8th Fin Disb Sec	3	17	" " "	3	17	
15th Fin Disb Sec	3	17	" " "	3	17	
305th MPU	1	11	" " "	1	12	
Det D2D1, 1st SCAR	4	6	" " "	4	6	[illegible]
Det D5F1, 1st SCAR	4	6	" " "	4	6	10 [illegible]
53rd Medical Bn	7	24	" " "	7	26	
382nd Med Coll Co	4	89	" " "	5	96	
383rd Med Coll Co	5	91	" " "	4	9[illegible]	
684th Med Clr Co	12	95	" " "	14	1[illegible]	
97th QM Bn, Hq & Hq Det	6	20	" " "	7		
606th QM G R Co	5	124	" " "	6		
3275th QM Service Co	3	208	" " "	4		
3604th QM Truck Co	5	134	" " "	5		
3892nd QM Truck Co	5	133	" " "	5		

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Unit	Strength Shown First Report O	Strength Shown First Report EM	Date of First Report	Strength as of 27 Aug., or last strength if Relieved O	Strength as of 27 Aug., or last strength if Relieved EM	Date of Relief
V Corps Arty, Hq & Hq Btry	33	136	6 Aug 1944	30	137	
17 FA Obsn Bn	28	496	" " "	26	491	
187 FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	18	91	" " "	18	96	
190 FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	18	95	" " "	18	93	
406 FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	15	81	" " "	16	81	
76 FA Bn	29	451	20 " "	31	451	
186 FA Bn	33	557	6 " "	31	549	
187 FA Bn	32	532	" " "	30	525	
190 FA Bn	30	622	" " "	30	616	
196 FA Bn	31	457	" " "	31	457	
200 FA Bn	37	680	" " "	37	667	
240 FA Bn	26	500	20 " "	27	498	
250 FA Bn	31	448	" " "	31	448	26 Aug 1944
941 FA Bn	32	532	6 " "	30	530	
953 FA Bn	37	591	" " "	37	586	
955 FA Bn	34	537	" " "	34	536	
961 FA Bn	31	483	20 " "	30	483	26 Aug 1944
987 FA Bn	522		28 " "	484		
997 FA Bn	28	605	6 " "	29	600	25 Aug 1944
3rd TD Gp, Hq & Hq Co	15	73	" " "	15	64	
607 TD Bn	34	714	20 " "	36	720	24 Aug 1944
610 TD Bn	32	709	" " "	30	714	24 Aug 1944
612 TD Bn	36	766	6 " "	34	751	16 Aug 1944
629 TD Bn	38	661	" " "	36	600	
630 TD Bn	731		31 " "	731		
654 TD Bn	35	597	1 " "	35	593	4 Aug 1944
773 TD Bn	671		28 " "	670		
801 TD Bn	33	759	27 " "	33	757	
818 TD Bn	34	605	1 " "	34	606	3 Aug 1944
821 TD Bn	34	716	13 " "	34	721	16 Aug 1944
893 TD Bn	40	636	6 " "	39	630	
3rd Armd Gp, Hq & Hq Co	18	86	" " "	18	86	
70 Tank Bn	43	684	27 " "	40	665	
702 Tank Bn	40	652	20 " "	38	650	24 Aug 1944
712 Tank Bn	38	628	" " "	37	672	24 Aug 1944
735 Tank Bn	38	649	1 " "	38	649	3 Aug 1944
737 Tank Bn	38	663	" " "	37	653	4 Aug 1944
741 Tank Bn	41	696	6 " "	41	670	
747 Tank Bn	40	667	13 " "	43	663	
759 Tank Bn (L)	37	490	6 " "	37	490	6 Aug 1944
102 Cav Gp, Hq & Hq Tr	18	69	" " "	13	59	
38 Cav Recon Sq (Mecz)	35	732	" " "	39	713	
102 Cav Recon Sq (Mecz)	44	767	" " "	40	707	
18 AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	14	68	28 " "	13	75	31 Aug 1944
115 AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	13	67	6 " "	13	74	
116 AAA Bn (Gun)	31	696	28 " "	41	696	31 Aug 1944
377 AAA Bn	38	744	27 " "	38	744	
447 AAA Bn	795		28 " "	795		
448 AAA Bn	39	761	1 " "	39	761	4 Aug 1944
449 AAA Bn	39	800	1 " "	39	800	3 Aug 1944
459 AAA Bn	40	778	13 " "	40	777	31 Aug 1944
460 AAA Bn	39	788	6 " "	33	617	
461 AAA Bn	38	808	" " "	37	793	
462 AAA Bn	35	780	" " "	37	795	31 Aug 1944
537 AAA Bn	37	742	20 " "	47	742	24 Aug 1944
633 AAA Bn	38	774	" " "	38	774	24 Aug 1944
2891 Engr Tech Intel Team 1		3	6 " "	1	3	
1121 Engr (C) Gp, Hq/HqCo	18	70	" " "	17	65	
1171 " " " "	16	68	" " "	15	68	
20th Engr (C) Bn	32	643	" " "	31	624	
112th Engr (C) Bn	30	583	" " "	32	610	
146th Engr (C) Bn	31	601	" " "	34	599	
254th Engr (C) Bn	32	645	" " "	31	595	
1340th Engr (C) Bn	33	652	" " "	32	644	

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Unit	Strength Shown First Report		Date of First Report	Strength as of 27 Aug., or Last Strength if Relieved		Date of Relief
	O	EM		O	EM	
502 Engr L Pon Co	6	208	6 Aug 1944	6	207	
610 Engr L Equip Co	5	142	" " "	4	136	
668th Engr Topo Co	5	120	" " "	5	118	
989 Engr Treadway BR Co	4	140	" " "	7	153	
996 Engr Treadway BR Co	4	143	" " "	4	145	
1st Plat, 1501 Water Supply Co	1	27	27 " " "	1	27	

III. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS.

1. Command Post.

a. 030800 Aug. - Section closed at LaBazoque (T 673682)
b. 031200 - Section opened in the vicinity of Torigny-sur-Vire (T 588566)
c. 081310 - Section closed at T 588566
d. 081515 - Section opened 3.6 miles south east of Vire (T 614370)
e. 150925 - Section closed at T 614370
f. 151130 - Section opened 3 miles south of Vire (T 640290)
g. 161630 - Section closed at T 640290
h. 161745 - Section opened at la Cour (T651226)
i. 172145 - Section closed at T 651226
j. 181200 - Section opened in vicinity of Tanville (Q 280995)
k. 191000 - Section closed at Q 280995
l. 191200 - Section opened 1-1/2 miles north of Sees (Q 441318)
m. 231800 - Col. Lee departed from section with V Corps TAC, which opened in vicinity of St. Prest (R 3802)
n. 241800 - V Corps TAC closed at St. Prest
o. 241900 - V Corps TAC opened in vicinity of Limours (R 838209)
p. 250900 - V Corps TAC closed at R 838209
q. 252000 - V Corps TAC opened in vicinity of Longjumeau (R 013248)
r. 260705 - Section closed at Q 441318
s. 262000 - Section opened at Longjumeau (R 013248)
t. 300845 - Section closed at Longjumeau (R 013248)
u. 301045 - Section opened at St. Denis (S 066512)

2. Inclosures, Collecting Points, PWs and Stragglers - Corps.

a. 3 August 1944 - Vicinity la Chapelle du Fest (T 572583)
b. 8 August 1944 - Vicinity Braye (T 611367)
c. 15 August 1944 - Vicinity Les Monts (T 640295)
d. 16 August 1944 - Vicinity St. Saveur de Chalieu (T 642217)
e. 18 August 1944 - Vicinity Bois du Pierre (Q 289990)
f. 19 August 1944 - Vicinity Boisville (Q 442317)
g. 23 August 1944 - Vicinity Chilly Marin (R 008256)

3. Straggler Lines.

No Straggler Lines were maintained during the period.

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IV. CASUALTIES AND RETURNS.

1. Consolidation of Estimated Losses.

a. Offensive Phase - D/56 thru D/59 (1 Aug 44 thru 4 Aug 44).

Unit	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Captured		TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES		Sick and Non-Battle Casualties		TOTAL CASUALTIES	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
2nd Inf Div	6	64	47	827	5	47	0	0	58	938	13	362	71	1300
5th Inf Div*	0	16	6	11	0	1	0	0	6	28	5	48	11	76
35th Inf Div**	4	52	19	524	2	93	0	0	25	669	0	270	25	939
Corps Troops	3	32	12	94	1	34	0	0	16	160	3	59	19	219
Total Estimated Casualties for Phase	13	164	84	1456	8	175	0	0	105	1795	21	739	126	2534

NOTE - * 5th Inf Div relieved from V Corps, 3 Aug 44; ** 35th Inf Div relieved from V Corps, 5 Aug 44.

b. Defensive Phase - D/60 thru D/64 (5 Aug 44 thru 9 Aug 44).

Unit	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Captured		TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES		Sick and Non-Battle Casualties		TOTAL CASUALTIES	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
2nd Inf Div	1	14	10	233	2	25	0	0	13	272	11	253	24	525
Corps Troops	0	0	3	12	1	3	0	0	4	15	3	70	7	85
Total Estimated Casualties for Phase	1	14	13	245	3	28	0	0	17	287	14	323	31	610

c. Offensive Phase - D/65 thru D/71 (10 Aug 44 thru 16 Aug 44).

Unit	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Captured		TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES		Sick and Non-Battle Casualties		TOTAL CASUALTIES	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
2nd Inf Div*	8	109	33	789	1	83	0	0	42	981	18	736	60	1717
29th Inf Div**	4	20	3	102	0	13	0	0	7	135	7	146	14	281
Corps Troops	1	11	1	56	0	1	0	0	2	68	5	98	7	166
Total Estimated Casualties for Phase	13	140	37	947	1	97	0	0	51	1184	30	980	81	2164

NOTE - * 2nd Inf Div relieved from V Corps, 18 Aug 44; ** 29th Inf Div attached to V Corps, 12 Aug 44, and relieved, 16 Aug 44.

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d. Offensive Phase - D#72 thru D/80 (17 Aug 44 thru 25 Aug 44).

Unit	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Captured		TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES		Sick and Non-Battle Casualties		TOTAL CASUALTIES	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
4th Inf Div*	0	0	0	18	0	15	0	0	0	33	0	33	0	66
80th Inf Div**	5	90	9	319	5	153	0	0	19	562	0	45	19	607
90th Inf Div***	3	34	6	284	0	32	0	0	9	350	0	93	9	443
2nd Armd Div(US)%	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	8	0	9
2nd Armd Div(Fr)#	0	8	0	92	0	25	0	0	0	125	0	39	0	164
Corp Troops	2	9	4	78	1	22	0	2	7	111	2	43	9	154
Total Estimated Casualties for Phase	10	141	19	792	6	247	0	2	35	1182	2	261	37	1443

NOTE - Reports for 17 Aug 44 not included in totals. All V Corps units reported to XIX Corps.
* 4th Inf Div attached to V Corps, 22 Aug 44; ** 80th Inf Div relieved from V Corps, 26 Aug 44; *** 90th Inf Div relieved from V Corps, 26 Aug 44; % 2nd Armd Div (US) attached to V Corps, 18 Aug 44, and relieved, 19 Aug 44; # 2nd Armd Div (Fr) attached to V Corps, 17 Aug 44. Totals for 2nd Armd Div (Fr) include Officers and EMs, listed as EMs.

e. Offensive Phase - D/81 thru D/86 (26 Aug 44 thru 31 Aug 44).

Unit	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Captured		TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES		Sick and Non-Battle Casualties		TOTAL CASUALTIES	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
4th Inf Div	1	19	4	125	0	49	0	0	5	193	7	165	12	358
28th Inf Div*	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	40	0	50
2nd Armd Div (Fr)	0	7	0	41	0	2	0	0	0	50	0	2	0	52
5th Armd Div(US)**	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	11	0	13
Corps Troops	2	6	2	16	1	7	0	0	5	29	1	15	6	44
Total Estimated Casualties for Phase	3	33	6	192	1	59	0	0	10	284	8	233	18	517

NOTE - No report received from 2nd Armd Div (Fr) for 26, 27, 28, 29 and 31 Aug 44.
* 28th Inf Div attached to V Corps, 28 Aug 44. No report received for 29 Aug 44.
** 5th Armd Div (US) attached to V Corps, 28 Aug 44. No report received for 29 and 30 Aug 44.

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f. Total Estimated Casualties for Divisions and Corps Troops (1 Aug 44 thru 31 Aug 44).

Unit	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Captured		TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES		Sick and Non-Battle Casualties		TOTAL CASUALTIES	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
2nd Inf Div*	15	187	90	1849	8	155	0	0	113	2191	42	1351	155	3542
4th Inf Div	1	19	4	143	0	64	0	0	5	226	7	198	12	424
5th Inf Div**	0	16	6	11	0	1	0	0	6	28	5	48	11	76
28th Inf Div	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	40	0	50
29th Inf Div***	4	20	3	102	0	13	0	0	7	135	7	146	14	281
35th Inf Div****	4	52	19	524	2	93	0	0	25	669	0	270	25	939
80th Inf Div#	5	90	9	319	5	153	0	0	19	562	0	45	19	607
90th Inf Div##	3	34	6	284	0	32	0	0	9	350	0	93	9	443
2nd Armd Div(US)%	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	8	0	9
2nd Armd Div(Fr)	0	15	0	133	0	27	0	0	0	175	0	41	0	216
5th Armd Div(US)	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	11	0	13
Corps Troops	8	58	22	256	5	67	0	2	34	383	14	285	48	668
TOTALS	40	492	159	3632	19	606	0	2	218	4732	75	2536	293	7268

NOTE - * 2nd Inf Div relieved from V Corps, 18 Aug 44; ** 5th Inf Div relieved from V Corps, 3 Aug 44; *** 29th Inf Div relieved from V Corps, 16 Aug 44; **** 35th Inf Div relieved from V Corps, 5 Aug 44; # 80th Inf Div relieved from V Corps, 26 Aug 44; ## 90th Inf Div relieved from V Corps, 26 Aug 44; % 2nd Armd Div (US) relieved from V Corps, 19 Aug 44.

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2. Actual Casualties by Week as Shown by G-1 (S-1) Periodic Reports.

Period	Killed		Sick - Gassed - Wounded Evacuated		Sick - Gassed - Wounded Non-Evacuated		Missing		Captured		Total	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
2nd Infantry Division												
30 July-5 Aug 7	93	71	1449	19	251	7	97	0	0	104	1890
6 Aug-12 Aug 5	36	38	803	11	124	1	28	0	0	55	991
Totals 12	129	109	2252	30	375	8	125	0	0	159	2881
80th Infantry Division												
13 Aug-19 Aug 5	74	4	151	4	44	7	129	0	0	20	398
90th Infantry Division												
13 Aug-19 Aug 7	70	22	374	0	0	0	32	0	0	29	476
4th Infantry Division												
20Aug -26 Aug 0	5	13	165	3	40	0	0	0	0	16	210
Corps Troops												
30 July-5 Aug 2	25	21	183	1	49	1	4	0	0	25	261
6 Aug -12 Aug 0	6	6	91	3	54	0	0	0	0	9	151
13 Aug-19 Aug 2	17	7	99	2	78	2	2	0	0	13	196
20 Aug-26 Aug 2	4	2	56	1	11	0	2	0	1	5	74
Totals 6	52	36	429	7	192	3	8	0	1	52	682
Actual Casualties - Divisions and Corps Troops Resume												
30 July-5 Aug 9	118	92	1632	20	300	8	101	0	0	129	2151
6 Aug -12 Aug 5	42	44	894	14	178	1	28	0	0	64	1142
13 Aug -19 Aug 14	161	33	624	6	122	9	163	0	0	62	1070
20 Aug -26 Aug 2	9	15	221	4	51	0	2	0	1	21	284
Totals 30	330	184	3371	44	651	18	294	0	1	276	4647

NOTE - No reports were received from the following divisions during the period of attachment: 5th Inf Div, 1-3 Aug; 28th Inf Div, 27-31 Aug; 29th Inf Div, 13-16 Aug; 35th Inf Div, 1-4 Aug; 2nd Armd Div (US), 17-18 Aug; 2nd Armd Div (French), 17-31 Aug; 5th Armd Div (US), 27-31 Aug.

3. Battle Casualty Reports.

Due to the fact that the 26th MHU, attached to this headquarters, processed Battle Casualty Reports during the month of August for the 1st Infantry Division, the 2nd Infantry Division and the 2nd Armored Division (US) only, it has been impossible to obtain Battle Casualty Reports for the divisions operating under V Corps in time for inclusion in this report.

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V. GRAVES REGISTRATION.

1. Corps operated no cemeteries. All evacuations were made to the following cemeteries located in succession along our axis of advance:

a. S 687890
b. Q 710875
c. R 267508

VI. REPLACEMENTS.

1. During the period covered by this report, the entire operation of the replacement system was taken over by the Field Forces Replacement System and the 41st Replacement Battalion was relieved from attachment to the Corps.

2. The following table taken from G-1 (S-1) Periodic Reports submitted by various divisions and non-divisional units shows the number of replacements received during the period:

TOTAL REPLACEMENTS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD

Divisions	31 July to 5 Aug. O	31 July to 5 Aug. EM	6 to 12 Aug. O	6 to 12 Aug. EM	13 to 19 Aug. O	13 to 19 Aug. EM	20 to 26 Aug. O	20 to 26 Aug. EM	TOTAL O	TOTAL EM
2nd Inf Div	11	1033	45	1008					56	2041
80th Inf Div					20	38			20	38
90th Inf Div					6	61			6	61
4th Inf Div							17	31	17	31
Sub Total									99	2171

Corps Troops	31 July to 5 Aug. O	Ret'd O	31 July to 5 Aug. EM	Ret'd EM	6 to 12 Aug. O	Ret'd O	6 to 12 Aug. EM	Ret'd EM	13 to 19 Aug. O	Ret'd O	13 to 19 Aug. EM	Ret'd EM	20 to 26 Aug. O	Ret'd O	20 to 26 Aug. EM	Ret'd EM	TOTAL O	Ret'd O	TOTAL EM	Ret'd EM
81 Chemical Bn	1	0	0	4			2	3	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1	2	0	2	12
56 Signal Bn	0	8	0	0	1	0	0	0					0	2	0	0	1	10	0	0
305th APU	0	1	0	0													0	1	0	0
187th FA Bn	1	1	0	0	0	1			0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	4	0	0
953rd FA Bn	0	6	0	0	0	6			0	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	20	0	0
112th Engr (C) Bn	0	0	0	1					0	2	0	0					0	2	0	1
146th Engr (C) Bn	1	0	0	0													1	0	0	0
20th Engr (C) Bn	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2					0	1	1	3
668th Engr Topo Co	0	1	0	0													0	1	0	0
759th Tank Bn	3	0	0	0													3	0	0	0
102 Cav Recon Sq	7	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	1	0	0	9	8	0	0
3 TD Gp Hq	0	1	0	0					0	1	0	0					0	2	0	0
53 Med Bn, Hq Det	0	1	0	0	0	4	0	0									0	5	0	0
382 Med Coll Co	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0									0	3	0	0
97 AW Bn, Hq Det	1	0			1	1	0	0									2	1	0	0
Co A, 507 MP Bn					1	0	0	0									1	0	0	0
V Corps Arty, Hq Btry					0	2	0	0									0	2	0	0
1171 Engr Gp, Hq					0	1											0	1	0	0
38 Cav Recon Sq					5	1	0	0									5	1	0	0
462 AAA Bn					0	1	0	0									0	1	0	0
254 Engr (C) Bn									0	1	0	0					0	1	0	0
747 Tank Bn									0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
459 AAA Bn									0	0	0	2					0	0	0	0
606 AM G R Co									0	1	0	0					0	1	0	0
76 FA Bn													1	4	1	0	1	4	1	0
460th AAA Bn													1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
629 TD Bn													4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
Sub Total																	32	69		
TOTAL																	0			
																	1			

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VII. PRISONERS OF WAR.

Unit	Offensive [illegible]	Defensive [illegible]	Offensive [illegible]	Offensive [illegible]	Offensive [illegible]	[illegible]
2nd Inf Div	186	34	893	11		1104
4th Inf Div					1526	1526
5th Inf Div	22					22
28th Inf Div					125	125
29th Inf Div			221	2		223
30th Inf Div	1					1
35th Inf Div	87					87
80th Inf Div				1314	2	1316
90th Inf Div				11164	38	11202
2nd Armd Div (US)			---			---
2nd Armd Div (Fr)				14	11076	11090
5th Armd Div (US)					300	300
Corps Troops	25	3	111	40	533	712
TOTALS	301	37	1225	12545	13600	27708

1.

VIII. PROMOTIONS.

STATUS OF PROMOTIONS

	Recd at Hq V Corps	Forwarded to First U.S. Army	Pending at Hq V Corps	Disapproved by Hq V Corps	Retd by First US Army	Pending at First US Army	No. of Officers Pro-moted
Battlefield 1-31 Aug 1944							
Corps less Divisions	76	80	1	2	0	17	84
Divisions	109	126	0	0	0	11*	124
TOTALS	185	206	1	2	0	28	208
Command 1-31 Aug 1944							
Corps less Divisions	2	2	0	0	0	2	4
Divisions	4	8	0	0	0	8	12
TOTALS	6	10	0	0	0	10	16
Regular 1-31 Aug 1944							
Corps less Divisions	20	17	0	3	0	21	50
Divisions	2	2	0	0	0	12	43
TOTALS	22	19	0	3	0	33	93
Appointments 1-31 Aug 1944							
Corps Less Divisions	5	5	0	1	0	4	4
Divisions	7	6	0	1	0	1	5
TOTALS	12	11	0	2	0	5	9

* Promotions pending are for the 35th Infantry Division, Third U.S. Army. Letter has been sent to the 35th Infantry Division to determine whether these promotions have been made by Third U.S. Army.

2. Reclassification, Reassignments and Demotions.

	Brig. Gen.	Col.	Lt. Col.	Maj.	Capt.	1st Lt.	2nd Lt.	W.O.	TOTAL
Reclassification				2	2	13	20		37
Reassignments					NONE				
Demotions					NONE				
TOTAL				2 *	2	13	20		37

Note: One 1st Lt. and one 2nd Lt. recommended for reclassification are being held at this headquarters pending determination as to whether they may be court martialed or reclassified or both. One Major, one Captain, three 1st Lts. and three 2nd Lts were sent to another headquarters for disposition after relief of their organization from this command.

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IX. MORALE.

1. Unit Citations.

None.

2. Decorations and Awards.

(See charts on pages 12 and 13.

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2. The following chart shows the number and type of recommendations submitted by organizations during the period and their status as of the close of this report.

DECORATIONS AND AWARDS

Unit	Medal of Honor		D S C		D S M		Legion of Merit		Silver Star		Bronze Star		Air Medal		TOTAL	
	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded
	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM
Hq V Corps							2	6		1		7 2			2	14 2
V Corps Arty							1				3	1		3 2	1 3	3 3
1st Inf Div	1 3		1	9 17	1		3								6 3	9 17
2nd Inf Div			1	1			4	2		21 38		241 791		9	4 3	271 830
2nd Armd Div (US)							3								3	
35th Inf Div			1													1
80th Inf Div									1			1				2
90th Inf Div									2	2		14				2 16
5th Ranger Inf Bn				1												1
17th FA Obsn Bn									1		1	2 2			1	3 2
20th Engr (C) Bn							1 1			3		6			1 1	9
38th Cav Ron Sq											1				1	
53rd Med Bn									1							1
56th Sig Bn							1								1	
62nd Armd FA Bn			1									1				1 1
81st Cml Bn												2 6				2 6
102nd Cav Gp												2				2
102nd Cav Ron Sq							3 1		1 1			1 3			3 1	2 4
112th Engr (C) Bn												1				1
115th AAA Gp	1		1	1			1					1			1	1
146th Engr (C) Bn										1					2	1 1
186th FA Bn												4		3		3 4
187th FA Gp														1 1		1 1
187th FA Bn												2				2
190th FA Gp											2 1			4	2	5
190th FA Bn														3		3
196th FA Bn														2		2
200th FA Bn														6		6
254th Engr (C) Bn												7				7
299th Engr (C) Bn										2						2
406th FA Gp														2		2
460th AAA AW Bn												1				1
741st Tank Bn			1						1						1	1
743rd Tank Bn			1						1						1	1
745th Tank Bn			1								1				1	1

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2. (Continued).

Unit	Medal of Honor		D S C		D S M		Legion of Merit		Silver Star		Bronze Star		Air Medal		TOTAL	
	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded
	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM	O EM
893rd TD Bn																
941st FA Bn									1 1	4	4 3	10			5 4	14
953rd FA Bn														4		4
955th FA Bn											2 9	1 2		4	2 9	5 2
997th FA Bn												1		4		4 1
1121st Engr (C) Gp														4		4
1171st Engr (C) Gp												2				2
1340th Engr (C) Bn												1				1
War Dept												1				1
											1	1			1	1
TOTALS	2 3		5 2 11 19		1		18 5 6		1 1 30 51		9 17 262 857		49 3		36 28 358 930	

Note: No Soldier's Medals were awarded during August.
"Pending" columns as of 31 August 44; "Awarded" columns are for the month of August 44.

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3. Postal.

Due to the rapid movement of the Corps during the period, the most serious interruption of mail service during the campaign to date was encountered. During the early part of the period the Corps advanced south towards Vire. On 18 August the Corps was moved 87 miles from the left to the right flank of the First Army. Again on 23 August, the Corps was assigned the objective of capturing Paris, which necessitated a move of 115 miles to the North East. These sudden changes in the tactical plans upset the supply lines and as a result the PRS were not able to keep up to the APOs following the combat units.

The acute shortage of transportation added to the difficulties of maintaining a regular mail service. As a result of this shortage, both incoming and outgoing mail was held at the PRS for periods of five days or more. No immediate relief is anticipated until the transportation and gasoline supply difficulties are overcome in the Corps sector. The PRS are now being moved up to our new axis of advance.

4. Religious Activities.

a. With the beginning of August, the total number of Chaplains assigned to V Corps was sixty-five (65). During the month there were one hundred and twenty-five (125) Chaplains under Corps jurisdiction at various times. At the end of the month there was a total of sixty-nine (69).

b. There were neither replacements nor reassignments during the month, but one (1) casualty KIA occurred.

c. At the end of the month there was a total of sixty-nine (69) Chaplains divided as follows: Protestants - forty-six (46) - Catholics - twenty-one (21), Jewish - two (2).

5. Special Service.

a. During the month of August five American Divisions attached to V Corps were given brief periods of rest. Each time this occurred, all the facilities of the Special Service Section, Special Service Company, Clubmobile Group, and the V Corps Band were made available to the organizations. The divisions thus serviced were:

(1) 5th Infantry Division
(2) 2nd Infantry Division
(3) 29th Infantry Division
(4) 80th Infantry Division
(5) 90th Infantry Division

b. Though the Commanding Generals of the Divisions requested immediate service for the divisions upon their relief from combat, and the service was given, it was found that men must first be allowed to rest, clean up, and regain their alertness before entertainment is useful. The USO and G.I. Shows reported that the men of the 2nd, 5th, and 29th Divisions, on their first day of relief, showed absolutely no response to jokes and gags.

c. The usual service a division receives when coming out of the line is:

(1) 4 to 8 Clubmobiles
(2) 8 Mobile Projectors
(3) 2 G.I. Shows
(4) 1 U.S.O. Show
(5) Reading material - Council Books
(6) Bands and Dance Orchestras
(7) Film from Corps library to operate six to ten unit projectors.

d. The rapidly moving tactical situation of the Corps did not permit the efficient planning of these U.S.O. Shows. As a result, on 15 August, control was given back to First U.S. Army.

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e. 63rd Army Ground Force Band. The band played 29 concerts to 551,600 attendance during period.

(1) Public concert held in liberated town of SEES on 20 August to 5,000 civilians.

(2) On Tuesday, 29 August, the band played for the Paris liberation.

f. Stars and Stripes.

Due to the rapidly moving tactical situation, the distribution of Stars and Stripes was impaired. It was also necessary to change the plan of distribution and make Corps responsible for distribution to include divisions.

g. Activities Summary.

The following summary of statistics contained in this report is listed hereunder to present a complete picture of activities:

MOVIES

SPECIAL SERVICE COMPANY

No. of shows	570
No. of Movie Titles	20
Attendance	119,915

FILM LIBRARY AND UNIT PROJECTORS

No. of Shows	739
No. of Titles	27
Total Attendance	101,702

TOTAL OF ALL MOVIES

No. of shows	1,309
No. of Movie Titles	47
Total Attendance	221,617

LIVE SHOWS

USO AND G.I.

No. of Performances	145
Total Attendance	79,375

CLUBMOBILES

No. of Doughnuts served	212,321
Cups of Coffee served	59,775

BAND CONCERTS

No. of Concerts	29
Total Attendance	55,600
No. of Organizations Serviced	26

EQUIPMENT ISSUED

9,700 Council Books
2 B Kits (Radio, Phonograph)
75 Phonograph Records
Assorted athletic equipment
400 French Phrase Books

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X. PROVOST MARSHAL.

1. On 18 August, V Corps moved 87 miles from the left to the right flank of First U.S. Army to close the FALAISE-ARGENTAN pocket. As a result, and in view of the large numbers of prisoners anticipated, First U.S. Army agreed to provide an Escort Guard Company. At 2000 hours, 19 August, the 428 Escort Guard Company reported to V Corps and established a prisoner of war cage at NONANT-LE-PIN (480388), on Route N-138. This was a former German concentration camp. Many operating difficulties arose, which were adjusted on the ground by V Corps.

2. Following is a summary of the prisoners of war processed and evacuated during the period of Corps operation in the "pocket" area by the 428th Escort Guard Company's cage:

DATE	UNIT TURNING IN PRISONERS	NUMBER RECEIVED	TOTAL AT 2400	EVACUATED	ON HAND
19 August	80th Inf Div	12			
	90th Inf Div	870	882	0	882
20 August	2nd Armd Div (Fr)	26			
	80th Inf Div	150			
	90th Inf Div	4808			
	Civilians	5	4989	0	5871
21 August	V Corps	11			
	2nd Armd Div (Fr)	14			
	80th Inf Div	519			
	90th Inf Div	2930			
	Civilians	2	3476	917	8430
22 August	V Corps	43			
	VII Corps	1			
	XIX Corps	131			
	80th Inf Div	475			
	90th Inf Div	1062			
	Sengalese	80	1792	3472	6750
23 August	80th Inf Div	33			
	90th Inf Div	18			
	553 Escort Guard Co	1430	1481	5988	2243
24 August	553 Escort Guard Co	1111	1111	1173	2181
25 August	553 Escort Guard Co	319	319 (1000 hrs)	0	2500
	TOTALS	14050	14050	11550	2500

3. On 25 August, V Corps moved to the vicinity of Paris, and the Escort Guard Company moved to the vicinity of MAGOLLINE (941083). A list of prisoners captured during this phase appears below:

DATE	CORPS	2ND FF & FFI	4th INF DIV	28TH INF DIV	5TH ARMD DIV
26 August	500	2000	403	-	-
27 August	3	4000	128	-	-
28 August	25	5076	80	-	-
29 August	5	0	383	-	-
30 August	0	0	304	125	-
31 August	0	0	228	-	300
TOTALS	533	11076	1526	125	300

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XI. FINANCE.

1. Operations.

The following chart shows operations for the month of August:

	Finance Section V Corps	8th Finance Disbursing Section	15th Finance Disbursing Section
Total Credits for Pay and Allowances (Emeluding Travel)	$397,481.65	$1,559,671.67	$1,469,897.10
Add: Repayments of Soldier's Deposits (Including Interest)	200.00	580.16	72.32
(1) TOTAL CREDITS	$397,681.65	$1,560,251.83	$1,469,969.42
LESS: Allotments			
Class "B"	$ 20,997.50	$ 90,703.75	$ 76,843.15
Class "E"	113,322.02	452,913.21	494,591.30
Class "F"	45,319.00	188,396.85	175,416.54
Class "X"	1,531.57	1,212.14	1,232.00
Class "D"	156.87	53.94	162.42
Class "N"	30,394.26	119,180.32	105,832.17
(2) TOTAL ALLOTMENTS	$211,721.22	$ 852,460.21	$ 854,077.58
(2a) PARTIAL PAYMENTS OFFICERS (Debits)	$ 393.59	$ 460.00	$ 2,228.15
(2b) TOTAL ITEMS (2) and (2a)	$212,114.81	$ 852,920.21	$ 856,305.73
(3) GROSS AMOUNT CHARGEABLE TO APPROPRIATIONS (Item (1) less (2b))	$185,566.84	$ 707,331.62	$ 613,663.69
LESS: VOUCHER COLLECTIONS			
PTA - Funds	$ 20,456.00	$ 98,958.00	$ 75,276.71
War Bonds	187.50	1,593.75	693.75
Soldier's Deposits	9,720.00	31,120.00	20,607.00
Other Collections	11,013.28	31,978.28	23,597.58
(4) TOTAL VOUCHER COLLECTIONS	$ 41,376.78	$ 163,650.03	$ 120,175.04
(5) NET DISBURSEMENTS FOR PAY AND ALLOWANCES (Item (3) less (4))	$144,190.06	$ 543,681.59	$ 493,488.65
LESS: CASH COLLECTIONS			
PTA - Funds	$374,126.74	$ 397,102.98	$ 193,123.54
War Bonds	2,137.50	7,161.50	4,443.75
Soldier's Deposits	16,110.00	50,732.00	31,990.00
Other Collections	12,306.27	504.15	3,789.5[illegible]
(6) TOTAL CASH COLLECTIONS	$404,680.51	$ 455,500.63	$ 233,346.[illegible]
NET CASH RETAINED (Item (5) less (6))	$260,490.45	$ 88,180.96	$ 260,1[illegible]

2. Savings.

The following is a summary of savings for the month of August:

a. Total number of payees: 29,285.
b. Total credits for pay and allowances: $3,427,050.4 2.
c. Percentage of allotments to total credits: 55.9%.
d. Percentage of net cash retained to total credits: 2.5%.
e. Percentage of net cash retained to cash actually disbursed: 15.3%.
f. Average amount retained by each payee: $2.65.

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XII. DISCIPLINE.

1. Courts Martial.

a. The following is a summary of Court Martial convictions for the month of August:

	General	Special	Summary
(1) Corps Troops (Under court martial jurisdiction of 4 Corps			
(2) 4th Infantry Division	4	15	32
(3) 28th Infantry Division	2	8	9
(4) 5th Armored Division	0	2	2
	1	1	13
TOTALS	7	26	56

b. The following is an analysis of the types of offenses for which Corps Troops were tried:

Offenses	General	Special	Summary
Assault with dangerous weapon	1		
Voluntary Manslaughter	1		
Offer violence to superior officer	1		
Disrespect to superior officer	1		
Drunkenness	1	1	
Assault and battery	1	5	15
Destroy property	1		
Disobedience or Disrespect to NCO	1		
AWOL and other violations of AW 61	1	2	4
Assault and battery on NCO	1	3	4
Fail to obey orders of competent authority	1		
Misbehavior of sentinel		3	2
Careless discharge of firearms or explosives			3
Wrongful disposal or damage to government property		1	3
Break restriction		2	1
			1
*TOTALS	10	17	33

* These totals include cases where accused has in one trial been found guilty of two or more different types of offense, hence the total offenses analyzed by type is necessarily greater than the amount of cases tried as shown in paragraph a (1), above.

R. V. LEE,
Col., GSC,
A C of S, G-1.

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[illegible] were received the day [illegible] for future [illegible] and Corps. These were coordinated by G-4, with the [illegible] units were relieved from assignment and placed T Corps were [illegible].

Administrative Order No. 6 was prepared and published, superseding all previous administrative instructions. This was a complete order giving procedures, basis of issue and other administrative instructions in addition to location of supply and evacuation units, and was published to give quick reference to units newly arrived in France and those not formally assigned or attached to First Army.

Corps HQ moved to the vicinity of CARTERVILLE on 8 August.

Liberation of Vire

Corps assembled and defended VIRE and attacked to the south to capture TINCHEBRAY. With the capture of TINCHEBRAY, the Corps again was pinched out in its zone by fast moving movement of the British 8 Corps and the XIX Corps passing across its front.

The town of VIRE had been heavily bombed and shelled, and immediately upon securing its defense, Corps Engineer undertook the large task of removing debris and opening roadways through the town. The town was a critical point due to narrow streets and converging roads passing through it on one main street. It was necessary to route traffic of the XIX US Corps, the V Corps, and the British 8 Corps through the town. Early reconnaissance indicated that the British north-south traffic could be routed through the eastern portion of the town without flooding into the [illegible] Chateaubriant. Also that XIX Corps and V Corps traffic could be routed [illegible] through the bottleneck with close control, determining northbound traffic [illegible] routed south of VIRE for XIX Corps and through the eastern portion of [illegible] for V [illegible]. This situation was kept under close scrutiny by MP traffic control [illegible] traffic was handled through the town expeditiously until the town passed from [illegible] control.

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Following a recommendation by Gen. V Corps, Army [illegible] Corps [illegible] temporary permitting the forward displacement of Corps traffic control posts and the relief of Division MPs for further duties within the Division area.

At the close of this period, 2nd and 29th Infantry Divisions again assembled in positions vacated and were subsequently relieved from assignment to V Corps.

A request was received and two of 30 trucks from the QM truck companies was attached to serve DUD replacements from the 41st Replacement Battalion to the 30th Infantry Division. It is the Corps policy to assign QM transportation for specific situations and for trucks to be immediately released and returned upon completion of mission. In this instance, 8 of the 30 trucks were employed to transport replacements to the 1st Infantry Division which was then located about 60 miles from V Corps area of action. This diversion was made without authority of the Corps and the Commanding Officer, 41st Replacement Bn, was directed to submit a letter of explanation on the misuse of QM truck transportation furnished.

First Army directed a complete rehabilitation of the 29th Infantry Division in [illegible] assembled locations. Corps special staff were directed to contact special staff of the services within the Division to determine the maximum aid that could be given the 29th Division during the time available for refitting. Army furnished [illegible] without hesitation and to assist in enlarged maintenance; the Quartermaster [illegible] responsible for laundry and bath service and assisted the Division in the [illegible] of clothing, etc.

[illegible]

The Corps was directed by the Army Commander to move to the vicinity of [illegible] assembly area of the 2nd and 29th Infantry Divisions and the [illegible] (Fr) Armored [illegible] Corps to the north with the mission of [illegible] the [illegible] of available Army forces.

[illegible] 2nd and 29th Infantry Divisions were being

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In view of the unsettled tactical situation and the distance of the First U.S. Army Evacuation Hospital from the City of PARIS, the Corps Medical Battalion (53rd Med Bn) was ordered to the vicinity of Corps CP for immediate support of Division Cavalry Companies and Corps Troops.

In addition to supervising and supervising the supply of divisions and Corps troops within the Corps, Gen was called upon to assist Task Force "T" and the Ad-hoc Headquarters, Paris Base Section.

The transportation problem remained critical throughout this period, one truck company being short 20 trucks still on detached service with XIX Corps.

Elements of the Corps Forward Echelon moved from vicinity of ORES on 26 August and joined the Advance Group at VILLACOUBLAY, on the outskirts of PARIS, the same day.

The local situation in PARIS required that a small headquarters be set up in the center of town to represent the Corps Commander, who was also the Military Commander of PARIS, in administering and coordinating the numerous activities involved. The group consisted of the Deputy Chief of Staff and representatives of the General Staff Sections. It included one officer and ten enlisted men. This PARIS headquarters remained in operation from the 27th of August until the close of the period.

Numerous reports of captured material were received from the various agencies in PARIS, investigated by representatives of the Corps Special Staff and the [illegible] Section. Numbers, types of equipment, and estimated quantities, were [illegible] to Third Army and Corps Base Section for disposition.

At the close of this period, plans were drafted for the support of the [illegible] in its advance to the southeast of PARIS.

The unit which operating in PARIS returned to the Forward Corps CP, [illegible] 1944.

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reports (Incloses 1 to 6 inclusive).
and Incl 7

U. S. Army,
Colonel, GSC,
Adj. of G., G-2.

6 Incls:
Incl No 1 - GS Report
Incl No 2 - Engineer Report
Incl No 3 - Surgeon Report
Incl No 4 - Signal Report
Incl No 5 - PM Report
Incl No 6 - Quartiens Journal - August
File III (1 copy only)
Incl No 7 - Ordnance Report

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Quartermaster

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT - ARMY ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY

1 August 1944 to 31 August 1944

1. The Quartermaster Operations during this period varied greatly from earlier operations on the Continent. The speed with which the combat elements of the Corps pursued Kesselring and the administrative moves of some 300 miles took on the aspect of a very flexible and fast moving system of Quartermaster supply. Shortages for both Class I and Class III supplies had to be learned because of an average of 20 to 30 miles daily. Prior to the occupation of Paris the Corps was an administrative area in the vicinity of Paris and its very existence was conditioned by this area. Quartermaster Depots. Redistribution operations of Class I supplies had been developed by these two Depots only to those Corps who had established a ration period 48 hours in advance. Both Depots worked to exhaustion due to the low tonnage values of the Corps Quartermaster, all units were issued the required number of rations.

2. The Corps Quartermaster was given an additional Halftrack Company and an additional Quartermaster Truck Company in order that Corps could be in a position to operate a Quartermaster Forward Area. Due to excessive distribution of Corps operations only one Halftrack Company and one Quartermaster Truck Company functioned in Forward the Quartermaster Area and Quartermaster Truck Company functioned in Forward Quartermaster area of having overloads all forward.

3. After passing through Paris, the question situation began to become a serious problem. Due to the lack of the necessary transportation, it was difficult to keep in touch with the Army Quartermaster on the question situation. Many times the Corps Quartermaster had information that was not available, Corps Quartermaster had information that was not available, Corps Quartermaster had information that was not available,

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[illegible] Quartermaster and [illegible] Installations, at least one [illegible] (Remote controlled) at all times and the Publication [illegible] shall only be opened at night.

For the Quartermaster:

V. L. [illegible],
Captain, QMC,
Asst. Quartermaster.

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Headquarters
Office of the Engineer

5 September 1944

SUBJECT: Action against the Enemy, Reports After Action Report, August 1944.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C. (Thru Channels)

1. The engineer regiment, Independent V Corps, during the month of August 1944, continued the enemy operations and pursuing the flight of numerous engineer, including the activities of the 7th Engineer Group and supporting engineer units, between the divisions and groups.

2. The corps was still on the offensive at the beginning of August, the effectiveness of further advance the corps through the city of VIRE, which the enemy was attacking, of the situation over the River Vire for the first step of the corps attacks. This involved the passage of four necessary bridges and three bridges over the Vire River. In the first instance, on the city itself, the 1st Army, Bridge and a necessary bridge was constructed successively over the Vire River south of VIRE and a small crossing.

3. Because of the corps through the city of VIRE was a major problem on the attack was so fully blocked by the attack and crossing, the result of [illegible] and bridging, the regiment, the use of the entire 20th Engineer [illegible] established [illegible] all the bridge equipment available to the corps, [illegible] to allow troops to cross the [illegible] the bridges, the two V Corps and the [illegible] through the [illegible].

4. Following the passage of the city of VIRE and the rapid advance to the [illegible] of [illegible] the corps [illegible] and the [illegible] the corps [illegible] to the [illegible] of [illegible].

5. [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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(1) As of 31 August 1944, after 40 days of operation the [illegible] Signal Corps Detachment had completed [illegible] [illegible] of which [illegible] were [illegible] [illegible] to be [illegible] to any regular soldiers [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Provost Marshal
APO 305, U.S. Army

3 September 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Reports After / After Action Reports For The Period 1 August to 31 August 1944.

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, V Corps.

I. The following report covers the traffic regulation and control effected by PM of the PM Section during action against the enemy from 1 August 1944 to 31 August 1944.

It is divided into the following three (3) phases:

1 August - 16 August: Fire Area Operation
17 August - 22 August: Closing of Falaise Gap
23 August - 31 August: Capture of Paris

II. Phase I. Fire Area Operation.

a. The Provost Marshal Section continued to supervise traffic and control [illegible] in accordance with the plan for Control and [illegible] of Traffic in the Combat Zone. Effective 011200B August a new Corps boundary was established and Corps Military Police were posted at critical [illegible] in the new area. Also, road signs were placed throughout the [illegible] Motorcycles patrolled the highways to insure the smooth flow of traffic. Effective 021200B August, a new divisional rear boundary was established. Again, roads were aligned and patrolled. Also, an overlay indicating locations of traffic posts within the new Corps area was prepared and submitted to the Corps Provost Marshal.

b. The Fifth Infantry Division move out of V Corps area on 4 August. Coordination between the Corps Traffic Management and First Army Headquarters and was established without [illegible]. Corps Traffic Management were stationed at critical points along the route together with motorcycles who were quickly dispatched to correct any traffic difficulties.

c. The 35th Infantry Division was given movement clearance for the [illegible] Traffic Management on 7 August during conference [illegible] with the First Army Traffic Management section. The movement was [illegible] and no serious congestion.

d. On 7 August, arrangements were made with the [illegible] Corps and V Corps, at which [illegible] the [illegible] Corps [illegible] SECRET

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ANNEX

a. [illegible] agreement the utilizing of Route N-24 with the Corps Provost Marshal. By mutual agreement V Corps [illegible] is on P-24 as far as 24-34, inclusive of the junction and the British were to control the traffic from the junction south to Tinchebray.

b. The Corps Military Police Company established Traffic Control Point #1 at the intersection of N-174 and N-175.

c. On 9 August the Corps Provost Marshal assumed the traffic control of Vire which was under hostile shell fire. Corps Military Police were posted to handle the movement of elements of the 29th Infantry Division and 2nd Infantry Division through the town. The plan for the traffic flow of Vire was coordinated by the Provost Marshal in conference with G-4 and Engineer Section, V Corps. This was necessary as the town was a mass of debris which left very few streets in a passable condition.

d. On 10 August the Corps Engineer further discussed a change in road and traffic circulation in Vire with the Corps Provost Marshal as certain road barriers placed for use were blocked and filled with rubble. An overlay showing an alternate road in Vire which could be opened in a shorter period of time was furnished the Corps Provost Marshal by the Engineer.

e. On 13 August, the left boundary of V Corps was modified to provide joint use of a crossroad at (74,928) and give the Sourdeval - Tinchebray and Tinchebray - Ger roads west and southwest of the crossroads to V Corps.

f. Effective 141800B August, a new Divisional rear boundary was established and First U. S. Army military police were to relieve Corps. That evening the 509th Military Police Battalion (First Army) stationed military police in Vire, however, withdrew them shortly thereafter stating that V Corps would retain the town for another twenty four hours. As a result, the Corp Provost Marshal contacted the Army Provost Marshal to verify any change in the original plan and it was determined that no change was in effect. The Corps Provost Marshal requested that the Commanding Officer, 509th Military Police Battalion coordinate the change over of military police in the area acquired by First Army; however, this was not done. Corps military police remained on post until 2200 when they were relieved by the First Army military police.

g. On 16 August the first contact and coordination was effected by the Army Military Police in regarding the posting of Military Police and signing in Vire which reverted to First Army control 141800B. August. The replacement of signs was discussed and it was agreed that those posted by Corps would remain and Corps would be given sign material in kind.

h. During this phase of the operation the following conclusions became apparent:

(1) Close supervision over convoy movement on the road must be

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effected in order to insure a continuous flow of traffic. Motorcyclists can be used to enforce road rules and take prompt corrective action against traffic congestion.

(2) When on the flanks of an ally, difficulty is encountered in that allied single vehicles and convoys mistakenly moving over roads within the U. S. Army Area cause undue traffic congestion and wear on the roads.

(3) Coordination between provost marshals and military police units must be accomplished when a new area is designated.

III. Phase II. Closing of the Falaise Gap.

a. On the afternoon of 17 August Traffic Headquarters, coordinated with the Corps G-3, planned the move of all V Corps units from its position between the 2nd British Army on the left and the 19th Corps on the right, to the opposite flank of First Army. The Provost Marshal Section moved from the vicinity of La Cour to Bois du Pierre which was the first night movement and the longest, covering a distance of 78 miles. One officer from Traffic Headquarters and a representative of G-3 remained at the old CP to continue to obtain convoy clearances and coordinate with the Troop Movement Section, First Army, the movement of V Corps units until respective destinations were reached in the new Corps area.

b. On 19 August as a result of excessive speed observed in the area, signs were posted designating 25 MPH for convoys and 35 MPH for single vehicles. These and "No Stopping on Highway" signs were posted on the main roads between Seez, Harcourt and Alencon.

c. The Provost Marshal, 80th Division and Provost Marshal, 90th Division, contacted the Corps Provost Marshal and discussed the Corps SOP for Traffic Control and matters pertaining to the roads, traffic control, and route signing within the respective areas.

d. Corps Military Police were posted for traffic control in Carrouges, Harcourt and Seez to include motorcycle highway patrolmen on the 19 August.

e. On 20 August, Traffic Headquarters effected a traffic clearance for trucks being used to haul ammunition from an Army Dump to a Corps Dump. A meeting was held at Traffic Headquarters to brief 14 unit representatives as to the route and rate of march of the 299 vehicles being used.

f. On 22 August the 50th Division of the 30th British Corps was given priority to move across the Corps area east along road DC-15 to DC-13 to the VII Corps boundary, and west from Argentan on road to RF M-24, DC-14, thence along DC-24 and DC-24 to VII Corps boundary. Simultaneously, the 2nd French Armored Division was routed from their assembly areas in the vicinity of Domfront, south on road DC-24, DC-16, DC-18 to assembly areas in the vicinity of Briqny. The move of the British and French entailed the crossing of the two columns at three points. These movements were directly

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August 1944

2-6	1/8	157	5	1	668710 640870	GC 8, GC 34, N 178, GP 122	1278 Engr 6 Bn 8.6
2-17	4/8	60	5	1	Corps Hdq Corps Hdq	GC 18, GP 34, to Corps Boundary	116 AAA 8.8
2-28	5/8	145	5	1	air-Fire Corps Hdq GC 34	GC 34, GC 18, GC34A, N 176, N 178	GE, Virch Army 10.1
2-3	6/8	60	2	1	EJ 2178 Pontfarcy	GP 10, N 178, GC 66, GC 34, GC 18, GC18A	5 Scots Hdq 10.6
2-30	6/8	60	2	1	668756 528608	GP A, GC 29, GC28, GC29 to Tessy	66 Scots Hdq 8.8
2-41	6/8	22	1	1	601608 411605	N 176, N178, 18 A GP 81	79 RE Sq 8.7
2-42	6/8	70	4	1	St Gilles Villeneuve	N 176, N 178, 18 A, GP 81	246 RE Bn 8.7
2-43	6/8	70	4	1	St Gilles Villeneuve	N 176, N 178, 18 A, GP 81	222 RE Bn 8.7
2-44	7/8	92	8	1	St Gilles Villeneuve	GC 81, GC 82, GC 18 A	108 RE Bn 8.8
2-50	7/8	188	8	1	607605 Army Hdq	GC 81, GC 82, GC 18 A	109 Engr Bn 8.8
	8/8	110	4	1	610605 Army Hdq	N 176, N on GC 81	116 AAA 8.8
2-8	7/8	60	2	1	Ireland Army Hdq	N 176	4 Hdq 8.7
2-62	7/8	160	5	1	605615 Hurley	N on GC 81	8.8
2-110	11/8	22	1	1	8705 615680	N 176	1278 Engr 6 Bn 8.8
2-1[illegible]	11/8	22	1	1	8705 615680	GC 18A	1278 Engr 6 Bn 8.8
2-1[illegible]	11/8	68	2	1	8705 670670	N 176, GC66	1278 Engr 6 Bn 8.8
2-117	14/8	68	2	1	Corps Hdq N 176 N 177 N Hdq	N 176, N 177	GE, Virch 8.8
2-118	14/8	80	2	1	Fire Gulland le Grand	N 34, GP 81, GP 82, GC 29, GC 108	Veneers Engr Bn 8.8
AO-2[illegible]	14/8	82	2	1	Fire 628625	N 177 to Northmidlem	8.8
AO-2[illegible]	14/8	82	2	1	Fire 628625	N 177 to Northmidlem	8.8
AO-2[illegible]	14/8	82	2	1	Fire 628625	N 177, left on 178	8.8
2-142	14/8	100	4	1	Corps Hdq N177 Hurtain	GC 18 to Hurtain	8.8
2-143	14/8	82	2	1	Corps Hdq N 177 Hurtain	GC 18 to Hurtain	8.8
2-144	15/8	70	2	1	Corps Hdq N 177 Hurtain	GC 18 to Hurtain	8.8

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

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MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	CONVOY COMMANDER	No Vehs	NO M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	L.P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ROUTE	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	RELEASE TO CORPS AREA
V-27	30/8		311	15	5	806320	E of St Denis	See Overlay			1172 Engr Gp	30.0
[illegible]	[illegible]		66	3	1	772246	NE of Paris	In relay through Paris			996 Engr Trangle	35.0
[illegible]	[illegible]						Marsh on Paris				V Corps and Units	30.0
V-29	[illegible]		305	20	5	GE640277	NE of Paris	In relay through Paris			1121 Engr Gp	30.0
[illegible]	[illegible]		89	5	1	8070089	Melun	N, N10, N 484			1248 Engr Bn	31.0
[illegible]	[illegible]		2500	165	25		Assy Area	S Houten through Paris			3 Armd Div.	75.0
[illegible]	[illegible] & 19 Aug		500	25	5		Gar Ste Sens	GC 33, 42 32, 32 22, N 606			Corps Troops	70.0
V-35	[illegible] & 20 Aug		1090	54	15		Sauveur Ste Sens	GC 33, 0° 32, 0° 22, N 606			Corps Troops	70.0
V-36	[illegible]/8		500	25	5		Sauveur Sens	GC 33, 40 32, 06 22, N 606			Corps Troops	70.0
V-37	[illegible]/8		1090	54	15		Sens Longjumeau	GC 5, N 306, 0633, N 138, 08 45, 08117 N 841, N 839, N 10			Corps Troops	70.0
V-38	[illegible]		500	25	5		Sens Longjumeau	Same			Corps Troops	125.0
V-37	[illegible]/8		500	25	5		Sens Longjumeau	Same			Corps Troops	125.0
V-38	23/8		2500	145	25		Sens Paris	GC 33, 32, 22, N606			Corps Troops	125.0
											2nd French Armd.	125.0
TOTALS			15088	689	170							1860.5

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1 August 1944

Col. D'Espinosa, Capt. Palmer, S-3, 100th Ord. Ammunition and G.O. 65th Ordnance Ammunition Company conducted another reconnaissance for the new ASP site near Torigni-sur-Vire, but were again turned back due to the proximity of the MLR.

Mobile ASP consisting of 1/3 unit of fire for the 2nd Infantry Division and attached troops was opened at 630891 near Lamberville at 2000 hours. Previous plans called for this installation to be utilized by the 5th Infantry Division and attached troops only. This ASP is for a 24 hour operation only.

Major Williams and CWO Ewell went to the Schneider Crusot Works at Caen in an attempt to locate electric welding rod, which was sorely needed for the "Rhinocerous" project. Trip was successful. 1200 lbs of welding rod was found together with stocks of "precious" brass and bronze stock.

177t. Ordnance Battalion was given advice to the effect that they should utilize the abundance of metal stock at this installation in replenishing their stocks.

D.A.O., 2nd Infantry Division, moved to 585575.

Ammunition expended 414 long tons.

Ammunition issued from ASP 603. 124 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST-OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Pistol, auto., cal. .45, M1911A1		1	1
Gun, Mach., cal. .30, M1919A4	1		1
Car, armored, light, M8	1		
Gun, sub-mach., cal. .45, M1A1	4		
Binoculars, M3	1		
Tractor, Medium, M4			1

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Following maintenance units were contacted by Lt. Berger:

705th Ord. LM Co. 111th Ord. MM Co.
~~708th Ord. LM Co. 47th Ord. MM Co.~~
755th Ord. LM Co.

Progress of the TD armor plating project for the 629th TD Bn. was also investigated by Lt. Berger.

Mobile ASP at Lamberville will continue operation until 1200 hours, 3 August. Thereafter remaining ammunition will be diverted to ASP 105.

Final reconnaissance for ASP was completed. Locations as follows: Depot Office to be located at 568525, boundaries are 547500, 588504, 567513, 575515 and 568525.

Arrangements were made with Army Ordnance to initiate stockage beginning at 1200 hours, 3 August 1944. Mine sweeping and bull-dozing details were arranged and clean up work started at 1800 hours.

ASP 105 will open at 1800 hours, 3 August 1944. ASP 503 will close 24 hours later.

Ammunition allowances for period 030600B August 1944 to 070600 B August 1944 was received from First U. S. Army.

Daily allowances (030600 to 040600) authorized for 2nd Infantry and 35th Infantry Divisions on following items:

105mm How., M2	155mm Gun, M1	8" How.
155mm How., M1	4.5" Gun	

Commanding General, V Corps Artillery, to authorize allowances for:

105mm How., M1	155mm Gun., M1	8" How.
155mm How., M1	4.5" Gun	

Ammunition expended: 190 long tons.

Ammunition issued: 87 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

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ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6	1	
Gun, mach., cal.50, M2, HB, flex	1	
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, dump	1	
Carbine, M6, cal. .30		1
Truck, wrecking, heavy, M1	1	
Tank, medium, M4	4	
Truck, ¾ ton, 4x4	1	
Tank, light, M5A1	6	
Car, armored, light, M8	1	
Gun, sub-mach., cal. .45	5	
Carriage, motor, 75mm How., M8	1	
Scabbard, M8, trench knife	6	
Mount, truck, M32	1	
Gun, mach., cal. .30, M1917A1	1	
Mount, tripod, cal. .50, M3	1	
Elev., cradle, assy, M1	1	

3 August 1944

Mobile ASP at Lamberville closed 1200 hours, ASP 105, at 668525, opened at 1800 hours with approximately 1,000 tons of stockage.

Col. D'Espinosa visited Army Ordnance Officer relative to turning in of American ammunition in original containers to ASPs. Decision reached was that ASPs will accept such ammunition.

Ammunition expended: 355 long tons.
Ammunition issued, ASP 503: 22 long tons.
Ammunition issued, ASP 105: 132 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT
Bayonet, M1 w/scabbard	2
Knife, trench, M3 w/scabbard	9
Launcher, Rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1	2
Gun, sub-mach., cal. .45	11
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, dump	2
Tank, light, M5A1	6
Watch, Wrist, 7 jewel	6
Car, armored, light, M8	3
Truck, ¾ ton, 4x4	3
Binoculars	6
Launcher, grenade, M7	2
Launcher, grenade, M8	2
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 whl, cargo	1
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo	1
Stiffkey, stick	1
Gun, machine, cal. .30, M1919A4	1
Mount, tripod, cal. .30, M6, M2	1

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4 August 1944

Ordnance Section, together with the 16th and 17th S.D. Squads, moved to [illegible] within Forward echelon.

Meanwhile units of the 177th Ordnance Battalion moved and were located as follows:

127th Ord. [illegible] Co.	557813	347th Ord. [illegible] Co.	584846
526th Ord. [illegible] Co. (Tk)	557813	111th Ord. [illegible] Co.	593862
3422nd Ord. [illegible] Co.	557813	Hq. 177th Ord. Bn.	575813

Ammunition expended: 156 long tons.
Ammunition issued, ASF 108: 241 long tons.
Ammunition issued, ASF 303: 0 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Tank, light, M41	4	
Truck, [illegible] ton, 4x4	2	
Gun, mach., cal. .50, HB, M2	1	
Gun, sub-mach., cal. .45	1	
Binoculars	2	
Launcher, rocket, [illegible], 2.36", [illegible]	2	
Launcher, grenade, [illegible]	1	
Bayonet, [illegible] w/scabbard, M7	15	
Tank, medium, M4	1	
Gun, mach., cal. .50, [illegible]		1
Carbine, cal. .30, [illegible]		2
Thermometer, powder temp., [illegible]		1

5 August 1944

Major Freveston, Ordnance Officer, 30th Infantry Division and his Ammunition Officer, Captain Wilson, reported for instructions on Corps Ordnance operating procedure.

30th Infantry Division was relieved from V Corps.

Col. [illegible]pinosa contacted the 177th Ord. Bn. relative to reconnaissance of new locations.

Army Ordnance Officer expressed a desire to move the 177th Ord. Bn. further south to make room for the 88th Bn. in vicinity of Lorighi. This plan was not permissable or feasible at this time due to the fact that the 177th Bn. was just moved on the third and that the new Corps boundary was

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not known at this time.

Ammunition issued, ASP 108: 84 long tons.
Ammunition issued, ASP 808: 0 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Stiffkey stick	1	
Carbine, [illegible], cal. .30, M1	2	
Binoculars, M3	1	
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel	3	3
Knife, trench, M3, w/scabbard	1	
Gun, sub-mach., cal. .45	17	
Rifle, [illegible], cal. .30, M1	9	
Pistol, auto., cal. .45, M1911A1	1	
Gun, mach., cal. .30, M1919A4	2	
Periscope, M4 w/tele., M40	1	
Tank, medium, [illegible]	1	
Truck, [illegible] ton, 4x	1	
Carrier, personnel, [illegible], M3A1, w/o/arm	1	
Tele., pan., M12A5	1	
Tele., M73B	2	

6 August 1944

The following ammunition allowance was received from [illegible] G-4, First U. S. Army for period 070600 Aug 44 to 100600 Aug 44 incl.:

105mm How., M3	-1748 rds.	105 How., M2	-12,814 rds.
81 Mortar (Lt.)	-2087 rds.	155 How., M1	- 3,243 rds.
60 Mortar (Lt.)	-4760 rds.	155 Gun, M1	- 1,658 rds.
4.2" Mortar, M2	-1106 rds.	4.5" Gun	- 725 rds.
4.2" Mortar, M1	-1327 rds.	8" How.	- 600 rds.

Unexpended balance from previous ration period may be expended during this period.

Ammunition officer of the 29th Infantry Division conferred with Capt. Larson on this date. It was beleived that the 29th Division will be assigned to V Corps.

Refitting and inspection of the 2nd Infantry Division was in progress with the 86th Ord. Bn. fulfilling the job. Assistance was being given by the 111th Ord. Co. and the organic 702nd LM Co.

Refitting of the 94th FA Bn. was being done by the 1[illegible] Ord. MM Co.

Light tanks and armored cars are becoming critical and will no doubt be frozen.

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Ammunition expended: [illegible] long tons.
Ammunition issued, ANF 105: [illegible] long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST-OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED AND REPLACED
Gun, sub-mach., cal. .45	3	1	
Binoculars	3		
Launcher, grenade, M7			5
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel			1
Watch, wrist, 8 jewel			1
Circle, aiming, M1			2
Carbine, cal. .30, M1A1			1
Light, instrument, M19			
Gun, 3", M5, w/carr., M1	1		

7 August 1944

Contacts were made by the Maintenance section to the Ordnance Officer 2nd Infantry Division and the 702nd Ord. Co. Company relative to the refitting of the Division.

Commanding Officer, 602nd Ord. Co. visited section this date and related the progress of his units refitting job for the 2nd Infantry Division.

From 3 July to 8 August the two Bomb Disposal Squads worked on 20 incidents involving artillery and grenade duds and 23 incidents involving UXB's.

Stocks at ANF 105 now consist of one unit of fire for all artillery and three fourths unit of fire on small arms for two infantry divisions and attached Corps troops.

Ammunition expended: 42 long tons.
Ammunition issued, ANF 105: 112 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST-OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED AND REPLACED
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel	3		7
Mortar, 60mm, comp. w/sit and sight	1		
Knife, trench, M3			9
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1		1	

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8 August 1944

Ordnance Section, together with the 16th and 17th Bomb Disposal Squads, moved with the forward echelon to [illegible], vicinity of [illegible].

Ammunition expended: 94 long tons.
Ammunition issued, ASP 106: 180 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST - OTHER CAUSES	WRECKED BEYOND REPAIR
Launcher, grenade, M8	3		
Launcher, grenade, M7	2		
Binoculars, M3	4		
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel		4	
Mount, M36, truck		1	
Gun, mach., cal. .50, M2, M3		1	
Gun, 3", M5, w/carr., M1	1		

9 August 1944

Ammunition expenditure allowances received from First U. S. Army for period 1008003 Aug to 1408003 Aug, incl. as follows:

60mm Mortar	11,675	155mm Gun	1,612
81mm Mortar	12,360	4.5" Gun	1,[illegible]
81mm Hvy	1,817	8" How.	[illegible]
81mm HP	1,428	4.2" Mortar, [illegible]	2,052
105mm How., M3	1,425	4.2" Mortar, [illegible]	2,052
105mm How., M2	19,478	105mm How., M[illegible]	[illegible]
155mm How., M1	4,5[illegible]	105mm How., M2	317

155mm How., M1, may be expended not to exceed 24 of [illegible]. Unexpended balances for previous period revert to Army control.

ASP 106, at 433277, opens this date, target is 24,000 tons. It will service VII and XII Corps and the 26th Infantry Division.

Shell, smoke, M[illegible], M64, w/fuze M[illegible] for 75mm gun is now available for issue. All armored units will expend present basic load of M[illegible] shell and replenish with M64 shell. These instructions were forth[illegible] from Armored Section, First U. S. Army.

Equilibrator springs on the 105mm M[illegible] have been causing trouble and necessitating replacement.

Ammunition expended: [illegible] long tons.
Ammunition issued, ASP 106: [illegible] long tons.

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Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Pistol, auto., cal. .45	23	
Binoculars	13	
Stiffkey Stick	1	
Thermometer, temperature, powder, M1	2	1
Carbine, US, Cal. .30, M1		
Gun, sub-mach., cal. .45	21	
Telescope, M68	1	

10 August 1944

AMF 105 was zero balance of 10[illegible], [illegible], shell, [illegible], M1 with fuze [illegible] and [illegible], and for shell [illegible], M101 for gun, 155mm, M1.

Contact was made with the 38th [illegible] Bn. (155mm How) relative to refitting. The 814th [illegible] (FA) Bn. was assigned to division and was doing satisfactorily.

Corps Artillery headquarters was contacted relative to future refitting jobs.

The following DAD data on disposed bombs is enumerated for the period 10 June to 8 August, incl.:

AMERICAN	BRITISH	GERMAN
1000 lb G.P.-- 4	1000 lb G.P.-- 2	1800 lb [illegible] line-- 1
500 lb G.P.-- 24	500 lb G.P.--12	50 kg SDs --11
500 lb G.P.-- 3	250 lb G.P.-- 2	SD-10 -- 1
100 lb G.P.-- 1[illegible]	100 lb G.P. [illegible] -- 4	SD-1 --70
20 lb [illegible] --270		

With the exception of American 20 lb. fragmentation bombs, allied DAD seem to be very low in ratio to number dropped during this phase.

German air activity has been curtailed during this period so no estimate as to ratio of [illegible] can be made.

Ammunition expended: 103 long tons.
Ammunition issued, [illegible] 100: 284 long tons.

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Daily losses were as follows:

12		
81mm, 24 (type mortar)	2	
m/shot, 1 w/scabbard, 7	11	
launcher, rocket, .., 2.36", 1:1	2	
thermometer, power, temperature, 81		1

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11 August 1944

Maintenance Officers contacted 507th Ordnance HM (FA) Co. in connection with tube trouble of the 190th FA Group and arranging for certain key personnel of our maintenance companies being present when a refitting project is underway by that organization for one of our units.

177th Ordnance Battalion was directed to see that key personnel of all maintenance units are present when a refitting project is being done by a foreign unit, on one of their support organization.

Ammunition Officer, First United States Army advised this office that V Corps should draw ammunition from Depot 106 on or about 14 August 1944.

Ammunition expended: 260 long tons
Ammunition issued from ASP 105: 217 long tons

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	EVACUATED NOT REPAIRED
Stiffkey Stick		1
Rifle, U.S. cal.30, M1	2	
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	2	
Binoculars	2	
Mount, tripod, cal.30, M1917		1
Gun, sub-mach, cal.45		1
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel		4

12 August 1944

Maintenance Officers contacted 507th Ord. HM (FA) Co. relative to unserviceable and questionable tube replacement. Arrangements were made for this unit to contact this office when they declare a tube unserviceable so the investigation and replacement can be expedited. Otherwise the matter will have to be processed thru Battalion and Group to the First U. S. Army Ordnance Office.

There were no major items lost on this day.

29th Infantry Division was again attached to this command as of 1800 hours. DAO was located 534326. 729th HM Co. was located at 575320.

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Permission was received from First Army Ordnance Officer to maintain ASP 105 with 100 tons re-supply daily until ASP 107 is opened. Types of ammunition not available at ASP 105 will be drawn from Depot 106.

Notification was received from First U. S. Army Ammunition Officer that ASP 105 will be closed 14 August, and that subsequent issues will be made from ASP 106.

29th Infantry Division will continue to draw from Army Depot 106 until ASP 107 is established.

Captain Larson conducted reconnaissance of roads to and from Depot 106 and of German ammunition dump in the St. Sever Forest.

Ammunition expended:	327 long tons
Ammunition issued from ASP 501:	449 long tons

13 August 1944

Ammunition allowances for period 140600B to 180600B August received from Hq. First U. S. Army were as follows:

60mm Mtr	14,176 rds	155 Gun M1	2,396
81mm Mtr Lt.	14,742 rds	4.5 Gun	2,175
81mm Mtr. Hvy	2,169 rds	8" How	1,107
81mm Mtr WP	1,702 rds	4.2" M2	2,449
105 M M3	2,512 rds	4.2" M2	2,449
105 M M2 M7	34,891 rds	105 M M2 WP	150
155 M M1	8,940 rds	105 M M2 HP	376

SHELL Smoke WP for 155mm M1 may be expended not to exceed 20% of HE. Deficits for period 100600B Aug and unexpended balances in all type ammunition will be carried over to period by this allowance.

Reconnaissance of sites for ASP 107 conducted by Ammo. Off. V Corps, C.O., 100th Ord. Amm. Bn., Op's Off, 71st Ord Amm Grp. and C.O. 50th Ord. Amm. Co. Site selected is at 65-25. Engr. mine sweeping detail arranged for.

Amm. Off. 29th Division reports to Amm Off V Corps, he is located at 543420.

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ASP 105 was not completely restocked as of 12 Aug as promised by Ammo Off FUSA. After telephone conversation he agrees to complete re-stockage on 155 gun & 4.5" gun. Said ammunition did not arrive this day. 155mm gun HE ammo and Prop. chg. 4.5" MB issued to zero balance.

List of type and amounts totaling 150 tons were phoned to Ammo Off., FUSA.

Total incidents of unexploded shells and bombs handled by the 16th and 17th Bomb Disposal Squads for the period 6 Aug to 13 Aug incl., were as follows:

Unexploded shells: - 14 incidents
Unexploded bombs: - 16 indidents

Maintenance Officers contacted 177th Ord. Bn. and checked refitting job being done by the 86th Ord. Bn on the 955th FA Bn.

Ammunition expended: 392 long tons
Ammunition issued at ASP 105: 144 long tons

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel		1	
Binoculars			2
Launcher, rocket, AT 2.36" M1A1			2
Gun, sub-mach, cal.45			1
Mount, tripod, cal.30, M2			1
Post, aiming M1	2		
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	1		
Trailer, 1/4 ton, 2 whl., cargo	1		
Gun, mach, cal.50, W/C			1
Carbine, cal.30			1
Howitzer, 155mm w/carriage			1

14 August 1944

100% calss "A" inspection of the 187th FA Bn was completed by the 51[illegible] and 544th Ordnance HM (FA) Companies.

Maintenance officers contacted 177th Ord. Bn. relative to Class A in[illegible] tions. Class A inspection originally scheduled for 953rd FA Bn was cancel[illegible]

Word was received from 507th Ord HM (FA) Co that the services of calib[illegible] tion team for Corps will be available starting 15 August.

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Target for ASP 107 will be 1½ U/F for all calibers except AA which is ½ U/F and cal. .50 M6 which is 1 U/F.

Ammunition expended: 346 long tons
Ammunition issued from ASP 105: 287 long tons

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Tank, medium M4, (w/dozer attachment)	8	
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	2	1
Carbine, US, cal.30	1	11
Light, instrument, M19		1
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36" M1A1		1
Rifle, US, cal.30, M1903		4
Binoculars		2
Gun, mach, cal.50, HB, M2 flex		1
Quadrant, range, M100		1
Telescope, T116		1
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel		2

15 August 1944

ASP 107 received 1200 tons of ammunition. Corps labor detail of 50 men assisted from 1300 hours to 2100 hours.

57th Ordnance Ammunition Company arrived at ASP 107 for duty.

Word was received from Ammunition Officer First U. S. Army that Corps troops and Division not in contact with the enemy would draw from Depot 106 and those in contact with the enemy would draw from ASP 107.

Col. D'Espinosa arranged with Ordnance Operations, First U. S. Army, for a refitting job for the 29th Infantry Division.

Ammunition expended: 111 long tons
Ammunition issued from ASP 105: 196 long tons
Ammunition issued from ASP 107: 3 long tons

Daily losses were as follows: Negative report.

16 August 1944

Ordnance section moved with forward echelon to 651226.

Maintenance Officers contacted 29th Infantry Division relative to refitting inspection. Much difficulty and delay was encountered due to poor contact and coordination with 29th Inf. Div.

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Colonel D'Espinosa rectified the matter immediately and the refitting job was scheduled to be in full operation on August 17.

Received command channel TWX from Hq. First U. S. Army that only those Corps units in contact with the enemy would draw ammunition from ASP 107. Others will draw from ASP 106. Verbal permission obtained from Ammunition Officer, First U. S. Army, for units not in contact with the enemy to draw ammunition in amounts of one truckload or less.

Ammunition expended: 16 long tons

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEMS	LOST IN COMBAT	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	1	
Mount, ped. M31	1	
Binoculars	8	
Gun, mach, cal.30, M1919A4	6	
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel	7	3
Gun, sub-mach, cal.45	14	
Watch, pocket, 15 jewel		2
Mount, tripod, cal.50, MG, M3	1	
Holster, pistol, cal.45		6

17 August 1944.

Section closed business in anticipation for a move to a sector in vicinity of 298985, near Alencon.

As of this date V Corps had no front. At this time the 29th Infantry Div and the 747th Tank Bn. were undergoing a refit job.

No ammunition data was obtainable on this date.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEMS	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Post, aiming, M1	7		
Gun, mach, cal.30, M1919A5			1
Trailer, 1/4 ton, 2 whl, cargo		1	
Mount, tripod, cal.50, M3	2		
Gun, 3" M5 w/carr. M6	1		
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 whl. cargo	1		
Gun, sub-mach, cal.45, M3	1		
Light, aiming post, M14	2		

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18 August 1944

Section together with 16th and 17th AD squads completed a 60 mile night trip and located at 298985, vicinity Forest D'Couvene, Section closed at 1000 hours and was set up for operations at 1130 hours.

Word was received that divisional units of this command would consist of the 80th and 90th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd Armored Division (FR.), Ord. officers of all the forementioned divisions called at the section today for orientation on V Corps Ordnance operation procedure. All of these commands had been part of the Third U. S. Army.

The 2nd U. S. Armored Division was attached to this command temporarily and was subsequently relieved at 2100 hours.

Lt. Col. Raisig and Major Davis of the 177th Ordnance Bn. called at the section to seek clearance on the following locations for their battalion units:

Hq., 177th Ord. Bn.	331066	127th MM Co.	318051
463rd Ord. Evac. Co.	331066	92nd MM Co.	322056
3422nd MAM Co.	331064	111th MM Co.	312045
3478th MAM Co.	319053		

Ammunition Officer of the 2nd U. S. Armored Div. on call on Capt. Larson relative to policies in ammunition supply in the new Corps and Army area.

Third Army's ASP No. 12, located near Sees, was available to V Corps Divisions and Corps troops for withdrawals. ASP has stock totalling 600 tons composed mostly of artillery types. First Army ASP No. 108 is opened for V Corps units and divisions. Division Amm. Off. from 80th and 90th Inf. Div. report to Corps Amm. Office for instructions. Corps Amm. Officer conferred with VII Corps Ordnance Officer regarding ASP locations and future plans. VII Corps Amm. Officer and C. O., 619th Ord. Amm. Co. reconnoitter location for ASP 108 to be moved into vicinity of Sees 430280. No expenditure reports received.

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Daily losses were as follows:

ITEMS	LOST IN COMBAT	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Trailer, 1/4 ton, 2 whl, cargo		1
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	1	
Mount, truck, M48	1	
Gun, mach, cal.30, M1919A4	1	

20 August 1944.

Visit by Col Medaris, Army Ordnance Officer, to Col. D'Espinosa was made on this date. Matters regarding stockage of ASP's 108 and 109 were discussed. Other matters brought out were parts for the 2nd Armored Division (Fr.) which were supposedly in custody of Third Army and a change in policy of Ordnance supply and delivery service.

Regarding the former, Col. Medaris will take the matter up directly with the Third Army Ordnance Officer. Col. Medaris will also attempt to get the 534th MMT Co., former back up unit of the French Armored Division, from Third Army for continued support.

Received instructions from Col. May that no more ammunition would be unloaded at ASP 108. These instructions were modified by Army G-4 at request of Col. Wood. ASP 108 was out of 105mm How, M2, 155 How. M3 and 75mm HE and APC during the day. Some 105, 155 and 3" arrived to relieve the shortage. G-4 requested 140,000 rds. cal.30 MG and 1,000 rds. 75 gun APC delivered to 2nd Armored Div. (Polish). The cal.30 and 189 rds of 75 gun were obtained at ASP and delivered. Further request made by G-4 for 320 rds 3" HE and APC and 1200 rds. 75mm Gun HE and APC for Polish. None arrived at ASP to satisfy this request. Target for ASP 108 was reduced to only those amounts required to fill basic load shortages. Stockage of ASP 109 began. ASP 109 depot office located at 135075.

Ammunition expended: 154 long tons
Ammunition issued from ASP 108: 735 long tons

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Daily losses were as follows:

ITEMS	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Carrier, personnel, W/T, M3	1		
Gun, 3" M5 w/carr. M6	2		
Launcher, rocket AT 2.36 M1A1	1		1
Binoculars	7		
Tele. observation M48-M49	1		
Gun, mach, cal.50, HB, M2 flex	1		
Mount, tripod, MG cal.50, M3	1		
Mount, MG, cal.30, M48	1		
Knife, trench, M3	17		
Scabbard, M8 trench knife	3		
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel	10		
Watch, wrist, 15 jewel	2		
Compass, M2 w/case	1		
Mount, cal.30, or .50 M35	3		
Carbine, cal.30	3	2	
Mount, tripod, cal.30, M2	1		
Stiffkey stick, (40mm gun)			2
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4		1	
Pistol, cal.45, M1911A1 w/holster	2		
Periscope, M6	18		
Gun, sub-mach, cal.45	6		
Gun, mach, cal.30, M1919A4	1		

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21 August 1944

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Major Williams contacted First Army Ordnance relative to General Supply Procedure. The future requirements for stockage of the 177th Ordnance Battalion will be effected through the 52nd Ordnance Group. On items deemed "frozen" of critical by First U. S. Army the dealings will be the same as presently in effect. Allocations on other than the forementioned items will be forthcoming from 52nd Group.

Allowances received from Headquarters First U. S. Army for period 220600 Aug. to 260600 Aug 1944:

60mm Mortar, HE	10,450 rds.	155mm How	4,550 rds.
60mm Mortar, Ill	839 rds.	155mm Gun	1,763 rds.
81mm Mortar, Lt.	4,496 rds.	4.5" Gun	1,004 rds.
81mm Mortar, Hvy.	1,898 rds.	8" How	712 rds.
81mm Mortar, WP	1,292 rds.	4.2" Chml Mtr, HE	2,375 rds.
105mm How, M3	2,150 rds.	4.2" Chml Mtr, WP	2,375 rds.
105mm How M2, M7	18,750 rds.		

In addition to previous allocation you are authorized the following for period 220600B August:

105mm How, M2, M7	7,500 rds.
155mm How	1,280 rds.
155mm Gun	705 rds.

Deficits and unexpended balances for period 180600B August to 220600B Aug. will be carried over to period 220600B to 260600B August.

320 rounds 3" APC and 280 rds. 75mm Gun AP & HE (85 rds. were supplied by air) sent forward to Polish 2nd Armored Division thru 90th Division Ammunition Officer.

90th Division request 500 yellow Smoke Hand Grenades. Telephone request for same was made to FUSA Ammunition Officer.

ASP 108 is able to supply all artillery requests. 75 Gun and 3" Gun arrives in small amounts late in the day.

Ammunition expended	:	154 long tons.
Ammunition issued from ASP 108	:	1,156 long tons.

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Daily losses are as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Post, Mine, M1			
Trailer, cart, 2 wh, cargo			
Gun, 40mm, M1 w/carriage, M2		11	2
Truck, ¾ ton, 4x4			3
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6	3		2
Projector, pyrotechnic, hand, M9	2		
Bayonet, M1 w/scabbard	2		
Holster for cal. .45 pistol		5	
Setter, fuse, M14		1	
Truck, 3/4 ton, C/R w/w			
Binoculars		1	2
Gun, sub-machine, cal. .45	16		
Mount, tripod, cal. .50, M3	6		
Telescope, Obsn., M16	1		
Launcher, Grenade, M7	2		
Launcher, Grenade, M8	2		

22 August 1944

Request was made of G-4 to choose four V Corps units for a refitting project. Units designated were 38th Cavalry Squadron, 462nd AAA AW Battalion, 20th Engr. Battalion and the 112th Engineer Battalion. The 177th Ordnance Battalion will perform the necessary work with the aid of the 86th Ordnance Battalion.

Request was made on the 52nd Ordnance Group by Captain Fiehler and Lt. Berger for additional maintenance support in the present refitting program. A definite answer was not forthcoming at this time.

Major Williams contacted S-4, 52nd Ordnance Group in connection with Major item allocations and status of stocks for the 177th Ordnance Battalion. It was found that there will be no change in policy in the control of major items. The only difference is that contacts will be made on Group S-4 instead of Army Ordnance Officer. Frozen and critical items will continue to be issued by the Army Ordnance Office.

Col. D'Espinosa and Major Williams made a reconnaissance of enemy spoil at Chambois. There was nothing remaining that could be utilized by the Ordnance Dept.

500 Yellow Smoke hand grenades received at ASP 108 and issued to 90th Inf.

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Shipments of [illegible] shell and 75mm Gun shell to 2nd [illegible]ish Armored Division was stopped after conversation with G-4, 90th Inf. Div. Any future requests for [illegible] Polish will be phoned directly to V Corps Ammunition Office.

Ammunition Officer, First U. S. Army desired to close ASP 106 today.

V Corps G-4 wants ASP 106 to remain open until final disposition of combat troops is disclosed.

Ammunition expended : 3 long tons
Ammunition issued from ASP 106 : 60.5 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST-OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 whl cargo	1		
Truck, ¾ ton, 4x4	1		
Tank, med., M4A1 w/SCR 538	2		
Binoculars.	5	1	
Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, W/O		1	
Gun, sub-machine, cal. .45	10		
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel.	6		
Elevator cradle assembly, cal. .50, M1			1
Post, Aiming, M1			2

23 August 1944

No special activities were evident on this date. Plans were being made for the processing and occupation of Paris by V Corps.

Col. Medaris, Army Ordnance Officer, visited section, Col. DiRosinach and matters involving the new V Corps mission were discussed.

Division and Corps units were refilling Basic Load from ASP 106.

Corps G-4 did not indicate whether he desired ASP 106 to remain open. [illegible] continues receiving small amounts of ammunition from ASP 107. ASP 107 to be cleaned out today.

Ammunition Expended : 2 long tons.
Ammunition Issued from ASP 106 : 73.9 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST-OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Mount, truck, M32			1
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel		1	3
Truck, 2½ ton, cargo, 6x6			1
Trailer, M10	3		
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 whl, cargo	4		
Gun, mach, cal. .30, M1919A4	7		

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ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST. CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Bayonet, M1 w/scabbard,	1		
Gun, sub-mach, Cal. .45	25		
Periscope, M4	2		
Knife, trench, M3	13	3	
Scabbard, trench knife	13	1	
Stiffkey Stick			2
Mount, triped, cal. .30, M3			1
Compass, M2	2		
Holster, pistol, cal. .45	2		
Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4	1		
Mount, triped, cal. .30, M2	1		
Launcher, grenade, M7	1		
Mount, truck, M48	1		
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1	2		
Motorcycle, sole	2		
Binoculars, M3	2		
Post, Aiming, M1	4		
Light, Aiming post, M1	9		

24 August 1944

Medium tanks again were in short supply. It was evident that First Army would again have to set a unit level of supply.

ASP 108 closes out at 1800 hours. Shipments began to ASP 109. Ammunition Off. First U. S. Army states that there will be no 75mm Sabot, gun, ammunition available in France. There is no 57mm Sabot available now, distribution will be effected by First U. S. Army when next shipment arrives.

Ammunition Expended : 0 long tons.
Ammunition Issued from ASP 108: 0 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6		1
Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4		1
Car, Armored, light, M8	1	

25 August 1944.

Captain Larson, 16th and 17th B.D. Squads went on ahead to the Advance [illegible] of the forward echelon. G-4 desired an Ordnance Officer be with the advance [illegible]

Preparations were made for the move of the CP to vicinity of Paris.

Ammunition expended: 0 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

Negative Report.

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26 August 1944

Section moved forward echelon at 1100 hours to vicinity Chilly Mazarin, S-014296, and closed at 2100 hours.

Col. D'Espinosa and Major Williams arrived at Command Post at 1400 hours then proceeded to Paris in an effort to locate Corps "TAC" Headquarters set up there, but turned back after shooting was being encountered enroute through the town.

Location for the 177th Ordnance Battalion had to be reconnoitered again due to changing of Corps boundaries.

Ordnance service was very much in demand but was not available due to priorities being given to tactical units.

V Corps, G-4 desired next ASP location to be established about 10 miles NE of Paris.

Ammunition expended: 16 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:
Negative Report

27 August 1944

Units of the 177th Ordnance Battalion were sorely missed. The following unit S-4's called at section this date and were desperate for service: 102nd Cavalry Sq., 38th Cavalry Sq., 406th FA Group, Corps Artillery, 747th Tank Bn., 70th Tank Bn., 3rd Armored Group, 3rd TD Group, 893rd TD Bn., 629th TD Bn. and 941st FA Bn.

It was announced today that V Corps would have the following divisions: 28th Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 5th Armored Division. The disposition of the 2nd French Armored Division was not known at this time.

The Ordnance Officer and G-4, of the 5th Armored Division contacted office this date for orientation on Corps Policies. The 5th Armored Division had formerly been a Third Army Unit and was transferred to this command in questionable shape as regards to maintenance and supply.

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Ammunition Officer, First U. S. Army was contacted relative to establishing ammunition truckhead in vicinity of Palaiseau. He agrees, and set up procedure for ASP 112 to be established at R 937280, 2 miles west of Palaiseau. Operations to begin 28 August, 1500 hours. Target of 30 tons. ASP 112 to operate on "Mail Order" basis in that the ASP accepts T.O.s, brings T.O. ammunition from Army Depot 110, and then issues same to units 24 hours later. Contacts made with ammunition officers, 2nd Armored Division (Fr.), 4th Infantry Division and 5th Armored Division relative to basic load shortages. 5th Armored Division reports shortages of about 10 tons. Target of 30 tons for ASP 112 sent to Ammunition Officer, First U. S. Army.

Ammunition Expended: 0 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT
Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, W/C	1
Truck, 1 ton, 4x4	7
Car, Armored, Light, M8	5
Launcher, Grenade, M7	2
Launcher, Grenade, M8	4

28 August 1944

It was reported that the 16th and 17th B D Squads handled 19 UXB incidents of which 19 were German, 3 British and 7 American.

Maintenance Section and 16th BD Squad were employed in Paris in checking abundance of abandonment German supplies.

Two German ammunition dumps investigated and reported to First U. S. Army Ammunition Officer. Ordnance guide remains at ASP 112 site from 1300 to 1930 hours waiting to meet ASP personnel and stocks. Personnel and stocks did not arrive. Phone call made to Army Ammunition Officer. He will investigate 2nd Armored Div. (Fr.) reports basic load shortages amounting to 65 long tons.

Ammunition expended: 76 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT
Carbine, US, cal. .30, M1	9

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ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT
Gun, sub-machine, cal. .45	1
Gun, machine, cal. .30, M1919A4	3
Launcher, grenade, M8	6
Launcher, grenade, M7	8
Truck, 4 ton, 4X4	1
Pistol, auto., cal. .45	1
Tank, Medium, M4 w/75mm Gun	3
Tank, Medium, M4 w/75mm Gun	2

29 August 1944

Major Williams made two plane trips to First U. S. Army in an effort to alleviate the deficiencies of the 5th Armored Division and to handle matters involving general supply.

ASP 112 personnel and stocks arrive 1700 hours. Target for ASP 114 (760 long tons) given to Ammunition Officer, First U. S. Army. Target amounts to 1/3 unit of fire for 2 Infantry Divisions and 1st Armored Division plus Corps troops. Ammunition Officer, 28th Infantry Division reports for instructions. Map reconnaissance of prospective site for ASP 114. Representatives from 71st Ord. Amm. Gp. arrive 1800 hours. Reconnaissance made of ASP 114 area. Could not get into desired area so alternate area was chosen. Further reconnaissance to be made in morning of 30 August then bring 96 truck loads of ammunition during afternoon. Representative from Corps Amm. Office to meet ammunition personnel and stocks at ASP 113 and lead them to assembly area near La Pin, approximately 13 miles East of Paris.

Ammunition expended: 0 Long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Motorcycle, solo	1	
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo	1	1
Howitzer, 155mm, w/carriage		1
Gun, mach, cal. .30, M1919A4	4	
Gun, mach, cal. .50 HB, M3	1	
Mount, tripod, cal. .30, M2	2	
Mount, tripod, cal. .50 M3	2	
Launcher, grenade M8	1	
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36"	1	
Pistol, cal. .45, M1911A1	1	
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel		1
Gun, sub-mch., cal. .45, M3	1	

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ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Carbine, cal. .30, M1	1	
Knife, trench, M3 w/scabbard	2	

30 August 1944

Ordnance Section moved with forward echelon to [illegible], vicinity of St. Denis, north of Paris. Move was completed at 1130 hours and operations were in effect at 1245 hours.

Col. D'Espinosa visited Army Ordnance Officer and took up matter involving future maintenance and supply logistics.

Representative from Ammunition Section met Ammunition Company at ASP 113 and led them to ASP 114 location. Reconnaissance of new location was completed. Received message from Ammunition Officer, First U. S. Army that he has stopped re-supply of ASP 112, because Transportation Orders were totaling too much tonnage. Ammunition Officer, 4th Infantry Division, reports German ammunition dump he had inspected. 16 truck loads of ammunition arrive at ASP 114 at 2100 hours. Truck companies had been instructed to pick up a guide from ammunition company at Le Pin; Ammunition company had received instructions to furnish guide at La Loupe (ASP 109). Another guide from the ammunition company was then sent at 2130 hours to Le Pin to direct ammunition trucks.

Ammunition expended 55 long tons.
Ammunition issued from ASP 112 0 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST-OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo			1
Truck, ¾ ton, 4x4		1	
Gun, mach. cal. .50 HB, M2			1
Carbine, GP cal. .30, M1	1		
Watch, Wrist, 7 jewel			1
Holster, Pistol, cal. .45			1

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31 August 1944

This office informed that ASP's to accompany V Corps immediate operation shall be a minimum of 30 miles apart. The ASP's stock to be about 300 to 400 tons. Ammunition Officer, this office, confers with ammunition officer, First U. S. Army in regard to ammunition supply during a fast moving operation. Arrangements accomplished for reconnaissance party to meet at V Corps Ordnance Office at 1200 hours, 1st September and for stocks to arrive at rendezvous point at ASP 114 at 1600 hours, 1st September. Arrangements were later postponed for 24 hours because of change of V Corps operation plan. Ammunition Officer, First U. S. Army, orders ASP 112 to close. 71st Ordnance ammunition group later orders ASP 112 to remain oper. Check accomplished on ASP 114 stocks; were very low on small arms ammunition and artillery fuzes. Ammunition Officer, First U. S. Army, notified of same and was requested to make priority shipment.

Ammunition Expended: 101 long tons.
Ammunition Issued from ASP 114: 64 long tons.

Daily losses were as follows:

Item	Lost in Combat	Lost Other Causes	Evacuated Not Repaired
Truck, ¾ ton, 4x4	3	1	2
Rifle, cal. .30, M1	1		
Mortar, 60mm, complete	2		
Compass, M2	1		
Binoculars, M9	8		
Watch, wrist	10		2
Knife, trench	2		
Car, armored, light, M8			1
Gun, SMG, cal. .45	3		
Carrier, pers., H/T, M3	1		

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-5
APO 305, U. S. Army

Auth: Col, Corps
Date: 5 Sep 44
Initl:

5 September 1944.

SUBJECT: (G-5) CIVIL AFFAIRS - [illegible]

I. Operations.

(1 - 4 August 1944 - [illegible] Campaign)

A. Location: Corps GPs.

B. Personnel:

(1) G-5 Section, Hq. V Corps.

Colonel [illegible], Chief of Section.
Lt. Col. [illegible], Executive.
Captain JOHN W. CATANAL, PA, Administrative.
Captain G. DE WAILLY, French Liaison Officer.

S/Sgt. Fedele Genito, Chief Clerk.
Cpl. William F. Allen, Typist, Interpreter, Driver.
Pfc Harry Adler, Typist, Interpreter, Driver.
Pfc John [illegible] Schwaller, Typist, Interpreter, Driver.
Pvt John J. O'Donnell, Typist, File Clerk, Driver.

(2) Civil Affairs Sections of:

3rd U.S. Inf. Div. - Lt. Col. KETLER, SCAO.
5th U.S. Inf. Div. - Major PEONY, SCAO.
35th U.S. Inf. Div. - Major [illegible], SCAO.

(3) Civil Affairs Detachments:

D571 [illegible], [illegible], [illegible].
D271 ST. JEAN DES MAIRESSES, ST. AMAND, TORIGNY.

C. The attack on VIRE was underway at the beginning of the month. CA Detachment D571 was attached directly to Corps operating at [illegible] for TORIGNY. This Detachment subsequently spent 24 hours at [illegible] prior to entering TORIGNY. A change in the tactical situation caused this Detachment to be transferred by V CAD to the 35th U.S. Infantry Division who installed it at that town. No officials being present in the town which had been severely damaged by combat action, a Mayor was designated by an AGT Officer of the 35th U.S. Infantry Division and an election held the following evening. The temporary Mayor together with all other civilians were killed by the explosion of a German shell in the house in which the civilians were gathered. The remainder were severely wounded including Lt. Melin, French Liaison Officer to the 35th U.S. Infantry Division who lost his right leg at the knee and other wounds. He was recommended for a decoration and a promotion for his fine work by the Division SCAO.

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

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

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The Detachment at TORIGNY passed to Corps on August 2nd and operated a Corps Refugee Transit Area but the population was kept to a minimum by local absorption. Detachment D5F1 was brought forward, attached to the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division and staged momentarily at PLACY MONTAIGU before entering CAMPEAU where it was made responsible for all of the canton of [illegible] within the American Zone.

(5 - 9 August 1944 - Occupation of VIRE - Defensive Phase)

a. Location: Corps CPs.

b. Personnel: CA Staffs - 5th U.S. Inf. Div. - Major Peddy
29th U.S. Inf. Div. - Major Gardiner
35th U.S. Inf. Div. - Major Condren

c. Disposition of CA Detachments: D5F1 - Capt. Blakemore
C1B1 - Major Wagner

d. Disposition of CA Detachments were, D2C1 directly under Corps at TORIGNY operating a Corps Refugee Transit Area with a capacity of 250 - 350 but at no time was over ¼ of their capacity used due to the Corps Policy of absorption within the immediate areas. SCAO, 5th U.S. Infantry Division operated a Refugee Collecting Point at PLAINES OUVRES and a similar operation was performed by Detachment D5F1 at CAMPEAU under the supervision of the SCAO, 2nd U.S. Infantry Division.

e. During this period Detachment C1B1 was called forward from Army and installed by SCAO 2nd U.S. Infantry Division in VIRE. A group of about 6 French Officers under Major Buteau (Fr) joined the Detachment to assist the new Sous-Prefet in reorganizing the administration of the city which was 75% destroyed in an Allied air attack on 6 June 1944. See Photograph - Annex F-1 herewith. It was reported that Allied leaflets warning civilians to evacuate blew into the adjoining fields but some were brought to the Sous-Prefet and referred by him to the German Commandant who advised that they be ignored. 800 civilians were killed in the resulting bombardment. On leaving the city the civilians found the leaflets and were very bitter towards the Germans for having caused this warning to be withheld.

During the consolidation period, Civil Affairs Operating Instructions were published as Circular No. 44, Hq. V Corps dated 7 August 1944. See Annex "G". This publication, initiated by Corps G-5 was the subject of favorable comment from higher echelon.

(10 - 17 August 1944 - VINCHERAY - Offensive Phase)

a. Location: Corps CPs.

b. Personnel: CA Staffs - 2nd U.S. Inf. Div. - Lt. Col. Keller
29th U.S. Inf. Div. - Major Gardiner
CA Det C2C1 - Major Brown
CA Det D2C1 - Major Viault

c. This phase opened with Detachment C1B1 installed in VIRE. Detachment [illegible] was called forward and staged at ST OUVY, North of VIRE, in general support of the [illegible] U.S.

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Infantry Division. As the action progressed, this Detachment was brought forward by the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division and [illegible] preparatory to entry into TINCHEBRAY. Many refugees were evacuated in this area but all were absorbed locally. On entry into TINCHEBRAY on the morning following its uncovering information was received that from 6,000 to 10,000 refugees in the vicinity of TINCHEBRAY centered principally around CHANU, in the British Zone. Preliminary investigations were made and "stand fast" orders issued prior to turning TINCHEBRAY over to the British caused by the change in the tactical boundaries. The town of TINCHEBRAY was virtually undamaged by combat. See Annex B-1.

d. Detachment D2C1 attached to the 29th U.S. Infantry Division came to Corps with that Division. It was moved from LANDELLES to ST. GERMAINE DE TALLEVANDE to control large groups of refugees found at that point. It was later moved forward in general support of the 29th U.S. Infantry Division as that unit turned northward to assist in the taking of TINCHEBRAY.

(17 - 22 August 1944 - CHAMBLIS (ARGENTAN) Offensive)

a. Location: Corps CPs.

b. Personnel: CA Staffs 80th U.S. Inf. Div. and 90th U.S. Inf. Div.
CA Detachment C1D1, Major O'Connell and A1F1, Lt. Col. Diggs.

c. This action to participate in the closing of the bottleneck on the German 7th Army necessitated leaving behind all Divisions and Detachments and moving the Corps Staff by night march to a new location. The 80th and 90th U.S. Infantry Divisions from the Third U.S. Army were acquired, the 90th, however, having previously been under the First U.S. Army in the assault stages. These Divisions were found to be wholly unsupplied with the Eisenhower Proclamations and had never seen many of the posters currently in use by the First U.S. Army. No current instructional directives from Third U.S. Army had been received. The need for a uniform operational policy between Armies was apparent. Personnel policies between Armies also vary and seriously affect morale. Allotted grades for Division Civil Affairs Officers are as follows:

	First U.S. Army	Third U.S. Army
Lt. Col.	1	0
Major	3	1
Captain	1	3
1st Lt	0	1

A "D" and "C" type Detachment were requested of Army and C1D1 and A1F1 were sent forward. C1D1 was given responsibility for the Canton of SEES and A1F1 the balance of the Arrondissement of SEES within the zone of the Corps with [illegible] to take over all of the Arrondissement on the departure of the A Detachment [illegible]

d. On the uncovering of ARGENTAN a "D" Detachment was improvis[illegible] of A1F1 and they operated there for approximately 48 hours until the to[illegible] over to the British on the change of the tactical boundaries. In addit[illegible] directed to establish part time offices in MORTREE and MONTMIRAIL EN FIN.

e. A short two day period of bivouac and care of equipment [illegible] the area as indicated on Annex "K" hereto did not lessen the work of [illegible] G-5 Section or the Detachments although Divisional CA Staffs became i[illegible]

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f. In this campaign the first contact with the FFI was made. These armed civilians were used by the civil authorities to augment civilian police guard on German supply dumps.

g. The 2nd French Armored Division joined V Corps and Major de Limur reported as SCAO. He had been sent direct to the Division from North Africa and while he had been in the diplomatic service and spoke better French than English he had had no Civil Affairs training prior to joining the Division. In addition he was not provided with transportation, clerical help or office equipment. His functions, as a result, were reduced to liaison almost in their entirety. A captured enemy vehicle was provided him.

(23 - 28 August 1944 - PARIS)

a. Location: Corps CPs.

b. Personnel: CA Staffs - 2nd French Armored Division, Major de Limur
4th U.S. Infantry Division, Lt. Col. Stone

c. This phase required a large displacement forward of the Corps CP. All along the route tonspeople lined the roads smiling, waving and cheering each vehicle as it went by. All houses were decorated with flags and more armed FFI were in evidence. Instances of FFI cutting the hair of women who consorted with Germans were observed but given no recognition.

d. Troops for the operation were the 2nd French Armored Division and the 4th U.S. Infantry Division (Mts). Arrangements for Civil Affairs Detachments for PARIS were completed with G-5 First U.S. Army. The following Detachments were collected in a pool near ABLIS and later moved to the vicinity of RAMBOUILLET to be available to enter PARIS on call.

D4A1*	D3E1	A1A1 (Lt. Col. Howley)
D5D1	D3C1	A2C1
D1C1	D4B1	
D7D1	D6E1	*Removed from list and given responsibility
D6D1	D2A1	for Arrondissement of RAMBOUILLET under Corps
D4D1	D6F1	Control.
D5A1	D2B1	
D3D1	D5C1	
D8B1	B1E1	
D5C1	C1F1	
D5E1		
D4B1		

e. In addition A1A1 was assigned ST. DENIS and A2C1 was made responsible for Civil Affairs matters in SCEAUX, both suburbs of PARIS. All Detachments were under the operational supervision of Lt. Col. Howley. See letter of instructions issued by Lt. Col. Howley attached hereto as Annex "W".

f. Colonel Moroney, G-5 and Capt. de Waldner, French Liaison Officer of V Corps and Army G-5, Colonel Gunn, Lt. Col. La Roque and Major Camerlynck entered PARIS at 1730 hours on 25 August 1944. They went directly to the Hotel de Ville where joyous crowds overwhelmed them. A conference was held with the Prefet of the Seine. It was explained to him that under General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander and General de Gaulle as Senior French Commander, General Koenig had been designated as Military Governor

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PARIS. Major General L. T. Gerow, Commanding V Corps, was the Senior Tactical Commander in the area responsible for military security and Civil Affairs. Colonel P. J. Moroney G-5 V Corps, was the officer on the ~~[illegible]~~ of the Civil Affairs responsibilities. Lt. Col. Howley as Commanding Officer of the PARIS Civil Affairs Detachments would be the operating agency for the execution of Civil Affairs matters within PARIS. A temporary office of Corps G-5 was opened by Colonel Moroney at the Grand Hotel du Louvre on 25 August 1944.

g. A message was dispatched by officer courier to Lt. Col. Pharr, Executive Officer, G-5 V Corps, to move the PARIS Detachments into that cit[illegible] 0600 hours on 26 August 1944. This message was dispatched by motorcycle dispatch rider and the Detachments moved in at the time and place directed in the message.

h. G-5 office was opened at 270800[illegible] August 1944 at the Corps CP (VICTOR TAC) at Les Invalides, the former offices of Marechal Petain. Lt. Col. Pharr joined Colonel Moroney in PARIS at 262100 hours. Capt. Cavanagh and the remainder of the section joined at VICTOR TAC at 271000 hours. By direction of the Corps Commander the Section in addition to installing the Civil Affairs Detachments in PARIS and supervising their operations until military control passed to the Commanding General, Seine Base Section, Communications Zone at 1200 hours on 28 August 1944, all matters pertaining to the FFI were handled through G-5. At the request of Brig. Gen. Rogers, Commanding General of the Seine Base Section, the Corps Commander further directed that the Corps G-5 continue in PARIS to assist the Commanding General, Seine Base Section in administration of Civil Affairs matters in that city until 1[illegible] September 1944.

i. The attitude of the population was one of extreme joy and welcome to the Allied troops. See newspaper photographs as sample. Annex. Troops were swamped with admirers at every step and showered with gifts of flowers, apples, tomatoes or whatever the people enroute had access to as a token of their appreciation. The population appeared healthy and full of vigor and there were no evidences of starvation or even privation, although long queues appeared before every grocery store during business hours.

j. Emergency supply of foodstuff for PARIS was stated by Colonel Ryan of Twelfth Army Group to be the direct responsibility of that echelon. The only available information on the supply plan was an oral statement of a plan to fly in 10,000 tons of supplies within the first 7 days of a 45 day program. There were also statements about supply convoys of American trucks with American drivers, American and captured vehicles with French drivers and British truck and drivers. The only supplies known to have arrived prior to departure of Corps G-5 were 19 truck loads of assorted supplies previously arranged for by G-5, First U.S. Army and brought in by Corps G-5 with the CA Detachments. An indication of the status of supply in PARIS is furnished by the priority requested by Civil Authority:

1st Priority - Flour
2nd Priority - Tinned goods, meat, etc.
3rd Priority - Fats
4th Priority - Milk, Cheese, Chocolate, Soap and Coffee. While they have sugar they would like to have jam.

k. Merchandise in stores appeared to be limited and of inferior quality, however clerks would disappear into warerooms and appear with better quality merchandise which had been hidden from the view of the German customers. On the whole the people appeared equally as well fed and much better dressed than people in London. The absence of motor transportation, except that confiscated by the FFI and used to dash madly through the city at excessive speeds on inconsequential errands was very noticeable.

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(29 - 31 August 1944 - Drive Northeast of PARIS to BELGIUM)

a. Location: Corps CPs.

b. Personnel: CA Staffs - 5th U.S. Armored Division - Major Sampiter
4th U.S. Inf. Div. - Lt. Col. Stone
28th U.S. Inf.Div. - Capt. Thompson

c. Lt. Col. Pharr and two enlisted men opened the G-5 Section at VICTOR Forward at ST. DENIS on 31 August at 1030 hours. Staff Visit made to the 28th U.S. Infantry Division where Civil Affairs Matters for the coming operation were discussed with G-1 in the absence of the SCAO. Plans to call forward CA Detachments for SENLIS and COMPIEGNE were made and message dispatched to MASTER requesting two type "D" Detachments were completed when the period closed at 312400B Aug 1944. 5th Armored Division SCAO was contacted and Civil Affairs plans for the operations were discussed.

2. Attached hereto are a set of the Proclamations, Notices and other forms used in Civil Affairs activities.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-5
APO 305, U. S. Army

25 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions.

TO : Commanding Officer, CA Detachment A1A1.

1. Your Detachment has been attached to V Corps by VOCG, First U.S. Army. Certain other Detachments, for operations in PARIS, have also been attached. These Detachments and any others added later will be under your immediate supervision.

2. You are advised that General Koenig (Fr) has been recognized as representative of General Eisenhower and General de Gaulle to take over the administration of civil government as military governor of PARIS. The Corps Commander, Major General Leonard T. Gerow, is the senior military commander of the area and Brigadier General Helmick, Commander of the Corps Artillery, is the General's representative responsible for the military security of the city. Col. Damon M. Gunn, G-5, First U.S. Army, has the responsiblity for Civil Affairs in PARIS. Col. T. J. Moroney, G-5, V Corps, is responsible to the Corps Commander for the operational supervision of Civil Affairs in the City. You will function under the supervision of Corps G-5. Staff Officers of G-5, First U.S. Army will be available for such assistance as may be advantageous to you, but in no way affect your responsibility to Corps G-5, so long as PARIS is in the zone of V Corps.

3. Civil Affairs operating policies of V Corps will be followed while attached to this headquarters.

4. When directed, you will move your Detachment to the Hotel de Ville, Paris, and present yourself or be presented by Corps G-5 to the Prefet de la Seine. You will advise him that the services of yourself and your Detachments are available to him and inquire his needs of assistance from Allied Military Authorities. You will advise him of your requirements for offices and billets for yourself, officers and enlisted personnel. The proclamation by General Eisenhower only, will be posted until further notice.

5. When directed by Corps G-5 you will cause the Civil Affairs Detachments described in paragraph one (1) hereof to be brought forward and follow similar procedure at each of the Arrondissements of PARIS to which assigned.

6. Civil Affairs Detachments will not initiate any independent action but they will fully inform themselves of their respective specialities and hold themselves in readiness to be of assistance to the Military Governor.

7. You will make a daily operational report of your Detachment including all those under your control as of 1800 hours daily to reach Corps G-5 in triplicate by 0800 the following day. The report will cover action completed, and matters on which it is recommended that action be taken by higher authority. In case of doubt on any question refer to G-5 this headquarters.

8. You will cause this directive to be reproduced, copies to be furnished to the Commanding Officer of each Detachment for compliance.

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T. J. MORONEY,
Colonel, GSC,
A.C. of S., G-5.

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Auth: CG, V Corps
In
Date: 2 July 1944

HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, U.S. Army

SECTION I - G-3 Report of Operations

1. Operations -
010001B July to 102100B July 1944 - Defensive period.

July opened with V Corps on the line held 30 June. These positions started from the division boundary at 564664 and extended to the north slopes of Hill 192 (570655), west along the creek bed south of ST GEORGES d'ELLE, to junction at 598667, then southwest through MONTRABOT (650622) to VACQUIRIE (665597), and west through VILLEUVE (691591), CAUMONT (703593), to the inter-Army boundary at 725589. (G-3 Periodic Report, 010001B July 1944).

Field Order No. 9, Hq., V Corps, issued at 011700B July 1944 (G-3 Journal, No. 61, 011830B July 1944) provided (in summary):

> 2nd Armored Division will relieve elements of British 7th Armored Division on the left of the V Corps zone beginning 1 July 1944, completing relief by 020600B July, and defend that sector. Corps and Army left boundary is adjusted to RJ 742694, south along road to 729648, south edge of wood 731647, road at 742635, bridge 743627, farm 754623, Les HAUTS VENTS (758603), La MASURE (755584), bridge 751567, thence southwest along line of the river. 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions to defend the line held at that time until further order.

The British 7th Armored Division was relieved as ordered, completing the change at 020330B July, when the 2nd Armored Division began preparing defensive positions in its new locations. The 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions improved their positions. The 2nd Infantry Division held combined infantry-tank training in the rear areas. This training involved combined infantry-tank action to break through and advance in the hedgerow type of country facing the Corps, where normal tactics were not practical. The defensive phase continued through 10 July 1944.

Corps Artillery fired counterbattery missions using and air ground OP as well as missions called for by front line divisions. At 041200B July every Artillery piece on the V Corps front that had previously been in action fired one round at a known enemy target, as an observance of Independence Day. This was done on First US Army directive under which the salute was fired all across the U. S. front. The British 50th Division, to V Corps' left, joined in the salute as a gesture of respect. Engineers with the Corps continued normal duties throughout the period. Antiaircraft units of the Corps engaged 56 enemy aircraft in 30 engagements, claiming 3 planes destroyed and 5 others probably destroyed. The 102nd Cavalry Group maintained liaison between front line divisions and engaged in patrol activities. Armored forces were attached in support of the divisions but were inactive during this static period. Tank destroyer units were prepared for anti-mechanized defense but were not required for action. Units were located in positions to give direct support to the infantry by indirect fire. Air support missions were flown as requested by V Corps and divisions when weather permitted. Enemy movements on 5 and 9 July

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and an Artillery position on 9 July were bombed and strafed. Signal units improved communications facilities. The 81st Chemical Battalion was in support of the front line divisions but was inactive during the period.

Attachments and detachments from V Corps during this period were as follows:

Attached (or Asrd)	Detached
Cos. B & D, 81st Cml Bn - 011200	Co. B, 86 Engr Hv Pon Co - 020800
	20 Postal Reg Sect - 6 July
	581 APU - 8 July
	588 APU - 8 July
	596 APU - 8 July
	553 APU - 8 July
	142 APU - 8 July
	764 Engr Dump Trk Co - 060800
	384 Med Coll Co - 10 July

During the period 1 July to 10 July 1944 the V Corps held its defensive positions which were improved in preparation for the next offensive phase. Contact with the enemy was maintained all across the front by active patrolling. Artillery was comparatively inactive due to shortage of ammunition but fired counterbattery and some harassing missions. All units prepared for attack. For daily positions, see Situation Photos, attached.

102100B July to 122400B July 1944 - Attack on Hill 192 (5765)

Field Order No. 10, Hq., V Corps, issued at 042100B July 1944 called for attack to secure Hill 192. It provided in substance:

> 2nd Infantry Division to attack on Corps order to secure and hold Hill 192. The remainder of the Corps to assist the attack by strong demonstrations to the south. V Corps attack to be coordinated with an attack by the 29th Division of the XIX Corps. (FO No. 10, G-3 Journal, No. 31, 0507273 July 1944).

The attack was finally set for 110600B July. To the 38th Infantry Regiment was given the mission of taking Hill 192 while the 23rd Infantry advanced on the flank to the right of the hill. Hill 192 was the dominating terrain feature of the whole front from ST LO in the XIX Corps sector to the Army left boundary, as well as commanding the rear of the V Corps front and the terrain held by the enemy to the south. Because of its importance it was strongly held by the Germans who were dug in behind hedgerows on the upper part of the north slope of the hill. The 38th Infantry was in positions on the lower one-third of the north slope.

The advance was to be behind an intense artillery barrage, which included all 2nd Division artillery, part of the 1st Division artillery, and that part of the Corps artillery which was in position to fire in support of the 2nd Division. Air support was to be provided on pre-arranged targets, but the weather closed in and prevented the accomplishment of the air missions, which were taken over by the artillery.

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The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 38th Infantry, pushed off as scheduled and advanced with tanks from the741st Tank Battalion up the hill against stubborn opposition. The Artillery support moved 100 yards ahead of the advancing infantry and tanks. Tank dozers were used to open lanes through the hedgerows through which the tanks and infantry moved, fighting from hedgerow to hedgerow. The crest of the hill was reached shortly afternoon, andthe enemy disengaged. Our troops advanced slowly through the wood covering the south slope and dug in at nightfall 11 July at the edge of the wood after a 900-yard advance. (See Situation Photo, 112200B July). Meanwhile, the 23rd Infantry had advanced to the right of the hill about 1500 yards against similarly stubborn resistance. The two regiments advanced across the ST LO - BERIGNY roadthe following day against slight opposition, and dug in, preparing a new defensive position. (See Situation Photo, 122200B July, appended).

Corps and division artillery fired 45 tons of high explosive shells in support of the 2nd Division attack, providing a continuous barrage which was dazing to the enemy. Engineers maintained usual normal duties. Corps AA units were inactive in normal missions, but some units fired indirect support for the 2nd Division. The 102nd Cavalry Group maintained contact and patrolled. Tank units joined with infantry in tank-infantry teams during the advance and were very effective. Tank destroyer units were prepared to repel armored attacks but were not used in that role. Some units fired indirect fire support missions of supporting and harassing fire for the attack. Air support missions consisted of 6 armed reconnaissance and one bombing. Results were excellent with the destruction of enemy materiel reported. Signal units continued normal duties and kept signal communications following the attack. The 81st Chemical Battalion was in a supporting role.

Attachments and detachments for the period were as follows:

Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
None	16th Crd Bomb Disp Sqd - 12 July

As a result of the 2-day action, Hill 192 was taken and the German hold on this commanding terrain feature was broken. The way was opened for further advance to the south and the German command of the approach to ST LO was removed.

130001B July to 260600B July 1944 - Regrouping of forces and preparation for attack.

The 1st Infantry Division was relieved (FO No. 11, G-3 Journal, No. 36, 130732B July 1944) in its defensive position by the 5th Infantry Division on 13 and 14 July and moved into Army reserve in assembly areas near COLOMBIERES. The 2nd Armored Division was relieved from assignment to V Corps on 18 July and reassigned to VII Corps. (G-3 Journal, No. 70, 181625B July 1944). The Corps front remained the same until 26 July. Patrol activity maintained contact with the enemy while defensive positions were consolidated and improved. On 23 July the 5th Infantry Division was relieved (FO No. 13, G-3 Journal, No. 15, 220725B July 1944) by the 15th Scottish Division of the British XXX Corps, the relief being completed on 24 July when the 5th Division (less the 2nd Infantry Regiment) passed to Corps reserve in a concentration area slightly behind the front. Under Field Order No. 13, the 2nd Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division remained in position, prepared to attack VIDOUVILLE objective of Field Order No.

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12. The V Corps lost the left portion of its sector. (See Situation Photo, 242200B July 1944).

During this period much study was made on the tactics of hedgerow fighting. Troop F of the 102nd Cavalry Squadron, 102nd Cavalry Group, devised a "rhino" device to fit on the front slope of their tanks. This device consisted of three knives vertically and three horizontally. Using this the tank is enabled to break through hedgerows six to seven feet wide and five feet thick, opening a path which can be followed by tanks, half-tracks and trucks. This device was exhibited to Corps and Army Commanders. The Commanding General, First US Army, ordered ordnance to prepare "rhinos" for all tanks to be used in the coming attack.

Artillery continued on active counterbattery policy as far as possible with restrictions on fire due to shortage of ammunition. Engineers continued normal duties. Antiaircraft units fired on 53 enemy planes in 20 engagements, claiming 27 destroyed and 11 others probably destroyed. The 102nd Cavalry Group maintained contact and patrol activities. Tanks were in reserve of the front line divisions. Tank destroyer units were ready to provide anti-mechanized defense and fire supporting and harassing missions by indirect fire under control of V Corps Artillery. Air support missions were flown as requested by Corps and divisions when possible with good results. All other Corps units performed normal functions. V Corps forward CP was shelled by enemy artillery at 222010B July. Six casualties were caused, including Colonel A. E. CAMPBELL, Provost Marshal, all slightly wounded. One enlisted man was evacuated as a result of injuries.

Attachments and detachments during the period were:

Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
5th Infantry Division - 13 July	1st Infantry Division - 14 July
735th Tank Bn - 13 July	103rd AAA AW Bn - 14 July
818 TD Bn - 13 July	745th Tank Bn - 15 July
449 AAA AW Bn - 13 July	635th TD Bn - 16 July
16th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd - 19 July	84 Cml Smoke Gen Co - 13 July
17 Ord Bomb Disp Sqd - 23 July	161 Cml Smoke Gen Co - 13 July
759th Tank Bn (L) - 25 July	966 Engr Maint Co - 16 July
	2nd Armd Div - 18 July
	702nd TD Bn - 18 July
	195th AAA AW Bn - 18 July
	62nd Armd FA Bn - 15 July
	65th Armd FA Bn - 15 July
	Det A, 35 Sig Constr Bn - 20 July
	15 Ord Bomb Disp Sqd - 23 July
	Det D4C1, 1st ECA Regt - 15 July
	Det D3B1, 1st ECA Regt - 18 July.

During this defensive phase V Corps held its positions andprepared to continue the attack when ordered. Tank "rhino" devices for hedgerow fighting were developed. Late in the period the Corps was regrouped in preparation for the attack to the south.

, 260600B July to 312400B July 1944 - Attack.

Field Order No. 12, Hq., V Corps, ~~originally~~ issued 160900B July (G-3

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Journal, No. 44, 160925B July 1944) called for an attack to the south with divisions abreast, 2nd Division on the right, 5th Division on the left.

> "The plan is to attack generally south making the main effort of the Corps along the Ht VIDOUVILLE - COLOMBIERES Ridge. * * * At the completion of the operations directed herein, dispositions will be such as to facilitate further advance to the south."

This order called for four phases in the attack, the first of which was the line through ST JEAN des BAISANTS and VIDOUVILLE. Later phases called for continued attack to the south.

Prior to the attack changes in dispositions of troops by Army and change of the Army boundary as above described, caused a change in plans, and at 242000B July (G-3 Journal, No. 66, 242235B July 1944) a letter of instructions was issued to CG, 5th Infantry Division, then with the 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments, in reserve, to prepare plans for attack to the southwest towards ST SUZANNE sur VIRE to secure and hold the area between ST JEAN des BAISANTS and the VIRE River. This attack was to follow securing of ST JEAN des BAISANTS by the 2nd Division.

V Corps attacked at 260600B July in accordance with the original plan of Field Order No. 12, as modified by Field Order No. 13 for the 5th Division. The 2nd Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division attacked to secure VIDOUVILLE. Some mortar andmachine gun fire was encountered in early stages of the attack, but resistance was generally light. The objective was reached at 261600B and defensive lines established. The 2nd Infantry Division, using all three regiments, attacked at 260600B. The 9th Infantry Regiment attacked to the southwest, partially flanking the objective and against scattered resistance, made good progress. The 23rd and 38th Regiments attacked to the southeast from their positions on the right flank, and against very heavy opposition including artillery and mortar fire, succeeded in gaining generally 1000 to 1500 yards. (SeeSituation Photo, 262200B July 1944).

V Corps continued the attack at 270800B July. The 2nd Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division continued its attack to the southwest against moderate to heavy resistance. Enemy counterattacks were repulsed with serious losses to the enemy. The 2nd Division continued its attack to the south and southwest to secure the objective. Resistance varied from moderate to very heavy.

At 271230B July, Field Order No. 14 was issued, directing the division of the Corps zone between the 2nd and 5th Divisions, andproviding for the relief of the 9th Infantry Regiment in the 2nd Division sector by the 10th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division.

At the close of the day's action the relief was being achieved. Another strong counterattack at 1600 on the 2nd Infantry Regiment front was repulsed and one enemy company was practically wiped out.

At 2100 a telephone call from First US Army attached the 35th Infantry Division to V Corps, and movedthe V Corps right boundary west to the VIRE River, to include the area within which the 35th Division was then attacking

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A General advance by the 2nd Division of 1200 yards had been achieved, while elements of the 5th Division had moved south and southwest from 500 to 1000 yards. (See Situation Photo, 272200B July 1944).

~~The attack was resumed on 28 July, the 5th Infantry Division on the left~~ attacking at 1200 with the 2nd and 10th Regiments making gains against fairly light opposition. The 2nd Infantry Division resumed the attack at 1000 hours and secured the assigned objective of ST JEAN des BAISANTS. Resistance was from moderate to very heavy. The 35th Infantry Division, with the 134th and 320th Regiments in the line, advanced approximately 4500 yards against stubborn resistance and gained STE SUZANNE sur VIRE. Patrols were sent forward to the final objective, CONDE sur VIRE.

At 290130B Corps issued Field Order No. 15, calling for a continued attack by all three divisions, 35th on the right, 2nd in the center, and 5th on the left, to reach a line of advance specified (generally from CONDE sur VIRE along the stream northeast, then through LANGERVILLE to le BISSON) and to prepare for attack on Corps order, anytime after 291200B July to secure further objectives - (35th, Torigni-sur-Vire; 2nd, high ground east of La CHAPPELLE du FEST; 5th, Hill 170, south of Le BREVIL). Boundaries were shown by overlay. (See Situation Photo, 292200B July 1944, attached). Strong patrolling was to be engaged in on securing of "Limit of Advance" to maintain contact with the enemy and prevent organization of defensive positions.

Under this order all Corps units advanced on 29 July. In the 5th Infantry Division sector the 10th Infantry Regiment advanced at 0930. Objectives were reached at 2130B. The 2nd Infantry Regiment remainedin position on the V Corps left flank and patrolled vigorously. The 2nd Division, with the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments engaged, reconnoitered in force at 1000B. At 1500 the two regiments advanced against scattered resistance. The left flank encountered heavy fire late in the period. The 35th Division resumed the attacknat 0630 with the 134th and 320th Regiments committed and gained over 4000 yards along the entire front. A general advance of 4000 yards was made on the Corps front. (See Situation Photo, 292200B July 1944).

At 291710B July (G-3 Journal, No. 28, 291710B July 1944) a letter of instructions was directed by CG, V Corps, to CGs, 2nd, 5th, and 35th Divisions. This letter called attention to the general withdrawal of the enemy along the Army front, and attempt to break contact with V Corps. All divisions were directed to initiate a strong advance to the south within their respective zones. Maximum effort was to be made to deny the enemy the opportunity to reorganize.

This letter was followed by Field Order No. 16, 292130B July, ordering the advance and redefining the division boundaries. (See Situation Photo, 292200B July 1944).

The advance continuedunder the Field Order on 30 July. The 9th and 38th Regiments of the 2nd Infantry Division made slight advances against very strong resistance from both flanks. The 5th Infantry Division advanced the 2nd Infantry Regiment about 3000 yards when very strong resistance haltedthe advance until late in the day, when the TORIGNI-sur-VIRE - CAUMONT road was crossed. The 35th Division attacked twice, both attacks being met by very heavy resistance. Only local gains were made. (See Situation Photo, 302200B July 1944).

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The advance was continued as a coordinated attack by all three divisions on 31 July under a letter of instructions dated 30 July. The 5th Inf ntry Division attacked at 0400. Rapid progress was made until late afternoon, when resistance stiffened materially. The 2nd Infantry Regiment joined with elements of the British 11th Armored Division in a coordinated tank-infantry attack on strongpoints near FORET l'EVEQUE (63-49). The 2nd Infantry Division resumed the attack at daylight and advanced against scattered enemy strongpoints. Resistance increased towards the end of the day. The 35th Division continued the advance and entered TORIGNI-sur-VIRE (576538) at noon. It was discovered the enemy had withdrawn, and the advance continued to a line 2000 yards south of the city where strong resistance was met.

V Corps Artillery fired general support of the advance, and conducted active counterbattery. All artillery fired an intensive preparation for the initial and succeeding attacks. Observed and unobserved counterbattery fires were very effective. Engineers continued support missions, clearing roads following the advances. Antiaircraft units provided protection for artillery positions. In a total of 19 enemy raids, five enemy planes were claimed as destroyed and three probably destroyed. The 116th AAA Gun Bn was moved into front positions and fired anti-tank missions by indirect fire under Division Artillery control. During the early part of the attack the 102nd Cavalry Group protected the right flank, and advanced as dismounted cavalry assisting their armored units attack to the south. At the end of the period they were withdrawn and reorganized for further attack. Tank units engaged in the attack in the tank-infantry teams, aiding the advance materially. Tank destroyer units provided anti-mechanized protection and one battalion fired indirect fire missions under artillery control. Air support was active, many bombing and reconnaissance missions being flown, with excellent success. In addition to many reconnaissance flights, 32 targets were bombed.

Attachments and detachments during this period were:

Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
Det D5P1, 1st ECA Regt - 26 July	744 Tank Bn - 26 July

During the attack period, which was continuing at the close of July, V Corps units had advanced across the entire front. The enemy defense had been broken and the enemy was withdrawing, fighting strong rear guard actions. The advance of V Corps averaged in the vicinity of seven miles. The city of TORIGNI-sur-VIRE was taken. The enemy was relentlessly pursued to deny him the opportunity to prepare defensive positions.

During the month of July, the Corps engaged in two attacks covering nine days of the month, the balance of the time being spent in holding the First Army hinge on the CAUMONT position. Attacks netted the Corps about 11 miles advance. At the end of the period the enemy was retreating slowly with the V Corps in aggressive pursuit.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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HISTORICAL RECORD
G-2 Section, Headquarters V Corps

Section II - Intelligence Report

Month of July

PART I - ENEMY SITUATION

Period 1 July - 10 July

As the second calendar month of the campaign on the continent began, the enemy line facing V Corps which had remained unchanged for some time was as follows: from North of ST ANDRE DE L'EPINE through ST GEORGES D'ELLE, thence Southeast exclusive of ST GERMAIN D'ELLE to the CAUMONT--ST LO highway near LE BISSON. From LE BISSON the line ran generally to the East South of CAUMONT. the units holding this line were from West to East: II Battalion of the 9 Parachute Rifle Regiment, I Battalion of the 5 Parachute Rifle Regiment, II Battalion of the 5 Parachute Rifle Regiment, I Battalion of the 9 Parachute Rifle Regiment, III, II, and I Battalions of the 8 Parachute Rifle Regiment. The 2 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was East and West of SEPT VENTS. The boundary between the 3rd Parachute Division and the 2nd Panzer Division was believed to be from West of LE BISSON South through BELLAY.

The extension Eastward of the left V Corps boundary brought facing our front the 304 Panzer Grenadier Regiment. New identifications of 3 July indicated that the bulk of the 2nd Panzer Division faced us on the left sector: II Battalion of 2 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, a battalion of 304 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, II Battalion of 3 Panzer Regiment, and 2 Panzer Rcn Battalion. Also in the general area were a battalion of 74 Artillery Regiment at FUMECHON and 38 Pz Engr Bn.

This long quiet interval was used to great advantage by the enemy to improve his defense line. He appeared to be strengthening his outposts 250 to 300 yards from our lines to stop night patrols; weapons were located to cover all important terrain features. In the area between LE BISSON and VILLENEUVE on 8 July, our forces made a minor advance forcing I Battalion of 8 Parachute Regiment toward the South.

In a local counter-attack which the enemy staged against the British in the vicinity of ANGOVILLE--ST GERMAIN D'ECOTOT, units of the 2nd Panzer Division which had previously been identified in the CAUMONT sector participated. Tanks from II Battalion of 3 Panzer Regiment supported this attack.

On 9 July arrangements were made with German Officers headed by Capt. Brandt, Commander of I Battalion, 2 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, for the return of 9 German nurses to the enemy lines.

During this period a total of 25 prisoners of war were taken.

Period 11 July - 14 July

Early in the morning of 11 July, enemy forces of two companies of 5 Parachute Rifle Regiment supported by engineers attacked in the direction of BERIGNY in the hope of straightening out their lines, but were unsuccessful. They offered stubborn resistance, however, to our attack launched at 0600 11 July on the Corps right flank. Chief opposition came from III Battalion of 9 Parachute Rifle Regiment which at the end of the first day had been forced out of its well dug-in positions on Hill 192 (57 65). With this line of defense broken, the enemy could oppose our advance with only slight resistance, and he retreated to a line South of the BERIGNY--ST LO road. As a result of the first day's fighting, units of both 5 and 9 Parachute Rifle Regiments, 2 Company of the 9 Regiment in particular, suffered heavy losses. In an effort to halt our break-through, the enemy first committed 12 Parachute Assault Gun Battalion and then the 3 Parachute Reconnaissance Company. As a last reserve, 3 Parachute Engineer Battalion was finally committed. During the night of 11 - 12 July III Battalion of 9 Parachute Rifle Regiment was relieved by the III Battalion of 8 Parachute Rifle Regiment. The enemy then fortified his positions South of the ST LO--BERIGNY highway. His attempts to drive our forces off Hill 192, first by heavy artillery fire and then with a small counter-attack, met with no success.

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A shift of units Westward was indicated by the identification of prisoners of war from all three battalions of 9 Parachute Rifle Regiment, and the appearance of II Battalion of 5 Parachute Rifle Regiment on the line at BOIS DE LA RILLIERE (57 64). The entire 9 Parachute Rifle Regiment was apparently relieved by 8 Parachute Rifle Regiment on 13 July, and an additional company was even made available from 3 Parachute Signal Battalion. That additional non-organic artillery units were supporting the 3rd Parachute Division was made evident by the identification of 761 Artillery Regiment and a Special Medium Artillery Battalion. Our attack of this period brought in approximately 140 prisoners of war.

Period 15 July - 25 July

At the beginning of a relatively quiet period extending from 15 July to include 25 July during which the front lines remained unchanged, the enemy situation facing V Corps was as follows:

On our right flank the enemy front lines extended Northeast from approximately ST PIERRE LE SEMILLY to include BERIGNY. Enemy units along this portion of the defended position South of the highway were: III Battalion of 8 Parachute Rifle Regiment, I Battalion of 5 Parachute Rifle Regiment, III Battalion of 5 Parachute Rifle Regiment, the latter defending the BERIGNY salient. The line then ran Southeast until it crossed the CAUMONT--ST LO highway. The ST GERMAIN D'ELLE sector was occupied by II Battalion of 5 Parachute Rifle Regiment, and the area North of VIDOUVILLE by II Battalion of 8 Parachute Rifle Regiment. East of VIDOUVILLE was I Battalion of the same regiment. The enemy line continued East beyond CAUMONT, thence Northeast to the V Corps boundary. This line was held by units of 2nd Panzer Division in order from West to East: II Battalion of 2 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, I Battalion of the same regiment, and IV Battalion of 304 Panzer Grenadier Regiment.

Enemy activity during this quiet period was generally confined to patrolling and reconnaissance. Well protected by his dug-outs and emplacements in a strong defense line as mentioned above, the enemy reacted vigorously to our every attempt to penetrate his lines. On several occasions combat patrols up to a platoon in strength were organized to penetrate our lines with negative results.

A new Corps boundary having come into effect, only one panzer grenadier regiment of the 2nd Panzer Division was left opposing us on our front. The rest of the enemy line was occupied by the 3rd Parachute Division with the exception of 9 Parachute Rifle Regiment of that division which was on the XIX Corps front. The new Corps boundary ran from about 2 miles East of CAUMONT Southwest to ST MARTIN DES BESACES (67 50).

Information from a prisoner of war of 3 Company, 9 Parachute Rifle Regiment taken at (648 602) disclosed that by 21 July units of 9 Parachute Rifle Regiment had replaced units of 8 Parachute Rifle Regiment on our central front. I and III Battalions of 9 Parachute Rifle Regiment were in the VIDOUVILLE--BIEVILLE area. A total of 23 prisoners of war were captured and evacuated during this period.

Operation COBRA, 26 July - 31 July

The full-scale attack begun by our forces early on the morning of 26 July with a heavy air and artillery bombardment had by the end of the period driven the enemy back about 1500 meters on our Western flank in the vicinity of ST PIERRE LE SEMILLY (57 64). After being driven back in the vicinity of (56 63) [illegible] regained some ground by a local counter-attack. In this sector, identification confirmed the presence of the following units: III Battalion, 8 Parachute Rifle Regiment, II, III Battalions of 5 Parachute Rifle Regiment.

The enemy continued to hold with I and II Battalions of 5 Parachute Rifle Regiment a pocket extending South of BERIGNY as far as NOTRE DAME D'ELLE and FORET DE LA BIGNE.

On the Eastern portion of our front, the enemy was driven back about 2500 meters South of ST GERMAIN D'ELLE (62 60) with his loss of ground diminishing Eastward to about 500 meters South of VIDOUVILLE (63 60). Prisoners taken in

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this sector were from II and III Battalions of 9 Parachute Rifle Regiment. The third battalion (I) of the regiment was said to be located in this sector. Of an undetermined number of self-propelled guns which appeared on the Eastern portion of the front, two 88-mm guns were disabled by our forces. During the first day of the attack 283 prisoners of war were taken.

In the course of the next period, the enemy withdrew from the BERIGNY salient without offering resistance, realizing that he was in danger of being isolated. On the Eastern V Corps front there was not much resistance although three small counter-attacks, one of which recaptured VIDOUVILLE, were made against this sector. All the ground gained by the enemy was later lost by him. Two companies (7 and 8) of an additional regiment on our front (15 Parachute Rifle Regiment) were said by a prisoner of war to have been committed in the VIDOUVILLE sector. Strong enemy resistance met our push Southward. A captured document indicates that the enemy expected the main attack of First U. S. Army to come on the V Corps front instead of West of the VIRE.

The enemy was forced back on 30 July to a line about 900 meters North of, and roughly parallel to, the TORIGNI--CAUMONT highway. He succeeded in making a stand there with small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. On the extreme Eastern portion of our front only rear guard action was met. Forced out of this favorable defense position, the enemy withdrew to commanding ground on a line running Northeast - Southwest from BRECTOUVILLE (54 52) and on the ridge Southeast of TORIGNY SUR VIRE. On this last day of the month the enemy held firmly for a time against our attacking forces in the East, but his plans for protracted defense were disturbed by the threat of British forces moving West from Hill 309 (69 51). Some prisoners of war were taken from I Battalion and 14 Company of 752 Infantry Regiment of the 326th Infantry Division which had been identified farther East. The enemy offered little resistance; he was obviously retreating to the next defense line. During the period of operations which began on 26 July, 585 prisoners of war were captured.

PART II - G-2 SECTION

15 July - Major J. H. Cavins reported for duty at the G-2 Section.

20 July - Victor forward CP opened at LA BASCQUE at 1400 hours.

21 July - Letter from Headquarters, ETOUSA, officially transferred 1st Lt. William Boehme, O-1591001, to IPW Team #11, 1st Infantry Division, and 2nd Lt. Manuel Shapiro O-1591438, from that team to IPW Team #23, Hq. V Corps.

22 July - At 1738 hours about twelve rounds of 149-mm (Italian) landed in the V Corps CP area. T/3 Matt Nisha (PI) received a slight scalp wound from bomb fragment during shelling.

24 July - A strafing plane was over V Corps CP area. Major Cavins suffered a broken ankle while jumping into dug-out. The Major was hospitalized and later removed to England.

26 July - Major Abernathy visited the CP of the 102nd Cavalry Group at 1600 hours. T/3 Timothy Moriarity of PI Team #11 (31293327) was replaced by T/3 George W. Campbell (35231071), the former being sent to PI Team [illegible] PROOME, A.P.O. 350, G-2 Section. MII Team #11 received [illegible] (31289752), T/3, as replacement for S/Sgt. [illegible] was transferred to MIS, Headquarters [illegible] the Psychological Warfare Division, A.P.O. [illegible]

27 July - Colonel Henry M. Zeller, G-2, XX Corps, accompanied by Lt. Col. McFarland, and Capt. [illegible], visited the section from [illegible]

28 July - Colonel Ford visited the 35th Infantry Division.

30 July - Colonel Henry M. Zeller, G-2, XX Corps, accompanied by [illegible] McFarland and Capt. [illegible] visited the G-2 Section during the afternoon.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305, U.S. ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

Sec. III
G - 1
OPERATIONS REPORT
No. 2

1 July - 31 July 1944.

7 August 1944.

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MAPS: GSGS - France, 1/50,000 St Lo 6F/2
Torigni-Sur-Vire 6F/4
Vire 6F/6

I. GENERAL.

1. Organization.

During period covered by Operations Report No. 1, the need for an administrative officer to handle the routine business of the section became apparent. 2nd Lt. Reed A. Schmidt was assigned for this purpose from 2nd Armored Division on 6 July 1944. [illegible] is overstrength.

On 23 July 1944, Major John P. McKnight, GSC, Observer from OPD, War Department, left the section to return to the War Department.

II. STATION LIST AND STRENGTH OF COMMAND.

1. Divisions.

Division	Period of Attachment	Strength Shown First Periodic Report		Date of 1st Periodic Report	Strength Shown Last Periodic Report		Date of last Periodic Report
		O	EM		O	EM	
1st Inf Div	1-13 July		15921	1 Jul 1944		15601	8 Jul 1944
2nd Inf Div	1-31 July	967	14269	1 Jul 1944	861	13552	30 Jul 1944
5th Inf Div	13-31 July	812	13583	16 Jul 1944	818	13228	30 Jul 1944
35th Inf Div	26-31 July	784	12646	30 Jul 1944	784	12646	30 Jul 1944
2nd Armd Div	1-17 July	916	14305	1 Jul 1944	931	14886	16 Jul 1944

2. Corps Troops

Unit	Location as of 31 July, or last Location	Strength shown 1st Report		Date of 1st Report	Strength as of 31 July, or last strength if relieved		Date of Relief
		O	EM		O	EM	
Hq/Hq V Corps	La Bazoque	130	544	Jul 2, 1944	130	474	
MP Platoon	"	2	49	" "	3	89	
506 QM Car Co	"	1	32	" "	1	32	
Det A,133 La Bn	"	1	10	" "	1	11	
63 AGF Band	2 Mi W Balleroy	1	31	" "	1	31	
GHQ Det,V Corps	La Bazoque	2	14	" "	2	14	
Hq 3 Armd Gp	Balleroy	18	87	" "	18	87	
735 Tank Bn	Litteau	37	650	Jul 16, "	40	665	
737 Tank Bn	565656	41	681	Jul 30, "	41	681	
741 Tank Bn	613677	42	777	Jul 2, "	40	711	
744 Tank Bn	Forst LeCeriay	37	517	Jul 9, "	38	518	26 Jul
745 Tank Bn	T 6462	766		Jul 2, "	765		13 Jul
759 Tank Bn(L)	575645	38	533	Jul 2, "	35	523	
3 Trop Hq	656434	15	65	" " "	16	74	
812 TD Bn	Cormolain	39	660	Jul 2, "	37	772	
629 Trans	656623	36	774	Jul 2, "	37	772	
633 TD Bn	527034	[illegible]	[illegible]	Jul 2, "	[illegible]	847	13
634 TD Bn	513622	34	774	Jul 2, "	34	594	
702 TD Bn		38	643	Jul 2, "	38	629	13
818 TD Bn	634675	35	617	Jul 16, "	36	614	
819 TD Bn	779631	40	640	Jul 9, "	40	641	
102 Cav Gp Hq	Near Couvaine	16	72	Jul 2, 1944	15	72	
38 Cav Recon Bn	634675	33	883	" " "	42	737	
102 " " "	E of Couvaine	45	885	" " "	34	786	
2891 Engr Tech Intel Team	La Bazoque	1	3	" 9, "	0	3	
1131 Engr Gp Hq	627738	18	114	" 2, "	18	87	
112 Engr (C) Bn	Cerisy LeForet	34	632	" " "	32	[illegible]	
146 " " "	Littee	29	586	" " "	32	[illegible]	
1171 Engr Gp Hq	Lattry	18	73	" " "	14	[illegible]	
20 Engr (C) Bn	1 Mi NW Lattry	35	673	" " "	32	[illegible]	

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Unit	Location as of 31 July, or last Location	Strength shown 1st Report O	Strength shown 1st Report EM	Date of 1st Report	Strength as of 31 July, or last strength if relieved O	Strength as of 31 July, or last strength if relieved EM	Date of Relief
254th Engr (C) Bn	684642	37	674	2 July 1944	33	648	
1340 Engr (C) Bn	Litteau	33	662	"	33	654	
502 Engr L Pon Co	Canneber	5	199	"	6	201	
Co B, 86 Engr Hvy Pon Bn	La Commune	4	134	"	4	134	2 July 1944
610 Engr L Equip Co	624734	5	140	"	5	139	
668 Engr Topo Co	S of Bernesque	5	116	"	5	118	
764 Engr D T Co	622729	4	106	"	4	106	6 July 1944
996 Engr Trdwy Br Co	626736	4	148	"	3	146	
966 Engr Maint Co	693727	3	117	"	3	117	16 July 1944
15 Ord BD Sqd	W of Balleroy	1	6	"	1	6	12 July 1944
16 Ord BD Sqd	" "	1	6	"	1	5	
17 Ord BD Sqd	" "	1	6	30 "	1	6	
115 AAA Gp Hq	La Londe	13	65	2 July 1944	13	65	
103 AAA AW Bn	T 7064	824		1 July 1944	819		13 July 1944
116th AAA Gun Bn	656653	31	704	16 July 1944	31	700	
195th AAA AW Bn		39	706	2 July 1944	40	705	18 July 1944
448th AAA AW Bn	512625	39	762	30 July 1944	39	762	
449th AAA AW Bn		39	812	16 July 1944	39	807	
460th AAA AW Bn	Bois d'Elle	37	792	2 July 1944	39	790	
461st AAA AW Bn	S of Balleroy	39	822	2 July 1944	38	813	
462nd AAA AW Bn	585814	34	792	2 July 1944	36	782	
53 Med Bn Hq	1½ Mi S Balleroy	7	24	2 July 1944	7	26	
382 Med Coll Co	"	5	105	"	5	104	
383 Med Coll Co	"	3	80	"	3	80	
384 Med Coll Co	La Poterie	5	105	"	5	105	16 July 1944
684 Med Coll Co	1½ Mi S Balleroy	14	106	"	14	107	
Co A, 507 MP Bn	La Bazoque	6	178	"	5	176	
81st Chemical Bn	Laval	42	769	1 "	45	740	
56 Signal Bn	2 Mi W Balleroy	37	930	2 "	38	914	
3250 Sig Serv Co	Near LaBazoque	8	134	" "	8	131	
Det A, 35 Sig Const Co	" LaBazoque	1	32	" "	1	32	21 July 1944
97 QM Bn Hq	Balleroy	5	21	" "	5	21	
606 QM G R Co	"	6	124	" "	5	124	
3275 QM Serv Co	"	4	207	" "	4	208	
3892 QM Truck Co	"	5	134	" "	5	134	
V Corps Arty	LaBazoque	35	135	" "	33	137	
62 FA Bn Armd	Balleroy	687		" "	34	575	15 July 1944
65 FA Bn Armd		39	565	" "	39	563	15 July 1944
186 FA Bn	SW Cerisy LeForet	592		" "	34	560	
187 FA Bn	SE Les Essarts	32	538	" "	31	536	
190 FA Bn	585699	31	632	" "	31	627	
196 FA Bn	578615	29	457	31 July 1944	29	457	
200 FA Bn	La Mine	38	685	2 " "	37	684	
941 FA Bn	Planquery	38	545	"	32	535	
953 FA Bn	NW St Germain Elle	37	600	"	37	597	
955 FA Bn	Planquery	33	545	"	34	542	
987 FA Bn	715695	25	410	9 " "	26	408	16
997 FA Bn	Cerisy Le Foret	28	627	2 " "	29	607	
Btry B, 153 FA Bn	667736	5	125	23 " "	5	125	
17 FA Obsn Bn	Litteau	30	510	2 " "	29	498	
187 FA Gp Hq	3/4 Mi S Cerisy Le Foret	18	79	2 " "	18	95	
198 FA Gp Hq	Bois D'Elle	17	91	"	19	95	
406 FA Gp Hq	Couvains	16	77	"	14	[illegible]	
41 Repl Bn	1 Mi E Rubercy	31	166	"	29	[illegible]	
8 Fin Disb Sec	1 Mi E Monfiquet	3	17	"	3	17	
15 Fin Disb Sec	" "	3	17	"	3	17	
26th MRU	Bas de Montfiquet	3	39	"	3	39	
63 AGF Band	2 Mi W Balleroy	1	31	"	1	31	
APU 305	½Mi W Bas de Montfiquet	1	11	"	1	10	
D1C1, Civ Affairs	La Mine	4	6	"	4	6	
D2C1, Civ Affairs	Cormolain	4	6	"	4	6	
D3B1 " "	Trevieres	4	6	"	4	6	18 July 1944
D4G1		4	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	15 [illegible]

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III. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS.

1. Command Post.

a. 20 July 1944 the Command Group closed at La Poterie (636608) and opened at La Bazoque (6668) approximately 2 miles south west of Bailleul.

b. 21 July 1944, the forward echelon followed.

c. 22 July 1944 the rear echelon closed at 626623, and opened at La Platiere (6568).

2. Inclosures - End of Period.

a. Prisoners of War and War Criminals.

(1) Army P/W Enclosure #1 - vicinity FOUGARNEILS (9500)
(2) Army P/W Enclosure #3 - vicinity FONGEMOY (6676)
(3) Corps P/W Collecting Point - Vicinity LA BAZOQUE (9700)
(4) 2nd Inf Div " " - " CRESTET LE PORET (6664)
(5) 35th Inf Div " " " ST LO (512243)

b. Civilian Internees.

Army Enclosure, HOTEL DE VILLE, LISIEUX.

c. TOPT Workers.

Army P/W Enclosure - vicinity FOUGARNEILS (9500)

d. Prisoners awaiting trial by general court martial or awaiting review of sentence.

Army P/W Enclosure #3 - vicinity FONGEMOY (6676)

e. Prisoners sentenced to confinement outside of Theater.

P/W Enclosure #3 - vicinity FONGEMOY (6676)

3. Stragglers.

a. Army Collecting Point - P/W Enclosure #3 - [illegible]
b. Corps " " - [illegible]
c. Divisions:
(1) 2nd Inf Div - 1-1/2 miles south [illegible]
(2) 35th Inf Div - ST LO (5122[illegible])

IV. CASUALTIES AND RETURNS.

1. Estimated Loss Totals (Est [illegible])

a. [illegible] units to carry a large number of [illegible] which possible [illegible] organized [illegible] formations with which [illegible] their military [illegible] [illegible] known [illegible] classified in the Estimated Loss Totals, [illegible] setting the following [illegible]

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2. c. Defensive Phase - D / 36 thru D / 49 (13 thru 25 July)

Unit	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Captured		TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES		Sick and Non-Battle Casualties		TOTAL CASUALTIES	
	0	[illegible]	0	[illegible]	0	[illegible]	0	[illegible]	0	[illegible]	0	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1st Inf Div *	-	1	1	13	1	9	-	-	2	23	1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
2nd Inf Div	2	68	10	245	1	28	-	-	13	341	15	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
5th Inf Div **	1	23	7	168	3	10	-	-	11	201	4	123	15	[illegible]
2nd Armd Div ***	1	11	3	44	-	-	-	-	4	55	3	19	7	[illegible]
Corps Troops	1	12	5	65	-	-	-	-	6	77	3	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total Estimated Casualties for Phase	5	105	26	535	5	47	-	-	36	687	32	[illegible]	68	[illegible]

* 1st Inf Div reld fr asgmt to V Corps 14 July.
*** 2nd Armd Div reld fr asgmt to V Corps 17 July.
** 5th Inf Div atchd to V Corps 19 July.

4. Offensive Phase - D / 50 thru D / 55 (26 thru 31 July)

Unit	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Captured		TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES		Sick and Non-Battle Casualties		TOTAL CASUALTIES	
	0	[illegible]	0	[illegible]	0	[illegible]	0	[illegible]	0	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
2nd Inf Div	12	178	41	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	-	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
5th Inf Div	4	144	24	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
39th Inf Div *	4	19	23	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	-	-	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Corps Troops	3	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	[illegible]	-	-	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total Estimated Casualties for Phase	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

* 39th Inf Div atchd to V Corps 28 July.

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2. e. TOTAL ESTIMATED CASUALTIES FOR DIVISIONS AND CORPS TROOPS. (1 July thru 31 July 1944)

Unit	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Captured		TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES		Sick and Non-Battle Casualties		TOTAL CASUALTIES	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
1st Inf Div *	3	27	7	126	3	15	-	-	13	168	15	387	28	555
2nd Inf Div	18	318	106	1962	2	88	-	72	126	2440	32	954	158	3394
5th Inf Div **	6	167	51	1178	4	286	1	3	62	1634	10	321	72	1955
35th Inf Div ***	4	49	20	461	1	93	-	-	25	603	-	249	25	852
2nd Armd Div ****	2	27	9	140	1	6	-	-	12	173	9	258	21	431
Corps Troops	5	74	42	411	1	51	-	-	48	536	17	384	65	920
Total Estimated Casualties for July	38	662	235	4278	12	539	1	75	286	5554	83	2553	369	8107

* 1st Inf Div relieved from assignment to V Corps 14 July 1944.
** 5th Inf Div attached to V Corps 14 July 1944.
*** 35th Inf Div attached to V Corps 28 July 1944.
**** 2nd Armored Div relieved from assignment to V Corps 19 July 1944.

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3. Actual Casualties by Week as shown by Col Periodic Reports.

Period	Killed		Sick, Gassed, Wounded Evacuated		Sick, Gassed, Wounded Non-evacuated		Missing		Captured		TOTAL	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION												
2 Jul - 8 Jul	1	16	20	313	6	28	-	5	-	-	27	362
2ND INFANTRY DIVISION												
2 Jul - 8 Jul	18		146		121		4		2		291	
9 Jul - 15 Jul	110		496		171		20		-		797	
16 Jul - 22 Jul	16		117		163		11		3		310	
23 Jul - 29 Jul	135		1165		289		70		8		1667	
Total	279		1924		744		105		13		3065	
5TH INFANTRY DIVISION												
9 Jul - 15 Jul	1	4	2	80	-	12	-	2	-	-	3	98
16 Jul - 22 Jul	-	18	2	182	4	95	3	2	-	-	9	297
23 Jul - 29 Jul	5	73	24	411	1	80	-	72	1	4	31	640
Total	6	95	28	673	5	187	3	76	1	4	43	1035
35TH INFANTRY DIVISION												
23 Jul - 29 Jul	7	98	15	626	6	32	2	128	-	-	30	884
2ND ARMORED DIVISION												
2 Jul - 8 Jul	1	13	11	176	3	39	2	8	-	-	17	236
9 Jul - 15 Jul	1	15	7	121	5	49	-	-	-	-	13	185
Total	2	28	18	297	8	88	2	8	-	-	30	421
CORPS TROOPS												
2 Jul - 8 Jul	-	3	1	98	10	90	-	4	-	-	12	194
9 Jul - 15 Jul	1	14	6	97	7	114	-	1	-	-	14	226
16 Jul - 22 Jul	-	9	3	105	4	16	-	-	-	-	7	130
23 Jul - 29 Jul	3	51	34	310	9	82	1	12	-	-	47	[illegible]
Total	4	77	44	610	30	302	1	17	-	-	80	[illegible]

ACTUAL CASUALTIES BY WEEK - DIVISIONS & CORPS TROOPS RESUME

2 Jul - 8 Jul	52	765	297	23	2	[illegible]
9 Jul - 15 Jul	146	809	358	23	-	[illegible]
16 Jul - 22 Jul	43	409	282	16	3	[illegible]
23 Jul - 29 Jul	372	2585	499	285	13	[illegible]
Total	613	4568	1436	347	18	[illegible]

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4. Consolidation of Battle Casualty Reports as occurring on the dates shown.

a. Defensive Phase - 1 July thru 10 July.

Unit	KIA	DOW	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	CAP	NET TOTAL	RTD	EUS	ALW	GROSS TOTAL
1st Inf Div	23	4	13	1	96	6	19		162	26	17		305
2nd Inf Div	36	6	16	1	114	5	3		181	58	8	1	248
2nd Armored Div	17		35	1	48	6	4		111	17	4		132
Corps Troops	2		4		10	1			17	27	6	3	53
TOTAL	78	10	68	3	268	18	26		471	228	35	4	738

b. Offensive Phase - 11 thru 12 July.

1st Inf Div	2		3		34	7	9		55	9			64
2nd Inf Div	127	10	20		277	9	13		456	10		3	469
2nd Armd Div	1				13				14	1		2	17
Corps Troops	1			1	2	1			5	2			7
TOTAL	131	10	23	1	326	17	22		530	22		5	557

c. Defensive Phase - 13 July thru 25 July.

2nd Inf Div	102	15	35		194	26	39		411	83		8	502
2nd Armd Div	14	5	11		35	3			68	6		1	75
5th Inf Div	28	3	51	1	121	12	6		222	10		1	233
Corps Troops	7		6		24	1			38	3			41
TOTAL	151	23	103	1	374	42	45		739	102		10	851

d. Offensive Phase - 26 July thru 31 July.

2nd Inf Div	71	17	82	1	1182	154	140	1	1648	2			1650
5th Inf Div	88		66		315	14	41	1	525				525
35th Inf Div	139	7	33		271	30			480				480
Corps Troops	16		3		44	4			67				67
TOTAL	314	24	184	1	1812	202	181	2	2720	2			2722

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4. Consolidation of Battle Casualty Reports as occurring on the dates shown (continued)

c. Total for July

Unit	KIA	DOW	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	CAP	NET TOTAL	RTD	EUS	ALW	GROSS TOTAL
1st Inf Div	25	4	16	1	130	12	28		217	135	17		369
2nd Inf Div	336	48	153	2	1767	194	195	1	2696	153	8	12	2869
2nd Armd Div	32	5	46	1	96	9	4		193	24	4	3	224
5th Inf Div	116	3	117	1	436	26	47	1	747	10		1	758
35th Inf Div	139	7	133		271	30			480				480
Corps Troops	26		13	1	80	7			127	32	6	3	168
CORPS TOTAL - JULY	674	67	378	6	2780	279	274	2	4460	354	35	19	4868

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5. V Corps Casualties for month of July by Arm or Service.

These figures include all casualty reports received at this headquarters through 2 August 1944. 35th Infantry Division has not reported casualties through this headquarters. As figures for 35th Inf Div become available they will be included in subsequent reports.

1 July thru 10 July	MP	Inf	FA	QMC	MD	CWS	CE	ORD	CAV	CAC	SC	NO	CC	TOTAL
1st Inf Div	1	240	15	5	18	5	18	1	2					305
2nd Inf Div		223	4		9		12							248
2nd Armd Div		122	5		1				2	1	1			132
Corps Troops		9	10	2	1		20		3	5	3			53
Total	1	594	34	7	29	5	50	1	7	6	4			738
11 July thru 12 July														
1st Inf Div		51	1		1	5	4		2					64
2nd Inf Div		421	12		12	1	22		1					469
2nd Armd Div		14							3					17
Corps Troops			2				2		3					7
Total		486	15		13	6	28		9					557
13 July thru 25 July														
2nd Inf Div		424	25		20	5	14		10	2	2			502
2nd Armd Div		45	22						1	7				75
5th Inf Div		201	12		5		1		6	8				233
Corps Troops	1	1	28	2	1		2			3	2	1		41
Total	1	671	87	2	26	5	17		17	20	4	1		851
26 July thru 31 July														
2nd Inf Div		1428	29		66	16	7		102	1			1	1650
5th Inf Div		369	5	1	31		8		109	2				525
35th Inf Div		437	22				8		4	1				472
Corps Troops		20	21		4		20			2				67
Total		2254	72	1	101	16	43		215	6			1	2714
TOTAL FOR JULY														
1st Inf Div	1	291	16	5	19	10	22	1	4					369
2nd Inf Div		2496	70		107	22	55		113	3	2		1	2869
2nd Armd Div		181	27		1				6	8	1			224
5th Inf Div		570	17	1	36		9		115	10				758
35th Inf Div		437	22				8		4	1				472
Corps Troops	1	30	61	4	6		44		6	10	5	1		168
TOTALS	2	4005	213	10	169	32	138	1	248	32	8	1	1	4860

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1 July thru 10 July	MP	Inf	FA	QMC	MD	CWS	CE	ORD	CAV	CAC	SC	MO	CC	TOTAL
1st Inf Div	1	240	15	5	18	5	18	1	2					305
2nd Inf Div		223	4		9		12							248
2nd Armd Div		122	5		1				2	1	1			132
Corps Troops		9	10	2	1		20		3	5	3			53
Total	1	594	34	7	29	5	50	1	7	6	4			738
11 July thru 12 July														
1st Inf Div		51	1		1	5	4		2					64
2nd Inf Div		421	12		12	1	22		1					469
2nd Armd Div		14							3					17
Corps Troops			2				2		3					7
Total		486	15		13	6	28		9					557
13 July thru 25 July														
2nd Inf Div		424	25		20	5	14		10	2	2			502
2nd Armd Div		45	22						1	7				75
5th Inf Div		201	12		5		1		6	8				233
Corps Troops	1	1	28	2	1		2			3	2	1		41
Total	1	671	87	2	26	5	17		17	20	4	1		851
26 July thru 31 July														
2nd Inf Div		1428	29		66	16	7		102	1			1	1650
5th Inf Div		369	5	1	31		8		109	2				525
35th Inf Div		437	22				8		4	1				472
Corps Troops		20	21		4		20			2				67
Total		2254	72	1	101	16	43		215	6			1	2714
TOTAL FOR JULY														
1st Inf Div	1	291	16	5	19	10	22	1	4					369
2nd Inf Div		2496	70		107	22	55		113	3	2		1	2869
2nd Armd Div		181	27		1				6	8	1			224
5th Inf Div		570	17	1	36		9		115	10				758
35th Inf Div		437	22				8		4	1				472
Corps Troops	1	30	61	4	6		44		6	10	5	1		168
TOTALS	2	4005	213	10	169	32	138	1	248	32	8	1	1	4860

These figures include all casualty reports received at this headquarters through 2 August 1944. 35th Infantry Division has not reported casualties through this headquarters. As figures for 35th Inf Div become available they will be included in subsequent reports.

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GRAVES REGISTRATION.

1. No cemeteries operated by V Corps in Corps sector.

2. One cemetery serviced Corps units, including divisions under control of First U. S. Army. Cemetery located at St. Laurent-Sur-Mer (678895).

3. Corps cemeteries will be established as the advance of the corps proceeds inland.

VI. REPLACEMENTS.

1. Unit Overstrengths.

Due to the fact that initial casualty estimates were in excess of actual losses, the automatic flow of replacements to the battalion servicing the Corps, prior to the arrival of the depot on the continent, exceeded capacity of the battalion to stock them. (See Sec VII, Par. 2, Operations Report No. 1). In order to overcome this, First U.S. Army directed that these replacements be assigned to the organizations for which they were intended, irrespective of the strength of these organizations, with the result that divisions and practically all Corps units were overstrength.

2. Casualties and Others Returning From Hospitals.

During the period of this report a number of personnel who formerly were members of divisions and Corps units and who had either been left in hospitals in the UK when their organizations moved overseas, or who were wounded during the early stages of the operation and evacuated to hospitals in the UK, became available for return to duty. While both the Army and Theatre directives contained provision for the return of these individuals to their former units, it became apparent that this could not be carried into effect without increasing the then existing overstrength. This Army refused to do. Eventually, due to the number of infantry casualties sustained, the problem, insofar as divisions were concerned, reached a solution. To date no solution has been reached in the case of non-divisional units. An effort is currently being made to turn back their overstrength to the replacement system, which, it is thought, will solve the problem with respect to them. It is strongly recommended that any plans for future operations not only from the point of view of morale, but also in the interest of efficiency and the conservation of manpower, make adequate provision for the return to their former units of trained personnel who become hospitalized and are later returned to duty.

3. Training of Replacements.

a. Infantry. The system described in Sec VII, par 9, of Operations Report No. 1, was continued with observation tours being made to the 2nd Infantry Division after the relief of the 1st Infantry Division from assignment to the Corps.

b. Other Arms and Services. A system for the training and battle indoctrination of replacements of other arms and services was developed. (See Training Memorandum No. 16, Hq V Corps, 5 July 1944, attached as Exhibit A). It has been found more practicable in most instances to make these attachments for indefinite rather than limited periods, as outlined in par. 3, Training Memorandum No. 16.

4. Location of 41st Replacement Battalion.

On 31 July 1944, the 41st Replacement Battalion moved from its former location in the vicinity of Rubercy to the vicinity of St. Quentin (6066).

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5. Personnel Shipments.

The following tables show the number of replacements forwarded to divisions and Corps Troops by phases during the period of the report and the breakdown by branches of replacements forwarded to Corps Troops.

a.

Phase	2nd Inf Div		5th Inf Div		35th Inf Div		Corps Troops		Total	
	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM
Defensive 1-10 July	0	0	0	0	-	-	7	11	7	11
Offensive 11-12 July	0	0	0	0	-	-	19	2	19	2
Defensive 13-25 July	25	604	6	204	-	-	15	136	46	944
Offensive 26-31 July	4	1246	18	694	-	-	18	100	40	2040
TOTALS	29	1850	24	898	-	-	59	249	112	2997

b. Consolidated Report of Daily Shipments to Corps by Branch.

DATE	INF		AF		CAC		CAV		CE		CIT		CWS		FA		MD		ORD		QMC		SC		TD	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
1 July		1								2									1			1	1			
2 July																										1
3 July																										
4 July																										
5 July	1																		1							
6 July																										
7 July																										
8 July										2																
9 July									3								4									
10 July																										
11 July		1							2						1											
12 July			3						11				3													
13 July		163		38																						
14 July															1										1	
15 July		3	1																							
16 July		7																								
17 July		187	1	9										1		1									2	14
18 July																										
19 July	1	44		1						14																
20 July	6	2	3	1					1							3		3								
21 July	12	212														8		4								
22 July	1	54					1															1				
23 July	4	106								1																
24 July	8						1			8					1							4				
25 July	1	49							1	5																
26 July	3	133	4	22		8		1	1	15		3		1	2			2						1		
27 July	3	506	2						2	2				4	3	5								1		
28 July	12	886	1												4			2								
29 July		9	1	32																		1				
30 July		388																1								
31 July																										
	52	2751	16	103	0	8	2	1	21	49	0	3	3	6	10	19	0	16	2	0	0	7	1	2		

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VII. PRISONERS OF WAR.

Phase	Corps	1st Inf Div	2nd Inf Div	5th Inf Div	35th Inf Div	2nd Armd Div	Total
Defensive (1 July thru 10 July)	5	12	5				22
Offensive (11 July thru 12 July)			117				117
Defensive (13 July thru 25 July)	1		21	19		5	46
Offensive (26 July thru 31 July)	24		432	44	77		577
TOTAL for July	30	12	575	63	77	5	762

Note: These figures do not include 114 prisoners of war evacuated through medical channels.

VIII. a. PROMOTIONS.

1 July thru 31 July	Regular	Battlefield	Command	Appointments	Corps Less Divs	Divs	TOTAL
Received	109	247	25	12	169	224	393
Approved	109	193	21	8	-	-	331
Disapproved	-	30	-	3	16	17	33
Pending	-	24	4	1	8	21	29

b. Reclassifications, Reassignments and Demotions

	Brig Gen.	Col.	Lt. Col.	Maj.	Capt.	1st Lt.	2nd Lt.	W.O.	TOTAL
Reclassifications	-	2	1	2	5	9	15	1*	35
Reassignments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Demotions	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
TOTALS	1	2	1	2	5	9	15	1	36

Note: * W.O. not reclassified but his warrant withdrawn to be terminated upon return to U.S.

IX. MORALE.

1. Unit Citations. Citations for the following units were approved during the period of this report:

*18th Inf Regiment — 1st Engr (C) Bn — 20th Engr (C) Bn
397 MG AAA Bn (Prov) — 112th Engr (C) Bn — 121st Engr (C) Bn
*Approved by First Army for forwarding to War Department.

2. Decorations and Awards.

a. The Army's supply of medals and ribbons became exhausted early in the period covered by this report. The inability to make prompt presentation of medals after awards have been published to a large measure detracts from the effect which the award should have on the morale of units as well as on the individu[illegible] It is expected that an adequate [illegible]pply of decorations will soon be available.

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b. The following chart shows the number and type of recommendations submitted by organizations during the period and their status as of the close of this report.

Unit	Medal of Honor				D. S. C.				L of M				Silver Star				D. F. C.				Soldier's Medal				Bronze Star				Air Medal				Unit Totals	
	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded	Pending	Awarded		
	Off		EM		Off		EM		Off		EM		Off		Em		Off		EM		Off		EM		Off		EM		Off		EM		Off	EM
Hq/Hq Co V Corps					1				5				1	2		2									1	22		10					32	12
V Corps Arty									1								1									8		2		4			14	2
1st Inf Div	1		3		25	12	22	12	7		1			12		50						1		1		11		20					69	109
2nd Inf Div							2		4		2			26		80						1		3		427		1616		4			462	1703
5th Inf Div									2				1		1	2								1			5						3	9
35th Inf Div							1																											1
2nd Armd Div							1		7					7		14								4		11		44					25	63
Prov Engr Gp					1																												1	
3 Armd Gp																										1							1	
17 FA Obsn Bn																												1						1
20 Engr (C) Bn											1			2		3										8		20					10	24
38 Cav Recon Sq																2										2							2	
41 Repl Bn											1															2		11					2	12
56 Signal Bn					1									1		7										2		4					2	11
62 FA Bn Armd																												4		2	1		2	5
65 FA Bn Armd						1		5								3									1	5		9					7	17
81 Chemical Bn					1				3		1					1										2		8					5	10
102 Cav Recon Sq													2			1										2							4	1
112 Engr (C) Bn									1																	1							2	
115 AAA Gp	1				5		2						3			10										3		7					12	19
146 Engr (C) Bn																													1		7		1	7
153 Air Liason Sq																										1							1	
186 FA Bn																										1		1		2			3	1
186 FA Gp																2																		2
187 FA Bn																										2		2		2			4	2
190 FA Gp																					2		4			1							3	4
190 FA Bn																																		

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b. (continued)

Unit	Medal of Honor				D. S. C.				L of M				Silver Star				D. F. C.				Soldier's Medal				Bronze Star				Air Medal				Unit Totals	
	Pending		Awarded		Pending		Awarded		Pending		Awarded		Pending		Awarded		Pending		Awarded		Pending		Awarded		Pending		Awarded		Pending		Awarded			
	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM
200 FA Bn																																		
254 Engr (C) Bn																									1									
293 JA Sig Co													1												1		1						1	
299 Engr (C) Bn					2		1																				1						2	1
635 TD Bn													1																					1
741 Tank Bn																																	3	1
743 Tank Bn				2	2		2						1		2												1							1
745 Tank Bn				1	5		3						1		1												8						5	12
759 Tank Bn (L)				1									1																				7	4
953 FA Bn																											3						2	3
987 FA Bn																									1									1
1121 Engr (C) Gp													1												1								1	
1340 Engr (C) Bn																																	1	
TOTALS	2	-	3	-	30	29	26	25	30	- 6	-	2	61	1	180	1	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	15	3	515	5	1780	-	15	-	8	692	2049

Note: "Pending" columns above are as of 31 July 1944; "Awarded" columns above are for month of July 1944.

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3. Postal.

a. On 1 July 1944 Corps units were being serviced by APO 305 (43 units) and APO 581 (14 units). The remaining units were being serviced by Division APOs to which the units were attached.

b. On July 10 APOs began accepting EFM messages for forwarding to APO 887 for transmittal to the United States.

c. On 20 July 1944, the mail service from the continent to the United Kingdom was considerably improved by the assignment of planes to transport first class letter mail, weather permitting. This mail normally arrived at Omaha Beach at 0930 hours, departing at approximately 1000 hours for the United Kingdom with the first class letter mail destined for the United States and the United Kingdom. Some first class letter mail and all parcel post mail has been arriving at Omaha Beach by ship; in some cases it was found that due to unloading priorities there has been some unavoidable delays in unloading the mail.

d. Army Postal Unit 305, located in Rubercy, France, which provided mail service to the majority of V Corps units, received and delivered to V Corps units 1,333 pouches of first class letter mail and 1,237 sacks of parcel post during the month of July, and dispatched 473 pouches of first class letter mail and 818 sacks of parcel post. During the same period APO 305 issued 4,229 money orders amounting to $193,441.21; paid 317 money orders to the value of $6,774.47. The total money order business for the month of July was $200,215.78. Stamp and envelope sales during this period amounted to $9,920.29. 537 incoming registered articles were received and delivered and 760 registered articles dispatched during the month.

e. On 28 July 1944, the Postal Section of Advance Section, Communication Zone took over from First U.S. Army the compilation and distribution of a master Mail Routing Scheme to all APOs on the continent. All APOs are now required to scheme all their outgoing mail to APO of service which will expedite mail service on the continent. Hereto it has been found that some mail traveled back to the United Kingdom for scheming, causing an unnecessary loss of time.

4. Religious Activities.

a. With the beginning of July the total number of Chaplains assigned to V Corps was sixty-four (64) with two (2) vacancies. There were twenty-nine (29) relieved by troop assignment and twenty-nine (29) replaced by troop assignment, these being effected by the loss of two (2) divisions and the gaining of two (2) other divisions.

b. Replacements during the month were seven (7); change of assignment within the Corps one (1); casualties six (6); reclassification one (1) and six (6) chaplains received the award of Bronze Stars.

c. At the end of the month a total of sixty-five (65) Chaplains were regularly assigned to Corps, namely, forty (40) Protestants; twenty-three (23) Roman Catholics and two (2) Jewish.

d. Services: The number of services here tabulated is based upon but seventeen (17) reports from a total of twenty-three (23) from Corps troops as well as no report from one of the divisions in V Corps for half the month.

Sunday services	767	attendance	35,279
Weekday services	1186	"	27,773
Confessions	8767	"	
Communions (all faiths)	19,939		
Hospital Visits	407	patients visited	1,953
Baptisms	29		
Personal conferences	4,401		
Extreme Unction given	75		
Funerals	60		

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4. Religious Activities. (cont'd)

Sex lectures		attendance	785
New Testaments distributed	772		
Jewish Scriptures "	55		
Individual Group Discussions		- 250 attendance	4,502
Scapulars distributed	503		
Rosaries "	1,171		
Religious pamphlets "	2,527	(all kinds)	

5. Finance.

a. General.

It was intended, prior to operations, that all finance service for Corps troops, except divisions, should be furnished by the V Corps section with the 8th and 15th Finance Disbursing sections attached. Due to the disposition of troop units and the location of the other finance sections in the combat zone, it has been necessary to change the original plan. During July 1944, instructions were received from the Finance Officer, First U. S. Army, to accept payrolls and vouchers from any and all units located near the V Corps Rear Echelon C.P., - in other words, finance service is to be rendered more upon an area basis. This plan was followed in July and approximately 25% of the payrolls are from units of First Army; the remainder are from units assigned or attached to V Corps.

b. New Operations.

The PTA system extended on 12 July 1944 to provide for sending funds to individuals or banks in the U.K. (This was suggested by V Corps Finance Section to the Fiscal Director, ETOUSA.)

c. Operations.

Figures as shown on following chart for June and July:

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	FINANCE SECTION V CORPS		8TH FIN DISB SECTION		15TH FIN DISB SECTION	
	JUNE '44	JULY '44	JUNE '44 (*)	JULY '44	JUNE '44 (*)	JULY '44
TOTAL CREDITS For Pay and Allowances (Exluding Travel)	$103,894.38	$289,688.00	$ 0.00	$1201,716.91	$ 0.00	$1180,532.47
ADD: Repayments of Soldiers' Deposits (Including Interest)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
(1) TOTAL CREDITS	$103,894.38	$289,688.00	$ 0.00	$1201,716.91	$ 0.00	$1180,532.47
LESS: Allotments						
Class "B"	$ 4,678.75	$ 14,373.75	$ 0.00	$ 75,763.50	$ 0.00	$ 75,991.75
Class "E"	34,942.92	111,800.53	0.00	333,817.64	0.00	393,344.85
Class "F"	5,629.00	21,009.00	0.00	155,625.00	0.00	128,493.09
Class "X"	279.12	756.75	0.00	454.00	0.00	1,280.00
Class "D"	99.12	335.63	0.00	52.87	0.00	125.54
Class "N"	4,223.56	15,396.23	0.00	103,133.19	0.00	86,582.84
(2) TOTAL ALLOTMENTS	$ 49,852.47	$163,671.89	$ 0.00	$ 668,846.20	$ 0.00	$ 685,818.07
(2a) PARTIAL PAYMENTS OFFICERS (Debits)	$ 637.24	$ 1,862.62	$ 0.00	$ 2,773.45	$ 0.00	$ 3,446.02
(2b) TOTAL ITEMS (2) and (2a)	$ 50,489.71	$165,534.51	$ 0.00	$ 671,619.65	$ 0.00	$ 689,264.09
(3) GROSS AMOUNT CHARGEABLE TO APPROPRIATIONS (Item (1) less (2b))	$ 53,404.67	$124,153.49	$ 0.00	$ 530,097.26	$ 0.00	$ 491,268.38
LESS: VOUCHER COLLECTIONS						
PTA - Funds	$ 50.00	$ 4,574.00	$ 0.00	$ 19,194.00	$ 0.00	$ 23,518.10
War Bonds	18.75	543.75	0.00	337.50	0.00	693.75
Soldiers' Deposits	725.00	3,168.70	0.00	9,180.00	0.00	2,164.00
Other Collections	3,115.84	9,403.92	0.00	20,842.40	0.00	21,398.84
(4) TOTAL VOUCHER COLLECTIONS	$ 3,909.59	$ 17,690.37	$ 0.00	$ 49,553.90	$ 0.00	$ 47,774.69
(5) NET DISBURSEMENTS FOR PAY AND ALLOWANCES (Item (3) less (4))	$ 49,495.08	$106,463.12	$ 0.00	$ 480,543.36	$ 0.00	$ 443,493.69
LESS: CASH COLLECTIONS						
PTA - Funds	$ 22,139.48	$220,021.22	$ 1,110.00	$ 307,992.85	$ 839.60	$ 198,734.59
War Bonds	1,350.00	2,212.50	0.00	2,175.00	168.75	3,635.50
Soldiers' Deposits	2,059.07	9,256.27	436.00	56,470.00	525.00	38,357.00
Other Collections	3,239.90	7,856.70	.11	161.00	0.00	58.61
(6) TOTAL CASH COLLECTIONS	$ 28,788.45	$239,346.69	$ 1,546.11	$ 366,798.85	$ 1,533.35	$ 240,785.70
NET CASH RETAINED (Item (5) less (6))	$ 20,706.63	-$132,883.57	$-1,546.11	$ 113,744.51	$-1,533.35	$ 202,707.99

Note: The 8th and 15th Finance Disbursing Sections did not disburse until 27 June 1944. Vouchers paid 27 to 30 June 1944 will show in July figures.

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5. d. Savings.

Attention is invited to the following figures:

(1) Total number of payees: 24,603.
(2) Total credits for pay and allowances: $2,671,937.38
(3) Percentage of allotments to total credits: 56.8%
(4) Percentage of net cash retained to total credits: 6.9%
(5) Percentage of net cash retained to cash actually disbursed: 17.8%
(6) Average amount retained by each payee: $7.46.

e. Observations.

The result of the drive to increase payroll and voucher deductions for funds returned to the U.S., purchase of bonds, and Soldiers' Deposits, are disappointing. Men and officers do not object to payroll deductions, but the amounts, in most cases, are insufficient. Then when the individuals are paid, additional funds are available to be sent home. Personnel officers report very little time saved since work is duplicated. The only explanation is the human element and the idea that some way to spend the money may develop.

6. Courts Martial.

a. The problem of the retention of personnel awaiting trial and of the confinement of personnel sentenced by summary and special courts arose. Arrangements were effected for First U.S. Army to retain personnel accused of crimes of violence against whom charges had been preferred, and a directive was issued to Corps troops (see copy attached as exhibit "B") dealing with the general subject of confinement.

b. Summary of Convictions.

	General	Special	Summary
(1) Corps Troops (under court-martial jurisdiction of V Corps)	5	28	71
(2) 2nd Infantry Division	7	26	4
(3) 5th Infantry Division	2	23	18
(4) 35th Infantry Division	0	8	8
Total	14	85	101

c. Analysis of the types of offenses for which Corps Troops were tried. (Par. 6 b (1) above)

Offense	General	Special	Summary
Sentinel leaving post	1		
Assault with gun	2		
AWOL with intent to avoid hazardous duty	1		
Conduct unbecoming an officer and gentlemen	1		
Assault and battery on NCO or M.P.	1		
Disrespect Superior Officer		1	
AWOL and other violations of AW 61		3	1
Misuse of government motor vehicles		4	24
Careless discharge of firearms or explosives		2	
Drunkenness		3	14
Fail to obey orders of competent authority		8	9
Committing a nuisance		11	16
Wrongful breaking and entering			1
Disrespect to NCO			1
Petty Larceny			1
Losing Equipment			3
Improper Uniform			1
Misbehavior of Sentinel			1
Violate censorship regulations			1
Assault and battery			1
*Total	6	35	74

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6. c. (continued)

*This total includes cases where accused has in one trial been found guilty of two or more different types of offense, hence the total offenses analyzed by type is necessarily greater than the number of cases tried as shown in par. 6 b (1) above.

7. Special Service Activities.

a. The 2nd Special Service Company, consisting of 5 officers and 109 enlisted men, arrived in France on 17 July 1944, and began operations from V Corps Rear on 18 July 1944.

b. Group B of American Red Cross Clubmobile Units arrived in France 18 July and were immediately assigned to V Corps. The first production was effected on 19 July 1944. The unit is kept intact as a group and works under supervision of Corps Special Service Officer.

c. A USO Show was received by V Corps on 28 July for corps units and divisions.

d. Summary.

The following is a summary of all statistics in Special Service for period 1-31 July:

MOVIES

Special Service Company 12 Days

No. of Shows	180
No. of Movie Titles	20
Attendance	30,020

Film Library and Unit Projectors 31 Days

No. of Shows	1,301
No. of Movie Titles	23
Attendance	185,243
Different Organizations Serviced	No Record

Total of all Movies

No. of Shows	1,481
No. of Movie Titles	43
Total Attendance	217,263

Live Shows --- 12 days

USO and G.I.

No. of Performances	43
No. of Organizations Serviced	25
Total Attendance	10,850

Clubmobiles --- 10 Days

No. of Doughnuts served	127,900
Cups of Coffee Served	28,425
Stops Made	109

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Band Concerts --- 31 Days

No. of Concerts	28
Total Attendance	18,050
No. of Organizations Serviced	25

Equipment Issued

13,920 Council Books
11 Generators
4 Radios and Phonographs
400 French Phrase Books
Assorted Athletic Supplies
1,000 Decks of Cards
Musical Instruments
1 ea. 16mm Projector
Miscellaneous Supplies in Small Amounts

X. PRESCRIBED UNIFORM.

On or about 13 July 1944, Quartermaster Laundry units became available. As troops had only one wool uniform with them, permission was obtained from Army for all troops to wear herringbone twill while their uniforms were being laundered.

XI. PROVOST MARSHAL.

1. Military Police Units within V Corps jurisdiction for various periods from 1 July to 31 July were as follows:

a. Military Police Platoon, V Corps.
b. Provisional Security Detachment, V Corps.
c. Company A, 507th M.P. Bn
d. Military Police Platoon, 1st Division, 1 July - 12 July
e. Military Police Platoon, 2nd Division, 1 July - 31 July
f. Military Police Platoon, 2nd Armd Div, 1 July - 23 July
g. Military Police Platoon, 5th Division, 12 July - 31 July
h. Military Police Platoon, 35th Division, 27 July - 31 July

2. Enforcement of Orders and Discipline.

There were 460 Reports of Delinquency during month of July as follows:

2nd British Army	-	3 Delinquency Reports
V Corps	-	45 Delinquency Reports
First U.S. Army	-	412 Delinquency Reports
		460 Total

Through constant enforcement and correction, the discipline within the Corps area improved during the month of July. However, constant pioneering of enforcement is necessary due to the influx of new units.

3. Prisoners of War and War Criminals.

Six prisoners of war, but no war criminals were processed through the Corps collecting point during the month of July.

4. Civilian Suspects, Inhabitants and TODT Workers.

Three civilian suspects were processed through the Corps Collecting Point during the month of July. Two of the civilians were apprehended in La Poterie and the third in La Mine. They were interrogated at the collecting point by the Corps CIC and determined not to be suspicious.

There were no civilian evacuees processed through the Corps Collecting point during the month of July.

Six travel passes were issued to French civilians in the La Bazoque area by the Corps P.M. during the month of July.

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5. Stragglers, AWOL's and Deserters.

Twenty-three stragglers were processed through the Corps Collecting point during July. On 5 July the Straggler post at Tournieres and at Mandeville was discontinued. A new straggler post was established at the junction of GC-96 and the stream (758797 - map 1/50,000 France). Effective 25 July all V Corps Straggler posts were discontinued and a roving straggler patrol was established.

The V Corps straggler line was established 25 July from Corps west boundary east along road GC-15 to La Mine and thence east on road GC-5 to eastern boundary.

The Corps straggler collecting point as of 31 July was located adjacent to the bivouac area of Co A, 507th PF Bn at La Bazoque.

R. V. LEE,
Colonel, GSC,
A C of S, G-1.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305

COPY

5 July 1944.

TRAINING MEMORANDUM)
)
NO.....16)

TRAINING OF V CORPS REPLACEMENTS OTHER THAN INFANTRY

1. At the present time there are some 500 officers and enlisted men in the replacement pool of the 41st Replacement Battalion attached to V Corps. These replacements are classified in various branches and services other than infantry, including field artillery, armored force, tank destroyer, engineers and medical. It is expected that the present strength of this specialist group will remain more or less constant throughout this campaign.

2. It is desired that the above mentioned replacements receive a well-rounded training and general battle field orientation while awaiting assignment to units of V Corps. This can best be accomplished by periodic attachment to units for routine orientation under combat conditions during quiet periods when the tactical situation is more or less static.

3. The orientation training attachment period for officers and enlisted men will be not less than 3 days, excluding travel time in each case. All commanders of divisions, groups, and separate units assigned or attached to this corps will cooperate to the fullest extent with the Commanding Officer, 41st Replacement Battalion to insure that the greatest benefit will accrue from this orientation training.

4. Authority is granted the Commanding Officer, 41st Replacement Battalion or his designated representative to contact Corps Artillery Group and Division Artillery Headquarters, Armored Division Headquarters, 3rd Armored Group Headquarters, 3rd Tank Destroyed Group Headquarters, Corps Engineer Group Headquarters, and Division Engineer Battalions, and Corps and Division Medical Battalions, through appropriate Corps, Division and Group Staff Sections in order that necessary arrangements may be made to accommodate officers and enlisted men under provisions set forth in this memorandum.

5. Details concerning conduct of training, transportation and messing arrangements, etc., will be worked out between the Replacement Battalion and the units concerned.

By command of Major General GEROW:

OFFICIAL:

/s/ R. B. Patterson
/t/ R. B. PATTERSON,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

H. J. MATCHETT,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

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Exhibit "A"

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305

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29 July 1944

CIRCULAR)
)
NO... 43)

PUNISHMENT FOR OFFENSES..... SECTION I

I. PUNISHMENT FOR OFFENSES:

1. In the case of organizations located in the combat zone, confinement is considered a suitable form of punishment only for personnel charged with serious crimes of violence.

2. Accordingly, commanders will make maximum use of non-punitive, corrective administrative measures such as admonitions, reprimands, censures, rebukes, or reduction in grade. In cases where the foregoing are considered inadequate, commanders will exercise punitive measures under AW 104, as a means of avoiding trial by courts martial for minor infractions of discipline.

3. Summary and Special Courts Martial, whenever possible, will avoid imposing sentences of confinement but will make maximum use of other authorized forms of punishment such as forfeiture of pay, etc.

4. Commanders are reminded that a high percentage of courts martial cases is an indication of poor leadership. However, nothing contained in this circular is to be interpreted to prevent commanders from immediately confining individuals guilty of crimes of violence or preferring charges in such cases for trial by General Courts Martial.

5. After charges have been preferred, personnel accused of crimes of violence who require restraint will be turned over by their units to the First U.S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure, designated in current Administrative Orders for their reception. Personal equipment (less weapons) will accompany them. Service records and allied papers will not be forwarded until sentence has been approved.

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By command of Major General GEROW:

/s/ H. J. Matchett,
/t/ H. J. MATCHETT,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

(Copy)

OFFICIAL:

/s/ R. B. Patterson
/t/ R. B. PATTERSON,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General

Exhibit "F" 481

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, US Army

SECRET
Auth: CG, V Corps
Date: 5 Aug 44
Initials:

SECTION IV - G-4, LOGISTICS REPORT

1 July to 25 July 1944

The tactical situation remained unchanged during this period and supply and evacuation systems functioned along conventional lines.

The local situation confronting one infantry regiment of the 1st Inf Div was such that the Division Commander requested authority to expend a full unit of fire per day of mortar ammunition. This request was granted and arrangements were made to withhold mortar ammunition from tank destroyer, armored field artillery and other Corps units in order to meet the requirements and not to exceed the restriction of 1/3 unit of fire placed on the Corps by Army.

A request for the use of an area within the Corps zone for the purpose of bivouacing British troops was referred to Corps by Army. The DQMG, 21 Army Group, presented the request and with the approval of the Chief of Staff, an area in the rear of the Corps zone adjacent to the Army boundary, was allocated with the understanding that the troops using the area would conform to the established Corps traffic circulation and local regulations prescribed by the Corps Commander. It was agreed that British 21 Army Group would handle military police within the area.

Administrative Order No. 4 was prepared and published, the changes made to conform to Change No 1 to Administrative Order No 3, First US Army.

A request was received from the Artillery Commander, 2nd Inf Div, for permission to sort by lot number, using Div troops in ASP 505, sufficient 105mm Howitzer ammunition to provide a suitable amount for use in firing a barrage in a forthcoming [illegible]. This request was necessary due to the fact that artillery ammunition in the [illegible] not segregated by lot number. The request was presented by the Corps G-4 to [illegible] US Army, and Army authority given to permit 2nd Inf Div personnel to sort, [illegible] mark in the ASP, 15,000 rounds of 105mm Howitzer ammunition for the 2nd Inf Div.

In order to replace losses of 81mm M1 mortars in infantry divisions, Army [illegible] ed that these weapons would be turned in to Ordnance [illegible] battalions (Inf).

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armored field artillery battalions and tank destroyer battalions. This was a temporary expedient.

The restriction of all types of ammunition to 1/3 unit of fire per day was lifted 4 July and an expenditure table substituted therefor. This table placed no restriction but provided the following basis: 1/3 unit per day for normal days, 1/2 unit of fire for support, no limitation for first day of attack with 1/2 unit of fire for subsequent days of attack. It further required that while there was no restriction, expenditures exceeding the amounts set forth in the table would be justified in writing to Army within 24 hours after expenditure. This program was put into effect as a conservation measure during the period of building up reserves in France.

Traffic, generally, moved freely and without interruption during this period except in a few minor cases. Traffic difficulties and violations of Corps traffic regulations were found to be almost entirely caused by units from without the Corps. This problem was met in the following manner: For units moving into the Corps zone and not familiar with Corps regulations: a Corps representative contacted the unit upon arrival and furnished the Commander with the Traffic Circulation Plan and SOP for Traffic Control. Violations of existing regulations were noted by those responsible for control and the incident brought formally to the attention of the unit concerned. In the case of units not under Corps control, a full report with all pertinent data was submitted to Army. It has been demonstrated conclusively that with coordination of motor movements and the observance of a few simple rules on road all traffic can flow smoothly and without interruption.

Two or three incidents were reported of artillery and AA units establishing battery positions adjacent to hospital and service units, thereby subjecting installations to hostile fire. These reports, necessitating the shifting of units could have been avoided had the Commanders concerned properly coordinated their moving.

Expenditures of 105mm howitzer and 155mm howitzer

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quantities set up in the plan for shipment to France. Units found that this type of ammunition had an extremely high demoralizing effect and called for WP concentrations to the extent that reserves were almost depleted. Army restricted the issue of WP for these weapons to 2% of the HE required on all transportation orders.

An interesting study is provided by Provost Marshal's consolidated report of delinquencies for the period of 6 to 30 June 1944, copy of which is attached to this report.

As a means of compiling a permanent record of operations, Corps initiated a program of photographing operations and situation maps at the end of each day. G-4 maintained two situation maps, one showing dump locations and the other service troop locations and reserved areas for service troops. These were photographed for record daily except on those days when no changes occurred. Copies of the photographs are submitted with this report.

The arrival of large numbers of Army and Communications Zone service troops in France brought innumerable requests to Corps for bivouac areas within the Corps and Division zones. When area desired was in Corps zone, the request was processed through G-3 for clearance prior to approval by G-4. When area requested was within a Division zone, the concurrence of the Division concerned was obtained.

Army announced a policy on captured enemy vehicles requiring that all such vehicles would be immediately turned in to Army ordnance collecting points for inspection and processing through ordnance channels, to be reissued by CG, First Army only. In effect all captured vehicles were issued to agencies in rear [illegible] none being issued to forward units.

A tentative plan for an attack by the Corps was issued to the Corps [illegible] July by the Corps Commander. G-4 called a conference of members of the [illegible] (QUASEC) and included the Provost Marshal and Civil Affairs Officers, [illegible] Corps Commander's proposed plan was outlined and the special staff r[illegible]

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their recommendations to support same by 1400 hrs, same date. (This plan was later abandoned.)

An urgent request for procurement of sound machine recording paper for 17th FA Obsn Bn was forwarded to CG, First US Army. This material was not available in France and would necessitate procurement from local resources in the U.K. or priority air shipment from the U.S. The request was met and a limited supply flown to France and issued to the Obsn Bn before its operating stock had been fully depleted.

The 5th Inf Div was assigned to Corps and relieved 1st Inf Div in the line. The relief and movement of the two divisions was made simultaneously. Plans were made by Traffic Hq and the movements coordinated with all agencies concerned. Relief and movement was accomplished without incident.

To support a plan under consideration by the Corps Commander, G-4 prepared a study of armored vehicles capable of transporting infantry that were available in the Corps. A copy of the study is attached to this report.

On 17 July 1944, the Army Commander directed that units would not have in their possession ammunition of any type in excess of basic load except by direct authority of the Chief of Staff, First US Army. Units having currently any excesses over basic load would not turn ammunition in to ASPs, but would expend ammunition on hand and refrain from withdrawals until excesses had been expended.

Administrative Order No. 5, Hq V Corps, issued on 19 July 44, copy attach

Army issued tables of authorized expenditures of ammunition by weapon for periods prior to D day of forthcoming coordinated Army Operation COBRA were transmitted to Divisions and Corps troops by Corps. Tables and direc attached.

A request by 2nd Inf Div to place ammunition in excess of basic l tions was returned from Army not favorably considered.

2nd Armd Div was relieved from Corps and moved to assembly are

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of LA MINE. Movement offered no particular problems or difficulties.

A critical shortage of grenade launchers, M7, existing within the infantry divisions of the Army necessitated, as a temporary measure, the turn-in of these weapons by Corps and Army QM, Engr, AA Arty and TD units.

At the end of the period Army commenced making block allocations of ammunition to Corps by period. Corps reallocated ammunition by day for certain weapons to Divisions and Corps units. Portions of daily allocations remaining unexpended at close of day were authorized accumulative.

The requirement for the submission of G-4 (S-4) Periodic Reports was changed from a daily report to a weekly report. It was found that the equipment replacement system was functioning satisfactorily and that these reports were unnecessary as a daily matter. However, reports of battle losses of equipment were furnished each day by the Ordnance Officer from the daily Ordnance Materiel Loss Report.

26 July to 31 July 1944

A coordinated Army attack, Operation COBRA, commenced. V Corps mission to support attack on D day with Corps attack to commence on D + 1. An estimate of the supply situation revealed that the attack could be supported from supply installations as currently located. Studies were made and plans prepared to establish forward Class I and III truckhead and ASP in the vicinity of Torigny-Sur-Vire when advance approached Vire River.

The 2nd Armd Div moved from Corps zone on order of VII Corps Commander. Traffic difficulties were encountered caused by one combat command taking exclusive use of road on which they had been given only road priority. Prompt action on the part of G-4 and Traffic Hq, V Corps, alleviated the existing situation.

Army requested approval for the reservation of an area within the Corps zone to locate six Canadian companies detailed as wood cutting crews. G-4 coordinated the processing of this request and in conference with Col. Lloyd, a British representative

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from SHAEF, approved the request subject to certain restrictions set forth in memorandum attached.

Near the end of this period, the Corps right boundary was shifted to the west and the 35th Inf Div, formerly assigned to the XIX Corps, was assigned to V Corps. Because of shifts of Corps and Army boundaries, the Class I, III and V installations supplying the Corps were located at a distance too great for the economical supply of the 35th Inf Div. Arrangements were made with Army for the Division to use a truckhead and ASP to the rear of their zone of action. This required coordination with and approval from XIX Corps for the use of certain roads within XIX Corps zone as an MSR for the 35th Inf Div. This action was accomplished and the supply of the Division was satisfactory.

In furtherance of the Corps policy of moving supply, evacuation and traffic control agencies forward as rapidly as possible to free Division personnel of the duties connected therewith, the Corps Quartermaster was directed to provide the necessary personnel for the purpose of collecting and evacuating salvage and the evacuation of the dead in order that the advance of the Divisions could be as rapid as possible.

For summary of activities of special staff sections on Supply, Evacuation, Maintenance, and Traffic Control responsibilities, see the attached special staff reports (Inclosures No 1 to 6 inclusive).

O. C. MOON,
Colonel, GSC,
A.C. of S., G-4

7 Incls:
Incl No 1 -- QM Report
Incl No 2 -- Ordnance Report
Incl No 3 -- Engineer Report
Incl No 4 -- Surgeon Report
Incl No 5 -- Signal Report
Incl No 6 -- PM Report
Incl No 7 -- Operations Journal - July
File II

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Quartermaster

QUARTERMASTER REPORT - AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY

PHASE I - OPERATION NEPTUNE

PHASE II - 13 JUNE 1944 to 25 JUNE 1944

PHASE III - OPERATION COBRA

Incl #1

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PHASE I - OPERATION NEPTUNE

1. The Quartermaster Section, Headquarters, V Corps, consisting of four officers with assignments shown below and eight enlisted men landed on Omaha Beach "D" day, 6 June 1944.

Lt. Colonel Martin C. Rhodes - Quartermaster
Lt. Colonel Thomas K. Normont - Executive
Major Fred C. Prebil - Supply
Captain William N. Herndon - Operations

2. A thorough study of the plan of the operation had been made and very careful consideration given to the employment of the relatively limited number of Quartermaster service units attached to corps under the many possible tactical situations that might be encountered after "H" hour. The restricted lift available for transporting these units placed further limitations on their employment in the early stages of the operation as it was found necessary, in order to get them phased in early in the operation, to break them down into platoons, sections and even into detachments to be carried wherever space was available. The necessity for the early landing of the truck companies, the service company and the graves registration company was kept uppermost in mind. They were mounted and landed as follows:

a. The 3892nd QM Truck Company was attached to the 1st Infantry Division. This served the purpose of getting them ashore rather early on D + 1 and, in addition, enabled the division to carry an appreciable reserve of supplies of all categories.

b. One-half of the 3604th QM Truck Company was attached to Headquarters, V Corps, to land with the command echelon and the forward echelon of Corps Headquarters. These vehicles were required for the transportation of Corps Headquarters' equipment and impedimenta. The balance of this company landed with the rear echelon of Corps Headquarters, carrying approximately 20,000 extra rations, in addition to their own and Corps Headquarters' equipment.

c. One platoon of the 606th QM Graves Registration Company was attached to each of the two divisions of the assault. The balance of this company landed with the build-up on D + 5 and D + 6.

d. One section (1 officer and 49 enlisted men) of the 3275th QM Service Company was attached to each division in Forces "O" and "B." This served the dual purpose of getting the bulk of this unit landed early and of assisting the divisions in the collection of bodies and the establishment of cemeteries planned for the beach maintenance area. The balance of this company landed with the build-up on D + 11.

e. The 309th QM Railhead Company and the 3168th QM Service Company, att[illegible] to Corps for operations only, were phased in by Army to land on D + 2.

3. During the first few days of the operation, it was apparent that insuff[illegible] graves registration and service personnel had been landed to cope with the situ[illegible] the beaches and the area to the immediate rear thereof. As a result of the he[illegible] fire on the beaches on "D" day, the beach area remained in a rather chaotic c[illegible] for several days. It had been originally planned to open two cemeteries in [illegible] maintenance area, one in the rear of each assault division. However, by D [illegible] of the pre-selected sites had been taken from the enemy nor h d any actio[illegible] by the engineer special brigades to collect bodies lying where they had f[illegible] afternoon of D + 2, the Quartermaster arranged with the Commanding Gener[illegible]

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ineer Special Brigade Group to take the following action:

a. Open a cemetery immediately in the rear of the 5th Engineer Special Brigade at coordinates 677897 (Sheet 6E/6 France 1:50,000).

b. Open a temporary cemetery on the beach itself in the area of the 6th Engineer Special Brigade. This was done because of the large number of bodies accumulated in this narrow stretch of beach and because the division operating in this sector had been unable to advance far enough inland to clear a cemetery site above the beach. The congestion of traffic across the one lateral road available across the beaches would not permit the evacuation of bodies from the area of the 6th Engineer Special Brigade to the cemetery established in the 5th Engineer Special Brigade area. At this time only one of the graves registration platoons of the engineer special brigades had landed and it was arranged with the Commanding General of the Engineer Special Brigade Group to divide this platoon between the two cemeteries mentioned and to begin the immediate collection, identification and burial of the dead. The 309th QM Railhead Company and the 3168th QM Service Company were sent to the vicinity of these cemeteries to begin the collection of bodies and the digging of graves. These companies were continued on this service until D + 5, at which time prisoner labor was furnished by the Engineer Special Brigade Group. As soon as cemetery locations had been determined, division quartermasters were notified to begin evacuation from the forward areas to the cemetery sites selected.

4. During the first four days of the operation, Class I and Class III supplies had not been landed in accordance with schedules arranged; in fact, for the first two days they were in quantities insufficient to maintain units landed. Close liaison was maintained with the Engineer Special Brigade Group Quartermaster and the temporary beach dumps were checked every six hours by an officer of the Corps Quartermaster Section in order that G-4 be given an accurate record of supplies landed as well as daily requirements of using troops. By keeping in close and continuous touch with the supply status, the Quartermaster was enabled to request the essential landing priorities for Class I and Class III to the end that necessary rations and Class III were made available to troops even though it was several days before any reserves were built up.

5. As soon as prisoner of war labor was made available to the cemeteries, the railhead company and the service company were used to assist in clearing the beaches of discarded equipment and getting same to appropriate dumps, where much of it could be reissued.

6. From D + 1 through D + 7, the vehicles landed of the two truck companies of Corps were used extensively for a variety of tasks. Two of the divisions, landed during this period, came ashore without any Quartermaster Truck Companies and temporary attachments were made from the Corps motor pool to these divisions. In addition, other vehicles were used to assist in moving supplies from the beach proper to the beach maintenance dumps and, yet again, others for troop transport.

PHASE II - 13 JUNE 1944 to 25 JUNE 1944

1. As the operation progressed inland the Corps Quartermaster, in view of the shortage of transportation especially with the Quartermaster Companies of the 2nd Infantry Division and the 2nd Armored Division and of the congestion of highways to beach maintenance areas, felt it necessary to establish a Class I and Class III head as far forward as possible. Accordingly on 13 June 1944, one was opened at Bret de Cerisy to service the divisions and corps troops. This was a rather [illegible]ition, well within enemy artillery range, but one which offered complete

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and an excellent highway net. Because of the proximity to the lines, it was determined to operate this more as a relay and breakdown point than as a truckhead; therefore, no appreciable reserve of either rations or Class III were carried here. The 309th QM Railhead Company moved up from the beach to operate the Class I truckhead and the 3813th QM Gasoline Supply Company, loaned by the Army Quartermaster, was used to operate the Class III point. Transportation for Class I supplies was furnished from the Corps truck pool. Rations were picked up at the beach dumps late each afternoon, brought up to the truck company bivouac area at night, and delivered early the following morning to the truckhead in sufficient time to permit breakdown and distribution. Class III was handled in substantially the same manner. It was decided that a minimum of this class of supply was to be carried overnight at the truckhead itself and this kept loaded on vehicles so as to permit an immediate evacuation of the location should the necessity arise; likewise, stocks of Class I were kept so that any rations carried overnight could be evacuated on short notice. By approximately D / 14, a pipeline and bulk storage tanks had been erected near this location, by the Army Quartermaster. However, upon recommendation of the Corps Quartermaster, this facility was not used until approximately 15 July 1944. An empty can collecting point was also established near the Class III truckhead and empty gasoline cans transported to this point.

2. Graves registration platoons were attached, for operations only, to each of the three divisions of the Corps. In addition, a service section (1 officer and 49 enlisted men) was also "loaned." These two units working together made up graves registration teams which handled the collection, identification and evacuation of all bodies within division areas. The service personnel performed most of the essential labor, thus relieving combat troops of this duty and the graves registration personnel were able to complete the processing and evacuation of the bodies to the cemeteries, with the result that bodies reached the cemeteries completely prepared for burial. This greatly facilitated the clearing of division personnel records and further relieved the graves registration people at the cemeteries of most of the clerical and technical work connected with graves registration activities. A Corps cemetery was not opened as the cemeteries of the beach maintenance areas, which were turned over to Army for operation on approximately D / 7, were within easy evacuation distance. The 4th Platoon of the Corps Graves Registration Company was used in making a systematic search of the Corps and division rear areas, processing bodies found and the disinterring of burials performed either by the enemy or by civilians. The remainder of the service company was used to assist the Corps graves registration platoon and further to clear the area of salvage.

3. On 12 July 1944, three platoons of the 595th QM Laundry Company were attached to the Quartermaster for operations. These were set up with two platoons and company headquarters forming QM Laundry No. 1 at coordinates, 610795, and the third platoon as QM Laundry No. 2 at coordinates, 669795. These three units were designated by Army to service not only the troops of the Corps but all troops within the Corps service area including the Air Corps, an estimated total of 80,000. To make maximum use of this facility, as well as to provide regular service on a two-week basis, individuals were limited to six items of clothing, selected from a published list, and units were limited to deliver laundry in bulk, segregated by item. (See Annex #1) A schedule was prepared allotting laundry facilities to divisions and Corps troops, this allocation in proportion to the strength of the unit against the total strength of the troops to be served. (See Annex #2 and #2a)

4. On 7 July 1944, one platoon of the 863rd QM Fumigation and Bath Company was attached to the Corps Quartermaster for operations. This platoon was made available to the divisions and Corps troops on a priority determined by the length of time the unit had been ashore. Based upon a study of the relative strengths of divisions and Corps troops, the Corps Quartermaster determined that a 16-day cycle could be established

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lished for this unit, i.e., by operating continuously throughout the daylight hours, troops of the Corps could be given showers every sixteen days; accordingly, four days were allotted to each of the three divisions and four days for the remaining Corps troops. Division Quartermasters scheduled troops within the division and a schedule for non-divisional units was established by the Corps Quartermaster. (See Annex #3 and #3a) At the end of the first cycle, arrangements were made with the Army Quartermaster for 3000 sets of Class B clothing to be available at the shower point. (See Annex #4) These were issued on a strict exchange basis and soiled clothing, taken in exchange, was laundered, sized and again placed in stock for reissue. It became apparent that additional shower facilities were badly needed as it was not always practical to use the full capacity of the shower due to difficulties incurred in getting troops to the shower point; hence, salvage pipe, showerheads, pumps, etc., were obtained from various sources and an improvised unit built by the Corps Engineer. This was placed in operation by the Quartermaster using personnel from the service company and has proven of sufficient capacity to handle Corps troops, thus releasing the Fumigation and Bath Unit to the service of divisions only, on a more frequent schedule. It is planned to open clothing exchange at this second shower point as quickly as sufficient stocks of class B clothing become available.

5. The truck companies have been used during this period on their normal service, namely, troop transportation, transportation of ammunition, supplies of various categories and the usual truck demands.

6. The Corps Quartermaster has maintained operational control of all Quartermaster units and the Quartermaster Battalion Headquarters has exercised administrative, supply and disciplinary functions over these units. This method of operation has, it is believed, been very successful as it has enabled the Quartermaster to make immediate adjustments to keep abreast of the operational requirements and to anticipate and plan in advance for future operational needs.

PHASE III - OPERATION COBRA

1. Plans and map reconnaissance were made prior to "D" day for Class I and Class III truckheads to be opened in forward locations convenient to division quartermasters and Corps units as soon as an advance of sufficient depth had been accomplished. The Army Quartermaster has been advised of these requirements and arrangements made with him for the advancement of sufficient operating personnel as well as of supplies for stocking these points when the situation permits. It has been established between the Corps and Army Quartermasters, as a matter of policy, that minimum requirements only will be carried at these truckheads until such time as it becomes certain that these points are not jeopardized by enemy action.

2. It is planned to open a Corps cemetery to service all Corps troops when the point is reached where evacuation of bodies to present beach cemeteries becomes impracticable. This will depend not only on the rate of casualties but upon distance and road congestion in both forward and rear areas. Map reconnaissance have been made for this purpose but no definite locations will be decided until ground reconnaissance can be made.

CONCLUSIONS - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The importance of providing adequate Quartermaster service personnel in the early phases of an operation such as "Neptune," or for that matter, any operation against the enemy, cannot be over-emphasized. In "Neptune," two Graves Registration platoons and one Service company, landed early on D + 1, could have materially alleviated the

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fusion on the beaches resulting from many scattered bodies and abandoned equipment. In addition, it is felt that the early collection and seclusion of bodies is important because of the depressing effect on in-coming troops.

2. Much individual equipment of troops landing on "D" day, was lost or destroyed due to enemy action. This was the case especially with blanket rolls carried on organizational vehicles. The lack of blankets and shelter-halves was acutely felt by one division by the night of D + 1. Replacements did not begin to arrive in any quantities until D + 4 or D + 5. "D" day landings of blankets, shelter-halves and intrenching tools is recommended.

3. The plan of evacuating bodies to large cemeteries in rear of divisions has proved sound, in this operation at least. Likewise, the detailing of sections of service companies to work with the Graves Registration platoons has meet with enthusiastic approval of the combat units. This service personnel has been used in forward areas for collection of bodies and assembly at Graves Registration collecting points, usually in regimental rear areas. From these points the bodies were taken to the Division morgues where complete records were made, GRS Form #1, accomplished, except for recording actual burial, personal effects inventoried and the bodies prepared for burial. Evacuation to the cemetery was usually made once each day. Under this plan, the cemetery had only to accomplish the burial and properly record same on the forms prepared in advance and in detail by the advance Graves Registration Platoon. Organization commanders have recommended this system highly -- especially the elimination of the necessity for combat soldiers handling bodies of their own comrades.

4. Class I and Class III truckheads were pushed well into the forward areas. This, at first, was necessary in order to relieve congestion in the beach area but proved very satisfactory in every respect. Particularly, it is believed that it contributed in large measure to keeping down the demands by divisions and Corps troops for additional transportation from the Corps motor pool and thus resulted in very efficient and economical use of trucks. It is believed that truckheads or distributing points can be operated much closer to the front lines than is generally believed possible or advisable, if they are used essentially as breakdown points and carry very little reserves.

M. C. Rhoades

M. C. RHOADES,
Lt. Colonel, QMC,
Quartermaster.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305

331.5 13 July 1944.

SUBJECT: Quartermaster Laundry Units.

TO : See Distribution.

1. The services of Quartermaster Laundry Units are now available for units of this Corps. Locations of these units and schedules for organizations will be furnished by the Corps Quartermaster.

2. Each individual will be limited to six items chosen from the following list:

1 ea shirt, wool, OD
1 ea. trousers, wool, OD
1 ea. undershirts, wool
1 ea. undershirts, cotton
1 ea. drawers, wool
1 ea. drawers, cotton
1 ea. suit, HBT, (1 piece or 2 piece)
1 ea. jacket, field
1 ea. towel.
3 pr. socks (to count as 1 item)

There will be no deviation from the above list.

3. Clothing to be laundered will be separated by organization into bundles of two hundred (200) of like items, i.e. shirts, wool, drawers, cotton, etc. Containers, such as bags, boxes, mattress covers, etc., for clean clothes will be furnished by organization. Sorting of finished work will also be done by unit concerned.

4. As no storage facilities for finished laundry exists, organizations will arrange for prompt pick-up of finished work at times specified by the laundry unit.

5. HBT Clothing may be worn while wool OD uniform is being laundered.

By command of Major General GEROW:

Sam F. Teague
SAM F. TEAGUE
Major, A. G.
Asst. Adj.

DIST: "B"

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Annex #1

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Quartermaster

SECRET
Authority: CO V Corps
Date: 24 July 1944
Initials: [illegible]

371.5

SUBJECT: Qm Laundry Schedules 24 July 1944.

TO : See distribution

1. All previous laundry schedules are cancelled effective 28 July 1944, and the attached schedules substituted therefor.

2. Attention is invited to letter, this headquarters, file no. 371.5, subject, "Quartermaster Laundry Units," dated 13 July 1944.

3. It is requested that scheduled units not desiring laundry service, notify the Quartermaster, this Headquarters, by calling Victor Base 21.

For the Corps Quartermaster:

[illegible]
Captain, Q.M.C.
Asst. Quartermaster

Encls:
Incl No 1 - Schedule, Laundry No 1
" No 2 - " " No 2

Copies to: Five separate units

Annex #2

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Inclosure #1.
(Reference 610795)

UNIT	TIME	July 28	29	30	31	August 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
5th Inf Div	0700	1680	1680	1680	1680	1680	1680	1680	1680	1680	1680	1680	1680	1680	1680
2nd Inf Div	0700	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500
Hq V Corps	1900	800													
Hq 97 Sig Bn	1900	26													
653 TD Bn	1500		700												
608 Topo Co	1930	120													
20 Engr Bn	1800			706											
3rd Medical Coll Co	1900		110												
744 Tank Bn	1500			554											
618 Engr LE Company	2030		149												
Hq 125 AA Group	1900				79										
Hq 3d Med. Battalion	2000				31										
629 TD Bn	1500				699										
3975 QM Serv. Co.	2030				110										
200 AAA Bn	1500					806									
56 Sig Bn	1500						963								
190 FA Bn	1500							661							
461 AAA Bn	1500								857						
200 FA Bn	1500									711					
197 AAA Bn	1500										750				
146 Engr Bn	1500											612			
3892 QM Trk Company	2000							139							
654 Engr Bn	1500												709		
953 FA Bn	1500													638	
894 Ord HM Company	2000					204									
3422 Ord HM Company	2000												100		
618 Medical Coll Co	2000													190	
507 Ord HM Company	2000											207			
764 Dump Trk Co	2000								107						
2d Special Serv. Co	2000						105								

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(La Poterie 669795)

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UNIT	TIME	July 28	29	30	31	August 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V Corps Arty Hq	1200	170													
Hq 3d Armd Group	1400	105													
Hq 3d TD Group	1600	79													
Hq 187 FA Group	1700	97													
Hq 102 Cav Group	1800	88													
Hq 1171 Engr Group	1200		91												
996 Eng Co	1330		202												
684 Medical Clr Co	1600		120												
502 Engr Co	1900		151												
966 Engr Co	1200			120											
Hq 1121 Engr Group	1330			133											
Hq 406 FA Group	2100		93												
383 Medical Coll Co	1530			109											
384 Medical Coll Co	1900			83											
Co A, 507 MP Bn	1200				184										
606 QM GR Company	2100			53											
Det A 35 Sig Co	1900				20										
Det D4C1 6901 C.A.	1900				10										
Det D2C1 6901 C.A.	1900				10										
Det D1C1 6901 C.A.	1900				10										
Det D3B1 6901 C.A.	1900				10										
987 FA Bn	1400			435											
3250 Sig Serv Co	1500				139										
1 Repln Battalion	1700				178										
604 QM Trk Company	2000				139										
109 FA Group	2000			108											
7 FA Obsn Battalion	1800					541									
27 FA Bn	1800						572								
25 FA Bn	1200								578						
77 FA Bn	1700									695					
12 Engr Bn	1700										700				
96 FA Bn	1200											592			
41 FA Bn	1200														

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UNIT	TIME	28	29	30	31	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
30 Photo Sqn	1400													240
109 Tac Rcn Sqn	1700													200
PID - G2	2000													130
67 Tac Rcn Sqn	1600								600					
457 AAA AW Bn	1200										800			
634 AAA AW Bn	1200											800		
452 Medical Coll Co	1700												112	
326 Serv Gp Team A, 9th A.F.	1200						900	900						
81 Chem Bn	1700									200				
10 Air Depot Group	0500	1400												
Hq 16 AAA Group	1900													60
109 AAA Bn	1200								500					
Co C, 834 Engr Bn	2000												180	
309 QM Rhd Company	1900	135												
Hq & Hq Det 2109 Ord	2100	35												
176 Med Bn	2000									150				
475 Engr Maint Co	1200													180
57 Ord AM Company	1600													176

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305

414.4 12 July 1944

SUBJECT: Quartermaster Bath Unit.

TO : See Distribution.

1. A Quartermaster Bath Unit will be available for use by assigned or attached Corps troops in the near future. The location of the bath unit and the times allotted your command for bathing will be furnished by the Quartermaster, this headquarters.

2. The capacity of the Bath Unit is limited and in order that the large number of Corps troops may be serviced, it is directed that each unit commander ensure that:

a. Each individual furnish his own soap and towel.
b. Individuals arrive at the Bath Unit 15 minutes prior to the scheduled hour of bathing as extensions of time cannot be granted.

By command of Major General GEROW:

Sam F. Teague Jr.
SAM F. TEAGUE, JR.,
Major, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. General.

Annex # 3

508

DIST: "C", less divisions.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305

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MEMO:

TO :

1. A Quartermaster Laundry is located in the vicinity of _____ at _____. Bundles of laundry as prescribed in Memo, this Headquarters, dated 13 July 1944, will be delivered by your unit on dates shown below. Pickup of laundry will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the Laundry unit upon delivery of first laundry.

No. of Bundles	Date

M. C. Rhodes
M. C. RHODES,
Lt. Col., Q. M. C.,
Quartermaster.

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Annex # 2a

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HEADQUARTERS TROOPS
APO 305

MEMO:

TO :

1. A Quartermaster Bath Unit is located in the vicinity of _____ at _____. Times allotted your command for bathing are as follows:

No. of Personnel	Time	Date

2. Attention is invited to Memo, this Headquarters, dated 12 July 194[illegible] regarding usage Bath Units, which directs that:

a. Each individual furnish his own soap and towel.
b. Individuals arrive at the bath unit 15 minutes prior to the scheduled hour of bathing as extensions of time cannot be granted.

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Annex #3a

M. C. RHODES,
Lt. Col., C. M. C.,
Quartermaster.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305

420

18 July 1944

SUBJECT: Issue of Clothing at QM Bath Point

TO : See Distribution

1. A limited stock of the following listed items of Class "B" clothing will be available for issue at the Quartermaster Bath unit, beginning 20 July 1944:

Drawers, wool
Undershirts, wool
Trousers, wool, od
Shirts, wool, od
Trousers, HBT
Jackets, HBT
Socks, wool, light

2. Clothing will be issued on an exchange basis to enlisted men of units of the Corps scheduled to use the bath facilities. An officer of each scheduled unit must certify that personnel receiving clean clothing are members of his organization.

3. Clothing issued will be sized only as small, medium or large.

By command of Major General GEROW:

Sam F. Teague Jr.
SAM F. TEAGUE, JR.,
Major, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

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DIST: "B"

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Ordnance Officer
APO #305, U. S. ARMY

AFTER ACTION REPORT

D-Day to D+3 (6 June 44 to 9 June 44)

Assault Period

D-Day (6 June 44)

The Ordnance Section was dispersed to insure safe landing of an adequate staff. The Ordnance Officer and one enlisted man were on the Alternate Command Ship and the Ammunition Officer with one enlisted man were on the Command Ship with other selected elements of the V Corps Headquarters. These elements landed as scheduled in the late afternoon. They proceeded to set up in the Corps CP in a slit trench at 674895 in the vicinity of St Laurent-sur-Mer. The remainder of the Ordnance Section was scheduled to land by H+15 (H-hour was 0630B) but, due to disorganized schedules and priorities given to tactical units, it was D+2 before the entire section was ashore.

The 1st Infantry Division brought ashore practically all of the service elements of the 701st Light Maintenance Company. The 29th Infantry Division attached elements to each RCT. Both Ordnance Officers claimed that their methods worked.

The only other Ordnance unit to land at beach Omaha was the 16th Bomb Disposal Squad late in the afternoon.

Little opportunity was found to do more than settle for the night on this day.

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D / 1 (7 June 44)

It was possible to make a survey of the ammunition supply situation, which was as follows: Approximately 90 DUKWS out of the 110 in Force "O" landed on D Day and were routed to 1st Division Dump near St Laurent-sur-Mer at 670896. It was impossible to contact the 29th Infantry Division or the 6th Engineer Special Brigade on Charlie of Dog beaches due to enemy action. It had been reported that all LCT's carrying ammunition had been lost. However, later in the day one LCT did land at Easy Red Exit. It was unloaded and ammunition routed to the St Laurent dump of the 1st Division.

Additional Ordnance Section personnel landed during the day but the majority of the maintenance and supply sections remained afloat.

C.O. and S-3 of the 100th Ammunition Bn. landed in the evening and conferred with the Ordnance Officer relative to initiating the first ASP. Remainder of the Battalion Headquarters stayed afloat.

D / 2 (8 June 44)

Ammunition situation still remained critical.

The 60 preloaded ammunition DUKWS of Force "B" landed. Six of these were diverted to a 29th Infantry Division dump and the remainder were routed to the beach dump at 661907, near St Laurent-sur-Mer.

During the morning, Brigade Group Headquarters was able to accumulate transportation to haul ammunition. The delay in starting was resultant from enemy action, personnel losses, debris on beaches and exits and the high seas. 300 tons of ammunition were moved into a dump at 678892 near St Laurent-sur-Mer.

The first maintenance unit, detachment 526 Ordnance HMT Company, came ashore at 0700 hours and were routed to transit area No. 4 to survey and recover as much equipment on the beaches as possible. Some evacuation

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was accomplished but many of the vehicles were completely burned out or demolished.

15th Bomb Disposal Squad landed at 0800 hours and bivouaced in the V Corps Headquarters area.

50th and 637th Ammunition Companies landed at 2100 hours and were dispatched to beach dumps to aid the 5th Engineer Special Brigade.

All remaining members of the Ordnance Section were landed by 2100 hours and normal activities were initiated.

First reports of losses in materiel began to trickle in from a few units. A cable was sent to First United States Army for immediate replacement of the following items lost in the assault and follow up waves:

70-¼ ton trucks
6-3/4 ton trucks, C/R
11-3/4 ton trucks, W/C
1-1½ ton trucks, 6x6
23-2½ ton trucks, 6x6, LWB
6-2½ ton trucks, 6x6, Dump
1- 2½ ton truck, 6x6, COE
1-2½ ton truck, 6x6, K32
1-M4 tractor
65-M4 tanks
13- trailers, ¼ ton
6- trailers, 1 ton
3- Ammo trailers, M10
4-Carriage, Motor, M7
1-Aiming Circle, M1
25-Binoculars
1-Telescope, M 48

11-Car, H/T, M2 w/arm
5-Carrier, Pers., H/T, M3, W/arm
19-Carr., Motor, Mult. Gun, M15
22-Carr., Motor, Mult. Gun, M16
3-60mm Mortar
3-81mm Mortar
1-40mm Gun
8-57mm Gun
22-105mm How., M2
11-105mm How., M3
9-Gun, mach., Cal.30, M1917A1
3-Gun, mach., Cal.30, M1919A4
14-Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1
4-Machine Gun, Cal.50, HB, M2
1-Machine Gun, Cal.50, WC, M2
1-Director, M9

The above list was far from being complete.

Lt. Col. Ray, Army Ammunition Officer reported to the Ordnance Officer during the evening to take up matters regarding the setting up of ASP's and stockage.

D + 3 (9 June 44)

Ammunition began to come ashore more steadily than during the three previous days. However, the stockage was scattered and not well balanced.

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Approximately 2,000 tons of ammunition was taken ashore by 1800 hours and deposited in 6 beach dumps and 2 beach collecting points.

During the day the 50th Ammunition Company and Hq. 100th Ammunition Bn. moved to vicinity of Formigny to prepare first inshore consolidated Ammunition Supply Point (ASP 501) for receipts.

The 526th Ordnance HMT Co. detachment was moved from Colleville to vicinity of Formigny to initiate a Corps Collecting Point in addition to their other duties.

The following units arrived this date and were located as follows:

Det 252nd Ord. MM Co. to Colleville (1st Div. support unit)
Det 92nd Ord MM Co. to Vierville (29th Div. support unit)
Det 463rd Evac. (Coll) Co. to Formigny

Report was received that the 3422nd MAM Co. and the follow up detachments of the 526th HMT Co. were sunk off shore. No details as to the loss of personnel were available.

No records of ammunition expenditures and status of stocks were available within the period covered by this report, inasmuch as reports of this nature were not required until D /4.

SUMMARY:

1. The success of early ammunition resupply was entirely due to preloaded DUKWS. No other ammunition was unloaded from craft until D / 2.

2. There was a woeful lack of unit maintenance in the early days particularly in Tank Bns, Armored FA Bns. and Engineer Special Brigades as well as lack of recovery vehicles on the beaches. This threw an unusual heavy load on the 526th HTM Co.

3. No definite conclusions as to the reliability of waterproofing were drawn due to variable wading requirements. Vehicles were landed dry but others were driven into 8 feet and more of water with a high sea. Many vehicles drowned.

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4. Many DD tanks and DUKWS were sunk in the assault waves due partially to high seas. DD's were floated as much as 10,000 yards out to sea and DUKWS were loaded to as high as an estimated 10,000 pounds. The DUKWS in question were those carrying 105mm Howitzers, M2 for divisional artillery.

5. No opportunity for supervised dewaterproofing was apparent for the first three days. Thereafter this condition steadily improved.

6. Large quantities of watches and binoculars became water soaked but the condition was slow in becoming known because individuals failed to turn them in for maintenance until the condition became serious. Many binoculars became badly etched but are still being used.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Ordnance Officer
APO #305, U. S. ARMY

AFTER ACTION REPORT

D/4 to D/12 (10 June 44 to 18 June 44)

Period of Defensive Action
With Limited Objective Attacks.

D/4 (10 June 44)

It was reported that .30 caliber ammunition in 8 round clips and 155mm Gun ammunition were critical in the dumps. During the day reasonable quantities of both of the above types began to come in at the Colleville dump.

Ammunition began to move into ASP 501 at 1200 hours, and issues were possible at 1800 hours. The 637th Ammunition Company was moved into ASP 501 to expedite depot service.

D.A.O. of the 2nd Infantry Division was contacted by the Corps Ammunition Officer and oriented on the ammunition supply situation and procedure.

Investigation of new type rocket projectiles on Dog Beach was made. Approximately 100 rounds of these rockets were found and were identified as being used against landing craft on the first two days of action. Report was forwarded thru Ordnance technical channels.

Detachments of the 443rd Ordnance Evacuation Company and 252nd MM Company arrived and were routed to their areas at Formigny and Colleville respectively.

Difficulty was experienced in obtaining information relative to expected landings of Ordnance troops due to dispersion within boats. Service units were being deferred due to command priorities given to tactical units.

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D/5 (11 June 44)

The following Ordnance troops arrived and were sent to the respective areas:

Det. 463rd Ord. Evac. Co.	vicinity of Formigny
Hq. Det. 177th Ord. Bn.	vicinity of Trevieres
887th Ord. Amm. Co.	vicinity of Formigny

Both the 15th and 16th Bomb Disposal Squads were being continuously employed due to the rain of anti-personnel bombs on the beach and CP areas during the night.

The Ordnance Officer's attempts to establish a forward ASP in approximate area 620720 on June 13th and 14th were to no avail. It was found that units were having difficulty in obtaining service at ASP 501 due to lag in inventorying receipts and due to flood of receipts.

Difficulty was being experienced by units failure to report battle losses to this headquarters.

Ordnance section moved with Headquarters V Corps to new area, 636805, in vicinity of la Poterie.

D/6 (12 June 44)

Ammunition was being received at ASP 501 too fast for personnel to handle it.

First United States Army assumed control of all command, administrative and service functions. First reports on ammunition and major item losses were forwarded.

Losses in materiel for Corps troops were:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST-OTHER CAUSES
Car, Armored, Light, M8	1	
Truck, ¾ ton, 4x4	1	
Carrier, Pers., H/T, M5A1, w/radio	1	
Gun, sub-machine, cal.45 (all types)	2	1
Carbine (all types)	6	1
Rifle, M1	2	
Magazines for Thompson SMG (30 rds.)	17	

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ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST-OTHER CAUSES
Height Finder, M1 (13 ft.)	1	
Instr. Observation, AABCM1	1	
Unit Generator, M7, w/trailer, M7	1	
Tractor, M4	1	
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo, 15ft. body	1	
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo, wo/w		3
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo, w/w		1
Launcher, grenade, M1		2
Magazines for carbine		3
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel	3	
Watch, wrist, 17 jewel	1	
Binoculars, M3	1	

Shortages and losses of small arms in divisions were alarming. Contacts were made with the Special Brigades and all Medical Clearing and Collecting Companies in an effort to trace existing shortages, but to no avail.

The first dependable expenditure reports were received this date. The total for the day was reported as 464 long tons for all troops in V Corps including divisions.

D+7 (13 June 44)

Ammunition was still coming in too fast for recording at ASP 501.

Existing shortages on cal.30 MG ammunition was relieved by receipt of 1,000,000 rounds at ASP 501.

Small reserve dumps of ammunition were established by the 2nd Inf. Div. at 646785, in vicinity of 702nd Ord. LM Co.'s bivouac, because of traffic congestion and difficulty of drawing ammunition at ASP 501.

Assistance was given 177th Ord. Bn. Hq. in reconnoitering sites for Hq. 463rd Evac. Co. (New collecting point), 526th HMT Co. and 127th Ord. MM Co.

Advance elements of 127th Ord. MM Co. arrived at 1600 hours.

Survey of captured enemy materiel was made by the Maintenance and

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Supply Officer. Items of foreign materiel at the collecting point were:

QUANTITY	ITEM	STATUS
2	2cm Flak 30	Doubtful as to serviceability
1	Pugeot Sedan	Unserviceable
1	MG 34 Soluthurn	Unserviceable
10	Mauser 7.92 Rifles	4 unserviceable, 6unserviceable
1	Flak ZFZOE Sight	Unserviceable (can be repaired)
1	Telescope, Sterioscopic, BC Type	Serviceable (no triped)
1	Volkswagen	Unserviceable
6	10.5 Cm Gun How. (1.F.H. 18)	Unserviceable
1	Opel Sedan	Unserviceable
2	Bicycles	Unserviceable
2	5 cm Light Mortar, 1.GR.W.36	1 serviceable, 1 unserviceable
2	Communication Trailers, Horsedrawn	Serviceable
1	7.5 Cm PAK 40	Serviceable-no sighting equip.

The 15th and 16th Bomb Disposal Squads were being extended to keep up with disposition of UXB's, enemy ammunition and booby traps.

463rd Ord. Evac. Co. (thru Bn. Commander) was instructed to keep a close guard on captured enemy materiel because of theft of instruments and accessories by "GI Souvenir Hunters".

Losses in major items for Corps Troops only were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT
Tool Set, Artillery Mechanics	1
Gun, sub-mach., cal. 45, all models	10
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel	1
Binoculars, M6	11
Truck, ¾ ton, 4x4	6
Launcher, grenade, M8	11
Carbine, cal.30, M1	44
Trailer, ammunition, M10	7
Gun, mach., cal. 30	1
Carriage, motor, 105mm How., M7	1
Carrier, personnel, H/T, M3A1	2
Telescope, observation, M48	1
Circle, aiming, M1	5
Telescope, BC, M65	2
Truck, 6x6, 2½ ton, cargo, LWB	3
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1	2
Compass, M2	12
Elevator, cradle assy., M1	18
Mount, triped, cal.30, M3	6
Gun, mach., cal.50, HB, M2	3
Mount, truck, M36	1
Tables, graphical firing, M4	4
Truck, 6x6, 2½ ton, dump	1
Knife, trench, M3, w/scabbard, M8	91
Clinometer, M3, M1917	1
Periscope, M4	1

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All subsequent loss reports will be for Corps troops only.

Ammunition expenditures for the day were 513 long tons.

D/8 (14 June 44)

Reconnaissance was conducted by the ammunition officer for possible forward ASP sites.

An ammunition allowance from Army was received today which consisted of 15,000 rds, 105mm How., M2, 2,000 rds, 155 How., M1 and 800 rds. 155mm gun for a 5 day period effective 2400 hours from this date.

A rumored difficulty with parts and accessories between 526th HM Tk Co. and 745th Tk Bn., which had aroused the Commanding General and Corps G-4, turned out to be unfounded.

Army took over management of captured enemy material at collecting point.

177th Ord. Bn., back up, the 86th Ord. Bn., arrived in force on this date. Units were located as follows:

202nd Ord. Depot Co.	649793
552nd Ord. HM Tk Co.	672751
111th Ord. MM Co.	643787
Hq. 86th Ord. Bn.	655855

Advice of new level of tank authorization for seperate medium Bns. for replacement purposes was received verbally from the Army Ordnance Officer. Level was set at 35 tanks exclusive of dozer tanks. This was promoted by short supply of tanks due to greater losses than anticipated.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST-OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Tank, M4			1
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo	1		
Truck, ¾ ton, 4x4		1	
Carbine, cal. .30	1	12	
Pistol, 1911A1		8	
Rifle, M1903		1	
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel		5	
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1	1		
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 whl, cargo	2		
Carrier, personnel, HT, M2A1	1		

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Ammunition expenditures for the day were 154 long tons.

D/9 (15 June 44)

It appeared that the Collecting Company was evacuating too much worthless enemy equipment to the detriment of traffic on MSRs.

Difficulties were ariding from issues of major items by Army and Corps Ordnance Offices. These were rectified by a visit of the Maintenance and Supply Officer to Army Ordnance Section. Results: Major items required for replacement that are not usually carried by the 177th Ord. Bn., can be allocated to Corps Ordnance Officer from Army informal contact. Stocks of major items carried by the 177th Ord. Bn. will be for V Corps troops only. Issues made by this office will be directed to Supply Officer, 177th Ord. Bn., for issue by the various battalion maintenance units. Division replacement will be made by Army.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST OTHER CAUSES
Mount, tripod, MG, cal. 50, M3	1	
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1	1	
Carbine, US, cal. 30, M1	2	2
Binoculars, M3	3	2
Gun, Mach., cal.50, Brg., M2, HB flex	1	
Elevator, cradle, AA, cal.50, M1	1	
Knife, trench, M3, w/scabbard	14	
Chest, Amm., cal.50, M17	12	
Pistol, auto., cal.45, M1911A1	2	
Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4	1	2
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel		2

Command Officer, 100th Amm. Bn., Asst. Ammunition Officer, First U.S. Army and Ammunition Officer, V Corps reconnoitered a site for ASP 502 within a general area designated by Ammunition Officer, First U.S. Army.

Ammunition expenditures for the day were 328 long tons.

D/10 (16 June 44)

Supply of the following items were declared critical:

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Tank, Medium, M4	Aiming Circle, M1
60mm Mortar	Carriage, Motor, Mult. gun, M15
81mm Mortar	Carriage, Motor, Mult. gun, M16
105mm How., M3	Gun, sub-machine
Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4	Rifle, Browning Automatic

Commanding General, V Corps and 2nd Infantry Division requested Corps Ordnance for an immediate allocation of 300 sub-machine guns for special tactical purposes. Army Ordnance directed that request be submitted through command channels which was not done. A total of 25 were made available thru 177th Ord. Bn. and were delivered to 2nd Inf. Div. Remainder were to be obtained from replacement personnel within the division and by exchange with the 1st Infantry Division.

Army Ordnance Operations Officer was contacted in regard to maintenance assignments of 111th Ord. MM Co. and the replacement for the 3422nd Ord. MAM Co. which were reported sunk. No decision was reached.

Contact was made with 177th Ord. Bn. Hq. in connection with establishment of Corps Collecting Point (669760), operation of contact parties and instalation of signs.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST-OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Trailer, 1ton, 2 whl, cargo	2		
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1	10	2	
Binoculars, M3	3	5	
Bayonet, M1	5		
Carbine, US, Cal. .30, M1	4	14	
Gun, 3", towed, M5 & carriage, M1	1	1	
Carrier, personnel, HT, M3	1	2	
Carrier, personnel, HT, M3A1	1	2	
Truck, ¼ton, 4x4		3	
Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4, 12 v		1	
Pistol, auto, cal. .45, M1911	1	2	
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1	2	4	
Compass, M2	2	2	
Carriage, Motor, 105mm How., M5		2	
Telescope, Obsvn., M49	1		
Projector, pyrotechnic, hand, M9	1	2	
Trailer, Ammo, M 10		2	
Launcher, Grenade, M7	15		
Launcher, Grenade, M8	6		

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ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST-OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Launcher, M1	1		
Watch, pocket, 15 jewel	1		
Tank, Med., M4	7		4
Truck, 2½ ton, cargo, 6x6, LWB	3		
Gun, sub-mach, cal.45, M3	3	1	
Tank, Lt., M5A1			2
Gun, Mach., cal.30,M1919A4	2		
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel	4		
Gun, machine, cal.50,HB, M2	2		

Ammunitionexpenditures for the day were 712 long tons.

D/11 (17 June 44)

Service and support assignments of Ordnance units disseminated this date to 177th Ordnance Battalion by Maintenance Officer. Ordnance patrols were checked and were found active on all roads. ASP 502 at 645668 opened for issue at 1800 hours. Reserve stock of hand fragmentation grenades and 155mm How., M1 ammunition were beginning to run low. Mortars (all types), half tracks, all combat full tracked vehicles and air cooled cal. .50 machine guns were in short supply.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST-OTHER CAUSES
Tanks, medium, M4	4	
Tanks, light, M5A1	2	
Half-tracks, M5A1	3	
Trailers, 1 ton, 2 whl, cargo	3	
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo, w/w		1
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, Dump		2
Truck, ¾ ton, 4x4		9
Trailers, ¾ ton, 2 whl, cargo		12
Rifle, US cal.30, M1		2
Binoculars		2
Quadrant, gunners, M1 (Mils)		1

111th Ordnance MM Co. was officially attached to the 177th Ordnance Bn. Its mission will be direct support of the 2nd Infantry Division.

Ammunition expenditures for the day were 302 long tons.

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D/12 (18 June 44)

New two day restriction on artillery ammunition was received from Army Ordnance Officer. This restriction was effective as of 0001 hours and consisted of 18,000 rounds, 105mm How., M2 and 3,500 rounds, 155mm How., M1.

The artillery of the 2nd Infantry Division was found to have on hand basic load plus 200 rounds per 105mm How., M2 and 100 rounds per 155mm How., M1. This caused considerable commotion at the Army Ammunition Office.

Visit was made by the M intenance and Supply Officer to First U. S. Army in connection with supply of critical items.

First flying bomb reported used in troop area occupied by our forces. BD Squads were sent to investigate. Damage was wide spread from blast. No identifying features of the bomb could be found.

Daily losses were as follows:

ITEM	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST-OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Carrier, personnel, HT, M3A1	5		
Carrier, personnel, HT, M3			2
Sight, Panoramic, M1A1	1		
Gun, machine, cal.30, M1919A4	7	1	
Quadrant, gunners, M1	1		
Mount, triped, mach.gun, cal. 30, M2	6		
Gun, sub-mach., cal.45	1		
Carbine, cal.30, M1	8	7	
Motorcycle, solo			1
Mortar, 60mm, M2	1		
Gun, mach., cal.50, HB, M2	1		
Cradle, assy, cal.30 mach. gun	10		
Pistol, auto, cal.45, M1911A1	2		
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1	4		
Watch, wrist, 17 jewel	1		
Tele., sight,M54 (57mm Tank Gun)	1		
Tank, light, M5A1	2		
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 whl, cargo	3		
Launcher, gren., M8	10		
Launcher, gren., M7	10		
Bayonet, M1	2		
AA cradle, for cal.30 MG (light tank)	1		
Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4	1		
Rifle, US, cal.30, M1		1	
Mount, mach. gun, M48		1	

Ammunition expenditures for the day were 286 long tons.

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SUMMARY:

1. Because of congestion at ASP 501 and because of the mixed nature of ammunition receipts, the depot had difficulty in segregating ammunition by type and was totally unable to seperate it by lot for this period.

2. The 2nd Infantry Division had maintenance personnel but practically no maintenance equipment during the period due to loading on different ships and inability to trace the equipment. Maintenance was supplied by the support MM co. and other units of the 177th Ord. Bn.

3. A waterproofed maintenance company is ineffective for at least 24 hours after landing.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Ordnance Officer
APO #305, U. S. Army

AFTER ACTION REPORT

D/13 to D/16 (19 June to 22 June 44)

SPECIAL PERIOD

D/13 (19 June 44)

The following major items were deemed critical by First Army Ordnance Section until certain Depot Companies afloat could be landed.

Gun, 57mm, M1	Tank, Med, M4
How, 105mm, M3	Carriage Motor, M15 and M16
Circle, Aiming, M1	Carrier, personell M3A1
Truck, ¾ ton	Rifle, Auto, Cal30, M1918A2
Trailer, ¼ ton	Launcher, Grenade, M7
M6, Cal, 30, M1917 and Mount	Launcher, Rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1 and M9
Mortar, 60mm, M2 w/Mount	
Mortar, 81mm, M1 w/Mount	

Difficulties in unloading was due stormy weather.

Materiel losses of the day as follows:

	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST - OTHER CAUSES
Binoculars, M3	30	4
Compass, M2		1
Rifle, Cal.30, M1	2	
Bayonet, M1 w/scabbard	9	
Truck, Dump, 2½ ton, 6x6	1	
Telescope, M70F	8	
Carbine, Cal.30, M1	3	
Watch, wrist, 7 Jewel	14	
Rifle, Cal.30, M1903		9
Gun, sub-mach., Cal.45, M1A1	31	
Launcher, Grenade, M8	3	
Launcher, Grenade, M7	1	
Pistol, Pyro., AN, M8		1
Gun, Mach., cal.30, M1919A4	15	

Ammunition expenditure for the day was 300 long tons.

D/14 (20 June 44)

Full complement of Ordnance maintenance troops were in and adjusted to the situation and full scale Ordnance service was in effect for the first time

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Losses in materiel:

	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST - OTHER CAUSES
Rifle, cal. 30, M1903		1
Carbine, cal.30, M1		2
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 whl.	1	
Telescope, panoramic, M12A3	1	
Gun, sub-mach, cal.45	7	
Bayonet, M1	7	
Binocular, M3	2	
Holster, M1916		1
		1

Expenditure of ammunition was 163 long tons.

D/15 (21 June 44)

Due to short supply, which was further aggravated by the storms that prevented unloading, all ammunition withdrawals and expenditures within First Army were limited to 1/3 U/F per day.

This restriction was applicable to all calibers, save for extreme emergencies. The maximum amount of artillery ammunition normally allowed to be on hand was arbitrated to be basic load plus 50 rds per 105 How M2 and 25 rounds per 155 How M1.

Materiel losses for the day:

	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST - OTHER CAUSES	EVACUATED NOT REPLACED
Truck, ¾ ton, 4x4	2	1	
Trailer, ¾ ton, 2 whl cargo		1	
Binoculars, M3 & M13	8	1	
Gun, sub-mach., cal. 45	1		
Carbine, cal. 30	1		
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 whl cargo		3	
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6 cargo		1	
Gun, machine, cal.50, HB Flex		1	1
Mt., Truck, M32		1	
Rifle, Cal. 30, M1	1		
Bayonet, M1, w/scabbard	20		
Stiffkey Stick			2

Ammunition expenditure for the day was 199 long tons.

D/16 (22 June 44)

It was necessary to lay down a policy to the Division Ordnance Officers concerned on the matters of control of MM Companies for their support.

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Division Ordnance Officers tend consider these units as attached and desire to have them operate as close as possible to their organic light maintenance companies.

Materiel losses for the day:

	LOST IN COMBAT	LOST - OTHER CAUSES
Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4	1	
Trailer, ¼ ton, 2 whl.	1	
Tool Set: M. V. M.	1	
Binoculars	32	2
Watch, wrist, 7 jewel	41	6
Launcher, grenade, M7	22	
Pistol, cal.45 & Holster		1
Rifle, cal. 30, M1	8	1
Mount, tripod, cal.30, M1917A1	1	
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36" M1A1	3	
Launcher, grenade, M8	3	
Watch, pocket, 15 jewel	2	
Carbine, cal. 30	9	
Finder, range, 1 meter base M9	13	
Circle, aiming, M1	6	

Ammunition expenditure for the day was 183 long tons

SUMMARY:

1. This period was marked by violent storms which caused practically complete cessation of landing new supplies and great destruction to our shipping. It pointed the need for a factor of safety in reserve stocks for a landing operation.

2. Reduction of ammunition reserves caused a command decision to reduce ammunition expenditures particularly in artillery. Artillery expenditures had been high and curtailment was difficult to adjust. High expenditures also caused complaint at the small size of the basic load which was based on normal expenditures one third of a unit of fire (ETOUSA U/F).

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Ordnance Officer
APO #305, U. S. ARMY

AFTER ACTION REPORT

23 June 44 to 23 July 44

Defensive Period

1. During this period V Corps maintained a defensive attitude to protect the beachhead already established while other troops of First United States Army captured the port of Cherbourg. It is understood that this decision was influenced partially by the small reserves of ammunition available as well as the desire to insure an adequate foothold on the continent before extending the front. Contact was maintained with the enemy through strong patrol action.

2. This period permitted the organization of normal Ordnance service to become routine. It also permitted the build-up of adequate maintenance service. Some of the difficulties which were overcome are detailed below.

3. Reports of UXB's and unexploded shells were being received in vague terms as to the nature and location of the hazard. Units were instructed to make all such reports through Bomb Reconnaissance Officers and clerks receiving messages were instructed to ask if the hazard had been surveyed by the Bomb Reconnaissance Officer. This improved the situation somewhat but officers given instruction in bomb reconnaissance in England could not be expected to remember many details without active experience in the mean time.

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4. Tank and Antitank units were somewhat perturbed for a period due to the fact that our tanks and tank destroyers were outgunned by German high-velocity guns. This has died down somewhat probably because of the small amount of such weapons actually encountered on our front. At the time medium tanks were armed with the 75mm gun and tank destroyers with the 3 inch gun whereas the Germans were using high velocity 8.8cm and 7.5 cm guns. At the same time the British were using a high velocity sabot round with their six pounder and a high velocity 17 pounder mounted on our Sherman Tank. The prompt developement of 90mm guns on medium tanks and tank destroyers is indicated as well as a high velocity gun for light tanks. HEAT shell is not the answer since it is low velocity and can not be as accurately fired at longer ranges as the AP high velocity projectile. First U. S. Army was succes ful in obtaining sabot rounds from the British and initial distribution of 250 rounds per Infantry Division was made.

5. It was found that .50 caliber rounds in web belts were becoming seriously loosened in vehicles which traveled extensively. Vibration caused the rounds to become misaligned and even to drop out when the belt was lifted. A recommendation was made that such vehicles be issued link belts in the future whereas the web belt should be issued to AA units, guns on half tracks and to ground mounts. This will probably result in a requirement for a higher ratio of link to web belts.

6. Ammunition expenditures and withdrawals were orginally controlled by stating in the plan for the invasion that expenditures after D/8 would average 1/3 of an ETOUSA unit of fire and that units would not have in their possession more than the basic load authorized by First U. S. Army. Withdrawals could be made on a Transportation Order signed by the Division

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Ammunition Officer of by the S-4 of Corps seperate units that they were to replace expenditures or were in anticipation of planned fires. This control was insufficient and resulted in extremely large artillery expenditures. The large expenditures resulted in the basic load being inadequate to support them and efforts were made to draw sufficient ammunition in anticipation of planned fires. The final result after reserves were becoming dangerously low was the adoption of a modified allocation system and the strict application of reduction of ammunition on hand to basic loads. Authorized expenditures of ammunition over stated periods were transmitted through command channels to tactical units. All expenditures over the authorized amounts were required to be explained by official communication within 24 hours. Ordnance Ammunition Officers notified the proper General Staff Officer of excess expenditures. Reports of overages in basic load were likewise required daily.

7. Upon initiating above restrictions requests began to multiply for authority to use German ammunition. The 2nd Infantry Division was finally authorized to use a battery of German 10.5cm howitzers with an adapter to receive our panoramic sight.

8. During this period complaints by the Field Artillery of the failure to issue ammunition by lot particularly for the 105mm Howitzer, M2, culminated in the loan of 100 artillerymen to initiate this work. Subsequently ASP 503 was manned with two Ammunition Companies and all artillery ammunition including 3 inch is now segregated and issued by lots. An effort is being made to segregate the same types in depots b[illegible] this will take time in view of existing conditions.

9. In order to determine whether or not the continued large l[illegible] of small arms, watches and binoculars were actually lost, a show-[illegible]

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inspection was ordered by First U. S. Army. Some of these items were returned to normal supply channels but not in very large quantities. An appreciable excess of machine guns and pistols were turned in.

10. The 102nd Cavalry Squadron developed a hedge cutter, christened Rhinoceros by First U. S. Army, which was immediately recognised as having great potentialities for changing tank tactics in this area. Hedgerows had largely restricted tank operations to roads and antitank guns were causing serious losses. The hedge cutter consisted of sharpened prongs built from six inch angle salvaged from tetrahedrons used as beach defenses by the Germans. They were mounted on tanks on the towing clevis with a pin and means provided for preventing rotation. The fingers piercing the hedge held the tank to the ground and lifted the top from the embankments. Every effort was made to build as many of these as possible for operation Cobra starting 24 July 1944. 100 percent installation was made in V Corps for tank units and nearly all tank destroyers were likewise equipped. The result was that both oxy-acetylene and welding rod became critical in this theater.

11. The Corps ASP, originally #502 near Litteau and then moved to #503 near le Molay for safety reasons, was stocked at varying levels ending with the maximum of two units of fire for artillery ammunition and one and a half units for all other types. Units were as authorized by ETOUSA.

12. Two Bomb Disposal Squads attached to V Corps investigated and made proper disposition of reports pertaining to 39 unexploded shells and 19 UXB's. In addition these units were called upon to destroy a quantity of enemy loose ammunition not acceptable by ASP's. This can not be considered their normal assignment but there was no one within Corps better qualified to perform this essential service.

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13. The following equipment, previously listed as critical, was made available to meet existing losses and shortages:

Carriage, Motor, Mult. gun, M15
Carriage, Motor, Mult. Gun, M16
Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4
Gun, Mach., cal. .30, M1919A4

14. Total materiel losses for the period:-

Gun, mach., cal. .30, M1919A4,flex	1
Gun, mach., cal. .50, Brg M2 HB flex	3
Gun, sub-mach, cal. .45, Thomp.(all types)	32
Mount, tripod,MG, cal. .30,M2	1
Mount, tripod,MG, cal. .50,M3	4
Elevator, cradleAA, cal. .50,M1	4
Mount, truck, M36	2
Bayonet, M1905	13
Bayonet, M1	22
Carbine, US, cal. .30, M1	39
Knife, trench, M3	72
Launcher, grenade, M7	28
Launcher, grenade, M8	12
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1	11
Pistol, auto. cal. .45, M1911 & M1911A1	9
Pistol, pyrotechnic, M8	1
Projector, pyrotechnic, hand, M9	5
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1	9
Scabbard, bayonet, M1910	17
Scabbard, bayonet, M3	2
Scabbard, bayonet, M7	31
Scabbard, trench knife, M8	54
Gun, 3" towed, M5 & Carr. M1 & M6	2
Binoculars, (all types)	21
Circle, aiming, M1	3
Compass, M2	4
Light, aiming post, M14	4
Light, inst., M32	3
Mt. Tele. M44	1
Mt. Tele M23	1
Periscope, M4&M4A1	1
Periscope, M6	14
Post, aiming, M1	11
Quadrant, gunners, M1 (mils)	4
Tele., pan. M12A3	2
Tele., pan. M12A5	1
Tele., obsn., M48,M49	4
Tele., el M29	2
Tele., M70G	1
Watch, pocket, 7 ~~&~~ 15 jewel	16
Watch, wrist, 7-9-15 jewel	39
Telescope, T-108	1
Carriage, motor, mult.gun, M16,w/arm	1
Carrier, personnel, H/T,M5,w/roll, w/o/arm	1

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Tank, light, M5A1	1
Tank, medium, M4	2
Tank, medium, M4 (105mm How.)	4
Trailer, Ammunition, M10	2
Tractor, medium, M5A1	1
Truck, heavy, wrecking, M1	1
Motorcycle, sole	2
Trailer, ¼ ton 2 whl, cargo	1
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 whl, cargo	3
Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4	5
Truck, 3/4 ton, C/R, w/o/w	1
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo, w/o/w	1
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6 cargo, w/w, w/rg mt	1
Truck, 6 ton, 6x6, Prime Mover	2
Truck, 7½ ton, 6x6, Prime Mover	1
Second Echelon set No. 3	1
Second Echelon set No. 4	1
Tube (8" How.)	1
Holsters (pistol)	5
Tele., T116	1

15. Total ammunition expended:-

7,727 long tons.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Ordnance Officer
APO 305, U. S. Army

Operation Cobra (Partial)

24 July 1944 to 31 July 1944

1. The object of Cobra was to break through the defenses the Germans had been able to organize during the one month defensive period preceding it, slice off an appreciable number of the enemy if possible and keep the Germans from reorganizing strongly thereafter.

2. The operation started on 24 July 1944 with an attack by the VII Corps with two Infantry Divisions. Upon breaking through the prepared positions, two Armored Divisions were then to pass through and capture objectives well out in front followed by another motorized Infantry Division with a similar objective. V Corps with other troops were to actively press the enemy to keep it occupied. V Corps was to attack on its front on 25 July 1944 with three Infantry Divisions abreast. The operation has so far resulted in the capture of the Cotentin Peninsula, and the start of operations in the Brest Peninsula. The operation is not yet complete.

3. In preparation for Cobra units drew ammunition in accordance with prepared fire plans for the operation. Due to the stringency of ammunition stocks, authorized expenditures were transmitted to Corps on the eve of the operation considerably less than those planned. The result was that units were overstocked. Attempts were made to absorb this excess by authorized expenditure aided by transfers within Corps. This was not entirely successful with some types of ammunition and difficulty was found in turning excesses back to ASP's. This condition is being rectified however.

4. The 2d Infantry Division used considerable stocks of 10.5 cm German HE in this operation by firing from captured 10.5 cm Howitzers. American

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panoramic telescopes had to be used on the equipment.

5. During this period the two B.D. Squads cleared twenty two (22) reports of unexploded shells and ten (10) of UXB's.

6. Units using the Rhinoceros, the hedgerow cutter described in the previous report, ascribed a considerable measure of their success to the surprise of its use. They were enabled to outflank antitank guns spotted for their approach on roads. Likewise they were of more value in developing a joint attack with Infantry against defended hedgerows.

7. Ammunition expenditure for this period amounted to 2,134 long tons.

8. Total Ordnance Losses were as follows:

Gun, mach. cal.30 M1919A4, flex.	16
Gun, mach. cal.50 Brg M2 HB flex	5
Gun, sub-mach. Cal.45, All Types	56
Mortar, 60mm, M2	3
Mount, tripod, MG Cal.30, M1917A1	1
Mount, tripod, MG Cal.30, M2	1
Mount, MG, cal.30, M48	1
Mount, truck, M36	1
Bayonet, M1	3
Carbine, US cal.30, M1	25
Knife, trench, M3	16
Launcher, Grenade, M1	1
Launcher, Grenade, M7	3
Launcher, rocket AT 2.36", M1A1	11
Pistol, auto cal.45, M1911 & M1911A1	1
Projector, pyrotechnic, hand M9	3
Rifle, US, cal.30, M1	4
Rifle, US, cal.30, M1903, '03A1 & '03A3	2
Scabbard, bayonet, M1910	2
Scabbard, trench knife, M8	5
Gun, 3" towed M5 & Carr. M1 & M6	2
Binoculars, M3	31
Finder, range, M9	1
Instrument, obsn, AA, BC, M1	1
Light, inst., M16	1
Periscope, M4	5
Periscope, M6	20
Post, aiming, M1	1
Quadrant, gunners M1	1
Sight, mortar, M4	3
Stiffkey Stick	2
Tele., M66	1

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Operation Cobra (Cont.)

Watch, wrist, 7 jewel	4
Carriage, motor 3" gun M10, w/arm	1
Tank, Light, M5A1	18
Tank, medium, M4	14
Trailer, Ammunition M10	2
Tractor, medium M4	1
Vehicle, tank recovery, T5	1
Motorcycle, solo	1
Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4	10
Truck, 3/4 ton C/R	1
Truck, 1½ ton, 6x6, Cargo	1
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, Cargo	1
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6, Dump	1
Truck, 6 ton 6x6 Prime Mover	1
Tool Set, Motor Vehicle Mechanic	6
Tool Set, Special Arm'd Force Co. Set	1

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Auth: CG, V Corps
Date: 4 Aug 1944
Init: [redacted] LGP

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Engineer

4 August 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Reports After/After Action Report.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C.
THRU CHANNELS.

I - PLANNING PHASE
Operation NEPTUNE - Up to 30 June 1944

1. Engineer planning for Operation NEPTUNE began in September 1943 when it was indicated to the Engineer Section that the COTENTIN (CHERBOURG) Peninsula would be the area in which we would later land in the invasion of France. Until the end of December 1943, planning by the Engineer Section concerned itself almost entirely in studying the terrain, preparing a 1/25,000 scale relief model of the entire peninsula, and becoming familiar with the results of various general terrain studies. Training of engineer troops was conducted to fit the terrain under study.

2. In late December 1943 Exercise DUCK was conducted which was the first large scale dress rehearsal for the invasion. The Engineer Section conducted a great deal of planning for this operation and supervised the activities and planning of both the Division Engineers and 1st Engineer Special Brigade during the Exercise. Much was learned which proved of inestimable value later. In January 1944, the Corps received the rough outline of Operation NEPTUNE and planning proceeded immediately in much greater detail than heretofore. A 1/5,000 scale relief map of the immediate area behind Beach OMAHA was prepared and a great deal of statistical data was compiled on the terrain, beach, beach exits, tides, road net, soil conditions and inundations. These data were distributed to the staff and to subordinate units. The Engineer Section did not go to Plymouth, England, with the planning echelon of the staff but continued its planning activities at Norton Manor, Taunton.

3. As the troop lists became firm, operation plans for each engineer unit were prepared for use of the Engineer Section in checking the plans actually submitted by the various subordinate units. Careful study was made of supply requirements for the force and for each of the divisions and all were integrated before submission to higher headquarters.

4. Throughout the planning phase, continual inspection was made of aerial photographs of OMAHA Beach and all other nearby beaches to determine whether or not the German was using beach obstacles. As soon as these obstacles appeared in the CHERBOURG area, training was commenced at the Assault Training Center, Woolacombe, England, of selected engineer units, in the assault and breaching of beach obstacles. On the first of May, Provisional Engineer Group, [illegible] under command of Lt. Col. J. T. O'Neill, was formed of two companies [illegible] 299th Engineer Combat Battalion and the entire 146th Engineer Combat [illegible]

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The training of this Group for the performance of its hazardous mission was the responsibility of the Engineer Section. A great deal of detailed planning was done by the Engineer Section before the final plan of the assault became firm.

5. The latter part of April and the entire month of May were devoted to supplying the Corps for the operation, assisting subordinate units in extremely detailed plans and in integrating our supply requirements with the ship tonnage available to the Corps. This integration necessitated many compromises, many of which have proven wise, but some of which have proven fallacious. As an aid to those planning similar operations the following points may prove of value.

a. The initial planning assumed that the enemy would have prepared for demolition and destroyed all bridges in the area, and therefore plans were made to bring in (on unit transportation and in bulk) sufficient Bailey, Treadway, and timber materials, as well as nested culvert, to bridge all crossings on the major road net as rapidly as this net uncovered. That the enemy did not destroy all bridges was indeed fortunate; that it did not rain and streams were not swollen were also fortunate; nevertheless it is true that V Corps arrived on the coast of France with but half of the bridging it could easily have needed to complete only the major road net. In actuality, the Bailey bridging hauled by the one Light Pontoon Company was sufficient to meet our immediate needs.

b. In preparing units for shipment Corps Engineer Combat Battalions and the Engineer Dump Truck Company were called on to furnish transportation for carrying certain types of Class IV Supply deemed immediate necessities on reaching the far shore. Each Engineer Combat Battalion furnished nine (9) 2½-ton trucks with the same number of 2½-ton trailers. The Engineer Dump Truck Company provided all of its 2½-ton dumps for the same purpose. Supplies allotted to these units consisted of bridging materials (Bailey bridge, two 40 ft. spans complete with tools to each battalion), 3" x 12" x 12' lumber in quantities sufficient to build timber trestle bridges, steel Treadway bridge sections for replacement of that carried by Treadway Bridge Companies, Somerfeld track and Coir Matting (road building expedients) and fortification materials consisting of barbed wire (reels), pickets, long and short, and coiled concertina rolls. It was found that this material was invaluable as scheduled shipments of supplies were so delayed that engineer work would have been considerably held up during the early days of the invasion.

c. For planning purposes, [illegible] water consumption, during the initial phases, would be at the rate of 1/2 gallon per man per day for all personnel ashore with additional allowance for the wounded (assumed at 10 per cent of all personnel), of two gallons per man per day for two days. Units were required to provide and carry two days water on unit transportation. To take care of the anticipated needs of the wounded additional water was brought ashore by [illegible] troops. Three water points were operative in the beach area on D+1 and [illegible] little of the bulk water carefully carried from England was ever used. [illegible] that in a country so well cut with water courses, and with the plentiful supply of water purification tablets available to our troops, that we could [illegible] with only that water brought in on unit transportation. Water requirements for the wounded did not become great until D+4 or later with the establishment of the major field hospitals; before this time evacuation was rapid and [illegible] water was consumed on the far shore.

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d. During the planning stage, the divisions ordered great quantities of explosives and other Class V engineer supplies, to be carried on unit transportation and by individual soldiers in the assault. Those supplies carried on unit transportation were later used. Those supplies carried by individual soldiers were discarded along the beach and along hedgerows and roads for some four miles inland. This discarding of explosives by the soldier was anticipated and it was hoped that affairs would be sufficiently ordered that platoon commanders could collect and make small scattered dumps of those explosives not used. As it was, satchel and pole charges were carried until the soldier became tired and then thrown away. No definite recommendation as to the amount of explosive to be carried in a beach assault can be made. A great deal of explosive was wasted; yet, if confronted with a similar landing, this section would recommend that similar large quantities be brought ashore by individual soldiers.

e. Map supply in the planning stage was satisfactorily handled by distribution through usual engineer channels. Map supply on the continent was included in the Army Engineer Plan and provided that Corps would land with a reserve stock of approximately one quarter of a division issue and that the Army Map Depot would be set up ashore and in operation on D/2. Great numbers of maps were lost on the beach, the Army Map Depot was held off shore until D/6, the Army Map Depot supplies did not arrive as scheduled and a critical map supply problem was alleviated only by the reserve stock brought in by this Section. It is recommended that the stocks of reserve maps issued to divisions and Corps be continued in amphibious operations and that great stress be laid on assuring the safe arrival of these maps.

II - LANDING AND BEACHHEAD - D-DAY TO D/3 DAY

6. The Corps Engineer Section landed near ST. LAURENT-SUR-MER, France, early D-Day, 6 June 1944. Initial mission of section was to gather reconnaissance information, open Command Post and establish communications with Division and Corps Engineer units. Activities of the section during the first two days consisted principally of verbal contact with Division Engineers and the gathering of engineer intelligence data. On D/2 Day section equipment arrived and the section began normal operations.

7. During the first three days Corps Engineer Battalions, although not attached to Divisions, operated under instructions issued by the Division Engineers. It was realized at this stage that the Corps Engineer could not advantageously control his battalions ashore without a Group Headquarters being ashore.

8. The Engineer Section did very little during the first two days ashore other than keep abreast of the situation on all sections of the front. It assisted divisions in locating engineer supplies on the beach and was able to advise the Commanding General in certain important aspects of the beach operations. However, by landing early and by closely watching the establishment of the beachhead, the Section was able to put each Group Headquarters to work immediately upon landing and was able to assist the Provisional Engineer Group in the accomplishment of its mission.

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III - LIMITED OBJECTIVE - D/4 DAY TO D/12 DAY

9. During the phase wherein the Corps was advancing to limited objectives, the Engineer Section became fully operative and was able to coordinate the activities of Division Engineers and Group Commanders toward starting extensive road maintenance, and supervised the construction of the following engineer work:

D/3 - Class 40 Bailey bridge at THEVIERES by the 1340 Engineer Combat Battalion. The original reconnaissance was done under severe fire, and the bridgehead was established by the engineers. Construction was started and the bridge finished after dark, while the unit was yet receiving occasional sniper fire.

Class 40 Bailey bridge at PONT DU VEY by Company C, 254th Engineer Combat Battalion. Construction was done during the hours of darkness. The company fought off a German patrol during the night, but finished the bridge by 0530B the next day, some 18 hours ahead of the deadline set by 21 Army Group.

4 treadway bridges on LE COUEF GOT - DOUET Road by Company A, 254th Engineer Combat Battalion. The installation of these bridges saved the 115th R.C.T., which was cut off south of the LOWER AURE inundation, from possible annihilation.

D/5 - Class 40 Bailey bridge constructed over railroad at LE MOLAY by 234th Engineer Combat Battalion.

D/8 - Class 40 Bailey bridge constructed at THEVIERES by 234th Engineer Combat Battalion. This bridge, and a by-pass to it, were put in just downstream of the old site, providing 2-way traffic on the Corps MSR.

D/9 - Class 40 Bailey bridge constructed at RUBERCY by the 502nd Engineer Light Pontoon Company. Bridge was required to by-pass a narrow existing Class 70 bridge.

IV - DEFENSE OF THE BEACHHEAD

D/13 TO END OF THE MONTH

10. During the defense of the beachhead, which extended well into the month of July, the Engineer Section continued the supervision of the operation of the two Corps Engineer Groups and supervised the erection of the following:

D/15 - Treadway truss crossing constructed at LE MOLAY by 1340th Engineer Combat Battalion, which alleviated the serious bottleneck to south-bound traffic, caused by the narrow underpass west of LE MOLAY station.

D/19 - Timber trestle bridge constructed at THEVIERES by 234th Engineer Combat Battalion, replacing the Bailey bridge. Some rolled-steel-joists. The bridge was made a two-way Class 70, on the old site.

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D/20 - FH Cargo, 2500-man, vicinity of FORMIGNY by the 1340th Engineer Combat Battalion.

D/21 - Class 70 Two-way pile and stringer bridge constructed at PONT DU VEY by Company C, 254th Engineer Combat Battalion.

V - SUMMARY

11. In summary, the Engineer Section, Headquarters V Corps, during the month of June 1944, landed on the coast of France, supervised the engineer work in connection with the establishment of a beachhead and its defense, with the neutralization of heavy beach obstacles and the maintenance of 310 miles of roads requiring 6,150 tons of road metal and the average issue to Corps and Army units of 60,000 gallons of water per day.

LEWIS C. PATTILLO,
Lt. Colonel, C.E.,
Corps Engineer.

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Auth: CG, V Corps
Date: 4 AUG 1944
Init: LCP

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Engineer

4 August 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Reports After/After Action Report, July 1944.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C.

THRU CHANNELS.

1. The Engineer Section, Headquarters V Corps, during the Month of July 1944, continued its normal function and duties, advising the staff on matters of engineer concern, supervising the activities of the two Engineer Groups and coordinating engineer work between the divisions and Groups.

2. Until the beginning of Operation COBRA, 25 July 1944 (D/48), the major problem was one of road maintenance and the improvement of circulation in the Corps zone. A barely adequate road net was improved by a heavy program. On removal of forward movement by the Corps, the road net was turned over to First Army in far better shape than it had been before the invasion. Tarred roads were repaired, using captured tar, and almost all dirt roads were heavily gravelled.

3. Numerous quarries and water points were operated; 41,000 tons of road metal was placed during the month; an average of 150,000 gallons of water was dispensed daily.

4. A critical traffic condition developed at the intersection of the seven roads in FORET DE CERISY at 867710. To alleviate this, a traffic circle was designed by the Engineer Section and constructed by the 1340th Engineer Combat Battalion under the supervision of the 1171st Engineer Combat Group in the period 8 - 14 July. This circle required 9,405 man hours, 3,314 yards of rock and 8,000 gallons of oil for stabilization. It has been christened VICTOR CIRCLE.

5. The Engineer Section prepared in England, and continued to prepare in France, a series of layer-tinted maps for use by the general staff in planning the advance. The use of these maps became extensive in planning of operations just south of TORIGNI SUR VIRE.

6. During the month of July the Section prepared and distributed to the staff, and Division Engineers, several terrain studies of areas on the Corps front. Also were prepared, a series of visibility charts showing those areas that could not be seen from prominent heights north and south of the VIRE valley.

7. With the beginning of Operation COBRA, the work of the Section has been largely devoted to giving the division engineers close support during the advance. Throughout the month, and especially in the advance, Corps engineers have habitually worked up to the line of battalion CPs, and occasionally ahead of the division engineers.

LEWIS C. PATTILLO,
Lt. Colonel, C.E.,
Corps Engineer.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Surgeon

3 August 1944.

AFTER ACTION REPORT
SURGEON'S SECTION, V CORPS

6 June - 30 June 1944 (D Day - D/24)

Landing Operations on a Hostile Shore (1 June - 3 June 1944, D Day - D/3).

The earliest organized medical effort other than that of aid groups attached to the assault teams and Engineers demolishing obstacles on the beach was by the 60th Medical Battalion (6th Engineer Special Brigade) and the 61st Medical Battalion (5th Engineer Special Brigade). They collected and treated the wounded on the beaches, and began establishing medical supply depots. The casualties which they collected were placed upon small craft usually LCVPs and taken to the LSTs standing offshore. As the assault moved inland, the 60th and 61st Medical Battalions set up their clearing stations at 666905 and 688812, respectively (Map 6E/6 1/50,000), and on the morning of D / 1, the Clearing Company of the 1st Medical Battalion set up its station at 673896 on the hill leading from the beach and the casualties treated in the station were evacuated to the beach by litter bearers of the Engineer Special Brigade Medical Battalion.

Colonel Brenn made visits to the beach area on foot and found the units functioning despite the beach obstacles and mines. Most units had lost medical equipment in some degree, but they did well with what they had, improvising as they went along, and in some cases utilizing supplies from the flotsom on the beach.

The first element of the Corps Medical Battalion appeared when part of the 382nd Medical Collecting Company (53rd Medical Battalion) arrived on the evening of D / 1. The Company had only six ambulances with them, but they soon contacted the 104th Medical Battalion of the 29th Infantry Division, and were evacuating casualties during the night.

On the evening of D / 1, LSTs brought in more medical supplies which the Engineer Special Brigades and the Advance Section, 1st Platoon, 1st Medical Depot Company used to supplement the supply depots they had organized. A hospital carrier arrived with supplies, including a stock of whole blood as well as elements of the 13th and 51st Field Hospitals and medical officers and enlisted men serving as the advance parties of Army medical units. Despite the lack of a full complement of organic medical personnel and equipment ashore, the divisions were collecting and treating their wounded, and with the beach head still very shallow, the 382nd Medical Collecting Company, together with elements of the 60th Medical Battalion was evacuating the division clearing stations.

As the 13th and 51st Field Hospitals began to receive their personnel and equipment, efforts were made to get them ready to function, since the Corps Surgeon's plan was to send one platoon of a field hospital with each clearing

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station. The casualties requiring major treatment and as a result being non-transportable, would be taken from the clearing station to the field hospital platoon. This would permit the clearing company to retain its mobility, and at its next forward location another platoon of the same field hospital would leap frog its immobilized platoon and join the clearing station's new set up. The field hospitals would be used in vertical echelon which would make control easier than a horizontal distribution would permit.

The first call for assistance came from the 29th Infantry Division on D + 2. The Division Surgeon, Lt. Col. Barrow, requested four medical officers to replace battle losses and personnel not yet ashore. They were obtained from the group of officers who were with the advance detachments of Army Medical Units, and sent to Lt. Colonel Barrow's headquarters in the chateau at Vierville-Sur-Mer. Four medical officers requested by Colonel Van Valin, Surgeon, 1st Infantry Division, on D + 3 were obtained from the same source as those sent to Lt. Colonel Barrow and were dispatched to the Clearing Station of the 1st Medical Battalion.

The divisions under Corps' control required ambulances during the initial period ashore. The 2nd Infantry Division, which had arrived ashore on D + 2, received four ambulances from the 382nd Medical Collecting Company and four from a Collecting Company of the 60th Medical Battalion. The 1st Infantry Division was given five ambulances on a loan basis by the 382nd Collecting Company, which, in turn, borrowed three from the 51st Field Hospital.

The advance party of personnel and vehicles of the 684th Clearing Company, 53rd Medical (Corps) Battalion came ashore and was bivouaced with the 13th Field Hospital until the entire company was assembled. The 13th Field Hospital which had received much of its equipment and personnel set up a platoon capable of functioning and remained ready for use in its bivouac area. The 51st Field Hospital's personnel and equipment was assembling at a slower rate, however its technical personnel was working in the 1st Medical Battalion's Clearing Station which was next to their bivouac area.

Medical supplies were coming ashore in ample quantities by D + 3, and units needing supplies were receiving them. Due to the presence of unauthorized personnel on the beach, too many decisions were being made for priorities of landing supplies and personnel, therefore a board was appointed by the First United States Army to control the situation. All requests for priorities by V Corps Units had to go through G-4, V Corps, or through Colonel Talley, a member of the board representing the Corps Commander.

The situation produced by the landing was one which was forseen but could not be prevented in that some units landed later than scheduled and on sections of the beach other than those indicated in the plans, and many units lost medical equipment or had to wait for it to arrive. These factors in addition to the failure of the assault to get inland as far as planned produced circumstances described by the Corps Surgeon to the Division Surgeons who visited the Section for instructions: Inasmuch as the rear boundary of every unit ashore at that time was the sea, the likelihood of echelon control or echelon evacuation was out of the question. The area occupied bordered the sea, covered a wide front with a shallow depth, and as a result, had very short lines of evacuation.

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Therefore the basis of medical service devolved upon reporting news immediately so we could plug each gap - personnel, equipment, medical supplies and ambulances, as it occurred. In other words, until our area acquired sufficient depth to work on an echelon basis, we would aim at "targets of opportunity" to borrow a phrase from the Field Artillery. This plan proved entirely satisfactory.

Limited Objective Attack - 10 June - 18 June 1944 (D + 4 - D + 12)

D + 4

The attack made by V Corps continued. The advance of our troops had been rapid as there was little resistance at some points and as a result casualties were not heavy. The 1st Medical Battalion Clearing Station moved from 673896 to 698863 (Map: 6E/6 1/50,000) near Hau Gros and one platoon of the 61st Medical Battalion's Clearing Company moved in the site vacated by them. The collecting company of the 104th Medical Battalion on the right flank moved south-west towards Isigny in the wake of the 29th Infantry Division, but the clearing company was not functioning since only small portions of its personnel and equipment had arrived. There was, however, no delay in treatment of the 29th's casualties since the collecting companies of the 104th supplemented by ambulances of the 382nd Medical Collecting Company evacuated them to the Clearing Station of the 60th Medical Battalion which had moved from 666905 to 665895 (Map: 6E/6 1/50,000) the night before. The 2nd Infantry Division's need for medical personnel was the greatest since the Medical Detachment of the 38th Infantry Regiment (2nd Infantry Division) and the clearing company of the 2nd Medical Battalion had not gotten ashore. Two medical officers and six (6) litter squads (24 E.M.) from the Army medical units ashore was sent to the Division Surgeon, Lt. Col. Cook, at Formigny.

The 13th and 51st Field Hospitals were ready to function on D + 4. The Corps Surgeon obtained two surgical teams from Army (attached to the 61st Medical Battalion) and attached them to the 13th Field Hospital, one platoon of which was functioning in its bivouac area at 679883. One platoon of the 51st Field Hospital was working in conjunction with the Clearing Station of the 60th Medical Battalion.

Medical evacuation was functioning smoothly and patients were being sent to the U.K. by LSTs which had almost emptied the clearing stations of casualties ready for removal. Three (3) C-47 aircraft were on the air-strip near St. Laurent-Sur-Mer and were available for air evacuation of casualties.

Equipment was coming ashore at a rapid rate. Lt. Col. Cook, Surgeon, 2nd Infantry Division was able to return the ambulances borrowed from the 60th Medical Battalion and 382nd Medical Collecting Company. Co. A, 48th Armored Medical Battalion (2nd Armored Division) came ashore with twelve ambulances, but they were not utilized since the need for these vehicles was no longer acute.

D + 5

Lt. Col. Gordon, Commanding Officer, 53rd Medical (Corps) Battalion arrived with part of his headquarters. The remainder of the 684th Clearing Company and the 383rd Medical Collecting Company, both units of the Corps Medical Battalion,

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reported in and were bivouaced until the battalion moved to 634795 (Map: 6E/2 1/50,000), 1 mile west of la Poterie.

The Surgeon, 2nd Armored Division, Colonel Zehm, reported to the Corps Surgeon that only a small portion of his division had landed and Company A, 48th Armored Medical Battalion, would handle the necessary medical evacuation.

Orders were given to the commanding officers of the 13th and 51st Field Hospitals to have one platoon of each unit alerted and ready for movement. One platoon of the former would be located with the clearing company of the 1st Medical Battalion (1st Infantry Division) and one platoon of the latter would set-up with the Clearing Station of the 2nd Medical Battalion (2nd Infantry Division). Since neither field hospital had sufficient transportation with which to move, the 53rd Medical Battalion was instructed to move to its new location near la Poterie during the evening, unload the vehicles and send six (6) 2½ ton trucks to each hospital at 0800 B hrs., D + 6.

The Surgeon, 2nd Infantry Division, called for two medical officers, thirty-six litter bearers and five (5) ambulances which were obtained from the 383rd Medical Collecting Company. It was learned that the 38th Infantry Regiment (2nd Infantry Division) had suffered casualties and required additional aid in evacuating them.

In the morning of D + 6, the 384th Ambulance Company arrived intact together with the remainder of the 53rd Medical Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.

Late in the evening of D + 6, Lt. Col. Barrow, Surgeon, 29th Infantry Division informed us he was getting casualties from the 101st Airborne Infantry Division, a unit of the U.S. VII Corps, which was operating on the right flank of the 29th. The Surgeon, V Corps, instructed the 53rd Medical Battalion to send three (3) ambulances to help evacuate these casualties. Thus, the Corps Medical Battalion not only served V Corps troops and evacuated the divisions under Corps, but was relieving the pressure in an adjoining Corps.

The field hospital platoons functioning with the 1st and 2nd Medical Battalions Clearing Stations lightened the burden of the latter and decreased the number of casualties requiring immediate evacuation to the rear, and as a result, five (5) ambulances of the 382nd Medical Collecting Company were relieved from duty with the 1st Medical Battalion's Clearing Station. After the arrival of the Ambulance Company of the 53rd Medical Battalion on D + 6, that unit began to make service calls on the Corps troops, and enabled the Battalion Commander to rest the 382nd Medical Collecting Company which had been active since D + 1.

On D + 8, the 41st Evacuation Hospital Commander reported that his unit would be located at 650784 (Map 6F/2 1/50,000) near le Molay and he was given instructions relative to reports, supplies, and the plan of evacuation now in effect.

At 1800 B hrs., D + 8, Army assumed supply and evacuation control behind Corps, but requested that Corps continue evacuation of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions and the 2nd Armored Division. The 68th Medical Group began to evacuate

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the 29th Infantry Division and part of the 101st Airborne Division, and the ambulances of the 384th Ambulance Company (53rd Medical Battalion) were released and returned to their home station. Another section of the 53rd's ambulances began servicing CCA of the 2nd Armored Division on the Corps' right flank.

The 68th Medical Group began evacuating the Clearing Station of the 1st Medical Battalion on D + 10, and the 2nd Armored Division on D + 11 and completed the Army control over the evacuation of the divisions of the V Corps.

Lt. Col. Cook, Surgeon, 2nd Infantry Division, made a request for fifty (50) enlisted medical personnel which were obtained from the 53rd Medical Battalion upon the Corps Surgeon's approval, but the Corps was delayed in receiving a similar number from Army due to changes in administration which obviated an agreement which the Army and Corps Surgeons had made in England prior to the invasion. The fifty (50) men furnished constituted the 53rds' over strength plus replacements previously estimated and requisitioned for in the Neptune plan. All men were transferred outright.

In order to prevent further occurences of this type, the Corps Surgeon visited the First Army Headquarters for a conference on the replacement situation. Colonel Brenn spoke to Colonel Snyder acting for and in the absence of the Army Surgeon, Colonel Rogers. The following points were agreed upon: (1) Division Surgeons will replace losses in attached medical personnel from their respective medical battalions and at once initiate a requisition for replacements through normal G-1 channels. (2) The divisions will call upon the Corps Surgeon for loan personnel to temporarily replace losses pending the arrival of normal replacements. Upon receipt of the latter, all loan personnel, less such combat and/or other losses as may have been incurred, will be returned immediately to the Corps Surgeon. Corps will initiate requisitions through G-1 for such replacements as may be required for Corps personnel only. (3) The Corps Surgeon, if the need is sufficiently great, will call upon the Army Surgeon for loan personnel under the same arrangements as prescribed in (2) above.

The phase between D + 9 - D + 12, during which Corps was engaged in limited objective attacks, illustrated the dependence of the divisions upon Corps Medical Service when casualties increased in number, or the circumstances involved difficulties in evacuations, and the rapidity with which Corps furnished the desired assistance when personnel and ambulances were available.

Defensive Period 19 June - 30 June 1944 (D+13 - D+24)

During this period, there was a lull on the V Corps front due to the necessity of waiting for the completion of the Cherbourg campaign. The storm which struck Normandy on 19 June made it difficult to bring in supplies off the beach until 22 June (D+16), however ample medical supplies were available ashore and no inconvenience was suffered. When certain items for hospital use were required, they were flown in by air carriers. The activities of the Surgeon's Section during the defensive period were administrative and supervisory and

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consisted of checking the status of medical supplies in the units, the character of the ambulance service offered, the evacuation of casualties, the procurement of medical personnel replacements and the preparation of reports.

C. E. Brenn

C. E. BRENN,
Colonel, M.C.,
Surgeon.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Surgeon

2 August 1944.

AFTER ACTION REPORT
SURGEON'S SECTION, V CORPS

1 July - 31 July 1944 (D/25 - D/55)

The defensive period continued from 1 July (D/25) to the beginning of "Cobra" on 25 July (D/49) during which time the organization of the medical units of the divisions subordinate to Corps was satisfactory. The organization of the Corps Medical Battalion, the 53rd, was unsatisfactory since the loss of the 384th Ambulance Company removed thirty of the fifty ambulances from our use. The Company was relieved from assignment to the 53rd Medical Battalion and assigned to the 68th Medical Group (Army). During the quiescent period, the remaining ambulances were able to make the necessary service visits without strain since the roads over which they travelled were good and there were few additional calls for ambulances. The 53rd Medical Battalion has a total of 20 ambulances remaining, two of which are usually under repair, to service from 30 to as high as 38 Corps units.

The status of Medical Supply was satisfactory. Corps units and the divisions requisitioned directly from Army Medical Depots. The Medical Supply Officer of this section kept the units informed of depot locations, proposed sites of new depots, types of supplies available and the administrative procedures relative to procuring supplies at an earlier date than Administrative Orders would afford.

The method employed in requisitioning medical personnel by Corps units and divisions is not satisfactory inasmuch as the requisitions are forwarded to the Adjutant General's Section and leaves the Surgeon without knowledge of the shortages. When the Adjutant General receives information that the requisitioned medical personnel is available, we are asked for recommendations for their assignments which, only too obviously, can not be given since we did not know which units needed the replacements. The Section solved this problem by constant liaison with the subordinate units to learn the extent of their requirements and by requesting the A.G. Section, V Corps, to furnish us with a memorandum of every requisition on which medical personnel were listed.

Pending the arrival of medical replacements, it is the practice in this Corps to "loan" personnel to Corps units and to Division Medical Battalions on the condition that such personnel be returned immediately upon receipt of replacements. "Loan" personnel are taken from the 53rd (Corps) Medical Battalion.

The medical replacements furnished the field units under our control were satisfactory with exception of the medical officers. Inasmuch as medical officer replacements were slow in coming from the United Kingdom, higher authority obtained them from hospitals located in France. Since most of the medical officers would

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be sent to battalions, physical fitness was of paramount consideration, but those received initially were in their 40's, one being 46 years of age, none had any field training and all had many minor complaints, such as back aches, difficulties with their feet etc. As was expected, they proved to be useless and soon were hospitalized or otherwise removed from the units to which they had been assigned. This matter was taken up with Captain Herron, the Hospitalization and Personnel Officer, of the Army Surgeon's Staff. It is recommended that if the hospitals are going to be used as the depots for obtaining medical officers for field service, a select list of young and physically fit officers should be kept and replacements be taken therefrom. The officers and their records should be inspected to prevent hospitals from making their own selections which in our experience have been older men with specialist training, the very type of officer who should not be sent to the field units. This plan is, of course, an alternate to one in which young medical officers with field training could be pooled in the United Kingdom and be subject to call when required.

The defensive period ended on 26 July (D/50) when V Corps attacked in conjunction with "Cobra". Within a short time, the 2nd Infantry Division Surgeon requested the loan of one complete litter platoon to augment division medical service. This was necessitated by the exceptionally long litter haul over an area south of Hill 192 (58-64) which exhausted the litter bearers of the 2nd Infantry Division. The desired platoon was obtained from the 53rd (Corps) Medical Battalion and sent forward. On the following day, 27th July (D/51), a similar request was made inasmuch as the recently furnished litter platoon was likewise approaching exhaustion. An additional platoon was sent from the 53rd Medical Battalion which, by that time, had no litter bearers remaining - all had been loaned to the 2nd Infantry Division. Fortunately, the remaining two divisions, the 5th and the 35th, made no requests for additional aid which could have been obtained only from Bandsmen, from the Corps Replacement Battalion, or from First Army. All loaned personnel were returned to the 53rd Medical Battalion on 29th July (D/53).

At this time arrangements were made with the 41st Replacement Battalion to obtain medical personnel on a detached service basis and attach them to the 53rd Medical Battalion. This would create a pool of litter bearers which could be used when needed.

On 30 July, the 2nd Infantry Division made two separate calls for 6 squads of litter bearers and six ambulances and the 35th Infantry Division made one call for twenty-four litter bearers and ten ambulances. The 53rd Medical Battalion furnished two groups of 6 litter bearer squads, and called on the 41st Replacement Battalion for 29 litter bearers, out of which 6 squads were sent to the 2nd Infantry Division. The ambulances were obtained from the 176th Medical Battalion of the 68th Medical Group. The ten ambulances sent to the 35th Infantry Division's Clearing Station were dispatched in two groups due to the necessity of gathering them from various points at which they were located.

The various requests for personnel and vehicular assistance on the 30th July were handled well by all concerned, but refinements in organization would have made the task easier and less cumbersome. The arrangement by which medical personnel was obtained from the 41st Replacement Battalion on a loan basis necessitated multiple phone calls to contact the Replacement Unit and the 53rd Medical

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Battalion which had to call for them. The loss of the 384th Ambulance Company was keenly felt when we had to go through six telephone exchanges to contact the 176th Medical Battalion. Prior to losing the ambulance company, it was possible for the Corps Surgeon to honor requests for ambulance assistance in from one to two hours.

In view of the fact that personnel and ambulances are obtainable, but time is lost in securing and dispatching them, it is recommended, that prior to operations, we obtain personnel and ambulances on a detached service basis and attach them to the 53rd Medical Battalion. This would place all our facilities in one area which would eliminate many telephone calls during a period when phone traffic is heaviest and definitely eliminate the time lag, sometimes a matter of hours, between calls for assistance and time of arrival at the places where it is needed.

C. E. BRENN,
Colonel, M.C.,
Surgeon.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER

3 AUGUST 1944

AFTER ACTION REPORT, SIGNAL SECTION V CORPS, 6 JUNE - 31 JULY 1944

1. HEREWITH A SUMMARIZATION OF SIGNAL SUPPLY ACTIVITIES FOR THE PERIOD 6 JUNE - 31 JULY 1944 INCLUSIVE:

A. D - D/3 (6-9 JUNE) - THE LANDING.

ALL UNITS HAD BEEN SUPPLIED WITH AN APPRECIABLE EXCESS IN SIGNAL MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT SO AS AND IF UNIT VEHICLES GOT ASHORE, THERE WERE NO SHORTAGES. BEACH DUMPS HAD LITTLE OR NO SIGNAL SUPPLY PRIOR TO D/5.

B. D/4 TO D/12 (10-18 JUNE) - LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACKS.

AS OF D/6, THE SIGNAL SUPPLY MAINTENANCE SITUATION WAS CRITICAL ON ITEMS SUCH AS WIRE W-110
WIRE W-130
REEL EQUIPMENT CE-11
RADIO SET SCR-536
RADIO SET SCR-300
DETECTOR SET SCR-625

UNLOADING PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED IN FAVOUR OF OTHER CLASSES OF SUPPLY SUCH AS AMMUNITION, RATIONS, AND POL ARE BELIEVED RESPONSIBLE.

C. D/13 TO D/16 (19-22 JUNE) - UNFAVOURABLE WEATHER.

RESERVES IN SIGNAL SUPPLIES BECAME EXTREMELY CRITICAL DURING THIS PERIOD BUT DUE TO THE ABUNDANCE WITH WHICH UNITS HAD BEEN SUPPLIED PRIOR TO EMBARKATION, THE SHORTAGE IN THE DUMPS DID NOT AFFECT OPERATIONS OF COMBAT TROOPS.

D. D/17 TO D/24 (23-30 JUNE) - DEFENSIVE SITUATION.

THE SIGNAL SUPPLY SITUATION IMPROVED STEADILY DURING THIS PERIOD. SHORTAGE IN BATTERIES WAS RELIEVED BY TWELVE TONS BROUGHT IN CORPS SIGNAL SUPPLY WITH ARRIVAL OF REAR ECHELON. A DIRECT SHIPMENT WAS RECEIVED FROM THE STATES OF CE-11'S.

ONE DIFFICULTY THAT DID CROP UP RESULTED FROM THE ISSUANCE OF COMBAT VEHICLES MINUS INTEGRAL RADIO EQUIPMENT.

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SUPPLY DISCIPLINE AS A WHOLE WAS GOOD. UNIT REPAIR SECTIONS DID A GOOD JOB ONCE IT WAS REALIZED THAT EQUIPMENT COULD NOT BE REPLACED. REPAIR PARTS WERE ORIGINALLY SCARCE. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT 20% OF DAMAGED EQUIPMENT COULD HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY REPAIRED HAD THE NECESSARY PARTS BEEN AVAILABLE.

SINCE THE INITIAL DAYS, CORPS AND DIVISION REPAIR SHOPS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REPAIR ABOUT 90% OF THE EQUIPMENT BROUGHT IN.

E. SIGNAL SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE - 1 JULY TO 26 JULY, 1944.

DURING THE PERIOD 1 JULY TO 26 JULY, 1944, THERE WAS A MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN THE SIGNAL SUPPLY SITUATION. WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS THERE WAS ADEQUATE STOCK IN THE DEPOT TO MEET ALL DEMANDS. ALL UNITS TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE LULL IN OPERATIONS TO BRING THEIR UNIT LOAD OF EXPENDABLE SIGNAL SUPPLIES UP TO LEVEL AND TO MAKE ALL EQUIPMENT IN FIRST CLASS CONDITION.

THERE WERE MANY CALLS FOR NEW AND UNAUTHORIZED EQUIPMENT, CHIEFLY DUE TO CHANGES IN T/E AUTHORIZATION SINCE JANUARY 1944. SEVERAL UNITS FORMERLY ASSIGNED TO THIRD ARMY CAME IN AND WERE PUT INTO ACTION WITHOUT THE OVER T/E EQUIPMENT WITH WHICH ALL FIRST ARMY TROOPS HAD BEEN SUPPLIED BEFORE GOING INTO ACTION. IN OTHER INSTANCES REQUESTS WERE MADE FOR EQUIPMENT WHICH OPERATIONS HAD PROVED DESIRABLE. AT FIRST, ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO MEET THESE DEMANDS WHEN THEY WERE WELL FOUNDED AND VERBALLY APPROVED BY BOTH CORPS AND ARMY SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS CONCERNED. HOWEVER, DEMANDS PLACED SUCH A HEAVY DRAIN ON THE MAINTENANCE STOCK IN THE SIGNAL DUMP THAT THE POLICY WAS FINALLY ESTABLISHED BY G-4, FIRST ARMY, THAT UNITS WOULD BE MAINTAINED AT THE LEVEL THEY ARRIVED ON THE CONTINENT. ISSUE OF EQUIPMENT TO COVER INITIAL ISSUE SHORTAGES AND T/E CHANGES WILL HAVE TO BE HELD UP UNTIL STOCKS ARE RECEIVED FROM THE U.K. REQUESTS FOR EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF T/E AUTHORIZATION WILL HAVE TO BE IN THE FORM OF A COMMAND RECOMMENDATION AND APPROVED BY ETO, IN WHICH CASE SUPPLY WILL BE AUTOMATIC FROM THE U.K. URGENT DEMANDS FOR SPECIAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO MEET SPECIAL SITUATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE ISSUED FROM MAINTENANCE STOCK ON A TEMPORARY LOAN BASIS.

THE SIGNAL SUPPLY PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED EARLY AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF SIGNAL SUPPLY OFFICER, FIRST ARMY, IS STILL IN EFFECT AND HAS PROVED VERY EFFECTIVE. STOCKS ARE STILL CRITICAL TO THE EXTENT THAT CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF ISSUE IS REQUIRED. ALL CORPS UNITS SUBMIT REQUISITIONS TO THE CORPS SIGNAL SUPPLY OFFICER FOR EDIT AND APPROVAL. URGENT REQUIREMENTS ARE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY TO ARMY BY THE UNIT AFTER TELEPHONIC ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BETWEEN CORPS AND ARMY SIGNAL SUPPLY OFFICERS. OTHER REQUISITIONS ARE HELD UNTIL EVENING AND TAKEN TO THE ARMY SIGNAL SUPPLY OFFICER AS A CONSOLIDATED GROUP. SPECIAL REQUESTS ARE DISCUSSED WITH THE ARMY SIGNAL SUPPLY OFFICER TO INSURE THAT EVERY EFFORT IS MADE TO SUPPLY THE MOST URGENT NEEDS AS FULLY AS THE AVAILABILITY OF SUPPLIES WILL PERMIT. RELEASES FOR SUPPLIES ARE HELD AT THE CORPS SIGNAL SUPPLY OFFICE WHERE UNITS ARE NOTIFIED TO CALL FOR THEM. DIVISION SIGNAL SUPPLY OFFICERS OPERATE SIMILARLY FOR

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ORGANIC AND ATTACHED TROOPS. THE PROCEDURE IS PARTICULARLY DESIRABLE FOR SEVERAL REASONS. FIRST, THE RESPECTIVE SIGNAL SUPPLY OFFICERS KNOW THE PROBLEMS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE TROOPS AS A WHOLE AND CAN BETTER WEIGH INDIVIDUAL DEMANDS AGAINST AVAILABILITY. SECOND, BY PROCESSING EACH UNIT REQUISITION, IT GIVES CORPS SIGNAL SUPPLY OFFICER A PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT THE UNIT DEMANDS ARE AND WHAT THE UNIT IS GETTING TO MEET THOSE DEMANDS. THIRD, THE DECENTRALIZATION TO CORPS AND DIVISIONS GREATLY REDUCES THE TRAFFIC IN THE ARMY AREA AND ELIMINATES THE TIME THAT CONTACTS OF INDIVIDUAL UNITS WOULD MAKE ON THE ARMY SIGNAL SUPPLY OFFICER.

UNIT REQUISITIONS AND UNSERVICEABLE EQUIPMENT TURNED IN REFLECTED A MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN THE SUPPLY DISCIPLINE. IT IS VERY EVIDENT THAT UNITS ARE TRYING TO ELIMINATE LOSS AND NEEDLESS DESTRUCTION OF CRITICAL EQUIPMENT. THIS IS ESPECIALLY EVIDENT FROM THE FACT THAT ALL UNITS RECOVERED AND REUSED NEARLY 75 TO 80% OF THEIR FIELD WIRE.

SPARE PARTS AND REPAIR MATERIALS ARE STILL IN SHORT SUPPLY. HOWEVER, THIS EMERGENCY HAS BEEN MET FAIRLY SATISFACTORILY BY CANNIBALIZATION OF NEW ITEMS TO PROVIDE REPLACEMENT PARTS WHERE ONE PART OF AN ITEM CANNOT BE REPAIRED. CONSIDERABLE STOCK OF SIGNAL EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN BUILT UP IN THE CORPS SIGNAL REPAIR SECTION, SO THAT NOW ABOUT 90% OF THE UNSERVICEABLE EQUIPMENT OF CORPS UNITS CAN BE EITHER REPLACED OR IMMEDIATELY REPAIRED. THIS PROCEDURE ELIMINATES THE NECESSITY OF OBTAINING THE RELEASE OF A COMPLETE NEW ITEM FROM THE ARMY DEPOT AS WAS FORMERLY REQUIRED.

THE CORPS SIGNAL DUMP IS OPERATED TO EXPEDITE THE ISSUE OF AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED EQUIPMENT AND TO FORM AN AGENCY FOR REDISTRIBUTION OF ANY SIGNAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE CORPS. THE ONLY ITEM STOCKED FOR ISSUE TO CORPS UNITS IS ABOUT 150 MILES OF FIELD WIRE TO MEET EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS. A SMALL STOCK OF TELEPHONES IS USED TO LOAN TO UNITS TO MEET EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS.

F. SIGNAL SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE - 27 JULY TO 30 JULY 1944.

AS WAS ANTICIPATED THE DEMANDS FOR SUPPLY HAS CONSISTED CHIEFLY OF EMERGENCY REPLACEMENT OF COMBAT LOSSES. PRINCIPAL LOSSES HAVE BEEN RADIO SET SCR-610, TELEPHONE EE-8 AND ANTENNAS ON VEHICULAR RADIOS. MOST REPLACEMENT TANKS AND COMBAT VEHICLES ARE COMING COMPLETE WITH SIGNAL EQUIPMENT. THE DEMAND FOR FIELD WIRE INDICATES THAT IN SPITE OF FAST MOVEMENT, UNITS ARE RECOVERING CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF WIRE.

SUPPLY PROCEDURE REMAINS THE SAME WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT THE CORPS SIGNAL SUPPLY OFFICER IS AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE NON-RESTRICTED ITEMS ON ARMY SIGNAL DEPOT NO 1, WITHIN LIMITED QUANTITIES. THESE QUANTITIES ARE SUFFICIENT TO TAKE CARE OF NORMAL OPERATIONS, BUT IT IS NOT ANTICIPATED THAT THEY WILL MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF A FAST MOVING SITUATION. QUANTITIES OF ITEMS OVER THOSE AUTHORIZED HAVE TO BE PROCESSED AS CONTROLLED ITEMS. VERBAL ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE SO THAT ITEMS CAN BE RELEASED IN EXCESS OF QUANTITIES AUTHORIZED TO MEET EMERGENCIES.

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THE REPAIR STOCK HAS BEEN VERY EFFECTIVE IN MEETING DEMANDS OF CORPS UNITS. WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS ALL UNSERVICEABLE EQUIPMENT BROUGHT IN FOR REPAIR HAS BEEN REPLACED OR REPAIRED IMMEDIATELY. IN SEVERAL INSTANCES REPAIR STOCK WAS ISSUED TO REPLACE BATTLE LOSSES, WHERE THE TIME REQUIRED TO OBTAIN REPLACEMENT FROM ARMY DUMPS WOULD AFFECT THE COMBAT EFFICIENCY OF THE ORGANIZATION.

Haskell H. Cleaves.
HASKELL H. CLEAVES,
COLONEL, SIGNAL CORPS,
SIGNAL OFFICER.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Provost Marshal
APO 305, U.S. Army

SECRET
Auth: CG, V Corps
Date: 2 Aug 1944
Initials: arc

2 August 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against The Enemy, Reports After / After Action Reports For The Period 6 June to 31 July 1944.

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, V Corps.

I. In V Corps both traffic regulation and control are supervised by the Provost Marshal under the general direction of the A. C. of S., G-4. A Traffic Headquarters is located in the Provost Marshal Section. The following report covers the traffic regulation and control during action against the enemy from 6 June to 31 July 1944.

It is divided into the following four (4) phases:

6 June - 9 June; Beach Landing.
10 June -22 June; Limited Objective Attacks.
23 June -25 July; Defensive Actions.
26 July -31 July; Offensive Operations.

II. Phase 1. Beach Landing.

a. The Provost Marshal Section landed in France on Omaha Beach during the afternoon of D day (6 June) and began immediately to supervise traffic and control it according to the plan previously prepared and coordinated with the divisions and Engineer Special Brigades. The Traffic Headquarters began to function on shore at 061800B June 1944. A traffic control post was established on the beach at 2030 hours and rendered assistance in guiding vehicles and personnel into transit areas.

b. Traffic from the beach on 7 June was very heavy but was kept moving forward and no congestion occurred. Telephone communication was established between the beach and Corps Traffic Headquarters.

c. On 8 June a Traffic Headquarters was opened on the hilltop overlooking Omaha Beach at 1300 hours by the Engineer Special Brigade Group. The Corps Traffic Headquarters was represented by a liaison officer and clerk who were on duty continuously and who had telephonic communication with the Corps Traffic Headquarters.

d. Co A, 507th MP Bn less one (1) platoon, which is attached to V Corps as Corps Military Police, landed on 8 June and were immediately used to assist in traffic control along the first lateral road south of the beach. One (1) platoon of Co A had been attached to the 1st Infantry Division prior to embarkation and landed early on

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6 June with the 18th Infantry Regiment. This platoon was released by the 1st Division on the evening of 8 June.

e. Telephone communication between transit areas 1, 2, and 3 and Engineer Special Brigade Group Traffic Headquarters was installed on 9 June. In accordance with previous plan, guides from parent units ashore were sent to the Engineer Group Traffic Headquarters where they were briefed by the V Corps traffic representative as to routes to be followed in escorting newly arrived units from the transit areas to their initial assembly areas. During the day the 2nd Armored Division moved out of transit areas to assembly points without any serious traffic congestion.

f. During this phase of the operation the following conclusions became apparent:

(1) Traffic Headquarters should be established and personnel selected in the early stages of planning for an operation. Sufficient time should be available to determine equipment needed and procure same. In this connection it is pointed out that there is no T/O provided for a traffic Headquarters. Drafting equipment and reproducing facilities are essential to properly project traffic circulation plans. Had this headquarters not been able through improvisation, friendly contacts, and other means to procure this equipment, its functions would have been seriously hampered.

(2) All Traffic Headquarters personnel, equipment and communications should be ashore and ready to function by H + 12 hours.

(3) The Corps Military Police Company should be landed on D day.

III. Phase 2. Limited Objective Attacks.

a. During the period 10 June to 22 June, a Corps Traffic Circulation Plan was prepared and distributed to Corps Staff Sections and divisions. Roads were posted and route numbers placed along Main Supply and Main Lateral Routes. Signs in both English and French showing that stopping on road was prohibited were posted at 1½ mile intervals on MSR's and Main Lateral Routes. Motor patrols were maintained to prevent drivers from stopping on these roads. First U.S. Army established a Sub-Traffic Headquarters at Formigny on 13 June and V Corps traffic liaison officer moved from Engineer Special Brigade Group Traffic Headquarters to this headquarters. First Army Traffic Headquarters took over the movement of units from the transit areas to assembly areas.

b. Daily road surveys were made and convoys checked for march discipline. "On the spot" corrections of traffic violations were made and prompt disciplinary action taken against drivers who wilfully disregarded the provisions of the Corps SOP for the Control

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and Administration of Traffic in the Combat Zone (Copy attached). These measures tended to limit traffic congestion and insure movement of vitally needed men and materiel.

c. During this phase of the operation it was developed that the following factors are essential to insure the proper flow of traffic and prevent traffic congestion and jams:

(1) Thorough instruction of drivers by unit commanders of provisions of SOP for Control of Traffic.

(2) Complete briefing before start of movement of all convoy commanders and drivers as to route to be followed and and specific destination.

(3) Obtaining traffic clearance from Corps Traffic Headquarters for all moves of 10 or more vehicles.

(4) Close liaison between the G-3, G-4 and Traffic Headquarters in planning and execution of movement.

(5) Maximum use of alternate routes for convoys in preference to Main Supply and Main Lateral Routes.

IV. Phase 3. Defensive Action.

a. During the period 23 June to 25 July many large movements of units were made including the movement on the 13 and 14 of July of the 1st and 5th Infantry Divisions simultaneously with columns crossing. This was accomplished without interference to normal administrative and and supply traffic. This movement involved 3950 vehicles. The success of this move was due to careful pre-planning and close control of traffic during the move. The 2nd Armored Division moved 3700 vehicles during the night of 25-26 July without accident or disruption of traffic. The 5th Infantry Division was relieved by the 15th Scottish Division (Dr) and was moved to a new location.

b. During this period units became increasingly familiar with the Traffic Headquarters set-up and began requesting clearances and routes for all movements. The need for security in transmitting information relative to movements was realized and arrangements were made between Army and Corps Traffic Headquarters for the use of the Slidex Code in telephone conversations. The Headquarters is now planning a Slidex Card covering traffic control which will simplify transmission of messages.

c. A hectic critical point was found in the Foret de Cerisy at coordinates 667710 at the junction of seven roads. The Corps Provost Marshal Marshal recommended the construction of a traffic circle at this point and one with an overall diameter of 480 feet and a roadway of 40 feet was constructed by the Corps Engineers. This traffic circle was named Victor Circle and was opened for use on 14 July 1944.

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a. A count of vehicular traffic flow for a 24 hour period was made at three points in the Corps area in order to ascertain the number of vehicles using the roads and the period when the use was the heaviest. This count showed the following volume of traffic: la Mine, 6602; Victor Traffic Circle, 6094; La Poterie, 5601. It also revealed that very few vehicles passed these points between 0001 and 0800 hours, the count for that period being : la Mine, 112; La Poterie 324; Victor Traffic Circle, 233. As a result of this count, efforts were made to dispatch more convoys and vehicles during the slack period. A copy of the count by hour is attached hereto.

b. During this phase the following conclusions were formed:

(1) Close contact should be maintained between Traffic Headquarters and the Corps Engineer relative to information concerning condition of roads and bridges. Corps Engineer should be informed of all large movements in order that repair groups can be dispatched to make road repairs needed.

(2) Security must be observed in telephone conversations regarding movements.

(3) Where conditions permit, consideration should be given to the road net in establishing tactical boundaries.

(4) Convoys should be dispatched during the period from midnight to 0800 hours whenever practicable.

V. Phase 4. Offensive Operations.

a. From 26 to 31 July, V Corps was engaged in offensive operations. 5th Infantry Division was ordered into the lines from Corps Reserve, necessitating a movement of the division to a new location. The roads were heavily taxed by the movement of tactical troops in addition to supply vehicles but no tie-ups occurred.

b. Several British units on the left flank moved convoys over roads in V Corps areas without first securing clearance. Fortunately, this did not result in any difficulties. However, it became apparent that British units do not always observe established boundaries and it is imperative to always have a clear understanding of the details of any movements arranged.

VI. a. A forward boundary was established for the Corps on 9 June, and was changed four times prior to 31 July. On each occasion the new area was reconnoitered and traffic posts established at critical points. During this period Traffic Control Posts were operated at Trevieres, Dungy, la Mine, and Victor Traffic Circle.

b. During the month of July thirty convoys involving a movement of 6066 vehicles over a total of 215.7 miles within the Corps area were cleared by the Corps Traffic Headquarters. During the same month thirty five convoys involving 12025 vehicles that traveled 350.7 miles

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within V Corps area were cleared by other traffic headquarters with the V Corps Traffic Headquarters.

g. The road net and bridges have been found to be in much better condition than had been anticipated. The Germans have not destroyed as many bridges and culverts as was expected. Many roads, considered to be available for one way traffic only from studies of aerial photographs, were found to be capable of carrying two way traffic. The prompt repair of damaged roads by Corps Engineers has reduced interference to traffic to a minimum.

Arthur E. Campbell
ARTHUR E. CAMPBELL,
Colonel, Infantry,
Provost Marshal.

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TRAFFIC FLOW COUNT
VEHICLES PER HOUR MILITARY TRAFFIC

HOUR		LOCATION		
From	To	La Wine (3)	Seven Point (4)	La Poterie (5)
1200	1300	330	330	231
1300	1400	610	555	413
1400	1500	800	580 (2)	500
1500	1600	620	545	520
1600	1700	540	553	538
1700	1800	440	414	439
1800	1900	360	326	325
1900	2000	340	302	267
2000	2100	410	270	218
2100	2200	700 (1)	174	180
2200	2300	140 (1)	108	85
2300	2400	180 (1)	24	30
2400	0100	20	17	22
0100	0200	22	8	14
0200	0300	8	7	5
0300	0400	6	5	3
0400	0500	7	5	2
0500	0600	4	7	33
0600	0700	15	99	70
0700	0800	30	85	175
0800	0900	170	232	193
0900	1000	210	326	385
1000	1100	310	579	495
1100	1200	330	423	458
	Total.	6602	6094	5601

(1) This count includes 472 vehicles of CCA, 3d Arm'd Div. under column control.
(2) This count includes 150 vehicles under column control.
(3) Count 071200B to 081200B- Weather, clear, cool.
(4) Count 081200B to 091200B- Weather, cloudy, intermittent rain, cool.
(5) Count 091200B to 101200B- Weather, cloudy, intermittent rain, cool.

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Count made by V Corps Traffic Headquarters - July 1944

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Appendix B to Annex 17
In 5 Pages

HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, U.S.ARMY

18 April 1944.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION OF TRAFFIC IN THE COMBAT ZONE

The following SOP for Traffic Control and Administration within V Corps is published for the information and planning of all concerned. Such provisions of this SOP that are not in conflict with current UK procedure will be followed prior to embarkation for the projected operations. All provisions of this SOP will apply to all elements of this command and in all territory within the boundaries of the Corps immediately upon entering the combat zone on the continent of Europe.

1. RESPONSIBILITY:

a. Between Corps and Division rear boundaries:

Corps, under the supervision of the Corps Provost Marshal.

b. In Division areas:

Divisions, as directed by the Division Commander.

2. CIRCULATION:

a. Main Supply Routes (MSRs):

1. Will conform to those prescribed by the next higher echelon of command.

2. Will be indicated forward of Corps rear boundary by Corps G-4; will be indicated forward of Division rear boundary by Division G-4.

b. Circulation Plans:

1. Will conform to those prescribed by the next higher echelon of command.

2. Will use secondary roads whenever possible to relieve traffic on MSRs.

c. Marking of Roads:

1. Sign posting and route marking is the responsibility of the Corps and Division Provost Marshals in their respective areas.

2. Corps and Division Engineers will mark mined areas and erect such bypass or detour signs as are required by engineer operations in their respective areas.

3. Military police at road junctions must have a map or sketch showing the points to which various roads lead.

d. Methods of Control:

1. Corps and Divisions will establish Officer and Traffic Control Posts at critical points. These posts will be supplemented by patrols on all main roads.

2. Civilians will be kept off roads when they interfere with military traffic. All commanders and military police are authorized and directed to enforce this provision.

3. Foot troops will not block traffic, and will keep well to the side of the roads when marching.

4. In the event of traffic congestions prompt action will be taken by military police and such officers as may be present to effect reduction of such congestion by moving vehicles into assembly areas adjacent to the highways. Vehicles so placed will not be move until authorized by the military police.

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f. Every officer will be responsible for correcting traffic violations on the spot, and for reporting the offenders name, serial number and unit to the nearest traffic post. This does not give officers the authority to supersede the control being exercised by the military police if the latter are currently handling the situation. It does place on each officer the responsibility for the correct control of traffic at all times, by direct and aggressive action at obstructions.

2. Priorities:

1. The following priorities will be given traffic in the Corps area unless otherwise directed by this or higher headquarters:

a. Tactical troop movements (motor)

b. Ambulances

c. Wire patrols and construction crews.

d. Staff and messenger vehicles.

e. Supply convoys, in following order:

(1) Class V

(2) Class III

(3) Class I

(4) All other supplies

f. If the situation demands, vehicles carrying road or bridging material may be allowed to fill in gaps between vehicles in convoys, and may be given any priority deemed necessary by the Corps or Division Commander concerned.

2. Priorities within Division areas will be designated by the Division Commander concerned.

3. RESTRICTIONS:

a. Lights:

1. Nothing brighter than marking lights (cat-eyes) will be used forward of light line designated by this or higher headquarters.

2. Dimout lights will be used in rear of the light line designated by this or higher headquarters except during air alerts, at which time only marking lights (cat-eyes) will be used.

3. Division Commanders will prescribe such additional restrictions as the tactical situation requires.

b. Speed:

1. Daylight - The leading vehicle in a convoy will not exceed 25 MPH on open highways and 15 MPH through towns and cities. Single vehicles will not exceed 35 MPH on open highways and 15 MPH through towns and cities.

2. Dimout lights - The leading vehicle in a convoy will not exceed 15 MPH on open highways and 10 MPH through towns and cities. Single vehicles will not exceed 20 MPH on open highways and 15 MPH through towns and cities.

3. Cat-eye lights - The leading vehicle of a convoy will not exceed 15 MPH on open highways and 10 MPH through towns and cities.

4. Exceptions to above speeds - When closing up march units, rear vehicles will be permitted a speed 10 MPH in excess of those set forth in 1, 2, and 3 above.

5. Local traffic and speed regulations will be complied with.

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TRAFFIC:

a. Convoy Control

1. March Units will not exceed 30 vehicles.

2. Serials will not exceed 5 March Units.

3. Intervals between March Units will be 3 minutes.

4. Intervals between Serials will be 8 minutes.

b. Convoy Clearance - Must be obtained for all convoys of 10 or more vehicles.

1. Within Corps area - through Corps Traffic Headquarters.

2. Within Division area - through Division Headquarters.

3. Requests for clearance will be submitted as soon as the necessity for the move is determined, and will include the following information.

a. Headquarters requiring clearance.
b. Name of Convoy Commander.
c. Unit to move.
d. Authority to move.
e. Total number of vehicles.
f. Total number of March Units.
g. Total number of Serials.
h. Heaviest type vehicle in column.
i. Travelling height of tallest vehicle in column.
j. Present location of unit.
k. Destination.
l. Time and date movement desired.
m. Route desired.
n. Desired location of IP.
o. Desired time head of convoy crosses IP.

4. Movements will be accomplished within allocated time intervals.

c. Convoy Commander:

1. The Convoy Commander will be responsible that:

a. The movement number of the convoy is clearly marked on the front of the lead vehicle and on the rear of the tail vehicle of each March Unit.

b. The lead vehicle of the convoy (not to include vehicle of the Convoy Commander), or of each column if convoy is moving in more than one column, is marked with a blue flag and the tail vehicle with a green flag, or, if at night, with blue and green lights.

c. All drivers are informed of the convoy number, the route to be followed, and the destination.

2. An officer representing the convoy commander will precede the convoy by a minimum of 20 minutes, contact Military Police and Traffic Posts enroute, and will insure the prompt movement off the road at destination.

3. Unit markers and/or guides will be employed to facilitate the movement.

4. Convoy commanders will report road damage and traffic blocks to the nearest Traffic Post.

d. Military Police - Corps and Division Military Police will maintain Traffic Posts within the respective Corps and Division areas on all MSRs and at each important road junction to:

1. Operate road blocks to stop interfering traffic.

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2. Operate road patrols.

3. Provide convoy escorts when necessary.

4. Enforce traffic regulations and priorities as set forth herein.

When the car of the Corps or Army Commander enters the Corps area, the first Military Police motorcyclist that encounters the car will escort it throughout the area.

e. Protective Measures:

1. Vehicles in convoy will maintain a minimum distance of 75 yards during daylight, at night, a minimum distance commensurate with safety. These distances will be maintained at halts.

2. Drivers will move vehicles as far off the road as possible at halts, being especially careful in mined areas, and will assist other vehicles in passing.

3. Disabled vehicles will be moved off the road immediately, and drivers thereof will direct traffic past the disabled vehicle. The driver of any vehicle creating a road block, or otherwise violating these regulations, will be subject to disciplinary action.

4. When moving vehicles off the road, dirvers will take care to avoid breaking telephone wire laid alongside the road.

f. Procedure at Halts:

1. Single vehicles - When a vehicle is halted wholly upon, or partially upon, a road, it is the responsibility of the driver of that vehicle to take position so that he can direct traffic approaching from either direction. The driver may designate another individual to perform this duty, but cannot delegate this responsibility. This procedure applies to all halted vehicles, regardless of the cause for the halt.

2. Vehicles in Convoy - In addition to having each driver or his delegate in position to direct oncoming traffic, as in 1 above, each halted convoy will have a responsible officer or noncommisioned officer at the rear of the convoy to give information to overtaking vehicles. At halts caused by obstructions, demolitions, etc., necessary action will be taken to insure that overtaking convoys are halted in rear and are not allowed to move into the intervals of the halted convoy.

5. PASSING:

a. General - When the driver of a vehicle desires to pass another vehicle in motion, he will sound his horn. The driver of the vehicle to be passed then determines whether or not passing is safe and signals the vehicle desiring to pass accordingly. In any case, the driver of the vehicle to be passed will give the signal to pass as soon as it is safe to do so.

b. Special Passing Privileges - The following vehicles may pass other vehicles regardless of whether such vehicle(s) to be passed is (are) proceeding singly or in convoy, or are halted or in motion, if speed limits are not exceeded and circumstances make it safe to do so:

1. Command and Staff vehicles when occupied by Commanders of field grade and/or Staff Officers.

2. Ambulances.

3. Messengers.

4. Wire patrols.

5. Wreckers on emergency call.

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c. Single vehicles - Single vehicles other than those enumerated above may pass halted single vehicles, single vehicles in motion, and halted convoys. They will not pass convoys in motion.

d. Convoys - Convoys may pass halted single vehicles and halted convoys, but will not pass single vehicles in motion or convoys in motion.

6. CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE.

a. Corps and Division Engineers within their respective areas will mark bridges with proper classification as per current ETO system. (See Operations Memo No. 9, First U. S. Army, 19 March 1944).

By command of Major General CERNAN:

Sam F. Teague, Jr.
SAM F. TEAGUE, Jr.,
Major, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. General.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
G-5 Section
APO 305, U.S. Army

7 August 1944

Section V - G-5 Civil Affairs Report

1. Operations.

(1 July - 10th July - Defensive Phase)

a. Location:

In bivouac in the vicinity of LA POTERIE, Canton of TREVIERES, Calvados (626805) during this period.

b. Personnel:

(1) CA Section, Hq V Corps.

Colonel T. J. Mornney, GSC, Chief of Section.
Major Robert W. Pharr, FA, Executive.
Captain John G. Cavanagh, FA, Administrative.
* Captain Geoffroy de Waldner, French Liaison Officer.

Staff Sergeant Fedele Genito, Chief Clerk.
Corporal William Allen, Typist, interpreter, driver.
Pfc Harry Adler, Typist, Interpreter, driver.
Pfc John Schwaller, Typist, Interpreter, driver.
Pvt John J. O'Donnell, Typist, file clerk, driver.

* Captain de Waldner was notified of his promotion from S/Lt on 1 July.

(2) Civil Affairs Staffs of: 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions and 2nd Armored Division.

(3) Civil Affairs Detachments: (See overlay "A" attached-Annex No. 1.)

D3B1 - TREVIERES - V Corps.
D1C1 - BALLEROY - 1st Infantry Division.
D2C1 - CORMOLAIN - (Staging to enter CAUMONT) - 1st Infantry Divi

c. The disposition of tactical units on the first of the month was as in- dicated in Overlay "A" Annex No. 2 attached hereto with the exception that the Armored Division became operationalon the East flank. A portion of the former British Zone was made available to them and they assumed responsibility for a portion of the area previously under the jurisdiction of the 1st Infantry Divi

(1) Begining on the East Flank, Civil Affairs activities were centered localities by units as follows:
Staff of 2nd Armored Division - St Paul de Vernay.
Staff of 1st Infantry Division - Canton of BALLEROY and liberated of CAUMONT.

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Det D1C1 (1st Inf. Div.) - Canton and Commune of Balleroy.
Det D2C1 (1st Inf. Div.) - Liberated portion of Caumont.
Staff of 2nd Infantry Division - Cerisy le Foret (Portions of St. Clair sur L'Elle and Balleroy.
Det D3B1 (V Corps) - Trevieres Canton.
Staff of V Corps - Supervision of above.

(2) The tactical situation was static and Civil Affairs activities consisted principally of:

(a) Putting into execution the Corps Security Plan - Civilians. (See Annex #3 attached.)

(b) Evacuation of civilians from forward zones.

(c) Control of civilian movement in military zones.

(d) Assistance to civil authorities in resumption of community life.

Some incidents of note during the period were that the 2nd Infantry Division completed plans and evacuated a group of residents to the Cherbourg Peninsula. The first few truck loads were by military vehicles until a civilian vehicle was repaired, when the remainder were evacuated solely by civilians, Civil Affairs making gasoline available for purchase by Mayors for the purpose. Each trip was coordinated in advance with the Civil Affairs Detachment in the receiving area and on the return trip a load of much needed potatoes was brought back from captured German stocks made available by Cherbourg Civil Affairs.

Detachment D3B1 at Trevieres reports that U.S. Army Engineers getting gravel from civilian gravel pit have more then trebbled best civilian output using electric power diverted from auxiliary power plant in an unused coal mine, and installed by civilians.

Several instances of refugees being sent from the British Zone both by French Civil Authorities and British Military without prior coordination with American Civil Affairs Personnel were reported. The Mayor of Balleroy was notified to receive 125 refugees from Bayeux in the British Zone the following day. On being advised, the SCAO 1st Infantry Division established an MP guard to prevent such an influx. Word was passed to the Sous-Prefect at Bayeux and the influx stopped until a more orderly procedure could be established. A survey of the number of additional refugees that could be accommodated above a line agreed upon by the Division (70 EW Grid) was made and Civil Authorities were advised. The workability of this plan was seriously jeopardized by continued instances throughout the month of unauthorized evacuations and "dumping" of refugees by British Military personnel. Reports of specific instances were made through official channels which resulted in minor improvements. This report also recited instances of British personnel entering the American Zone and commandeering all the wood in a certain wood yard for the use of the British Army and similar cases of disregard for military boundaries.

The French newspapers "La Rennaissance du Bessin" and "La Presse" published in Bayeux and Cherbourg respectively, appeared during this period without prior notice of their "official" status, with the result that their distribution within the Corps was forbidden for several weeks pending receipt of approval from First U.S. Army.

A weekly meeting of all French Liaison Officers was announced by First U.S. Army with the hope that more expeditious dissemination of information involving civilians and military will result.

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Information was received that all TODT workers regardless of nationality were to be sent to the camp established at Foucarville where they would be screened. The need for such an installation had been brought to the attention of higher echelon immediately upon arrival on the continent.

During the period, lateral liaison was maintained with the Civil Affairs Officer of the XIX Corps and a visit to the Section by the SCAO British 30 Corps.

Voluntary demonstrations by the French on 4th July appeared in nearly all liberated communes. This was manifested by signs of "Thanks to our Liberators", "Hail to the Americans" and garlands decorating homes and stores. The hand waving and smiles were a little more enthusiastic on that day.

(11th - 12th July - Offensive Phase)

a. Location: No change.

b. Personnel: No change.

c. This period saw an increase in activities by the CA Staff of the 2nd Inf. Div. in evacuation of refugees from the area in the forward zone incident to the attack on Hill 192 by that Division. The activities of two RCT officers of that Division, Major Hardwicke and Capt. Coverly were such as to earn them the Bronze Star.

Plans for recognition of French Bastille Day, 14 July, were completed and the V Corps Band was scheduled for one hour concerts in Balleroy, La Mine and Trevieres.

The 5th Infantry Division SCAO reported in during this period for orientation prior to taking over from the 1st Infantry Division which was to shortly withdraw from the Corps.

It became necessary to protest to Civil Affairs Section, First U.S. Army, the practice of 1st European Civil Affairs Regiment in sending complete Detachments from the pool to visit operating Detachments to "observe". The resulting confusion was not instructive to the "observers" but merely served to disrupt normal operations. A promise was exacted that this practice would be stopped.

Instances of disregard of the prerequisites of the Corps Commander within the Corps Zone continued in the form of a requisition of bicycles and billets by a Canadian unit and delivering of three truck loads of refugees to La Mine from Bayeux by French Civil Authorities without prior coordination. Each instance was promptly reported to higher authority and assurances received that repetition would not occur.

(13th - 25th July - Defensive Phase)

a. Location: Vicinity of La Bazoque (663-676)

b. Personnel: No change.

c. During this phase a security procedure during a static situation was developed based on experiences to date. Divisions evacuate civilians from the area within approximately two kilometers of the front lines, fix in place those in the next two to four kilometers and establish a line in the rear of which circulation for an announced distance up to 6 kilometers is permitted. All other circulation requires a pass from Civil Affairs. Patrol of these lines which create three zones is maintained by military personnel in the forward areas and

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and combined military and civilian patrols plus a joint MP-Gendarme-CIC motorized patrol in the rear areas.

Information was received from Army Civil Affairs that units could augment their messes with surplus perishable foodstuffs with the approval of unit surgeons. This information was passed on to the Divisions.

Advance Section, Communications Zone, Real Estate and Claims Officer arrived in Trevieres and billeting information accummlated by the Civil Affairs Detachment was surrendered to him.

Further assurances were received from First U.S. Army that the British would not send refugees into the American Zone without coordination with the Americans.

In the area north of EW Grid 70 which was released to the French authorities to send in refugees from the British area, over 800 were sent in during the first week.

Detachment D3B1 assisted in setting up a small refugee camp operated by the French at Mandeville and arranged billets for 29 American Red Cross girls in Trevieres prior to reverting to Army Control on the middle of the month.

Lieut. General Grasset with Brigadier Robbins of G-5, SHAEF, and Col. Gunn of First U.S. Army Civil Affairs visited the Section and conferred with the Corps Commander and Chief of Staff.

Lt. Col. Houston, War Dept., Observer, attached to the Corps prior to departure from U.K. was taken on a staff visit of inspection to Divisions and Detachments as was the Corps Adjutant General.

Civil Affairs Detachment D1C1 at Balleroy reverted to the Corps on drawing of the new Division rear boundaries on 20th of July. This Detachment maintains a part time office at La Mine in the northern part of the Canton so that when the boundary between British and American forces was redrawn a few days later the Commune of Balleroy going to the British, this Detachment was relocated at La Mine.

A CIC surprise check of civilians in forward areas found everything in order. Further discussions were had with G-2 on the mechanics of setting up Division Collection Points and Corps Transit Areas for refugees in preparation for the coming assault phase. Readjustment of CA Detachment was further necessary. A "D" type Detachment was requested from the Army Pool for attachment to the 5th Inf. Div., and SCRO for 2d Inf. Div. requested a Detachment for his projected zone of operations. Cormolain now being in the zone of the British, Detachment 2C1 was furnished to the 2d Inf. Div. and stationed at Litteau.

Liaison conferences were held with CA officers of the British 30 Corps on the flank and the period ended with the move of the Corps CP to La Bazoque.

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(26th - 31st July - Offensive Phase)

a. Location: Vicinity of Vieux Calais (591-566).

b. Personnel: No Change.

c. The three zone system of refugee control (Evacuated, Static and Limited Circulation Zones) became inoperative as Divisions moved rapidly forward in the assault phase. Only a single security line became necessary forward of which civilins were evacuated and in the rear of which civilians were desired so as to provide potential places for refugees. As the fire fight moved forward it was found that the Germans had evacuted all civilians from within several kilometers of the front. The result was a No Man's Land for 4 to 8 kilometers wide devoid of all inhabitants and littered with dead livestock. The absence of civilians presented a problem in burial of livestock, most of which had been dead 3 to 6 weeks. Concurrence of G-4 in the use of captured German fuel oil was secured and requisition was initiated through Det D9B1 at St. Clair sur L'Elle during the 48 hours this Detachment was attached to the Corps prior to returning to Army Control. D9B1 and the Detachment operating the Refugee Assembly Center at St. Marguerite D'Elle were attached to V Corps from XIX Corps when the Corps boundaries changed but reverted to Army almost immediately.

Civil Affairs Detachments changed status as following:

a. D1C1 to La Mine responsible for the portion of Balleroy Canton remaining in the Corps Zone.

b. D2C1 to Litteau, attached to the 2nd Inf. Div. After a few days at this location the Detachment moved forward to St. Jean des Baisants pending clearance of Torigny to which it was scheduled for permanent location.

c. D5F1, Capt. Blakemore, reported and was attached to 5th Infantry Division. This Detachment relieved D2C1 at Litteau pending their being called forward to become operational. See Overlays "B" & "C" Annex #2.

The 35th Inf. Division joined the Corps and Major Condren the SCAO reported for orientation and was furnished with a kit containing written instructions.

Reports of French road maintenance men under the Agent Voyer cutting grass along roads and hedges carrying communication wires was taken up with the British Civil Affairs Detachment at Balleroy and instructions were issued to road workers throughout the Canton to avoid hedges with wires.

The employment of Prisoners of War to bury dead cattle in Division rear areas was discussed with G-1 and G-4. Their use for this purpose would require Army approval in each case and their retention within the Division Zone longer than normally desirable.

Detachment D1C1 was complimented by the Corps Special Service Officer on the efficient method of handling a request for billeting a USO show unit in La Mine.

D1C1 and D9B1 reverted to Army Control on 31 July 1944 on the redrawing of the Corps Rear Boundary.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, U. S. Army

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY
1 March 1945 to 31 March 1945

M-28 471-S
Vol. 1

SECTION I
OPERATIONS

1. 1 March 1945 to 11 March 1945. Advance to the RHINE River.

The V Corps front was quiet on 1 March. All objectives had been reached during the closing days of February and elements of the Corps were assembled and making preparations for future operations. Offensive action was limited to the 69th Infantry Division sector where the 271st Infantry made limited advances to occupy HESCHEID (F-097087) and HAHNENBERG (F-088073) and the 273rd Infantry attacked and secured SCHNORRENBERG (F-078035) and VOHLFART (F-078042). Elsewhere along the front the positions gained in February were consolidated and improved and the 2nd, 28th and 106th Infantry Divisions patrolled aggressively to maintain contact with the enemy. The 7th Armored Division assembled in preparation for future operations.

The 102nd Cavalry Group crossed the ROER River on 2 March and established defensive positions on the east bank of the river. Other elements of the Corps consolidated and improved positions.

On 3 March offensive action was begun by the 2nd Infantry Division, whose Task Force "S" crossed the bridge at HEDMBACK (F-1227) and made an advance of approximately 4500 yards. The advance was continued on 4 March against stubborn resistance, particularly from pillboxes on the north bank of the URFT River. The town of GEMUND (F-125200) was cleared by the Task Force. The 9th Infantry attacked through Task Force "S" later in the day, met light opposition, and made an advance of approximately 4500 yards before stopping. The 109th Infantry, 28th Division, crossed the URFT River at SCHLEIDEN (F-7015) and passed through the town. The 102nd Cavalry Group advanced, taking HERGARTEN (F-7020) and established a line from (F-164255) - DUTTLING (F-159238) - (F-138200). Other elements of the Corps maintained positions and pushed aggressive patrols forward.

The 2nd Division resumed the advance on 5 March. The 9th Infantry occupied GLEHN (F-1923) and BERGBEIN (F-1723), the 23rd Infantry occupied BERG (F-4417), FLOISDORF (F-2127) and EICKS (F-2126), and the 38th Infantry cleared pillboxes in the area near NIEUFELD (F-9626), meeting stubborn resistance. The 102nd Cavalry Group advanced to LESSENICK (F-283237), KOMMERN (F-230243) and SCHAVEN (F-245250).

On 6 March the 2nd Division attack continued with the 9th Infantry making an advance of six miles and clearing the towns of BLEIBUIR (F-1721), HOSTEL (F-2023), BESCHEID (F-1720), LUCKERATH (F-1821), SCHUTZENDORF (F-1921), STREMPL (F-2020), WALLENTHAL (F-1819), KALENBURG (F-1919), SCHEVEN (F-1818), KALLMUTH (F-2018), [illegible]ACH (F-2118), BERGHEIM (F-2319), VUSSEM (F-2319), EISERFREY (F[illegible] (F-2316), HORZHEIM (F-2517) and PESCH (F-2515). The 23rd [illegible] relieving the 102nd Cavalry Group in KOMMERN, continued to

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advance rapidly for approximately seven miles, taking MECHERNICH (F-2321), ~~ROGGENDORF (F-2121), RISSDORF (F-2722), BREITENBENDEN (F-2420),~~ WEILER (F-2620), HOLZHEIM (F-2619), ESCHWEILER (F-2919), IVERSHEIM (F-3120), and NOTHEN (F-2817). The 69th Division pushed forward, the 271st Infantry reaching the general line ZINGSCHEID (F-112082) - HECKER (F-133068) - KREUZBERG (F-124061), the 272nd Infantry the 13 grid line, and the 273rd Infantry the 10 grid line. The 102nd Cavalry Group occupied KIRSPENICH (F-337229), KALKER (F-319225), ARLOFF (F-335219), WACHENDORF (F-300222) and ANTWEILER (F-300235), and relieved elements of the 78th Infantry Division along the V Corps north boundary.

On 7 March the 2nd Division took the towns of RODERATH (F-2712), BOUDERATH (F-2913), SCHONAN (F-3212), FROHNGAN (F-2711), BUIR (F-2810), HOLZMULHEIM (F-2911), LANGSCHEID (F-3111), EICHERSCHEID (F-3115), MAHLBERG (F-3412), MUNSTEREIFEL (F-3117), EFFELSBERG (F-3813), KREIZBERG (F-4612), and BRUCK (F-4509). The bridge over the AHR River at KREIZBERG was captured intact by the 23rd Infantry. The 28th Infantry Division attacked southeast, reached the AHR River against light resistance, and cleared the towns of SISTIG (F-135110) and BLANKENHEIM (F-230050). The 69th Division attacked eastward, capturing SCHMIDTHURN (F-165027) and DAHLEM (F-155001). The 106th Infantry Division advanced in its zone until pinched out by the 69th Division advance. The 7th Armored Division was detached from V Corps at 072000A March and began movement from the Corps zone.

The 2nd, 28th and 69th Divisions continued the attack on 8 March. Light resistance was encountered and large quantities of enemy materiel were overrun during the advance. The 2nd Division cleared all enemy from northwest of the AHR River. The 28th Division pushed on with CT 112, occupying FREILINGEN (F-284021), DORSEL (F-329982) and LOMMERSDORF (F-300021), and patrolled along the AHR River. The 69th Division took WALDORF (F-205990), RIPSDORF (F-233990), HUNGERSDORF (F-250002), and NONNENBACH (F-217002). The 102nd Cavalry Group secured three bridge crossings and one vehicular tunnel crossing on the AHR River in addition to mopping up in its area and securing the town of MAYSCHOSS (F-499142).

On 9 March elements of the 2nd Division reached the RHINE River, in the zone of CT 23. Other elements of the Corps were engaged in mopping up within their respective zones. The 2nd Division held positions along the RHINE River on 10 and 11 March as mopping up continued. RHEINBECK (F-6910), OBERBREISIG (F-6812) and NIEDERBREISIG (F-6912) were cleared. The Corps advance command post moved from MONSCHAU (K-945181) to MECHERNICH on 10 March, opening in MECHERNICH at 101500A March.

V Corps Artillery was quite active during the early part of the period but fired no missions on 8, 9, 10 and 11 March. During the period a total of 215 missions were fired, including 118 harassing and interdictory, 37 counterbattery, 19 personnel, 11 registration, 4 preparation and 4 close support. Ammunition expended totalled 8159 rounds. Results of the Artillery fired during the period were reported as excellent.

Air Support was furnished V Corps by the IX Tactical Air Force on 1 and 2 March. When operational on other days the Air Force was not in direct support

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of the Corps but was successful against transportation facilities and troop concentrations.

Engineer units with V Corps continued in support of component elements. Most of the work was in maintenance and improvement of roads. Many enemy minefields were removed from areas through which the Corps advanced during the period. Armored and Tank Destroyer units were attached to the various divisions of the Corps in direct support. Communications were maintained during the advance by the Signal units.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

(Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
351st FA Group - 1 March	142nd AAA Gun Bn - 3 March
1 Equip Plat, 508 Engr L Pon Co - 1 March	Btry A, 285th FA Obsn Bn - 050600A March
1st Plat, 990 Engr Trdy Br Co - 2 March	4 & 5 Cos, 6th Belgian Fusilier Bn - 1 March
L Equip Plat, 502 Engr L Pon Co - 3 March	Det I4H2, 2nd ECA Regt - 5 March
285th FA Obsn Bn (-Btry A) - 050600A March	Det G1H2, 2nd ECA Regt - 6 March
656th FA Bn (8" How) - 050600A March	Btry C, 987th FA Bn - 7 March
17th Belgian Fusilier Bn - 5 March	7th Armd Div - 072000A March
Det H1B3, 3rd ECA Regt - 5 March	203rd AAA AW Bn - 7 March
	814th TD Bn - 7 March
	76th FA Bn (25 pdr) - 9 March
	285th FA Obsn Bn (-Btry A) - 10 March
	446th QM Trk Co - 7 March
	3967 QM Trk Co - 7 March
	106th Inf Div - 10 March
	Co A, 738th Tk Bn - 11 March

During this period V Corps advanced to the RHINE River in its zone, assumed defensive positions on the west bank of the river, and cleared the enemy from its zone west of the river.

2. 12 March 1945 to 20 March 1945. Consolidating Positions.

This was a period of consolidation of the positions along the RHINE River which had been gained in the preceding period. The 2nd Division engaged in mopping up enemy stragglers in its area. Anti-tank guns were moved up and emplaced in direct fire positions on the west bank of the RHINE. Enemy movements on the river were fired upon, and several small boats were sunk. The division conducted training throughout the period in preparation for a crossing of the RHINE River.

The 69th Division, in positions behind the 2nd Division, maintained security patrols throughout its area and spent the period in rehabilitation, maintenance, and training, as did the 28th Division. The latter was relieved from attachment to V Corps at 162400A March and moved from the Corps zone the following day. The 102nd Cavalry Group guarded the river crossings over the AHR and conducted training in the Corps rear area.

V Corps Artillery, which displaced forward early in the period, was very

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active, particularly in harassing and interdictory fires, of which 238 missions were fired. Many of these missions were in support of the III Corps operations in the REMAGEN bridgehead east of the RHINE River. A total of 455 missions were fired including those mentioned above with an expenditure of 14,662 rounds of ammunition.

Most of the Engineer work during the period was road improvement and maintenance, although Corps Engineer units also engaged in several bridging projects to increase the road net. In the areas taken by the infantry elements during the advance to the RHINE River engineers removed enemy mines and demolitions and assumed responsibility for large supplies of enemy explosives overrun during the advance. Armored and Tank Destroyer elements remained attached to the various divisions. There were reports of 84 enemy aircraft over the Corps zone on bombing, strafing, and reconnaissance missions during the period. Antiaircraft units claimed 15 of these destroyed with another 14 possibly destroyed. Close air support was not provided V Corps during this quiet period. Signal units maintained and improved communication facilities.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
16th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd - 19 March	134th AAA Gun - 12 March
Co A, 738th Tk Bn - 20 March	28th Inf Div - 162400A March
	447th AAA AW Bn (M) - 16 March
	777th Tk Bn - 16 March
	Co A, 86th Cml Bn - 16 March
	Co B, 86th Cml Bn - 16 March
	190th FA Bn - 12 March
	953rd FA Bn - 12 March
	102nd Cav Gp Hq & Hq Tr - 15 March
	38th Cav Ron Sqdn - 15 March
	630th TD Bn - 15 March
	161st Ord Bomb Disp Sqd - 19 March

During this period V Corps held positions on the west bank of the RHINE River and was out of contact with the enemy. The period was spent in mopping up stragglers within the area, and in rehabilitation, maintenance and training in preparation for future operations.

3. 21 March 1945 to 31 March 1945. Offensive Period.

V Corps began crossing the RHINE River on the morning of 21 March. Elements of the 9th and 38th Combat Teams of the 2nd Infantry Division crossed the river over the III Corps bridge at REMAGEN (F-6520) and assembled in areas east of the river. CT 23 remained west of the river. The 9th Armored Division was attached to V Corps on 21 March in positions east of the RHINE. The 69th Infantry Division continued mopping up and security missions in rear areas west of the river.

An attack was launched on 22 March with CC "B", 9th Armored Division, and CT 38, 2nd Infantry Division, taking part. CC "B", meeting little resistance,

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occupied LEUTESDORF (F-750060), WALLENDORF (F-778062), and crossed the WIED River. NEUWIED (F-8004) was taken late in the day after some fighting in the town. CT 38 attacked, advancing 5 to 6 kilometers against moderate resistance, and established a bridgehead over the WIED River. The towns of SEGENDORF (F-8107) were captured. The 28th Infantry Division was attached to V Corps on 22 March and moved into the Corps sector, occupying positions on the west bank of the RHINE.

Little action took place in the 9th Armored Division sector on 23 March. CC "A" began construction of a Bailey Bridge across the WIED River at (F-794047) and at darkness began enlarging its bridgehead, reaching the line (F-834056) - (F-846040) - (F-851027) at 2330A. CC "B" and CC "R" remained in place. CT 38, 2nd Infantry Division, continued its attack and established a firm bridgehead on the high ground east of the WIED River against moderate resistance. It captured DATZEROTH (7812), WOLFENACKER (8112), EHLSCHEID (8012), RENGSDORF (8311), ALTWIED (8109) and MELSBACH (8110). CT 23 crossed the RHINE River and assembled in preparation for committment. The 28th and 69th Infantry Divisions remained on defensive missions west of the RHINE River. V Corps CP moved to AHRWEILER (F-551166).

The 9th Armored Division was inactive on 24 March. CC "A" completed the Bailey bridge over the WIED River. CT 38 resumed its attack and advanced three to four kilometers, taking GLADBACH (8406) and OBERBIEBER (8308).

CC "A" of the 9th Armored Division jumped off in an attack on the morning of 25 March. It crossed the SAYN River and took the towns of BENDORF (F-880035) and VALLENDAR (F-9100), also occupying the hill at (F-876036). CT 38 captured the castle at (F-847104) and took positions to protect the left (north) flank of the division. CT 23 attacked through CT 38 and advanced east about six kilometers. CT 9 passed through CT 23 and advanced against light resistance to capture GRENZHAUSEN (9404). The Corps CP moved from AHRWEILER to NEUWIED (F-807030), on the east bank of the RHINE.

CC "A" and CC "B", 9th Armored Division, attacked on 26 March. CC "A" secured a bridgehead over the LAHR River, where it was relieved by CC "R". It then attacked east, meeting no enemy resistance, and passed through HILLSCHEID (F-9800) and HOLLER (G-214015). CC "B" passed through BAUMBACH (F-990064), reached the Autobahn and moved down it to capture LIMBURG (M-233991). In the 2nd Division zone the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments advanced without opposition, occupying GRENZHAUSEN, HILGART (9605), BAUMBACH, REMSBACH (9807) and ALSBACH (9407), and established a defensive position at NAUORT (9207) and CAAN (9108). The 28th Division continued its security mission west of the RHINE. The 69th Division crossed the RHINE and moved into assembly areas east of the river.

On 27 March CC "R" passed through CC "A" at LIMBURG and attacked southeast along the Autobahn, seizing its objective at NIEDERHAUSEN (M-413735). CC "A" captured DIEZ (M-1997). CC "B" cleared the Corps zone east to the LAHR River and constructed a Treadway bridge across the river at LIMBURG. The 2nd Division resumed the advance with the 9th and 23rd Regiments and occupied NIEDERELBERT (0501), HORRESSEN (0403), MONTABAUR (0604), HILLSCHEID, WIRGES (0508), DERNBACH (0407) and ELGENDORF (0405). The 69th Division attacked to clear its zone of enemy and brought additional elements across the RHINE.

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On 28 March the 9th Armored Division captured IDSTEIN (M-3880) and established contact with VIII Corps. Elements of the 2nd Division were relieved in LIMBURG by VIII Corps troops. Divisions with V Corps assembled and regrouped in preparation for a continuation of the attack in a northeasterly direction. The 28th Infantry Division, still west of the RHINE River, was relieved of attachment to V Corps at 281200A March.

The 9th Armored Division resumed the advance on 29 March and made a rapid advance of about 55 kilometers, reaching the KIRCHAIN (6834) - KIRTORF (G-9642) road. The 2nd Division closed in assembly areas and prepared to follow the advance of the 9th Armored Division. The 69th Division continued its mission of clearing the rear areas of stragglers. V Corps CP moved to WEILBURG (G-3709).

On 30 March the 9th Armored Division advanced to the EDER River. Elements of CC "B" crossed the river and captured BERGHEIM (H-9886). The 2nd Division followed the 9th Armored Division's advance, mopping up and securing the areas taken. The 69th Division assembled south of WEILBURG.

The attack continued on 31 March, the 9th Armored Division advancing to the northeast. WARBURG (H-9822), DASEBURG (H-0320) and MENNE (H-9625) were captured. The 2nd Division began movement to forward assembly areas and the 69th Division moved to DEHAN (G-2603) and GIESSEN (G-6621). The Corps CP moved to NEUSTADT (G-9751).

Corps Artillery gave support to the advance during the period 21 - 26 March inclusive. A total of 310 missions were fired, of which 200 were harassing and interdictory, and 39 were counterbattery. A total of 6153 rounds of ammunition was expended. No missions were fired between 27 and 31 March as the rapid advance required constant forward displacement by the artillery units.

After the initial crossing of the RHINE River by V Corps elements and establishment of a bridgehead east of the river, work was begun by Engineer units of the Corps on construction of a bridge across the RHINE. On 22 March a Class 40 M-2 Treadway bridge was erected at HONNINGEN (F-696128). This bridge was 1372 feet long and was built by the 245th Engineer Combat Battalion and a platoon of the 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, together with the 990th and 994th Treadway Bridge Companies. Very heavy traffic passed over this bridge as it was the only one available in the V Corps zone. Three divisions were crossed over this bridge but most of the infantry troops were ferried over with LCVPs. In the expansion of the bridgehead south and east in the V Corps zone another difficult bridging job was accomplished in the launching of a 150-foot DD Bailey Bridge at ERLICH (F-796053). The LAHN River at LIMBURG was bridged by placing 228 feet of M-2 floating treadway across the river. Four engineer battalions with the Corps were callued upon late in the month to furnish a total of 144 trucks to form provisional truck companies to assist in moving supplies and motorized combat teams to follow the rapidly advancing armored units. Employment of these trucks on other than their normal duties seriously handicaped normal engineer activities.

Direct air support was given V Corps only on 26 and 31 March. The IX Tactical Air Force flew missions in support of the 9th Armored Division's advance

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on those days. At other times during the period the air force was operational in general support missions over the western front from which V Corps received an indirect benefit. Two enemy aircraft flew over the Corps zone on 21 March on reconnaissance missions and were engaged by Antiaircraft Artillery units. No claims were made. An unidentified aircraft flew over the area on 22 March and was fired upon. No other enemy air activity in the V Corps zone was reported.

The 102nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron prepared for operations until 25 March when it moved to NEUWIED. It relieved elements of the 9th Armored Division at VALENDAR on 26 March and at DIEZ on 27 March. It protected the south flank of the Corps for the remainder of the month, mopping up the areas through which the armor and infantry had passed. Armored and Tank Destroyer units were attached to divisions and assisted them in the advance. During the rapid movement forward infantry rode the tanks and tank destroyers to keep as close as possible behind the 9th Armored Division spearhead. The rapid advance created great difficulty in maintaining communications but signal units performed remarkably effective work. Despite the speed of movement, communications were maintained, although in several instances only limited facilities could be kept open.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
9th Armd Div - 21 March	69th Inf Div Arty (-879 FA Bn) - 22 March
482nd AAA AW Bn - 21 March	508th Engr L Pon Co - 22 March
656th TD Bn - 21 March	Co A, 738th Tk Bn - 28 March
3459th QM Trk Co - 21 March	447th AAA AW Bn - 28 March
3600th QM Trk Co - 21 March	28th Inf Div - 28 March
28th Inf Div - 22 March	12 Armd Gp Hq & Hq Co (-Det Gp Hq) - 28 Mar
447th AAA AW Bn - 22 March	
777th Tk Bn - 22 March	
Det 16D2, 2nd ECA Regt - 26 March	
Det 17D2, 2nd ECA Regt - 26 March	
69th Inf Div Arty (-879 FA Bn) - 28 March	

V Corps crossed the RHINE River during this period and met only moderate to light enemy resistance. Spearheaded by the 9th Armored Division, which was followed by the 2nd and 69th Infantry Divisions, the Corps made rapid advances to the east and captured LIMBURG. It then turned northeast and continued advancing against light resistance, reaching WARBURG, DASSBURG and MEINE.

During March V Corps advanced to the RHINE River, protecting the [illegible] of the III Corps bridgehead as it was enlarged. Crossing the RHINE on [illegible] March, the Corps drove rapidly to the east, advancing to GIESSEN 60 miles [illegible] the RHINE and 108 miles east of the German border.

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3458th QM Trk Co - 21 March	447th AAA AW Bn - 28 March
3600th QM Trk Co - 21 March	28th Inf Div - 28 March
28th Inf Div - 22 March	12 Armd Gp Hq & Hq Co (-Det Gp Hq) -28 Mar
447th AAA AW Bn - 22 March	
777th Tk Bn - 22 March	
Det I6D2, 2nd ECA Regt - 26 March	
Det I7D2, 2nd ECA Regt - 26 March	
69th Inf Div Arty (-879 FA Bn) - 28 March	

V Corps crossed the RHINE River during this period and met only moderate to light enemy resistance. Spearheaded by the 9th Armored Division, which was followed by the 2nd and 69th Infantry Divisions, the Corps made rapid advances to the east and captured LIMBURG. It then turned northeast and continued advancing against light resistance, reaching WARBURG, DASEBURG and MENNE.

During March V Corps advanced to the RHINE River, protecting the rear and flank of the III Corps bridgehead as it was enlarged. Crossing the RHINE on 21 March, the Corps drove rapidly to the east, advancing to GIESSEN 66 miles from the RHINE and 108 miles east of the German border.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, U.S. Army

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY
1 February 1945 to 10 February 1945

SECTION I
OPERATIONS

1. 1 February to 10 February 1945 - Attacking the Dams.

The morning of 1 February found the operations to capture the series of dams on the ROER and URFT Rivers in full progress. KRINKELT (K-975045) and ROCHERATH (K-981053) had been taken by the 2nd Infantry Division. Elements of the 9th Infantry Division held ROHREN (K-973177) and WIDDAU (K-984190) and were in contact with CC"A", 5th Armored Division on the left. The advance was greatly hampered by deep snow and moderate enemy resistance, but the progress was steadily continuing along the entire Corps front.

On 1 February elements of the 60th Infantry in ROHREN and WIDDAU were relieved by elements of the 102nd Cavalry Group and the advance through the woods to the southeast was resumed. The 47th Infantry continued to attack to the northeast, and the 39th Infantry captured the important RJ at (F-001126) and made contact with leading elements of the 9th Infantry advancing northward from ROCHERATH. The 99th Division continued to advance north of WIRTZFELD (K-954043) gaining 1½ miles.

On 2 February the 60th Infantry advanced to the high ground 2500 yards west of DREIBORN (F-060170) and the 47th Infantry occupied high ground 1000 yards southwest of HAMMER (F-002193). In the 2nd Division sector the 9th Infantry captured HARPERSCHEID (F-062143). The 23rd Infantry continued to press northward against strong resistance.

The 78th Infantry Division was operationally attached to V Corps on 2 February without change of position in the line. At 022300A, Field Order No. 36, Hq. V Corps, was published directing a new phase of the operation in progress. The attack to secure the high ground overlooking GEMUND and SCHLEIDEN was to be continued, and a new attack launched by the 78th Division to capture Dam No. 3 (F-085274), southeast of SCHMIDT (F-063297).

On 3 February elements of the 78th Division captured DEDENBORN (F-021212). 2nd Division units captured BERESCHEID (F-063158), ETTELSCHEID (F-085156) and BROMSFELD (F-085143). DREIBORN, HERHAHN (F-090184) and EINRUHR (F-041213) were secured by units of the 9th Division. The 99th Division was detached from V Corps and attached to the XVIII Corps (A/B).

The attack was continued along the entire Corps front on 4 February. RUHRBERG (F-043245), and the high ground to the north and south, was taken by the 311th Infantry, 78th Division. Elements of the 78th Division in RUHRBERG and DEDENBORN were relieved by units of the 102nd Cavalry Group in the afternoon. The 9th Division captured MORSBACH (F-088192), WOLLSEIFEN (F-073208), and ORDENSBERG - VOGELSANG (F-083217) and elements of the division secured the west end of Dam No. 5 (F-067234). To the south, units of the 2nd Division were securely situated on

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the high ground west of the URFT River overlooking SCHLEIDEN (F-105150).

On 5 February the 39th Infantry secured objectives on the high ground west of the OLEF River overlooking GEMUND. In the vicinity of SCHLEIDEN, 2nd Division troops fought their way into the town of SCHEUREN (F-100160) which was mopped up early the following morning. South of HARPERSCHEID, the 38th Infantry advanced without opposition to the outskirts of HELLENTHAL (F-080110) where intense hostile artillery, machine-gun, mortar, and small arms fire was encountered. By nightfall, however, our troops were fighting in the town.

In the 78th Division sector the 309th Infantry advanced to high ground 1½ miles west of SCHMIDT (F-063298). The 311th Infantry pushed north from RUHRBERG through deep snow and difficult terrain to capture WOFFELSBACH (F-051264).

6 February was a day of heavy fighting for the 78th Division, and no spectacular gains were made. HECHELSCHEIDT (F-035271) was seized, and the 517th Parachute Infantry, attached to the 78th Division on 4 February, pushed southward several hundred yards from the vicinity of BERGSTEIN (F-076387). HOHENFRIED (F-116188) was taken by the 9th Division, and HELLENTHAL was mopped up by the 38th Infantry, 2nd Division. At 061800A, V Corps assumed responsibility for the zone of the XVIII Corps (A/B), the 99th and 106th Infantry Divisions becoming attached in place.

Field Order No. 37, Hq. V Corps, 070600A February, directed a continuation of the attack to secure Dam No. 3, the 78th Division being assisted by a task force composed of units of the 82nd Airborne Division. The 69th Infantry Division, attached this date, and the 106th Division (-) were directed to prepare to take over the sector of the 99th Division. On 7 February the Corps consisted of six infantry divisions and one armored division, and Corps troops.

Following a 30 minute artillery barrage the 78th Division attacked at 070700A. KOMMERSCHEIDT (F-055308) was taken and a powerful assault of infantry and tanks was launched against SCHMIDT from the east at 071330A. By midnight the western half of the town had been captured after heavy fighting.

The battle in SCHMIDT continued on 8 February and the town was mopped up. HARSCHEIDT (F-070306) was also taken and the area between the town and the lake cleared of enemy resistance.

In compliance with Letter of Instructions, Hq. V Corps, dated 081400A, February, the 2nd Division took over the sector of the 9th Division in the afternoon and evening, relieving the 47th Infantry and 60th Infantry in place. The 39th Infantry remained in position and was operationally attached to the 2nd Division. The 9th Division (-39th RCT) moved rapidly to the STRAUCH - STECKENBO area and prepared to pass through the lines of the 78th Division and seize Dam No. 3. The 309th Infantry and the 311th Infantry were relieved in the KOMMERSCHEIDT - SCHMIDT area by the 505th Parachute Infantry, and were then attached to the 9th Division at 082100A February.

On the Corps south flank the 394th Infantry was relieved in the line by the 424th Infantry. At 081245A February, the 424th Infantry was detached from the 99th Division and reverted to the 106th Division, which assumed responsibility for the sector at that time.

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The final phase of the attack on Dam No. 3 was entered on 9 February. The 311th Infantry jumped off at 090600A and after overcoming strong initial resistance seized and mopped up the area along the lake to within 600 yards of the north end of the dam. The 309th Infantry moved out in the afternoon and reached the north end of the dam and secured the control house by 092340A. The 60th Infantry attacked at 090430A to secure the area in its sector to the ROER River. Some resistance was encountered but by 091600A all high ground north of the river was cleared and by 091900A a foothold had been gained in HASENFELD (F-098275).

The attack continued on 10 February. By 100430A HASENFELD was secured. It was discovered that a 50 foot gap had been blown in the roadway above the sluices at Dam No. 3, rendering a crossing by the 3rd Battalion, 309th Infantry, impossible. Reconnaissance was immediately initiated for suitable crossing sites north of the dam, and engineers began an examination to determine the extent of enemy demolitions and purposed demolitions.

The 309th Infantry continued mopping up on the north side of the dam. To the north the 505th and 503th Parachute Infantry Regiments patrolled east to the ROER River, encountering no opposition other than mines. By nightfall, all enemy opposition west of the ROER had ceased and our forces effectively controlled Dam No. 3.

Throughout this period the 7th Armored Division remained in Corps Reserve in the vicinity of EUPEN, conducting training, maintenance of materiel, and preparation for future operations. At 041140A, February, CC"B" was placed on a 6 hour alert for possible employment in the Corps zone but the alert was cancelled on 6 February. On 5 February CC"R" was attached to the 78th Division and operated in that sector until relieved from attachment at 101200A. During the period 5-10 February the division artillery reinforced the fires of the 78th Division Artillery. The 23rd Armored Infantry Battalion was attached to the 99th Division at 081500A and performed defensive missions in the line. The 814th TD Battalion was attached to the 99th Division at 081500A.

V Corps Artillery was extremely active during the period. 1385 missions were fired, including 916 harassing & interdiction, 192 counterbattery, 21 preparations, and 76 close support missions, with a total expenditure of 43,733 rounds of all calibres. 2300 rounds were fired on SCHLEIDEN alone on 1 February. Artillery of the 78th and 9th Divisions were strongly supplemented in the attack in the area of SCHMIDT and Dam No. 3. Results of artillery operations during the 10 day offensive period were excellent.

Air support of the IX Tactical Air Command was operational seven of the ten days. Principal targets were SCHLEIDEN, GEMUND, EUSKERCHEN, WOLFGARTEN, and rail and communication facilities on both sides of the RHINE. Reports indicate that large numbers of locomotives, railroad cars, motor transport, and armored vehicles were destroyed or damaged.

Corps Engineer units supported other elements of the Corps. Due to the thaw and considerable rainfall, the roads in the Corps zone showed signs of serious deterioration early in the period, and by 6 February the situation was critical.

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Road maintenance was given top priority, and all service troops available were employed in keeping sufficient roadnet open to support the operation in progress. Armored and Tank Destroyer units were attached to the various divisions of the Corps in direct support missions. The 102nd Cavalry Group performed reconnaissance and defensive missions in the 9th and 78th Division sectors. Signal units continued to maintain adequate communications under difficult weather conditions, being greatly hampered by the poor condition of the roads.

Attachments to and detachments from V Corps during the period were:

ATTACHED (OR ASGD)	DETACHED
Det. 13H2, 2nd ECA Regt - 1 Feb	18th AAA Gp Hq/Hq Btry - 1 Feb
Det. 14H2, 2nd ECA Regt - 3 Feb	801st TD Bn (T) - 3 Feb
Det. G1H2, 2nd ECA Regt - 3 Feb	751st FA Bn - 3 Feb
Det. 116G2, 2nd ECA Regt - 3 Feb	750th Tank Bn - 3 Feb
1262nd Engr C Bn - 3 Feb	3rd Armd Gp Hq/Hq Co - 6 Feb
2nd Ranger Inf Bn - 4 Feb	460th Prcht FA Bn - 10 Feb
517th Prcht Inf Regt - 4 Feb	517th Prcht Inf Regt - 10 Feb
596th A/B Engr Co - 4 Feb	596th A/B Engr Co - 10 Feb
460th Prcht FA Bn - 4 Feb	16th Ord BD Sqd - 10 Feb
Det 15D2, 2nd ECA Regt - 6 Feb	644th TD Bn (S) - 080600A Feb
106th Inf Div - 061800A Feb	
99th Inf Div - 061800A Feb	
Det H6H2, 2nd ECA Regt - 7 Feb	
Det H5D2, 2nd ECA Regt - 7 Feb	
69th Inf Div - 7 Feb	
661st TD Bn (S) - 7 Feb	
504th Prcht Inf - 7 Feb	
508th Prcht Inf - 081040A Feb	
817th TD Bn (T) - 080600A Feb	
142nd AAA Gun Bn (M) - 080600A Feb	
Btry C 226th AAA S/L Bn (less 1st & 2nd Plats) - 090600A Feb	
1402nd Engr Mob S/L (Maint Sect) - 090600A Feb	
161st Ord BD Sqd - 10 Feb	
12th Armd Gp Hq/Hq Co - 8 Feb	

During this period V Corps attacked along its entire front, making gains of up to 15 kilometers and advancing the front to the line of the ROER and URFT Rivers. The towns of HARPERSCHEID, DEDENBORN, BÜRESCHEID, ETTELSCHEID, BRONSFELD, DREIBORN, HERHAHN, EINRUHR, KESTERNICH, RUHRBERG, MORSBACH, WOLLSEIFEN, ORDENSBERG - VOPELSANG, HELLENTHAL, HECHELSCHEIDT, HOHENFRIED, KOMMERSCHEIDT, HASENFELD, HARSCHEIDT, and SCHMIDT were captured and Dams No. 3, 4, and 5 on the ROER and URFT Rivers were brought under control.

2. 110001A February 1945 to 282400A February 1945 - Holding Phase.

With the seizure of control of the ROER and URFT River dams, particularly Dam No. 3, the prime objective of the Corps attack was attained. Plans had been made for crossings to the east bank of the ROER in considerable strength but were

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suspended for the time being. Meanwhile, the Engineers conducted extensive examination of the dams to determine the extent of enemy demolitions and estimate what measures might be taken to remove the threat of flood in the ROER valley to the north.

Extensive reorganization was effected following the cessation of the offensive. On 11 February units composing Task Force "A" were released from operational control and reverted to the 82nd Airborne Division. The 69th Division relieved the 99th Division in the line, the latter moving to assembly areas vicinity of WEISMES (K-845030). On 12 February the 78th Division relieved elements of the 9th Division in its sector and passed to control of the XVIII Corps (A/B) with a resultant change in the north V Corps boundary. The 9th Division resumed control of its sector which had been taken over by the 2nd Division.

All movement of troops and supplies was greatly hampered by the critical condition of the roads in the entire First Army zone. As a result of the thaw and the heavy traffic incident to offensive operations, a large number of roads, dirt and gravel for the most part, had become virtually impassable. Stringent traffic control was instituted, and all travel not considered absolutely necessary was forbidden. The 7th Armored Division (- Division Artillery and Tank Destroyer units) was designated to assist the Engineer troops in emergency road repair and maintenance.

On 14 February the Corps was composed of 5 infantry divisions and one armored division. Infantry divisions holding sectors in the line were, from left to right, the 9th, 2nd, 69th, and 106th. The 102nd Cavalry Group held a sector in the line between the north boundary of the 9th Division and the north Corps boundary. The 7th Armored Division was in Corps reserve in vicinity of EUPEN and the 99th Infantry Division was assembled in vicinity of WEISMES. The III Corps relieved the XVIII Corps (A/) on the Corps north flank on 13 February.

No changes in composition or disposition of the Corps took place until 17 February, when the 9th Division was relieved from attachment and moved to III Corps. Responsibility for the sector vacated by the 9th Division was assumed by the 2nd Division. On 19 February the 99th Division was relieved from attachment, reverting to First Army control.

The 28th Infantry Division was attached to V Corps at 200001A Feb and began arriving in the Corps zone on that date. Owing to the deplorable condition of roads in the First Army zone, considerable difficulty was experienced in moving the division in. The foot elements were moved to AACHEN by rail, and thence by motor transport. Only the infantry and a minimum of service elements were brought in initially. The units were moved directly to the sector of the 2nd Division where they relieved elements of that division in the line upon arrival. By 240230A, relief was completed and the 28th Division assumed responsibility for the sector, the 2nd Division retaining that portion formerly held by the 9th Division.

Throughout the period until 27 February no action took place on the V Corps front other than active patrolling, artillery exchanges, and a few scattered attacks of very limited strength. All units improved defensive positions and prepared for future operations. The 7th Armored Division continued to furnish

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large numbers of men for road repair and maintenance, as did the 99th Division while in assembly areas prior to movement from the Corps zone. Close control of the dams in the Corps zone was maintained.

The forward echelon of V Corps Command Post moved to MONSCHAU, GERMANY, on 27 February, opening at the new location at 271300A February. The Rear Echelon moved from LIMBOURG to EUPEN, BELGIUM, occupying the location vacated by the Forward Echelon.

The 69th Division launched an attack at 270600A February to capture the high ridge east of the PRETHER River and facilitate the use of the HELLENTHAL - HOLLERATH highway as a MSR. Initial resistance was light and scattered, stiffening later in the day. DICKERSCHEID (F-075083) and BUSCHEM (F-090097) were captured after house to house fighting. GEISCHEID was taken with moderate resistance. On 28 February the attack was resumed against moderate resistance and all objectives were secured including the villages of RESCHEID (F-077047), OBERREIFFERSCHEID (F-090083), HONNINGEN (F-090100), and KAMBERG (F-065043). UDENBRETH (F-046033) was occupied.

The 102nd Cavalry Group held a sector in the line on the north flank of the Corps zone, patrolling to the ROER River, and maintained an observation post at (F-045235) to give warning of any break in Dam No. 5 (F-069235). 2nd Ranger Battalion was attached to the Group at 222000A February.

Corps Artillery was active throughout the period, mainly in harassing and interdictory roles. Ammunition expenditure was somewhat restricted due to transportation difficulties incident to the critical condition of roads during the entire period. A total of 1339 missions were fired, expending 13,218 rounds. Engineer units concentrated on repair and maintenance, utilizing all available personnel. Much assistance was rendered by the 7th Armored Division which furnished up to 2700 men daily for road work throughout the period. By 15 February marked improvement was evident, and by the end of the period, thanks to good weather, the road net in the Corps zone was in fair condition. In addition to road maintenance, much work was done in the area of the ROER and URFT River dams and valuable information furnished regarding the condition of the structures and control of stored water. Removal of enemy mines and assistance in preparation of artillery positions were also performed. Armored and Tank Destroyer units provided direct anti-mechanized and indirect harassing & interdictory fire support to the units to which they were attached. Air support by the IX Tactical Command was operative 18 days of the period with excellent results reported. Signal units maintained adequate communication.

ATTACHED (OR ASGD)	DETACHED
467th AAA AW Bn (S) - 110600A Feb	Det H6H2, 2nd ECA Regt - 11 Feb
28th Inf Div - 18 Feb	Det H5D2, 2nd ECA Regt - 12 Feb
447th AAA AW Bn (M) - 18 Feb	Det I3H2, 2nd ECA Regt - 12 Feb
630th TD Bn (T) - 18 Feb	78th Inf Div - 131800 Feb
773rd FA Bn (4.5 G) - 21 Feb	504th Prcht Inf - 132400A
MG Dets H3B3 and I3B3, 3rd ECA Regt - 22 Feb	508th Prcht Inf - 132400A
	987th FA Bn (155 G-SP) - 14 Feb

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ATTACHED (OR ASGD)

MG Dets H4B3 and I4B3, 3rd
ECA Regt - 23 Feb
53rd Med Bn Hq/Hq Co - 25 Feb
382nd Med Coll Co - 25 Feb
384th Med Coll Co - 25 Feb
684th Med Coll Co - 25 Feb
777th Tank Bn - 26 Feb

DETACHED

Btry C, 226th AAA S/L Bn - 15 Feb (less 1st Plat)
1402nd Engr Mob S/L Main Sect - 15 Feb
9th Inf Div - 17 Feb
376th AAA AW Bn (M) - 17 Feb
746th Tank Bn - 17 Feb
899th TD Bn (S) - 17 Feb
Light Equipage Plat 502nd Engr
L Pon Co - 19 Feb
99th Inf Div (-394th Inf & 324 Engr Bn - 201400 Feb
275th Armd FA Bn - 20 Feb
535th AAA AW Bn (M) - 20 Feb
817th TD Bn (T) - 22 Feb
Light Eqipage Plat 508th Engr
L Pon Co - 22 Feb
1st Plat 990th Engr Trdwy Br Co - 22 Feb
394th Inf - 232400
324th Engr Bn - 232400
773rd FA Bn (4.5 G) - 24 Feb

During the period the V Corps maintained and improved defensive positions in its zone of action and maintained contact with the enemy. At the end of the period offensive action was undertaken to secure the high ground in front of the 69th Division sector. DICKERSCHEID, BUSCHEM, HONNINGEN, OBERREIFF, ERSCHEID, GEISCHEID, KAMBERG, RESCHEID, and UDENBRETH were captured. Positions on the ridge were being consolidated as the period ended.

During the month of February V Corps was on the offensive from 1 February to 10 February inclusive and held defensive positions during the balance of the month until 27 February, at which time a limited attack was made by the 69th Infantry Division.

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Auth: CG, V Corps
Date: 10 Feb 1945
Init: SBM

HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, U.S.Army

OPD

319.1 10 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Act on Against Enemy, Report After/After Action Report.

TO : The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

THROUGH: The Commanding General, First United States Army, APO 230, U S Army.

1. In compliance with Paragraph 10 (Change 4), Army Regulations 345-105, and Letter, Headquarters, First United States Army, same subject and file, dated 13 July 1944, this Report After Action Against the Enemy by the V Corps, U.S. Army, for the period 1 January 1945 to 31 January 1945, inclusive, is submitted.

2. This report consists of the following sections:

SECTION I - OPERATIONS
SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE
SECTION III - PERSONNEL
SECTION IV - LOGISTICS
SECTION V - MILITARY GOVERNMENT

which are annexed hereto.

For the Commanding General:

S. B. MASON,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, U.S. Army

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY
1 January 1945 to 31 January 1945

SECTION I
OPERATIONS

1. 1 January 1945 to 14 January 1945 - Holding Phase.

At the end of December the German major counteroffensive had reached its greatest penetration and had been stopped. V Corps had held its positions throughout the latter part of the month and prevented the Germans from making good any of their attempts to turn the force of their drive northward. Enemy pressure along the southern V Corps front was heavy, while pressure was steady against the eastern front. The Third U.S. Army was attacking the enemy bulge from the south while the First U.S. Army was attacking southward in the area west of the V Corps zone, and other elements of the Twenty-First Army Group were hammering the salient from the west. The size of the salient already was being reduced by Allied attacks.

During 1 and 2 January there was no action of any size on the V Corps front. Patrols were active in harassing enemy outposts but defensive positions were held by our troops. The 1st Infantry Division and the 9th Infantry Division held their positions and conducted patrolling to the front. The 2nd and 99th Divisions continued rehabilitation and reorganization of certain elements in reserve positions while holding the front with the balance.

As the VII Corps to the west of the V Corps began a general attack on 3 January, elements of this Corps were directed to make demonstrations by strong combat patrols to give the impression of an all-out attack. All four infantry divisions of the Corps took part in these demonstrations. The 1st Division sent strong patrols into STEINBACH and FAMMENVILLE but made no attempts to retake the towns. Other patrols were active all along the division front, harassing enemy positions and inflicting as heavy casualties as possible before withdrawing to original positions. The 2nd and 99th Divisions demonstrated with strong patrols but made no effort to adjusts their defensive positions after creating the impression that an attack of large size was starting. The 9th Division made strong diversionary attacks to arde limited objectives in its sector, with one large patrol reaching KOHZEN before withdrawing to the original positions.

Following these diversionary demonstrations on 3 January contact patrols were sent forward constantly to feel out the enemy. These patrols usually met stubborn resistance and they inflicted some losses. The original positions were held and improved by all units in the line. German outposts were attacked by the patrols and were destroyed, while our own outposts were pushed forward. The 99th Division was relieved from operational attachment to the 2nd Division at 071200A January and took over responsibility for the sector in which it had been operating. This period was one of relative quiet all along the Corps front, marked only by patrol activity. It continued through 14 January.

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During this entire period the 9th Armored Division was under V Corps control, but was on four-hour alert status as First U.S. Army reserve, ready for employment in either the First or Ninth Army sectors. Combat Command "R" was charged with the defense of EUPEN, under the division, in addition to its mission.

Artillery with V Corps was active throughout the period, mainly in harassing and interdictory roles. More than 18,500 rounds were fired by Corps Artillery battalions alone, with a greater amount of fire delivered by the Division Artillery units. Fire support for the demonstration on 3 January was on a scale for an all-out attack. Results of the Artillery operations were reported as excellent. Corps Engineer units supported other elements of the Corps. Road improvement and snow removal were high on the list of accomplishments during the period. In addition, the engineers laid defensive minefields and prepared barriers, removed enemy mines, and assisted in preparing the improving defensive positions. There was little activity by armored elements, which were engaged mainly in rehabilitation and preparation for future commitment to action. Tank Destroyer units provided direct anti-mechanized and indirect harassing and interdictory fire support to the units to which they were attached. They were located well forward and engaged German armor and vehicles with good effect on a number of occasions. The 102nd Cavalry Group held a portion of the Corps east front. Air support was inoperational on nine days during the period because of bad weather. On the remaining five days fighter-bombers of the IX Tactical Air Command provided close support over the V Corps area, attacking enemy columns, armored vehicles, transportation, and supply installations, and troops concentrations. Results were reported as excellent. Enemy aircraft were over the V Corps zone on only three days during the period. On 1 January approximately 70 hostile aircraft made bombing and strafing raids. Our Antiaircraft Artillery units claimed 26 of these planes as destroyed with many others probably destroyed but not verified. Twenty-four planes were over the extreme southern part of the Corps sector on 10 January but only two were engaged and no claims were made. Three planes raided the area on 14 January, one of which was claimed as destroyed by antiaircraft fire. Signal units, under extreme conditions of weather, maintained communication services.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during the period were:

Attached (or Asgd)	Detached
Troop A, 38 Cav Rcn Sqdn - 6 Jan	Co C, 703 TD Bn - 020800A Jan
Btry A, 285 FA Obsn Bn - 13 Jan	413 AAA Gun Bn - 3 Jan
	2nd Ranger Inf Bn - 3 Jan
	Det A, 165 Air Ln Sqdn - 5 Jan
	863 AAA AW Bn (-Btry A) - 11 Jan

During this period V Corps held its defensive positions, making a diversionary demonstration to assist the VII Corps attack on 3 January. Positions were improved throughout the period and patrol contact was maintained with the enemy. Rehabilitation and reorganization of units was taken care of during the relative quiet of the period as preparations were made to turn to offensive action in the following period.

2. 150001A January 1945 to 312400A January 1945 - Attacking the Bulge.

At the start of this period the enemy was withdrawing from the ARDENNES salie

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created by the penetration which started 16 December, and was conducting strong delaying action in some areas. The Allied armies were continuing attacks against the German bulge, which was being constantly reduced. V Corps was to begin its part of this attack during the forthcoming period.

Field Order No. 34, Headquarters, V Corps, was issued to direct this operation. The attack was to be carried out by the 1st Infantry Division, to which was attached the 23rd RCT of the 2nd Infantry Division, while other elements of the V Corps held their defensive positions and maintained pressure against the enemy. The 1st Division was to attack south to secure the FAYMONVILLE-SCHOPPEN area, and to be prepared to continue the attack when these objectives were secured.

The operation got underway on 15 January when the 1st Infantry Division sent the 16th Infantry in an attack towards FAYMONVILLE at 180615A. Little enemy opposition was met by the infantry elements on the way to FAYMONVILLE but minefields were encountered that delayed the tank and tank destroyer support. The 23rd Infantry attacked at the same time and met considerable resistance. By night the 16th Infantry had captured FAYMONVILLE while the 23rd Infantry had taken RENONAUD and had gone forward to the high ground southwest of FAYMONVILLE.

The attack was continued on 16 January to secure the general line MONTENAU-KIBERTINGEN and the high ground overlooking AMBLEVE. The 16th Infantry continued the attack but met heavy resistance and was stopped short of SCHOPPEN. A German counterattack in some force came from SCHOPPEN but was contained after hard fighting. Opposition to the attack continued on 17 and 18 January and little advance was made by the 16th Infantry but on 19 January SCHOPPEN was reached while the 23rd Infantry was making a coordinated advance which put them on the MONTENAU-KIBERTINGEN line and in control of those villages.

The 16th Infantry continued the attack on 20 January and reached the high ground south of SCHOPPEN while the 23rd Infantry consolidated its positions. Both regiments consolidated positions on 21 and 22 January. The 23rd Infantry reverted to 2nd Division control on 22 January while the 9th Infantry of the 2nd Division relieved the 26th Infantry of the 1st Division.

On 24 January the 16th Infantry moved south to the woods overlooking KIBERTINGEN while the 26th Infantry attacked south, securing a crossroad at 930008 and a road and trail junction at 928003. High ground in the vicinity of 927997 was reached and consolidated. An infantry counterattack late in the day was contained without loss of position.

The 16th Infantry sent reconnaissance patrols to AMBLEVE and MIRFELD on 25 January and thereafter occupied both towns. A small force of enemy was cleared out of AMBLEVE while MIRFELD was taken without opposition.

The objectives of Field Order No. 34 had been secured and consolidated by the 1st Infantry Division which was preparing for a continuation of the attack.

Meanwhile, other elements of the Corps maintained their defensive positions, keeping contact with the enemy by strong patrols and harassing enemy outposts. During this period the enemy was not offensively minded and there was little action along our front except in the 1st Division sector. All units of the Corps took advantage of the quiet period to strengthen positions and to prepare personnel and

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and equipment for future operations.

Field Order No. 35, Headquarters, V Corps, issued at 261300A January, called for a continuation of the attack, to start on 29 January, with the objectives of GEMUND and SCHLEIDEN and preparation for an advance on ZULPICH.

The 2nd Infantry Division was ordered to attack when the XVIII Airborne Corps attach had reached BULLINGEN with an initial objective in the area around MURUNHEN; then to push on to the HARPERSCHEID area. Simultaneously the 99th Division was to mop up to the northeast while the 9th Division was to attack towards WOLLSEIFEN and south into the GEMUND area. The 2nd and 9th Divisions, after completion of the early phases, were to advance to the final Corps objectives in the SCHLEIDEN-GEMUND area upon Corps order.

The 1st Infantry Division was relieved from attachment to V Corps on 26 January and was attached to XVIII Airborne Corps, with a consequent readjustment of the inter-Corps boundary. On 27 January the 5th Armored Division was relieved of its assignment as First U.S. Army reserve under V Corps control, and moved from the area. It was replaced in position by the 7th Armored Division which was attached to V Corps on 27 January.

Patrol activity was the only action by the V Corps elements until 29 January. During this period the units prepared to undertake the operations directed by Field Order No. 35.

The 2nd Division started the attack on 30 January. The 9th Infantry moved forward from the BULLINGEN area and against light resistance secured the high ground in the vicinity of K964027. The 38th Infantry made a night attack which resulted in the capture of the town of WIRTZFELD. It continued against heavier enemy resistance to KRINKELT, which had been cleared of the enemy at nightfall after house-to-house fighting, and to ROCHERATH. Our troops were in ROCHERATH that night but did not completely mop up the town until the following day. The 9th Division attacked against scattered resistance and took the town of ROHREN. The 99th Division made small attacks to limited objectives to support the main efforts by the 2nd and 9th Divisions.

Operations were continued on 31 January and the objectives were reached and consolidated. Most of the period was spent in mopping up. During these actions our forces were impeded more by the heavy snow than by enemy action.

Throughout this period of offensive action close support was given by the Corps Artillery, which fired heavy schedules with good effect. Corps Engineers also were effective in support of the attack. Most of their work during the period consisted of removal of snow to permit movement of the front line troops, mine removal, and guarding barriers. Armored elements took part in the attacks but were handicapped by the heavy snow and enemy minefields. Tank Destroyer units provided effective indirect fire support to the units to which they were attached and also were sited for anti-mechanized direct fire support as needed. There was no enemy air activity over the V Corps area during this period and Antiaircraft Artillery units were not called upon to provide AAA protection. Air support was effective when weather permitted, and enemy vehicular columns, communication centers, and transportation facilities were bombed and strafed with good effect. Cavalry units held a portion of the front line but were not active in the offensive. Signal units maintained

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communications under difficult weather conditions.

Attachments to or detachments from V Corps during this period were:

Attached (or Asgd)
102 Cav Gp Hq & Hq Co - 24 Jan
102 Cav Ren Sqdn - 24 Jan
Co A, 738 Tk Bn - 251300A Jan
750 Tk Bn - 251620A Jan
Co B, 86 Cml Bn - 26 Jan
Co A, 86 Cml Bn - 27 Jan
2nd Plat, Btry C, 226 AAA S/L Bn (Opns only) - 270600A Jan
187 FA Bn - 270600A Jan
Btry A, 987 FA Bn - 280600A Jan
987 FA Bn - 290600A Jan
508 Engr L Pon Co - 280800A Jan
7th Armd Div - 29 Jan
814 TD Bn - 29 Jan
203 AAA AW Bn - 29 Jan
446 QM Trk Co - 29 Jan
3967 QM Trk Co - 29 Jan
275 Armd FA Bn - 29 Jan

Detached
987 FA Bn - 17 Jan
268 FA Bn (-Btry B) - 190600A Jan
Det QM Bn Hq & Jq Co - 24 Jan
3604 QM Trk Co - 24 Jan
3892 QM Trk Co - 24 Jan
595 QM Laundry Co - 24 Jan
863 QM Fum & Bath Co - 24 Jan
606 QM Gr Reg Co - 24 Jan
3275 QM Serv Co - 24 Jan
5th Armd Div - 27 Jan
387 AAA AW Bn - 27 Jan
1st Inf Div - 261800A Jan
109 AAA AW Bn - 261800A Jan
745 Tk Bn - 261800A Jan
634 TD Bn - 261800A Jan
272 FA Bn - 280600A Jan

During this period the V Corps started offensive operations which resulted in the capture of MODERSCHEID, EIBERTINGEN, AMBLEVE, MIRFELD, WIRTZFELD, KRINKELT, and ROCHERATH. The operations were continuing at the end of the period towards additional objectives.

During January V Corps occupied defensive positions from 1 to 14 January inclusive and took the offensive during the latter half of the month, resulting in the capture of the towns named in the preceding section.

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HISTORICAL RECORD
G-2 SECTION, HEADQUARTERS V CORPS

7 February 1945.

Month of January

PART I - ENEMY SITUATION

Period 1-14 January

The enemy front lines on the HOFEN-KONZEN sector had changed very little since the beginning of the German counter-offensive on 16 December. The northern boundary of the V Corps was just north of KONZEN (K-95 22), and from there the line continued south, with DUGENBROICH (K-95 20) in enemy hands. The line then bent toward the east which left HOFEN and ALZEN in our hands. This area had been held by the 326th Infantry Division, its regiments 753, 752, 751 from north to south, but sometime before 3 January it began to be relieved by units of the 246th Infantry Division. A considerable shifting of units took place on the V Corps front at this time. The sector from WIRTZFELD (K-86 05) to south of DOM BUTGENBACH had been held by the 12th Infantry Division, which on 2 January, was identified to the west in the WALMORE - LIERNEUX area. It was replaced by elements of the 89th Infantry Division: I and II Battalion of 1055 Infantry Regiment and 89 Fuselier Battalion. South of PERLEN Creek at (K-947 131) was the northernmost regiment of the 277th Infantry Division - 990 Infantry Regiment. The remainder of the divisional sector to include ROCHERATH (K-98 05) was held by 989 and 991 Infantry Regiments.

As a result of the enemy counter-offensive in December, the front line ran west from BULLINGEN (K-95 02); from (K-920 015) to the V Corps western boundary at (K-860 022) the enemy line was defended by 8, 5, and 9 Regiments of the 3rd Parachute Division.

Our efforts of 1 January to dislodge the enemy from his positions on the west bank of the SCHWADBACH met with considerable resistance, for although our forces reached the stream, the enemy remained on the height of HOHENMARK (K-945 115). After not having been identified for several days, P/W's were taken from the 277th Infantry Division, reconfirming its presence on the front.

Extensive patrolling by our troops, as a demonstration on 3 January, met with varying reactions from the enemy. Some patrols encountered no enemy, others ran into machine gun crews and mortar positions. One patrol got into a fire fight with an estimated company of enemy at (K-91 02), and the enemy was hit by a box barrage with good results. A combat patrol engaged a platoon of 5/1055 Infantry Regiment in new positions west of CR at (K-955 035), and caused approximately 40 casualties, including eighteen P/W's.

There was increased enemy patrolling on 4 January, and one combat patrol attempted unsuccessfully to drive our outpost from RUTHER Hill (K-865 028) which had been seized from the enemy 4 January. Information from P/W's indicated that III/9 Parachute Regiment held the sector of the REMONVAL (K-850 015) - KREUX Hill with I Battalion on the extreme left flank of the division. The 5 Parachute Regiment appeared to be in reserve.

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Another attempt on 7 January to reestablish our outpost at a disabled tank located at (K-945 117) on the HOHENMARK met with unexpected enemy resistance. Approximately 25 enemy successfully resisted with heavy automatic weapons fire our attempt to take the position. The conclusion drawn by our front-line units was that personnel of the 246th Infantry Division were more alert and intelligent in their patrolling and defensive activity than the 326th Infantry Division which they replaced.

A fire fight between a friendly patrol and 40 to 50 enemy at (K-968 070) resulted in two enemy killed. The non-identification for several days of III/5 Parachute Regiment (3rd Parachute Division) was explained by its appearance 7 January in the fighting northwest of VIELSALM (P-70 89). The identification on 8 January of 4/1055 Infantry Regiment southwest of DOM BUTGENBACH in the vicinity of (K-918 017) indicated that the boundary between the 3rd Parachute Division and the 89th Infantry Division was somewhere east of Hill 588 (K-914 015).

On 10 January our patrols penetrated up to 1200 yards, but engaged in several fire fights. The enemy's hold on the HOHENMARK area continued, since our patrols failed to dislodge the outpost around the tank at (K-946 117). A deserter from 10 Company of III Operational Battalion, 999 Penal Brigade, reported that his company was in WIRTZFELD.

A more aggressive attitude was displayed by the 277th Infantry Division in its patrolling activity of 11 January. A ten-man patrol from one of our units was ambushed by the enemy at (K-967 087) during the morning, and a friendly outpost was raided at (K-956 082). Four deserters and a patrol of four men were taken from 14/990 Infantry Regiment. Apparently without AT weapons, 14 Company occupied a sector from (K-951 125) to (K-947 128). Enemy movement of normal proportions was noticed behind the lines of the 3rd Parachute Division and the 89th Infantry Division. Friendly interdictory fire was placed on the HUNNINGEN (K-97 00) - MURRINGEN (K-98 02) road where heavy movement was observed at 1350 hours.

An enemy outpost at (K-945 135) was taken by surprise on 12 January, with more than ten of its occupants killed, and fourteen taken prisoner. After dark, however, the enemy occupied this abandoned outpost; and the first enemy patrols in some time in the vicinity of (K-945 196) engaged in fire fights with our forces.

Identifications during the period confirmed the location of I and II Battalions, 404 Infantry Regiment (246th Infantry Division) in the vicinity of HOFEN.

A number of vehicles heard in the vicinity of BULLINGEN at 1815 hours on 13 January were shelled by our artillery, but they were not believed to constitute a movement of major importance. Enemy assault guns were active against the 1st U.S. Infantry Division. The enemy reestablished an outpost in the vicinity of (K-944 1[illegible]) but suffered twenty casualties in an unsuccessful attempt to establish one in the vicinity of (K-965 148). On 14 January enemy positions were successfully reconnoitered 700 to 1000 yards in front of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division, but our patrols met stiff resistance in most cases. On the 9th U.S. Infantry Division front, however, it was believed that the enemy outpost line was being pushed farther forward especially in the "OMSCHAU area. A heavy artillery barrage of 150 rounds which fell in HOFEN was evidently in retaliation for our shelling of an enemy artillery OP. During the period 1 - 14 January, 186 P/Ws were taken by the V Corps.

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Period 15-19 January

The attack launched shortly before dawn by the 1st U.S. Infantry Division met considerable resistance from the 3rd Parachute Division in position along its front. In addition, the almost insurmountable obstacles presented by the rough, wooded terrain and the extremely bad weather made our progress both difficult and costly. Enemy resistance had been organized around well-constructed strong-points, heavily defended with automatic weapons and enfilading gun fire. Centers of this strong-point resistance were in the towns of KLINGELSBERG (K-900 125), FAYMONVILLE (K-868 020), STEINBACH (K-855 016) and BEMONVAL (K-850 015).

After severe fighting in the KLINGELSBERG sector, enemy forces of I/5 Parachute Regiment finally had to abandon most of their positions on the high ground in the vicinity of (K-890 022). On the west, though not actually identified, was II/5 Parachute Regiment. The forces contacted in the FAYMONVILLE area were II/9 Parachute Regiment, and elements of I/8 Parachute Regiment. FAYMONVILLE was largely in our hands after a day's hard fighting, and 143 prisoners were taken in that area.

The initial light resistance met by our troops advancing south upon STEINBACH (K-855 016) and BEMONVAL (K-850 015) soon increased. Elements of III and II Battalions of 9 Parachute Regiment estimated at 120 men delayed our forces until, converging from the north and south, our forces took the town. STEINBACH (K-855 016) and the high ground to the southeast were each defended by about 100 enemy. The enemy's excellent fields of fire and observation points made the objective particularly difficult to obtain, but this was done by 1900 hours on 15 January. About half the enemy forces in this area were taken prisoner.

Supporting units of the 3rd Parachute Division identified on the first day of the attack were 13/5 Parachute Regiment, 3 Parachute Artillery Regiment, and 3 Parachute Antitank Battalion. Direct supporting fire was thought to have come from assault guns of 394 Assault Gun Brigade. Self-propelled guns were also thought to be firing into the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division area.

Little enemy reaction to our attack on 15 January was noted on the remainder of the front. Ten prisoners were taken in a raid on a pillbox at (K-948 180). Six men sent up to replace the captured outpost could not locate in the fog the pillbox which had been destroyed, and were also taken prisoner.

The 3rd Parachute Division continued to put up a dogged resistance from well-defended positions on the high ground south of the AMBLEVE River which, in spite of heavy enemy losses the preceding day, caused our attack to slow up greatly in the afternoon of 16 January. A series of strong-points south of KLINGELSBERG along the northern edge of the woods (K-905 017) to (K-920 017) enabled the enemy to place withering fire on the exposed ground to the north. These strong-points were thought to be held by 1055 Infantry Regiment with I/5 Parachute Regiment south of KLINGELSBERG at (K-890 018). Our forces which reached the northwest edge of SCHOPPEN were met by lethal self-propelled gun and artillery fire, and had to withdraw. By 1200 hours ONDENVAL (K-85 00) and the open ground to the east had been taken with slight enemy resistance. The enemy, however, occupied well dug-in positions south of the AMBLEVE River. When our troops reached the river, they were subjected to intense small arms, self-propelled gun, tank and artillery fire which caused them to withdraw to the high ground southwest of ONDENVAL.

Enemy forces just south of the AMBLEVE River in the vicinity of (P-84 9 were outflanked, and had to give up their positions except on the forward slope o

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the hill. The units comprising this force were believed to be one battalion of 9 Parachute Regiment with elements of 8 Parachute Regiment. East of SCHOPPEN (V-89 00), 5 Parachute Regiment was still well organized in good defensive positions. Stubborn resistance met our forces south of the MOOSBACHER Creek, but enemy positions east of KLINGELSBERG were not attacked on 17 January. The statement of a P/W that he had talked to members of 1056 Infantry Regiment, as yet unidentified, indicated the very probable location of the regiment in immediate reserve.

The enemy in the pocket south of the WRIEVE River was practically eliminated in the course of the day's fighting on 18 January. Sixty prisoners of an estimated 150 men in the force were captured, as well as the two 88-mm AA/AT guns supporting them. The force consisted of remnants of I/9 Parachute Regiment and elements of 8 Parachute Regiment commanded by a major, also taken prisoner.

An enemy counter-attack on the morning of 19 January delayed our own offensive plans. The attacking force comprising 400 men from 8 and 9 Parachute Regiments and supported by five to seven assault guns and tanks had as its mission the task of clearing the woods in the vicinity of (P-855 987). After severe fighting, the enemy withdrew at 1430; over 300 enemy dead were later counted in that part of the woods. Other battered, but even more stubborn, parachute troops continued to offer strong resistance north of SCHOPPEN and along BUTGENBACHER HECK.

Enemy opposition to the advance of our troops upon IVELDINGEN (P-86 97) and MONTENAU (P-85 97) on 19 January was short-lived. An enemy strong-point at the railroad underpass near (P-855 970), manned by a group from 5/352 Infantry Regiment (246th Infantry Division), proved no great obstacle to our entrance into the two towns. Obviously, the enemy had been caught completely by surprise, little expecting an attack to be launched in such extremely unfavorable weather.

The defenders of EIBERTINGEN (P-88 97) offered more resistance, after being contacted at 1100 hours, but our intense artillery fire caused them to seek the basements of the town for shelter. Following some hand to hand fighting when the enemy came out of the cellars counter-attacking, resistance collapsed shortly after 1600 hours. An estimated 100 enemy troops had withdrawn toward DEIDENBERG (P-865 957). Prisoners taken in EIBERTINGEN were largely Luftwaffe replacements sent down from Holland to reinforce the dwindling ranks of the parachute troops.

The town of SCHOPPEN was under our control by 1100 hours. The customary enemy counter-attack launched at 1430 hours by an estimated 100 enemy and three assault guns was dispersed by our artillery fire. During the short period from 15 to 19 January, the V Corps took 603 prisoners.

Period 20-23 January

Enemy troops from I/1055 Infantry Regiment and from 89 Fuselier Battalion (both from 89th Infantry Division) were cleared on 20 January from about 800 yards on the northern edge of the BUTGENBACHER HECK at (K-915 015). Reinforcements from two companies of 294 Infantry Regiment (18th Infantry Division) were sent to the dwindling forces of 8 Parachute Regiment in the MONTENAU (P-855 965) area.

By 21 January, according to a P/W, all semblance to regular companies had been lost in 8 and 9 Parachute Regiments which had been combined into one battle-group. In the BUTGENBACHER HECK the enemy forces mentioned above limited our gains to about 200 yards in the vicinity of (K-914 010). A relief of at least elements of the 246th Infantry Division which had been anticipated through movements in the KONZEN - ROHREN area was confirmed 21 January by the appearance of

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352 Infantry Regiment of the division on the XVIII U.S. Corps front. On the following day, 404 Infantry Regiment was identified in the MONTENAU - EIBERTINGEN area where reinforcements were critically needed to bolster a faltering line. After the departure of 352 and 404 Infantry Regiments, the sector of the 689 Infantry Regiment - the third regiment of the 246th Infantry Division - was extended south of the ROER River. The 246 Fusilier Battalion extended its sector, and south of it appeared 246 Field Replacement Battalion. A combat school composed of approximately 150 men and formerly operated by Army Group "B" was made operational by being committed south of ALZEN (K-95 15).

The capture of a patrol 22 January revealed that a battle group composed of 2/5 Parachute Regiment, 15/8 Parachute Regiment and 14/9 Parachute Regiment had the mission of establishing a defense line along the stream from (P-901 980) to MODERSCHEID. The V Corps captured 277 P/W's during this four-day period.

Period 24-26 January

Our attack begun on 24 January was initially directed against the MORSCHHECK crossroads (K-930 007) where the enemy, although well-prepared in defensive positions, least expected an attack. The bulk of I/1055 Infantry Regiment in the BUTGENBACHER HECK was thereby isolated, as were elements of II Battalion initially in position in the woods. In the afternoon of the same day, II/1056 Infantry Regiment launched a counter-attack from HEPSCHEID (P-926 986) toward the MORSCHHECK crossroads; it was a complete failure. Another effort by a force of about 50 men to take the crossroads had a similar end. MODERSCHEID (P-90 99) was taken by our forces, and an isolated group of about 150 enemy troops remained in the BUTGENBACHER HECK, completely cut off from the main body. Other enemy units which had been contacted during the day's advance were III/5 Parachute Regiment, north of MODERSCHEID, and Kampfgruppe SCHENK, comprising the remnants of 9 Parachute Regiment, in MODERSCHEID. A shifting of units to the south had become necessary in order to hold the threatened line which the badly depleted 3rd Parachute Division was no longer able to do alone - hence the appearance of 1055 Infantry Regiment in the fighting, and the identification of II/1056 Infantry Regiment southwest of BULLINGEN. The 277th Infantry Division had extended its sector south as well as north, as was indicated by the identifications of II/991 Infantry Regiment in the WIRTZFELD (K-95 04) - KRINKELT (K-97 04) area and of I Battalion in ROCHERATH (K-98 05). In the midst of these changes, 89 Fusilier Battalion appeared to be unlocated.

The disruption and confusion caused by the unexpected success of our attack on 24 January prompted the enemy to withdraw the 89th Infantry Division to the line HEPSCHEID (P-92 93) - BULLINGEN (K-95 02), 1056 Infantry Regiment to the north and 1055 Infantry Regiment to the south. The 3rd Parachute Division apparently withdrew to the HEUTENBACH (P-92 97) - WALENDER (P-916 960) area, with elements of 5 Parachute Regiment probably going into HEPPENBACH, and elements of 9 Parachute Regiment into the WALENDER area. Thus, the continuation of the attack on 25 January met opposition only from small groups left behind as outposts.

The surprise gained on 25 January by our movement from the north and MEBLEVE (P-88 90), initially held by elements of 8 Parachute Regiment and of 1056 Infantry Regiment (246th Infantry Division), enabled us to cut off the major part of this enemy force. Although some enemy escaped to MIEFELD (P-90 96), they were captured after some fighting.

The V Corps sector was shortened at 1800 hours on 26 January by the transfer of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division to the XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps, putting the southern boundary of the V Corps just north of BULLINGEN (K-95 02). The enemy order of battle on the Corps front was then as follows from north to south: I/689 Infantry

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Regiment, 246 Fuselier Battalion, 246 Field Replacement Battalion (all of 246th Infantry Division), Kampfgruppe KERSTEN (Engineer Combat School from BERK), 990, 989, and 991 Infantry Regiments of the 277th Infantry Division, and III/1056 Infantry Regiment (89th Infantry Division). 475 P/W's were taken by the V Corps during this period.

Period 27-29 January

The capture of a P/W from 1/164 Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of (K-94 20) marked the appearance of at least one regiment of the 62nd Infantry Division, replacing 689 Infantry Regiment of the 246th Infantry Division. The I Battalion of 164 Infantry Regiment was identified north of the V Corps front. The division had been greatly depleted in the battles of the ARDENNES, and was the first infantry division to be withdrawn from the line. The regiment had received a number of replacements from a MARSCH battalion.

An attack by three enemy on an outpost at (K-938 133) believed to have been followed by a company at 0300 hours on 27 January was easily repulsed by our artillery. A similar attack by an enemy patrol on 28 January caused our outpost to withdraw, but the position was reoccupied by a larger friendly force. Generally, enemy activity was confined to patrolling, artillery, mortar and small arms fire. The V Corps captured 45 P/W's during this three day period.

Period 30-31 January

Our attack of 30 January launched along the entire V Corps front achieved considerable surprise. The enemy had evacuated WIRTZFELD (K-95 04) just prior to the attack, and he had liberally mined the approaches to KRINKELT (K-97 04) and ROCHERATH (K-97 05). The enemy made use of buildings in both towns to put up a stubborn resistance until he was forced out of the remaining buildings late in the morning of 31 January. Only a group from 11/1056 Infantry Regiment initially opposed our advance to Hill 629 northeast of BULLINGEN (K-96 02), and this resistance was quickly overcome. Stiffest resistance was offered on the central sector where, on the first day of the attack, our troops were pinned down by heavy machine gun and small arms fire. Only a small number of enemy defended ROHREN (K-97 18), but from the pillboxes along the valley to the west and north of the town there was stiff opposition. A counter-attack of forty men from the direction of WIDDAU (K-98 19) was dispersed. The remaining two regiments of the 62nd Infantry Division were identified in the ALZEN-ROHREN area (K-97 15) to (K-95 17), 183 and 190 Infantry Regiments, but they had received few reinforcements, and were only of battalion size. Artillery fire throughout the sector was surprisingly light.

Enemy forces in WIDDAU (K-98 19) surrendered with scarcely any resistance on 31 January. By noon our forces were in control of the high ground along the entire southern bank of the ROER River from MONSCHAU to WIDDAU. In the area south and east of ALZEN, however, the enemy took advantage of the wooded, hilly terrain to delay our advance and give himself time for an orderly withdrawal. A number of fire-fights were staged, the most serious at 2300 hours being broken up by artillery fire. During these last two days of January, the V Corps took 653 P/W's.

PART II - SECTION ACTIVITY

1 January

a. Colonel Ford, accompanied by Sgt Grigaitis, visited the V Corps CIC detachment in EUPEN.
b. Pvt Paul Eisler, of the PPW unit attached to the Section, was promoted to T/5

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c. SO No. F-1, Hq, [illegible] (Fwd), APO 887, dated 1 January 1945, promoted the following personnel of MII Team 416-G:
T/5 Lester C. Engelking to T/4
T/5 Kurt Hess, to T/4
Pvt Richard F. Lichenauer, to T/5

d. The same order mentioned under c. above, promoted Pfc Howard H. Triest of MII Team 407-G to T/5.

2 January

a. SO No. F-99, MIS (Fwd), APO 887, dated 22 December 1944, ordered the transfer of S/Sgt Taylor to PI Team No. 5 as a replacement for M/Sgt Bjerke who left the team due to illness.

6 January

a. T/5 Julius A. Inguagiato was promoted to T/4.

7 January

a. Colonel Ford, accompanied by Sgt Grigaitis, visited the 2nd Infantry Division and the 1st Infantry Division.
b. Major Drinkwater of the Royal Airborne Corps visited the section.

9 January

a. Major Robertson of Fifteenth Army Headquarters joined the section as an observer and departed the following day.

10 January

a. Colonel Platt and Lt. Col. White, the G-2 and assistant G-2 of XIX U.S. Corps, visited the section.
b. Lt. Col. Pickett and Major White from G-2 Section, XXII U.S. Corps, joined the section as observers.

23 January

a. Colonel Dickson, A.C. of S, G-2, First U.S. Army, visited the section.
b. Lt. Col. MacFarland, G-2, 5th Armored Division, visited the section.
c. Lt. Col. Pickett and Major White who had joined the section as observers on 10 January departed.
d. T/4 John Horn of IPW Team No. 11 was promoted to T/3.

24 January

a. Lt. Col. Christensen, G-2, 2nd Infantry Division visited the section.

26 January

a. 1st Lt. Howard C. Goldsmith of OB Team No. 4 was promoted to Captain.

THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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Auth: CO, V Corps
Date: 7 Feb 1945
Initials: _____

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305, U.S. ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

G-1
OPERATIONS REPORT
No. 8

1 January - 31 January 1945

7 February 1945

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MAPS: G503 4042 - BRUSSELS - LIEGE, Sheet No. 3, 1/250000.

I. GENERAL.

1. Organization.

No change.

II. STATION LIST AND STRENGTH OF COMMAND.

1. Divisions.

Division	Period of Attachment or Assignment	Assigned Strength 1 Jan 45 O	Assigned Strength 1 Jan 45 EM	Assigned Strength as of 31 Jan or Last Strength O	Assigned Strength as of 31 Jan or Last Strength EM
1st Infantry Division	1-26 Jan	808	13139	806	12960
2nd Infantry Division	1-31 Jan	791	12047	812	13033
9th Infantry Division	1-31 Jan	832	12973	830	13139
99th Infantry Division	1-31 Jan	689	9959	817	12853
5th Armored Division	1-27 Jan	612	9206	659	9828
7th Armored Division	29-31 Jan	701	9678	696	9624

2. Corps Troops.

Unit	Assigned Strength as of 1 Jan, or Date Joined O	Assigned Strength as of 1 Jan, or Date Joined EM	Date Joined	Assigned Strength as of 31 Jan or Last Strength O	Assigned Strength as of 31 Jan or Last Strength EM	Date of Relief
Hq & Hq Co, V Corps	101	343		99	347	
MP Plat						
Atchd Med Det						
V Corps Air Sup Party						
506th QM Car Co	1	24		1	24	
Flight A, 153rd Ln Sq	1	10		1	10	5 Jan
16th Ord Bomb Disp Sq	1	6		1	6	
17th Ord Bomb Disp Sq	1	6		1	6	
63rd AGF Band	1	31		1	31	
Det D, 165th Sig Photo Co	1	17		1	17	5 Jan
CIC Det 205	1	10		1	10	
APU 137	1	11		1	11	
APU 305	1	12		1	12	
26th MRU	3	45		3	45	
8th Fin Disb Sect	3	17		3	17	
15th Fin Disb Sect	3	18		3	18	
803rd MP Co (Corps)	5	171		5	169	
56th Signal Bn	37	910		37	939	
3250th Sig Service Co	8	117		8	116	
2nd Special Service Co	5	102		5	102	
289lst Engr T I T	1	3		1	3	
86th Chemical Bn	44	543		46	540	
V Corps Artillery, Hq&HqBtry	27	96		28	96	
17th FA Obsn Bn	28	465		28	464	
62nd Armd FA Bn	34	482	24 Jan	36	479	
76th FA Bn #	32	453		31	452	
187th FA Gp	18	75		18	81	
190th FA Gp	16	78		18	79	
406th FA Gp	18	78		18	77	
186th FA Bn #	32	477		29	479	
187th FA Bn	32	484	27 Jan	32	484	
190th FA Bn #	30	510		30	520	
196th FA Bn	32	435		31	433	
200th FA Bn #	35	512		36	510	
268th FA Bn	23	346		24	349	19 [illegible]
272nd FA Bn	29	486		28	485	28 [illegible]
275th FA Bn (Armd)	35	487	29 Jan	35	479	
[illegible]5th FA Obsn Bn, Btry "A"	7	145	13 Jan	7	142	
[illegible]st FA Bn	31	465		31	479	

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Unit	[illegible] as of [illegible]		Date Joined	as of 31 Jan or Last Strength		Date [illegible]
	O	E		O	E	
961st FA Bn #	32	484		32	485	
995rd FA Bn	36	489		35	481	
998th FA Bn	32	486		33	483	
997th FA Bn	27	451	29 Jan	27	451	
977th FA Bn	29	536		28	540	
2nd TD Gp, Hq & Hq Co	17	61		16	59	
612th TD Bn	33	569		38	567	
634th TD Bn		611			612	26 Jan
644th TD Bn	36	603		38	617	
801st TD Bn	31	661		40	636	
814th TD Bn	40	547	29 Jan	39	558	
899th TD Bn	36	589		35	598	
3rd Armored Gp, Hq & Hq Co	18	86		18	86	
741st Tank Bn	38	607		40	606	
745th Tank Bn		709			710	26 Jan
746th Tank Bn	38	627		45	657	
750th Tank Bn	36	654	25 Jan	36	654	
18th AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	11	55		12	61	
115th AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	11	52		12	54	
103rd AAA AW Bn		781			769	26 Jan
134th AAA Gun Bn	33	690		33	691	
203rd AAA AW Bn	41	654	29 Jan	41	653	
376th AAA AW Bn	39	751		39	757	
387th AAA AW Bn	40	651		39	653	27 Jan
440th AAA AW Bn #	37	729		37	744	
441st AAA AW Bn #	37	735		38	756	
442nd AAA AW Bn	40	730		39	730	
535th AAA AW Bn	39	724		38	755	
102nd Cav Gp, Hq & Hq Tr	14	54	24 Jan	14	54	
38th Cav Ren Sq (Mech)	34	552	Trp "A", 6 Jan	43	698	
102nd Cav Ren Sq (Mech)	42	693	24 Jan	42	701	
1121st Engr (C) Gp, Hq&HqCo	16	65		15	65	
1171st Engr (C) Gp, Hq&HqCo	18	64		17	62	
20th Engr (C) Bn	33	595		31	583	
112th Engr (C) Bn #	32	583		32	582	
146th Engr (C) Bn	32	583		30	586	
254th Engr (C) Bn #	31	529		34	538	
1340th Engr (C) Bn	29	572		30	590	
502nd Engr L Pon Co	5	200		4	201	
508th Engr L Pon Co	6	196	28 Jan	6	196	
610th Engr L Equip Co	4	63		4	66	
666th Engr Topo Co	5	115		5	115	
990th Engr Trdwy Br Co	4	130		4	129	
53rd Medical Bn, Hq&Hq Det#	7	21		7	21	
382nd Medical Coll Co	5	95		5	96	
383rd Medical Coll Co	4	86		5	89	
684th Medical Clr Co	13	99		13	99	
97th QM Bn, Hq & Hq Det	7	22		8	21	24 Jan
595th QM Laundry Co	5	263		5	260	24 Jan
606th QM G R Co	6	120		6	120	24 Jan
863rd QM Fumig & Bath Unit	3	83	1 Jan	3	83	24 Jan
446th QM Truck Co	5	106	29 Jan	5	106	
3275th QM Service Co	4	200		4	205	24 Jan
3604th QM Truck Co	5	135		5	135	24 Jan
3892nd QM Truck Co	5	129		5	129	24 Jan
3907th QM Truck Co	5	113		5	123	27 Jan
3912th QM Truck Co	6	110		6	124	27 Jan
3967th QM Truck Co	5	116	29 Jan	5	117	
Provisional Military Gov't Security Guard *						

NOTE: # Denotes detachment with Provisional Military Government Security Guard.
* No assigned strength shown, inasmuch as strength of detachments comprising the Provisional Military Government Security Guard is included in figures of parent units.

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III. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS.

1. Command Post.

1 January thru 31 January 1945 - Eupen, Belgium (K 806260)

2. Inclosures, Collecting Points, PWs and Stragglers - Corps.

a. Inclosures.

Vicinity HUY (K 229180)

b. Collecting Points.

Vicinity EUPEN (K 797275)

c. Straggler Lines.

No straggler lines were maintained. However, 109 stragglers were processed through the Corps Collecting Point.

IV. CASUALTIES.

1. Consolidation of Estimated Losses.

a. Defensive Phase - 1 January (D/209) to 14 January (D/222).

Unit	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Battle Casualties	Sick & Non-Battle Casualties	Total Casualties
1st Inf Div	20	89	20	0	129	510	639
2d Inf Div	14	76	-492*	494	92	407	499
9th Inf Div	39	78	21	0	138	745	883
99th Inf Div	13	148	8	-1	168	434	602
5th Armd Div	2	3	0	0	5	134	139
Corps Troops	15	59	0	1	75	326	401
TOTAL	103	453	-443*	494	607	2556	3163

b. Offensive Phase - 15 January (D/223) to 31 January (D/239)

1st Inf Div	49	566	204	0	819	680	1499
2d Inf Div	60	507	61	6	634	688	1322
9th Inf Div	28	192	17	0	237	665	902
99th Inf Div	273	-141*	13	457	602	470	1072
5th Armd Div	0	1	2	0	3	125	128
7th Armd Div	0	30	2	0	32	78	110
Corps Troops	8	60	-144*	151	75	396	471
TOTAL	418	1215	155	614	2402	3102	5504

c. Consolidation of Estimated Losses - 1 January thru 31 January 1945.

1st Inf Div	69	655	224	0	948	1190	2138
2d Inf Div	74	583	-431*	500	726	1095	1821
9th Inf Div	67	270	38	0	375	1410	1785
99th Inf Div	286	7	21	456	770	904	1674
5th Armd Div	2	4	2	0	8	259	267
7th Armd Div	0	30	2	0	32	78	110
Corps Troops	23	119	-144*	152	150	722	872
TOTAL	521	1668	-288*	1108	3009	5658	8667

NOTE: * As a result of the enemy "breakthrough" of 17 December 1944, and the resultant loss of ground and records, a large group of unaccounted for personnel were allowed to remain in the missing and wounded columns of the "estimated reports" until checks determined the proper status. This was corrected by subsequent adjustments in the killed, wounded and captured columns, resulting, in some cases, in negative figures for the month of January.

For periods of assignment and attachment of units see pars. 1 and 2, Sec. II.

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IV. SIGNALING (Continued)

2. Battle Casualty Reports.

a. The following chart indicates the battle casualties reported through BCR channels for the period 1 - 31 January, 1945, by type of casualty:

(1) Defensive Phase - 1 January (D + 209) through 14 January (D + 222)

Unit	KIA	DOW	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	Total Casualties
1st Inf Div	25	7	7		95	26	22	182
2d Inf Div	8	8	10		41	46	1	114
9th Inf Div	21	6	53	2	89	20	31	222
99th Inf Div	21	4	37		58	21	23	164
5th Armd Div	1				4			5
Corps Troops	1	3	1		7	6		18
TOTAL	77	28	108	2	294	119	77	705

(2) Offensive Phase - 15 January (D+223) through 31 January (D+239)

1st Inf Div	116	8	75		452	243	143	1037
2d Inf Div	58	7	103		232	150	70	620
9th Inf Div	24	2	78	4	78	43	39	268
99th Inf Div	56	4	77	1	132	90	40	400
5th Armd Div						1		1
7th Armd Div	1	1	2			20		24
Corps Troops	4		1	1	10	8		24
TOTAL	259	22	336	6	904	555	292	2374

(3) Total for January 1945.

1st Inf Div	141	15	82		547	269	165	1219
2d Inf Div	66	15	113		273	196	71	734
9th Inf Div	45	8	131	6	167	63	70	490
99th Inf Div	77	8	114	1	190	111	63	564
5th Armd Div	1				4	1		6
7th Armd Div	1	1	2			20		24
Corps Troops	5	3	2	1	17	14		42
TOTAL	336	50	444	8	1198	674	369	3079

b. Battle Casualties sustained by Divisions and Corps Troops during January by arm or service.

Unit	INF	FA	MD	CE	CAV	CAC	CMS	SC	MC	TOTAL
(1) Defensive Phase - 1 January (D+209) through 14 January (D+222)										
1st Inf Div	165	9	2	6						182
2d Inf Div	98	3	3	7	1	1			1	114
9th Inf Div	208	4	6	4						222
99th Inf Div	149	7	6		1	1				164
5th Armd Div	2	1	1	1						5
Corps Troops	1	8		2	1	1	4		1	18
TOTAL	623	32	18	20	3	3	4	-	2	705
(2) Offensive Phase - 15 January (D+223) through 31 January (D+239)										
1st Inf Div	987	19	22	4	2	2			1	1037
2d Inf Div	584	18	12	5		1				620
9th Inf Div	257	1	6	3				1		268
99th Inf Div	380	6	14							400
5th Armd Div				1						1
7th Armd Div	20		1		3					24
Corps Troops		14		4	2	1	3			24
TOTAL	2228	58	55	17	7	4	3	1	1	2374
(3) Total for January 1945.										
1st Inf Div	1152	28	24	10	2	2			1	1219
2d Inf Div	682	21	15	12	1	2			1	734
9th Inf Div	465	5	12	7				1		490
5th Armd Div	2	1	1	2						6
7th Armd Div	20		1		3					24
99th Inf Div	529	13	20		1	1				564
Corps Troops	1	22		6	3	2	7		1	42
TOTAL	2851	90	73	37	10	7	7	1	3	3079

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IV. CASUALTIES (Continued)

2. Battle Casualty Reports (Continued).

c. The following charts indicate the casualties by type and casualties by arm or service reported through BCR channels for the period 1 - 31 December 1944. These reports were not included in Report No. 7 nor added as a supplement as indicated in said report due to late receipt. They are included herewith for comparative purposes.

Unit	KIA	DOW	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	Total Casualties
(1). Attack Phase - 1 December (D/178) to 7 December (D/184)								
1st Inf Div					1			1
8th Inf Div	65	8	49		445	61	184	812
9th Inf Div	5	1	5		12	2	3	28
99th Inf Div	7	1	11	1	26	3		49
5th Armd Div	26	3	16	1	118	28	15	207
Corps Troops	32	5	18	3	62	17	5	142
TOTAL	135	18	99	5	664	111	207	1239
(2) Attack Phase - 8 December (D/185) to 15 December (D/192)								
1st Inf Div	1		1		2	1		5
2nd Inf Div	25	8	48		221	78	18	398
8th Inf Div	54	13	22	1	245	47	126	508
78th Inf Div	85	7	62		470	37	121	782
99th Inf Div	17	2	8		134	15	19	195
5th Armd Div	2	2			8		2	14
9th Armd Div								-
Corps Troops	17	2	25	3	69	17	1	134
TOTAL	201	34	166	4	1149	195	287	2036
(3) Defense Phase - 16 December (D/193) to 31 December (D/208)								
1st Inf Div	86	5	40	1	351	78	107	668
2nd Inf Div	130	28	130	2	586	247	900	2023
8th Inf Div	17		4		43	14	56	134
9th Inf Div	38	12	68	3	116	23	17	277
30th Inf Div	17		22	2	63	16	294	414
78th Inf Div	36	5	28	2	196	28	398	693
99th Inf Div	111	17	161	10	536	88	1449	2372
3rd Armd Div	2				6			8
5th Armd Div	7	4			6	1	4	22
9th Armd Div								-
Corps Troops	35	12	18	3	122	37	113	340
TOTAL	479	83	471	23	2025	532	3338	6951
(4) Total for December 1944.								
1st Inf Div	87	5	41	1	354	79	107	674
2d Inf Div	155	36	178	2	807	325	918	2421
8th Inf Div	136	21	75	1	733	122	366	1454
9th Inf Div	43	13	73	3	128	85	20	305
30th Inf Div	17		22	2	63	16	294	414
78th Inf Div	121	12	90	2	666	65	519	1475
99th Inf Div	135	20	180	11	696	106	1468	2616
3rd Armd Div	2				6			8
5th Armd Div	35	9	16	1	132	29	21	243
9th Armd Div								-
Corps Troops	84	19	61	9	253	71	119	616
TOTAL	815	135	736	32	3838	838	3832	10226

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IV. CASUALTIES (Continued).

2. Battle Casualty Reports (Continued).

d. Battle Casualties sustained by Divisions and Corps Troops during December, 1944, by arm or service.

Unit	INF	FA	MD	MC	CE	CAV	CAC	AMC	QMS	ORD	SC	FIN	MAC	CM	DC	MP	MO	ARC	TOTAL
(1) Attack Phase - 1 December (D/178) to 7 December (D/184)																			
1st Inf Div		1																	1
8th Inf Div	783	12	10		5	2													812
9th Inf Div	26	1		1															28
99th Inf Div	43		2		4														49
5th Armd Div	196	4	6			1													207
Corps Troops	67	30	2		27	11	2		3										142
TOTAL	1115	48	20	1	36	14	2	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1239
(2) Attack Phase - 8 December (D/185) to 15 December (D/192)																			
1st Inf Div	4	1																	5
2d Inf Div	364	12	20		2														398
8th Inf Div	482	6	12		3	1	4												508
78th Inf Div	722	12	30		18														782
99th Inf Div	185	1	9																195
5th Armd Div	14																		14
9th Armd Div																			-
Corps Troops	61	38	5	1	9	4	4		10								2		134
TOTAL	1832	70	76	1	32	5	8	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2036
(3) Defense Phase - 16 December (D/193) to 31 December (D/208)																			
1st Inf Div	610	33	12		9	1	1			1	1								668
2d Inf Div	1552	229	42	1	104	17	11	20		21	15	1	2			5	3		2023
8th Inf Div	120	2	5		5	2													134
9th Inf Div	209	9	1	1	43		11	1									2		277
30th Inf Div	393	13	4		4														414
78th Inf Div	650	28	12		1						1			1					693
99th Inf Div	1927	239	118	1	35	21	1	2	1		6		1	1	1	10	8		2372
3rd Armd Div	3	4					1												8
5th Armd Div	15	3			1	2	1												22
9th Armd Div																			-
Corps Troops	21	108	12	1	106	23	27	5	18		17							2	340
TOTAL	5500	668	206	4	308	66	53	28	19	22	40	1	3	2	1	15	13	2	6951
(4) Total for December 1944.																			
1st Inf Div	614	35	12		9	1	1			1	1								674
2d Inf Div	1916	241	62	1	106	17	11	20		21	15	1	2			5	3		2421
8th Inf Div	1385	20	27		13	5	4												1454
9th Inf Div	235	10	1	2	43		11	1									2		305
30th Inf Div	393	13	4		4														414
78th Inf Div	1372	40	42		19						1			1					1475
99th Inf Div	2155	240	129	1	39	21	1	2	1		6		1	1	1	10	8		2616
3rd Armd Div	3	4					1												8
5th Armd Div	225	7	6		1	3	1												243
9th Armd Div																			-
Corps Troops	149	176	19	2	142	38	33	5	31		17						2	2	616
TOTAL	8447	786	302	6	376	85	63	28	32	22	40	1	3	2	1	15	15	2	10226

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V. GRAVES REGISTRATION.

1. Cemeteries.

[illegible] period at [illegible] (X 705352).

2. Collecting Points.

a. Collecting points were as follows:

(1) Vicinity [illegible] (X 792259)
(2) Vicinity [illegible] (X 843089)

VI. REINFORCEMENTS.

1. The flow of reinforcements continued heavy throughout the first half of the period to restock divisions reduced as a result of losses suffered in the enemy "breakthrough" in December. The 99th Infantry Division received the larger allotments.

2. The following table, based on information extracted from Daily Estimated Loss Reports, shows the number of reinforcements received during the month of January:

Divisions	1 - 14 Jan	15 - 31 Jan	Total
1st Infantry Division	456	1593	2049
2nd Infantry Division	1305	1821	3126
9th Infantry Division	500	904	1404
99th Infantry Division	2095	2249	4344
5th Armored Division	434	425	859
7th Armored Division		375	375
Sub-Total Divisions	4790	7367	12157
Corps Troops			
*Hq & Hq Co, V Corps	10	10	20
803rd MP Co (Corps)		1	1
V Corps Artillery	1		1
187th FA Gp	3		3
190th FA Gp		1	1
406th FA Gp		1	1
17th FA Obsn Bn		3	3
62nd FA Bn (Armd)		3	3
76th FA Bn	4	1	5
186th FA Bn	5	4	9
190th FA Bn		1	1
196th FA Bn	7	7	14
200th FA Bn		5	5
268th FA Bn	3		3
285th FA Obsn Bn		2	2
751st FA Bn	12	7	19
941st FA Bn	3	2	5
953rd FA Bn	2	5	7
987th FA Bn	5		5
997th FA Bn	4	6	10
612th TD Bn	24	18	42
634th TD Bn	27	12	39
644th TD Bn	23	27	50
801st TD Bn	22	7	29
814th TD Bn		2	2
899th TD Bn	20	8	28
741st Tank Bn	17	32	49
745th Tank Bn	15	17	32
746th Tank Bn	33	41	74
18th AAA Gp	3	2	5
115th AAA Gp		3	3
103rd AAA Bn		2	2
134th AAA Bn		15	15
203rd AAA Bn		2	2
376th AAA Bn	12	5	17

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VI. [illegible] (Continued).

Corps Troops	1 - 14 Jan	15 - 31 Jan	Total
387th AAA Bn	1	8	9
460th AAA Bn	14	14	28
461st AAA Bn	19	19	38
462nd AAA Bn	22	10	32
535th AAA Bn	27	25	52
1121st Engr (C) Gp		4	4
1171st Engr (C) Gp	2		2
20th Engr (C) Bn	9	2	11
112th Engr (C) Bn	5	9	14
146th Engr (C) Bn	15	7	22
254th Engr (C) Bn	9	26	35
1340th Engr (C) Bn	20	17	37
502nd Engr L Pon Co		4	4
990th Engr Trdwy Br Co		3	3
38th Cav Ron Sq (Mecz)	23	20	43
102nd Cav Ron Sq (Mecz)		16	16
86th Chemical Bn	20	30	50
56th Signal Bn	13	15	28
2250th Signal Serv Co		1	1
382nd Medical Coll Co		1	1
383rd Medical Coll Co	5	1	6
506th QM Car Co	2		2
3275th QM Service Co	6		6
Sub-Total Corps Troops	467	484	951
GRAND TOTAL - DIVISIONS AND CORPS TROOPS	5257	7851	13108

NOTE: For periods of assignment and attachment of units see pars. 1 and 2, Sec. II.

VII. PRISONERS OF WAR.

Unit	1 - 14 Jan	15 - 31 Jan	Total
1st Infantry Division	37	1277	1314
2d Infantry Division	41	293	334
9th Infantry Division	56	291	347
99th Infantry Division	31	101	132
5th Armored Division			-
7th Armored Division		83	83
Corps Troops	10	8	18
TOTAL	175	2053	2228

NOTE: For periods of assignment and attachment of units see pars. 1 and 2, Sec. II.

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VIII. PROMOTIONS.

1. Status of Promotions and Appointments.

	Recd at Hq V Corps	Forwarded to First U.S. Army	Pending at Hq V Corps	Returned or Disapproved by Hq V Corps	Recd by First U.S. Army	Pending at First U.S. Army	Officers Promoted or Appointed
APPOINTMENTS 1-31 Jan 45							
Battlefield							
Corps less Divisions	13	13	0	3	0	5	15
Divisions	-	-	-	-	-	-	173
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	188
Regular							
Corps less Divisions	1	1	0	0	0	11	2
Divisions	5	5	0	0	0	24	0
TOTAL	6	6	0	0	0	35	2
PROMOTIONS 1-31 Jan 45							
Battlefield							
Corps less Divisions	11	12	0	0	0	7	19
Divisions	-	-	-	-	-	-	102
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	121
Regular							
Corps less Divisions	41	35	0	6	0	15	27
Divisions	110	110	0	0	0	63	92
TOTAL	151	145	0	6	0	78	119

2. Reclassification, Reassignment and Demotions.

	Brig Gen	Col	Lt Col	Maj	Capt	1st Lt	2nd Lt	WO	Total
Reclassification					5	3	5		13
Reassignment					NONE				
Demotion					NONE				
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	5	3	5	-	13

IX. MORALE.

1. Unit Citations.

a. Approved in January:

2d Engr (C) Bn, 2d Inf Div.
2d Bn, 47th Inf Regt, 9th Inf Div.

b. Recommended in January:

26th Inf Regt, 1st Inf Div.
2d Bn, 39th Inf Regt, 9th Inf Div
3rd Bn, 39th Inf Regt, 9th Inf Div
3rd Bn, 47th Inf Regt, 9th Inf Div

2. Decorations and Awards.

See following chart.

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IV. MORALE (Continued)

2. Decorations and Awards.

Unit	Medal of Honor		DSC		DSM		Legion of Merit		Silver Star		DFC		Bronze Star		Soldier's Medal		Air Medal	
	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded	Pen-ding	Awar-ded
V Corps, Hq & Hq Co					1		10	1					3	5				
V Corps Arty					1									5				1
1st Inf Div	2		5	2	1	1	1							1				
2nd Inf Div	1		2	1			2	1		8				11				
4th Inf Div				1			6											
5th Armd Div			4	2														
7th Armd Div										82				269				8
9th Inf Div	1		12				1			183	2			678		1		10
28th Inf Div			1	1	1		1											
29th Inf Div							4											
99th Inf Div			1	1			1			50	9			217				5
3rd TD Gp														1				
16th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd														2				
18th AAA Gp														8				
38th Cav Recn Sq							1			6				32				
53rd Med Bn														8				
56th Sig Bn													2	18				
62nd Armd FA Bn														17				1
76th FA Bn													1	8				
86th Cml Bn			1							12				3				
102nd Cav Gp							1											
112th Engr (C) Bn									2	2			2	2				
115th AAA Gp							1	1										
134th AAA Gun Bn										1								
146th Engr (C) Bn				1					1				1	1				
165th Sig Photo Det														5				
186th FA Bn													1	7				1
187th FA Gp														1				1
187th FA Bn														1				1
190th FA Gp														1				
190th FA Bn														3				
196th FA Bn			1							6				1				
200th FA Bn														3				2

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2. Decorations and Awards (continued)

Unit	Medal of Honor		DSC		DSM		Legion of Merit		Silver Star		DFC		Bronze Star		Soldier's Medal		Air Medal		Totals	
	Pen-ding	Award-ed	Pen-ding	Award-ed	Pen-ding	Award-ed	Pen-ding	Award-ed	Pen-ding	Award-ed	Pen-ding	Award-ed	Pen-ding	Award-ed	Pen-ding	Award-ed	Pen-ding	Award-ed	Pen-ding	Award-ed
203rd AAA AW Bn										6				17						23
205th CIC Det														1						1
254th Engr (C) Bn										4			1	5					1	9
268th FA Bn														3				1		4
275th Armd FA Bn										6				11						17
376th AAA AW Bn										6				10						16
460th AAA AW Bn										1				4						
406th FA Gp																		1		1
461st AAA AW Bn														1						1
502nd Engr L Pon Co														2						2
535th AAA AW Bn														3						3
610th Engr L Equip Co													1						1	
628th TD Bn				1																1
644th TD Bn														1						1
668th Engr Topo Co														1						1
741st Tank Bn			1	1															1	1
745th Tank Bn				1																1
746th Tank Bn														3						3
751st FA Bn																	3			3
773rd TD Bn				2																2
801st TD Bn										2				20						22
814th TD Bn										8				37						45
893rd TD Bn										5				9						
899th TD Bn										6				1						
941st FA Bn																	2			2
953rd FA Bn																	3			3
955th FA Bn										1				1			1			3
987th FA Bn				1						8				1			1			11
997th FA Bn													1	1			2		1	3
1121st Engr (C) Gp														2						2
1171st Engr (C) Gp														1						1
3273th QM Serv Co														1						1
3604th QM Trk Co														1						1
3267th QM Trk Co														1						1
TOTALS	4	-	28	15	4	1	29	3	3	403	11	-	13	1116	-	1	-	44	92	1913

NOTE: "Pending" columns as of 31 Jan 45; "Awarded" columns are for the month of Jan 45.

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II. MORALE (Continued)

3. Postal.

a. On 1 January 1945, V Corps troops were being serviced from APO 305 located in Limbourg-Dolhain, Belgium, and from APO 137 operating in Eupen, Belgium. This arrangement of V Corps postal section has worked out very satisfactorily.

b. Due to the tactical situation in December, 1944, and the large number of troop movements the mail was considerably delayed. This created a large backlog of first class letter mail and parcels. During the month of January this backlog has been considerably reduced. In view of the large number of troops now on the continent, there is very little hope for a consistent flow of airmail due to the lack of available air transport from the United States. A large quantity of this airmail will have to be transported by surface carriers.

c. It is anticipated that V Mail service will be considerably improved in the future, inasmuch as buildings have been acquired and machinery is being installed to process V Mail on the continent. This will expedite V Mail service a great deal, especially to troops in the forward areas.

d. The following is a summary of postal business transacted during the month of January:

(1) Picked up at 26th Postal Regulating Section at Liege, Belgium, 9,609 sacks of parcel mail and 1,162 pouches of first class mail for distribution to V Corps troops.

(2) During the same period, 2,910 sacks of parcels and 721 pouches of first class mail were dispatched from APO 305.

(3) 856 pieces of registered mail were delivered and 664 pieces dispatched.

(4) Money order business amounted to $402,496.77, comprised of 8,028 money orders issued in the amount of $369,834.13, and 1,248 orders paid amounting to $32,662.64.

(5) Sales of stamps and stamped paper totaled $21,200.19.

4. Religious Activities.

a. At the close of the period of this report, there were 75 chaplains assigned or attached to V Corps. During this period, 31 chaplains were picked up and 28 dropped as a result of troop assignments, evacuations, replacements and one reclassification. While there were no casualties among chaplains, at the end of the month five vacancies existed.

b. There were seven awards made to chaplains during January, which included five Bronze Stars and two Purple Hearts.

c. The following compilation indicates the scope of chaplains' activities for the month:

Number	Services	Attendance
1,209	Sunday services	77,816
2,079	Weekday services	78,248
7,970	Confessions	
11,552	Communions	
18,126	Pastoral, educational, recreational and misc.	28,325
3	Baptisms	
126	Funerals	
82	Extreme unctions	
115	Rosaries distributed	
6,422	Religious pamphlets distributed	
92	New Testaments distributed	
384	Jewish Scriptures distributed	
36,607	Mileage traveled by all chaplains	

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IX. Morale (Continued)

[illegible]. Religious Activities (Continued)

[illegible] made [illegible] changes in policy affecting the Corps as follows:

(1) Supplies will be requisitioned here [illegible] looked up by Corps direct from base section.

(2) The administrative [illegible] of Corps by [illegible] will be discontinued.

(3) Corps chaplains will assist in the future in the coverage of army cemeteries. Formerly army furnished chaplain coverage for its own cemeteries.

[illegible]. Red Cross Field Director.

a. Previous reports from the Field Director have invited attention to the necessity of [illegible] leave for men overseas and particularly for men of this Corps, who have been overseas relatively longer than some other units. They have also pointed to the lack of a policy permitting men to return to the U.S. for rest, recreation or for family problems resulting from the long periods spent of our troops spent in the E.T.O. These points were definitely a factor in the low morale noted during the period 15 October thru 30 November. However, the German "breakthrough" had a very favorable effect on morale throughout the period of the report. In addition, returns to the United States were continued and plans initiated for trips to the U.K. A large number of compassionate cases were returned to the U.S. as part of the quota allowed during the early [illegible] period. Full credit for operation was given to the organization of the Field Director.

b. The following statistics indicate the activity of the Field Director in social service [illegible] during this period:

[illegible] cases brought forward from previous month.
[illegible] new and reopened cases.
[illegible] recurrent cases.
[illegible] cases closed during the month.
[illegible] cases required continued service.
[illegible] cases required brief service.
[illegible] total cases handled.

c. An analysis of the quota cases reveals the following types:

[illegible] personal problems
[illegible] family problems
[illegible] home condition reports
[illegible] dependency report
[illegible] financial
[illegible] health and welfare
[illegible] furloughs
[illegible] allotments

6. Special Service.

During the first half of the period special service activities were at a very reduced scale with entertainment personnel removed from the combat area and nearly all units occupied with reorganization, resupply and otherwise restoring combat losses that resulted from the enemy breakthrough of the preceding period. The last half of the period found a need for the re-establishment of morale activities and a reinstatement of passes, etc. Paris passes were re-established on 19 January, at which time the quota was substantially increased and the pass period was increased to 72 hours. The V Corps Recreation Center, which had been closed on 17 December, was reopened on 28 January with the Corps Special Service Officer in charge. The quota continued at 600 during each 48

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period. A plan was announced by First U. S. Army to provide for leaves to the United Kingdom. However, the plan did not become operative during the period of this report. Passes to Brussels were authorized. Listed below are the recreational pass quotas allotted the Corps, to include divisions, during the period of this report:

Paris	Eupen	Brussels	U. K.	U.S.
379 officers 1596 enlisted men 75 colored	1050 officers and enlisted men	16 officers 81 enlisted men	None	19 officers 219 enlisted men

Other activities of the Special Service Section during the period are summarized below:

a. Post Exchanges.

Post Exchanges continued to function during the period and with the reopening of the Corps Recreation Center a large central Post Exchange was reopened in Eupen. During the month 200 watches were received for distribution to units of Corps, exclusive of divisions, who received distribution direct from First Army. First Army announced that for the next period Coca-Cola would be available as an item of issue, and, for the first time since the sales Post Exchange opened, an accumulation of beer was on hand, which promises a larger quota for distribution to units.

b. Special Service Company.

The Company kept two live shows and 15 movie teams on the road during the entire period, and, with the reopening of the recreation center, furnished two 2-1/2 ton trucks, two officers and seven enlisted men to the recreation center. During the month the two Special Service Company G. I. Shows gave 40 performances to an attendance of 8975. Likewise, the teams showed 35 different movies 683 times to an attendance of 108,180.

c. Jeep Shows.

On 20 January the Corps received three Jeep Shows constituted of from 3 to 8 men loaded into jeeps for the purpose of touring combat units. During the limited experience for the period of the report, they were enthusiastically received by the troops. The advantages of this type of entertainment lie in the fact that the shows are mobile, the entertainers versatile, and the shows can be split up into groups as small as individuals to entertain small groups of soldiers under combat conditions. They gave a total of 53 shows during the month, playing to 13,840 personnel.

d. U.S.O. Shows.

On 13 January the Stalzer unit of three men and two women joined the Corps. This unit does not have the entertainment possibilities of previous units but was able to play for rear installations, and, with the reopening of the Recreation Center, began regularly scheduled shows to troops on pass. During the month of January the unit played 27 performances to an attendance of 12,325 people.

e. Unit Projectors.

The Corps Special Service Section continued to service units, to include divisions, by the rotation of film and assisting in the repair and maintenance of unit projectors. Spare parts for projectors continued to be a critical item. Projector repair items from First U. S. Army proved of assistance, but during the month 35 to 40% of unit projectors continued unserviceable. The 2nd Special Service Company initiated a school for projectionists, starting 20 January, in an effort to preserve film and protect equipment from misuse.

f. Publications.

On 20 January the Stars and Stripes began publication of a Liege edition. The advantages are quicker delivery and more local news. As an example, V Corps was cited twice in issues subsequent to 20 January which makes

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the third time since D-Day reference to Corps has been made in the Stars and Stripes. The New York Herald Tribune Continental edition has replaced the British Daily Mail as supplemental reading and, while the basis of issue remains one paper per hundred men, which is not sufficient coverage, it is a distinct improvement over the Daily Mail. Publications received and distributed during the month were as follows:

Stars and Stripes	- 837,000
Yank Magazine	- 50,000
Army Talks	- 25,000
N.Y. Herald-Tribune	- 14,000

c. 63rd Army Ground Force Band.

With the closing of the recreation center, the band became a minor item in the entertainment field inasmuch as it was impractical to transport it to units and there existed a shortage of facilities for inside entertainment. For the period the band gave 21 performances to an attendance of 11,800.

h. Clubmobiles.

Clubmobiles returned to special service activities on 15 January. During the balance of the period Clubmobiles travelled 931 miles to serve 310,400 doughnuts to 58,564 men. With the reopening of the recreation center a portion of their activities was concentrated in Aupen.

7. Temporary Duty in the United States.

a. Early in December 1944, instructions were received from First Army that 289 individuals from the Corps, as then constituted, could be returned that month to the U.S., for 30 days temporary duty for rest, recuperation and rehabilitation. Selection was limited to personnel:

(1) Twice hospitalized for wounds;
(2) Twice decorated for bravery;
(3) With 6 months service in combat zone who could present evidence of home emergency.

This quota was ultimately readjusted between organizations as follows:

8th Infantry Division	43
9th Infantry Division	98
99th Infantry Division	0
Corps Troops	45

The readjustment was necessitated by the inability of divisions to meet the priorities established by higher headquarters.

b. The January, 1945, quota was established at 288 individuals and the priorities were changed so that the only restrictions on the selection of individuals were:

(1) Extended service overseas and efficient performance of duty.
(2) Exceptional cases of a compassionate nature.

Cir. No. 124, [illegible], (1944) outlining administrative procedure to be followed was received. The quota for January 1945 was sub-allotted as follows:

1st Infantry Division	80
2nd Infantry Division	55
9th Infantry Division	80
99th Infantry Division	0*
5th Armored Division	30
Corps Troops	43

* 99th Inf Div was afforded opportunity to submit exceptional cases of a compassionate nature to be charged, if approved, against the quota for Corps Troops. None were submitted.

As was expected, no difficulty was experienced in filling these quotas and no readjustment between organizations was necessary.

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7. Temporary Duty in the United States.

c. A survey was instituted to determine the number of personnel in the Corps with protracted continuous overseas service. Reports of this survey were submitted informally to First Army, and that headquarters immediately directed that a complete survey of its command be made. Meanwhile this headquarters was asked for and submitted as its official opinion that no differentiation be made between combat and service troops in computing priority for temporary duty in the U.S., based on length of service overseas. The results of this survey are shown in the attached chart.

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Corps Troops and Divisions

Personnel Overseas by Indicated Number of Months

	Assigned Strength	12	13	14	16	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36
Corps Troops	16445	381	555	2485	1990	201	286	940	538	29	26	53	15	120	55	523	390	1154	126	332	9	179	17	265	400	31
1st Inf Div & atchd units	15425	710	224	565	105	25	499	134	303	450	351	196	245	42	111	162	203	101	4974	245	11	465	8	70	15	2
2nd Inf Div & atchd units	15193	360	242	344	7795	23	35	54	16	16	6	3	3	13	4	18	15	21	60	6	0	5	3	13	5	5
9th Inf Div & atchd units	18575	223	349	90	39	700	34	169	385	195	104	281	70	85	1055	2224	2257	57	12	7	[illegible]	5	2	3	4	[illegible]
95th Inf Div & atchd units	14601	41	22	25	29	12	145	24	3	5	1	0	0	0	13	3	25	41	45	4	2	0	0	0	2	2
5th Armd Div & atchd units	11272	47	25	16	72	8	6	3	2	1	0	0	8	0	1	2	2	4	4	1	0	0	1	1	1	1
TOTAL CORPS TROOPS AND DIVISIONS	94012	2357	1415	4125	10031	974	1058	1124	1347	706	497	513	349	1165	1768	4949	3392	1366	5421	655	28	657	31	250	426	41

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ersonnel overseas by Indicated Number of Months

END	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	Over 36
48	381	855	2483	1990	201	286	948	536	29	46	33	18	120	33	525	390	1164	128	332	5	179	17	263	403	31	2
25	710	224	555	105	25	439	134	303	469	551	196	245	183	111	152	203	101	494	245	11	465	5	0	18	2	11
03	360	242	944	7795	23	35	54	16	16	5	3	3	13	4	15	16	21	80	6	0	4	3	13	5	5	3
75	228	349	90	39	700	34	169	395	195	104	281	70	85	1803	2224	2227	37	12	7	0	5	2	3	4	0	23
01	41	22	45	49	12	143	24	3	5	1	0	0	3	13	3	25	41	45	4	2	0	0	0	3	2	3
72	47	23	16	72	8	6	3	2	1	0	0	3	0	1	2	2	4	4	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
12	2367	1415	4125	10031	974	1038	1124	1347	706	437	815	345	1155	1765	2929	3392	1266	3221	555	28	857	31	240	423	41	42

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2. PROVOST MARSHAL

1. The following Military Police units were available to V Corps during the period of this report:

Military Police Platoon, Headquarters Company, V Corps.
803rd Military Police Company (Corps)
428th Military Police Escort Guard Company
Military Police Platoon, 1st Infantry Division (1 Jan to 26 Jan)
" " " 2nd Infantry Division (1 Jan to 31 Jan)
" " " 9th Infantry Division (1 Jan to 31 Jan)
" " " 99th Infantry Division (1 Jan to 31 Jan)
" " " 5th Armored Division (1 Jan to 27 Jan)
" " " 7th Armored Division (29 Jan to 31 Jan)

2. There were no serious problems in the enforcement of order and discipline encountered by the Provost Marshal during the period.

3. The location of Corps Rear and Forward boundaries during the period were:

a. 1 January 1945 - Corps Forward Boundary - Corps left (North) boundary at (K 852261) - SW to (K 831240) - SW to Hwy N-28 (K 801235) - South along Hwy N-28 to junction with Hwy N-27 (K 805162) - SW to SART (K 720150), all inclusive to Corps.

b. 26 January 1945 - Corps Forward Boundary - Corps left (North) boundary at (K 885261) - SW to (K 831240) - SW to Hwy N-28 (K 801235) - S along Hwy N-28 to junction with Hwy N-27 (K805162) - thence along Hwy N-27 to (K 857112) E to RJ (K 859110) - S along road to RJ (K 861099) - E to RJ (K 874092) N to RR thence S along RR to RR crossing (K 874074) - SE along road to Corps right (South) boundary.

c. 1 January 1945 - Corps Rear Boundary - Eupen (inclusive to Corps) - Verviers (Towns and road exclusive to Corps).

d. 26 January 1945 - Corps Rear Boundary - Eupen (Inclusive to Corps) - Verviers - Theux - Louveigne - Sougue (Toens and road exclusive to Corps).

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XI. [illegible]

1. Operations:

The following [illegible] for the month of January, 1945:

	V Corps Finance Sect.	5th Finance Sec. Section	12th Finance Sec. Section
TOTAL CREDIT - For Pay and Allowance (excluding Travel)	[illegible]	1,101,[illegible].18	1,2[illegible],[illegible]2.73
ADD: Repayments of Soldiers' Deposits (Including Interest)	2,[illegible].21	[illegible].27	11,[illegible].32
(1) TOTAL CREDIT	[illegible]	1,1[illegible],[illegible].45	1,271,[illegible].05
LESS: ALLOTMENTS:			
Class "A"	$ 10,271.25	$ 64,622.30	$ 38,901.04
Class "E"	96,[illegible].03	356,630.18	429,[illegible]1.38
Class "F"	22,477.[illegible]	133,[illegible].80	13[illegible],791.22
Class "[illegible]"	[illegible]	--- --- ---	1,[illegible].14
Class "[illegible]"	1[illegible]	1[illegible].67	1[illegible].14
Class "[illegible]"	10,410.[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible],772.30
(2) TOTAL ALLOTMENTS	146,[illegible].1[illegible]	[illegible]	7[illegible],[illegible].62
(2a) PARTIAL PAYMENTS OFFICERS (Debits)	200.00	$ 1,[illegible]	[illegible].00
(2b) TOTAL ITEMS (2) and (2a)	146,[illegible].21	[illegible]	72[illegible],[illegible].62
(3) GROSS AMOUNT CHARGEABLE TO APPROPRIATIONS (Item (1) less Item (2b))	139,[illegible].86	$ 46[illegible],177.98	$ 500,715.43
LESS: VOUCHER COLLECTIONS			
PTA - Funds	$ 2,168.30	$ 18,2[illegible].32	$ 27,[illegible].77
War Bonds	--- --- ---	--- --- ---	--- --- ---
Soldiers' Deposits	3,674.[illegible]	4,304.[illegible]	21,[illegible].30
Other Collections	6,536.29	17,031.84	17,[illegible].17
(4) TOTAL VOUCHER COLLECTIONS	$ 12,378.[illegible]	$ 39,6[illegible].76	65,[illegible].14
(5) NET DISBURSEMENTS FOR PAY AND ALL. (Item (3) less Item (4))	$126,717.[illegible]	$ 4[illegible],[illegible].22	$ 4[illegible],332.29
LESS: CASH COLLECTIONS			
PTA - Funds	293,258.[illegible]	$ 1[illegible],397.17	$ 154,2[illegible].43
War Bonds	1,425.00	[illegible],428.75	4,091.25
Soldiers' Deposits	11,[illegible].00	27,239.00	64,734.00
Other Collections	40,[illegible].36	[illegible]	10,[illegible].30
(6) TOTAL CASH COLLECTIONS	346,[illegible].43	$ [illegible],522.31	231,660.98
NET CASH RETAINED (Item (5) less Item (6))	(-217,[illegible].16)	1[illegible],960.31	238,171.31

2. Savings:

Following is a summary of savings for January, 1945:

(1) TOTAL NUMBER OF PAYEES: 26,348
(2) TOTAL CREDIT FOR PAY AND ALLOWANCES: $3,645,124.67
(3) PERCENTAGE OF ALLOTMENTS TO TOTAL CREDIT: 22.7%
(4) PERCENTAGE OF NET CASH RETAINED TO TOTAL CREDIT: 8.8%
(5) PERCENTAGE OF NET CASH RETAINED TO NET DISBURSEMENT: 22.1%
(6) AVERAGE AMOUNT RETAINED BY EACH PAYEE: $ 8.88
(7) COMMERCIAL VOUCHERS PAID: Number 2 Amount: $96.71
(8) TOTAL NUMBER OF PTA's: 1,397
(9) OBLIGATIONS - COMMANDING GENERAL'S OFFICIAL ENTERTAINMENT FUND: None
(10) OBLIGATIONS - MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND C.I.C. FUNDS: $60.00
(11) TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL WAR BOND SALES: 6,285

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VII. DISCIPLINE.

1. Courts Martial.

a. Following is a summary of court martial cases for Corps troops and attached divisions for the month of January, 1945:

	GENERAL	SPECIAL	SUMMARY
Corps Troops (under court-martial jurisdiction of V Corps)	8	47	42
2d Infantry Division	5	9	2
9th Infantry Division	6	27	10
99th Infantry Division	1	0	3
7th Armored Division	4	20	8
TOTALS	24	103	65

b. Following is an analysis of the types of offenses for which Corps Troops were tried:

OFFENSES	GENERAL	SPECIAL	SUMMARY
Assault with intent to rape	1		
Assault with intent to do bodily harm	1		
Assault and battery	1		
Disrespect to Superior Officer	1	1	1
Wilful disobedience of Superior Officer	1		
AWOL and other violations of AW 61	2	34	9
Desertion	1		
Sentinel drunk on post	2		
Fail to obey orders of competent authority		7	12
False official statement			3
Drunkenness and related offenses		5	4
Disobedience, striking or disrespect to NCO		3	3
Misbehavior of sentinel			2
Wrongful using, loss or damage to gov't property		5	
Larceny		3	
Speeding			7
Receive stolen property		1	
Breach of restriction		1	
Wrongfully urinate in billets			1
TOTALS *	10	60	42

Note: * These totals include cases where accused has in one trial been found guilty of two or more different types of offenses, hence the total offenses analyzed by type is necessarily greater than the number of cases tried as shown in par. 1, above.

c. Following is a breakdown according to units, of General, Special and Summary Court Martial cases for Corps Troops:

UNIT	GENERAL	SPECIAL	SUMMARY
200th [illegible] Bn	1		
3275th [illegible] Service Co	1		2
1340th Engr (C) Bn	1	2	1
134th [illegible] Gun Bn	1	4	3
3892nd [illegible] Truck Co	1		
3250th Sig Service Co	2	1	
963rd [illegible] Fumigation & Bath Co	1		
196th [illegible] Bn		1	6
2[illegible]th Engr (C) Bn		9	
1st [illegible] Group			3

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UNIT	[illegible]	[illegible]	SUMMARY
953rd F[illegible] Bn			1
46[illegible]th [illegible] Bn		3	
4[illegible]1st [illegible] Bn			3
382nd Med Coll Co		1	
254th Engr ([illegible]) Bn		2	
751st F[illegible] Bn			
112th Engr ([illegible]) [illegible]			2
17th F[illegible] Ebsn-Bn		4	1
165th Sig Photo Co		6	
967th [illegible] Bn		1	
1[illegible]0th [illegible] Bn		1	
268th F[illegible] Bn		3	
502nd Engr L[illegible]ron Co			2
595th [illegible] Dary Co			2
56th Signal Bn			8
955th F[illegible] Bn			1
990th Engr [illegible] Br Co.			1
953rd [illegible] Bn		2	
272nd [illegible] Bn		2	
38th Cav Recon Sq (Mecz)			5
387th [illegible] Bn			1
40th Mobile Comm Sq		2	
86th Chemical Bn		1	
		2	
TOTAL	8	47	42

H. V. [illegible],
Colonel, GSC,
A/C of S, G-1.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
APO 305, US Army

SECTION IV - G-4 LOGISTICS REPORT

1 January to 14 January 1945

The German counter-offensive initiated in mid-December penetrated some 40 miles through the Ardennes toward the Meuse, and at the opening of this period V Corps was holding a strong defensive line along the critical north flank of the "bulge". The Corps was disposed with the 1st Inf Div facing to the south at Waimes, the 2nd Inf Div facing southeast at the hot corner of Butgenbach, and the 99th and 9th Inf Divs facing east from Elsenborn to Monschau, with the 5th Armd Div in Army reserve in the vicinity of Eupen. The infantry divisions maintained agressive patrol activity throughout this period.

Ammunition continued to be allocated throughout the period and long hauls were necessary due to ASPs being set up far back in Army territory. Army took cognizance of this situation and allowed an additional 25 rounds per gun in 105mm and 155mm How ammunition for Division and Corps artillery units. A smoke shell for the 60mm mortar was received for the first time and enough rounds for familiarization were made available to each Division in anticipation of future supplies of this item.

The Corps Ordnance Officer reported the results of monthly spot-check inspection as showing the general condition of ordnance materiel excellent throughout the Corps. However, increased deadlining of general purpose vehicles was reported as a direct result of dwindling maintenance stocks in supporting ordnance units, the principal difficulty being in the shortage of major assemblies. During this period, track extensions, or "duckbills" were made available to all SP TD units, the tank units assigned to Corps having been taken care of previously. A report of tire and tube inspection was submitted to Army outlining preventive measures taken in the Corps for continuing conservation of these critical items.

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G-4 published instructions to all units regarding the continuing need for battlefield salvage, outlining a program for salvage collection through Class I truckheads augmented by collecting points along MSRs. The QM Service Co. continued to implement this program as it has done since beachhead days. Units were also reminded of the necessity for the destruction of government property in the event of imminent capture by the enemy. All units have standing instructions on this subject.

The Army Commander, in a personal letter to the Corps Commander, decried prevalent irregularities in property accounting, particularly as reflected in vehicular thefts. G-4 published this letter to all division and separate unit commanders, emphasizing the need for unit commanders to make periodic checks to determine that vehicles assigned to their units were physically present and that all vehicles illegally acquired by members of their command be turned in to proper ordnance authorities. It was pointed out that 64 vehicles were reported stolen from V Corps units during the preceding two months.

The continued heavy snowfall necessitated more stringent camouflage discipline for both men and materiel. The Engineer Camouflage Bn supporting the Corps devised a calcimine paint which was used to camouflage vehicles, particularly those used for combat reconnaissance. Snowcapes and snowsuits also provided by the Camouflage Bn and intended to blend scouts and patrols into the landscape were supplied in limited quantities during this period. The general supply picture was much improved, but shortages remained critical for certain items of QM Class II and Ordnance Class II and IV, chiefly automotive spare parts and dump trucks.

Throughout the period the "bulge" was being steadily whittled down by pressure of the Third Army from the southwest and the First Army from the northwest, with the British Corps being pinched out before Houffalize by the junction of the two Armies. In Field Order 34, dated 11 Jan 45, Corps announced the Army's general plan of attack

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with XVIII Corps attacking on 13 January toward St. Vith and V Corps attacking as flank protection. For the coming operation one combat team of the 2nd Div was attached to the 1st Div with a corresponding increase in artillery support.

15 January to 27 January

A month to the day after the enemy breakthrough, Corps resumed the offensive with the 1st Division attacking to the South toward St. Vith, vital hub of German communications in what remained of the "bulge". The 1st Division made its usual good showing despite stiff resistance from the enemy and stiffer resistance from the bitterly cold weather. The intensity of the cold may be judged by the fact that the 1st Division requested medical heat pads to warm radio batteries but this expedient, unfortunately, could not be developed due to a shortage of subject item in medical stocks.

Because of the long haul from the ASPs in Army territory, the 1st Division was authorized to dump two units of fire for 105mm Howitzers and three units of fire for 155mm Howitzers on gun positions in excess of basic loads and the previously authorized 25 rounds per gun. Corps provided assistance by loaning QM trucks to help transport the ammunition for this operation. High winds and a heavy blizzard combined to block the MSR on a critical stretch, so that supply vehicles had to detour many miles. At the height of the blizzard, G-4 restricted traffic to ammunition and evacuation vehicles, but after about eight hours and by the continuous use of four bulldozers on a one-mile stretch of road, normal traffic was resumed.

The additional snow created still another problem, that of evacuation, and 75 toboggan sleds were issued to the Division for cross country transportation of wounded to the point where ambulances could operate. The Army Quartermaster, through local procurement, arranged for limited quantities of sleds, snowshoes and skis to be made, and all Divisions were requested to submit their requirements for

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this equipment. Additional snowsuits and snowcapes were made available with a goal of 5,000 garments per division. The Engineer Bns began to draw extra winter clothing, the chief items of which were mufflers, mittens and shoepacs.

The attack of the 1st Division on Ambleve proved successful, and with the XVIII Corps' capture of it. With the "Battle of the Bulge" was practically over, positions having been restored to within five kilometers of our pre-breakthrough lines. Toward the close of the period, 1st Division passed to XVIII Corps control and a new east-west boundary was drawn between V and XVIII Corps preparatory to a general Army offensive to the East.

28 January to 31 January

For the coming offensive, all artillery units attached to Corps except the 4.5-inch and 8-inch gun battalions were authorized to draw one unit of fire in excess of basic load. ASP 135 was set up in the vicinity of Robertville for the convenience of the 2nd and 99th Divisions and operational attachments, while the 9th Division and its attachments on the northern sector were to continue drawing ammunition from ASP 125 in the Army area.

Corps Surgeon attached 60 litter bearers to the 2nd Division, 40 to the 9th Division and made 40 available to the 99th Division on call in anticipation of long carrying distances and the extra difficulties to be expected because of the deep snow. These litter bearers came from the Corps Medical Bn and the supporting Army Medical Group and were considered necessary to augment casualty collecting personnel of the Divisions.

Additional snowsuits and capes were made available to the Divisions and Corps troops, making a total of 18,835 of these camouflage garments issued during the month with an average of 5,200 garments per infantry division and the balance to Corps troops.

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Ordnance Class II and IV supplies improved during this period and the new M24 light tank was issued to the Corps cavalry for the first time. Army also made additional M29 cargo carriers (Weasels) available, recognizing their adaptability to snow conditions. Army announced the policy that the Weasels were to be used as a Corps pool out of which the Corps Commander would allocate these vehicles to the Divisions as needed for operations. Units leaving the Corps would turn in to the Corps Ordnance Officer Weasels in their possession. Shortages of QM items increased during the period, and the Engineer reported that the current infantry practice of using TNT and blasting caps to dig foxholes in the frozen ground created a shortage in these demolition items. Prestone requirements were 75% filled with substitute antifreeze products available in sufficient quantities to completely protect all vehicles of the Corps. On the whole, the supply status at the end of the period was greatly improved over the previous periods.

The attack to the East jumped off in the early morning hours of 30 January with Corps objectives of Gemund, Schleiden and Zulpich, all deep in the Siegfried Line. Ninth US Army troops on our left flank attacked simultaneously with good results, and as the period ended there were indications of a general gain along the entire Allied front in the West.

THOMAS W. TAYLOR,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-4.

7 Incls:
Incl No 1 - QM Report (in quad)
" No 2 - Ord Report "
" No 3 - Engr Report "
" No 4 - Surg Report "
" No 5 - Sig Report "
" No 6 - PM Report "
" No 7 - Operations Journal - Jan., File VIII

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
Office of the Quartermaster

QUARTERMASTER REPORT - AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY

1 January 1945 to 31 January 1945

1. Normal operation characterized the activities of the Corps Quartermaster during the month. The period was highlighted by the substantial reduction of some critical class II shortages and by the supply of special winter clothing and equipment to divisions and corps units. Emergency requests for skis by the engineer groups were met by the purchasing and contracting officer.

2. Class I truckhead #56, located at Herbesthal, serviced corps units. Status of rations during the month is as follows:

	No. of Rations on Hand, 1 Jan 1945	Received during Month	Issued during Month	Balance on Hand, 31 Jan 1945
A	100,557	2,806,928	2,805,787	101,698
C	20,680	142,336	121,878	41,138
K	2,340	113,892	110,796	5,436
10-1	17,500	142,390	115,890	44,000

3. As mentioned briefly in paragraph 1, above, allocation for special winter clothing and equipment were obtained during the month of January. Items and breakdown to units are shown below:

Item	Per Div.	Cav. Rcn. Sqdn.	TD Bns.	AAA Bns.	Engr. Bns.	FA Obsn Bn.
shoe pacs	8,000	400	400	375	400	60
insoles	8,000	400	400	375	400	60
heavy socks	16,000	800	800	750	800	120
ponchos	12,000	700	500	700	600	90
mittens, shell, with insert	11,000	400	400	375	400	60
muffler	8,000	400	300	375	400	60
trousers, cotton, od	8,000	400	375	375	400	60
skis	100	---	---	---	---	--
snowshoes	100	---	---	---	---	--

The shortage of shelterhalves was considerably reduced by the allocation of 10,000 to corps units. Release of 1,000 packboards with attachments was also obtained.

4. The purchasing and contracting officer made the following major local procurements:

a. Provided Victor Recreation Center with:

(1) Pass cards

(2) Wrapping materials

(3) Dishes

(4) Silverware

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b. Provided Engineer Group with skis.

c. Provided 102d Cavalry Sqdn. with candles for emergency lighting.

d. Provided corps units with stove pipe elbows. Nonavailability of this item at the time stoves were issued by Army necessitated the manufacture of 300 elbows.

5. Class III truckhead #56, located at Herbesthal, serviced corps units. Status of supply during month was as follows:

	On hand, 1 Jan 1945	Received	Issued	Balance
V-80	145,660	2,424,285	2,473,505	96,440
Diesel	6,395	90,950	89,745	7,600
Oils, assorted	10,240	60,625	55,636	15,229
Greases	5,620	15,524	17,303	3,841

6. Transportation

The 3604th and 3892nd QM Truck Companies furnished transportation for hauling ammunition, troop movements, Quartermaster supplies, and other corps trucking requirements. Division transportation was augmented by these companies as required. Total operational miles:

3604th QM Truck Company -	45,513
3892nd QM Truck Company -	41,790
Total -	87,303

7. Graves Registration

The 606th QM Graves Registration Company operated 2 collecting points during the month of January 1945; one at Eupen, Belgium, and one at Ovifat, Belgium.

Number of bodies processed 1 January 1945 to 31 January 1945:

American -	391
Allied -	1
German -	157
Total -	549

Number of bodies processed since 6 June 1944:

American -	5213
Allied -	26
German -	2444
Total -	7683

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8. Laundry

The 595th QM Laundry Company continued to furnish laundry service to the corps during the period.

Number pounds clothing laundered - 1,062,357
Number pieces clothing laundered - 1,037,191
Average daily hours of operation - 18

9. Fumigation and Bath

863rd QM Fumigation and Bath Company continued to service the corps during the period 1 January 1945 to 31 January 1945.

Number men showered - 44,098
Number sets clothing exchanged - 26,136
Average daily hours of operation - 11.25

10. Salvage

One section of 216th QM Salvage Repair Company continued servicing units of the corps.

Shoes repaired - 1613 pairs
Shoes salvaged - 815 pairs

11. The 3275th QM Service Company patrolled roads and areas of the corps and picked up approximately 5 tons of salvage per day.

W. C. RHODES,
Colonel, QMC,
Quartermaster.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT
ORDNANCE SECTION HQ V CORPS
DURING THE MONTH OF JANUARY
1945

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AFTER ACTION REPORT
ORDNANCE SECTION HQ V CORPS
DURING THE MONTH OF JANUARY
1945

I. Tactical Resume

1. V Corps remained on the defensive after the break through holding the pivot while the Germans were being gradually forced back from the west. On 15 January the 1st Infantry Division on the right of V Corps took the offensive to the south to help reduce the number of routes of retreat available to the Germans. Advance was slow and gradually changed in direction toward the east.

2. On 30 January a coordinated attack by the entire Corps to the northeast was begun with the object of securing roads south of the Roer River through the Siegfried Line and leading to Eiaskirchen. This attack was supported by the XIX Corps on the north and by the XVIII Corps (Airborne) on the south as well as elements of the Third U. S. Army further south.

3. The entire month was cold with snow gradually accumulating to depths of 12 to 14 inches on the level and as deep as seven feet in the drifts.

4. The period of comparative inactivity furnished an excellent opportunity for alleviating the losses incurred in December. Large quantities of supplies began to flow into the First U. S. Army supply channels reflecting the effects of receipts at Antwerp. The result was that supplies of all items were in better shape than at any time since Normandy.

II. Supply-General

1. The defensive role of V Corps during the major portion of January enabled this command to replenish battle loss deficiencies that were prevalent as a result of the German December offensive.

2. Serious shortages existed on the following major items until January 21, 1945:

Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4	Trailer, 1 ton, 2 whl cargo
Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, W/C	Trailer, ¼ ton, 2 whl cargo
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6	Truck, 1½ ton, 6x6
Gun, mach., cal.30, M1919A4	Gun, mach., cal.30, M1919A6
Gun, mach., cal.30, M1917A1	Mount, triped, cal.50, M3, M5
Rifle, auto., cal.30, Brg., M1918A2	Launcher, grenade, M8
Gun, 57mm M1A3	Gun, 3", M5-M6
Howz., 105mm, M5	Mortar, 60mm
Mortar, 81mm	

3. Subsequent to 21 January only the 2½ ton trucks, cal.30 machine guns, and mounts, ¼ ton trailers, and the 81mm mortars were in short supply.

4. The supply of combat and track laying vehicles was sufficient throughout the month. Tank battalions were still operating on a fifty (50) tank level instead of the TE authorization of 54. The first complement of M24 light tanks were received by V Corps and issued to the tank troop of the 38th Cavalry Squadron.

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5. The issues on following types of engines were still being controlled by First U. S. Army:

GMC SN3230 GPW 6005
GMC Diesel Twin Unit GAA Ford

The supply of the SN3230 and GPW 6005 engines had at no time been sufficient to meet maintenance requirements. Sufficient engines for the M4A5 Tank and M10 Tank Destroyer had been made available to fill Corps maintenance requirements.

6. The supply status on tires and tubes improved considerably during the month. Sufficient tires of all sizes were made available to complete 100% vehicular TE authorizations. Units were able to comply with existing wear standards for exchange and subsequent re-capping except in the early part of the month. Tubes remained a serious problem. This situation was further aggravated by shortages of hot and cold patch material.

7. Brake lining (except GMC rears), brake fluid and hoses improved for the time being. Although the temporary requirements of this command had been met there was no assurance that sufficient lining would be available to meet the large anticipated expenditure of February, March and April. The receipt of large quantities of locally manufactured lining and brake fluid removed from deadline many vehicles [redacted] within this command.

8. The resupply of parts common and assemblies was in its best state at the conclusion of this month over any period since the invasion. This was due to the exploitation of unloading facilities at the Port of Antwerp.

9. Local purchases were continued throughout January and aided considerably in reducing back orders existing at the Depot Company and subsequent unit deadlines.

10. Major item resupply became normal again during the month. Balanced stocks of major items in the forward battalion were for the most part sufficient to effect resupply or maintenance exchange within 24 hours. Items not in stock for immediate issue were delivered to the using unit from 36-48 hours after unit loss reports had been submitted. During the latter period of January (24-31 inclusive) all Ordnance unit transportation in the rear and intermediate areas were diverted from the Port of Antwerp (see Par 8) for hauling to Army base depot and shop battalions. This necessitated forward Ordnance unit transportation being utilized to pick up and deliver major items not in stock from Army rear areas to using unit location. This process expedited delivery service forward as the majority of equipment picked up was delivered the same day. There were very few instances where a 24 hour period had been exceeded.

11. Previous shortages existing in 2d echelon tool sets were entirely removed by the medium of local purchase.

12. The following "parts common" were all in a seriously low state of supply:

Lining, brake GMC, rear	8-L-996-65
Patch hot large	8-P-215

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Cable low tension	15-C-2165
Cable low tension	15-C-2175
Battery, storage, 6 volt	17-B-8708
Cable high tension	15-C-
Nitrogen	
Acetylene	
Oxygen	
Solder acid core #1	
Chain tire 600 x 16	
Chain tire 750 x 20	
Hydrometer anti freeze solution	

13. Industrial gases are in a most serious state of supply. It is felt that an Engineer gas generating unit located within each Army area might alleviate this condition for both Ordnance and Engineer agencies.

14. British 25 Pounders were issued to two former 105mm Howitzer Battalions of this command to reduce the demand for 105mm Howitzer M2 ammunition. (See Section III Ammunition). Firing missions were seriously affected between 18-25 January due to shortages of Organizational Spare Parts and Equipment. (See Section IV Maintenance).

15. Listed below are shortages of parts and assemblies peculiar to major items that have continually and are presently increasing the duration of our deadlines:

a. Howitzer, 155mm, M1		
Adapter, breechblock carrier, assy		
Recoil mechanism, M6		
b. Gun, 3", M5		
Equilibrator, assy		C940-01-24000
		D58955
c. Gun, 4.5", M1		
Recoil mechanism, M5		
d. Gun, 155mm, M1A1		
Mechanism, recoil, M3		
Equilibrator ass'y		D54229
e. Howitzer, 105mm, M2A1		
Extractor	C-21-01-00050	C8668
Lock, firing assy, M13	C-21-01-00068	C8662
Spring, sear	C-21-02-05215	A12135
Bearing, roller taper	C-21-04-00140	B158861
Bushing, firing pin	M5-01-00240	A12579
Holder firing pin	M5-01-01201	B6187
Shaft, trigger	C21-01-00180	C8669
f. Howitzer, 8", M1		
Equilibrator	D54229	
Recoil Mechanism, M6		

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g. Car, armored, light, M8

Arrester (short but not causing deadline		D199969
Cap, distributor		AL-IAC-1061
Rotor, distributor		AL-IAC-1016
Guage, oil engine unit		B246995
Motor starting		B246994
Guage, water temperature, engine unit		A255078
Rail, declutch shaft		D47599

h. Half tracks (all models)

Carburetor assy	G102-01-00920	C85548
Gasket, fuel bowl filter	G102-02-02190	A214569
Muffler	G102-02-02400	D48148
Line, winch assy	G102-06-01800	B184482

i. Carriage, motor 5" Gun, M10
Engine, GMC twin diesel

j. Tank, med., M4 series (all models)

Solenoid assy	G104-05-05880	B183592
Carburetor, Bendix	G104-15-51730	D47582
Control, hand throttle assy	G104-15-40105	B1975748
Disc, driven	G104-15-51807	D47588
Plug, spark Champ. S8	G104-17-40655	GAA 12005
Generator auxiliary assy	G104-26-03200	D75616
Pump, fuel	G102-01-01741	C92050
Breaker, contact, mag. assy	G104-05-00599	SCIR-841
Shaft, propeller	G104-06-02000	D47549
Starter assy	G104-17-01851	MED4008
Wheel, bogie, w/bearings & retainer assy		C555730

k. Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6

Engine assy	SW 3230
Spring, front assy	2140055
Radiator assy	2179052
Wheel cylinder assy rear brake	5450558
Wheel cylinder assy front brake	5450619
Lining set rear	605380
Gear steering assy	268891
Gear steering assy	268845
Carburetor	2135096
Axle, rear split	2181205
Guage, therm.	1811254
Case trans. (T)	2182396
Axle, rear fwd unit (T)	2181204
Cover & press plate clutch	754579
Oil seal, rear wheel bearing inner	599657
Oil line flex panel	2127840
Transmission assy	2140096
Transfer case assy (B)	3659994
Hose front brake	2100591

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l. Truck, 1½ ton, 6x6, P & C

Core, radiator assy	927353
Generator, 12 V assy	922488
Regulator, gen., 12 V assy	922487

m. Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4

Cylinder assy front brake	GPW 2061
Cylinder brake master assy	GPW 2140
Cylinder, assy, rear brake	GPW 2261
Engine	GPW 8005
Radiator	GPW 8005
Carburetor	GPW 9510
Transfer case assy	GPW 7700
Plate, clutch pressure assy	GPW 7563
Spring frontRH	GPW 5310
Spring front LH	GPW 5311
Spring front rear	GPW 5560
Absorber shoxok frt. assy	GPW 18045
Absorber shock rear assy	GPW 18060
Bell crank bearing	GPW 3171
Kit brake shoe lining	GPW 18367
Bell crank drag link	GPW 3151
Point set	GPW 18354
Wheel assy	GPW 1015
Shaft rear axle right	GPW 4234
Axle rear left	GPW 4235
Carburetor	GPW 9510
Bolt, torque reaction spring	GPW 5608
Bolt torque reaction spring	GPW 5609

o. Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, W/C

Differential & Carrier Assy	927833
Engine assy W/C	920770
Carbureter assy	922260
Core, radiator assy	924891
Cylinder wheel assy, right	924206
Cylinder wheel assy, left	924207
Lining brake shoe kit	996447

p. Truck, 4 ton, 6x6, (Cargo-Prime Mover)

Valve, exhaust	FED 1-A-7376	5124F
Engine		

q. Gun, 75mm M5

Crosshead, breech block	C34-01-00770	A25534
Extractor, right hand	C34-01-00120	C705208
Plunger cocking fork	C34-01-00270	A24628
Retainer, sear	C34-01-00320	A25629

r. Tractor, high speed, 15 ton, M5

Gauge, air pressure	U-162-12-88527	A-523649
Switch starter, w/shield		A332126

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s. Tractor, high speed, 18 ton, M4
Hose, torque oil (M253249) 02-38845
Clutch (C 139414) 01-38260
Coil ignition assy 01-39787
Radiator 01-40088
Kit repair carburetor (A294677) 02-61088

t. Gun, 25 Pounder, (QF) Br.
Reservoir compressed air 5½" Diam. #5
Compressed packing liquid cylinders
Compressed packing buffer cylinders
Compressed packing H.P. cylinders
U Leather packing liquid cylinders
U Leather packing buffer cylinders
U Leather packing H.P. cylinders

III. Ammunition

1. Prescribed basic loads were on hand in all units during the month of January.

2. Following types of ammunition were in short supply:
M48 Trip flares
M49 Trip flares
4.5" Gun projectiles
4.5" Gun propelling charges (M8 Super)
Ground Signals MRIA1
H.V.A.P. 3" — 76mm
All Artillery WP

3. Following new types of ammunition were made available to V Corps for the first time during January:
2" HE Bomb
76mm Illuminating Shell
60mm Mortar WP
25 Pounder British ammunition

4. For the first time since the invasion 57mm HE Shell became plentiful.

5. To reduce the expenditure of 105mm Howitzer ammunition First Army Artillery decided to utilize 25 Pounder (Br.) Guns for the non-divisional light battalions, for which there were large amounts of ammunition. Increased shortage of 105mm MZ ammunition is anticipated in the near future if past expenditures serve as a criterion.

IV Maintenance

1. Usual monthly spot check inspections which were curtailed in December due to the German breakthrough were again resumed in January.

2. The general mechanical condition of V Corps Ordnance equipment is:
Instruments and Small Arms - - - Excellent
General Purpose Vehicles - - - Very Satisfactory

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Track laying vehicles - - - Excellent
Heavy Artillery - - - Very Satisfactory
Medium Artillery - - - Very Satisfactory

3. An artillery refitting project was initiated at the 2d and 99th Infantry Divisions during the latter part of January and was progressing satisfactorily.

4. The number of general purpose vehicles deadlined during the month of January was greater than in any previous month. This condition is the result of normal increase of wear and the continued difficulty in obtaining sufficient quantities of major assemblies and parts. (See Section II).

5. Despite a very satisfactory rating of medium and heavy artillery, there has been considerable trouble encountered in the receipt of replacement hydro pneumatic recoil mechanisms and equilibrators. More trouble can be anticipated in this respect due to the long service of these assemblies on practically all artillery equipment now in use with V Corps. A large percentage of the guns were deadlined for periods of 24-72 hours for want of nitrogen, which is not available in sufficient quantities.

6. Shortages of grousers necessitated manfacture of traction devices by Ordnance units serving this command.

7. The past month was characterized by the location of Ordnance companies within normal operating distances of units they were supporting. The minimum distance of 25,000 meters from front line set up by First Army because of traffic and road net work, and the tactical situation was rescinded.

8. Evacuation due to the improved tactical situation was again normal.

9. The receipt of two battalions of British 25 Pounder (QF) Gun equipment brought additional trouble to Ordnance maintenance personnel due to lack of OSP & E with the guns and necessary 3rd echelon tools and equipment. Shortages of recuperator, H.P. buffer cylinder packing together with compressed air equipment deadlined as many as six (6) guns at one time for a 24 hour period.

V Deficiencies of Equipment and Ammunition

1. 1st Infantry Division reported having trouble with loose ignition cartridges on Shell, HE, M43A1, w/PDF M52, 81mm Mortar. During a recent firing mission thirty (30) out of fifty (50) rounds fired had the head of the ignition cartridge left in the mortar after firing the round. This resulted in misfires on subsequent rounds. A full report with materiel exhibits was being forwarded through Ordnance Channels.

2. 1st Infantry Division also reported receipt of four (4) lots of Shell, HE, M43A1 w/PDF M52B1 wherein noses of the plastic fuses were broken off. In all cases this ammunition was packed one round per original container, four (4) containers per box. Lots were as follows:

a. IOF-440
b. IOF-7-18
c. IOF-17
d. WC-9-5

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No action was instituted to suspend these lot numbers in V Corps. This trouble was reported to Ammunition Officer First U. S. Army.

3. Oil filled equilibrators (D54299) for the 155mm Gun and 8" Howitzer received by forward area maintenance companies in original packing from the United States have been received in unserviceable condition. Many instances of failure immediately after installation on the gun carriage have occurred. Two reasons for this failure have been advanced. One is that the Neoprene packing pulls away from cylinder in cold weather and the other is that the assembly had not been gymnasticated frequently enough in storage. A report of this deficiency is being forwarded through Ordnance Channels.

4. Additional occurrences of disintegration of 105mm Howitzer M2 tubes were reported during the month of January. As in the other cases reported the tube forward of the locking ring fell apart. Barrel segments recovered were large pieces, there being little fragmentation. The three tubes concerned this month were manufactured both by the Vilter Manufacturing Co. and the Chain Belt Manfucturing Co. All other data as to service rounds fired were reasonably the same as similar cases reported.

VI General

1. Determination of worn out gun tubes is a difficult problem in the field. Authorized methods in First U. S. Army are as follows:

a. Measurement of actual range dispersion from one tube with one lot of ammunition compared with range table probable error.

b. Measurement of muzzle velocity with calibration team to determine if it meets tactical requirements.

c. Measurement of muzzle velocity dispersion with calibration team converting to range probable error by using range table factor and comparing calculated range probable error.

The first method has not been used within Corps because of lack of suitable observation or opportunity. No standards have been set up for the second. This leaves the third as the common method. Some debt has been registered against this method by using units since muzzle velocity dispersion is only part of range dispersion, and also because a number of rounds fell short into the supported Infantry soon after calibration showed the 155mm Guns of one battalion of Corps Artillery to have very little muzzle velocity dispersion. These guns were known to have considerable erosion.

2. Tank crews operating at night in forward stationary positions have voiced complaints on the noise created by the Homelite generating unit. This noise has, according to reports, made tanks more vulnerable for destruction by enemy patrol or artillery action. An extension to the muffler has been made jointly by the 526 Ordnance HM Co. (Tk) and the 746th Tank Battalion which reduces the hazard mentioned above. (See inclosure #1 of this report) The effect on the life of the generator is not definitely known.

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3. The BD Squads handled 4 UXB incidents, 3 shell incidents, and 13 ammunition incidents during the month of January.

For the Ordnance Officer:

C. J. WILLIAMS
Lt. Col., Ord. Dept.,
Ass't Ord. Officer.

1 Incl.
Drawing of additional Muffler for Homelite Generator on M4 Tanks

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

Additional Muffler for Homelite Generator on MW tanks

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AUTH: CO, V Corps
DATE: 3 Feb 1945
AUTH: 1027

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Engineer
APO 305

/Eng

3 February 1945

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Report After/After Action, January 1945.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Through Channels).

1. The Engineer Section, Headquarters V Corps, continued its normal functions and duties during the month of January 1945, advising the staff of matters of engineer concern, supervising the activities of the two Engineer Groups and coordinating engineer work between the Divisions and Groups.

2. V Corps continued its holding operations on the northern Shoulder of the enemy salient. (See December report.) During this phase the Corps Engineers were confronted with the vital problem of maintaining and keeping open the limited net of two main roads. The shipment of rock via rail to the Corps area was continued throughout the month. 4890 cu yds of rock and 10,544 cu yds of sand was used or stockpiled along the roads for use on critical points. During the night 18-19 January a heavy snow storm followed by strong winds caused drifts at the rate of four feet per hour. This situation was critical as it completely blocked the Corps supply line. The 117lst Group called out all of their snow removal equipment to cope with the situation, but was unable to hold the roads open without assistance. The 1121st Engineer Group and First U. S. Army were called upon to furnish additional snow removal equipment and with the combined strength, the road was opened. Continuous patrols on the Corps net was maintained throughout the month.

3. A camouflage road screen was employed for the first time on a large scale in V Corps area when Company "C" 602 Camouflage Battalion erected a road screen on the MUTZENICH - KALTERHERBERG and the MUTZENICH - MONSCHAU roads. The use of these roads was vital in that they were a portion of the 9th Inf Div MSR. The enemy enjoyed direct observation on a portion of the roads mentioned above. Approximately two miles of screen was erected. The road screen served its purpose, as shown by the remarks of an Artillery Officer F/O who stated that, "Before the screen was erected I could see every vehicle using the road". Erection and maintenance were difficult because of the high winds and heavy snow in the area. The results show that the use of road screen camouflage is practical when a portion of a vitally needed road is under direct enemy observation.

4. The need for an extension of the existing 1/50,000 scale map series from the 290 North-South grid Eastwards into the V Corps zone of action arose during the month. The operational maps in use were the 1/25,000 and the

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1/100,000. These two series were in adequate supply but it was felt that there would be much use for an intermediate sheet (1/50,000). Accordingly, the 668th Engineer Topographic Company took existing 1/25,000 sheets revised by latest aerial photos of the V Corps sector and compiled a special map series of 1/50,000 scale consisting of three (3) sheets. Special attention was given to road information and all sheets were overprinted with latest ground or air reconnaissance data. Seven thousand (7,000) copies of each sheet were printed and distributed. Shortly after the issue of this special map was made, higher authority distributed a similar map which was an extension of the existing series and which had been compiled and printed in England. This new series eliminated the need for any further compilation or reproduction of this scale sheet by the Corps Topographic Company. The issue of this special map series met a definite map need in V Corps and was useful in that it filled the map requirements of the Corps while the extended series was being compiled and printed by another agency.

5. During the latter part of the month the enemy salient was almost entirely reduced and plans were initiated for an all-out assault of the Siegfried Line with the towns of GEMUND and SCHLEIDEN as the Corps objectives. A terrain estimate was prepared and an extensive aerial photo study was made of the area of operation with the view of formulating an Engineer Plan. It was found that roads in the area of approach were snowbound and would require great effort to clear. An Engineer estimate of the situation was prepared and distributed with the Engineer Plan which included arrangements for Corps equipment to be pooled with that of the Battalions directly supporting attacking Divisions.

6. The removal or fending in of Corps barriers was completed prior to the launching of attack on 30 January.

7. A daily average of 125,000 gallons of water was purified and distributed to Corps troops during the month of January.

8. A cheap and expedient way of marking road shoulders with empty shell cases was originated by the Corps Engineers, thus reducing the hazard of vehicles running off the road into snow filled ditches. Critical sections on the Corps road net were protected from drifting by snow fences.

9. Due to the accumulation of snow and the enemy's extensive use of mines in the first phase of operation, many bulldozers and tank dozers were put out of action by striking mines while removing snow. To combat this and to reduce losses the following plan was put into effect: Men hand shoveled the snow down almost to the road surface immediately in front of each track and then swept the shoveled area with mine detectors. The dozer then moved forward in the cleared path and pushed the snow aside. When it reached the end of the detected portion, the dozer backed out and the process was repeated. Although this method was slow and laborious it proved practical as it did reduce heavy equipment losses. The above method need only be used on the drifted portion of a road where the snow is at a depth greater than 12 to 18 inches. When the snow is less than 12 inches

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mine detectors can be employed in the normal manner.

9. Inclosure No. 1 shows bridging activities during the month of January.

LEWIS C. PATTILLO,
Colonel, C. E.,
Corps Engineer.

Incl: (1)
Bridging Activities,
January 1945.

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BRIDGING - V CORPS ENGINEERS - JANUARY 1945

Coordinate	Stream	Nearest Town	Characteristics Type	Length	Span	Unit	For	Date
*QE647992	Amel R.	OMDEMVAL	Treadway	40	48'	1st Engr C Bn	1st Inf Div	19 January
PE892286	Gotz Bach	NUTZENICH	Timber	40	20'	15th Engr C Bn	9th Inf Div	20 January
*QE653968	Amel R	MONTENAU	Treadway	18	36'	1st Engr C Bn	1st Inf Div	21 January
PE903993	Wodersheider-bach	WEIDERSCHEID	Treadway	40	24'	1st Engr C Bn	1st Inf Div	26 January
PE967035	Holzwarche	KRINKELT	Bailey DS	60	50'	20th Engr C Bn	1171 Engr Gp	31 January
PE884224	Gotz Bach	NUTZENICH	Culvert			15th Engr C Bn	9th Inf Div	9 January

* Taken over by XVIII Corps (AB) 25 January.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Surgeon

1 February 1945

AFTER ACTION REPORT

Surgeon's Section, Hq. V Corps

1 January 1945 to 31 January 1945, Inclusive.

INSTALLATIONS IN SUPPORT OF V CORPS

Close liaison was maintained throughout this period between Division and Corps units, and Army supporting units. Army supporting units operated under command of the 134th Medical Group. In general, Army installations were operated well forward and in easy access of Division Clearing Stations.

EVACUATION

The evacuation rate, all causes, for this period was moderate. The incident of cold and moisture reactions and trench foot was reduced to a moderate extent. This was primarily due to the issue of additional overshoes and the increased stress placed on proper care of the feet by Unit Commanders; however, the incidence of frost bite was increased due to the period of frost and heavy snows during the middle of the month.

Sleds were used with good results in the evacuation of wounded forward of aid stations. These sleds are made of ski-like runners with a lattice-type support on which the litter rests; the litter is thus supported approximately eighteen inches above the runners. The regular litter squad, of four men, is required to properly use this sled (An anchor-man must remain in rear of the sled). Cargo carriers M-29 (Weasels) were used with good results in carrying wounded out of snow covered rough terrain, as well as for towing sleds.

MEDICAL SUPPLY

Medical supply stocks were good. Combat losses were replaced promptly, with a minimum of effort required by combat troops to obtain them. Demands for [illegible] ceptional items, needed because of unusual terrain and extreme weather conditions, were met without undue delay. An advance Army medical dump was maintained [illegible] behind the Corps and in easy access to troops throughout this period.

PERSONNEL

Officer and enlisted reinforcements received during this period were [illegible] factory as regards training and physical condition. Replacement of personnel losses was slow and in almost all cases personnel had to be borrowed from [illegible] units, some of which were in operation, in order to continue proper medical service. This method of "filling in" with loan personnel, although necessary at times, is not considered economical inasmuch as it decreases the efficiency of one unit to keep another in operation. A loan officer after barely completing the "breaking in" period in the unit to which he is attached is returned to his [illegible]

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present with upon arrival of the regular reinforcements.

It is believed that a small pool of reinforcement officers, to be used in emergency, should be established by Army or Corps. The assignment of these officers should be limited by the requirement of issue in positions requiring where immediate replacement is a necessity, i.e., Battalion Surgeon, key medical officers in divisions (Sanitary Platoon, etc. They should not be used for normal replacements (to replace an officer where immediate replacement is not necessary, or to replace personnel in units not in operation). Reinforcements for normal replacement can be furnished in the usual manner. During the latter part of the month, the medical officer reinforcements began to appear, and divisions were almost up to T/O strength.

An officer of the Sanitary Corps was assigned to this office during the latter part of this month. He has performed several sanitary inspections, and made investigations into the cause of trench foot and cold and moisture reactions.

C. R. [illegible],
Colonel, M. C.,
Surgeon.

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HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER

4 FEBRUARY 1945

AFTER ACTION REPORT, SIGNAL SECTION, V CORPS, 1 JANUARY - 31 JANUARY 1945

1. HEREWITH A SUMMARIZATION OF SIGNAL SUPPLY ACTIVITIES FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY - 31 JANUARY 1945 INCLUSIVE:

A. JANUARY MAY BE CLASSIFIED AS AN AVERAGE MONTH AS FAR AS THE COMBAT CONSUMPTION OF SIGNAL SUPPLIES IS CONCERNED. AS SOME SUBSTITUTE ITEM HAS BEEN AVAILABLE FOR EACH CRITICAL SHORTAGE, NO SHORTAGE HAS BEEN OF A VERY SERIOUS NATURE IN THE CORPS LEVEL. IN HIGHER ECHELONS, DEPOT STOCKAGE OF CERTAIN ITEMS HAS BEEN REPORTED CRITICALLY LOW AND UNITS WERE REQUIRED TO REDUCE CONSUMPTION OF SUCH ITEMS TO A BARE MINIMUM. IN COMPARING JANUARY WITH DECEMBER, V CORPS UNITS WERE MUCH MORE STATIC AND, AS A RESULT, REDUCED THE ENORMOUS CONSUMPTION OF SOME CRITICAL ITEMS SUCH AS WIRE, W-110.

B. DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS OF JANUARY SOME OF THE ARMY SIGNAL DEPOTS MOVED UP MUCH CLOSER TO CORPS. THIS MOVEMENT WILL RELIEVE MANY OF THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED DUE TO THE EXTREME DISTANCES FROM THE CORPS AREA TO ARMY DEPOTS DURING THE PREVIOUS TWO MONTHS.

C. AFTER THE GERMAN ATTACK AND BREAKTHROUGH IN DECEMBER, THE V CORPS SIGNAL SUPPLY AND REPAIR PLATOON WAS REQUIRED TO FURNISH A LARGE NUMBER OF EXTRA GUARDS. DURING THIS SAME PERIOD THE INCREASED REQUIREMENTS OF SIGNAL SUPPLY AND REPAIR DUE TO THE REVIVED FURY OF COMBAT ADDED STILL MORE WORK. ONLY BY WORKING FOR EXTREMELY LONG HOURS WERE REPAIRMEN ABLE TO PERFORM THE REQUIRED REPAIRS ON SIGNAL EQUIPMENT. DURING THE LAST WEEK IN JANUARY THIS EXTRA GUARD REQUIREMENT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED AND THE FLOW OF REPAIR REQUIREMENTS APPROACHED A MORE NORMAL LEVEL.

D. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMATION OF THE WORK DONE DURING JANUARY 1945:

(1) NO OF JOB ORDERS ACCEPTED SINCE "D" DAY 3920
(2) NO OF JOB ORDERS ACCEPTED DURING JANUARY 55[illegible]
(A) NO OF ITEMS TURNED OVER TO HIGHER ECH REPAIR [illegible]
(B) NO OF ITEMS HANDLED BY DIRECT EXCHANGE 313
(C) NO OF ITEMS REPAIRED IN LESS THAN 3 DAYS 4[illegible]
(D) TOTAL NUMBER OF ITEMS NOT REPAIRED AT END OF JANUARY INCL 1D(2)(A) [illegible]

(3) MAJOR ITEMS REQUIRING REPAIR DURING THE MONTH OF JA[illegible]

CABLE, 5 AND 10 PR RUBBER
CASE, CS-79
CONVERTOR, M-209
DYNAMOTORS, DM-34 AND DM-35

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GENERATOR, GN-45
HANDSETS, TS-9 AND TS-13
HEAD AND CHEST SETS, HS-19
METERS (NUMEROUS TYPES)
MICROPHONE, T-17
MINE DETECTORS, SCR-625
POWER UNITS, PE-45, PE-75, PE-95, PE-97, PE-103, PE-104,
PE-108, PE-110, AND PE-117
RADIO TRANSMITTERS AND/OR RECEIVERS, BC-312, BC-603, BC-604
BC-611, BC-620, BC-652, BC-653, BC-654, BC-659
BC-683, BC-684, BC-728, AND BC-1000
REEL UNIT, RL-26
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT, RM-29
SWITCHBOARDS, BD-71 AND BD-72
TELEPHONE, EE-8-A

(4) CRITICAL ITEMS - AVAILABILITY OF WHICH HINDERED RAPID REPAIR OF EQUIPMENT DURING JANUARY:

PARTS FOR DYNAMOTORS (NUMEROUS TYPES)
PARTS FOR POWER UNITS, PE-108 AND PE-214
SPEAKERS FOR BC-603, BC-659 AND BC-728
TRANSFORMERS FOR PE-104
TRANSMITTER UNITS FOR MICROPHONE, T-17

HASKELL H. CLEAVES,
COLONEL, SIGNAL CORPS,
SIGNAL OFFICER.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the Provost Marshal
APO 305 U. S. ARMY

.....SECRET.....
:Auth: CG, V CORPS :
:Date: 1 February 45 :
:Init: :
:.....:

1 February 1945

SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports for the Period 1 January 1945 to 31 January 1945.

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, V Corps.

I. General: Traffic was lighter in January 1945 than in any other month of operation. Due primarily to the static defensive situation, troop movements were at a minimum, and supply and evacuation traffic was routine. Roads were covered with snow and ice throughout the month.

II. Troop Movements: There were no major troop movements until 24 January. On that date the 102nd Cavalry Group and 42nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion returned to V Corps from XIX Corps, staging near MEMBACH and moving to MUTZENICH on 28 January. On 26th, 27th, and 28th January, V Corps Artillery moved to new positions to support the attack scheduled for 29 January. Four battalions of heavy artillery of the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade moved to the ROBERTSVILLE area during the same period. 8th Armored Division moved to XIX Corps on 28 January, being replaced by the 7th Armored Division, which moved on 29 January.

III. Traffic Control:

(a) During the month of January 1945 the following traffic control posts were in operation:

(1) Roads: Nine traffic posts; four motorcycle patrols; 2 motor patrols; and one Traffic Information Center.
(2) Gas-Bathans: One traffic post.
(3) Railways: One traffic post and one motor patrol.
(4) Highways N87 and N68: Two traffic posts and five motor patrols.
(5) Southwest: Five traffic posts.

(b) Posts in GOR-BEFRAME and ZILSHEY were relieved 28 January, and posts in SCHERNDT were placed in operation 28 January.

(c) Two V Corps Traffic Regulating Posts were in operation until 26 January when the third post at SCHERNDT became operational.

(d) Personnel necessary for the operation of TRP's was authorized by Par 4, SO No. 12 dated 12 January 1945. By special arrangements between Signal and Ordnance officers, four SCR 193 radios were installed in 1/4 ton trucks for the 503rd Military Police Company for use of V Corps Traffic Headquarters.

(e) Two traffic circulation plans were published during the month. (See exhibits 1 and 2)

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IV. Conclusions: Enforcement of road discipline must be more stringent. Air activity by the enemy during the month of December already demonstrated that dispersion of vehicles is necessary. Travelling bumper to bumper, and double banking must be eliminated.

V. Traffic Statistics:

(a) During the month of January, 55 convoys involving a movement of 5500 vehicles over a total of 785.2 miles within the Corps area were released by Corps Traffic Headquarters. During the same period, 24 convoys involving 1201 vehicles travelled 256.4 miles within the Corps area and were cleared by other Traffic Headquarters with the Traffic Headquarters of V Corps. (See exhibit No. 5)

JESSE G. POINTER
Lt. Col., F.A.,
Provost Marshal

Inclosures: 5

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

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

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

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

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

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

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



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

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

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

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

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HEADQUARTERS, 3rd ARMY CORPS
APO 305
TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
MONTHLY TRANSPORT REPORT

MONTH JANUARY 1945

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U.'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN [illegible]
1	1/3	20	1	1	Bupon	Francorchamps	Bupon, Geo[illegible]thum, Limbourg, Verviers, unnumbered road to destination.	462 AAA [illegible]	8.7
[illegible]	1/3	72	2	1	Bupon	Verviers	N31	413 AA Gun	8.5
[illegible]	1/3	82	2	1	Sourbredt	Bupon	N27, N26	196 AAA Gun	15.5
[illegible]	1/3	42	2	1	N31 (East)	Verviers	N31	413 AA Gun	20.5
[illegible]	1/3	5	1	1	Sourbredt	4mi SE of Bupon (N31)	N27, N28, N31	(1 Platoon) [illegible] (1 Platoon)	18.5
[illegible]	1/4	7	1	1	Sourbredt	" " " " "	N27, N28, N31	[illegible]	18.5
[illegible]	1/5	16	1	1	Bupon	Verviers	N29, Bupon, N31, Verviers	[illegible] QM Trk Co.	9.5
[illegible]	1/							20 Inf REP	
V-10	1/11	9	1	1	Malmedy	Vicinity of Bupon	N27, N27A, N28, N28 to Bupon	489 AAA (A)	18.1
[illegible]	1/15	98	4	1	743105	Vicinity of Robertsville	Unnumbered road to N28, N28 to N27, Right on N27 to destination.	897 FA Bn.	14.8
V-12	1/15	22	2	1	Bupon	Camp Elsenborn	N28, N27, Sourbredt to destination.	[illegible] QM Trk Co.	19.8
V-13	1/15	60	5	1	Verviers	Salmester	Valdieu, Battice, Verviers, Sart to dest	908 Engrs. 14Pon	18.8
V-14	1/20	14	1	1	Hutzenich	Bupon	N31, Bupon	47 Armd Inf.	16.8
V-15	1/21	9	1	1	Hutzenich	Bupon	N31, Bupon	47 Armd Inf.	16.8

Exhibit 82

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH JANUARY 1945

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. MEN	NO. SERIALS	I. D.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
V-16	1/25	40	2	1	Neubach	Noteriaus	Unm rte to Eupen, N31 to dest.	102 Cav.	
V-17	1/25	100	4	1	Neubach	Noteriaus	N29, Eupen, N31 to dest.	82 Aund FA	10.0
V-18	1/26	24	1	1	Rotgen	Sourbrodt	Rotgen, Eupen, N28, dest.	272 FA Bn.	25.4
V-19	1/26	96	4	1	Rotgen	Hidrum	Rotgen, Eupen, N28, Sourbrodt, to dest.	781 FA Bn.	28.6
V-20	1/27	59	2	1	Rotgen	North of Sourbrodt	Rotgen, Eupen, N28 to dest.	272 FA Bn.	21.0
V-21	1/27	25	1	1	Eupen	Vicinity of Sourbrodt	IP, N28, N27 to dest.	(3 Btry's) [illegible] FA Bn.	12.3
V-22	1/28	100	6	1	Vielsalm	Sourbrodt	IP, Trois Ponts, Stavelot, Malmedy, Ovifat, Sourbrodt	750 Tank Bn.	6.2
V-23	1/27	126	6	1	Malmedy	Weywerts	East on N32, unm rte, left to dest.	287 FA Bn.	6.0
V-24	1/27	96	4	1	Ovifat	Vicinity of Metscheich	North on N27A&N6, Eupen, N31 to dest.	941 FA Bn.	27.1
V-25	1/27	96	4	1	Bruyere	Vicinity of Kaltenherberg	N27, North to Unm Rte, N3(N3026) dest.	606 FA Bn.	8.1
V-26	1/27	96	4	1	Paymeuville	Sourbrodt	Waimes, N27 to dest.	76 FA Bn.	7.5
V-27	1/27	45	2	1	Eupen	Sourbrodt	N28, N27 to dest.	190 FA Bn.	12.5
V-29	1/28	360	15	3	Herbesthal	Recrum	IP, South on unm rte to Eupen, N28,N29, Symetten. East on unm rte to dest.	6th Armd Div "A"	1.5
V-30	1/27	126	5	1	Malmedy	Weywerts	East, N32, unm rte, left to dest.	963 FA Bn.	6.0
V-31	1/28	45	2	1	Eupen	Sourbrodt	IP, N28, N27, Sourbrodt	190 FA Bn.	12.4

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH JANUARY 1945

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
V-34	1/28	376	14	2	Limbourg	MASTER	IP, Walhorn, Astenet, (K-8083)	9th Armd Div CCB	
V-35	1/28	244	7	1	Henri-Capell	Gemmenich	IP, Moresnet, dest.	8th Cav Rcn Sqd	
V-36	1/28	75	3	1	Eupen	Moresnet	IP, Walhorn, Hergenrath, dest.	Hqs. 9th Armd Div	1.0
V-37	1/28	299	10	4	Verviers	Aachen	IP, Battice, N3 to dest.	9th Armd Div Trains	
V-38	1/28	25	1	1	Retgen	Kalterherberg	Eupen, N28, N27, Sourbrodt, unm rte, left to dest.	(1 Btry) 987 FA Bn.	30.0
V-39	1/28	25	1	1	Eupen	Kalterherberg	IP, N28, N27, Sourbrodt, unm rte, left to dest.	(1 Btry) 987 FA Bn.	30.0
V-40	1/28	25	1	1	.....	.....	.....	(1 Btry) 987 FA Bn.	30.0
V-41	1/28	25	1	1	Retgen	Kalterherberg	Eupen, N28, N27, Sourbrodt, unm rte, left to dest.	(1 Btry) 987 FA Bn.	30.0
V-42	1/28	25	1	1	.....	.....	.....	(1 Btry) 987 FA Bn.	30.0
V-43	1/28	25	1	1	Eupen,	Sourbrodt	Eupen, N28, N27 to dest.	V Corps A'Tr.	30.0
V-44	1/28	474	16	6	861971	North of Eupen	Waimes, N32, Malmedy, Francorchamps, Sart, Pileur, unm rte to Limbourg, N31, Eupen, N7 on unm rte to dest.	7th Armd Div. CC "B"	
V-45	1/28	180			Sourbrodt	Kalterherberg	East on unm rte to RJ(K-870275), North to dest.	26th FA Bn. 26th FA Bn.	7.5
V-46	1/28	10	1	1	Sourbrodt	Disem	N27, Verviers, NE on unm rte to dest.	12th FA Bn.	12.5
V-47	1/28	150	5	1	861971	753291	Waimes, N27, N28&N27, Verviers, N31 dest.	9th Armd Div. Trains	19.5

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH JANUARY 1945

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
V-48	1/28	100	4	1	861971	753291	Waimes, N27, N28AN27, Verviers, N31, dest.	7th Armd Div Hqs.	19.6
V-49	1/29	370	14	5	861971	North of Limbourg	Waimes, N32, Malmedy, Sart, Pellcur, Verviers, N31 to dest.	7th ArmdDiv CC "A"	19.6
V-50	1/29	191	7	3	861971	753291	" " " " " " " " " " " " " " "	CC "B"	19.6
V-51	1/29	75	4	1	861971	753291	" " " " " " " " " " " " " " "	CC "B"	19.6
V-52	1/29	216	7	1	861971	North of Limbourg	" " " " " " " " " " " " " " "	87 Cav Rcn Sqd.	19.6
V-53	1/29	11	1	1	Malmedy	Eupen	N28 to dest.	461 AAA (A)	20.6
V-54	1/29	11	1	1	Eupen	887086	N28, N27, Sourbredt, Camp Elsenborn	460 AAA (B)	13.5
V-55	1/29	11	1	1	Eupen	887086	South on unn rte to dest.	460 AAA (A)	13.5
V-56	1/29	11	1	1	Eupen	Kalterherberg	East on unn rte to RJ(K)871095, North on unn rte to dest.	461 AAA (B)	7.5
V-57	1/29	15	1	1	Eupen	Kalterherberg	N28, N27, Sourbredt, (Rest as above)	460 AAA (A)	20.9
V-58	1/29	14	1	1	Sourbredt	Eupen	N27, N28 to dest.	461 AAA (B)	13.4
V-59	1/29	192	7	1	Iverdingeen	Vicinity of Walkenraat	IP, Waimes, N27, Jalhay, N29, Limbourg, N31, Eupen, NW to dest.	7th Armd Div. CC "B"	19.6
V-60	1/29	450	16	4	Lignauville	Vicinity of Limbourg	IP, Malmedy, Francorchamps, Sart, Verviers, Limbourg, NW to dest	7th Armd Div. Artv.	19.2

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MONTH: JANUARY 1945

MOVEMENT NUMBER	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. V.U'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
-1 M-1	1/2	50	2	1	Rotgenbach	Chevron	IP, Elsenborn, N27, Verviers, Theux, Remouchamps, Nerbomont, N15, N23, left on unnumbered road to dest.	703 TD Bn.	21.8
C-1	1/3	46	2	1	Sourbrodt	9214	IP, Camp Elsenborn, North to dest.	376 AAA	7.5
A-549	1/7	50	4	1	Lammersdorf	8920	IP, Rotgen, Eupen, N31 to dest.	38 Cav (Trp A)	16.2
M-19	1/10	40	2	1	Verviers	Eupen	N31	49 AAA Brigade	9.3
M-21	1/11	75	3	1	Eupen	Namur	N31	Hq, HSC btrys 863 AAA AW Bn.	9.3
M-22	1/11	35	1	1	Eupen	M-123428	Unnumbered route to N3, N27, Vise, N18, St Trond, N3, Overiespen to dest.	D Btry 863 AAA AW Bn.	1.
A-602	1/13	45	2	1	Walheim	Elsenborn	Rotgen, Eupen, N29, N27	A Btry 285 FA O Bn	33.4
M-25	1/14	20	1	1	Tiege	Maastricht	Unn rte, Verviers, N27, RJ N43	1185 Engr C Grp	10.0
A-8523	1/14	45	2	1	Walheim	6421	IP, Rotgen, Eupen, N31, Verviers, todest.	A & B Btry 285 FA O Bn	18.3
B-10	1/14	240	16	4	Lefeaunx	Vicinity of Robertsville	Verviers, Unn rte, S & SE to N28, N on N28 to N27, right to dest	7th Armored Div. Artillery	28.4
B-31	1/14	23	1	1	Leuviegne	=====	N27 to dest.	738 Tank Bn.	19.3
A-358	1/14	260	17	4	Eupen	Membach	Rotgen, Eupen, N29 to dest.	102 Cav Rec Sqd 102 Cav Grp	
					Eupen	Monschau	Rotgen, Eupen, N31 to dest.	62 Armd FA Bn.	

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
APO 305
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
MONTHLY TRAFFIC REPORT

MONTH JANUARY 1945

[illegible]	DATE	NO. VEHS.	NO. M.U.'S	NO. SERIALS	I. P.	DESTINATION	ROUTE	ORGANIZATION	MILEAGE IN CORPS AREA
[illegible]	1/[illegible]	[illegible]	2	1	Verviers	Malmedy	N67, Bourbredt, dest.	8th Inf Maint.	20.2
[illegible]	1/[illegible]	40	1	1	Malmedy	Robertsville	N67 to dest.	268 FA Bn.	4.0
[illegible]	1/[illegible]	11	1	1	Malmedy	Robertsville	N67 to dest.	268 FA Bn.	4.0
[illegible]	1/[illegible]	70	4	1	Malmedy	Robertsville	N67 to dest.	188 FA Bn.	4.0
[illegible]	1/[illegible]	[illegible]	1	1	Malmedy	Robertsville	N67 to dest.	158 FA Bn.	4.0
[illegible]	1/[illegible]	70	4	1	Malmedy	Robertsville	N67 to dest.	558 FA Bn.	4.0
[illegible]	1/[illegible]	[illegible]	1	1	Malmedy	Robertsville	N67 to dest.	558 FA Bn.	4.0
[illegible]	1/27	[illegible]	1	1	Spa	7th Army	Theux, Remouchamps, Aywaille, Harzbe	3148 Engr Bn.	3.0
[illegible]	1/27	248	5	1	[illegible]	XIX Corps	East on N28, North on N29, Hupen, to destination.	628 TD Bn.	16.8
[illegible]	1/[illegible]	[illegible]	2	1	Robertville	Bourbredt	N67 to dest.	987 FA Bn.	1.5
[illegible]	1/[illegible]	[illegible]	8	1	Malbourget	Malmedy	Um rte to Hupen, N28, N27AMS to destination	Co "A" 40th Sig Bn.	18.1
[illegible]	1/[illegible]	[illegible]	4	1	Malmedy	Bukembach	N32 to dest.	551 FA Bn.	1.0

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A C of S., G-5
APO 305, U. S. Army

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Date: 3 Feb 45
Init: [illegible]

3 February 1945

ACTION AGAINST ENEMY, REPORTS AFTER/AFTER ACTION REPORTS

Section V - G-5 Military Government Report.

1. OPERATIONS

1 - 14 January 1945 - Defensive

a. Map References:

1/100,000 Sheet S 1 - BONN.

b. The CA/Mil Gov Detachments attached to this Corps on 1 January 1945 were:

DA01	EUPEN	Lt Foulkrod	Attached to V Corps (Under MGHQ)
MS02	EUPEN	Maj Staats	Attached to V Corps
IL002	LUXEMBURG	Capt Spitler	Attached to V Corps
L1H2	ROBERTVILLE	Capt Hill	Attached to 1st US Inf Div
I6D2	SOURBRODT	Capt Fox	Attached to 2d US Inf Div
L4G2	MONSCHAU (Gen.)	Capt Gostehaus	Attached to 9th US Inf Div

The enemy air offensive caused interruptions in the power service to the EUPEN area in an unusual manner. On one occasion, a pilotless aircraft fell on one of the lines thus severing it; on a second attack a power line was shot up by one of our own AA Automatic Weapons units while engaging enemy aircraft; and on 1 January 1945, an enemy plane shot down by our forces crashed on the principle power line from LIEGE to EUPEN. In each instance, repairs were made rapidly by personnel of the local electric company under military escort.

Lt Col Keller, MGO, 2d US Inf Div reported civilians from towns in the 30th US Inf Div area (on the right flank of V Corps) were violating security regulations, particularly circulation restrictions. Contact was made with G-5 Section XVIII Corps (Airborne), and arrangements were completed to exercise a better degree of control in the areas concerned.

In connection with the death sentence adjudged by a V Corps General Military Court in the case of Karl Funseler, it was decided the sentence might be carried out by other methods than decapitation. Subsequently, Funseler's sentence was commuted by the Army Commander to imprisonment for life on the grounds of his extreme youth. He is 16½ years of age.

In accordance with letter of Hq Twelfth Army Group "Use of the the

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term Police and of Mil Gov Police Brassards and Headgear markings", dated 5 November 1944, the term "Military Government Police" will no longer be used by any unit of V Corps. All reference to Mil Gov Police in organizations or in publications was amended to read "Security Guards".

Samples of water taken from the municipal water supply system of EUPEN by Maj Rubin, Public Health Officer, indicated the local water supply to be potable. However, it is not chlorinated, and therefore may not be used by U. S. troops without prior chlorination.

A paper on "Survey of Housing in the First Army Area" was prepared by Resources Officers of First U. S. Army and presented to this headquarters for comment. The report concluded that field detachments cannot escape the rear responsibility for billeting regardless of the time consumed. This section opined that the responsibility for billeting placed on Mil Gov Detachments operating in the Corps Zone, except in a static situation, will seriously interfere with the primary mission of Mil Gov in any forward movement.

Col Rolin and Capt Perrier, Belgian Officers attached to First US Army visited this headquarters 8 January. They advised additional Belgian Liaison Officers to Mil Gov Sections to Detachments are available for assignment. It was decided one such officer was needed with Capt Fox's Detachment in ROMERTVILLE, and the officer selected, Capt E.H.G. Goyens, Belgian Army, subsequently reported for duty.

Col Rolin stated severe punishment may be given Belgian civilians for violations of military regulations under an ordinance in effect since 6 September 1944. Violators of military security regulations such as those concerning circulation, curfew and blackout, may be sentenced to imprisonment for one year or fined an amount not exceeding 70,000 francs or both. To date no report of punishment given any civilian by Belgian authorities has been received.

The Displaced Persons Center, EUPEN, under the command of 1Lt Carter, operated three different installations during this period. One of these was found to be overcrowded, but this condition was relieved by the transfer of evacuees to other billets. Many of these people had friends or relatives in EUPEN, and upon clearance by CIC, they were permitted to be billeted privately.

G-2 this headquarters advised this section of the suspected presence of a large number of enemy agents in American uniforms in the EUPEN area 10 January. V Corps Mil Gov Security Guards were alerted, and a check was made of all uniformed personnel in the city. No agents were discovered in the search.

Many reports reached this section of U.S. troops billeted in private homes using the entire coal supply on hand. Reimbursement of coal to the owners was not possible under the circumstances according to Capt Hately, G-5 Section, First U.S. Army.

During the evening of 12 January, Col Seneff, acting A C of S., G-5, First U.S. Army advised Lt Col Pharr that in the future, no refugees or evacuees from the Corps will be moved to the rear of the Corps Rear Boundary.

Col Simon, formerly commandant of the Kaserne in EUPEN gave this section much information regarding pro and anti-Nazis in EUPEN. His information was based on his knowledge of the local situation gained by his five year term of duty in EUPEN prior to 1939. His information was forwarded to CIC.

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15 - 31 January 1[illegible] - Offensive

a. Map References:

1/100,000, Sheet 2 1 - BONN

b. Major Sampier, MOO, 5th Armored Division reported Ninth U.S. Army G-5 authorities are failing to exercise proper control over the HEINRATH-NIEUW [illegible]-HERTEN areas. One result of the lack of strict supervision has been a weakening of circulation restrictions. German Nationals in the area have been crossing the International boundary line into Germany by using side roads and filtering through the town of BILCHEN. Ninth Army Headquarters was informed of this report.

Due to excessive purchases from civilian bakeries in EUPEN by U.S. troops, it was necessary to request the Corps Provost Marshal to post them "OFF LIMITS" to American personnel. This measure was necessary because of the shortage of civilian food supplies in the area. In addition the Burgermeister was requested to forbid the bakeries to sell to soldiers.

In order to improve security measures in the ROBERTVILLE - SOURBRODT area, Capt Fox of Detachment 1602 limited circulation to the hours of 1000-1400 daily. Violators were held in the Gendarmerie 48 hours. Flagrant or repeated violators were to be transported to the prison in VERVIERS.

Although earlier reports had indicated no civilians would be discovered in recaptured communities, the 1st US Inf Div uncovered approximately 100 in FAYMONVILLE, 72 in the area immediately South of the village and 40 in ONDENVAL. Most of these people had hidden themselves to avoid evacuation by the Germans.

Civil Affairs Detachment in EUPEN reported the following amounts of steel electric powerline wire on hand at the local Utilities plant:

(a) 7,000 Miles - 17,000 in. of 50 mm sq cross section.
(b) 20,000 Miles - 35,000 in of 70 mm sq cross section.
(c) 13,000 Miles - 17,000 in of 25 mm sq cross section.

Due to a shortage of soap, scabies was spreading throughout the community of MONSCHAU, Germany. Request was made for a supply from the soap works in STOLBERG. This plant is under the control of Ninth U.S. Army, who had frozen this soap for use by their troops and therefore none could be obtained. The G-5 Supply Section of First U.S. Army arranged for a quantity of U.S. soap be shipped to MONSCHAU to meet the emergency.

Further reports from 1st U.S. Inf Div on the status of re-liberated territory indicated the "Scorched Earth" policy was not being carried out, except isolated cases of commandeering all foodstuffs.

Contact was made with G-5 Section XIX Corps (on the left flank of V Corps) in regard to conditions in the town of STOLBERG where the Rear Echelon of 9th U.S. Inf Div was located. The Mil Gov Detachment there seemed unable to cope with the local prostitution problem, as 7 or 8 prostitutes, the majority of whom were diseased, were engaging in business in the town and raising the V.D. rate of our troops. Col Price, G-5 XIX Corps, took immediate steps to correct this situation.

Curfew and blackout hours in the Corps area remained unchanged at

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half an hour after sunset to half an hour before sunrise despite changes in this schedule in towns in the Army Service Area. The curfew for civilians in VERVIERS was extended to 2200 hours 21 January 1945.

This section was advised by V Corps G-5 of plans to reopen the Visitor Recreation Center in Spaa January, 27 January. It was decided that [illegible] space for the Center, a number of chairs were requisitioned to replace those [illegible] and the chief of staff directed that no entertainment units would be permitted to occupy space in the city unless G-3 approved the use as tactical priority of G-3 granted the request because of tactical necessity for the operational units. The 23 requested billets to be used by V-Mail, engineer by our forces to make certain such space was in good order. Security requirements were satisfied as that hotel, restaurant and other equipment required for the efficient operation of the Center might be permitted on the checks after curfew.

One hundred German National residents of AACHEN were repatriated to their home city 23 January under the supervision of Capt Schilling, C.A. Detachment XXXIII, EUPEN. Three additional trips were made on subsequent days until a total of 376 persons were repatriated. Quartermaster, V Corps furnished the transportation. Further assistance was furnished at the request of the AACHEN Detachment who stated their facilities were being used for other purposes on orders of higher headquarters.

Maj McKabe of the G-5 Public Safety Section, Twelfth Army Group, visited the Corps Headquarters 23 January for the primary purpose of obtaining information concerning the Corps President Kit Car Security Guard unit. He stated Twelfth Army Group was considering a change in the Corps T/O to provide for a battalion of Security Guards, and the organization would be patterned after the V Corps unit - the original organization of its type. Maj McKabe also stated he would recommend a redesignation of the term "Kit Car Public" instead of Security Guard which is somewhat inaccurate.

On the request of G-5 Section, Ninth U.S. Army and the AACHEN Mil Gov Detachment, electricians in EUPEN were permitted to make repairs on a power line at the Belgian German frontier. The line was needed as a "security" for the operation of a waterworks which is supplying the entire AACHEN area. The line was not to be tapped without prior consent of this Headquarters.

By direction of S.O. #24, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, 24 January 1945, Colonel Harmony was relieved from assignment and duty with this Headquarters and was assigned to Headquarters Fifteenth U.S. Army. He has since been designated as A C of S., G-5 of the Fifteenth Army. Lt Col Fleury succeeded Col Harmony as G-5, V Corps, as per S.O. #13, Headquarters V Corps, 27 January 1945. Maj Roberts took over the duties of Executive Officer in addition to his duties as Administrative Officer.

A change in the Corps Rear Boundary incorporated a large amount of territory in the Corps area which had previously been under control of XVIII Corps (AB). Following a conference between Lt Col Kane, A C of S., G-5 XVIII Corps (AB) and Lt Col Fleury, it was learned no special problems existed in the new area. One additional detachment (XXIII-CFA) became attached to the Corps as a result of the change.

Capt Fletcher of the CA Detachment, LIEGE, visited this section to obtain a clarification of the Corps policy on passes. It was agreed

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further notice, no passes for travel into the Corps area should be issued by the LIDDE Detachment without prior concurrence of this Headquarters.

No civilians were found in ROSTOCK, Germany after its capture by the 9th U.S. Inf Div, and none were found in WERTZFELD upon its re-capture by the 2d U.S. Inf Div the same date. Only one civilian was reported to be in the two towns of KRINKELT - ROCHERATH when they were cleared of the enemy.

The status of CA/MG Staffs and Detachments at the end of the period was as indicated by the attached overlay.

2. Recommendations.

The C.O., Corps Mil Gov Police, is of the opinion that the designation of Mil Gov Police as "Security Guards" in compliance with directives from Headquarters Twelfth Army Group and First U.S. Army is not an appropriate title, as the duties and functions of Mil Gov Police in support of Mil Gov are more than "guards". The term "Security Guards" is also apt to be confused with the use of other troops under the security plan for protection of rear areas. It is recommended that permission be granted to use a more definitive term, preferably the original "Military Government Police," or failing that: "Military Gov Security Force", which will more clearly indicate the primary Mil Gov functions.

ROBERT W. PHARR
1Lt Cal, G.S.C.
A C of S, G-5

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S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
V CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 305

SECRET
Auth: CO, V Corps Arty
Date: 7 June 1945

5 June 1945

SUBJECT: Unit Report of Action, 1 May to 9 May 1945

TO : The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
(Thru: Channels)

MAPS - GERMANY GSGS 4416, 1/100,000. Sheets S-6, S-7, T-6, T-7, U-6, U-7.

NARRATIVE:

During the last nine days of the war against Germany, V Corps Artillery decentralized control of Corps Artillery groups and battalions to divisions. Two facts dictated this policy: (1) During the last phase of the eleven months old fighting, since the landing in Normandy, France, there was no need for centralized Corps Artillery fires against the rapidly crumbling and disappearing "Wehrmacht", and (2) To facilitate divisions to expedite and overcome the sporadic resistance offered by some stubborn, isolated German units.

One group, the 351st FA Group and one battalion, the 656th FA Battalion were attached to the 3rd Tank Destroyer Group to function as Security Guards.

The principal role of Corps Artillery was to keep abreast of the situation; to be able to centralize control and coordinate and mass Corps Artillery fires in case the enemy should offer serious resistance in any place within V Corps sector. Such contingency did not arrive, Germany and the "Wehrmacht" were defeated. On 9 May 1945 all organized resistance ceased. V.E. Day had arrived.

OPERATIONS:

Corps Artillery fired no missions during this period. From 1 May to 7 May, Corps Artillery Headquarters remained at Windischenbach, Germany; on 8 May Corps Artillery displaced to the last CP in the war against Germany - Pilsen, Czechoslovakia - to be in position to support the attack of the Corps if the situation so demanded. Corps Artillery engaged in no other operation during this period.

ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT:

1 May 1945

Hq V Corps Artillery	P 179429
17th FA Obsn Bn	P 176429

SECURITY GUARD

351st FA Group	(attached to 3rd TD Group)
656th FA Bn	(" " " " ")

ATTACHMENTS

187th FA Gp (953rd & 190th FA Bns) attached 2nd Div

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[illegible] Bn Gp (187th & 987th FA Bns) attached 97th Div
406th FA Gp (186th & 200th FA Bns) attached 1st Div
955th FA Bn attached 1st Div
76th FA Bn attached 1st Div
62nd Armd FA Bn attached 102nd Cav Gp

Operations - Negative.

2 May 1945 -

Organization for Combat - No change.

Operations - No change.

3 May 1945 -

Organization for Combat - No change.

Operations - No change.

4 May 1945 -

Hq V Corps Artillery P 179429
17th FA Obsn Bn P 176429

SECURITY GUARD
351st FA Group (attached to 3rd TD Group)

ATTACHMENTS:
187th FA Group (953rd, 190th, & 186th FA Bns) attached 2nd Div
190th FA Gp (187th, 987th, & 656th FA Bns) attached 97th Div
& "A" 285th FA Obsn Bn
406th FA Gp (200th FA Bn) attached 1st Div
955th FA Bn attached 1st Div
76th FA Bn attached 1st Div
62nd Armd FA Bn attached 102nd Cav Gp

Operations - 186th FA Bn relieved of attachment to 1st Div and attached to 2nd Div.
Btry "A", 285th FA Obsn Bn, attached to 190th FA Group.
656th FA Bn attached to 190th FA Group.

5 May 1945 -

Hq V Corps Artillery P 179429
17th FA Obsn Bn P 176429

SECURITY GUARD (attached to 3rd TD Group)
351st FA Group O 949365
656th FA Bn

ATTACHMENTS:
187th FA Gp (953rd, 190th, & 186th FA Bns) attached to
(P 547111) 2nd Div.
190th FA Gp (187th, 987th, & Btry A 285th FOB) attached
(P 510452) to 97th Div.
406th FA Gp (200th, 955th, & 76th FA Bns) attached 1st Div.
(P 145340)
62nd FA Bn attached 102nd Cav Gp

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[redacted]

Operations - [redacted] of attachment to [redacted] FA Group and attached to [redacted] Div.
[redacted] FA Bn is attached to [redacted] FA Group.

[redacted] May 1945 -

[redacted] V Corps Artillery — [redacted]
[redacted] FA Obsn Bn — [redacted]

[redacted] (attached to 3rd ID Group)
[redacted] FA Gp — 0 [redacted]
[redacted] FA Bn — TAGNOV

ATTACHMENTS:
[redacted] FA Group (953rd, 190th, & 286th FA Bns) attached 2nd Div (P [redacted])
[redacted] FA Group (187th, & Btry A, 285th FOB) attached 97th Div (P [redacted])
[redacted] FA Group (200th, 955th, & 76th FA Bns) attached 1st Div (P [redacted])
[redacted] Armd FA Bn attached 102nd Cav Gp
[redacted] FA Bn attached 26th Armd Div.

DIVISION ARTILLERIES:
1st Div Arty — P [redacted]
2nd Div Arty — [redacted]
97th Div Arty — P [redacted]
[redacted] Armd Div Arty — P [redacted]
26th Armd Div Arty — P [redacted]

Operations - [redacted] FA Bn relieved from attachment to [redacted] FA Group and attached to 26th Armd Div.

[redacted] May 1945 -

Organization for Combat - No change.

Operations - No change.

[redacted] May 1945 -

[redacted] V Corps Artillery — Pilsen, Czechoslovakia
27th FA Obsn Bn — Pilsen, Czechoslovakia

SECURITY GUARD (attached to 3rd ID Group)
[redacted] FA Gp — 0 [redacted]
[redacted] FA Bn — TAGNOV

ATTACHMENTS:
287th FA Gp (953rd, 190th, & 286th FA Bns) attached 2nd Div (L [redacted])
290th FA Gp (187th, Btry A, 285th FOB) attached 97th Div. (P [redacted])
406th FA Gp (200th, 955th & 76th FA Bns) attached 1st Div. (P [redacted])
62nd Arm'd FA Bn attached 102nd Cav Gp
[redacted] FA Bn attached to 26th Armd Div

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DIVISION ARTILLERIES:

1st Div Arty	P 312744
2nd Div Arty	U 67-65 (vis)
97th Div Arty	P 787413
9th Arm'd Div Arty	P 152238
26th Arm'd Div Arty	P 439267

Operations - Hq & Hq Btry, V Corps Arty & 27th FA Obsn Bn displaced CP's to PRIBEK, CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

9 May 1945 -

Organization for Combat - No change.

Operations - No change.

MANNER OF OPERATIONS:

Corps Artillery did not operate under centralized control during this period. The main effort was effected by decentralizing control of groups and battalions to the divisions, and to displace to positions to be able to regain centralized control had the situation arisen. In support of mopping-up operations and in breaking the final resistance offered by the enemy in V Corps sector, corps artillery battalions fired 97 missions and expended 2267 rounds. These supporting and reinforcing missions expedited the final operations of the division in this last period of the Corps attack.

MISSIONS FIRED:

Corps Artillery units operated under Division Artillery control during the period. Corps Artillery units fired the following missions: 14 Registrations, 3 Preparation, 9 Close Support, 31 Harassing & Interdiction, 1 Enemy CP., 28 Personnel, 10 Miscellaneous, for a total of 97 missions.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED:

A total of 2267 rounds were fired during the period.

CASUALTIES:

a. FA Battalions - See separate battalion reports.

b. FA Group Headquarters & Headquarters Battery - See separate reports.

c. Headquarters & Headquarters Battery V Corps Artillery
Officers - None
Enlisted Men - None

STANLEY BACON
Colonel, F.A.,
Commanding

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3 Incls:
S-3 Journal, S-2 Journal &
Staff Journal (Originals only) S-E-C-R-E-T

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HEADQUARTERS
V CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 305

SECRET
Auth: CG, V Corps Artyy
Date: 7 May 1945
Init: 9676

7 May 1945

SUBJECT: Unit Report of Action, 1 April to 30 April 1945.

TO : The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

MAPS - Germany GSGS 4416, 1/200,000. Sheets E-3, E-4, G-3, G-4, G-5, G-6, G-7, H-5, H-6, H-7, I-4, I-5, I-6, I-7, K-4, K-5, K-6, K-7.

0205-

NARRATIVE:

On 1 April, the day the Ruhr Pocket was closed by the link up of the 2nd and 3rd Armd Divs, V Corps reached the limit of its northward advance just beyond Herford (H-9822), having attached with the 9th Armd Div, followed by the 2nd and 69th Inf Divs. Before-hand to a period of mopping up, reorganization and patrolling, the Corps attacked to the east on 5 April with the 2nd and 69th Inf Divs abreast, the 2nd on the north. By 10 April, having advanced against light to moderate resistance, the Corps had secured a line running generally south from Detmoldt (G-7786), and the 9th Armd Div passed through the infantry divisions and advanced 50 kilometers to reach a point east of Sondershausen (D-1822). During the next four days the armored division followed by the two infantry divisions advanced to the Weisse River south of Leipzig (H-1114), and then the attached northeast and north to cut off Leipzig from the east while the infantry divisions attached the city itself. By 19 April Leipzig had been completely cleared, and the infantry divisions occupied positions along the Mulde River, relieving the 9th Armd Div, which proceeded to an assembly area in the Corps center. The Corps then secured the [illegible] and conducted active patrolling, two patrols from the 69th Inf Div contacting Russian forces at Torgau (H-6481) and Riesa (H-6815) on 24 April. On 28 April the 2nd and 69th Inf Divs and the 9th Armd Div were relieved of attachment to V Corps, and the Corps moved south to assume control of the 1st and 97th Inf Divs in the sector from Adorf (H-[illegible]) to (H-9200).

During the advance in April Corps Artillery followed the divisions closely. At least one medium battalion was attached to each attacking division, and most of the remainder of Corps Artillery displaced under Corps control, being available to move forward to firing positions on short notice. A number of trucks from Corps Artillery battalions were organized into provisional truck trains which helped transport Corps supplies [illegible] of the north. Two battalions were on Corps security duty most of the time, and [illegible] troops with two battalions established military government in Leipzig subsequent to the capture of that city.

1. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT:
1 April to 5 April:

Hq V Corps Artillery	H-085976
27th FA Obsn Bn	H-085977
551st FA Group	H-085978

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190th FA Group	B-662098
200th FA Bn	B-636042
997th FA Bn	B-661098
656th FA Bn	B-822074
406th FA Group	C-931430
187th FA Group	B-848067
999th FA Bn	B-849067
941st FA Bn	B-848071

ATTACHMENTS:
62nd FA Bn attached to 102nd Cav Gp
186th FA Bn attached to 9th Armd Div
187th FA Bn attached to 2nd Div
999th FA Bn attached to 69th Div

3 April to 5 April:

Hq V Corps Artillery	C-002041
17th FA Obsn Bn	C-002042
351st FA Group	B-805033
190th FA Group	H-025576
997th FA Bn	H-0257
656th FA Bn	B-822074
187th FA Group	B-848067
941st FA Bn (Corps security)	H-0762

ATTACHMENTS:
406th FA Group
200th FA Bn
953rd FA Bn
186th FA Bn
} --attached to 9th Armd Div
62nd FA Bn attached to 102nd Cav Gp
187th FA Bn attached to 2nd Div
959th FA Bn attached to 69th Div
987th FA Bn (SP) attached to 9th Armored Div.

5 April to 8 April:

Hq V Corps Artillery	C-002041
17th FA Obsn Bn	C-002042
351st FA Group	C-931430
190th FA Group	H-025576
997th FA Bn	C-973511
656th FA Bn (Corps security)	H-076325
187th FA Group	H-087315
406th FA Group	C-032246
200th FA Bn	B-972272
953rd FA Bn	C-019217

ATTACHMENTS:
186th FA Bn
987th FA Bn
} -- attached to 9th Armd Div
62nd AFA Bn attached to 102nd Cav Gp
187th FA Bn attached to 2nd Div
959th FA Bn attached to 69th Div

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8 April to 15 April:

Hq V Corps Artillery	C-002041
17th FA Chem Bn	C-002042
351st FA Group	B-931430
190th FA Group	C-185033
187th FA Group	B-077827
406th FA Group	C-032246
200th FA Bn	B-972272
953rd FA Bn	C-019217

ATTACHMENTS:

186th FA Bn } -- attached to 9th Armd Div
987th FA Bn }
62nd AFA Bn attached to 102nd Cav Gp
187th FA Bn attached to 2nd Div
955th FA Bn attached to 69th Div
997th FA Bn attached to 3rd TD Group
656th FA Bn) (Corps security)

15 April to 18 April:

Hq V Corps Artillery	J-849897
17th FA Chem Bn	J-848903
351st FA Group	J-780890
190th FA Group	J-791891
187th FA Group	J-846907
406th FA Group	J-819980
200th FA Bn	J-753991
"B" Btry 997th FA Bn	J-7597

ATTACHMENTS:

186th FA Bn } -- attached to 9th Armd Div
987th FA Bn }
62nd AFA Bn attached to 102nd Cav Gp
187th FA Bn attached to 2nd Div
955th FA Bn } -- attached to 69th Div
953rd FA Bn }
997th FA Bn (less "B" Btry) attached to 3rd TD Group
656th FA Bn attached to 3rd TD Group

18 April to 20 April:

Hq V Corps Artillery	J-849897
17th FA Chem Bn	J-848903
351st FA Group	J-780890
190th FA Group	J-791891
187th FA Group	J-846907
406th FA Group	J-819980
200th FA Bn	J -753991

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[redacted] attached to 9th Arml Div

[redacted] attached to 2nd Div

[redacted] attached to 2nd Div

[redacted] attached to 2nd Div

[redacted] attached to 2nd Div Group

[redacted] attached to 2nd Div Group

20 April to 23 April

[redacted] Corps Artillery	[redacted]
[redacted] FA Gbn Bn	[redacted]
[redacted] FA Group	[redacted]
[redacted] FA Bn }	[redacted]
[redacted] FA Bn }	[redacted]

— on arrival for security check

ATTACHMENTS

[redacted] FA Bn is attached to 9th Arml Div

[redacted] FA Bn } — attached to 69th Div

[redacted] FA Bn }

[redacted] FA Bn attached to 2nd Div

61st AAA Bn attached to 102nd Cav Gp

DIVISION ARTILLERY

[redacted] FA Group	[redacted]
[redacted] FA Group	[redacted]
[redacted] FA Group	[redacted]
[redacted] FA Bn	[redacted]
[redacted] FA Bn	[redacted]
7th Bty, [redacted] FA Bn	[redacted]

CORPS ARTILLERY

[redacted] (3 Bty) FA Bn

[redacted] FA Bn

24 April to 27 April

[redacted] Corps Artillery	[redacted]
[redacted] FA Gbn Bn	[redacted]
[redacted] FA Group	[redacted]
76th FA Bn (on arrival)	

ATTACHMENTS

[redacted] FA Bn } — attached to 2nd Div

[redacted] FA Bn }

[redacted] FA Bn } — attached to 69th Div

[redacted] FA Bn }

61st AAA Bn attached to 102nd Cav Gp

DIVISION ARTILLERY

[redacted] FA Group	[redacted]
[redacted] FA Group	[redacted]
[redacted] FA Group	[redacted]
[redacted] FA Bn	[redacted]

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LEIPZIG POLICE (Cont'd)

290th FA Bn	E-2315
997th FA Bn	E-2315
19[illegible]th FA Bn	E-2315

SECURITY BAND

656th [illegible] Bn

27 April 1945:

997th FA Bn and 76th FA Bn relieved from attachment and attached to VIII Corps.

30 April 1945:

Hq V Corps Artillery	I-179429
17th FA Obsn Bn	F-176429
351st FA Group	O-3673

ATTACHED TO:

187th FA Group attached to 2nd Div
- 194th FA Bn
- 953rd FA Bn

193th FA Group attached to 97th Div
- 19[illegible]th FA Bn
- 997th FA Bn

[illegible]86th FA Group attached to 1st Div
- 186th FA Bn
- 20[illegible]th FA Bn

62nd [illegible] Bn attached to 102nd Cav Group

2. DIRECTION: Corps Artillery operations during the month of April fall logically into four categories: Units under Corps Artillery Control; Units attached to Divisions; Corps Truck Trains; Corps Security Duty and the Leipzig Police.

a. Units under Corps Artillery Control: Because of the fast moving situation and the lack of organized [illegible] resistance, units under Corps Artillery control did no firing. Both in the vicinity of Marburg (B-9822) and in the movement to the east, groups and battalions were displaced to areas from which they could have readily moved forward to firing positions, if they had been needed. Although many trucks were on the Corps truck train detail, sufficient ammunition was carried by battalions at all times, no unit carrying less than [illegible] basic load. The observation battalion ran a scheme of survey control in the area of [illegible]el (C-2803), and it recovered control points in the area of Kassel and in the area southwest of Leipzig (E-1414). In addition, it continued to furnish metro re ages for the Artillery with the Corps.

b. Units attached to Divisions: In the area of Marburg the 406th Group and the 997, 200, 953, and 2[illegible] [illegible]s reinforced the fires of the 9th Armd Div from 3 to 5 April. The 186 and 997 [illegible]s remained with the division, rendering support in the advance towards Leipzig and in the subsequent envelopment of the city. In the initial advance to the east between 5 and 10 April the 187 and 955 FA Bns gave effective support to the 2nd and 69th Inf Divs, respectively, and in the attack on Leipzig these battalions along with the 953rd FA Bn, attached to the 69th Div, reinforced division fires. A battery of the 997 and a battery of the 997 FA Bns helped in the reduction of the last active strongpoint in Leipzig. On the front along the Mulde River between 20 and 22 April, the 955 and 186 FA Bns reinforced the 69 Inf Div in its capture of Bilenburg (E-1929).

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c. Corps Truck Trains: The trucks from Corps Artillery formed two Corps truck trains to help haul supplies and PW's from 5 to 26 April. Three of the 7½ ton trucks hauled a Corps gasoline reserve of 50,000 gallons loaded in three 20 ton trailers, this in addition to the hauling done by these trucks while in the regular trains. The estimated total loads carried by the truck trains from Corps Artillery during this period were 5,800 tons of supplies and 11,700 PW's.

Table of Trucks and Trailers Furnished

(1) Period from 3 to 10 April.

Unit	Trucks: 2½ ton	Trucks: 4 ton	Trucks: 7½ ton	Trailers: M10	Trailers: 1 ton	Trailers: M25
200 FA Bn	4		4	4		4
953 FA Bn	12	6		18		
17 FOB	17				17	
997 FA Bn	12		5	12		5
941 FA Bn (until 5 April)		6		6		
656 FA Bn	4			4		

(2) Period from 10 to 26 April.

Unit	Trucks: 2½ ton	Trucks: 4 ton	Trucks: 7½ ton	Trailers: M10	Trailers: 1 ton	Trailers: M25
200 Bn			3			3
953 Bn	12			12		
17 FOB	17				17	
997 Bn			5			5

d. Corps Security Duty and the Leipzig Police:

(1) Security Duty: On 3 April the 941 FA Bn was placed on Corps security duty and posted at the Fritzlar (C-0882) airfield. When this battalion reverted to Army control on 5 April, it was relieved by the 656 FA Bn, which continued on the security duty during the remainder of the month. From 8 to 24 April the 997 FA Bn was also on security duty. These battalions helped establish military government and helped guard important installations in the V Corps sector.

(2) The Leipzig Police: Task Force Hill assumed responsibility for the police of the city of Leipzig at 2011458 April 1945. However, prior to this time, beginning 18 April, the task force started moving into the city. Task force units cleared areas by-passed by the infantry and rounded up many PW's. A continuous check for PW's was maintained during the entire period of occupation.

(a) General organization:

190th FA Group Hq -- Office of General Administration
197th FA Group Hq -- Safety & Military Security
460th AA Bn -- Zone I
200th FA Bn -- Zone II
953rd FA Bn -- Zone III
190th FA Bn -- Zone IV
476th FA Group Hq -- Utilities & Welfare

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(b) General Administration:

All banks were closed. On account of the shortage of coal and water all factories were shut down with the exception of factories producing food, medical supplies, and fuel. Labor was scarce.

Initially there were an estimated 40,000 displaced persons in the city, scattered in small camps. The food distribution system to displaced persons had broken down. The small camps were consolidated, and food rations were supplied. There was established at each camp an aid station in charge of a doctor. Religious services were provided for all displaced persons.

All schools were closed for an indefinite period. Religious activities were continued throughout the city.

(c) Safety and Military Security:

The Police Department, although unorganized at the time of arrival of Task Force Hill, was in operation within four days. Many of the Department heads were removed because of their former positions and ranks as SS men.

The Fire Department operated continuously. Very few officials in the Fire Department were removed.

Over 7500 prisoners were taken by the Military Police of Leipzig.

(d) Utilities and Welfare:

The electrical power system was operating at approximately 3% normal capacity. This was later increased upon availability of coal.

The main water works at MEUSDORF were damaged by bombing therefor only 25% of the normal supply was available. Later the supply of water was increased to approximately 8%.

Street cars were put back into operation a week after Military Government was established. Over 2000 civilian motor vehicles were requisitioned and placed in civilian motor pools.

Telephones were operated within the city. All telephone lines outside the city were cut.

The gas mains in the city were damaged by bombing, but part of the city was supplied with gas. Work on the damaged mains was estimated to take several weeks before the entire city could be supplied with gas.

(e) Units of the XII Corps took over from Task Force Hill the Military Government of Leipzig, and the Corps Artillery units displaced to the XII Corps sector on 30 April 1945.

3. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Division artillery fires were reenforced both during the advance to the east and during the operations around Leipzig. Corps supply and evacuation was facilitated through the use of truck trains furnished by Corps Artillery battalions, and the military government of Leipzig was effectively instituted and maintained by the Corps Artillery units comprising the Leipzig Police.

4. CASUALTIES

a. FA Battalions - See separate battalion reports.

b. FA Group Headquarters & Headquarters Battery - See separate reports.

c. Headquarters & Headquarters Battery V Corps Artillery

Officers - None
Enlisted Men - One

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5. [illegible]:

Corps Artillery units operated under Division Artillery control during the period. Corps Artillery units fired the following missions: 7 Vehicles, 28 Counterbattery, 18 Harassing, 57 Harassing, 29 Strong Points, 28 Preparation, 14 Registrations, 6 Tanks, 9 Infantry, 1 Machine Gun, 3 CP's, 4 Demonstrating a total of 244 missions.

6. [illegible]:

105mm How - 541
155mm How - 7046

TOTAL - 7587 rounds

C. G. HELMICK
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Commanding

3 Incls:

S-3 Journal (Original only)
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Hq V Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary

585, 5607
24 JAN-23 OCT
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C. No. 42
INTELLIGENCE CHIEF
COLLATION
EVALUATION
ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE
ENEMY MATERIAL
DISSEMINATION

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS (REINF)
Office of Chief of G-2.

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By authority: C.G. V Corps
Date: 30 January 1943.
Initials: R.O'C.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 10
for week ending 30 January 1943

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated, and the provisions of AR 380-5.

1. GERMANY'S SATELLITES (Confidential - from Order of Battle Report No. 14, ETOUSA) It is estimated that about a million non-German troops (other than Finns) are fighting with the Axis on the Russian front, and casualties have been extremely heavy among these. Ten Italian divisions (4 infantry, 1 Celere, 3 Alpine, and 2 semi-motorized) were sent to this front, and by the end of 1942 the Russians were said to have routed or destroyed six of these. It is thought that the remaining Italian divisions in Russia consist of one infantry, and three Alpine, and are now heavily engaged. It is also thought that not more than two or three additional Italian divisions could be made available for this front. The Rumanian force on the Russian front consisted of the equivalent of 21 divisions, and about two-thirds of this force was reported to have been routed. Rumania has probably suffered the heaviest of the Axis satellites on the Russian front, and it is doubtful if any more Rumanian divisions are available for fighting on this front. Hungary has sent about 150,000 to 180,000 troops to Russia, and about two-thirds of these are on the front line. No estimate of Hungarian losses is available, but in view of recent Russian operations against these troops, they have no doubt suffered considerably. Hungary probably could send an additional corps to Russia, but this would be with great difficulty, and is considered unlikely. Bulgaria is not at war with Russia at present, but of its 16 divisions, probably seven could be sent to Russia if Germany exerted sufficient pressure; this is considered unlikely. The Finnish army consisting of 14 divisions and 5 brigades, has suffered some losses, and probably will not attempt any offensive action on their own initiative. While not demoralized, the Finns are thought to be war-weary, and would probably be willing to make peace if the Germans would let them. The Croats have one division on the Russian front plus a regiment that is a part of the German army, and nine second and unreliable divisions at home; these latter are not considered a serious factor. The Slovakians have a weak division in Russia and another at home; both are thought to be even more unreliable than the croats. The Spanish Blue Division, still on the Russian front, is down to about half its strength, its air component has already gone home, and it is possible that the remainder of the division may follow. The SS Motorized Division VIKING, made up of Flemish and Scandinavian volunteers, is still on the Russian front, but has suffered heavy casualties; it may later be withdrawn from Russiaand converted into a Panzer division.

It may be concluded from the above summary that the man-power problem is acute, and the number of fresh units available from satellite countries is small. The Germans may decide to form additional divisions similar to the VIKING, which will be volunteers in name, if not in fact. How well they will fight remains to be seen. While the available man-power in the Balkans is not great, the Germans, may, of necessity, have to use all possible strength from this source.

2. ENEMY SUBMARINES IN THE ATLANTIC (Secret - from N.I.S. Daily G-2 Reports 15-19 incl.) During the period 15-19 January, enemy submarines operating in the Atlantic west of Iceland were reported as follows: 76 on 15 January, 81 on 16 January, 88 on 17 January, 59 on 18 January, and 70 on 19 January. Concentrations were reported between Newfoundland and Iceland, with one near each of these places, and another south of Greenland.

3. AXIS MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE a. (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Bulletin No. 207) Enemy transport planes continue to bring reinforcements to Tunisia on a formidable scale; about 60 to 80 JU-52's are thought to be reaching there daily. (These planes normally carry about 14 men, although many of them no doubt are being used for supplies.) b. (Secret - from N.I.S. Report No. 21) Movement of enemy barges capable of carrying troops or tanks, are reported as moving through the BOSPHORUS (at the western end of the BLACK Sea) toward the Mediterranean. The first report of these movements was on 23 December, when four barges passed through the BOSPHORUS; continuous movements of such barges through the BOSPHORUS have been reported since.

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4. MIDDLE EAST (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Bulletin No. 208) From 1 October to 22 January, 505 Axis aircraft have been destroyed against Allied losses of 335. In all the campaigns in the Middle East, it is estimated that the Axis has lost 6,000 aircraft of which 4,000 were destroyed in conbat and 2,000 on the ground.

5. SOUTHWEST PACIFIC (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Bulletin No. 207) The total of operational aircraft of the Japanese is estimated at 2200; of these, 1115 are Army and 1085 are Naval.

6. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Bulletin No. 207) It is estimated that Germany has a total of 3960 operational and 440 non-operational aircraft, in addition, it is estimated that she has a total of 1200 transport aircraft of which approximately 275 are on the Mediterranean front.

7. GERMAN NAVAL FORCES (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Bulletin No. 208) The following changes are noted in the disposition of the German Naval units; the pocket battleship, LUTZOW, is believed to be in ALTEN FJORD (reported 27 Dec.) after leaving GDYNIA and was probably in the action with the Royal Navy, reported on 31 December. The heavy cruiser, HIPPER, (reported 27 Dec.) is now confirmed as being in ALTEN FJORD and was probably in the action with the Royal Navy, reported 31 December. The heavy cruiser, PRINCE EUGEN, was reported on 11 January to be off the SKAW, course west; its present location is unknown. (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Bulletin No. 209) Reports have been received that the HIPPER had a boiler room flooded in the BARENTS SEA on 31 December. The aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPLIN is expected to be in service towards the end of March.

8. SOUTHERN EUROPE (Secret - from M.I.S. Report No. 21) The reinforcement of SCARPANTO, RHODES, and CRETE has been reported. It was also stated that the Bulgarians were building pillboxes and trenches along their Turkish frontier.

9. ITALIAN NAVY (Secret - from Daily M.I.S. Report No. 298) Photo reconnaissance on January 4 showed 2 battleships still at TARANTO and 3 cruisers at MESSINA. (Secret - from M.I.S. Report No. 299) The damaged 8-inch Italian cruiser BOLZANO, which was at Naples December 17, is now at Catellamare (on the Gulf of Naples.) Photo reconnaissance of Palermo area January 2 showed a damaged cruiser of the ARGOLO class with its stern under water.

R. R. O'CONNOR,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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



FRIEND OR FOE

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Last week's armored vehicle: 4-wheeled light armored car Sd. Kfz 221

Length	15' 9"
Width	6' 5"
Height	5' 7"
Weight	4 tons
Armament	one L.M.G. (one AT rifle carried)
Crew	2 men.

Points for Recognition: High turret with vertical sides. Large octagonal cupola offset to the left-hand side. High super-structure. 2 bogies with 2 wheels each with vertical girder brackets. Large rear idler wheel on the ground. Latest models are without cupolas.

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





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Last week's plane: British Spitfire IX (Merlin) single-seat fighter.
Span 36' 10"
Length 31' 0½"

Recognition features: Low wing: radial engines: long pointed nose: inboard engines underslung: wings have long straight center section, dihedral outboard of outer motors and in plan have wide span and small round tips: fuselage long and tapering with long underneath off-set bomb welt: large tail plane with square cut tips: large upright single fin and rudder with equal straight taper on both edges and broad blunt top.

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By Auth: C.G. V Corps
Date: 6 February 1943
Initials: R.O'C.

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 11
for week ending 6 February 1943

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated, and the provisions of AR 380-5.

1. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE IN NORTH AFRICA (Confidential - from ETOUSA Order of Battle Report No. 15) a. German troops in Tunisia total about 50,000, with 270 tanks, including the following elements: 10th Panzer Div., 334th Inf. Div., GENERAL GOERING Div. (air force personnel fighting as infantry), a composite AA division, and numerous miscellaneous units.

b. Italian troops in Tunisia total about 25,000, with 100 tanks, and include the 1st SUPERGA Div., the 131st CENTAURO Armored Div., the 15th Mechanized Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Parachute Detachment.

c. The bulk of the German force is in Northern Tunisia, with Central and Southern Tunisia held mostly by Italians, but stiffened by German units.

d. Rommel's force consists of the following:

(1) About 50,000 German troops, with 60 tanks, including the following divisions which are at about half their normal strength: 15th Panzer, 21st Panzer, 90th Light, 164th Light, a brigade of air force personnel (the RAMCKE Brigade), and a battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment.

(2) Approximately 70,000 Italian troops (40,000 of them suitable for combat) and 30 tanks, including the 80th SPEZIA Airlanding Division and the 16th POSTOIA Motorized Division, both almost intact; remnants of the divisions destroyed at EL ALAMEIN; and such frontier and desert garrison troops as could be collected.

2. ENEMY AIR STRENGTH IN NORTH AFRICA (Confidential - from ETOUSA Order of Battle Report No. 15) The enemy has about 429 planes based in North Africa - both in Tunisia and with ROMMEL - and about 560 bombers and 300 transports based across the SICILIAN Channel. The serviceability in all cases is thought to be about 50%. (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Bulletin No. 211) The Germans have withdrawn 130 of the 150 planes they had in Libya, and 150 of the 200 Italian planes in Libya have been sent elsewhere. (This would leave only 70 planes with Rommel's force; some of the planes withdrawn have probably gone to Tunisia, while others may have gone to the European mainland.)

3. REVIEW OF OPERATIONS IN NORTH AFRICA DURING JANUARY 1943 (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Bulletin No. 217) In Northern Tunisia, activity limited to patrolling with few changes in position. In Central Tunisia, two enemy offensives and an Allied counter-attack resulted in a line seven miles east of OUED KESIR and DJEBEL BOU KRIL being established. In Southern Tunisia the enemy occupied STON DE SENED after three attempts, and captured FAID on 30 January. In Libya, the British advanced 200 miles, with forward elements having crossed the Tunisian frontier, and the main force having reached SABRATHA. During the month the enemy flew about 1600 transport sorties between Italy, Sicily, and Tunisia; over 1500 of them were with JU-52's (which normally carry 14 fully-equipped men.) The enemy air force attacked about a third as many targets as were attacked by the Allies.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES IN NORTH AFRICA (Confidential - from Order of Battle Report No. 15) a. The enemy has three main capabilities in North Africa:

(1) Passive defense of the beachhead now held; this would not be in line with usual German tactics, and would surrender the initiative to the Allies.

(2) Delay in successive positions, falling back on the TUNIS-BIZERTA beachhead with the idea of ultimately evacuating as much of the force as possible.

(3) Active defense based on the line now held, but carried out in the main by a mobile striking force. Tactics of this type would aim to extend the beachhead, thus gaining more maneuver room and greater security for the airfields and ports now held. Communications of the First Army might be threatened, and initiative temporarily taken out of Allied hands. As a subsidary to this operation, small air or sea-borne forces might be landed either to the east or west to operate against communications of the First or Eighth Army.

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b. Possibility of reinforcements from Europe - Reinforcements have been reaching Tunisia at the rate of about 700 a day, although the main transport effort of the enemy seems to be concentrated on supply at this time. There is no reliable evidence of any fresh German divisions being ready for shipment, but the Italian 26th ASSIETTA Infantry Division (now in Sicily) is said to be earmarked for Tunisia. If this division is sent, the total Axis strength in Tunisia (including ROMMEL'S force) will be about 200,000, or about 12 divisions of miscellaneous combat value. The present port capacity of Tunisian ports in Axis hands amounts to about 2,500 tons daily, which is just sufficient to supply this force. As about 50% of the Axis shipping which makes for Tunisia is sunk, it seems that essential items of day-to-day supply must be flown over. Arrival of the Eighth Army's air component on the Southern border of Tunisia will make this method of supply more hazardous. It therefore seems unlikely that the Axis will send more than one fresh division to Tunisia in the future.

c. Defensive positions in Tunisia:

(1) Positions prepared by von ARNIM'S forces include the main defensive fortifications in the area of TUNIS and BIZERTA, both to the west and south. They are believed to have mined some, if not all, of the passes through the mountains in the northern sector. An anti-tank ditch has been dug west of PONT DU FAHS. In the central sector, that of the 1st SUPERGA Division, there have been no reports of any extensive defensive works, other than the normal trench systems. Some of the passes are reported to be mined. In the Southern sector, apart from occasional road-blocks, there appear to be no defensive positions prepared.

(2) The MARETH Line includes three main positions. The first stretches for 60 miles across the desert from ZARZIS to the DES KSOUR mountains. The second is between MARETH and the sea, where the desert gap is only 20 miles wide. The third covers the 50 mile gap between GABES and the salt water lakes. The MATMATA hills, on which the right flank of the first two positions rests, are not high, but are so broken and possess so few tracks that they would prove a considerable obstacle to a force of any size, while providing excellent positions for defense. North of the MATMATA hills are the salt lakes or swamps which offer only treacherous crossings. It is doubtful if a large army with heavy vehicles could succeed in crossing them at this time of the year when the rainy season is just finishing. The fortifications, constructed in depth, are similar to those of the MAGINOT Line. They include intercommunicating concrete block-houses, in groups of four, with much barbed wire and a number of anti-tank obstacles. The village of BEN GARDANE, in front of the first line, is an important tactical point in the system. It has been made into a strong point with groups of sunken pillboxes and an anti-tank ditch on the southern side of the village. MEDENINE, between the first and second lines, has also been fortified and wired.

5. ENEMY HEAVY TANKS (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Bulletin No. 217) Report of 2 February stated that the enemy had used 56-ton Mark VI tanks in central Tunisia, the first appearance of these tanks in North Africa.

6. THE MEDITERRANEAN (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Bulletin No. 211) a. The three Italian battleships missing for several weeks have been located at SPEZIA.

b. It has been reported that the Germans will attempt to salvage certain units of the French fleet, but no action has yet begun.

c. There is now definite evidence that the German Air Force is developing airfields in Sardinia.

d. The harbor facilities of TRIPOLI are in bad shape, but repairs can probably be effected soon, the HOMS harbor is undamaged, and the BEURAT harbor is already being used for handling petrol.

e. Enemy naval craft in the Mediterranean as reported by aerial reconnaissance (Bulletin No. 214) was reported as follows: (1) At CAGLIARI 26 Jan - 7 Submarines, 3 mediun and 5 small merchant ships; (2) At TRAPANI 27 Jan - 7 Destroyers, 19 E-boats, 4 F-boats, 4 SIEBEL ferries; (3) At PALERMO 27 Jan - 8 Destroyers, 1 torpedo boat, 1 submarine, 11 E-boats, 2 F-boats, 4 SIEBEL ferries.

7. AXIS DIVISIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Bulletin No. 217) The number of German divisions in France and the Low Countries as of 30 January was estimated at 38 (of which 4 were unconfirmed), as against an estimate of 45 divisions on 1 January. (The British estimate of 6 January was 40 divisions.) The estimate of Italian divisions in France and the Low Countries remained at 6 on 30 January, the same as on 1 January.

8. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Bulletin No. 212) The TIRPITZ, the KOLN, and 3 destroyers were reported anchored at FISKFJORD (in the vicinity of LOFTEN Island) on 25 January. Photo reconnaissance of WILHELMSHAVEN the same day showed the ADMIRAL SCHEER in dock; it had last been reported at [illegible]MUNDE. (Bulletin No. 216) Reconnaissance of 30 January showed the TIRPITZ still at LO FJORD.

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9. HUNGARIAN ARMY (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 180 - British) A Russian communique of 23 January announced that 9 Hungarian divisions and an independent tank brigade had been routed near VORONEZH. This would indicate that the entire Hungarian Expeditionary Force has suffered the same fate, as two-thirds of their force was previously reported as routed. In view of general disquiet in Hungary caused by these disasters and transport difficulties between Hungary and Russia, German demands for more Hungarian troops may continue to be refused by the Hungarians; the leaves of men back from Russia has been prolonged, and parcel post will not be accepted for certain units until further notice.

10. GERMAN DIFFICULTIES ON RUSSIAN FRONT (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 180 - British) With the Germans in the Caucasus being rapidly hemmed in near ROSTOV, escape for them by the KERCH Straits presents difficulties. The capacity of the ports is small, and the beaches are unsuitable for embarkation purposes. There is no bridge across the straits and in view of the strong currents, the construction of even a pontoon bridge is impossible. A freezing of the straits to a degree that would permit the passage of guns or tanks is a very rare occasion, although it took place last year. It is thought that all of the heavy equipment would have to be abandoned, although personnel might escape in small boats.

11. BULGARIA (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 180 - British) It is thought probable that Bulgaria has been asked by the Germans to supply more divisions for the occupation of Yugoslavia. At present there are two Bulgarian divisions in MACEDONIA (which has been annexed by Bulgaria), and three more in SERBIA (which is nominally independent). It is thought that three more divisions may be furnished, in order to relieve German troops for the Russian Front, and this may have been discussed in the recent visit of General MIHOV (Bulgarian War Minister) to Hitler's headquarters.

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

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 12
for week ending 13 February 1943

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated, and the provisions of AR 380-5.

File

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. CHANGES IN THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 181 - British) ROME radio announced the following changes in the Italian High Command: (1) The resignation, at his own request, of Marshall Ugo Cavallero, Chief of the General Staff of the Italian armed forces (Navy, Army, and Airforce) (2) The appointment, as his successor, of Army General Vittorio Ambrosio, formerly Chief of Staff of the Army (3) The appointment, as successor to Ambrosio, of General Ezio Rosi, formerly Commander of the VI Army.

Cavallero's resignation is a logical result of the rapid decline in the military fortunes of his country. The government probably feels that his post should be filled by a man commanding more general respect in the army.

2. ITALIANS IN RUSSIA (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 181 - British) Further reports from the Russians have announced the destruction of the 156th VICENZA Infantry Division and of the entire Alpine Corps, consisting of the 2d, 3d, and 4th Alpine Divisions. Prisoners from the Alpine Corps total eleven thousand including three Divisional Commanders. This information and reports previously submitted justify the Russian claim that they have virtually eliminated the Italian Eighth Army, which included ten of Italy's best Divisions and probably amounted to 200,000 men at full strength. How far the remainder of this force may be reconstituted it is still impossible to say.

3. ROMANIANS IN RUSSIA (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 181 - British) Two more Romanian Divisions were reported liquidated with the forces at STALINGRAD, the 20th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division. It is extremely difficult to appraise the full extent of the Romanian losses in the last two months. Reports speak of the formation of five and even ten new divisions, but it is doubtful whether there is manpower available for more than five divisions and even then the Germans would have to provide all the equipment.

4. WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 233) An enemy force, described as one battle cruiser and three destroyers, was reported in BRUFJORD (north of BERGEN on the coast of NORWAY) southbound, 5 February. This force probably includes the heavy cruiser Hipper, returning to repair damage suffered in the BARENTS SEA action on 31 December 1942. Torpedo aircraft failed to intercept owing to weather.

Soviet air reconnaissance reported one cruiser in ALTEN FJORD, 4 February; this was probably the pocket battleship Lutzow. (Secret - from Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 225) The Tirpitz was reported in LO FJORD on 7 February but the Hipper and the Koln were no longer present in the TRONDHEIM area. The Hipper and the Koln were therefore probably the two units reported in BRUFJORD southward bound on 5 February.

5. ADMIRAL KARL DOENITZ (Secret - from Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 223) Admiral Doenitz, Commander-in-Chief of U-boats, has succeeded Admiral Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. He was simultaneously promoted to Grand Admiral.

He is 52 years of age and entered the German Navy in 1910. During an attack on a convoy in 1918, his boat was destroyed and he was taken prisoner. As a prisoner of war, he successfully sharmed to be mad and was committed to a lunatic asylum where he remained until the war was over when he was repatriated as insane in 1919.

In 1935, he returned to the U-boat service after many years in other departments and was promoted to a Sea Captain, and was given the job of building up a new submarine force; by the end of 1938, seven flotillas of U-boats were in service or about to go into commission.

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He was promoted to [illegible] Doenitz has been described as an energetic, capable and resourceful officer. He is reputed to possess a strong hold on the loyalty of his U-boat crews, they respect his authority and know that his orders are the fruit of his personal experience in U-boats.

As Commander-in-Chief, Doenitz is directly responsible to Hitler, in the same position with regard to the Navy as Goering holds with regard to the Air Force.

6. THE SITUATION IN SCANDINAVIA (Confidential - from Order of Battle Report No. 36, FINLAND) The Germans are reported to have ten divisions in NORWAY (including 7 Infantry Divisions and 3 Coastal Defense Divisions). They are also reported to have 50 Independent Infantry Battalions and 300 Coast Artillery Batteries (these figures are considered maximum). The German forces in DENMARK are reported to be two Infantry Divisions (with a total strength estimated at 50,000 to 75,000). The Northern Sector in FINLAND is held by the German Army of Lapland which consists of three Mountain Divisions, 1 S.S. Mountain Division, two Infantry Divisions, and one S.S. Mountain Brigade (which may be motorized or armored), with a total strength of approximately 100,000. The Finnish Army consists of 14 Infantry Divisions, two Infantry Brigades, one Light ("Jaeger") Brigade, and one Armored Brigade. Four infantry divisions and two infantry brigades hold the central sector of the Russian-Finnish front. The remainder of the army is grouped on either side of LAKE LADOGA. Total strength is 200,000 to 230,000. The SWEDISH Army consists of approximately 12 Infantry Divisions, 2 to 4 Light ("Jaeger") Brigades, 2 to 4 Armored Regiments, 2 Motorized Regiments and 2 Independent Garrisons. The total strength of the SWEDISH Army is about 200,000 and if fully expanded could reach a figure of approximately 500,000 equipped men. The strength of the German Air Force in SCANDINAVIA is about 368 aircraft. Offensive power is limited to about 42 long range bombers and 39 dive-bombers, most of which are based in Northern NORWAY for use against convoys to RUSSIA.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN SCANDINAVIA Norwegian opinion, with the exception of a few Nazi followers, is almost wholly opposed to any form of collaboration with the Axis. There is no doubt that in the event of an Allied invasion the Norwegian people would do everything in their power to assist us. The Danes never made any attempt to resist the German occupation and consequently their hatred of the Nazis is not as bitter as other Scandinavian countries. The Danish government is also frightened at the thought of a Communistic Europe as the result of a Russian victory. Of late the Germans have been looting the Danish food supplies and blaming the decline in the Danish standard of living to the British blockade. They are also starting to tamper with the law enforcement and are insisting on the application of the German Anti-Jewish law. It is thought that in the case of an Allied invasion the Danish people would be of little military assistance. SWEDEN is believed to be about 85% pro-Ally and particularly pro-American. But so far as the Russian-Finnish war is concerned, Swedish opinion is almost entirely on the side of the Finns. It is thought that the Swedes would strongly resist invasion by either the Allies or the Axis. The Finns reached their present line at the cost of great casualties and privations, and should the Germans allow it they might well try to make peace with RUSSIA on the lines of the 1939 frontier. The Finnish Army is not demoralized, but are thought to be war-weary, and probably will not under-take any large scale offensive on their own initiative. While there is still much hatred of the Russians in FINLAND, the democratic Finnish people cannot reconcile themselves to the fact that they are on the side of Germany and Japan, while the United States and Great Britain are in the other camp. The Finnish attitude in Scandinavia would largely depend upon what the Russians did. Should the Russians attack the German Army of Lapland it is almost certain that the Finns would put up a determined fight. On the other hand should the Allied action be a purely Anglo-American affair the Finns would have less heart in opposing it, and it is likely that they would not fight at all if given sufficient guarantee concerning their Eastern frontier.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

7. HANDLING OF PRISONERS IN NORTH AFRICA (Confidential - from GHQ Home Forces Monthly Notes for Intelligence Officers, No. 3 - British) Experience from troops in the field has shown that in practice it is difficult, owing to shortage of guards, number of trucks, etc., to separate officers from men. This is particularly difficult with large numbers of prisoners of war.

Prisoners may take some time before reaching the division cage and if segregation is impossible, <u>strict silence should be imposed</u>. This will prevent officers and NCO's from giving last minute security lectures to their men, and will also do much to lower the morale and self-confidence.

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Upon arrival at the cage segregation of officers, NCO's and men will, of course, make the enforcement of silence at the cage unnecessary. But all guards must be taught the rudiments or procedure with prisoners of war. Since only wire has intervene, separates officers and men, guards must prevent cross-chat between pens and see also that men do not settle down on the side of the wire nearest to officers and NCO's. It is also important that all guards realize that prisoners of war who have been interrogated must be separated from those who have not.

At divisions provision must be made for enough food and guards to hold prisoners for the time needed for interrogation. This seems elementary-common sense, but experience has shown that prisoners of war are always being hurried off to the next cage and the interrogator finds himself working desperately against time.

8. Pz.Kw.III COMMANDER'S TANKS (Secret - from Technical Intelligence Summary No. 98 - British) Pz.Kw.III Commander's tanks are so far known to exist in four models designated D1, E, H and K respectively. The designation D1 is used for very early Commander's tanks corresponding to fighting tank Models A to D (five to eight bogie wheels each side.)

In all Pz.Kw. III Commander's tanks, the turret is fixed, and is fitted with a dummy gun, a machine gun being arranged on a ball mounting in the right of the turret face. A railing type aerial is mounted over the rear superstructure behind the turret, and besides this there is also a rod type aerial which is fitted on the left side of the turret, instead of on the right as in the fighting tanks.

In Models D1 and E, the dummy gun was made to resemble the 3.7 cm. tank gun of the corresponding fighting models, while in Model H it resembles the short 5 cm. tank gun. The dummy 5 cm. gun in Model H Commander's tanks is made of light metal. Up to and including Model K, the mantlet is a copy of the old original design in which the gun was carried on an inner moving mantlet partly protected by a fixed outer mantlet with rectangular openings.

Section III - Publications

9. Publications received in the G-2 office during the past week are listed below. A few extra copies of each are available, and may be had by calling at the G-2 office.

a. MIS War Department Tactical and Technical Trends No. 16, 14 Jan. 43.
b. GHQ Home Forces Monthly Notes for Intelligence Officers No. 3, Jan. 43.
c. Technical Intelligence Summary No. 98, 31 Jan. 43.

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Date: 20 February 1943
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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 13
for week ending 20 February 1943

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical items of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 226) Photographic reconnaissance of GDYNIA, 9 February, showed the Scharnhorst, Emden, Schleisen and Schleswig-Holstein present; the port, however, was not completely covered. (Secret - from Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 232) Photographic reconnaissance, 14 February, showed that one Littori battleship had left SPEZIA since 5 February and that there were no naval units present at MESSINA. On 15 February, one cruiser and eight destroyers were sighted at NAPLES, two battleships and two cruisers at TARANTO and five destroyers at PALMERO. It is reported that the Tirpitz was in LO FJORD 14 February; it had been reported exercising in TRONDHEIM FJORD 11 February.

2. NOTES ON ITALIAN NAVAL STRENGTH

	Strength on entering war 10th June, 1940	Losses up to 1st February 1943	At Present: Seriously damaged.	At Present: Refitting	Present effective
Battleships					
15-inch	2	---	---	---	3
12.6-inch	4	---	1	(?) 1	2 (?3)
Cruisers					
8-inch	7	4	1	---	3
6-inch	12	6	---	1	6
5.3-inch (Regolo Class)	---	---	1	---	---
Destroyers	67	30	10 of each estimated to be undergoing minor repairs to refitting.		46
Torpedo-boats (under 700 tons.)	54	14			52

3. POLITICAL REVIEW FOR WEEK ENDING 10th FEB. 43 (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 182 - British) The outstanding event of the week is that the German authorities, under the stress of emotions which almost suggest panic, are doing their utmost to erect the Bolshevik bogey and turn the thoughts of all conservative (by which is meant peaceable minded) persons towards the idea of a peace by compromise before Europe goes down in a welter of communistic catastrophe etc., etc.

4. ESTIMATED AXIS STRENGTH BY 1 MARCH (Secret - from Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 230)

	(Von Armin Forces (Northern TUNISIA (Including GAF)	(Rommel's Forces (MARETH Area ex- (cluding IAF)	(Total)	(Increase from 3 Feb.)
GERMAN	70,500	59,100	129,600	13,000
ITALIAN	29,500	51,400	80,900	8,000
TOTAL			210,500	21,000

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5. FINLAND (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 182 - British) There has been talk in the British press of a note delivered by the Finnish Minister in Berlin indicating that Finland may have to consider the possibilities of a separate peace in default of increased supplies. A similar story has appeared in a Swedish provincial paper. It would, however, be imprudent to conclude that the Finnish government will take any action, being bound by absolute necessity to Germany's chariot. If the submarine menace were fully mastered the issue would perhaps take another aspect.

6. NORTHERN ITALY (Secret - from ETOUSA Periodic Report No. 2) Unconfirmed reports have been received that the Germans are supervising the construction of a defensive line across North ITALY. This line is said to run from GENOA along the valley of the SCRIVIA to PIACENZA, along the vally of the PO to OSTIGLIA, thence to MANTUA from which town it follows the valley of the ADIGE to the coast where it turns north and runs along the coast of VENICE. If true, these reports indicate that the Axis may regard the peninsula of ITALY as indefensible, and in case of attack may be planning to concentrate on the defense of the more valuable industrial north.

7. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE: German divisions by areas (10 Feb. 43.) (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 182 - British)

Area	Off:	Def:	Adm:	Total:
Russia	157	14	1	172
Finland	8	-	-	8
Poland and E. Prussia	-	5	11	16
Germany Excl. E. Prussia	1	4	29	34
Norway	5	5	--	10
Denmark	-	2	-	2
France and Low Countries	14	20	-	34
Balkans	2	6	-	8
North Africa and Italy	7	-	-	7
TOTAL	194	56	41	295*

(*4 Divisions unidentified in France)

8. AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE - FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Confidential - from Order of Battle Report No. 17) In line with the policy which they have pursued since the beginning of the RUSSIAN campaign, the GERMANS are again moving to the RUSSIAN front divisions which have spent the summer and fall resting and reorganizing in the west. These is turn will gradually be replaced by battered and exhausted troops from RUSSIA. The number of divisions which have left FRANCE and THE LOW COUNTRIES to date, since October, is at least SIXTEEN, with SIX more, probably scheduled to leave at any moment, if they have not already gone. Such identifications as are available, of divisions replacing those departed show a preponderance of newly formed (or newly identified) divisions. However, if the same procedure as last year is followed, reinforcing divisions will not begin to arrive in force until spring. This was the case in 1942, when the low point was in March. At that time only TWENTY GERMAN divisions remained in FRANCE and THE LOW COUNTRIES. The following GERMAN divisions are known to have left FRANCE and THE LOW COUNTRIES: The 6th, 7th, 10th, 27th, and GENERAL GOERING Panzer Divisions. The SS ADOLF HITLER and SS REICH Panzer Grenadier Divisions and the 17th, 106th, 257th, 328th, and 333rd Infantry Divisions have also left. The newly formed infantry divisions recently reported to be in FRANCE and THE LOW COUNTRIES are the 39th and 65th Marine Infantry Divisions, in the North; the 326th and 344th Infantry Divisions in the south; and the 347th Infantry Division somewhere in FRANCE. The only reliably identified arrival from RUSSIA to date is the 1st Panzer Division, which arrived in FRANCE from the RJEV sector in a weakened condition and is at present near AMIENS. If the report of its location is true it would tend to increase the belief that the 26th Panzer Division has already left. An unidentified SS Division, probably "Panzer Grenadier", is reported to have arrived in the CHALONS/SUR/MARNE area.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

9. ENEMY CAPABILITIES (Secret - from ETOUSA Periodic Report No. 2) No change, however, the following remarks are appropriate relative to the capability, "THE ENEMY CAN ASSUME THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE". The widespread demands made upon GERMANY'S war potential by the military obligations which her past victories have caused her to assume, coupled with the losses due to the recent GERMAN disaster in RUSSIA, have brought about a severe shortage of manpower. This is nowhere shown more clearly than in GERMANY'S decision to utilize an apparent total of twenty of her replacement training divisions as "Reserve Divisions", about sixteen of which have to date been identified. Other signs which indicate GERMANY'S

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shortage of manpower are her increasing use of Air Force personnel as Infantry, and her increasing comb-out of civilian personnel for the Armed Forces. Under these circumstances it appears quite likely that she will adopt the strategic defensive.

10. HANDLING OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS (Confidential - from GHQ Home Forces Monthly notes for Intelligence Officers No. 3) Experience from troops in the field has shown that guards seldom realize the importance of documents. The most valuable documents are; marked maps, official documents, diaries, note-books, manuals, photographs of equipment, and any printed matter. These should be pointed out to the guards and explained to them. Often times when the interrogators arrive prisoners start tearing up and destroying their documents. This can be avoided by an immediate search upon capture. Letters can be left, as prisoners seldom destroy them and interrogators can ask for letters as they require them. Although documents are always sent back, it very seldom happens that they arrive with the prisoners. Documents are not only of value in themselves, but also a great aid to interrogators, and prisoners can be caught up in their statements by diaries, notes, etc. It is suggested that ready-made labels and large envelopes be distributed with the following; "Documents.....Captured at..... date.....place.....from.....remarks.....These should go down to battalions and will insure that the information gets back with the documents. At present one or another of these essentials is invariably missing.

Section III - Publications

11. Publications received in the G-2 office during the past week are listed below. A few extra copies of each are available, and may be had by calling at the G-2 office.

a. MIS War Department Tactical and Technical Trends No. 17, 28 Jan. 43.
b. MIS War Department Notes and Lessons on Operations in the Middle East Campaign Study No. 5, 30 Jan. 43.

R. E. O'Connor
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A. C. of S., G-2.

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 14
For week ending 27 February 1943

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. NORTH AFRICA (secret - from Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 235) A prisoner of War from the 501 Panzer Battalion captured at JEFNA 10 February suggests that two more Tiger Battalions, the 503 Panzer Battalion and the Herman Goering Panzer Battalion, may arrive in TUNISIA.

There is insufficient information upon which to estimate accurately the enemy forces engaged in TUNISIA. However, the reconnaissance battalion from the 334th German Infantry Division and small elements of the 10th Panzer Division, both formerly in Northern TUNISIA, have been identified and it is believed that the 580th Reconnaissance Battalion and elements of the 21st Panzer Division (both Rommel) have been active in the area. The scale of armor employed is believed to be the equivalent of about one panzer division. Whether all came from Northern TUNISIA or from Rommel's Southern TUNISIA force or from both, is not known. The evidence would indicate that armored elements from the 10th Panzer (Von Armin) and from the 21st Panzer (Rommel) were engaged. (Secret - from Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 237) Documents in an enemy tank on the SBIBA-SBEITLA road 19 February indicate the presence of the 8th Company 8th Panzer Regiment (15th Panzer Division) and elements of the 5th Panzer Regiment (21st Panzer Division). Prisoners from the same area, 20 February, were identified as belonging to the 220th Pioneer Battalion (part of the 164th Division formerly with Rommel's troops in LIBYA). Prisoners from the 7th Bersaglieri Regiment were also identified on the same day.

2. WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 235) A photographic reconnaissance of the port of WILHELMSHAVEN showed the heavy cruiser Hipper and five torpedo boats have arrived and are berthed at the north wall of the fitting out basin, the cruiser had no camouflage in position; the pocket battleship Admiral SCHEER remains in dry dock at the same port with camouflage in position.

(Secret - from Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 236) A photographic reconnaissance of KIEL on 20 February showed the GRAF ZEPPELIN in the floating dock and the light cruiser KOLN alongside. At BREMEN, the heavy cruiser SEYDLITZ was seen at her usual berth, all her superstructure has been removed since 23 December 1942.

3. DECLINE IN POTENTIAL MANPOWER OF THE GERMAN ARMY (Secret - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 183 - British) The strength of the German Army in June 1942 is estimated at 6,800,000; by June 1943 it will have fallen to 5,800,000, i.e. a reduction by one-sixth. This decline in strength is showing itself in the following ways: Many divisions in Russia are much below strength. All infantry divisions created since December 1941 have only 6 as opposed to the former 9 battalions. The Tables of Organization of certain formations have now been revised in order to effect economies in personnel, e.g. reconnaissance units in armored divisions have been abolished and their role taken over by motorcycle battalions: reduced artillery tables of organization have been introduced for all types of divisions (except mountain divisions). Reserve, or training, divisions are being increasingly used to garrison occupied territories. There are now 9 or 10 in France (out of a total of 34), and 1 in the Balkans out of a total of 8. G.A.F. formations and units are being increasingly used in field army roles, e.g. Goering Division in Tunisia, and GAF battalions in Russia and elsewhere. Alsations and Poles are being recruited into the army. The best evidence of the decline in strength of the Army is

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perhaps the inability of the High Command to form any strategic reserve in Europe to meet unforseen eventualities. The Russian front can only be reinforced by sending formations from France, which is becoming dangerously denuded, and these formations are committed piecemeal into battle in the German efforts to stem the Russian advance. Disagreement and conflict between Hitler, as head of the Nazi Party, and the German High Command. Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, was replaced by Zeitzler, a party man. Keitel (the younger) head of the personnel branch (in the German Army a combination of the Adjutant General's and Military Secretary's branch) has been replaced by Schmundt, who was (and remains) Hitler's personal adjutant. Numerous dismissals of high ranking generals of proved ability, e.g. Guderian, Hoepner, Kübler and Strauss and, more recently von Bock and List. Strict orders have been issued that no officers are to critisize the Party on Military policy. The legend of invincibility of the German Army has been proved false in Russia and in Africa, and the phychological effect of the loss of the 20 divisions at Stalingrad is bound to react throughout the Army. Satellite Losses in Russia. Italians. All 10 divisions routed. Rumanians. The equivalent of 16 divisions routed, leaving only 1 infantry division, 4 mountain brigades and 3 cavalry brigades facing evacuation from Caucasia, or liquidation. Hungarians. All 9 divisions routed: At least three of these were completely destroyed. 4 more divisions could be formed, but would have to be equipped by Germany. Total Losses in Russia, November 1942 - February 1943. German. 20 Divisions, at Stalingrad. 30 or 40 divisions severly battered, equivalent to the total loss of 10 divisions. Satellite. 35 divisions, routed. Taking 2 Satellite divisions as equivalent to 1 German division, this represents a total of 47 divisions lost in Russia, out of a total equivalent of 196 in November 1942, i.e. nearly one-quarter of the Axis forces lost. Few further German divisions from France are now available to fill the gap. The Satellites are unlikely to produce any more. Some 12 German and 5 Rumanian divisions now face liquidation in Caucasia, or partial evacuation with heavy losses in equipment across the Kerch Straits to the Crimea.

Section II Tactical and Technical

4. SIEBEL FERRIES (Confidential - from Weekly Intelligence Digest, Eighth U.S. Air Force, Vol II No. 8) One of the many types of German boats being seen for the first time by air combat crews is the twin-hulled Siebel Ferry, which has a squarish appearance when seen from above. They are at various points on enemy-occupied coast of Europe, and have been used as transports between Sicily and Tunisia. The vessel consists of twin pontoon hulls about 80 feet long, with a deck or platform over and joining them. The overall width is 55 feet, and each pontoon has an engine in the stern capable of giving the craft a top speed of about 9 knots. The main center of construction is at ANTWERP, and vessels have been seen in Norway, Belgium, other western European ports, in the Black Sea, and in the Mediterranean.

5. ENEMY AIR RAID OBJECTIVES (Confidential - from Weekly Intelligence Digest Eighth U.S. Air Force, Vol II No. 8) Information from prisoners of War sources states that for some time past, Jabo (German fighter-bomber) pilots have been given no specific objectives, but have been told quite frankly to attack anything and everything liable to terrorize the British public. Trains, motor-busses, gatherings of people, herds of cattle and sheep, etc., have been mentioned specifically at the briefing of likely targets.

R. E. O'Connor
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By Auth: C.G. V Corps
Date : 6 March 1943.
Initials: JJF TJF.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 15
for week ending 6 March 1943

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ENEMY DIVISIONS IN EUROPE (Secret - from ETOUSA G-2 Periodic Report No. 4) The total number of German divisions in Western Europe is given at 61, of which 30 are offensive divisions; this includes eight divisions thought to exist but unconfirmed. These divisions are distributed as follows: France - 15 offensive, 13 defensive; Belgium - 3 defensive; Holland - 2 offensive, 1 defensive; Denmark, 2 defensive; Norway - 5 offensive, 5 defensive; Finland - 8 offensive; Germany - 7 defensive. The number of Italian divisions in France remains at six. (The British War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary (classified as confidential) gave the following totals as of 10 February: Finland, Norway, and Denmark - 8 offensive, 7 defensive; France and the Low Countries - 10 offensive, 20 defensive; Germany and its protectorates - 1 offensive, 4 defensive, 29 administrative.)

2. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 184 - British) Four more German divisions have left France, all probably for the Russian front. Elements of the TOTENKOPF S.S. Division and the 327th and 333rd Infantry Divisions, formerly in France, have already been identified in Russia, and the 319th Infantry Division is thought to be en route there.

3. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETOUSA G-2 Periodic Report No. 4.) The total estimated German aircraft based on the Western Front (France, the Low Countries, Northwest Germany, Denmark, and Norway) is estimated as follows: Bombers, 433; Fighters, 1,002; Others (including 150 transports), 247.

4. GERMAN U-BOATS (Secret - from ETOUSA G-2 Periodic Report No. 4) Report of 27 February 1943 showed 189 German U-boats under construction in various yards, and 61 others were being fitted out.... Present production of submarines is estimated at 20 to 22 per month, with a total production during the six months ending 28 February 1943 estimated at 120 to 130. During the four and a half years prior to the war, about 57 submarines were constructed, with estimates of 40 during the first year of war, 130 during the second year, and 230 during the third year. (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force) Since the building of shelter-pens in French West Coast bases appears to be nearing its end, it is now possible to form a reliable estimate of the accomodation that will be available for U-boats when the last of the shelters is completed, reports R.A.F. Coastal Command. Shelters have been completed at BREST, ST. NAZAIRE, and LORIENT, and extensions to the original blocks are nearing completion at KERONAN and LA PALLICE. Work on the block at BORDEAUX is in progress. There will be available, in all of the above places, a total of about 100 berths under cover. The shelters normally contain two types of pens; one type has berths for two boats afloat, and the other type can be pumped out to form a wide dry dock for one boat. The shelters have a roof of reinforced concrete, 11 feet 6 inches thick, and behind each pen, still within the concrete structure, are workshops and machine shops.

5. AIR OPERATIONS (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Report No. 244) A few six-engined transport planes have been used recently by the enemy between TUNIS and the bases in SICILY and NAPLES. . . . During February 1943, the R.A.F. dropped 10,000 tons of bombs on Germany and the Occupied Countries, the largest number since June 1942, when 7,000 tons were unloaded.

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6. TANK LANDING CRAFT (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force) Tank landing craft, which the Germans were once building at a feverish rate, are still being constructed, but in far fewer numbers and at a much slower pace. The total number now located by R.A.F. aerial reconnaissance is 265, of which at least 228 have been completed. In the three months ending 1 February 1943, some 32 were completed, but few hulls (only three recorded) were laid down during that period. In Belgium construction seems to have almost completely ceased.

7. AXIS MANPOWER (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 184 - British) Recent reports of Axis losses in Russia require some modification and analysis. Although the Satellite divisions which were routed by the Russians were previously considered as entirely lost, it is now thought that remnants of many of these divisions escaped and will form a nucleus for the constitution of new divisions that may be used on the Russian front. Some time will be required to reconstitute these divisions, and heavy equipment will probably have to be supplied by Germany. Although these organizations may be temporarily lost from action, it appears that previous estimates of total losses have been too high, and any mathematical calculation of enemy losses must be only approximate.

8. ENEMY STRENGTH IN TUNISIA (Secret - from ETOUSA Daily Report No. 245.) Estimate of the strength of enemy forces in Tunisia, as of 1 March, is as follows:

	VON ARNIM'S ARMY	ROMMEL'S ARMY	TOTAL
German combat troops	60,400	42,600	103,000
Italian combat troops	18,750	40,950	59,700
German service troops	8,700	11,600	20,300
Italian service troops	4,550	6,450	11,000
	92,400	101,600	194,000

The total number of combat troops includes 19,800 A.A. troops. To the total ground force of 194,000 should be added the German Air Force strength estimated at 15,200, which would give a grand total of 209,200 enemy troops of all types. This represents an increase of 11,200 over the estimate of 1 Feb.

9. U. S. PRISONERS IN ENEMY HANDS (Secret - from ETOUSA G-2 Periodic Report No. 4.) It is probable that, among the American prisoners taken by the enemy, some may have broken down under interrogation. In view of the fact that much personnel now in North Africa has passed through the British Isles, the enemy probably now possesses a greater knowledge of our establishments and order of battle in England than he had before; however, such information is one to three months old when the enemy receives it.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

10. MARKING ON GERMAN PLANES (Secret - from ETOUSA G-2 Periodic Report No. 4) Five German fighters, FW-190's, recently seen over DUNKIRK, were said to have three vertical stripes painted on the vertical stabilizer, in front of the rudder. The stripes(from rear to front) consisted of a broad red stripe, a narrow white stripe, and broad stripe of either blue or black; the purpose was probably to cause a momentary doubt as to the nationality of the plane, and in some cases it was successful.

11. RECONNAISSANCE (Restricted - from Tactical and Technical Trends No. 16) The following report is extracted from the translation of a German Army High Command memorandum issued on 18 December 1940:

"The principal reason for failure of a reconnaissance is the desire of commanders to push forward the attack. As long as the situation on both sides remains fluid, this is justified. In such cases, the best opportunity to attack will be lost if the results of reconnaissance are too long awaited. When an attack is launched against an enemy who is organized for defense, the time taken to prepare the attack is also advantageous to the defender. Commanders must therefore do their utmost to secure speed. However, the preparation of an attack demands time, which must be allowed if unnecessary losses and set-backs are to be avoided. This time must be thoroughly used for reconnaissance."

"The employment of every week patrols is partly due to previous teaching.

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For example, in our Infantry Training Manual, it is stated that 'a few resolute men' suffice, and then again that 'the minimum strength is generally a commander and two men'. Almost all patrols in peacetime exercises were of this strength."

"It is also the result of the attempt of company and platoon commanders to keep their troops together, and avoid weakening them prematurely. Experience shows that only weak patrols can carry out reconnaissance against an enemy organized for defense. Patrols formed of from one to two squads under the leadership of a platoon commander and supported by mortars and machine guns have proved successful. The squad is also the most self-contained unit for this purpose and, with four squads to a platoon, one that is always available".

Section III - Publications

12. The following publications have been received in the G-2 Office during the past week. A limited distribution has been made, and a few extra copies are available that may be had by calling at the G-2 Office.

a. Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 6, M.I.S., Washington.
b. "The German Squad in Combat", M.I.S., Washington.

Thomas J. Ford
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Colonel, G.S.C.,
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Date : 13 Mar. 1943
Initials: TJF

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 16
for week ending 13 March 1943

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO Order of Battle Report No. 19) The following offensive divisions have either left Western Europe or will leave shortly: 106th, 326th, 332nd, and 334th Infantry Divisions. The defensive 708th and 711th Infantry Divisions have been reported as identified in Russia, but in view of their low combat rating they could probably be used there only as Line of Communications troops; in any event, their departure from Western Europe needs further confirmation. Nevertheless these divisions could probably be brought to offensive standard by addition of artillery, divisional troops, and services. The 189th Reserve Division is reported to have left France for the Balkans, but this is unconfirmed. Arrivals in Western Europe include the 1st Panzer Division, an unconfirmed S.S. Panzer Grenadier Division at CHALONS-SUR-MARNE, and another unconfirmed S.S. Panzer Grenadier Division believed to be in the process of formation at ANGOULEME. Movements within the area include the 157th, 159th, and 165th, Reserve Divisions, from the interior of France to the Channel coast, probably between CALAIS and the SEINE. The 347th Infantry Division is thought to have moved to the Mediterranean coast from the interior of France, probably to the sector vacated by the 327th Division.

2. COMBAT EFFICIENCY OF TROOPS IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret - from ETO Order of Battle Report No. 19) Although reliable information is lacking, it can be considered probable that the Germans are filling gaps in the defense of France and the Low Countries, at least in part, by means of new divisions with a framework based on remnants of divisions cut up in Russia. Five such divisions have been reported in Brittany and near BORDEAUX. The four remaining offensive infantry divisions definitely identified in France and the Low Countries have either left or will leave soon (see Par. 1 above), and there is virtually no mobile reserve despite the fact that there seem to be four armored divisions present. The 1st Panzer Division is weakened by service in Russia, the 26th Panzer Division has been weakened by drafts to other units, and the two new unconfirmed S.S. Panzer Grenadier Divisions are probably not yet fit to fight. There are, however, three marine divisions whose combat effectiveness is unknown, but that are probably worthy of offensive classification.

3. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO Daily Report No. 252 and Daily Telegram No. 253) Photo reconnaissance of 7 March showed the GRAF ZEPPLIN (in floating dock) and the KOLN at KIEL, and the SEYDLITZ (in a dismantled condition) at BREMEN. Photos made 8 March showed the PRINZ EUGEN, the SCHLESIEN, and the SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN at GDYNIA, but the SCHARNHORST, last reported at GDYNIA, was not in port; the HIPPER and the ADMIRAL SCHEER were at WILHELMSHAVEN on the same day. The EMDEN, reported at GDYNIA on 6 March, has since left that port, and visual reconnaissance of LO'Fjord on 9 March showed a large vessel present that was almost certainly the TIRPITZ. No additional reports have been received on the GNEISENAU or the LUTZOW, last reported in Norwegian ports.

4. THE SPANISH ARMY (Confidential -from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 185 - British) Shortly after the Allied attack was launched in Northern Africa last November, Spain ordered partial

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mobilization of its armed forces. It was stated that the mobilization was to maintain Spain's position outside the war, and to insure peace in Spanish territory. Subsequent Spanish policy has tended to support this statement. Much difficulty was encountered in effecting the expansion, partly due to lack of organization capable of caring for the many recruits, and partly due to the lack of uniforms and personal equipment. Consequently, many of the troops were returned to their homes on indefinite furlough. Due to this confusion, it has been impossible to make an accurate estimate of the actual increase in manpower of the Spanish forces. Prior to this mobilization, their strength was estimated at 452,000, exclusive of labor troops. A high Spanish military authority recently gave the figure of 800,000 as his estimate of the present strength, but it is not believed that this figure has yet been reached. It would seem, however, that this is probably the figure at which the Spanish General Staff is aiming, and would include the whole of the 1943 mobilization class which should be in service by April.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

5. AXIS ANTITANK WEAPONS (Restricted - from Tactical and Technical Trends No. 18) Until recently the largest caliber German antitank gun (as differentiated from the AA/AT gun, or the tank gun) has been the 50-mm. It is now believed that the Germans have a 75-mm antitank gun, the 7.5-cm Pak 40. This is probably the long-barreled tank gun of the new Mark IV German tank, produced as a field piece. Owing to the battlefield mobility of tanks, as well as to other factors, the towed antitank gun is not always an adequate antitank weapon. For a considerable period of time the Germans have shown a tendency to mount a large number of guns on self-propelled mounts, the calibers varying from 20-mm to 150-mm. Recently the following new German equipment of this type was reported to exist: German 37-mm AT gun on an armored personnel carrier; and the Russian 76.2-mm gun or the German 75-mm tank gun on either the German Mark II tank chassis or the Czech light tank chassis. The 37-mm on an armored personnel carrier and the 76.2 on the Mark II chassis have been used in North Africa, but it is not known whether the others have as yet been issued to units. The Germans are also reported to be developing 88-mm and 128-mm armored self-propelled guns.

Section III - Publications

6. All recent amendments to the British Air Recognition manuals, the "AP 1480" series, have been requisitioned, and will be distributed to all units as soon as they are received by this office.

7. With this week's summary are included a "Plane of the Week" and an "Armored Vehicle of the Week." Sufficient copies of each are included herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of each will be given with next week's summary, together with a new plane and armored vehicle. It is suggested that organizations make maximum use of these for training in identification, and comments or suggestions are invited.

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Colonel, G.S.C.,
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

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





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By Auth: C.G., V Corps
Date : 12 March 1943
Initials: JT

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 1

The following Order of Battle Report No. 19, TFUSA, is reproduced for the information of all intelligence agencies of this command. Since this report contains information of value to all officers of combatant units, it is suggested that it be disseminated and discussed in appropriate officer schools.

GERMAN DIVISION SECTOR, CHANNEL COAST

1. GENERAL.- This report describes somewhat schematically the organization for defense of a typical well-defended sector on the CHANNEL COAST of FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES, garrisoned by a full strength German offensive type division. To avoid the impression that defense of a coastal sector is organized in stereotyped fashion, the following points should be kept in mind:

a. GERMAN FLEXIBILITY.- It is standard German technique to vary the type of division and organization within the division to meet the specific situation. Therefore it is quite likely that no divisional sector will be exactly as described herein, however, the scale of resistance to be expected is indicated.

b. DEFENSE ADAPTED TO THE TERRAIN.- The strength, dispositions, and fortifications described herein would more likely be found on a stretch of coast where conditions are suitable for an assault. Where conditions favor the defense, divisions may hold wider sectors, the degree of fortification may be reduced, etc.

c. THE CURRENT SITUATION.- Few, if any, sectors of the coast are at present held by full strength offensive divisions. Most of the divisions in FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES are defensive types, of reduced quality. This is partly a seasonal trend, and will undoubtedly be rectified considerably by the time the season is appropriate for an assault.

2. POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED.- Only the units and installations normally found in the divisional sector are considered. Corps and Army reserves, which are held some distance to the rear, and defensive installations in the rear areas, are excluded. In studying the strength of such a sector, the following points must be considered:

aa. Size of garrison allotted to a given length of coast line.
b. Weapons employed.
c. Dispositions of troops and weapons.
d. Defensive installations (obstacles, pillboxes, etc)

I. SIZE OF GARRISON ALLOTTED TO A GIVEN LENGTH OF COAST LINE.

3. DIVISION SECTOR.- A division sector on a well-defended part of the coast is approximately 24 miles long by 12 miles deep. As the usual practice is to place two regiments forward on the coast and one in reserve, the regimental front is from 10 to 15 miles depending upon the terrain and natural boundaries. The type of division which might be found is the offensive infantry division with a strength of approximately 15,000, and which consists of the following units:

Three infantry regiments
One artillery regiment
One engineer battalion
One reconnaissance battalion
One siganl battalion
One tank destroyer battalion
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4. ATTACHED ARTILLERY.- In addition to division artillery, batteries from the GHQ pool are allotted, usually at the scale of about three heavy batteries to each forward regimental area.

5. ANTI-AIRCRAFT.- Anti-aircraft batteries are allotted in various numbers according to the importance of objectives (airdromes, major towns, heavy coastal batteries, etc.). An estimated six batteries per regimental sector is thought probable, some of which will be under orders of the division.

II. WEAPONS EMPLOYED.

6. DIVISION WEAPONS.- Normal weapons of the infantry division remain the backbone of the defense, supplemented by those of the coast defense units, anti-aircraft units, and railway artillery units (if railway guns are used). In addition, miscellaneous weapons are employed such as obsolete tanks and tank turrets used as pillboxes. The normal weapons of an offensive infantry division are:

36-105 mm gun-howitzers	In the division artillery regiment.
4-105 mm guns	In the division artillery regiment.
8-150 mm howitzers	In the division artillery regiment.
18- 75 mm guns	Six per infantry regiment.
6-150 mm howitzers	Two per infantry regiment.
2- 75 mm anti-tank guns	In the reconnaissance battalion.
84- 50 mm mortars	27 per infantry regiment plus 3 in the reconnaissance battalion.
57- 81 mm mortars	18 per infantry regiment plus 3 in reconnaissance battalion.
75- 37 mm & 50 mm anti-tank guns	12 per infantry regiment, 36 in tank destroyer battalion, and 3 in the reconnaissance battalion.
48- 20 mm dual purpose, anti-aircraft/anti-tank guns	4 per infantry regiment, 12 in artillery regiment, and 24 in tank destroyer battalion.
81-7.9 mm anti-tank rifles	27 per infantry regiment.
458- light machine guns	some in all units of the division.
116- heavy machine guns	36 per infantry regiment plus 8 in the reconnaissance battalion.

7. ATTACHED HEAVY ARTILLERY. - Coast defense units will likely be equipped with 6 inch guns. These guns are grouped in batteries of four, therefore with three batteries assigned to each forward regimental sector, the total with the division will be 24 guns.

8. ANTI-AIRCRAFT - Of the six batteries of anti-aircraft in each regimental sector, three may be heavy and three light. A heavy battery consists of four 88mm guns (sometimes 105mm guns) and two light anti-aircraft guns. A light battery usually has either 12-20mm anti-aircraft guns and 4-60cm searchlights or 9-37mm anti-aircraft guns and 4-60 cm searchlights.

9. RAILWAY ARTILLERY. - Within the division sector, there may be railway artillery, which would be located as far forward as the railroad and terrain permit. The transportable type 275mm railway gun is extensively used. The normal organization is two railway guns to a battery, giving a total of 4 guns.

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III. DISPOSITION OF TROOPS AND WEAPONS.

10. DISPOSITION OF DIVISIONAL TROOPS AND WEAPONS.

a. INFANTRY. - Two of the infantry regiments are placed forward on the coast while the third is held in reserve about ten miles to the rear. The command post of each of the forward regiments is located from 2 to 5 miles inland, near the center of the regimental sector. The division command post is generally located in a fair sized town some ten miles inland. In each regimental sector two battalions are usually sited forward with the third in reserve. Forward battalion command posts are located in small towns on the coast. The companies in each battalion form strongpoints at beach exits, vulnerable points along the shore, and at vital areas inland (road junctions, command and communication centers, etc.). These strongpoints are supplied with a high proportion of heavy machine guns and heavy mortars, drawn from the machine gun company in each infantry battalion and allotted to the rifle companies. Regimental anti-tank guns will also be located within strongpoints, and sited to cover beaches, beach exits, bridges, road junctions, and other such initial points.

b. ARTILLERY. - The division artillery regiment consists of the following units:

Three light battalions of 12-105mm gun-howitzers each.
One medium battalion of 4-105mm guns and 8-150mm howitzers.

One light battalion is likely to be sited in each forward regimental sector covering the sea approaches, with the remaining light battalion located in the area of the reserve infantry regiment as a "break-through" battalion. The medium battalion is probably placed well forward to fire upon shipping. All the guns of the artillery regiment are placed in some sort of emplacement, probably in most cases of the sandbag type although concrete emplacements have been built for some of the batteries near the coast.

c. MISCELLANEOUS UNITS. - The disposition of the remaining units of the division cannot be laid down.

11. DISPOSITION OF COAST DEFENSE ARTILLERY UNITS. - It is estimated that on the average three batteries of coast defense artillery will be found in each forward regimental sector. These guns are normally protected by concrete emplacements or casemates and located well forward as close to the shoreline as the terrain allows, but so sited as to be protected from capture in the first phase of an assault. Turntables or spurs for railway guns would be so located as to enable these guns to supplement the stationary artillery.

12. DISPOSITION OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS. - Anti-aircraft units, located where they can best protect vulnerable targets, wherever possible are sited so that they fulfill a secondary role of engaging ground and sea targets. Heavy anti-aircraft guns are sited so as to be able to fire on shipping and tanks as well as aircraft, while light anti-aircraft guns are located so that they can be used against landing craft, enemy tanks on the beach and beach exits, etc. Heavy guns are sited in groups of four or six while light guns are normally in groups of three.

IV. FORTIFICATIONS.

13. PILLBOXES. - Pillboxes are used to protect anti-tank guns and machine guns. They are located in company and smaller strongpoints sometimes on the beach, and occasionally in the cliffs backing the beach. Some are made of concrete, some of steel armor, and others consist of a tank turret over an excavation in the ground. At some locations, obsolete tanks are used as pillboxes, being dug in with only the turret projecting above ground. In some cases the sides of the excavations into which these tanks are driven are revetted with reinforced concrete.

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14. CASEMATES. - Casemates are widely used for the protection of coast defense guns sited near the shoreline. Owing to a shortage of labor and of materials, the majority of the guns are still in emplacements, but the Germans are rectifying this as fast as they can.

15. EMPLACEMENTS. - Gun emplacements are of cement where possible although most of them are built of sandbags or earth. Frequently they are circular to allow all around traverse.

16. OBSTACLES. - There are three main types of obstacles, i.e. underwater obstacles, anti-personnel obstacles, and anti-tank or anti-vehicle obstacles.

a. UNDERWATER OBSTACLES. - To date there has been no evidence of extensive use of underwater obstacles. This may be due to the difficulty in keeping them in position. At DIEPPE stakes were encountered by landing craft which were slowed down but were not stopped. Extensive underwater beach scaffolding, etc., has not been installed.

b. ANTI-PERSONNEL OBSTACLES. - Wire is extensively used on all beaches, at beach exits, and around strongpoints and gun emplacements. On beaches wire is generally placed just above the high water line, and in front of promenades and seawalls. Several types of wire entanglement are used including concertina, double apron and various improvised types. Anti-personnel mines are also placed on many of the beaches, although how extensively is unknown. Booby traps have been found on some of the beaches, set off by trip wires strung across exits and gaps in wire entanglements.

c. ANTI-TANK OBSTACLES. - Many types of anti-tank or anti-vehicle obstacles have been reported, including walls, ditches, dragons teeth, knife rests, and rail obstacles. Walls are constructed from concrete and generally strengthened by a ditch dug immediately in front of the wall. There is also an obstacle known as "Element C" which is a barrier built up of steel channel iron and cable. This has been seen more and more on beaches and near beach exits. Many beaches have also been mined with anti-tank mines.

17. R.D.F. STATIONS. - Radio direction finding stations are used extensively to give warning of approaching aircraft and seacraft, and quite often direct the fire of coast defense and anti-aircraft artillery. These stations are located as far forward and on as high ground as possible and are usually protected by circular sandbag or concrete emplacements. They are located within strongpoints for protection.

18. BEACH SEARCHLIGHTS. - Searchlights are located where required to illuminate targets on and approaching the beach. These searchlights are probably operated by the infantry of strongpoints, and are not used as part of the anti-aircraft defenses.

19. TOWNS. - A special case in fortifications which is worthy of discussion, is the strongpoint based on a coastal town. This type of strongpoint is particularly formidable. Almost all coastal towns will be found to be fortified to provide all around defense by fire and obstacles, as they usually have some port facilities or good beach, and at any rate are centres of communications. The beach is usually backed by a seawall and promenade, which will be made more effective as an obstacle by the use of wire or other means. Buildings along the water front are bricked up to include the ground floor, and thus converted into fortifications. Roads leading from the beach or waterfront are blocked with anti-tank obstacles. Buildings not used as fortifications and which interfere with fire are demolished. Civilian wire communications are fully employed and supplemented as required, to control the defense. For this reason battalion and sometimes higher headquarters, are often found in coastal towns.

THOMAS J. FORD,
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A.C. of S., G-2.

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READ AND INITIAL No. 15
INTELLIGENCE CHIEF
COLLECTION
EVALUATION
ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE
ENEMY MATERIAL
DISSEMINATION
COLLATION

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of A. C. of S., G-2

By Auth: C.G. V Corps
Date : 20 March 1943
Initials: TJF

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 17
for week ending 20 March 1943

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 5) The total number of German divisions in Western Europe has increased to 62, of which 32 are classed as offensive and 30 as defensive. In France there is an additional offensive division, as yet unconfirmed, with one less defensive division due to the departure of the 189th Reserve Division to Greece. Six of the offensive divisions in France are still unconfirmed, as is one of the offensive divisions in Holland. One offensive division, the 343rd Infantry Division, has arrived in Germany. (Weekly Summary No. 15 showed a total of 30 offensive divisions and 31 defensive divisions in this area.)

2. MOVEMENTS OF ITALIAN DIVISIONS (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Reports Nos. 5 and 6) Two more Italian divisions, as yet unidentified, have moved into France, making a total of eight Italian divisions there. The 6th Mountain Division has returned to Italy from Montenegro and the 4th LIVORNO Infantry Division is either moving or has moved from ROME to Tunisia. An unconfirmed report states that the whole Italian force on the Russian front (remnants of ten routed divisions) has been withdrawn to Italy, but that the Germans are insisting on another force to replace it. It is difficult to see where such a force could be drawn from, and the present condition of the force withdrawn from Russia would give it very little combat efficiency.

3. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 6) The total estimated German aircraft based on the Western Front (France, the Low Countries, Northwest Germany, Denmark, and Norway) is estimated as follows: Bombers, 438; Fighters, 995; Others (including 150 transports), 246. This represents decreases since the last report (Weekly Summary No. 15) of five bombers, seven fighters, and one other plane.

4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 6) The TIRPITZ was observed 11 March, accompanied by two destroyers and two torpedo boats, passing the entrance to TRONDHEIM Fjord, outward bound. The SCHARNHORST left GDYNIA some time after 21 February and its whereabouts are not known; the LUTZOW was in ALTEN Fjord on 4 February; the HIPPER was observed at WILHELMSHAVEN on 8 March; the PRINZ EUGEN was observed in GDYNIA on 21 February; the LIEPZIG is probably in the BALTIC but its location is unknown; the NURNBURG was observed near NARVIK on 2 February; the EMDEN left GDYNIA some time around 8 March and its location is unknown; the KOLN was seen at KIEL on 7 March. The following craft are reported as inactive: The GNEISENAU at GDYNIA, the ADMIRAL SCHEER at WILHELMSHAVEN, the SEYDLITZ at BREMEN, the SCHLESIEN at GDYNIA, and the SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN also at GDYNIA.

5. GERMAN U-BOATS (Secret - from ETO Daily Bulletin No. 260) It is estimated that the Germans have 250 operational U-boats at present, 100 of these being at sea. In addition, it is believed that they have 150 U-boats in training which will be available for operations in about 5 months.

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6. ROUMANIAN ARMY (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 186 - British) It is reported that of the remnants of the eight infantry and one cavalry divisions which the Roumanians had in the DON BEND sector, they have succeeded in forming only one new division. Five other Roumanian divisions have lost heavily, and their mountain troops, fighting in the CAUCASUS, are far below strength. It is thought that the original strength of the Roumanian Army, which was about 27 divisions now has a fighting strength of less than 14 divisions.

7. SWEDEN (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 186 - British) The Swedes have protested to Germany against violations of their territory by aircraft, and have recently employed not only A.A. guns, but fighter planes as well, to resist such trespasses.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

8. ENEMY IN DISGUISE (Secret - from ETO Daily Bulletin No. 256) A patrol of German Panzer Grenadiers disguised as Americans attacked an Allied post in Central Tunisia on the night of 10 March 1943.

9. GERMAN POWER GLIDERS (Secret - from ETO Periodic Report No. 5) Reports indicate that large power gliders are being constructed and assigned to the German Air Force for the transport of troops and supplies. These gliders are powered with low-horsepower engines that are very economical on fuel. It is probable that they will be towed as before, and released several miles from the target, landing with their motor cut off. The main advantages of power gliders over transport planes are the economy of materials and labor in construction, and the fact that they can land on short, rough fields. If attacked by fighter aircraft while in tow, they can cut loose and make independent efforts or controlled landings.

Section III - Publications

10. The following publications have been received by the G-2 Office furing the past week. A limited distribution has been made, and a few extra copies are available that may be had by calling at the G-2 Office:

a. Tactical and Technical Trends No. 18, Military Intelligence Service, Washington.
b. German Tactical Doctrine. (Special Series No. 8, Military Intelligence Service).
c. The Development of German Defensive Tactics in Cyrenaica, 1941. (Series No. 5, Military Intelligence Service).
d. German Military Symbols. (Military Intelligence Service).
e. Wall Charts of German Army Organization. (No extra copies available.)

11. Accompanying this report as Annex No. 1 is a list of the various types of German divisions, giving the manner in which they are employed, and the organization of the divisions of which details are known.

Thomas J. Ford
THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
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DISTRIBUTION:

Hq. V Corps (Reinf) - C.G., C/S., G-1, G-3, G-4, A.G., A.A., Arty., Engr., Finance, Hq. Comdt., I.G., C.W.S., Ord., Sig., Surgeon, Spl. Serv.

G-2, 29th Inf. Div.	(26 copies)	S-2, 53rd Med. Bn.	(1 copy)
A-2, EIGHTH Air Force	(1 copy)	S-2, 156th Inf. Regt.	(1 copy)
S-2, 102nd Cav. (Mecz.)	(3 copies)	S-2, 71st Ord. Bn. (Q)	(1 copy)
S-2, 190th FA Regt	(3 copies)	S-2, 12th Evac. Hosp.	(1 copy)
S-2, 112th Engr. Regt.	(3 copies)		
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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS (REINF)
Office of A. C. of S., G-2

~~27~~ 30 March 1943.

ANNEX NO. 1 to
Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 17.

The following Annex is reproduced from Special Report No. 23, ETOUSA. Since this report contains information of value to all officers of combatant units, it is suggested that it be disseminated and discussed in appropriate officer schools.

TYPES OF GERMAN DIVISIONS

1. GENERAL. - This report describes briefly the organization and employment of the various types of German divisions. The German name of the division is given in parenthesis.

2. THE ARMORED OR "PANZER" DIVISION (PANZERDIVISION).

a. EMPLOYMENT. - The Panzer division is used primarily for its shock action, and great fire power, either in the spearhead of the attack, or as a highly mobile striking force. It is described in German tactical doctrine as being primarily a weapon of offense, whose essential job is to force a decision in battle.

b. ORGANIZATION. - The division normally consists of a tank regiment, a motorized infantry brigade consisting of two motorized infantry regiments and a motorcycle battalion, an artillery regiment, an engineer battalion, a tank-destroyer battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a signal battalion, and the divisional services and trains. In some divisions, however, the normal reconnaissance battalion has been abolished. In these divisions the motorcycle battalion has been taken out of the motorized infantry brigade, given an armored car company, and is employed for reconnaissance purposes.

c. ORGANIZATION CHART. - See Annex "A".

3. THE MOTORIZED DIVISION (INFANTERIEDIVISION, MOTORISIERT).

a. EMPLOYMENT. - The motorized divisionis usually employed in conjunction with the panzer division, for exploitation of breakthroughs and in other situations where a highly mobile force is required.

b. ORGANIZATION. The division ordinarily consists of two motorized infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a motorized reconnaissance battalion, a tank-destroyer battalion, an engineer battalion, a signal battalion, and divisional services and trains. A tank battalion may be attached to the division, and it is reported that it may be made an organic part of the division.

c. ORGANIZATION CHART. See Annex "B".

4. THE LIGHT DIVISION (JAGERDIVISION OR LEICHTE AFRIKA DIVISION).

a. EMPLOYMENT. - The light division may be employed as a spearhead force in the attack, as an exploitation force in a breakthrough, or as infantry support for a panzer division.

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b. ORGANIZATION. - The organization of the light division is not definitely established. It may consist of either two or three infantry regiments; may have either a separate artillery regiment or artillery battalions attached to the infantry regiments; may have either a motorized reconnaissance battalion, a mixed reconnaissance battalion, or a bicycle battalion; and may or may not contain an anti-aircraft company in addition to the tank-destroyer battalion. Also, the division may either be completely or only partly motorized. Where it is only partly motorized, its organization is so adapted that it can conveniently be moved by motor transport of the GHQ pool. It is believed that this is an experimental type of division, whose organization is not yet definitely established.

c. ORGANIZATION CHART. - Because of the differences in organization outlined above, it is not possible to construct a "typical" organization chart for the light division.

5. THE INFANTRY DIVISION (INFANTERIEDIVISION).

a. EMPLOYMENT. - The employment of the German infantry division is very similar to that of the normal infantry divisions in other armies.

b. ORGANIZATION. - The offensive infantry division consists of three infantry regiments, a regiment of artillery, a reconnaissance battalion, a motorized tank-destroyer battalion, a signal battalion, an engineer battalion, and divisional services and trains. Certain divisions, which have been used primarily in defensive functions, have only two infantry regiments and a battalion of artillery.

c. ORGANIZATION CHART. - See Annex "C".

6. MOUNTAIN DIVISION (GEBIRGSDIVISION).

a. EMPLOYMENT. - The mountain division is a highly self- contained and self-sufficient unit, which can operate efficiently in mountainous or swampy areas, or other types of difficult terrain in which the operation of ordinary infantry or motorized units is hampered.

b. ORGANIZATION. - The division usually consists of two mountain rifle regiments, a mountain artillery regiment, a bicycle battalion, a tank-destroyer battalion, an engineer battalion, a signal battalion, and divisional services and trains.

c. ORGANIZATION CHART. See Annex "D".

7. LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS OR SECURITY DIVISION (SICHERUNGS-DIVISION).

a. EMPLOYMENT. - These divisions are used for mopping-up and security duties in the rear areas and along the lines of communications.

b. ORGANIZATION. - The division ordinarily consists of two "reinforced" infantry regiments (which contain a battalion of artillery in addition to the normal infantry components), a bicycle battalion, or company, a tank-destroyer battalion or company, an engineer battalion, a signal battalion or company, and divisional services and trains. The strength of the division varies considerably.

c. ORGANIZATION CHART. - See Annex "E".

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8. SPECIAL EMPLOYMENT DIVISIONS(DIVISION ZUR BESONDEREN VERWENDUNG OR DIVISION Z.B.V.).

a. EMPLOYMENT. - These divisions are ordinarily only administrative headquarters, but in some instances may be organized as combat divisions for special duties.

b. ORGANIZATION. - Nothing is definitely known of the organization of these divisions. Ordinarily, they are believed to be only administrative staffs controlling miscelleneous units.

9. FRONTIER DIVISION (GRENZWACHDIVISION).

a. EMPLOYMENT. - These divisions were originally organized for frontier defense, but are now used chiefly as occupation troops in conquered territories.

b. ORGANIZATION. - There is no definite organization for these units. They are made up of varying types of "Frontier Guard" units.

10. RESERVE DIVISION (RESERVEDIVISION).

a. EMPLOYMENT. - These divisions were originally replacement training (Ersatz) divisions inside Germany. Most of them were subsequently moved into occupied territories of France and Poland, where they continued their training functions, as well as serving as occupation troops. They have recently been reorganized into "reserve" divisions, still continuing their training duties, but in many cases taking over the defensive functions formerly assigned to infantry divisions.

b. ORGANIZATION. - Nothing is as yet definitely known of the organization of these divisions, although it is expected they will resemble infantry divisions.

11. DEPOT DIVISIONS (DIVISION NUMMER--).

a. EMPLOYMENT . - These divisions formerly controlled procurement and training of replacements for field units. Since the reorganization of certain of the replacement training divisions into reserve divisions, it is believed that the remainder of the replacement training divisions have now assumed depot functions, receiving and processing replacements, but not actually conducting extensive training as was the case in the past.

b. ORGANIZATION. - There is no definite organization of these divisions. They control varying numbers of Ersatz (replacement) units, although their present relationship to these units is not altogether clear.

12. COAST DEFENSE DIVISION (KUSTENSVERTEIDIGRENGSDIVISION).

a. EMPLOYMENT. - These are special tactical headquarters controlling separate coast defense artillery and infantry battalions in Norway and possibly elsewhere.

b. ORGANIZATION. - There is no definite organization for these divisions. They control various coast defense units in assigned sectors.

13. FIELD TRAINING DIVISION (FELDAUSBILDUNGSDIVISION).

a. EMPLOYMENT. - Field training divisions control training of replacements in rear areas before the replacements are sent to field units. At present, only five of these divisions have been identified, all of them being in Russia.

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b. ORGANIZATION. - Little is known of the organization of these units. They are believed to be only headquarters controlling and supervising the training of field replacement units.

14. SS DIVISIONS (WAFFEN-SS DIVISIONEN).

a. EMPLOYMENT. - The employment of SS divisions depends on the type of division involved, but is, in general, quite similar to that of normal divisions of corresponding types.

b. ORGANIZATION. - There are several distinct types of SS divisions. The SS-Polizei division is very similar to a two-regiment infantry division; the SS-Kavallerie is a cavalry division; the SS-Nord and SS-Prinz Eugen are mountain divisions. Although reorganization in some cases is not complete, four previously existing SS divisions are now known as "SS-Panzergrenadier" divisions; these consist of two motorized infantry regiments, a tank regiment of two battalions, and other units. The exact nature of these divisions is not yet clear, but it seems that they represent an intermediate stage between the panzer and the motorized division. Two more of this latter type are now being activated in France.

15. AIR FORCE GROUND-EMPLOYED DIVISIONS.

a. EMPLOYMENT. - Some Air Force formations have been employed as ground troops, chiefly as ordinary infantry, but in at least one case, a division closely resenbling the Panzer division has been formed from these troops. Their employment is identical with that of ordinary ground troops.

b. ORGANIZATION. - Organization of these units does not follow any definite pattern, as each unit is a special formation.

/s/ Sumner Waite
/s/ SUMNER WAITE,
Colonel, GSC,
Acting A.C. of S., G-2.

5 Annexes.
Annex A - Organization Chart, Panzer Division.
Annex B - Organization Chart, Motorized Division.
Annex C - Organization Chart, Infantry Division.
Annex D - Organization Chart, Mountain Division.
Annex E - Organization Chart, Sicherungs Division.

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ANNEX - A.

PANZER DIVISION

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS	TANK REGIMENT	MOTORIZED INFANTRY BRIGADE	ARTILLERY REGIMENT	RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION	TANK-DESTROYER BATTALION	SIGNAL BATALLION	ENGINEER BATTALION	SERVICES AND TRAINS
Strength - 185	Strength - 2640	Strength - 5460	Strength - 2200	Strength - 300	Strength - 600	Strength - 455	Strength - 870	Strength - 2390

REGIMENT	REGIMENT	MOTORCYCLE BATTALION
Strength - 2160	Strength - 2160	Strength - 1140

STRENGTH: Approximately 15,600 men.

WEAPONS:

Machine guns	957
Anti-tank guns	234
Mortars	30
Close support guns	58
Light artillery pieces	24
Medium artillery pieces	12

VEHICLES:

Tanks	201
Armored cars	24
Other motor vehicles	2,750

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ANNEX - B.

MOTORIZED DIVISION

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS	MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT	MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT	ARTILLERY REGIMENT	RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION	TANK-DESTROYER BATTALION	SIGNAL BATTALION	ENGINEER BATTALION	SERVICES AND TRAINS
Strength - 200	Strength - 3100	Strength - 3100	Strength - 2800	Strength - 800	Strength - 650	Strength - 550	Strength - 900	Strength - 2500

STRENGTH: Approximately 14,600 men.

WEAPONS:

Machine guns	575
Anti-tank guns	70
Mortars	108
Close support guns	20
Light artillery pieces	24
Medium artillery pieces	12

VEHICLES:

Armored cars	24
Other motor vehicles	2,200

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ANNEX - C.

INFANTRY DIVISION

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS	INFANTRY REGIMENT	INFANTRY REGIMENT	INFANTRY REGIMENT	ARTILLERY REGIMENT	RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION	TANK-DESTROYER BATTALION	SIGNAL BATTALION	ENGINEER BATTALION
Strength - 200	Strength - 3100	Strength - 3100	Strength - 1300	Strength - 2800	Strength - 600	Strength - 650	Strength - 550	Strength - 900

SERVICES AND TRAINS
Strength - 2500

STRENGTH: Approximately 17,500 men.

WEAPONS:

Machine guns	563
Anti-tank guns	72
Mortars	141
Close Support guns	26
Light artillery pieces	36
Medium artillery pieces	12

VEHICLES:

Armored cars	3
Other motor vehicles	1050

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ANNEX - D.

MOUNTAIN DIVISION

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS	MOUNTAIN RIFLE REGIMENT	MOUNTAIN RIFLE REGIMENT	MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY REGIMENT	BICYCLE BATTALION	TANK-DESTROYER BATTALION	SIGNAL BATTALION	ENGINEER BATTALION	SERVICES AND TRAINS
Strength -200	Strength-3500	Strength-3500	Strength - 2750	Strength-800	Strength - 750	Strength-600	Strength - 700	Strength-2700

STRENGTH: Approximately 15,500 men.

WEAPONS:

Machine guns	610
Anti-tank guns	77
Mortars	102
Close support guns	14
Light Artillery Pieces	48
Medium artillery Pieces	—

VEHICLES:

No details available.

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ANNEX - E.



Details of the strength and equipment of the Sicherungs Division are not available.

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READ AND INITIAL
INTELLIGENCE CHIEF
COLLECTION
EVALUATION
ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE
ENEMY MATERIAL
DISSEMINATION
COLLATION

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of A. C. of S., G-2

By Auth: C.G. V Corps
Date : 27 March 1943
Initials: TJF

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 18
for week ending 27 March 1943

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 7) The total number of German divisions in Western Europe remains at 62, but 33 are now classed as offensive (an increase of one) and 29 are classed as defensive (a decrease of one). These changes include the arrival of the 30th Infantry Division in Finland from Russia, and the departure of the 711th Infantry Division from France to the Russian front. The 711th is reported to have suffered heavy casualties in Russia, and it is now thought to have very low combat value. It was erroneously reported in last week's summary (Weekly Summary No. 17, Par. 2) that two more unidentified Italian divisions had been located in France. It has now been established that this was a false report, and that the number of Italian divisions in France remains at six.

2. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 7) The total estimated German aircraft based on the Western Front (France, the Low Countries, Northwest Germany, Denmark, and Norway) is estimated as follows: Bombers, 451 (an increase of 13 since last week's report); Fighters, 997 (an increase of 2); and other aircraft, including 150 transports, 247 (an increase of 1). This includes an increase of nine long-range bombers, the equivalent of one squadron, based in Holland. There was a similar increase last week.

3. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 7) Of the major units of the fleet, the locations of the following are unknown, or have not been checked by photographic reconnaissance for some time: TIRPITZ, SCHARNHORST, LUTZOW, LEIPZIG, NURNBERG, and EMDEN. Thus a total of six ships are, or could be, at large. Although it is unlikely that the Germans would send so great a portion of the fleet to sea at once, it is possible that one or more of them may slip out to sea. (ETO Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 263 stated that the TIRPITZ and three other major naval units, thought to be the SCHARNHORST, LUTZOW, and NURNBERG, were reported exercising in the NARVIK area on 19 March).

4. NORTH AFRICA (Secret - from ETO Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 264) A comparison of strength in the forward areas in Tunisia on 13 March was as follows: The Allies had 115 Infantry battalions against 109 Axis infantry battalions, the Allies had 1074 artillery pieces against 829 for the enemy, and had 1176 tanks against 255 tanks of the enemy.

5. ENEMY AIR STRENGTH, MEDITERRANEAN AREA (Secret - from Northwest African Air Forces Weekly Summary No. 16) On 6 March it was estimated that the enemy had 395 aircraft of all types in Tunisia, with an estimated serviceability of 65%. For the entire area of Tunisia--Sicily--Sardinia--Pantelleria, it was estimated on the same date that the enemy had 1320 planes of all types, with an estimated serviceability of 60%.

6. ENEMY AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 7) A considerable decrease in aerial reconnaissance of the United Kingdom by the enemy was noted for the week ending 20 March. Unfavorable weather

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was the probable cause. High-level reconnaissance flights were made on 15 March over PORTSMOUTH, ISLE OF WIGHT, SOUTHAMPTON, and the ORKNEY--SHETLAND areas; and on 13 March over DUNGENESS, RYE, HASTINGS, and the LOWESTOFT--BURY--ST. EDWARDS areas, with single flights reported off the east coast of SCOTLAND, the ORKNEYS, and off the northwest coast of IRELAND. Daily coastal reconnaissance was made of the south coast of England, and the east coast was reconnoitered on two days by enemy planes.

7. SOUTHWESTERN FRANCE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 7) Reports continue of troop and materiel movements into southwestern France, near the Spanish border, but they are not confirmed. There may be a maximum of five German divisions in the area west of TOULOUSE and south of BORDEAUX, but there is condiderable evidence that only three divisions are actually there. It is possible that reports of troop movements into this area are part of a German rumor campaign to contain Allied forces by the threat of an invasion of Spain.

8. DISCUSSION OF AN ENEMY CAPABILITY (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 7) Increase of German air activity against the United Kingdom is one of the major enemy capabilities, and such an increase would probably be partly for the effect that it would have on the morale of the German public in view of RAF and USAAF activity against Germany. Damage that could be caused to British and American preparations and installations in England would likely be a secondary consideration, in view of the relatively small number of aircraft that the G.A.F. would have available to use. Any major effort along these lines would cause a high wastage of aircraft and crews from the small force available for the purpose. In view of the recent reinforcement of the enemy bomber force facing the British Isles, a limited increase in raids over England may be expected, but large scale activity is unlikely since it would necessitate the transfer of squadrons from other fronts from which they cannot be spared at present.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

9. GERMAN PANZER ORGANIZATION (Confidential - from G.H.Q. Home Forces Monthly Notes for Intelligence Officers No. 4 - British) The new heavy tank, Pz Kw VI, is at present organized in independent battalions, and it is not expected that it will be incorporated in divisions. The present trend of organization in German tank battalions and regiments appears to be toward the homogeneous pattern characteristic of the British armored brigade. According to statements of prisoners, one tank regiment in North Africa was reorganized so that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th companies were equipped with the Pz Kw III and IV tanks, while the 4th and 8th companies had the Pz Kw IV special (mounted with the long 75-mm tank gun). There is also evidence that there is in existence a new medium tank of about thirty tons, probably mounting a 75-mm tank gun or a 75-mm tapered-bore tank gun. According to the prisoner, this new tank is an all-purpose tank intended to replace both the Pz Kw II and IV in tank regiments.

10. EXAMINATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR BY THE ENEMY. Attached hereto, as Annex ~~Appendix~~ II, is the condensation of two recent articles on German methods of interrogating prisoners of war. It is recommended that this information be used for the training of troops in action to be taken in case of capture.

Section III - Publications

11. The following publications have been received by the G-2 Office during the past week. A limited distribution has been made, and a few extra copies are available that may be had by calling at the G-2 Office.

a. Tactical and Technical Trends No. 19, M.I.S., Washington.
b. German Anti-aircraft Artillery, Special Series No. 10 of the M.I.S. series.

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THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

Hq. V Corps - C.G., C/S, G-1, G-3, G-4, A.G., A.A., Arty., Engr., Finance, Aq. Condt., I.G., C.W.S., Ord., Sig., Surgeon, Spl. Serv.

G-2, 29th Inf. Div.	(26 copies)	S-2, 53rd Med. Bn.	(1 copy)
A-2, EIGHTH Air Force	(1 copy)	S-2, 156th Inf. Regt.	(1 copy)
S-2, 102nd Cav. (Mecz)	(3 copies)	S-2, 71st Ord. Bn. (Q)	(1 copy)
S-2, 190th FA Regt.	(3 copies)	S-2, 12th Evac. Hosp.	(1 copy)
S-2, 112th Engr. Regt.	(3 copies)		
S-2, 56th Sig. Bn.	(1 copy)		

ANNEX 1 (Secret)

NEW INFORMATION ON DELAYED ACTION MINES

This office has just received a SECRET letter from the Office of the A. C. of S., G-2, ETOUSA, as follows:

> Information has been received from AFHQ revealing the method employed by the enemy to obtain a delayed action effect with the standard anti-tank mine. This is produced by laying standard mines with loosely-packed earth above. The first one or two vehicles passing over will compress the loose earth, but subsequent vehicles will explode the mine. Detection is stated to be difficult owing to the depth at which the mines are laid. They further state that the procedure is simple and effective.

ANNEX 2 (Confidential)

INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR BY THE GERMANS

(The following article is condensed from the Weekly Intelligence Digest of the Eighth U. S. Air Force, classified as Confidential, and from Tactical and Technical Trends of the M.I.S., classified as Restricted.)

Forms used by German interrogators in recording information obtained from prisoners of war have been captured, and the list of questions contained on the printed form are very comprehensive. It is not likely that the interrogator will fill in the form in the presence of the prisoner, but the questions included will give a clue to the answers that will be sought in the interrogation.

Besides the routine questions of name, rank, serial number, age, and the time and place captured, detailed information is sought concerning the unit from which the prisoner was taken - the type of company, and the name and number of the battalion, regiment, division, and corps. Questions also ask what component of the service the prisoner is from, detailed information on entry into the service, embarkation, route taken in movement overseas, debarkation, arrival of the unit at the front, and identity of other units in the division or in other divisions. Questions of losses and morale, and particulars of weapons, tank, equipment, and anti-gas equipment are also included.

More detailed information is desired by the enemy in regard to our Order of Battle, anti-tank and anti-aircraft equipment (including the extent to which infantry units have this equipment), signal communications, any knowledge whatever of the Air Corps or Ranger troops, effect of Axis weapons on our troops, any information on amphibious troops, any active or passive chemical warfare preparations, rumors of future operations, and the situation at home in regard to formation of new units, movements overseas, supply and food, opinions as to the prospects in the war, and general morale.

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A captured Oberleutnant (First Lieutenant) of the German Air Force have some interesting information in regard to German methods of questioning and treating prisoners. Since it comes from an enemy source, it should be considered as unverified information.

When possible, the Germans have always taken advantage of the shock and nervous tension suffered and try to conduct preliminary questioning at the earliest possible moment.

Frequently prisoners, particularlyofficers, are entertained in the Mess of a nearby station, where the conversation "naturally" turns to shop. Such parties are carefully staged, with an interrogator present to guide the conversation in the desired direction.

Everything was done to give the Anglo-Saxon prisoners a good impression of the Germans, it was stated, in hope that prisoners would learn to regard their captors as civilized human beings and not as Huns, and that they would carry out pro-German propaganda after the Germans have won (or lost) the war.

One G.A.F. officer prisoner recounted an instance in which two Americans were questioned after having been captured in Tunisia. They refused to give any information, and were then told that if they did not talk at once that they would either be beaten or tied down in front of a tank and run over. Needless to say, the threats were not carried out, and to the knowledge of the German prisoner giving this information, such threats have never been carried out against the British or Americans.

After a prisoner was taken back to the main prisoner camp for further interrogation, a decision was reached as to the type of treatment necessary. This decision was reached at an interrogation which took place soon after arrival. If the prisoner proved to be "tough" he would probably be moved into the main camp and put in a room with a companion, in the hope that information could be obtained by means of a microphone. The companion was quite likely a stool-pigeon. It was stated that a good deal of useful information was obtained by these methods.

Many of the stool-pigeons used were stated to be prisoners belonging to countries occupied by the Germans; they have usually been coerced into this activity by threats to themselves or their relatives in the country occupied. Others were men with a grouse, whose grievances had been played upon by the Germans or who had been persuaded that a German victory would be a good thing. These men realized that they might never be able to return to their homes after the war. Still others were men who were given a comfortable time and special treatment, who knew that there was a reason for this but shut their eyes to the facts.

A difficult prisoner would be placed in a room with a stool-pigeon, who had usually been primed beforehand as to suitable subjects for discussion, and the conversations were tapped by microphone. The stool-pigeon played the role of the comrade in distress and pretended to be hurt if the prisoner did not talk freely. The suggestion that the prisoner need not be afraid to talk to a comrade often had the desired effect.

The rooms for prisoners which the Oberleutnant had seen were about 15 feet by 12 feet in size, and were lined with tongue-and-groove boards covered in some cases with cloth. He had been told that there were four microphones in the ceiling and that the space above the ceiling was packed to a depth of about three feet with some material to deaden echoes and improve reception

The recording-room looked like a telephone exchange, and the operators listened-in with head phones and took notes in shorthand. The Oberleutnant was told that gramophone recordings could be taken, but did not see this done. The recording method was used largely when prisoners spoke with a dialect or used a lot of slang.

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Another method was to give the prisoner a period of solitary confinement. The Oberleutnant was told that it was surprising how soon some prisoners lost their resistance to interrogation after having been kept alone for a time; when subsequently treated decently, they were ready to talk freely.

For prisoners who were amenable, direct interrogation was used. Very comfortably furnished rooms were used for this purpose and the interrogators were at pains to create the atmosphere of an informal chat. The free use of alcohol played an important part in this method.

Efforts were made to convince the prisoner that he need not fear to talk because everything about his unit was already known. In each interrogation room, imposingly arrayed on a shelf, there was a series of books giving the history of each unit, together with names of personnel, losses, etc. The Interrogation Officer often started by reading out to a prisoner a number of details about his unit, and this frequently had the desired effect.

Another device used was to stage parties, given by the German officers at the camp, to which a number of prisoners were invited. These parties often went on until 4 or 5 a.m., and, as may be imagined, drinks flowed very freely. This method was particularly dangerous; it was obviously very disarming for a new arrival to attend a party and find Allied and German officers on apparently very friendly terms. The prisoner may well have come to believe that, where other and more senior officers talked freely, the same freedom of speech was permissible to himself.

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WHAT'S THIS PLANE?







A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each bulletin board. The identification of this plane, together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: "Spitefire", British Fighter, single seater, low wing monoplane, liquid cooled motor. Span - 40 ft. 2 in., length - 29 ft. 11 in.

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



FRIEND OR FOE?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: German medium tank, Pz. Kw. III
Length - 16 feet
Width - 9 feet 6 inches
Heighth - 8 feet
Weight - 18 to 20 tons
Armament - 1 5cm. gun
2 light machine guns
Crew - 5

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

By Auth: C.G. V Corps
Date : 3 April 1943
Initials: TJF TJF

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 19
for week ending 3 April 1943

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the [illegible] Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 8) The total number of German divisions in Western Europe is increased to 64 (ten of them unconfirmed), of which 34 are classed as offensive divisions and 30 as defensive. This is a net increase of two divisions, including an offensive division in Holland, and a defensive division in France. Arrivals reported during the week included the 191st Reserve Division in France from Germany, an unconfirmed panzer division in the PYRENEES sector of France, and an unconfirmed infantry division near ROTTERDAM. Departures included the 332nd Infantry Division from France to the Russian front, and an unconfirmed infantry division formerly near LORIENT, France. The 17th Infantry Division, previously reported to have left France, is still located there (near LORIENT). It has been learned that the 17th Infantry Division, previously reported as having left France, is still at LORIENT instead of the unconfirmed division that was thought to have taken its place. The number of Italian divisions in France remains at six.

2. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 8) Increases during the week include the equivalent of about a group of long-range bombers and four squadrons of ground-attack units in France. Approximately one more group of long-range bombers were shifted from Holland and Denmark to France, and there was a slight increase in single-engined fighters in Holland.

3. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 8) No changes in the major fleet units have been reported during the past week. The TIRPITZ, SCHARNHORST, LUTZOW, NURNBERG, LEIPZIG, and EMDEN are still unlocated, and it is assumed that the first four are likely together.

4. GERMAN ECONOMIC NOTES (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 8) Land transportation is well administered and efficient but nevertheless one of the tighter situations in the Axis economy. Weekly losses of motor vehicles by the fighting forces exceed the present rate of output, and a recent report from the Russian front showed German losses of 147 railroad trains and 199 locomotives in that locality.

5. GERMAN PERSONALITIES (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 8) Hitler has stepped down as Commander-in-Chief of the German Army and Goering as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, their places having been taken by Field Marshal Keitel and Field Marshal Milch, respectively, Zeitzler has replaced Halder as Chief of the German General Staff.

6. GERMAN DIVISIONS (Secret - from ETO Order of Battle Report No. 21) The German Army is now thought to have 297 divisions, including an air force division fighting as a ground force, a Spanish division, and a Croatian division. Of these, 197 are classed as offensive divisions, including panzer, motorized,

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light, mountain, SS, and infantry divisions; 63 are classed as defensive divisions, including infantry, line of communications, reserve, special employment, frontier, and coastal divisions; and 37 are administrative divisions, including depot, field training, and special employment divisions. There are 163 offensive, 15 defensive, and 6 administrative divisions on the Russian front, and 7 offensive divisions in Tunisia; the balance are scattered throughout Europe.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

7. ITALIAN PARACHUTE DIVISION (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 188 - British) A new Italian parachute division, to be called "Nembo" (meaning "cloud" or "shower") is being formed to replace the "Folgore" division destroyed at EL ALAMEIN. The division will probably be built along the same lines as the "Folgore" with two regiments of three battalions each, a divisional assault engineer battalion, a divisional motorcycle company, and a total strength of around 6,000. Weapons will probably include small arms and 47-mm close-support and antitank guns, and experience of the past has demonstrated that the morale of Italian parachute troops is far higher than that of the average Italian infantry.

8. MARKING OF BOOBY-TRAPS (Confidential - from Weekly Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force) Because of the irregular and fluid conditions existing on the modern battlefield, where the same position may be alternately abandoned and recaptured many times over, the Germans have been marking areas in which they have placed booby-traps, to prevent their own patrols from being killed by them. The marker is almost always in the form of a skull and crossbones sign. It cannot be depended upon that such a sign will be found, but if it is discovered in an area which is to be used by our troops, the Engineers should be notified in order that booby traps may be disposed of.

9. STREET FIGHTING TACTICS. Accompanying this week's Summary, as Annex No. 1, is an article on street fighting tactics used on the Russian front. It is recommended that this article be circulated among the officers of each unit to the maximum commensurate with its classification.

Section III - Publications

10. Distribution was made by this office during the past week of the following publications:

a. Inter-services Journal, "Aircraft Recognition", for March 1943; no additional copies available.

b. M.I.S., Special Series No. 10, "German Antiaircraft Artillery"; advance copies distributed, with fuller distribution to be made later.

11. Accompanying this week's summary are twelve charts showing the divisional insignia of various German divisions. These charts were reproduced from information received from ETO, and are not classified; they may be posted on bulletin boards.

Thomas J. Ford
THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

Hq. V Corps - C.G., C/S, G-1, G-3, G-4, A.G., A.A., Arty., Engr., Finance, Hq. Comdt., I.G., C.W.S., Ord., Sig., Surgeon, Spl. Serv., Q.M.

G-2, 29th Inf. Div.	(26 copies)	S-2, 53rd Med Bn.	(1 copy)
A-2, EIGHTH Air Force	(1 copy)	S-2, 156th Inf. Regt.	(1 copy)
S-2, 102nd Cav. (Mecz)	(3 copies)	S-2, 71st Ord. Bn. (M)	(1 copy)
S-2, 190th FA Regt.	(3 copies)	S-2, 12th Evac. Hosp.	(1 copy)
S-2, 112th Engr. Regt.	(3 copies)		
S-2, 56th Sig. Bn.	(1 copy)		

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Annex No. 1 to Weekly
Intelligence Summary
No. 19, Hq. V Corps

Reproduced from British
War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 188.

STREET FIGHTING TACTICS USED ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT

Strategic Importance - Fighting for, and inside, towns and villages on the Eastern Front has developed to a point where it became of primary strategic importance in certain phases of the campaign.

During the summer and autumn campaigns of 1942 fighting inside towns and villages did not play an important role in operations. Although the Russians did put up strong resistance in and around certain key towns, like MINSK and SMOLENSK, on the whole the German strategy of deep and rapid encirclement forced the Russians to abandon valuable towns in an attempt to extricate their armies. Certain cities were defended with great determination namely: ODESSA, LENINGRAD and MOSCOW - but in each case all the fighting took place at their approaches.

The first phase of the campaign in which street fighting became important was during the Russian winter offensive 1941 - 42, when the Germans stemmed the Russian advance by their determined defense of key towns and villages along the whole front. The tactical setting for this period of fighting was largely determined by the peculiar climatic conditions, in that an exceptionally cold winter and double the normal depth of snow denied to the Russians all freedom of maneuver and imposed on their troops a tremendous degree of hardship. The Germans were able to keep relatively warm in centers of population and concentrate on the defense of the main approaches and resorted to stubborn and costly street fighting whenever the Russians did manage to break in to a town or village.

The second phase of important street fighting was during the latter period of the Russian retreat in the summer and autumn of 1942 in southern RUSSIA and CAUCASIA. Throughout July and in August the Germans had advanced rapidly and had overwhelmed Russian resistance in some sectors by local air and tank supremacy. The Russians, at first, attempted to stop the Germans by getting off the main routes of German advance and striking at their lines of communication and supply but this only interfered with enemy progress and did not stem his advance.

The Soviet High Command then issued strict orders that all withdrawals were to stop and every town and village must be defended street by street and house by house whether it was surrounded or not. This policy was put into effect with determination and ruthlessness and achieved virtual stabilization of the whole front toward the end of August and throughout September, October and November. This in spite of the fact that in the steppe type of country in Southern Russia and North CAUCASIA the Germans had every facility to maneuver around centers of population. However, the determined defense of all key points on main lines of communication in depth makes a sustained offensive by the enemy extremely difficult. The Russians were told to fight in towns even partially destroyed by aerial bombardment and taught to appreciate the tactical advantages of fighting in ruins.

The third phase in the development of the tactics of street fighting centers around the Russian defense of the city of STALINGRAD which was of the utmost significance to the whole course of the campaign on the Eastern Front and raised the tactics of street fighting to a level of importance never before envisaged. In this case determined street fighting inside a large and unfortified city enabled the Russians to deny to the enemy one of the principal strategic goals of his summer campaign: The cutting of Russian communications along the VOLGA.

FIRST PHASE: January - April 1942.

German System of Defense - Invariably the Germans prepare a town or village, likely to be attacked, for all-round defense. There is usually a belt of field defenses outside the populated center with ditches, mine-fields and other anti-tank obstacles protecting all approaches, every obstacle

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being covered by fire according to a well co-ordinated fire plan. Anti-tank weapons and obstacles are generally concentrated along the main avenues of probable tank approach, usually in the outskirts of the town or village.

The populated center itself is fortified according to a carefully designed plan, keeping well in the foreground the importance of the element of surprise in all street fighting. Certain outlines are transformed into fortified strongholds and several such buildings, capable of mutual fire-support, form a center of resistance. Streets and houses which are outside these zones are covered by small-arms fire.

The ground-floor of the fortified point is usually reserved for heavy weapons: guns, anti-tank guns and mortars. Sometimes tanks are placed in ambush inside barns or buildings, or partly dug in along the outskirts of the town where they might be least expected and, generally, covering the approaches to a fortified zone.

Heavy and light automatic weapons, snipers and grenade throwers are dispersed on the upper floors and on roof-tops.

Artillery and mortars are also emplaced in parks, gardens and court-yards and are more effective in repelling tanks than in close fighting.

If one or two buildings of a fortified zone are lost the Germans attempt to counter-attack vigorously before the enemy has time to consolidate his position.

Russian Methods of Attack - Through costly experience the Russians learned that it is "the surprise nature of enemy fire in street fighting that has the deadliest effect" and that it is "often more difficult to find out where the enemy strong points are than it is to reduce them after they have been discovered".

Hence the first prerequisite of a successful attack on a town or village according to Russian teaching is establishing the plan of enemy defense in detail and preparing a co-ordinated plan of attack also with meticulous detail.

Therefore the Russians insist on the value of detailed intelligence which must aim not only at locating the fortified zones in the town, but also the location of the principal weapons and the fire plan. The importance of discovering means of approach to the fortified zones which will afford best cover is equally stressed.

If all this cannot be established from intelligence sources, thorough reconnaissance and even armed reconnaissance to draw enemy fire is recommended. A detailed plan of the town or village is drawn, if one does not exist, and a probable enemy system of defense is drawn up. Then the plan of attack is worked out in detail.

Phases of the Attack - (1) The approach: The Russians stress the importance of surprise. If reconnaissance has been thorough or local guides are available they prefer to attack by night. The attack is carried out simultaneously from different directions if possible. A feint is made generally to pin down the main anti-tank armament. Although the objective may be surrounded prior to the attack an avenue of retreat is left to the enemy as experience has taught that cornered Germans fight desperately and reducing fortified buildings is more expensive in casualties than fighting in the open. So the attempt is made to force the enemy to retreat after a number of strong-holds are taken and the probable line of retreat is ambushed.

The Russians usually employed tanks in attacking villages but used them sparingly and often to pin down the main armament rather than to rush the defenses and take part in street fighting. Often the tanks are thrown

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in from an entirely different direction from the main infantry attack, but the importance of co-ordinating and timing these various blows is always stressed.

Close artillery and mortar support is insisted upon. A preliminary bombardment or creeping barrage to cover the approach is not usually necessary. The main thing is to plan and co-ordinate artillery and heavy mortar fire with the action of other arms and, in the initial stages, attempt to distract or deceive the enemy to effect the maximum surprise.

(2) Street fighting to reduce strongholds: For fighting inside villages and towns the Russians rely principally on infantrymen armed with sub-machine guns, hand-grenades and bottles containing an incendiary mixture. Although the importance of training assaulting units in the art of street-fighting is continually stressed it is considered advisable to train and equip special detachments of assault troops for this task. It is not known how these groups are organized and whether each Infantry Battalion, Regiment or Division have such detachments. We do know that each detachment is sub-divided into a reconnaissance force and the main body. The reconnaissance detachment ascertains the best lines of approach and defiles which will enable the assaulting forces to approach their objective. The main body specializes in assault tactics and in hand to hand fighting.

The assault troops are taught to avoid advancing along streets or across squares. They must find their way to their objective by using back yards, fences, lanes and even making their way from house to house, breaking through walls or moving from roof to roof if necessary.

The objective of an assault group should be to isolate and reduce a group of fortified buildings which compose a stronghold and then go on to the next objective if necessary.

The importance of effective artillery support is stressed but the difficulty of providing it is fully realized. The following procedure is recommended. Before the attack the infantry and artillery commander agree on a preliminary, definite and simple plan of artillery support and establish a number of verey light signals, preferably, to announce the progress of the attack.

On the other hand, it is the duty of artillery and mortar commanders to keep in the closest possible touch with the assaulting troops and to use their initiative in giving them close support wherever circumstances permit. A proportion of guns is actually moved forward to take on targets over open sites and take part in street fighting.

(3) Consolidation to repel counter-attacks: The Russians have learned from experience that the German is a skilful and dangerous opponent as long as he can keep his enemy at a distance by effective fire but that he dislikes hand to hand fighting. Thus if the ground floor of a building is captured there is usually no difficulty in clearing the rest of the house, but if a strong point is lost, and the Germans have been forced to withdraw by hand to hand fighting they usually stage an immediate and determined counter-attack from a new direction.

Hence the importance is stressed of mopping up the ground taken, clearing it of booby traps and mines and fortifying it against counter-attacks as quickly as possible.

It is usual to allot this duty of fortifying and garrisoning a captured stronghold to a specially trained group forming part of the assault detachment.

SECOND PHASE: August - November 1942.

<u>German Method of Attack</u> - The German methods of attack on towns and villages along their path of advance in Southern Russia and CAUCASIA were

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radically different from the Russian methods under conditions of winter warfare.

Whenever the Germans expected to meet Russian resistance at a key point they preferred to disorganize the defense by terrific aerial bombardment and rushing the defenses in their stride by a massed tank attack. Their local air supremacy, speed of advance and lack of natural obstacles contributed to the surprise effect of such an onslaught.

Russian System of Defense - The Russians gradually developed the following means of combating the German blitz tactics:

a. To prevent the enemy from rushing the town defenses with tanks a belt of defense works was constructed in depth outside the town. The depth and intricacy of these defenses depending on the garrison available for their defense.

b. Inside the town, houses are reinforced and organized for defense in groups, as on the German pattern, with artillery emplaced on ground floors, in barns, squares and parks.

c. Particular attention is paid to anti-tank defenses. The Russians insist that tank obstacles to be effective must be coupled with ingenuity and cunning. An ordinary tank barrier covered by fire is little effective. The object should be to erect tank obstacles and traps so as to force the tanks to hesitate or turn and be taken by surprise. For instance, if along the probable avenue of tank approach obstacles are erected in the form of a labyrinth which would force the tanks to maneuver around and through the obstacles it would allow the garrison to deal with them effectively both by well-concealed anti-tank guns and rifles and by bundles of hand grenades and incendiary bottles.

d. The principal lesson which the Russian Command had to teach their troops was that a town or village largely burnt down or even destroyed by preliminary air attacks was even more suited to prolonged and stubborn defense than one with all its buildings intact.

The troops are taught to improvise fortified nests among ruins and charred remains of houses as quickly as possible and provide a number of alternative sites, all inter-connected by a system of deep trenches. The debris offers greater opportunities for camouflage, surprise and ambush than standing buildings, is not as likely to be effected by subsequent bombardment, and is not vulnerable to incendiary attack.

e. After the enemy has penetrated the area of the town or village the importance of surprise counter-attacks, when and where he least expects them, is stressed. In order to achieve this it is important not to give away one's position or fire plan by movement or desultory firing, hence practically all essential movement is restricted to night time. It is then that supplies and ammunition are brought up and wounded evacuated.

f. In preparing fortified positions the importance of eliminating all "dead ground" is stressed. This can be best achieved by enfilade fire and by having mobile groups armed with sub-machine guns make use of available, or improvised cover to attack enemy assault groups in flank and rear. The Russians make excellent use of snipers whose special task is to pick off officers and N.C.O.'s. The Germans have suffered heavy casualties among N.C.O.'s who keep in the vanguard of the assault to control the supporting artillery fire more effectively.

g. It is never advisable to erect tank obstacles or barricades in front of firing points because the enemy expects it and one is only likely to draw his fire.

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THE DEFENSE OF STALINGRAD - THIRD PHASE: 26 August - 23 November.

Street fighting tactics in STALINGRAD were on the whole no different from those outlined for phase two - both with regard to the methods of German attack or Russian defense - but the scope, intensity and versatility of these tactics have not been paralleled in this war.

Before even reaching the city's outer defenses, which had been improvis- [illegible] consisted of [illegible] field defenses, the Germans pulverised STALINGRAD by continous aerial bombardment. Then followed repeated assaults supported by great numbers of tanks. This is how a German officer described these first assaults on STALINGRAD:-

> "The attacking German troops move forward behind tanks and assault guns, sweep away barricades with gun fire, knock holes into house-walls and crush down wire obstacles. Guns and mortars batter concealed positions, anti-tank guns cover the side streets against possible flanking operations by tanks, A.A. is ready to meet attacking aircraft. Low flying aircraft and Stukas attack the rear sections of resistance in the inner town and supply points and routes inside the town. Machine guns engage snipers on the roofs. Covered thus infantry and engineer assault detachments, keeping close to the walls, advance over the wreckage from street to street, break down blocked doors and cellar windows with explosive charges and grenades, smoke out the less accessible corners with flame-throwers, comb houses from ground floor to roof, in which they have frequently to engage the enemy in hand to hand fighting".

These assults failed to make much progress partly due to the great quantity of artillery concentrated by the Russians, and partly due to the way in which the large number of reinforced concrete and stone buildings were adapted by the Russians for defense, even when they were in a ruined condition.

The Germans were virtually forced to give up large-scale tank attacks, as being too costly, and the war reverted to intense street fighting between relatively small infantry and sapper assault groups, liberally supplied with flame throwers.

The main difference between the fighting in STALINGRAD and that which took place at other inhabited localities along the Eastern Front was that considerable quantities of artillery of every caliber participated on both sides. Many of the Russian batteries were emplaced on the islands and the east bank of the VOLGA, while others remained among the ruins of the town.

The whole site of the city became a complicated tangle of trenches, deep dug-outs under blasted buildings, strongholds in ruins or in the remains of large and strong reinforced concrete buildings, such as abounded in the vast factory area.

Here, the theory that the ruins of a city constitute one of the most formidable types of fortification in modern war, was proved to the hilt.

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





A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each bulletin board. The identification of this plane, together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: A-20A (U.S. designation), Boston III (British designation)

Identification features:

- Twin-engine, underslung radial motors, quite close to fuselage.
- Mid-wing, fairly heavy wings, dihedral from their roots.
- Leading edge of wing straight, trailing edge tapered, well-rounded wing tips.
- Long, protruding nose.
- High single fin and rudder.

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

FRIEND OR FOE?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: German light tank, Pz. Kw. II

Length	- 15' 9"
Width	- 7' 2"
Height	- 6' 5"
Weight	- 9 tons
Speed	- 25 M.P.H.
Armament	- 1 2cm. MG; 1 LMG
Crew	- 3

Poihts for Recognition: Turret squat and streamlined. Rounded gun mantlet. Large front driving sprocket. Five independently sprung bogie wheels.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

By Auth: C.G. V Corps
Date : 10 April 1943.
Initials: TJF

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 20.
For week ending 10 April 1943.

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 Office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 9) The number of German divisions in Western Europe remains unchanged, with no arrivals or departures reported. Distribution is as follows: France, 16 offensive (8 of them unconfirmed), 12 defensive; Belgium, 3 defensive; Holland, 3 offensive (2 of them unconfirmed), 1 defensive; Denmark, 2 defensive; Norway, 5 offensive, 5 defensive; Finland, 9 offensive; Germany, 1 offensive, 7 defensive.

2. ITALIAN DIVISIONS IN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 9) The 6th ALPI GRAIE Division, located on the Franco-Italian frontier, is now known to have the bulk of its troops in France, so the number of Italian divisions in France is carried as seven. Other Italian divisions in the Western Mediterranean area are as follows: Corsica, 2 divisions; Sardinia, 2 divisions; Sicily, 3 divisions; Italy, 8 divisions. All are classified as offensive divisions.

3. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 9) The total estimated German aircraft based on the Western Front (France, the Low Countries, Northwest Germany, Denmark, and Norway) is estimated as follows: Bombers, 512 (a decrease of 5 since last week); Fighters, 992 (same as last week); and Others (including 150 transports), 256 (an increase of 9 since last week). These figures include aircraft of combat units only; they do not include planes of training units, which may on occasion be used in combat.

4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 9) Last week's summary reported six major naval units as unaccounted for. Of these, the NURNBERG has since been located at BOGEN Fjord; the TIRPITZ and two other units (thought to have been the SCHARNHORST and the LUTZOW) were reported at BOGEN Fjord a short time ago, but have since left, presumably for ALTEN Fjord; and the EMDEN and the LEIPZIG are still unlocated. It is thought that the latter may still be in the BALTIC. The ADMIRAL SCHEER, pocket battleship that was last reported (Weekly Summary 17) as inactive at WILHELMSHAVEN, was reported by ETO Daily Bulletin No. 281 to have left there.

5. ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NOTES (Secret - from ETO PA Report No. 6) It was learned from a reliable source that the civilian coal ration in Germany was cut by 48% in December 1942. . . . Another report said that small-holding farmers in Germany were ordered to move with their families to the Ukraine before spring. Trouble was anticipated, but 200,000 to 300,000 were moving, with their cattle and tools. Money was loaned to the transients. The younger members of the families are reported to prefer this move to the alternate of factory work. . . . Another unconfirmed source stated that "Italians are not disguising their delight that end of war is in sight no matter who wins."

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6. GERMAN AIR ACTIVITY OVER THE UNITED KINGDOM (Secret - from ETO Daily Bulletin No. 280) For the first three months of 1943, the Germans sent 1,062 planes over the United Kingdom, with 108 losses, or an average of 10.1%. The losses were 8.9% for January, 7.9% for February, and 12.4% for March.

7. GERMAN SHIPBUILDING (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol. II, No. 14) An analysis of photographs made by the R.A.F. during the past six months showed that almost all of the larger German shipyards were engaged in some U-boat construction, with the output continuing on a five-a-week basis. Recently the concentration has been on U-boats of 500-tons and more, with about three or four of the completed each week. During the six-months period ending 28 February, about 125 to 135 U-boats of all types were completed. Merchant shipbuilding has received more attention than hitherto, but work of naval surface vessels other than destroyers was on a small scale only. About 21 tank-landing craft were in various stages of construction at the end of the period covered, which was more than had been recorded at any one time previously. In addition to those under construction, about 23 were completed during the period.

8. GERMAN HIGH COMMAND (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 189 - British) On the occasion of HITLER's broadcast on 21 March, an announcement on the German radio implied that KEITEL had replaced HITLER as commander-in-chief of the German Army. HITLER had taken the post over in December 1941 after the failure of the Germans to capture MOSCOW. According to a newspaper report from Switzerland, a German military spokesman later described the announcement of 21 March as a mistake, and said that HITLER still retains his position as commander-in-chief of the Army (The Weekly Summary of this Headquarters for last week quoted the ETO Periodic Report as stating that HITLER had been replaced by KEITEL, but it seems probable that this statement was in error.)

Section II - Tactical and Technical

9. GERMAN BOMBS (Secret - Telegram from British War Office) S.C. 250 kg. (about 500-pound) bombs are being dropped by the Germans, which contain phosphorus and some unidentified components. The bomb may have a red band, one inch wide, around the body, and has two fuze pockets. One of the pockets has an impact fuse, and the other has a dummy fuze cap. Phosphorus filling is indicated by a broad black rubber ring under the flange of the male base plate. When the female base plate is fitted, this indication is not evident.

10. ARTILLERY OBSERVATION (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 189 - British) A recent article in "Red Star" (the Soviet Army's newspaper) stated that artillery observation from tanks had been widely used during the recent offensive actions and had fully proved its worth. Just as the correct position of the artillery observer has long been with the leading elements of the infantry, practical experience has proved that forward artillery observation is possible from tanks. The artillery officer has to be with the tanks forming the first wave, from which position he can judge what is holding up the advance, will be able to call for fire and correct it, thus expending less ammunition and achieving greater effect. The possibility of shelling empty ground or one's own tanks is reduced, and if this method is used, advancing tank units will receive timely and powerful support from the artillery assigned to them.

Section III - Publications

11. The following publications have been received by the G-2 Office during the past week. A limited distribution has been made, and a few extra copies are available that may be had by calling at the G-2 Office.

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a. M.I.S. publication, "Tactical and Technical Trends" No. 20.
b. Combined Operations pamphlet, "The Bulldozer" No. 11.
c. "Notes on Enemy Vehicles - Germany" (Limited distribution only; file copy of this office will be loaned if desired.)
d. M.I.S. Special Series No. 11, "Morale-Building Activities in Foreign Armies". (Advanced copies only have been received; additional distribution will be made later.)

12. Distribution of amendments to British Aircraft Recognition Handbooks is being made, accompanying this summary. The amendments should be placed in the handbooks at the places indicated, and the handbooks should be kept up-to-date at all times. These handbooks, as amended, probably give the best information available in this theatre for identification of aircraft.

13. Advance copies of FM 30-40, "Military Intelligence - Identification of United States Armored Vehicles" dated Jan. 9, 1943, have been received by this office. An order for additional copies will be placed by this office in one week; organizations that have not received this field manual by direct issue may submit their request to the G-2 Office and a bulk order will be submitted.

14. Accompanying this report is the Penguin booklet, "Modern Battle" by Major (now Lt. Col.) Thompson of the U. S. Army. This is a reprint of the book originally published by the Infantry Journal, and is recommended to intelligence personnel for outside reading on enemy tactics in the current war.

Thomas Ford

THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

Hq. V Corps - C.G., C/S, G-1, G-3, G-4, A.G., A.A., Arty., Engr., Finance, Hq. Comdt., I.G., C.W.S., Ord., Sig., Surgeon, Spl. Serv., Q.M.

G-2, 29th Inf. Div	(26 copies)	S-2, 53rd Med. Bn.	(1 copy)
A-2, EIGHTH Air Force	(1 copy)	S-2, 156th Inf. Regt.	(1 copy)
S-2, 102nd Cav. (Mecz)	(3 copies)	S-2, 71st Ord. Bn. (Q)	(1 copy)
S-2, 190th FA Regt.	(3 copies)	S-2, 12th Evac. Hosp.	(1 copy)
S-2, 112th Engr. Regt.	(3 copies)		
S-2, 56th Sig. Bn.	(1 copy)		

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



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Last week's armored vehicle: Cruiser Tank Mk. VI, "Crusader" (British).

Length	- 19' 8"
Width	- 9' 1"
Heighth	- 7' 4"
Weight	- 18 tons
Speed	- 27 m.p.h.
Armament	- 1-2 pounder 2-7.92 M.G.
Crew	- 5 men

Points for recognition: Streamlined undercut and diamond-shaped turret with two aerials mounted on the back with large evenly placed bogey wheels touching top and bottom of track. Prominent driver's cab on the right and subsidiary M.G. turret to its left.

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





earlier version lacks this distinctive nose, added to accomodate bomb-aimer

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each bulletin board. The identification of this plane, together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: Junkers 52, JU 52 - German transport.
Identification features: Three motor low wing monoplane, fixed landing gear, equally tapered leading and trailing edges of wings to square tip, with high set tail plane. Crew - 3, Carries 14 fully equipped men, Span - 69', length - 62'. The three motors are 760 h.p., B.M.W., air cooled.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS

Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

By Auth: C.G. V Corps
Date : 17 April 1943.
Initials: TJF

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 21.
for week ending 17 April 1943.

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 10) a. The total number of German divisions in Western Europe is now reported as sixty-seven. Last week's report indicated sixty-four divisions. Distribution of the sixty-seven divisions is as follows: France, 15 offensive (4 of them unconfirmed), 14 defensive; Belgium, 2 defensive; Holland, 3 offensive (2 of them unconfirmed, 1 defensive; Denmark, 2 defensive; Norway, 6 offensive, 5 defensive; Finland, 9 offensive; Germany, 3 offensive (2 of them unconfirmed), 7 defensive.

b. Changes reported since last week's report are as follows: (1) The 14th, 16th and 24th Panzer Divisions, reported to have been destroyed at STALINGRAD, have been identified in France where they are apparently being reactivated. Although all three are classed as offensive divisions, it is certain that their combat effectiveness will be low for a considerable time. (2) the 156th Reserve Division, classified as defensive, has moved from Belgium to the Mediterranean coast of France. (3) The 711th Division, defensive, was erroneously reported to be in Russia, but is still in France. (4) The presence of two SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions, formerly carried as unconfirmed in France, have been confirmed. (5) The unconfirmed Panzer Division in the PYRENEES has been identified as the 14th Panzer Division. (6) The departure of the 106th and 344th Infantry Divisions, both offensive, for the Russian front has been confirmed; they may have left some time ago. (7) The existence of an unconfirmed Marine Division on the French Mediterranean coast is no longer recognized, although a considerable number of marines probably not organized into a division are believed to be in that area. (8) The 25th Panzer Division has been identified in Southern Norway, it has probably been there for some time. (9) There is evidence that one motorized and one infantry division, formerly considered potential divisions in Germany, now actually exist; they are therefore classed as unconfirmed offensive divisions.

c. No changes have been reported during the week of the Italian divisions in France; the number of divisions remains at seven.

2. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 10) The total estimated German aircraft in combat units based on the Western Front (France, the Low Countries, Northwest Germany, Denmark, and Norway) is estimated as follows: Bombers, 518 (an increase of 6 since last week's report), Fighters, 1,005 (an increase of 13), and Others (including 150 transports), 257 (an increase of one). The estimated total number of German planes on all fronts as of 3 April (from ETO's Air Activity Report No. 4 - Secret) was as follows: Operational, 4,919 (including 845 transports); Non-operational, 1,181 (including 555 transports). This report also stated that 180 transport aircraft had been removed from the Russian front and placed on a non-operational status in Germany.

3. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 10) Six major naval units remain unlocated, although the TIRPITZ, SCHARNHORST, and LUTZOW are believed to be in Northern Norway, and the EMDEN and LEIPZIG are thought to be in the BALTIC. ETO Daily Bulletin No. 285 (Secret) reported that a pocket battleship, presumably the ADMIRAL SCHEER, was sighted at SWINEMUNDE on 4 April. Four or five destroyers are at present unlocated, but it is considered that most of them are probably with the heavy units in Northern Norway.

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4. GERMAN PERSONALITIES (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 10) Moscow radio reported on 5 April that ROMMEL and Admiral CANARIS (Chief of the German Military Secret Service) had arrived in Southern Italy, where headquarters of the Southern Defense Zone were already said to have been set up. The report stated that ROMMEL had been appointed Chief of Ground Forces, KESSELRING as Chief of Aviation, and CANARIS as Chief of Naval Forces; that while MUSSOLINI might remain titular Commander-in-Chief of Italian and German forces in Italy, ROMMEL would be the actual Commander-in-Chief.

5. GERMAN PREPARATIONS FOR GAS WARFARE (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol. II, No. 15) German forces in France are reported to be collecting anti-gas material and carrying out intensive anti-gas training, it has been learned from British Chemical Warfare sources. German officers constantly tell their men that the Allies will use gas, and one officer said that gas courses for officers have been held in PARIS for the past two months. In the opinion of that officer, the Germans will use gas in the case of an Allied landing in Europe. Another report quoted German officers heard talking in a Belgian cafe. They admitted that they had lost the war, but affirmed that HITLER was preparing a last offensive, using gas. They said a number of troops from occupied countries were being trained in HAMBURG for chemical warfare. Conflicting reports have been received as to preparations for civilian defense against gas attacks in Germany, but one source said that in the Rhineland there are large depots of a new type of gas mask to be issued to the public when required, and others told of construction of gasproof shelters in Western Germany and Luxemburg. Still another report stated that since the end of January, the outpost of gas masks of four large firms in Germany had been considerably increased.

6. NOTES FROM PRISONERS OF WAR (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol. II, No. 15) Survivors of a DO-217 which crashed in Scotland on 25 March said that since the U.S.A.A.F. raid on the ROMILLY aircraft plant southeast of PARIS on 12 December 1942, the airfield had been closed to all but light aircraft. Although the prisoners had no exact knowledge of the position at ROMILLY, it appeared that their GESCHWADER (squadron) had drawn replacement aircraft direct from Germany ever since ROMILLY was attacked. HITLER'S recent twelve-minute speech was received in complete and glum silence by these prisoners. They also said that war flights against England are considered fairly suicidal proceedings in these days; and that a serious invasion of the Continent is expected with certainty any day now. No one likes to think or talk about the future. Their GESCHWADER, the prisoners said, maintains an anti-invasion flight of three aircraft. These are kept in permanent readiness, fuelled and bombed. These aircraft maintain 24-hour watches, and operations over England are not allowed to interfere with the emergency flight.

7. GERMAN DEFENDING FORCES IN THE WEST (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 190 - British) The general structure of the German forces in Western Europe has shown little change in recent months, but their numbers have been seriously reduced and their quality has suffered. It is probable that France and the Low Countries will be defended by an increasing proportion of defensive troops; i.e., two-regiment infantry and reserve divisions. These units are of high value in battle as long as they play only a static part, installed behind formidable defenses. The number of offensive divisions to back these static units will vary from time to time, as divisions return from Russia and again become operational. They are likely, however, to remain near the minimum consistent with safety. German freedom from anxiety on the score of internal security will, to some extent, be assured by the presence of "Home Defense" forces.

8. LONG RANGE EFFECT OF BOMBINGS OF NAZI TARGETS (Confidential - from Weekly Intelligence Digest, Eighth Air Force, 10 April 1943) Reports from British sources show that long-range effects of U.S.A.A.F. attacks on Nazi targets have seriously dislocated their traffic system and that the Nazis' are slow in rebuilding after heavy raids. Serious damage was caused to the railway facilities in Northwest France, particularly at RENNES and ROUEN.

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At both places traffic was totally interrupted by cutting through main lines, and yard working was paralyzed by numerous hits on the yards. As a result of RAF raids, rail traffic in Brittany has been completely disorganized. At Sotteville scarcely any repair work had been undertaken two days after the U.S.A.A.F. raid of March 12. Little, if any, traffic had been moved and more than 1,200 cars were totally immobilized by damage to tracks. The slowness with which repairs are being carried out can be explained only by lack of adequate labor or equipment. RAF photo reconnaissance of the VULKAN shipyards, Vegesack, attacked 18 March by Eighth Air Force bombers, showed a great deal of re-roofing under way on April 5. Much of this necessitated the dismantling of large areas, apparently undamaged when previously seen, but so far there had been no rebuilding.

Section II - Publications

9. No new publications were received for distribution by the G-2 Office during the past week. Some units have requested additional copies of the plane and tank silhouettes that accompany this summary each week; requests for a reasonable number of additional copies will be complied with.

Thomas J. Ford
THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

Hq. V Corps - C.G., C/S, G-1, G-3, G-4, A.G., A.A., Arty., Engr., Finance, Hq. Comdt., I.G., C.W.S., Ord., Sig., Surgeon, Spl. Serv., Q.M.

G-2, 29th Inf. Div.	(26 copies)	S-2, 53rd Med. Bn	(1 copy)
A-2, EIGHTH Air Force	(1 copy)	S-2, 156th Inf. Regt.	(1 copy)
S-2, 102nd Cav.(Mecz)	(3 copies)	S-2, 71st Ord. Bn. (Q)	(1 copy)
S-2, 190th FA Regt.	(3 copies)	S-2, 12th Evac. Hosp.	(1 copy)
S-2, 112th Engr. Regt.	(3 copies)		
S-2, 56th Sig. Bn.	(1 copy)		

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



FRIEND OR FOE?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: German light tank, Pz. Kw. I
Length - 14 ft. 1 in.
Width - 6 ft. 6 in.
Heighth- 5 ft. 7 in.
Weight - 5½-tons.
Speed - 25 to 30 mph.
Armament - 2 light machine guns
Crew - 2

Points for recognition: Turret squat, streamlined and offset to the right.
Rounded gun mantlet.
Suspension linked by outside girder.

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





A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each bulletin board. The identification of this plane, together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last weeks plane: Blenheim IV (2-Mercury) bomber.
Span 56' 0" <u>Identification features</u> Length 42' 7" Height 15' 0"
Mid-wing with radial engines centrally placed. Straight centre section with dihedral on outer wing panels. Under-gun position off-set on nose. Equi-taper on wings with elliptically curved tips. Deep fillet at wing roots. Cut-away in trailing edge of tailplane. Single turret and high, pointed fin and rudder.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

By Auth: C.G. V Corps
Date : 24 April 1943
Initials: TJF.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 22.
for week ending 24 April 1943.

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 11) a. The total number of German divisions in Western Europe is now reported as sixty-four, a reduction of three divisions since last week's report.

b. Changes in location include movement of the 154th Reserve Division (defensive) to the MARSEILLES sector of France from Poland, the 39th Infantry Division from the CALAIS sector of France to the Russian front, and the 326th Infantry Division from the French Mediterranean Coast to an unknown destination, probably Russia. The 8th Mountain Division is no longer believed to be in Finland, but its exact location is unknown; an unconfirmed report located it in Russia.

c. No changes have been reported during the week of the Italian divisions in France; the number remains at seven.

2. GERMAN AIR FORCE a. (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 11) The total estimated German aircraft in combat units based on the Western Front is as follows: Bombers, 518 (same as last week); Fighters, 1,017 (an increase of 12), and other aircraft, including 150 transports, 266 (an increase of 9).

b. (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 5) The total number of German aircraft in all theaters is estimated at 4,740, of which 639 are non-operational; in addition there are estimated to be 1,400 transport planes, of which 555 are non-operational. This report, which was as of 10 April, showed an increase of 40 planes over the previous week's estimate.

3. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 11 and ETO Daily Report No. 294) a. Of the six major units of the German fleet reported as unaccounted for last week, only the LEIPZIG and the ADMIRAL SCHEER are now unlocated; the former is till thought to be in the BALTIC, and the SCHEER is probably at SWINEMUNDE. Reconnaissance showed the TIRPITZ in LANG Fjord (off ALTEN Fjord), and two battleships - almost certainly the SCHARNHORST and the LUTZOW - in KAA Fjord (at the southern end of ALTEN Fjord); the EMDEN was seen at KIEL.

b. Seven destroyers are at present unlocated.

c. The GRAF ZEPPELIN, last reported as inactive at KIEL, apparently left there on 20 April. Secret ETO Intelligence Bulletin No. 296 reported that it was present at 1100 hrs on 20 April, but was not seen seven hours later. The following morning at 0200 hrs the Bomber Command reported a large unidentified ship, escorted by six small vessels, at the FEHMARN Belt (just east of KIEL); it seems probable that this was the GRAF ZEPPELIN.

4. GERMAN OIL RESERVES (Confidential - from ETO Economic Reports) a. It has been indirectly reported that Germany has four new synthetic oil plants, completed during the latter part of 1942, with a total capacity of 650,000 tons per year.

b. The same source, which is considered as unconfirmed, said that Germany's shortage of oil at various places and for home consumption was due solely to the fact that she is building up reserves for a large spring offensive.

c. A prisoner of war stated that all fuel used at GABLINGEN was synthetic; the fuel supplied for JU-88's, labelled 100 octane, was of poor quality.

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Section II-Tactical and Technical

5. ENEMY SUPPLY IN NORTH AFRICA (Confidential - from ETO Weekly Intelligence Notes) General impressions gathered from the inspection of a captured enemy fuel dump at EL DABA were as follows: a. The Germans and Italians had supply systems that were quite different and distinct, as were the products supplied. b. Containers were sometimes interchanged, but the Germans were meticulous in re-marking borrowed Italian containers. c. The German supply system was functioning very well and products were delivered in good condition. The Italian system was chaotic; the contents of drums were improperly marked and this led to mixture and contamination.

d. No German motor lubricating oils were left behind.

6. NEW GERMAN TRANSPORT PLANE (Restricted - from Tactical and Technical Trends No. 21) The existence of a new German transport, the ME-323, has recently been confirmed. This high-wing monoplane appears to be a development of the "Gigant" glider, originally identified as the "Merseburg." The dimensions of the ME-323 tally exactly with those of the "Gigant," so far as is known, and it is probable that the powered aircraft will supplant the glider version. It has six twin-row, radial engines, and its maximum speed at 10,000 feet is estimated at 160 miles per hour. It is estimated that it will be able to carry 120 fully-equipped men, or an alternative load of small tanks or motor vehicles. It is fitted with six machine guns which fire through apertures in the sides of the fuselage, but the fore and aft armament has not as yet been reported.

Section III - Publications

7. The following publications have been received by the G-2 office during the past week. Distribution has been made, and a few extra copies are available that may be had by calling the G-2 office.

a. Tactical and Technical Trends No. 21, M.I.S. (Limited distribution; more copies should be available later)
b. Tactical and Technical Trends No. 22, M.I.S.
c. British Artillery Training Pamphlet No. 13, "Aircraft Recognition."
d. Aircraft Recognition magazine, Vol. 1, No. 8.
e. "Hints on Teaching Aircraft Recognition" (British Air Ministry).
f. Southern Command's charts on German Infantry Division and German Panzer Division. (Distribution for corps troops accompanies this summary; divisional troops have been previously supplied direct from Southern Command.)

Section IV - Special

8. EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT (Secret postgram from British Air Ministry) Experimental aircraft No. 142 will be seen flying experimentally with a torpedo underslung from the fuselage. The aircraft bears Naval camouflage, coloring, and markings, and conforms to the silhouettes contained in A.L. No. 46 to A.P. 1480A. (This refers to an amendment to the British loose-leaf recognition handbook.) Experimental aircraft No. 193 will be seen flying. This aircraft may bear prototype, operational, or civil camouflage, coloring, and markings, and conforms to the silhouettes in A.L. X/15 to A.P. 1480X.

THOMAS J. FORD
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

Hq. V Corps - C.G., C/S, G-1, G-3, G-4, A.G., A.A., Arty., Engr., Finance, Hq. Comdt., I.G., C.W.S., Ord., Sig., Surgeon, Spl. Serv., Q.M.

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A-2, EIGHTH Air Force	(1 copy)	S-2, 53rd Med. Bn.	(1 copy)
S-2, 102nd Cav. (Mecz)	(3 copies)	S-2, 156th Inf. Regt.	(1 copy)
S-2, 190th FA Regt.	(3 copies)	S-2, 71st Ord. Bn. (Q)	(1 copy)
S-2, 112th Engr. Regt.	(3 copies)	S-2, 12th Evac. Hosp.	(1 copy)

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

German PZ KWIK



Note: Latest models have long barreled gun with bulging muzzle brake.



FRIEND OR FOE?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: British Infantry Tank "MATILDA"
Length - 19 ft. 9 in.
Width - 8 ft. 6 in.
Height - 7 ft. 9 in.
Weight - 26 tons.
Speed - 15 m.p.h.
Armament - 2 pdr., 7.92 M.G.
Crew - 4

Points for recognition: Cast and round pillbox turret. Round cupola; wireless aerials mounted on the back of the turret. Bogey wheels almost completely obscured by armoured skirting with 5 rectangular mud chutes. Cast rounded nose; drivers cab centrally placed.

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

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each bulletin board. The identification of this plane, together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last weeks plane: German Messerschmitt 110 - Fighter
Span - 53' 4"
Length -.40' 4"

Identification features: Twin engined monoplane; low wings equally tapered, slight dihedral with square tips; small rounded fin and rudder; high tail-plane; oval nose surmounted by well-glazed cock-pit

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

Copy No. 45

By Auth: C.G. V Corps
Date : 1 May 1943
Initials: TJF.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 23

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE. Southern Command Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 17 (Confidential) reports that the 10 PIAVE Motorized Division has left Southern France for ROME. This would leave six Italian divisions in France, according to U. S. estimates made in recent reports. No other changes in the enemy order of battle in Western Europe have been verified during the past week.

2. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 6) The strength of operational combat units in initial equipment (i.e., normal number of planes according to organization) is estimated at 4,800 (an increase of sixty planes over the previous week's estimate), of which 648 are non-operational. This does not include transports, of which the estimated actual number of planes is 1,475; of these 595 are non-operational. Estimates for the Western Front showed an increase of 69 fighter planes, giving totals as follows: Bombers, 423; fighters, 909; transports, 100; others, 96. It is thought that the actual strength of units on the Western Front, as compared with initial equipment, is 100%, with possibly 20% to 30% over initial equipment for fighter planes. Estimated enemy losses on the Western Front (planes destroyed, probably destroyed, and damaged) were as follows: Week ending 17 April, 58:24:13; week ending 10 April, 89:22:27; week ending 3 April, 26:13:45; week ending 27 March, 46:12:17. Estimated enemy losses on the Mediterranean Front: Week ending 17 April, unknown; week ending 10 April, 174:62:142; week ending 3 April, 109:20:61; week ending 27 March, 113:32:50.

3. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 298) Photographs taken 22 April showed the ADMIRAL SCHEER and the GRAF ZEPPELIN still at SWINEMUNDE. (No additional information has been received as to the location of the LEIPZIG, which is still unaccounted for.)

4. AIR ACTIVITY IN TUNISIA (Secret - from ETO Daily Intelligence Bulletin No. 302) The enemy air transport daily average to and from Tunisia for the week ending 25 April was 13 planes per day; the daily average for the four previous weeks had been 88 per day for the week ending 18 April, 73 per day for the week ending 11 April, 121 per day for the week ending 4 April, and 120 per day for the week ending 28 March. Recently these transports have been carrying fuel and ammunition for the most part, with some personnel. The enemy's strength in transport aircraft is now thought to be 150, as against the previous estimate carried at 250. Strength in ME-323's has been reduced from 35 to 20.

5. DEFENSE OF SOUTHERN ITALY (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 192 - British) At the close of 1942, the garrison of Southern Italy consisted of three divisions - 4 LIVERNO and 21 GRANATIERI DI SARDEGNA at ROME, and 152 PICENO at LECCE - plus about 300,000 second-line troops. Since the first of the year, 4 LIVERNO has moved to Sicily, and three other divisions have been sent to reinforce Southern Italy - 10 PIAVE Motorized Division, moved from the French Riviera to ROME; 104 MANTOVA Lorryborne Division, from Northern Italy to COSENZA; and 47 BARI Infantry Division from LIVERNO to BARI-BRINDISI. The garrison of Southern Italy (including ROME) therefore consists of five divisions plus about 300,000 second-line troops at this time. It is interesting that the NAPLES area is apparently at present defended by second-line troops only. (Note: An Italian motorized division is supposed to be one that is transported by motor vehicles, while a lorryborne division is one that is so organized that it can easily be transported by motor vehicles but does not have such vehicles as organic equipment.)

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6. GERMAN DEFENSE OF NORWAY (Secret - from ETO Order of Battle Report No. 24) The Army NORWEGEN consists of three corps and a separate Panzer division, making a total of eleven divisions, of which five are classed as defensive. The Air Force consists of approximately 207 planes of all types, and the naval force in the area includes four major units (TIRPITZ, SCHARNHORST, LUTZOW, and NURNBERG) and twenty-seven minor units. Norway's coastline is 2,108 miles long, exclusive of its vast fringe of innumerable islands and rocks, which bring the total to 12,400 miles; there are few landing beaches that favor operations against the country. The enemy relies for the defense of Norway on the ruggedness of the shore-line, the poorness of communications which would hamper a force once landed, the strength of the port defenses, and the presence of the German fleet. Once these four obstacles have been overcome, he will find his own counter-attack seriously hampered by the poor communications. He has not prepared any large-scale counter-attack, having only one Panzer division for the purpose; once this was overcome, the invading force would have to reckon only with air attack.

~~Section II - Axis Organizations~~

7. TODT ORGANIZATION (Confidential - from ETO Order of Battle Report No. 23) The TODT Organization was formed in 1933 under command of Dr. TODT, an experienced engineer, and has become a semi-military organization that works both in the rear areas and close behind the fighting troops for engineering works, such as repairing bridges, building roads, removing ammunition stocks and other captured booty, and the like. At present it is thought to consist of about 450,000 permanent personnel, of which less than 200,000 are thought to be Germans; the balance are prisoners, foreign "volunteers" and the like. Local labor is hired or impressed when needed. The organization is based on areas, divided into sectors and sub-sectors, with the construction squad (about 100 men) as the lowest unit. Originally only German members wore a uniform, but recently foreigners willing to wear the uniform have been given higher pay for so doing; other foreigners wear civilian clothing. The uniform is of Khaki, open at the throat with black belt and plain buckle, and jackboots. German members wear the Nazi sleeve-band, with the words "Org. Todt" above the swastika; foreigners in civilian clothing wear a grey brassard with the unit or squad number on it. The O.T. contributes a great deal toward the German war effort, and releases many of the army engineers for other work, who would be needed in the rear areas were it not for this organization.

8. FRENCH NATIONAL MILITIA (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 192 - British) Announcement was made by the Vichy Government on 30 January 1943 of the formation of the National Militia (Milice Francais). It seems that this is really a political organization, formed to support the LAVAL regime on the lines of the original German Storm Troopers. However, since members of the Militia are not exempt from recruitment to Germany for labor, the strength of the organization has already fallen from its original 50,000 to 20,000. Germany has mistrusted the Militia from the start because of the Communist elements whose only object in joining was to procure arms. Consequently, only members in the big cities have so far been armed.

Section III - Publications

9. The following publications have been received by the G-2 office during the past week. Distribution has been made, and a few extra copies are available that may be had by calling the G-2 office.

a. M.I.S. Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 8, April 1943.
b. M.I.S. Special Series No. 11 (Advance copies previously distributed).

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- 7 -

THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

Hq. V Corps - C.G., C/S, G-1, G-3, G-4, A.G., A.A., Arty., Engr., Finance, Hq. Comdt., I.G., C.W.S., Ord., Sig., Surgeon, Spl. Serv., Q.M.

G-2, 29th Inf. Div	(26 copies)	S-2, 56th Sig. Bn.	(1 copy)
A-2, EIGHTH Air Force	(1 copy)	S-2, 53rd Med. Bn.	(1 copy)
S-2, 102nd Cav. (Mecz.)	(3 copies)	S-2, 156th Inf. Regt.	(1 copy)
S-2, 190th FA Regt.	(3 copies)	S-2, 71st Ord. Bn. (Q)	(1 copy)
S-2, 112th Engr. Regt.	(3 copies)	S-2, 12th Evac. Hosp.	(1 copy)

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





A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each bulletin board. The identification of this plane, together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last weeks plane: Mustang (P-51), U. S. single-seat fighter.
Span - 37 feet.
Length- 32 ft. 3 in.

Recognition features:

Low wing; in line engine; long nose; wing has marked dihedral, low aspect ratio and square cut tips; radiator prominent set far back under fuselage; large square cut tail plane; prominent square cut fin and rudder.

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



FRIEND OR FOE?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: German Tank "Pz. Kw. IV"

Length	-	19 ft. 4 in.
Width	-	9 ft. 7 in.
Height	-	8 ft. 6 in.
Weight	-	22 tons.
Speed	-	22 m.p.h.
Armament	-	one 7.5 cm. gun, two M.G's.
Crew	-	5

In the most recent model the 7.5 cm. gun has a much longer barrel with bulged muzzle brake projecting beyond front of hull.

Points for recognition: Squat streamlined turret. Commander's lookout cupola built on the rear of the turret. Large front driving sprocket. Eight small bogie wheels. Wide built out superstructure.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

By Auth: C.G. V Corps
Date : 8 May 1943
Initials: JJF TJF.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 24

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 Office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 13) a. The total number of German divisions in Western Europe is now reported at 70, of which 8 are unconfirmed. This represents an increase of 6 divisions over the estimate given in Weekly Summary No. 22, but the only actual change reported during the period was the movement of an SS Panzer Grenadier Division from the ARMENTIERES sector of France to the GHENET - TERNEUZEN sector of Belgium; the increase is due to a correction of the previous estimate. b. Distribution of German divisions in Western Europe is as follows: France - 18 offensive (4 of them unconfirmed), 15 defensive; Belgium - 1 offensive, 2 defensive; Holland - 3 offensive (2 of them unconfirmed), 1 defensive; Denmark - 2 defensive; Norway - 6 offensive, 5 defensive; Finland - 8 offensive; Germany, including Poland and Bohemia - 3 offensive (2 of them unconfirmed), 6 defensive. c. No changes in the number of Italian divisions in France have been reported.

2. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air ActivityReport No. 7) The strength of operational combat units in initial equipment showed a slight increase during the week, with a decrease innon-operational aircraft and transport planes. The latter is accounted for by a drop of 100 JU-52's and 15 ME-232's in the Mediterranean. Estimates for the Western Front alone show an increase of 39 operational craft, all of which are single-engine fighters. Estimated losses on the Western Front for the week ending 24 April are not yet known, but for the week ending 17 April, later estimates show that the enemy lost 111 destroyed, 32 probably destroyed, and 31 damaged instead of 58:24:13 as previously carried. Losses in the Mediterranean for the week ending 24 April are also unknown, but during the previous week the Axis losses were 147:39:80.

3. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report no. 13 and ETO Daily Bulletins 307, 308, and 310) Present locations of the major units of the German fleet, or the place where last seen: (Battleship) TIRPITZ at KAA Fjord (a branch of ALTEN Fjord) on 25 April; (Battle Cruisers) GNEISENAU at GDYNIA undergoing repairs; SCHARNHORST at KAA Fjord on 25 April; (Pocket Battleships) ADMIRAL SCHEER at SWINEMUNDE on 22 April; LUTZOW at KAA Fjord on 25 April; (8" Cruisers) HIPPER left WILHELMSHAVEN prior to 2 May, and now unlocated; PRINZ EUGEN seen under way in Gulf of DANZIG on 3 May; SEYDLITZ at BREMEN undergoing repairs; (6" Cruisers) LEIPZIG reported at LIBAU in Latvia on 1 April; NURNBERG reported in LANGELANDS BELT (northeast of KIEL) on 3 May; EMDEN seen under way in Gulf of DANZIG on 3 May; KOLN at KIEL on 20 April; (Old Battleships) SCHLESIEN and SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN at GDYNIA on 3 May; (Aircraft Carrier) GRAF ZEPPELIN at SWINEMUNDE on 22 April.

4. GERMAN ECONOMIC NOTES (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 13) The outstanding development of the first quarter of 1943 has been the introduction of a long-term shipbuilding program; it is reported that 157 cargo vessels, 3000 to 5000 tons, are to be built in Denmark and Holland. However, recent information points to increased difficulty in obtaining the necessary steel. . . Production of tank-landing craft is on the decrease, and many of these have been converted into gun boats . . . The change-over in production from ME-109's to FW-190's is continuing. . . . It has been reported that almost all aircraft factories in former Unoccupied France are being transferred to Germany. . . . It was reported that the German program for production of locomotives was behind schedule for 1942, with only 3000 of the scheduled 3600 locomotives

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being built; production of freight cars was only about half that scheduled, but there is evidence of improvement in this field. . . . Reports indicate that the motor truck shortage is becoming more acute.

5. GERMAN METHODS AGAINST PRISONERS OF WAR (Secret - from P.R. 10, ETO) A reliable source stated that the Germans in Tunis were showing prisoners a copy of an Air Ministry letter instructing them to cooperate in the filling in of Red Cross forms, and that this method of gaining information was proving very successful.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

6. GERMAN TANKS (Confidential - from a British P/W Report - I.R.M. 167) A captured German prisoner, taken 6 November 1942, stated that he had experimented with a Diesel-electric drive tank, but that it was very rapidly abandoned because the type of drive was too cumbersome, and because of slow starting and poor acceleration qualities. He further stated that 60 steam-powered tanks (each with 2 three-cylinder single expansion piston engines of 300 H.P.) were used in Russia for three months, during which time there was only one case of engine trouble; he said that they proved excellent, but were given up because of the difficulty of organizing the supply in the field of special fuel oil for them. Prisoner stated that 750 front-line tanks were used in the Polish campaign. 4400 front-line tanks (with an equal number in reserve) were used for the assault on Russia, and that at present Germany has 25,000 tanks available.

Section III - Publications

7. The following publications have been received by the G-2 office during the past week. Distribution has been made, and a few extra copies are available that may be had by calling the G-2 office.

a. Tactical and Technical Trends No. 23, M.I.S. Publication.
b. M.I.S. Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 7.
c. Additional distribution is being made of a number of the older M.I.S. Publications that have just been received.

Section IV - Special

8. HANDLING OF ENEMY MATERIAL (Confidential - from W.D.,A.G.O. letter of April 12, 1943) a. When forces in the field report military information under general directives, technical intelligence is desired by the War Department of enemy aircraft, bombs, mines, and torpedoes. Such reports should be made by qualified officers, and the Army Air Forces have trained and are training officers for this duty, who will be dispatched to theaters concerned as rapidly as possible.

b. Insofar as organizations of this Corps are concerned, there will be no change in existing procedure insofar as guarding and reporting captured materiel (including crashed aircraft) are concerned; examination will be made and reports rendered by personnel of Corps or higher headquarters who have a technical knowledge of the materiel concerned.

Thomas J. Ford
THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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DISTRIBUTION:

Hq. V Corps - C.G., C/S, G-1, G-3, G-4, A.G., A.A., Arty., Engr., Finance, Hq. Comdt., T.G., C.W.S., Ord., Sig., Surgeon, Spl. Serv., Q.M.

G-2, 29th Inf. Div	(26 copies)	S-2, 56th Sig. Bn	(1 copy)
G-2, EIGHTH Air Force	(1 copy)	S-2, 53rd Med. Bn.	(1 copy)
S-2, 102nd Cav. (Mecz.)	(3 copies)	S-2, 156th Inf. Regt.	(1 copy)
S-2, 190th FA Regt.	(3 copies)	S-2, 71st Ord. Bn. (Q)	(1 copy)
S-2, 112th Engr. Regt.	(3 copies)	S-2, 12th Evac. Hosp.	(1 copy)

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



A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each bulletin board. The identification of this plane, together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: Messerschmitt Me 109F, single-seat fighter.
Span - 32' 7"
Length - 29' 9"

Recognition features: Low wing monoplane, bullet shaped nose, rounded wing-tips with marked taper on trailing edge, equi-tapered tailplane with bluntish tips, squat fin and rudder.

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



FRIEND OR FOE?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: British Tank "Churchill"

Length	-	25' 1"
Width	-	10' 8"
Height	-	9' 1"
Weight	-	37 Tons
Armament	-	One 6-pdr. gun and two 7.92 Be guns.
Speed	-	17 m.p.h.
Crew	-	5 men.

Points for recognition: Angular flat turret with vertical sides. Eleven, mall bogey wheels. Overall tracks. Skirting to half way between top and bottom of tracks and large prominent air louvres on side of hull. Tracks protruding beyond front of hull.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

By Auth: C.G. V Corps
Date : 15 May 1943
Initials: TJF.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 25
for week ending 15 May 1943.

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 Office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 14) a. The total number of German divisions in Western Europe is estimated at 69, a decrease of one offensive division since last week's estimate. Changes in the totals show two additional offensive divisions in France, with a reduction in offensive divisions of one each in Holland, Finland, and Germany. Of the 20 offensive divisions now in France, three of these are Panzer divisions destroyed at STALINGRAD which are being reorganized. Their combat value is therefore extremely low, and they are almost certainly not capable of operating as divisions at present. b. Changes in the order of battle include the departure of the 17th Infantry Division from LORIENT to the Russian front which probably occurred in March, and the 38th Infantry Division from Finland to Russia which probably took place early in the year. Other changes, based on a reconsideration of available evidence, include the alteration of the figures of four unidentified divisions in France and two in Holland to seven in France and one in Holland, the dropping of two unconfirmed offensive divisions in Germany, and the identification of the 373rd Infantry Division in Austria (at BRUCK-AN-DER-LEITHA) which is classified as offensive. c. No changes in Italian dispositions in France have been reported.

2. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 8) a. The strength of the German Air Force in initial equipment again shows an increase, with the addition of some 27 operational craft estimated, and the change in status of about 50 transports from non-operational to an operational status. The change in the status of transports gave these additional craft to the MEDITERRANEAN sector, and since the report was made prior to the final collapse of the Axis in Tunisia, this estimate has no doubt since changed. b. The only change in the estimates for the Western front shows an increase of some 30 twin-engine fighters located in Germany.

3. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 14) There have been no further reports as to the whereabouts of the aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPLIN, which was last reported on 22 April off SWINEMUNDE. The present location of the heavy cruiser HIPPER is unknown, but it was reported by a fairly reliable source to have passed eastward through the KIEL Canal on 7 April. The disposition of the remaining German major naval units remains unchanged, but six or seven destroyers are unlocated.

4. AXIS ANTI-INVASION ACTIVITY (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol. II, No. 19) Extensive enemy defensive activity on the coasts of Italy and Norway, as well as France and the Low Countries, has been noted on aerial photographs taken during April. In Italy, a large number of new batteries have been discovered, including 15 new positions in the Genoa area with additional developments in 5 batteries previously discovered, 8 new batteries in the IMPERIA sector, 5 at SPEZIA, 2 at LEGHORN, 3 at ROME, and 8 on ELBA. Road blocks at ALBISOLA, ALBENGA, and VENTIMIGLIA are further evidence of Italian anxiety. In Norway, the most interesting development of the month was the fact that road blocks were constructed in several areas; there are now 4 road blocks at HAUGESUND, about 7 at ALLESUND, and at FREDRIKSTAD every street at the south and southwest of the town leading from the river GLOMMEN has been obstructed by concrete or masonry road blocks or dragon's teeth AT obstacles.

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Construction of AT ditches continues in the Low Countries, despite recent reports that it was to cease. In France the concentration of defensive positions into strong points continues and many such localities have been seen. A very large number of new batteries have been reported, including no fewer than 12 in the BREST area, where considerable rearrangement of the defenses appears to be in progress.

5. HUNGARIAN ARMY (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 194 - British) Col. Gen. JANY, Commander of the Hungarian Second Army, returned to BUDAPEST from Russia on 1 May. He was greeted on his arrival by the Premier, who paid tribute to JANY and the other Hungarian soldiers - numbering 100,000 - who were to follow him home. Apart from L. of C. troops, the Second Army (with a strength of about 150,000 consituted the entire Hungarian force in Russia. Its losses during the past winter amounted to about 50,000, of whom about 15,000 wounded had already returned. The withdrawal of an additional 100,000 is thus tantamount to the return of the entire Second Army. Public opinion had strongly opposed further participation in the Russian war. The L. of C. Troops, however, are being retained in Russia, and they are estimated to number 30,000 to 50,000. It was reported that the whole of Hungary's heavy equipment was lost in the Russian fighting.

6. POLITICAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL (Secret - from ETO P. R. No. 11) A reliable source reports that if elections were held in Austria, the Nazis would only poll about one per cent of the votes. . . . Thorough study shows a great increase in recent months in the number of Germans listening to foreign broadcasts, even among ardent Nazis.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

7. NEW HEINKEL PLANES (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth Air Force, Vol. II, No. 18) Latest information concerning two new HEINKEL aircraft, the HE-219 dive-bomber and the HE-280 jet-propelled monoplane, is reported by the Air Ministry on the basis of recent observation and study. Reconnaissance photos showed the HE-219 on the ground at ROSTOCK-MARIENEHE, and other photos of the SCHWECHAT airfield (near VIENNA) showed what were thought to be three HE-219's in company with a smaller type, probably the HE-280. In plan, the two types are similar, but the probable HE-219's are larger and seem to have a conventional-type power plant. The HE-219 seems strongly to resemble the JU-288 in appearance, but it is possible that the HE-219 has a tricycle undercarriage; estimates as to its dimensions include a span of 60 to 62 feet, and length of 50 feet. The HE-280 seen at SCHWECHAT is interesting in that its motive power is supplied by two thermodynamic turbine units; air from the atmosphere is compressed by a turbo-driven compressor and liquid fuel is burned in conjunction with it. The products of combustion are exhausted into the atmosphere through a jet to provide the propulsive thrust. Estimates as to the size of the HE-280 give a span of 38 or 39 feet, length of 33 to 35 feet, and tail-plane span of 12 or 13 feet. Recognition features of the HE-219, from a provisional drawing, are as follows: Mid-wing, straight center section to the engines, dihedral on the outside; two radial engines, mid-set; twin fins, entirely on top of fuselage; long, protruding nose, with engines well behind; wings with straight leading edge, curved trailing edge, rounded tips; tail plane with leading edge straight, trailing edge straight to rudders, then cut out; long, slim fuselage, straight two-thirds of the way back, then tapered.

8. THE BUTTERFLY BOMBS (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol. II, No. 19) The 2-kg anti-personnel bomb, or, as it is more commonly know, the "butterfly" bomb, resembles a butterfly since the body of the bomb is partially buried in the earth and only the vanes and the arming cable are visible. In the closed position it is somewhat similar to an overgrown hand grenade, and in most cases these bombs will be found in the open and in an armed position. The bomb has a cast-iron cylindrical body, 3 x 3 inches, with a fuse fitted diametrically into the side. The bomb body is encased in a grass-colored thin sheet-steel container made in four pieces - two end flaps and two pieces covering the sides of the bomb. These parts are hinged together, the hinges being mounted with torsion springs, tending to force the parts of the wings away from the body but are prevented from opening until a safety pin is pulled, when the container opens. After release the wings, because of their air drag, rise to the upper end of a 6-inch wire cable connected to the fuse. The rotation of the wings relative to the bomb body arms the fuse. These bombs weigh 4.4 pounds (2-kg) and are released from planes, as many as 23 at a time. Because of their slow rate of decent, they will not penetrate the ground more than 2 or 3 inches.

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The original fuse was designed to detonate on impact, but at present the fuzing is of a nature that will permit detonation either on impact or after a delay of approximately 30 minutes, or the bomb may remain in a sensitive and armed condition for an indefinite period and be detonated by a slight jar, such as a truck passing or even a person walking in close proximity to it. It is lethal up to 100 yards, and must be dealt with by bomb disposal personnel only.

Section III - Publications

9. The G-2 office has on hand an excessive number of certain field manuals that will be forwarded to S.O.S. unless desired by subordinate units. Requests for any of these field manuals must reach the G-2 office not later than 31 May. The list of manuals available, which include only those that have not been superceded by later editions, is as follows: FM 1-40, Intelligence in Aviation Units; FM 21-25, Elementary Map Reading; FM 21-35, Sketching; FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence; FM 30-10, Observation; FM 30-15 Examination of Enemy Personnel; FM 30-20, Military Maps; FM 30-21, Aerial Photography; FM 30-25, Counterintelligence; FM 30-40, Identification of U. S. Armored Vehicles (edition of 21 May 1941); FM 100-5, Operations; FM 101-5, The Staff and Combat Orders; FM101-10, Technical and Logistical Data; TM 6-230, Fire Control Code; TM 11-410, The Homing Pigeon; FM 1-45, Air Corps Signal Communication; FM 5-20, Camouflage; FM 5-30, Engineer Antimechanized Measures; FM 7-30, Service Company & Medical Detachment, Rifle Regiment; FM 24-5, Signal Communication; FM 10-5, Quartermaster Operations; FM 11-5, Signal Communications--Mission and Functions; FM 11-15, Organization and Operations of Signal Communications in Cavalry Units.

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THOMAS J. FORD,
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A. C. of S., G-2.

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



FRIEND OR FOE?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: German Pz Kw 38.

Length	- 15' 3"
Width	- 7'
Height	- 7' 2"
Weight	- 9.5 tons
Armament	- one 3.7 cm. gun. two M.G's.
Crew	- 4 men.
Speed	- 35 m.p.h.

Points for recognition: Heavily riveted turret with commander's look-out cupola. Rectangular face of turret for gun mountings. M.G's in ball mountings. Four large bogie wheels almost touching top of the tracks.

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

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: Heinkel He 177, bomber.
Span - 103'
Length- 64'

Recognition features: Mid-wing monoplane; very long, blunt nose; equal taper on wings and slight dihedral from engines; very large fin and rudder with cutout; fuselage projects beyond tailplane.

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By Auth: C.G. V Corps
Date : 22 May 1943.
Initials: _____ TJF.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 26
for week ending 22 May 1943.

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret) a. The total number of German divisions in France and the Low Countries is estimated at 35, with an additional 5 or 6 Italian divisions in Southeastern France. b. German offensive divisions in France include the 26th Panzer Division, the 1st Panzer Division, and Panzer Grenadier Division 10; the 14th, 16th, and 24th Panzer Divisions which are reorganizing after their destruction in Russia; the 347th and 343rd Infantry Divisions which are classed as unconfirmed; and six unidentified divisions. German defensive divisions in France include the 165th, 159th, 157th, 182nd, 171st, 191st, 148th, and 156th Reserve Divisions; the 716th, 709th, 708th, 715th, and 711th Infantry Divisions; and the 158th and 154th Reserve Divisions which are classed as unconfirmed. c. German divisions in Belgium include Panzer Grenadier Division 9 (offensive), and the 526th Frontier and 712th Infantry Divisions (both defensive). d. German divisions in Holland include the 65th Infantry Division (offensive), the offensive 291st Division (unconfirmed), and the defensive 719th Infantry Division (unconfirmed). e. Italian divisions in France include the 5th Mountain Division; the 58th, 46th, and 7th Infantry Divisions; and a motorized division which may be the 10th or the 2nd. It is not known whether or not the 134th Armored Division and the 6th Mountain Division are still present, but the total number of Italian divisions in France does not appear to be more than six. (NOTE: Information for the Order of Battle in France and the Low Countries has, in the past, been taken directly from the ETO G-2 Periodic Report for the Weekly Summary. Since several reports which show the order of battle are received from different sources, future estimates will be based on a consideration of all reports received.)

2. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 15) a. No change has been reported during the past week in the number of German divisions in Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Germany. There is, however, another unit in Norway - the 14th Luftwaffe Field Division - that was not previously shown. Its normal strength would be about that of a reinforced regimental combat team. b. In addition to the divisions shown for France and the Low Countries, there are eight coastal sectors - six in France, one in Belgium, and one in Holland - that are normally occupied by divisions. Although the presence of divisions in these sectors is not confirmed, they are presumably occupied; therefore, it is possible that the total of divisions in France and the Low Countries is higher than shown by the table. c. The only change in German divisions reported during the week was the movement of the 196th Infantry Division (offensive) within Norway to the TRONDHEIM area. It was formerly in the BODOE area, and its place has been taken by the 14th Luftwaffe Field Division. It is not yet clear whether this move is a strengthening of the defenses of the TRONDHEIM area, or whether a relief of either the 196th or the 161st Division (also in the TRONDHEIM area) is taking place.

3. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 9) a. The strength of the German Air Force in twin-engine fighter units continues to increase. This increase is applied as usual to the Western and Mediterranean Fronts. Overall strength in this category has been steadily built up since October 1942, and the Western Front has been as steadily reinforced. The Mediterranean started receiving its share of the build-up in February of this year. The increases on these two fronts have been achieved partly at the expense of the Russian Front, where losses have not been replaced. A continued decrease in non-operational units makes it appear that the winter "rest" period may be drawing to a close, and the trend from now on may be to return units to combat

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duty. There is no firm indication of this yet, but it is a trend to be watched for, as the time and place of their return to combat duty may give some indication of German intentions for the summer. b. Estimated strength of the G.A.F. on the Western Front in initial equipment as of 8 May was as follows: Long-range bombers, 249; Bomber-reconnaissance, 117; Ground attack, 57; Single-engine fighters, 459; Twin-engine fighters, 534; Army cooperation, 18; coastal, 78; Transports, 100; total, 1612. The only change over the previous week's estimate was in twin-engine fighters, which showed an increase of about 15 craft. Estimated actual strength of all types of planes on the Western Front is 100% of initial equipment, with 20 to 30% over initial equipment in the case of single-engine fighters. c. Estimated enemy losses on the Western Front (planes destroyed, probably destroyed, and damaged): Week ending 8 May, 10:-:2; week ending 1 May, 29:8:14, week ending 24 April, 7:-:6; week ending 17 April, 111:32:31. d. Estimated enemy sorties of all types on the western front: Week ending 8 May, 937; week ending 1 May, 866; Week ending 24 April, 1070; week ending 17 April, 1183.

4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 15) There have been no appreciable changes reported during the week; the NURNBERG was located at KIEL on 14 May, and the aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN, reported as unlocated last week, is reported to have been located at STETTIN on 5 May. The only major unit now unlocated is the HIPPER, although two active destroyers are also unlocated.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

5. PZ KW VI TANK (Confidential - from British Technical Intelligence Summary No. 104) Additional information on the Pz. Kw. VI tank shows that it can be submerged to a depth of up to 16 feet for fording rivers and other water obstacles. The tank has an automatic fire extinguisher, consisting of heat-sensitive elements that are arranged in suitable positions in the engine compartment; when fire breaks out, one of these elements will close an electric circuit to operate the estinguisher. The tank is normally steered by means of a steering wheel, but supplementary steering levers are provided for use when negotiating sharp turns. The 88-mm gun is electrically fired, and 92 rounds of 88-mm ammunition are carried in each tank.

Section III - Publications

6. The following publications have been received by the G-2 office during the past week. Distribution has been made, and a few extra copies are available that may be had by calling the G-2 office.

a. Intelligence Bulletin, M.I.S., Vol. 1, No. 9, April 1943 (Advance distribution only; complete distribution will be made later).
b. M.I.S. Special Series No. 12, "German Military Abbreviations".
c. Tactical and Technical Trends No. 24, M.I.S.

THOMAS J. FORD,
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A. C. of S., G-2.

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Annex No. 1 to weekly Intelligence Summary No. 26, Hq. V Corps

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THE GERMAN SOLDIER IN DEFENSE

(The following article is a translation of an unsigned article in the semi-official Army journal "Militaer-Wochenblatt" of August 1942. The fact that it appears in a normally authoritative and apparently widely-read Army organ, and the critical tone in which it is written, show that the conclusions drawn are regarded in Army circles as of some importance.)

The attack, and only the attack, will make for victory. For this reason our F.S.R. rightly states that only offensive conclusion of defensive operations can bring off a decisive victory. But, on the other hand, in the course of any long war, no Army is likely to escape defensive operations; no Army is strong enough to be attacking everywhere and all the time. Moreover there are times when it is better to allow the enemy to attack and only go over to the attack yourself when the enemy has thoroughly tied himself up. If the campaigns of 1939, 1940 and early 1941 only found the German Army on the defensive in a very few areas and only for a very short space of time, this was because of the extraordinary fast tempo of events up to the complete conclusion of the fighting. The importance of defense and its significance in the education and training of troops is not dimished by these facts. In fact no body of troops knows during its training what tasks it may not be called upon to perform. During a war the tactical situations change so quickly, suddenly and unpredictably that all troops must be educated and trained for defensive as well as for offensive action.

It was quite correct for our military education to lay the chief stress on the attack, as it still does. Moreover in the past there was very little time to teach defensive action. But that must not make us fail to recognize that, with even more reason, in concentrated war-time training some subjects are more neglected than others, and in our opinion this applies especially to defense. This article, therefore, will attempt to outline a few points, the teaching of which might well increase the defensive capabilities of the German infantryman, and, moreover, save lives.

The first essential is a sure and ready sense for ground. As is well know, the Higher Command lays down the main battle zone on the map, taking into consideration only major factors, e.g., the siting of artillery, O.P's and anti-tank defense, whilst subordinate commanders reconnoitre the main defensive line subsequently on the ground, taking into consideration above all, the siting of the infantry support weapons. If junior commanders have time for ground reconnaissance, they will normally find the right position. But if defense is taken up hastily, which is very often the case, then there is a noticeable lack of good judgment. Officers and men, in our opinion, have much to great a tendency to stick to the ground they have first settled on. And yet, in the defense a couple of hundred yards forwards or even, for that matter, backwards, don't make all that much difference. Judgment of ground in the long run only means in essentials getting all the advantages for yourself and giving the enemy all the difficult ground. Naturally that's easier said than done. But even if, as is usually the case, unfavorable ground has also to be occupied, it is important to recognize this fact and take the proper tactical measures to make up for it, e.g. siting reserves behind the probable danger area, thickening up anti-tank defense where the danger from tanks is greatest, etc. Training of this kind can only be carried out on the ground, both with troops and without, by means of a series of very small-scale exercises calling for appreciation of ground. In these exercises all units down to the very smallest, must be gone into in detail. Any high and mighty treatment of this subject is out of place. There seems to be by no means the universal recognition that there ought to be that, for example, edges of woods and landmarks, lone trees, etc., are not really suitable for machine gun positions or O.P's.

The second point where improvement is necessary is "Camouflage. One has very often the impression that people just haven't grasped the meaning of the word. Camouflage means fitting troops, weapons, equipment and positions into the landscape. Camouflage that suits one type of ground and one season is nonsense in another type of ground and at another time of year - think of waring a white snowcoat in summer. Camouflage is also a matter of time. Positions must be camouflaged before you begin to dig them; O.P's must

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be camouflaged before you man them; approach roads must be camouflaged or masked before you use them. The basic principle is therefore; camouflage first and dig after, but not vice versa. People often say: "The enemy isn't firing". Certainly, but he is looking. And as we note down everything we see and plot it on maps giving time and place, and take it to heart, it is clear that the enemy does it just as much. Hence the loss of the most important O.P's at the most critical moment, and the snapping up of runners or reserves on routes which have become known to the enemy. Our troops must have this hammered into them day by day and hour after hour, because such mistakes, though they may not have immediate repercussions, come home to roost sooner or later. In this connection senior officers must set a good example. Well may a brass hat, visiting the front line, expose himself to a little danger to cheer up the troops. In point of fact such conduct seldom draws enemy fire. But if senior officers give away an O.P. by their visits, by even so much as one incautious visit, enemy fire is likely to come down later on that O.P. and knock it out just when it is needed, which was certainly not the original intention. Don't say that this precaution is exaggerated and unworthy of senior officers. In our opinion everything is wrong which hands it to the enemy on a plate and everything right which increases defensive capabilities. Our people often lack a sense for little finesses, e.g., use of light and shadow, wariness as regards backgrounds. Some time ago we were shown a so-called camouflage suit in use by our enemies, extremely well-made, although to use it ourselves would load our infantry overmuch; but this type of camouflage suit might well be used for training is our reserve battalions. Our people are extremely inventive when they once have something to go on and, having been trained in this way, they might well start making themselves similar suits.

The third essential is a clear recognition of the value of digging. The German soldier does not like to dig; that is a fact we have to recognize and take measures against in our theoretical and practical training. The Russians are extremely clever in their field fortifications. This dislike for digging comes from the German soldier's innate desire to attack. "We're going forward again soon, what's the point of digging?" Nevertheless our regulations, based on the experience of the last war, emphasize at a number of points the necessity for digging, including during the attack. The regulations say that the troops must so "settle themselves in" in the ground during breathing spaces in the attack that they are exposed as little as possible to enemy fire. In other words: dig in. To say that digging blunts the "edge" of the attack is wrong, because those troops who save their skins in a hole can and will carry forward the attack when the time comes; whereas those who have been killed or wounded in the open are out of it. Hence the prime necessity of convincing junior commanders and troops of the value of digging. But no amount of sticking spades into the ground to "show were the trench should be" will get you there. We must have more, much more digging. It may cost time and sweat, but it will save lives later. There is no necessity to insist on a regular trench-system in all its ramifications. What is necessary is to teach a man during his training to dig in sufficiently to disappear as soon as possible from the surface in a hole or hollow. We do find in fact that our people recognize this, but unfortunately often only very later after they have had personal experience of men dying because they hadn't dug, whilst men in the most modest holes remained alive. A thousand unnecessary fox-holes do less harm than one dug too late. Only a cat has more than one life.

The construction of obstacles of all kinds and the laying of wire, etc., should also be very much emphasized. Preparing a village for defense is an art; but we have now learned the proper obstacles to use and our troops in training should be given the chance to practice with these in a practical manner.

The fourth essential is the recognition of correct behavior even in quiet periods. We pointed out above what happens to an O.P. which is given away, but there are many other instances of this kind. Machine gun positions are built which stand out like haystacks. They get beautifully camouflaged, but then someone forgets to shut the back, so that the enemy looks straight through them. Or an H.Q. is set up and becomes the centre of footpaths coming in from all sides - which, of course, immediately gives it away. Or you see signs "Look out! Ground covered by enemy!" Now you would think that people would take some notice of this and use the little detour which perhaps takes a quarter of an hour longer - Nothing of the sort! "The enemy isn't firing and, if he does fire, he won't hit me". This is wrong of course. Why the sign in the first place, if it isn't? Under this heading also falls the mobile conduct of defense, by which we mean the system of defense in depth introduced after 1916. This means that the main battle zone is a belt in depth. But we have many people who say that the German soldier stays where he has dug himself in. This is naturally correct in so far as it [illegible] that the way through the [illegible] only goes over

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his dead body. But does this mean that the man has to remain in one spot once the enemy has seen him? Certainly not. In other words firing positions intended for defense must remain as far as possible unrecognized, which they will only be if no one uses them. We also speak generally of "silent"machine guns. What happens in practice? Our people are too tired to take their machine guns to an alternative position, saying, "They won't spot us-not at once anyway". This is sheer wishful thinking and leads sooner or later to a catastrophe. The same may be said of O.P's, many artillery positions, H.Q's and other military localities. Variety in the siting of piquets, in the routing of patrols and supply convoys is also very much neglected through laziness.

The last point is a purely tactical question. F.S.R. speaks of a main battle zone whose forward edge is the main defensive line, i.e., a line which is to be marked out on the ground. But we do hear talk today that the M.D.L. does not suit modern conditions and that positions must be manned by "strongpoints". Apart from the fact that we have not yet seen any official amendment to F.S.R. to this effect, we cannot approve this view. F.S.R. talks about positions to be sited irregularly and in great depth; it goes on: "At particularly important points strongpoints containing a number of different types of weapons may be made; neighboring positions must be able to give each other mutual support; eventually, covered communications between all defensive positions must be provided". A difference is obviously made between "positions" and"strongpoints", but only insofar as a "strongpoint" is a "larger position containing a number of different types of weapons". Now if you say that defense is to be "by strongpoints" inasmuch as a number of strong points are set up and sited for all round defense ("hedgehogged off", as the pedants say) and that by reason of this there is no necessity for mutual communication or support, that is a false conclusion. No enemy is going to be so foolish as to attack these so called strongpoints from the front; he will infiltrate in between them and eventually break in and finally through; these islands of defense, cut off from one another and from any supply from the rear, can and have held for some time, but are sooner or later bound to capitulate unless relieved by a really strong immediate or planned counter attack. But if such strong reserves as those counter-attacking were there from the first, one is led to ask why they weren't used from the first in the forward positions. No sensible person letsa burglar inside his house for the purpose of throwing him out again; you make sure that he doesn't get in from the start. In the tactical sense you do that by manning the main battle zone in breadth without any gaps, i.e., by keeping contact to the flanks and also in depth so far as the forces are available and by giving units regulation frontages.

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Annex No. 2 to Weekly
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No. 26, Hq. V Corps

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AIR SUPPORT OF GROUND UNITS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

(An extract from a report by the U. S. Military Intelligence Service)

A specific example of the successful employment by U. S. forces of air strength in support of ground units is contained in the following article, which describes an operation which took place on an island in the Southwest Pacific in January 1943.

The heavy jungle on the island is cut by bare ridges and deep ravines, the precipitous walls of which are several hundred feet high. The bottoms of the ravines are covered with heavy jungle growth, offering excellent positions for enemy machine gun nests and strongpoints. Advances through this terrain required successive cleaning up of these strongpoints. While artillery fire could reach the far slopes of the ravines, and in some cases the bottoms, it was not able to reach the reverse slopes, where the Japs had dug in securely. The problem for air was to bomb these reverse slopes immediately preceding a push by the ground forces into the ravine.

Since the problem was to blast the Jap out of these positions, it was decided to use the 325-pound depth charge, with an instantaneous fuze, along with 500-pound demolition bombs. It was felt that the terrific blast of the depth charge would be very useful in killing Japs in their dug-in positions in the confined spaces of the ravines. It was agreed that air would be used only on those areas not accessible to artillery, after it had been definitely established that a strongpoint existed.

From 0550 to -620 hours on January 10, the artillery shelled the area into which the advance was to be made. At 0620 the artillery laid a line of smoke sheel about 100 yards in front of our lines, marking the line beyond which our planes were due to bomb. Twelve P-39's, armed with 500-pounder demolition bombs with instantaneous fuzes, and twelve SBD's, armed with three depth charges each, observed the shelling from above. As soon as the line of smoke shells became visible at 0620, the airplanes dive bombed the reverse slope immediately in front of our lines. Immediately afterwards, the infantry advanced into and took the area with small losses. Later the same day, another strongpoint was encountered, and six P-39's with depth charges cleaned it out so thoroughly that the infantry walked in with no opposition. Four Jap officers and 55 men were found dead in the area. This type of operation continued daily, and about two missions a day of eight airplanes were completed.

The communication problem for this type of operation is reduced to a minimum by close contact between the division OP, division artillery, and air liaison. When the strongpoint is encountered, the liaison officer proceeds to fighter operations and carefully briefs the pilots. The artillery is asked to lay smoke on the target as soon as all friendly troops have pulled back about 100 yards. The liaison officer leads the flight over, and bombs are dropped on the smoke signal. Ground troops stay as far forward as possible so as to take immediate advantage of the shock created by the bombing. At the termination of each bombing, the lead ship flies low over lines and waggles his wings to indicate that the bombing is completed. The entire process takes about one hour.

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

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: Martin B-26 (Marauder), U.S. Medium bomber.
Span - 65'
Length-58' 3"

Recognition features: Mid-wing monoplane: underslung radial engines, in long nacelles: circular section streamline fuselage, dorsal turret, tail end projects beyond and below rear turret: semi-taper wings, rounded tips, no dihedral: tapered tailplane, rounded tips, pronounced dihedral: high fin and rudder, rounded top.

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



FRIEND OR FOE?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: Canadian Tank "Ram"

Length	- 18' 8"
Width	- 9' 4"
Height	- 8' 7"
Weight	- 28½ to 30 tons
Speed	- 25 m.p.h.
Armament	- One 2 pdr. gun and 2 Browning .30 LMG's
Crew	- 5 men

Points for recognition: Track assembly as for Grant Tank. Round flat topped cast turret with vertical back and receding front. High Superstructure.

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Copy No. 45

By Auth: C.G. V Corps
Date: : 29 May 1943:
Initials: WF TJF:

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 27
for week ending 29 May 1943.

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret) The total number of German divisions in France and the Low Countries is estimated at 35 (10 offensive), of which 12 are unconfirmed; the estimate of Italian divisions in Southeastern France remains at 5 or 6. No movements or changes have been reported during the past week. In addition to the above estimates, it is thought that there are 3 Luftwaffe Field Divisions in France; these each have an average strength of one reinforced regimental combat team.

2. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 16) No changes have been reported during the past week in Germany, Norway, Denmark, or Finland, but it is now accepted that there are three Luftwaffe Field Divisions in Germany, and one in Norway.

3. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 10) The total strength of the German Air Force in initial equipment shows an increase estimated at 30 planes over last week's estimate. Increases in long-range bombers, ground-attack planes, and coastal craft are shown, with slight decreases in bomber-reconnaissance and single-engine fighters. The Western Front shown an increase of some two dozen craft, most single-engine fighters with a few long-range bombers, while the Russian Front shows a much greater increase in aircraft - estimated at six dozen planes. A net decrease of some 57 planes is shown in the Mediterranean, with considerable decreases in single-engine fighters and dive bombers. Operational long-range bomber strength is increasing on all fronts, with emphasis on the Russian Front and the Mediterranean. This increase is represented by units returning to combat duty from non-operational status. It is probable that from now on the number of bomber units held non-operational will continue to decrease. The single-engine fighter squadrons which were based in Tunisia until the end were, by and large, the only air force flying units to share the fate of the ground troops as a result of the Allied victory. Their losses represent a considerable blow to the German Air Force strength in this category.

4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 16, and ETO Daily Bulletin No. 326) The only major unit of the German Fleet that is now unlocated is the pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER, which left SWINEMUNDE some time after 20 April; there is no reason to believe that she has yet left the BALTIC Sea, however. Present locations of major units that have changed since previous report (Weekly Summary No. 24) are as follows: TIRPITZ in LANG FJORD (a branch of ALTEN FJORD); SCHARNHORST and LUTZOW in ALTEN FJORD; and the HIPPER at PILLAU.

5. THE ITALIAN ARMY (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 196 - British) Italy entered the war with 74 first-line divisions, reserve and frontier troops that were about equivalent of 14 additional divisions, and some depot troops, making a total strength of about 1,500,000. Since the beginning of the war 16 new first-line divisions have been created, making a total of 90 such divisions that have been put into the field. Of these 90, it may be considered that 31 have been eliminated, although one or two of these may be reformed at a later date. Even so, the loss of 31 divisions does not give a complete picture of the Italian losses, as many of those divisions destroyed had suffered heavily and been reformed, sometimes

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more than once, before their present extinction; some of the divisions now regarded as operational have suffered heavily; and a large number of non-divisional troops have been eliminated. As regards strength and manpower, the picture is different; although Italy entered the war with a million and a half men in the army, the present strength is about two million. This is explained by a considerable increase in the number of depot units, by a strengthening of corps and army troops, and most of all by the large number of second-line coastal and territorial units that have been created; the latter now account for about two-fifths of the total Italian strength. Total losses are estimated at 642,000, of which about 390,000 may be prisoners. Actual casualties have been heavy, but manpower is still not a factor limiting the size of the army. There are considerable reserves of manpower for which no equipment is available and many "operational" units are without their full complement of arms. Italian heavy industry has proved incapable of meeting the demands of a long war, and the Germans have done little to fill the gaps. Shortages have been felt in medium and heavy artillery, antitank guns, tanks, and motor transport; in addition, Italian armament has suffered from a multiplicity of types. In Italy, however, the lack of mechanical equipment would prove a less serious disadvantage, for most of the Italian troops are accustomed to mountainous country, and the ordinary soldier would probably be inspired to greater efforts than he had made in Africa, because of his deepfelt love for his homeland. Unless unforseen conditions arise, such as the collapse of the government or the defection of the high command, the troops would be likely to fight much better in defense of Italy than they have done in defense of the Empire.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

6. NEW GERMAN FIGHTER PLANE (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol. II, No. 21) A new German twin-engine fighter, designated as the ME-410, has been reported. It is said to be a development of the ME-210, with new and more powerful engines, and a maximum speed of 390 to 400 m.p.h. at 22,000 feet. It appears that the ME-410 differs from the 210 mainly in having the new DB 603 engines, but since these will increase the weight, the new plane's bomb load may be lighter.

7. GERMAN SURFACE VESSELS (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol. II, No. 21) Many reports have referred to German "E" boats and "R" boats, and the following information as to their characteristics seems apropos. The "E" boats are fast, gasoline-powered craft, 105 to 120 feet long, and with a beam of about 16 feet. They have a speed of 35 to 40 knots, are extremely maneuverable, and have two torpedo tubes in the bow; other armament includes two 20-mm guns and a number of machine guns, and the only armor is a thin bullet-proof plating on the wheel-house. "R" boats are fairly high-speed craft used for protecting coastal convoys, to attack shipping, and for minesweeping. Their speed is about 20 knots, they are powered by oil motors, and are quite maneuverable. They carry two 20-mm guns, and some machine guns, but no torpedoes. A typical "R" boat is about 105 feet long with a beam of 20 feet.

Section III - Economic

8. GERMAN OIL SUPPLY (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 16) A recent report, considered reliable, indicated that a Swedish tanker whose carrying capacity is about 14,000 tons, sailed from STETTIN recently bound for Finland with only 3,500 tons of gasoline; earlier reports indicated that this vessel had previously sailed with only a part cargo of oil. A study of all possible reasons for a valuable tanker sailing so lightly loaded leads to the conclusion that stocks of oil in German Baltic ports are in short supply. Reports in January and February had indicated that the tankers POLLUX and PROCYON, which maintain a service between North German ports and OSLO, were sailing only half loaded. Considering these reports, it is rather clearly indicated that German oil supplies, at least in the German coastal zone, are below an adequate distributional minimum.

9. GERMAN RAILROAD EQUIPMENT (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 16) Reports continue to be received concerning the shortage of locomotives in Germany. It is suggested that, owing to the lag in production behind the building program, the damage done to existing locomotives by air attacks,

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and to a less extent, sabotage, that the number of available locomotives is actually decreasing rather than increasing. There are reports of bad workmanship and there is good authority for saying that some of the newly-delivered locomotives have been received by the railway in such a condition that they have had to be sent immediately to the repair shops for attention before they could be used for traffic.

Section IV - Publications

10. Full distribution was made during the past week of Military Intelligence Service Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 9; and M.I.S., Special Series 12, "German Military Abbreviations." No new publications have been received for distribution by the G-2 office during the past week.

Thomas J. Ford
THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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



FAIRING OR FORE?

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Last week's armored vehicle: Daimler Armoured Car.

Length	13'0"
Width	8'1"
Height	7'5"
Weight	7¼ tons
Speed	45 m.p.h.
Armament	one 2 pdr., and one 7.92 Besa M.G.
Crew	3 men

Points for recognition. Octagonal pot-shaped body, large wheels.

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

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: Mosquito. 2 Merlin Engines.
Span - 52' 6"
Length - 40' 6"

Recognition features: Low wing: radial engine: wings have dihedral from roots, comparatively short span, blunt tips and fillets at roots of trailing edge: fuselage has straight undersurface and is noticeably slender in plan: rectangular tail plane has narrow chord and blunt tips: single fin and rudder has straight taper on leading edge, rounded top and curved trailing edge and is well faired into fuselage.

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Copy No. 45

By Auth: C. G. V Corps
Date : 5 June 1943.
Initials: TJF.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 28
for week ending 5 June 1943.

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret) The total number of German divisions in France and the Low Countries is estimated at 36, an increase of one division over last week's estimate. This includes 10 offensive divisions that have been identified (one of them unconfirmed), 19 defensive divisions that have been identified (three of them unconfirmed), and 7 divisions that have not been identified or confirmed. Changes reported since last week include the addition of an unidentified division in France in the BREST sector, and the confirmation of two divisions previously reported as unconfirmed - the 343rd Infantry Division in the ST BRIEUC sector of France, and the 291st Division in the ZUTPHEN area of Holland. There is some indication that the 1st Panzer Division may have left the RENNES area of France for the Balkans, but this has not as yet been accepted. The number of Italian divisions in France is accepted as six, although many of the elements of one of the divisions - located on the Franco-Italian border - are in Italy. (Note: A division is accepted as confirmed when its existence in a particular locality is verified by several sources; nevertheless, it is seldom possible to obtain conclusive evidence as to the location of an enemy division on the European mainland, so all estimates are naturally subject to error.)

2. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 17) Previous estimates of the number of divisions in Germany considered that there were two offensive and six defensive divisions located there, but it is now considered that only the six defensive divisions are present. In France, the 14th Panzer Division which was thought to be reforming in the PAU sector is now believed to be in the vicinity of NANTES; armored elements in the PAU area are thought to be parts of the HERMAN GOERING Division that did not move to Tunisia. SS Panzer Grenadier Division 10 is reported to have moved from the ANGOULEME region of France into the Brittany Peninsula.

3. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 11) The initial equipment in planes of the German Air Force is estimated to have increased by about 40 planes since the last report; in addition, some 77 planes that were non-operational have become operational. The biggest increase on the Western Front is in single-engine fighters, with a net increase of some 60 operational craft, more than half of them having been converted from their non-operational role. The fighter strength of the German Air Force continues to be built up on the Western Front and in the Mediterranean area, where the defending forces, despite increases, are inadequate to cope with the day and night attacks of the Allies. At times the fighter opposition to Allied attacks has been heavy on both of these fronts, but some attacks have met no opposition at all. The Western Front was reinforced by the equivalent of two groups of single-engine fighters, and the Mediterranean by over two squadrons. Operational long-range bomber strength was again increased in the Mediaterranean by the addition of one group. This is a further indication that more and more bomber units will return to combat duty in the near future from a non-operational status. (Note: Estimates for operational aircraft are given in initial equipment;

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They are obtained by multiplying the number of identified units by the number of aircraft which should be in the hands of each unit. Thus estimates in initial equipment do not give the actual strength in planes, but give an index as to the probable strength in planes.) The estimated actual strength on the Western Front is 100% of the initial equipment, with 20% to 30% above the initial equipment in the case of single-engine fighters. Estimated enemy losses on the Western Front for the week ending 22 May were 184 destroyed, 30 probably destroyed, 87 damaged; for the week ending 15 May, 168:66:118; for the week ending 8 May, 28:3:17; for the week ending 1 May, 29:8:14.

4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 17) The ADMIRAL SCHEER, reported as unlocated last week, is still not accounted for, and the GRAF ZEPPELIN, which left STETTIN some time prior to 22 May, is also unlocated. No other changes in major units have been reported.

5. RESULTS OF DAMAGE TO DAMS (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 17) Reconnaissance has shown that the R.A.F. attacks of May 16-17 on the MOHNE and EDER Dams resulted in the loss of practically all the contents of these dams; the destruction by inundation of bridges, railway embankments, hydro-electric power stations, and house property; and widespread temporary flooding of agricultural land, communications, and built-up areas, including out-lying parts of KASSEL and of several towns in the RUHR valley containing factories. Although complete evidence is not yet available, it seems that considerable temporary dislocation has been caused to railway working and that the dislocation is likely to last several months in the area affected; yet the more long-term effects on traffic working in Germany as a whole are likely to be small.

5. ECONOMIC NOTE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 17) Analyses of German military boots recently received have shown that in one case a considerable sign of deterioration of standard, as compared with previous samples, is apparent. The Leather Control reports that "the upper is good but the bottoning material includes a light insole backed with cardboard and the cardboard itself is not of very good quality. The boot is clearly of German manufacture, and cannot be Italian.

6. ENEMY PLANES ABANDONED IN TUNISIA (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol. II, No. 22) Headquarters, Northwest African Air Forces, reports that a total of 436 abandoned enemy aircraft had been found on the airdromes, landing grounds, dispersal areas, and dumps in the TUNIS--BIZERTA area up to 16 May. Of this total, 315 are German (188 fighters, 59 bombers and bomber-fighters, and 68 others) and 121 are Italian (105 fighters, 5 bombers, and 11 others). Only a small number are intact or could be made serviceable.

7. ENEMY INTENTIONS IN THE USE OF GAS (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol. II, No. 22) In its latest appreciation of enemy intentions to use gas, the Chemical Board of the British Ministry of Supply concludes that apart from the previously apparent increased attention to anti-gas training in the armed forces, there is no indication of any significant change in policy; that it is felt that many of the recent reports received concerning the enemy's intentions are Axis-inspired, but their exact object is not apparent; and that the enemy is fully prepared, both offensively and defensively, for the introduction of chemical warfare should they so choose.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

8. GERMAN FIGHTER-BOMBER (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol, II, No. 22) The FW-190, being spawned by the Germans in large numbers, is increasingly becoming a plane-of-all-work, being used not only in its original capacity as a fighter but also as a ground-attack plane and as a fighter-bomber. The fighter-bomber version, frequently employed in nuisance raids on England, is designated as the FW-190 A-4/U-8, and reports indicate that it has two 20-mm machine guns mounted in the wing roots which are harmonized at 220 yards instead of the customary 490 yards. The 7.9 guns, usually mounted above the engine, have been removed. The bomb carrier can accomodate either 550-pound or 1100-pound bombs, and supplementary gas tanks can be jettisoned; these can all be removed, readily converting the plane into a fighter.

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9. BOOBY TRAPS (Confidential - from Technical Intelligence Summary No. 105, British War Office) Two unusual booby traps were encountered in an antitank screen area. One of them was a Tellermine balanced on one branch of a tree by means of a long stick to the ground. A pull-igniter was attached to a second branch, the idea being that someone would remove the stick, thereby allowing the mine to fall and so explode in the air. The other, encountered in the First Army area in Tunisia, was the fixing of booby traps to Tellermines 42 pattern. Some were laid one on top of another and connected by wire and pull-igniter; some were connected to charges of various sizes; in one case a Tellermine was connected to a heap of about 30 other mines and in another a Tellermine was laid on top of about a hundred pounds of T.N.T. The mines were frequently laid at very close spacing, and in one case this caused sympathetic detonation.

10. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN ARMY ORGANIZATION (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 197 - British) a. Motorized and partly motorized battalions, equipped with 120-mm mortars, have recently been formed. No details as to organization have been received, but it is thought that they will be GHQ troops, available for allotment down to corps and divisions, either as battalions or by companies. b. Platoons of four 120-mm mortars are being introduced into mountain rifle regiments, presumable in heavy companies, and there is evidence of the introduction of motorized or partly motorized platoons of three or four 120-mm mortars in other units, possibly to replace 81-mm mortars. c. The motorcycle battalions, which provide the reconnaissance element in armored divisions, have been re-named "armored reconnaissance units" (Panzer Aufklarungs Abteilung), and have the following organization: One armored car squadron (with 6 heavy and 18 light armored cars); three rifle companies, transported either in armored cars or people's cars, or on motorcycles; and one heavy company (including three 50-mm antitank guns, two 75-mm infantry guns, and a pioneer platoon). d. In motorized divisions, the mechanized reconnaissance units have been withdrawn, and the former motorcycle battalions have been reorganized as armored reconnaissance units. e. It has been known for some time that the reconnaissance element in an infantry division might be provided by a reconnaissance unit, a cyclist battalion, or a mobile unit. All cyclist battalions are henceforth to be known as "Reconnaissance units" and all cyclist companies as "reconnaissance companies." Mobile units consist of two antitank companies and either two reconnaissance (cyclist) companies, or one reconnaissance company and a sabre squadron. f. The inclusion of the 56-ton Pz. Kw. VI in the tank regiments of the S.S. Panzer Grenadier Divisions, the HERMAN GOERING Division, and the GROSS DEUTSCHLAND Division is well established, and its appearance in the tank regiments of normal armored divisions must now be considered as imminent. According to a prisoner of war, the Pz. Kw. VI tanks are to be grouped into heavy battalions within normal tank regiments. g. Confirmation of the existance of the expected new German medium tank has been obtained from documents. It is known as the "Panther" and a prisoner stated that it weighs about 30 tons and is shortly to be included in normal tank squadrons. h. It is now known that in some armored divisions, the artillery regiment includes (besides two field battalions and a medium battalion), a mixed antiaircraft battalion (of eight 88-mm and eighteen 20-mm dual-purpose guns, and four light machine guns), and an assault artillery battalion (of twenty-two 75-mm guns).

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THOMAS J. BOND,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: Focke-Wulf Fw 190 Single-seat Fighter.
Span - 34' 5"
Length - 29' 1"

Recognition features: Low wing: In line engine: Short nose with prominent large radiator below: Wings have cranked appearance and in plan almost equal straight taper to broad round tips: Prominent streamlined glazed cockpit: Tail plane has swept-forward appearance: Single fin and rudder has curved leading edge and straight trailing edge with rounded top.

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



FRIEND OR FOE ?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this vehicle, together with a new vehicle, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: 7.5 CM Assault Gun (German)

Length	16'6"
Width	7'6"
Height	7'6"
Weight	30 tons
Speed	25 m.p.h.
Armament	One 75 mm gun; one machine gun coaxially mounted; one machine gun in ball mount
Crew	4 men

Points for Recognition. Has a shallow and angular turret with sloping sides and circular base. M.G. coaxial mounted on back. Receding turret face. Two smoke dischargers mounted on right of front. Machine Gun. There is built up bin and hinged. The driver's cut is inset into the nose. The steering is horizontal.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

Copy No. 45

By Auth: C.G., V Corps
Date: 12 June 1943.
Initials: TJF.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 29.
For week ending 12 June 1943.

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.)

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret) a. It is estimated that the German strength in France and the Low Countries is between 41 and 48 divisions. Although this is a greater number than was shown in last week's summary, there is not an actual increase, but the current estimate is based on more complete information. Actually, the trend seems to continue toward a decrease in this sector. b. There are 35 to 39 divisions in France, as follows: 13 offensive divisions (2 of them, scheduled to leave, may already have left; 3 are reforming after destruction in Russia; and another is known to be considerably understrength); 15 defensive divisions; 4 unidentified divisions; 3 or 4 Luftwaffe Field Divisions (average strength equal to a regimental combat team); and 3 sectors that are normally occupied by divisions, but that may or may not now be occupied. In addition, there are a few elements of the S.S. Division HERMAN GOERING in Southern France. c. There are 2 offensive and 2 defensive divisions in Belgium; one of the offensive divisions is reforming after destruction in Russia. d. In Holland there are 2 offensive divisions, 1 defensive division, 1 Luftwaffe Field Division, and 1 sector that may or may not be occupied by a division. e. The Italian strength in Southern France remains at five divisions, with another on the Franco-Italian border.

2. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 18) The number of German divisions in Western Europe (excepting France and the Low Countries) remains unchanged, with 2 defensive divisions in Denmark, 11 divisions in Norway (6 of them offensive), 7 offensive divisions in Finland, and 6 defensive divisions in Germany, including Poland and Bohemia.

3. QUALITY OF GERMAN DIVISIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO Order of Battle Report No. 26) The coastal sectors of France and the Low Countries are held largely by low quality offensive divisions and defensive divisions. A mobile reserve of Panzer and SS divisions is apparently being built up, but most of these divisions are at present low in combat value. Five of the seven Panzer and SS Panzer Grenadier divisions forming this reserve are located in or very near to the Brittany Peninsula, although the only one that is thought to have a high combat value may already have left France. Present enemy dispositions in France and the Low Countries indicate purely defensive intentions, although there has been some strengthening of the garrison since its record low in the early spring. The lack of strength would seem to indicate that an Allied attack in the West is not expected in the next few weeks, although it is certainly, at least in part, the result of requirements in other areas, especially Russia and the Balkans. An increase in German strength in France and the Low Countries is to be expected later in the summer, as the likelihood of an Allied Invasion becomes greater.

4. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 12) a. The operational single-engine fighter strength of the German Air Force continues to be steadily built up. The Mediterranean and the Russian Front, which are sorely in need of fighters, each have been reinforced by about the equivalent of a group. Operational ground-attack strength of the G.A.F. has been increased by more than a group. This increase is probably due partly to the fact that ground-attack units are being equipped with FW-190's instead of HS-129's.

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Production of the HS-129 was very slow and has been practically abandoned. The FW-190, because of its versatility, is being more widely used for this purpose. Operational twin-engine fighter strength has also been increased. The equivalent of about one group has been added to the Russian Front where night-fighter strength is definitely needed. b. One of the most important factors in considering the strength of any air force is the quantity and availability of reserves of aircraft and personnel, flying crews especially. No flying unit can be expected to maintain a reasonable scale of effort unless it is backed by proper reserves, readily available to be drawn on. Losses in operations must be promptly replaced, or units will be soon non-existent. Furthermore, even if a unit is not actually wiped out, unreplaced losses have an exceedingly depressing effect on the morale of the remaining personnel. An adequate reserve is a prime requirement of any air force, and quantity is not the whole story; replacements must be provided expeditiously. This factor is the one in which the German Air Force is at present most deficient. c. A significant change in the Order of Battle on the Western Front was the addition of about a group of ground-attack planes. Ground-attack units on this front are equipped mainly with FW-190's, so they can be used either defensively as fighters or offensively as fighter-bombers. The greater part of the long-range bomber concentration on the Western Front, which formerly was in Holland, is now in the area of France east of the SEINE, and in Belgium. The weight of the concentration has been changed by a shift in strength equivalent to two groups.

5. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 18) There are three major German naval units unlocated this week. The pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER, which was observed to have left SWINEMUNDE on May 20, is probably now in the BALTIC. The present whereabouts of the aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN, which was observed on 22 May to have left STETTIN, is still unknown. The light cruiser NURNBERG, is reported to have passed GJEDSER, Denmark, on an easterly course on 26 May, so she is probably somewhere in the BALTIC. The German destroyer fleet at present in commission appears to consist of some 25 vessels, with all but two of them active. Some 20 other destroyers are thought to be under construction.

6. GERMAN FORCES IN THE BALKANS (Secret - from ETO Order of Battle Report No. 25) The Germans have considerably strengthened their land forces in the Balkans, and have probably doubled their combat strength in the course of the past five months. This has permitted the transfer of two Italian divisions to Italy. While this German strength increase is doubtless largely to repel an Allied assault, it must also be borne in mind that the guerrillas have continued to be active and that the Italians have proved themselves incapable of dealing with the situation. Therefore, some of the German reinforcements may be intended as a preliminary to a final rounding up of the guerrillas. Meanwhile the construction of fortifications in the Balkans has been on a small scale compared to that undertaken by the enemy in other parts of Europe. There has been a marked decrease of Axis bomber strength and a small increase of fighter strength. In view of the troubled nature of the interior in the Balkans, Axis strength cannot be regarded as particularlyformidable.

7. CHANGES IN ITALIAN COMMAND (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 198 - British) Certain changes in the Italian command have recently been announced on the radio. As a result, General EZIO ROSI, hitherto Chief of the Army Staff, becomes Commander of an Army Group; General ROATTA becomes Chief of the Army Staff in ROSI'S place, and General GUZZONI becomes an Army Commander. The only Army Group known to exist in Italy controls Sicily, Southern Italy, and Sardinit. The command, which was believed to have little operational importance, was until recently held by the Prince of PIEDMONT. It is probably that this Army Group that General ROSI has taken over. General ROSI formerly commanded the Sixth Army in Sicily, and in January 1943 he became Chief of the Army Staff in ROME. He is noted as a specialist on supply matters, and his appointment suggests that the Italians are taking this matter in hand seriously. General ROATTA, who became Chief of the Army Staff in ROSI'S place, was actually Chief of the Army Staff in 1941. He then commanded the Second Army in Yugoslavia until March of this year, when he took ROSI'S place as Commander of the Sixth Army in Sicily. He thus has first-hand experience of a region which is regarded by the Italians as in the danger zone. He is regarded as a serious and efficient, but rather ruthless, officer.

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8. THE GERMAN MANPOWER SITUATION (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 198 - British) A general survey of the age groups from which prisoners captured in Africa have been drawn, made from the study of paybooks and other captured documents, throws an interesting light on the present manpower situation in Germany. It should be realized, however, that so far only a very small proportion of the available documents have yet been examined, and the percentages may have to be modified when the complete picture is available. According to a German Army Order dated 7 January 1943, the fighting troops sent to Africa were to be drawn in principle from the classes of 1914-1919 inclusive, while the older classes (1908-1913) were to be employed only in the services. The class of 1920 and younger were only to be sent to Africa as special cases. In spite of this order, research has elicited the following facts: a. The classes 1922 and 1923 in nearly every case provide the largest contribution. b. The classes 1908-1913 have been obliged to provide a surprisingly large contribution of fighting troops. c. The comb-out from industry and commerce has already come into the field, one set of paybooks showing that, out of a total of 22 men, 20 were sent straight into a fighting unit destined for Africa without any previous training whatever. d. The approximate average of the percentages provided by the three age groups mentioned above is as follows: 1920 and younger, 55%; 1914-1919, 30%; 1908-1913, 15%.

SECTION II - ECONOMIC NOTES

9. CLOTHING AND SHOES (Confidential - from Weekly Economic Intelligence Notes, 8 June 1943) A new regulation will come into force in Germany shortly, it has been reported, which will require everybody who possesses more than a certain amount of clothing or shoes to surrender the surplus to the authorities for the benefit of those who have lost their effects in air raids. This is the first time that the proposal of a general levy of clothing and textiles for air raid victims has been reported, and it suggests that reserves are therefore inadequate to meet current requirements.

10. GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 18) It is reported that according to German official statistics, German industrial production has declined by 7% as compared with 1942 as a direct result of air bombardment and by 15% as a result of all relative causes, including fatigue, dilution of labor, deterioration of machinery, etc.

11. SABOTAGE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 18) In recent weeks there has been a marked increase in the reports received of railway sabotage, particularly in France, Belgium, Jugoslavia, and Greece, but the fact that only a proportion of the incidents get reported to this country and the difficulty of distinguishing between deliberate sabotage, subtle indirect sabotage, and pure accidents make it difficult to draw any statistical conclusions as to the scale of, and increase in, sabotage. Nevertheless, it seems clear that sabotage has not increased beyond the nuisance stage and is definitely hampering railroad working and destroying or damaging rolling stock and other property, but there is yet no evidence that it has seriously embarrassed the working of enemy traffic.

SECTION III - TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL

12. GERMAN SUBMERSIBLE TANKS (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 18) By the summer of 1941, the weight of the Pz Kw III had already been increased by the fitting of additional armor. This was helpful in overcoming problems of obtaining sufficient underwater track adhesion in adopting standard tanks for submersion. The Germans actively experimented with the Pz Kw III in the early stages of the Russian campaign, and experiments were fairly successful. All joints and openings in the tank had to be sealed with rubber and the supply of air for the engine and crew was obtained by means of a length of flexible hose, the free end of which was attached to a float. Maximum depth of submersion was approximately 16 feet and the time taken to prepare a tank was about 24 hours. In April 1943, a Pz Kw III Model M was discovered to be permanently modified for immersion, if not for submersion. Documents and reports from Russia have shown that the standard Pz Kw VI is equipped for submersion to depths of up to 16 feet, requiring little preparation by the crew. It is possible to submerge this tank to greater depths

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by use of a longer hose. Track adhesion is not a serious problem due to the extremely heavy weight of the tank.

13. GERMAN BOOBY TRAP (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol. II, No. 23) From Headquarters, Northwest African Air Force, comes a report of a novel enemy booby trap. A cake of soap found in a German gas mask case bore the name "Bourjois" but instead of having the perfume characteristic of this brand of soap, it smelled more like common washing soap. The name "Bourjois" was stamped on one side and "Made in England" on the reverse. Also, inspection revealed a small circular mark at one end of the cake, which resembled verdigris and was apparently made by a metallic object inside the tablet. The soap was, therefore, placed in a can of water. After 24 hours, there was no apparent reaction, but on the second day the tablet broke in half. Although it was impossible to determine its actual contents, through the open seam in the tablet there appeared to be a metallic core. A guncotton primer fired six inches away from the can of water containing the tablet caused a sympathetic detonation of extreme violence. The bottom of the can was blown away, but the side of the can between the primer and the tablet was hardly damaged. The tablet weighed approximately three ounces and was of a light yellow color.

Thomas J. Ford
THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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



Friend or Foe ?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this vehicle, together with a new vehicle, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: Humber Armored Car No. 2.

Length	15'
Width	7' 3"
Height	7' 8"
Weight	6 3/4 Tons
Speed	50 m.p.h.
Armament	15mm H.M.G. 7.92 MG
Crew	3 men

Points for Recognition : Open turret. Four wheels. Beetle back. Typical German streamlined hull.

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

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: Typhoon (British Single Seat Fighter)
Span - 41' 7"
Length - 31' 8½"

Recognition Features: Low wing: in line engines: engines extend beyond short nose: wings have dihedral from roots and in plan straight taper to small round tips: fuselage slim with stream-lined glazed cockpit and side gun blisters: large tail plane with bites from elevator trailing edge roots: very large prominent single fin and rudder.

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Copy No. 45

By Auth: C.G., V Corps
Date: 19 June 1943
Initials: TJF.

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 30.
For week ending 19 June 1943.

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret) The number of German divisions in France and the Low Countries is estimated at 40 to 47, a decrease of one division due to the departure of the 1st Panzer Division from France; this division has been reported in the Balkans. Present distribution of divisions is as follows: France - 34 to 38 divisions, including 12 offensive (one of them, the 16th Panzer Division, is thought to be on the verge of leaving for Italy; two others are still reforming after destruction in Russia; and the 305th Infantry Division is known to be considerably understrength), 15 defensive, 4 unidentified, 3 to 4 Luftwaffe Field Divisions (average strength equal to a regimental combat team), and 3 sectors normally occupied by divisions that may or may not now be occupied. Belgium - 2 offensive and 2 defensive divisions; one of the offensive divisions is reforming after destruction in Russia. Holland - 2 offensive divisions, 1 defensive division, 1 Luftwaffe Field Division, and 1 sector that may or may not be occupied by a division. The remaining elements of the S.S. Division HERMAN GOERING, formerly located in Southern France, are reported to have left for Italy. The Italian strength in Southern France remains at five divisions, with another on the Franco-Italian border.

2. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 19) The number of German divisions in Western Europe (except France and the Low Countries) remains unchanged, with 2 defensive divisions in Denmark, 11 divisions in Norway (6 of them offensive), 7 offensive divisions in Finland, and 6 defensive divisions in Germany, including Poland and Bohemia. (Note: The number of divisions in Germany, Poland, and Bohemia refers to combat divisions only. ETO Order of Battle Report No. 22, 9 April, shows some 42 other divisions in this sector, including special employment divisions, depot divisions, and administrative divisions, but the combat value of these divisions is considered practically nil. There have been no later estimates on these divisions since the above report was published.)

3. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 13) The only significant change in the order of battle is the withdrawal of about four groups of long-range bombers from operations. Three of these groups are from the Mediterranean, and was accomplished by withdrawing the remainder of the long-range bomber strength in Sicily (more than two groups) and more than a squadron from Italy. All of the long-range bombers are now out of Sicily and Sardinia. Insofar as long-range bombers are concerned, it is believed that the airfields on these two islands will be used only as advanced landing grounds for bombers based in Italy. The other group withdrawn from operations was on the Russian front. The only change in order of battle on the Western Front was the addition of a squadron of single-engine fighters in Germany. The fighter strength in this area has been continually built up in the last few months due to the heavy Allied bombing attacks.

4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 19) Three major naval units remain unlocated - the ADMIRAL SCHEER, the NURNBERG, and the GRAF ZEPPELIN. It is possible that the latter may have begun trials in DANZIG Bay.

5. GERMAN INVASION BARGES (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence

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Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol. II, No. 23) Aerial photographs of "invasion" ports in France and Belgium in comparison with similar pictures taken a year ago emphasize strongly the German shift from offensive to defensive. The number of invasion-type barges in nine Belgian and western French ports has fallen from 530 in April 1942 to 80 in April 1943, the R.A.F. reports. It is apparent that invasion-type barges are now being used in ordinary commercial traffic, and the idea of using these barges for purely military purposes seems to have been abandoned for the time being.

6. GERMAN TRAINING COMMAND (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 199 - British) During the late summer of 1942, the German Training Command underwent a radical change, probably due to the shortage of manpower. The training command now fulfils a dual purpose; it trains recruits, and in most cases uses them during this training for occupational purposes in countries now under Nazi rule. In case of dire necessity, these recruits would form an immediate operational reserve to supplement the field army on any sudden air or sea landing by the Allies. The training command is now divided into three main branches: a. Depot Divisions, of which 22 have been identified (all inside Germany) have handed over their training functions to the training divisions outside Germany, and continue to exist only as centers to which recruits report on being called up, and as record offices. As reporting centers, they presumably keep recruits long enough to issue rifles, paybooks, etc. b. Training Divisions, of which 14 have been identified (all outside Germany), which seem to be supplied with recruits by the depot divisions. c. Field Training Divisions, which have the same organization as training divisions, but carry out advanced training; they are probably administered by the field army for some purposes. (Note: It would seem that a recruit would first go to a depot division for initial equipment, then to a training division for basic training, and finally to a field training division for advanced training; but it is unlikely that it would work out exactly this way in many cases.)

7. INACTIVITY OF THE ITALIAN NAVY (Confidential - from ETO Oil Intelligence Notes, 10 June 1943) A report states that the lack of fuel oil and lubricants in the Italian Navy is very serious and is one of the reasons why important naval units are being kept in port; that the Germans hardly deliver any fuel at all and only smaller vessels used for convoy work are allowed limited supplies. In evaluating this report, it seems that there have been so many reports that the inactivity of the Italian fleet is due to a shortage of fuel that they cannot be completely discounted.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

8. PANTHER TANK (Confidential - from Technical Intelligence Summary No. 106 - British) It is established from captured documents that German tank units are now being equipped with a new medium tank known as the "Panther", and there are indications that German tank production is being concentrated mainly on the production of this tank and the Pz. Kw. VI, with a view ultimately to the "Panther" taking the place of both the Pz. Kw. III and the Pz. Kw. IV. The "Panther" has not been identified in North Africa, nor is it known to have been in action on the Russian Front as yet. Recent evidence from prisoners of war and other sources suggests, however, that the tank weight is 34 to 38 tons, and that armament includes a high-velocity 75-mm gun.

9. MARKING OF MINEFIELDS (Confidential - from Technical Intelligence Summary No. 106 - British) It is reported from North Africa that the enemy used wooden stakes at the corners of minefields for marking purposes. The report states that some of these stakes were marked HP. This method of marking is one of the standard methods used by the Germans and has been noted on a number of occasions in connection with minefields on the seacoast. Certain fixed points (FP, or festpunkt) are chosen, and certain auxiliary points (HP, or hilfspunkt) are used. The position of each mine is found by measuring a certain distance, in meters, in a straight line from any one such point, along a given bearing.

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10. ITALIAN FLAMETHROWERS (Confidential - from Technical Intelligence Summary No. 106 - British) It has been reported that two models of Italian flamethrowers, models 35 and 40, have become obsolescent because of their excessive weight, and have been superseded by a model 41. The model 41 weighs 40 pounds, has a range of 17 to 22 yards, a fuel capacity of 1.75 gallons, and can project a flame continuously for 5 to 6 seconds. It includes three containers, two for fuel oil and the third for compressed air, which is the propellant. The fuel consists of heavy oil and gasoline in the ratio of 9 to 1.

Thomas J. Ford
THOMAS J. FORD
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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

FRIEND OR FOE?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: 4-wheeled Light Armored Car Sd. Kfz. 222.

Length	15' 7"
Width	6' 3½"
Heighth	7' 4½"
Weight	4.7 tons
Speed	30 m.p.h.
Armament	one 2cm H.M.G. and one M.G.
Crew	3 men

Points for Recognition: Streamlined undercut and diamond-shaped turret with two aerials mounted on the back. Four unevenly spaced large bogey wheels touching top and bottom of tracks. No jockey wheels, small front idler wheels. Abnormal narrow track plates. Prominent driver's cab.

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WHAT IS THIS PLANE







A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: Messerschmitt ME 210 (German twin-engined fighter bomber)
Span 52' 0"
Length 40' 6"

Recognition features: Mid wing: radial engines underslung: long glazed nose: pronounced gull wing: engine nacelles extend beyond trailing edge: dorsal gun turret: large twin fins and rudders of rectangular appearance outrigged.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

Copy No. 45

By Auth: C.G., V Corps.
Date: 26 June 1943.
Initials: JJJ TJF.

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 31.
For week ending 26 June 1943.

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret) The number of German divisions in France and the Low Countries is estimated at 48 to 53, with their distribution as follows: France - 20 offensive divisions (10 known to be considerably understrength, 2 not definitely located), 13 defensive divisions (1 of them not definitely located), 2 unidentified divisions, 1 parachute division (spread over a wide area in Western France), 3 Luftwaffe field divisions (average strength equal to a regimental combat team), and 3 sectors which may or may not be occupied by divisions. Belgium - 3 offensive divisions (1 of them may already have left for the East, while the other 2 are known to be considerably understrength), 2 defensive divisions. Holland - 3 offensive divisions (1 known to be considerably understrength), 1 defensive division, 1 Luftwaffe Field division (average strength equal to a regimental combat team), 1 sector which may or may not be occupied by a division. By comparison with last week's estimate (which showed a total of 40 to 47 divisions) this would appear to be a large increase, but it will be noted that last week there were only four divisions known to be considerably understrength, as compared with 13 such divisions this week. While considerable troop movement continues in this area, there is as yet no evidence of any great strengthening of the Western Front; many of the divisions have gone into France and the Low Countries to be reformed after destruction in Russia. The present trend indicates movement toward Southern France and the Balkans, with some troops no doubt going into Italy. The remaining elements of the SS Division HERMAN GOERING that were in Southern France have been reported in Italy, and movement of three divisions in France to the Mediterranean coast has been reported. Two defensive divisions, located in the interior of France, are reported to have moved farther south. The number of Italian divisions in France is still accepted as six, although some are expected to move into Italy.

2. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 20) The only change during the week in Denmark, Norway, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Bohemia was the movement of one division, the 156th Reserve Division, into Poland from the CALAIS sector of France. (Note: Although paragraph 1 of this summary considers that the 16th Panzer Division may still be in France, possibly along the Mediterranean coast, the ETO Periodic Report states that this division has definitely left France and may be in Italy.)

3. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 14) Changes in the order of battle show an increase in operational strength of long-range bombers by over a group on the Russian Front, with one group of dive-bombers having become operational on the Russian Front and another on the Mediterranean Front. Thus the G.A.F. continues the trend begun in April of returning long-range bomber units to operational duty. Estimated total strength of the G.A.F. in initial equipment on all fronts is 4,542 operational craft, not including 815 transports. It is estimated that the G.A.F. has 1,068 non-operational craft, of which more than half are transports. The only change of importance on the Western Front was the shift northwards of the single-engine fighter strength defending Germany; Germany was reinforced by the equivalent of a group at the expense of France and Belgium. Estimated strength of the G.A.F. on the Western Front in operational craft (initial equipment) is 1,716 planes, which includes 100 transports.

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4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 20) Two major units of the German Fleet are unlocated, the ADMIRAL SCHEER and the GRAF ZEPPLIN. Both are thought to be in the BALTIC SEA.

5. THE SPANISH ARMY (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 200 - British) Information has been received of the Spanish General Staff's plans for reorganization of the Army, which is based on a long-term policy. The changes contemplated will include reduction of the number of infantry divisions from sixteen to twelve; increase in mountain divisions from three to four; creation of an armored division from the four existing tank regiments; strengthening of coast defense units by the addition of engineers, signal units, and services; concentration of close support and reconnaissance under G.H.Q. instead of under corps; and reduction of the Army of Morocco from five infantry divisions to four, but with the addition of a horse-mechanized cavalry brigade. The main object of these changes seems to be an attempt to balance the arms, which at present are handicapped by a lack of support troops and a preponderance of infantry. It is intended to centralize all support arms as far as possible. The plan involves an increase in strength of some 10,098 men, bringing the total peace-time strength to 387,758 men. It is perhaps significant that the Spanish General Staff should be occupying itself at this moment with a question which is really a matter of long-term policy. It seems to indicate that high Spanish military circles do not think that the danger of Spain becoming involved in war is really very great.

Section II - Political

6. INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN ITALY (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 20) A few days ago CARLO SCORZA, Fascist Party Secretary, on behalf of the Directorate of the Party, addressed to MUSSOLINI an open list of recommendations for the reform of internal conditions in Italy so as to strengthen the will and capacity of the Italian people to resist. The circumstances of this action and their sweeping character, both unprecedented in Fascist history, suggest an all-out effort to pull the country together for a last-minute stand against invasion. Among the recommendations are the ruthless suppression of the discontented; complete control over industry, agriculture, and the supply and distribution of goods; simplification of economic and bureaucratic organization; repression of the Black Market; maximum effort from all workers of the country; stricter supervision of luxury hotels and restaurants, and other similar measures. The message closes with the demand that the Fascist Party assume "completely the responsibility of protecting and defending the nation, increasing its power and guarding its destiny."

Section III - Publications

7. CORRECTIONS IN M.I.S. PUBLICATION (Restricted) Information has been received from the Military Intelligence Service, Washington, that the following errors occur in the M.I.S. Intelligence Bulletin for April 1943 (Vol. 1, No. 8): On page 44, line 3, the light mortar of the German rifle platoon is referred to as a 30-mm weapon, but this is actually a 50-mm mortar. On page 45, paragraph 3 d (1), the 13 Company of the German Grenadier Regiment is referred to as having nine light infantry howitzers; there are actually six 75-mm infantry howitzers and two 150-mm infantry howitzers. A correction of these errors will be carried in the July issue of the Intelligence Bulletin, according to the M.I.S.

Thomas J. Ford
THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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S-2, 190th FA Regt.	(3 copies)	S-2, 12th Evac. Hosp.	(1 copy)
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

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A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: Cruiser Tank Mk. V "Covenanter".

Length	19' 6"
Width	9' 1"
Height	7' 4"
Weight	18 tons
Armament	2-pdr., 7.92 M.G.
Crew	4 men

Points for Recognition: Open top turret. When used as wireless car it is fitted with a square grid type aerial.

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





A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: North American B-25, U. S. medium bomber.
Span 67' 6"
Length 51' 5"

Recognition features: Low wing: in line engine: wings have dihedral from roots and are elliptical in plan; radiator under each wing: slim fuselage: small elliptical tail plane: small curved single fin and rudder faired into fuselage.

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Copy No. 43

By Auth: C.G., V Corps.
Date: 3 July 1943.
Initials: JKG.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 32.
FOR week ending 3 July 1943.

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret) The number of German divisions in France and the Low Countries is now estimated at 49 to 57, as compared with last week's estimate of 48 to 53. (These estimates include Luftwaffe field divisions, a parachute division, and sectors that are possibly occupied; such are usually not included in estimates made for other reports.) The number of divisions now thought to be considerably understrength is estimated at 8, as compared with 13 for last week. There are 38 to 46 divisions in France, divided as follows: 15 offensive infantry divisions (5 of them understrength), 3 Panzer divisions (1 of them understrength), 3 motorized divisions (1 of them understrength), 3 unconfirmed offensive divisions, 13 defensive divisions, 1 unconfirmed defensive division, 3 or 4 Luftwaffe field divisions, elements of 1 parachute division, and 2 or 3 sectors that may or may not be occupied by divisions. In Belgium there are 2 offensive infantry divisions (1 of them understrength), a Panzer division (which may already have left the Western Front), and 2 defensive divisions; in Holland there are 3 offensive infantry divisions, a defensive division, a Luftwaffe field division, and a sector that may or may not be occupied by a division. The German troops in France and the Low Countries are now reported to be under four armies and an independent corps. The Twenty-second German Army has recently been identified in the Mediterranean area, with headquarters at AVIGNON; other armies are the First in the southwest, and the Seventh and Fifteenth along the western coast. Most of Holland is under the independent LXXXVIII Corps. The number of Italian divisions in France is now given as five since the departure of the 6th ALPINI Division for Italy.

2. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 21) No change is reported in the number of divisions in Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Germany; the total remains at 27 divisions (of which 13 are offensive) and a Luftwaffe field division.

3. THE GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 15) A further shift of single-engine fighter strength to the Western Front has been reported, this time at the expense of the Russian Front. There has been some shift of fighter-bomber strength to the Mediterranean at the expense of the Western Front; the Mediterranean was also reinforced by a group of dive-bombers. Enemy losses on the Western Front for the week ending 12 June (the latest for which figures are available) show 112 planes destroyed, 27 probably destroyed, and 45 damaged, as against 24:2:9 for the week ending 5 June, and 63:6:25 for the week ending 29 May. German aircraft production for the first half of 1943 has seen an increased effort, particularly in fighters, and it is estimated that in June of this year about 1,525 aircraft were to have been produced.

4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 21) No important changes in the dispositions of the major units of the German fleet have been reported. The only ship not definitely located is the pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER, which is probably still in the BALTIC Sea. The daily average of submarines operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC for the week ending 26 June was 95.

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5. ITALIAN PARACHUTISTS TRAINED FOR SABOTAGE (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol. II, No. 26) Information has been received concerning seven groups of Italian parachutists that landed in the North African theater on June 13-14 to sabotage Allied airdromes. Each group consisted of an officer and nine men; all were captured. Interrogation revealed that they had been instructed to approach the airdrome under cover of darkness, overcome and disarm the guard from the rear with a minimum of noise, and each man was then detailed to destroy a bomber with explosives timed to go off one to two hours later. The group was to reunite on completion of the mission, and surrender without resistance. The prisoners stated that other groups are being formed in Italy for similar missions.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

6. GERMAN TELLERMINES (Confidential - from War Office Technical Intelligence Summary No. 107 - British) A captured German document gives instructions for the use of Tellermines as anti-tank grenades by tank destruction detachments. For this purpose the mines are fired by BZ24 igniters, screwed in conjunction with No. 8 detonators into the side igniter sockets. For reasons of safety the mines must not be fitted with their main igniters. The BZ24 igniter is that used in the standard stick grenade, and no other type of igniter is permitted to be used for this purpose, according to the document.

Section III - Political and Economic

7. SCANDINAVIA (Confidential - from War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 201 - British) The spirit of resistance seems to be rising in Denmark, where a crowd recently broke spontaneously into the strains of the Norwegian national anthem, with the result that a broadcast of the proceedings was abruptly cut off. Sabotage continues, and has reached a point which has forced the German authorities to reverse their recent policy of allowing and even encouraging the press to report such incidents, and to fall back on their earlier line of prohibiting such reports.

8. GERMAN RAILROAD POSITION (Confidential - from ETO Weekly Economic Intelligence Notes No. 25) An examination of recent issues of the German transport press shows that the emphasis laid on the enemy's burden on the German railroads has now disappeared and that by implication the transport crisis has been overcome. There is some evidence that the short-term position of the German railroads is in some ways easier than for some time past, but there is no reason to doubt that the long-term position is not as difficult as ever. Evidence of easing is seen in the abolition of the regulations permitting the overloading of freight cars. Some easing of the situation may be attributable to the comparative success of the car building program and possibly also to the decline in overall industrial production in Germany, which is believed to have occurred.

James K. Gaynor
JAMES K. GAYNOR,
Major, Infantry,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2.

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Copy No. 45

By Auth: C.G., V Corps,
Date: 10 July 1943.
Initials: JKG.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 33
For week ending 10 July 1943

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret) It is estimated that there are 46 to 50 German divisions in France and the Low Countries, divided as follows; France - 20 offensive divisions (4 of them unidentified), 13 defensive divisions, 3 or 4 Luftwaffe field divisions, and 3 sectors that may or may not be occupied by divisions; Belgium - 3 offensive divisions (1 of them unidentified), 2 defensive divisions; Holland - 3 offensive divisions, 1 defensive division, 1 Luftwaffe field division. The number of Italian divisions in Southeastern France continues to be estimated at 5. No movements of divisions during the week have been verified, but there is a strong possibility that the 3rd and 386th Motorized Divisions are moving from Southwestern France towards Italy. (Note: Although the estimate of the total number of divisions will vary from week to week, this does not indicate that corresponding movements have taken place. In many cases, the estimates are changed because additional or more reliable information has been received.

2. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 22) It is estimated that there are 32 German divisions in Western Europe in addition to those in France and the Low Countries. These are given as follows: Denmark - 1 offensive division, 3 defensive divisions, 1 Luftwaffe field division; Norway - 6 offensive divisions, 5 defensive divisions, 1 Luftwaffe field division; Finland - 7 offensive divisions; Germany - 7 defensive divisions, 1 Luftwaffe field division. Administrative divisions - such as special employment divisions, depot divisions, line of communications divisions, and the like - are not included in the above estimates; there are more than 40 such divisions in Germany and Poland alone.

3. THE GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 16) The most important change in dispositions of the G.A.F. for the week ending 26 June was the strong reinforcement of the Mediterranean, particularly with long-range bombers and single-engine fighters, which went to the central area. The redisposition of long-range bomber strength was achieved at the expense of the Western Front, where a group became non-operational without being replaced. The long-range bomber concentration in the PARIS-BRUSSELS area has been reduced to about a group, which has become non-operational. It was formerly based near PARIS, but moved to the BRUSSELS area, and operated against the United Kingdom from both of these bases, with some losses. These losses were not high, and the fact that it is now non-operational indicates the care with which the Germans are using their long-range bomber units. The center of gravity of single-engine fighter strength was again shifted northwards by a build-up of strength in Holland and Germany at the expense of France; this shift amounted to the equivalent of a group. Total strength of the German Air Force is estimated as follows: 5,370 craft in first-line combat units (of which about 470 are non-operational); 1,370 transport aircraft (of which 555 are non-operational); about 1,000 planes in reserve training units; about 1,000 aircraft of combat types used in schools; about 500 transports used in training; about 4,500 non-combat elementary trainers; and about 700 aircraft in stored reserves available to replace losses. This would give a first-line strength of 6,740, second-line strength of 7,000, and a total of 14,400 planes of all types (including stored reserves).

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4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No.22) All major units of the German fleet are now located; three are near the northern tip of Norway, one is inactive at BREMEN, and the remainder are either in the BALTIC Sea or its western approaches in the vicinity of Denmark.

5. GERMAN SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 22 and Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U. S. Air Force, Vol. III, No. 1) Aerial reconnaissance of German shipyards shows that the Germans are still attempting to increase their U-boat building program. About 274 submarines were under construction on 1 June, compared to 260 on 1 March. A total of 58 U-boats completed is recorded during the three-month period, and this figure - equivalent to about 18 a month - is probably not complete. Compared with the data relating to the period September 1942 to February 1943, however, a decrease of approximately 10% in U-boat construction is noted.

Section II - Political Notes

6. GENERAL SUMMARY OF POLITICAL EVENTS (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 22) Pres. BENES, of Czechoslovakia, is trying to build up an entente between Czechoslovakia, Russia, and Poland, has gotten STALIN to agree to form alliance with Czechoslovakia, not to interfere in internal Czech affairs, to form a similar alliance with Poland when Russo-Polish relations improve, and to approve of Czech post-war plans to move all Germans from Sudetenland. . . . MUSSOLINI retains power, though not prestige, by his appointments of "tougher, gangster-ish" Fascists to offices, his social legislation, imprisonment of political enemies, and emotional use of threat of Italian invasion. . . . Movements of troops to coastal areas by Spanish government are reported by Spanish foreign office to be part of spring training, and nothing more. Spaniards show open Allied sympathy, openly discuss change of government, and monarchist movement grows. . . . In Scandinavia, the threat of invasion is creating secret groups to aid Allies in event of invasion, is breaking up pro-Nazi parties, and is causing Nazis to tolerate considerable anti-Nazi sentiment in the press. . . . Finland continues to pursue the hopeless task of trying to please both the U. S. and Germany; has very little prospect of getting out of the war soon.

James K Gaynor
JAMES K. GAYNOR,
Major, Infantry,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2.

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Appendix No. 1 to Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 33, Headquarters V Corps.

(Note: At times it is desirable to disseminate matters of procedure or of an administrative nature to Intelligence Officers of subordinate units, and in the future, such information will be included as an appendix to the Weekly Summary whenever practicable.)

1. REQUESTS FOR AERIAL PHOTOS (Restricted - from ETO Letter, file AG 062 MGB, dated 3 July 1943) Requests for the procurement of aerial photos and photo intelligence material for all agencies will be submitted to the A. C. of S., G-2, ETOUSA, through the A. C. of S., G-2, V Corps. All such requests will be submitted in quadruplicate, and contain the following information:

a. Subject (description by NAME or type of installation).
b. Location (city and country).
c. Co-ordinates (English).
d. Map Reference (sheet and number).
e. Type of photography desired (Vertical, oblique, stereo pairs, flight strips, mosaics, ground views).
f. Approximate photo scale required.
g. Purpose for which photography is to be used.
h. Nature of intelligence sought from photography.
i. Special photo requirements.
j. Date of photography desired.
k. Type of reproduction desired (contact positive, film positive, enlargements to indicate diameter, duplicate negatives.).

2. INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING PUBLICITY ON THE INFORMATION PERTAINING TO PRISONERS OF WAR (Confidential - from WD Letter, file AG 383.6 (22-Jun-43) OB-s-b-M, dated 24 June 1943) The following instructions have been received in the handling of such matters, signed by order of the Secretary of War:

a. It is desired that no information obtained from the interrogation of prisoners of war, captured diaries and other papers of military value be released to the press for publication. It is further desired that news releases avoid mention of prisoners of war and enemy documents as sources of military intelligence.

b. All public relations officers and others concerned with the dissemination of news will be informed to this effect, as instances have occurred where in similar material released has been detrimental to the war effort.

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

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: German FW-200K (Kurier) Bomber,
Span 108 feet
Length 78 feet.

Recognition features: Very high tail plane: Low wing with long, straight center section: slight dihedral: Under slung engines: Nacelles project: Short nose: Slim fuselage: Wings have rectangular center section: Curved tips on wings: Very tall, large fin and ruddor: Streamlined fairing to tailplane.

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



FRIEND OR FOE

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, togethor with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: American M.3 Light Tank "Stuart".

Length	14' 10"
Width	7' 4"
Heighth	8' 4"
Weight	13 tons
Speed	35 m.p.h.
Armament	one 37-mm gun and 2 .30 Browning M.G.'s
Crew	4 men

Points for Recognition: Open turret. Four wheels. Hood, mudguards and mounting of spare wheel give the vehicle a motor car appearance.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

Copy No. 45

By Auth: C.G., V Corps,
Date: 17 July 1943.
Initials: ELL.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 34
For week ending 17 July 1943.

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES. (Secret) It is estimated that there are still 46 to 50 German divisions in France and the Low Countries, divided as follows: France - 20 offensive divisions (3 of them unidentified, 13 defensive divisions, 5 or 6 Luftwaffe Field divisions, and 2 sectors that may or may not be occupied by divisions; Belgium - 3 offensive divisions (1 of them unidentified) 1 defensive division; Holland - 4 offensive divisions (1 of them unidentified) 1 defensive division, 1 unidentified Luftwaffe Field division, and one sector which may or may not be occupied by a division. Reliable reports confirm the movement of the 3rd and 386th Motorized Divisions to Italy, confirms the locations of the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th SS Panzer Divisions in Western France and the Low Countries. No change in the 5 Italian Divisions estimated to be in Southeastern France. (Note: Although the estimate of the total number of divisions will vary from week to week, this does not indicate that corresponding movements have taken place. In many cases, the estimates are changed because additional or more reliable information has been received.)

2. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 23) It is estimated that there are still 32 German Divisions in Western Europe in addition to those in France and the Low Countries. These are given as follows: Denmark - 1 offensive division, 3 defensive divisions and 1 Luftwaffe Field Division; Norway 6 offensive divisions, 5 defensive divisions, and 1 Luftwaffe Field Division; Finland - 7 offensive divisions; Germany (including Poland and Bohemia) - 7 Defensive divisions, 1 Luftwaffe division. Administrative divisions - such as special employment, depot, and line of communication divisions, of which there are more than 40 in Germany and Poland alone, are not included in the above estimates.

3. THE GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 17) Strong reinforcements to the central area of the Mediterranean continued to be the most important change in the disposition of the German Air Force for the week ending 3 July. Long-range bombers, bomber-reconnaissance, and single-engine fighters compose the reinforcements which have been transferred at the expense of the Western Front. Dive-bombers and fighter-bombers have, however, been shifted from the Mediterranean to the Russian Front, though only in small numbers. Group 1/KG6, given as non-operational is now operational in Southern France. It appears that III/KG6 went through the same short non-operational period and since headquarters of KG6 is now believed to be in Southern France, it may be supposed that II/KG6 will soon follow the rest of the wing from the PARIS-BRUSSELS Area.

4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 23) No known change in disposition of German Fleet. Battleship TIRPITS, battle cruiser SCHARNHORST, and pocket battleships LUTZOW are in ALTEN FJORD; 8" cruisers HIPPER and PRINZ EUGEN, pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER, 6" cruisers LIEPZIG, EMDEN and NURNBERG, old battleships SCHLESIEN and SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN (both possibly active), and the aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPLIN (not active) are all in the lower BALTIC; 6" cruiser KOLN at KIEL.

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5. MISCELLANEOUS (Secret - from ETO, G-2 Periodic Report No. 23) Enemy air activity over ICELAND was heavier with approximately 11 reconnaissance sorties reported together with 2 attacks on fishing schooners, neither inflicting serious damage. Daily average of German submarines operating in the North Atlantic for this period reported as 95. Enemy defensive fighter activity moderate during this period except when Allied planes were operating on large scale. Offensive air activity over United Kingdom negligible. No reports of sea mining.

Section II - Tactical and Technical Trends

6. ENEMY AIRCRAFT LIKELY TO BE SEEN OVER UK (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eighth U.S. Air Force). Following is Anti-Aircraft Command's revised list of enemy aircraft likely or unlikely to be seen over this country at present:

Probable	Possible	Unlikely
JU-88	DO-17	JU-52
DO-217	HE-177	HE-115
HE-111	JU-86	DO-18
ME-410	ME-110	FW-200
FW-190		DO-24
ME-109G		BU-138

Four of the six in the "unlikely" list are German Naval aircraft - the HE-115 torpedo bomber and recce plane, a twin-float seaplane, and the DO-18, DO-24 and BU-138, flying boats.

Section III - Political and Economical

7. CHANGES IN GERMAN POLITICAL MACHINE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 23) The following shifts in the power of Nazi leaders are reported - Dr. Schacht, Minister of Special Tasks, relieved because of protest on conditions of A.R.P. camps filled with 15 year old boys; Goering, not seen in public since March 21, reported ill and his place on Defense Council believed to be taken by Field Marshal Keitel; Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda assuming increasingly large governmental duties; Ribbentrop, now lying low at his castle, has been replaced as head of the Foreign Office; and Himmler, Gestapo Chief, has now apparently won his long-fought battle to move in on the Armed Forces.

8. SARDINIAN LEAD AND ZINC MINES CLOSED (Confidential - from Southern Command Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 27) It has been reported that the Sardinian lead and zinc mines have been closed owing to the loss of export facilities. CAGLIARI, the chief port used, stated to be most damaged Italian town. Sardinia provides 50% Italian zinc, 90% lead. Reported German lead shortage indicated difficulty of obtaining alternative supply.

9. PROGRESS MADE IN RECONSTRUCTION OF DAMAGED RENAULT WORKS (Confidential - from Southern Command Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 27) Reconnaissance six weeks after bombing of Renault Works (4 April) showed substantial progress made towards reconstruction of over 30 damaged workshops. At one time Germans planned to remove equipment and workers to Germany but at present deem it vitally necessary to keep this plant running and justify the risk of further attacks.

NOTE: Plane shown on attached sheet, for study and identification, is Heinkel 115, German torpedo bomber and reconnaissance plane. Tank shown on attached sheet, for study and identification, is British Infantry Tank Mk. III "VALENTINE".

Eugene L. Long
EUGENE L. LONG,
Major, F.A.,
Ass't. A. C. of S., G-2.

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



FRIEND OR FOE

A suffuicient number of copies are issued herewth for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: German 4-wheeled light armored car (Sd. Kfz. 13)

Length	13' 10"
Width	5' 7"
Height	4' 11"
Weight	2 tons
Speed	40 - 50 m.p.h.
Armament	one M.G.
Crew	2 - 3 men.

Points for Recognition: Vertical sides to turret. Bulge at the back of turret for wireless set. Aerials mounted on back of turret. Six bogey wheels of unequal size with a gap in between the 3 wheel bogies. The tank can be distinguished at a great distance by the reflection of the light on the reduction gear on the rear driving sprocket. Prominent driver's cab, corrugated rear deck.

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

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: British WHIRLWIND - Single-seat fighter.

Span	45' 0"
Length	32' 5"
Height	10' 10"

Recognition features: Very wide tailplane, set high; Braced tailplane; Very angular, large fin and rudder; Wings have swept-back outer section with straight center section and broad, round tips; Wings have slight dihedral with slight anhedral in center section; Floats are level with nose; Aircraft has long, glazed cabin; Tailplane is similar to mainplane outer section.

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Copy No. 45

By Auth: C.G., V Corps,
Date: 24 July 1943.
Initials: ELL.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 35
For week ending 24 July 1943.

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret) It is estimated that there are 47 to 51 German Divisions in France and the Low Countries, divided as follows: France - 20 offensive divisions (4 of them unidentified), 13 defensive divisions, 3 Luftwaffe Field Divisions, and three sectors that may or may not be occupied by divisions; Belgium - 3 offensive divisions (1 of them unidentified), 2 defensive divisions; Holland - 4 offensive divisions (1 of them unidentified), 1 defensive division, 1 Luftwaffe Field Division, and one sector which may or may not be occupied by a division. Reliable reports say that the 24th and 26th Panzer Divisions have probably moved southwards and that the 371st Infantry Division formerly believed to be one of those in Brittany has been identified elsewhere. No change in the 5 Italian Divisions located in South-eastern France. (Note: Although the estimate of the total number of divisions will vary from week to week, this does not indicate that corresponding movements have taken place. In many cases, the estimates are changed because additional or more reliable information has been received.

2. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 24) It is estimated that there are now 34 German Divisions in Western Europe in addition to those in France and the Low Countries. They are given as follows: Denmark - 1 offensive division, 3 defensive divisions, and 1 Luftwaffe Field Division; Norway - 6 offensive divisions, 5 defensive divisions, and one Luftwaffe Division; Finland - 7 offensive divisions; Germany (including Poland and Bohemia) - 2 offensive divisions, 7 defensive divisions, and 1 Luftwaffe Field Division. Administrative divisions - such as special employment and depot divisions, of which there are over 40 in Germany and Poland alone, are not included in the above estimates.

3. THE GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 18) For the week ending July 10 the most important change in disposition of the German Air Force was the moving of twin-engine fighters to the Russian front at the expense of the Western Front. Non-operational also supplied single-engine fighters as well as 75 large transport to the Mediterranean and Sicily.

4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 24) There are no known changes in location of the German Fleet from that given in report of last week, except that Pocket Battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER is now unlocated and has probably left the lower BALTIC.

5. MISCELLANEOUS (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 24) Daily average of submarines operating in North Atlantic during the week estimated at 90. Enemy air defensive fighter activity moderate with greatly increased offensive activity over the United Kingdom by long-range bombers. One coast guard cutter and one fishing schooner attacked near ICELAND. No reports of sea-mining.

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Section II - Political

SWEDEN:

Sweden has objected to Moscow'saccusation that her neutrality means nothing more than acceding to every German demand. It is felt that this accusation and subsequent Swedish reaction make the outlook for Swedish-Russian relations rather grave....In Sweden, as in the rest of Scandinavia, the idea of the Nordic Union continues to be widely debated. The Swedish position is still that such a union can be effective only if part of a larger union of nations. It is rumored that within the next few days the Swedish Foreign Minister will announce the cessation of "leave traffic" of German soldiers through Sweden. If this does happen, it will indicate that Sweden feels strong enough to stand whatever force Germany could spare to use against her.

NORWAY:

From week to week the same patterns of resistance continue in occupied Norway. The people defy the labor mobilization, resign from, and refuse to have contact with, The Quisling Part, and openly profess their sympathy for the Allied cause.

GERMANY:

There is no doubt that political repercussion will be felt in Germany as a direct result of: The failure of the German offensive in Russia and the consequent Russian counter-attack; Allied advances in Sicily against German and Italian troops, and destruction of German cities and factories by Allied warplanes....It is reported that the S.A. in Western Germany has recently formed special units whose responsibility it is to remove anti-Nazi signs and slogans which are marked on walls, fences and sidewalks every night....Hitler is reported to be on the Russian front, and has a new favorite, a Nazi named Martin Borman. Borman is disliked and feared by other Nazis, who must secure his permission to have audience with the Fuehrer. High-ranking Nazis are numbered according to their importance and those numbered under 100 are theoretically free to speak to Hitler whenever they desire. Borman, however, takes drastic measures to prevent anyone from getting too close to Hitler. Goering no longer appears in public and has been shorn of additional powers because he failed in his duty of building an air force which was capable of dealing with all enemy attacks. There is a good possibility that Milch will be made head of the Luftwaffe in Goering's place. Goering has relinquished to others his control of airplane production and pilot training....Robert Ley, chief of the Reich Labor Front, was forced to stop an address to workers near Berlin because of constant heckling. Also, Goebbels, while talking to several hundred persons who had been bombed out of their homes during the last raid on Berlin, was interrupted by occasional cries of "You are to blame" and "Down with the Nazis". Goebbels is, as usual, straddling and is ready to shift to the camp which is most likely to gain control and at present it is said that he is courting the friendship of certain individuals whom he knows are not Nazis at heart....Echoes of the alleged attempt by Germany to have Japan arrange a German-Russian peace continue to be heard. A German industrialist who recently visited Sweden said that Hitler made at least two attempts to contact Russia on the matter of peace, but these attempts failed and the Foreign Office personnel connected therewith were liquidated for having "Acted without authority".

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Section III - Economical
(From ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 24)

ITALY:

The Pomigliano d'Arco Aircraft Factory was severely hit in the U.S.A.A.F. raid of May 30th. Recce reveals major damage to five large shops and to several smaller ones. Much of the plant at this place is underground, but the damage specified, combined with the very heavy damage in Naples, would almost certainly cause a temporary halt in the production of D.B. 601 engines for Macchi 202 fighters....The Bredo subsidiary IM.A.M. at Naples is reported to have been severly damaged in the same raid....Reports to the effect that the Italian Navy is immobilized through the lack of fuel are constantly recurring, but they should be treated with reserve. In view of the regular flow of Rumanian oil to Italy -

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estimated at 18,000 tons monthly - there is no reason to believe that Italian capital ships would be lying in port with depleted bunkers or that stocks of oil would not be sufficient for at least one sortie of normal duration. It is known that overall supplies of fuel oil have been below Italian requirements, but increased supplies of Rumanian and Albanian crude are now being sent to the Aquila Refinery....It is reported from a source believed reliable that the Isotta Fraschini works have been rebuilt underground; also that during the last two years energetic measures have been taken to transport certain Italian factories considered essential to the war effort to safer areas. It is stated that in Turin there are factories seemingly intact but which contain no machine tools, these having been removed....It is believed that by the end of June at least three Italian U-boat blockade runners were on passage to the Far East - others will no doubt follow at short intervals.

GERMANY

The German Press state ~~that further collections of textiles and footwear~~ will have to take place. The recent collection has just been concluded and, with regard to textiles, the result is officially reported to be 20% better than last year. Shoes which were collected for the first time show a total of 10 million pairs, including badly worn ones which can only be used as raw material. The reason for the new collections is that insufficient qualities have been so far handed in....In the official journal of the German Army, February 1943, attention is called to the orders issued for the burial of members of the fighting services. Men killed in action are only to be buried in the most essential articles of clothing. Equipment, greatcoats, woolen blankets, and, if possible, also footwear, are not to be put in the grave but are to be collected and turned in.... In course of conversation with the two German representatives who were negotiating with Swedish Shell Company, it came out that the oil plant of Rhenania Ossag at Hanburg had never been hit, nor apparently attacked by the R.A.F. On the other hand their plant at Dusseldorf was very badly damaged and now working at about 25% of capacity....Air recce shows that in the raid on Dortmund on 23rd June the Hoesch Synthetic oil plant was damaged; the plant appeared inactive after the raid. The capacity of the plant is estimated at 100,000 tons per annum....The Germans have struck oil at a point N.E. of Vienna, midway between Vienna and the Moravian Gap. Production is calculated at 1,300,000 t.p.a. The wells are 3,000m. deep and the drilling rigs were all transported from Petrol Block near Ploesti. This presumably refers to the Zisterdorf Field.

SERBIA:

It is reported that the Germans, during June, moved 100 powerful new locomotives to Belgrade, Nisch and Lapovo, also that a number of German drivers and firemen have arrived in Nisch.

FRANCE:

Reports covering traffic working on the Nice-Mentone line during April and May indicate the coal traffic from Germany to Italy via this route was maintained fairly regularly at a rate of one or two trains per day on most days. Apart from coal the only other regular traffic was explosives, mainly from Miramas and La Seyne.

NOTE: Plane shown on attached sheet, for study and identification, is P-40 F, American War Hawk.
Tank shown on attached sheet, for study and identification, is German Number Armored Car. No. 1.

SECRET

Eugene L. Long
EUGENE L. LONG,
Major, F.A.,
Ass't. A. C. of S., G-2.

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

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: Heinkel 115, German torpedo bomber and reconnaissance plane.
Span 75' 9"
Length 57' 1"

Points for Recognition: Low wing; inline engine; long nose with large radiator below; wings have dihedral from roots and in plan swept forward appearance; short fuselage; wing-nut type tailplane with curved cut out; characteristic single fin and rudder with straight taper on leading edge and curved trailing edge.

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



FRIEND OR FOE

A suffuicient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: British Infantry Tank Mk. III "VALENTINE".

Length	17' 9"
Width	8' 6"
Height	7' 6"
Weight	16 tons
Speed	15 m.p.h.
Armament	2 pdr., 7.92 M.G.
Crew	3 or 4 men, according to turret.

Points for Recognition: Has a shallow and angular turret with sloping sides and circular base. W.T. aerial mounted on back. Receding turret face. Two smoke dischargers mounted on right of heavy Machine Gun. High blunt nose with prominent driver's cab mounted on top. Streamlining slopes back towards the rear.

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By Auth: C.G., V Corps,
Date: 31 July 1943.
Initials: ELL.

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 36
For week ending 31 July 1943.

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.)

SECTION I - CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret) It is estimated that there are 47 to 52 German Divisions in France and the Low Countries, divided as follows: France - 20 offensive divisions (4 of them unidentified), 13 defensive divisions, 4 Luftwaffe Field Divisions, and 3 sectors which may or may not be occupied by divisions; Belgium - 2 offensive divisions (1 of them unidentified), 2 defensive divisions; Holland - 2 offensive divisions (1 of them unidentified), 1 defensive division, 1 Luftwaffe Field Division, and 1 sector which may or may not be occupied by a division. It is thought that the 18th Luftwaffe Division is occupying the CALAIS sector and that another Luftwaffe Field Division is in the LORIENT-VANNES sector. The 19th Luftwaffe Field Division is reported to be in the CANE-EVREUX area. It is now believed that Luftwaffe Field Divisions are holding many coastal areas and are porbably reinforced by parts of reactivated STALINGRAD Divisions. No change is given in the 5 Italian Divisions located in southeastern France. (Note: Although the estimate of the total number of divisions will vary from week to week, this does not indicate that corresponding movements have taken place. In many cases, the estimates are changed because additional or more reliable information has been received).

2. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 25) It is estimated that there are still 34 German Divisions in western Europe in addition to those in France and the Low Countries. They are as follows: Denmark - 1 offensive division, 3 defensive divisions, 1 Luftwaffe Field Division; Norway - 6 offensive divisions, 5 defensive divisions, and 1 Luftwaffe Field Division; Finland - 7 offensive divisions; Germany - (including Poland and Bohemia) - 2 offensive divisions, 7 defensive divisions, and 1 Luftwaffe Field Division. Administrative divisions are not included in the above estimated.

3. THE GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 19) For the week ending July 17, the most important change in the G.A.F. was the addition of over 2 Groups of long-range bombers to the Mediterranean from the Western and Russian fronts. This brings the estimate for the Mediterranean up to 8 Groups or approximately 1/3 of the G.A.F. long-range bombers. Fifty (50) JU-52 transports were also transferred to this area. Reliable reports give 3 to 5 Groups of single-engine fighters now in Holland.

4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 25) There are no known changes in the disposition of major elements of the German Fleet. The pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER remains unlocated. The minor elements are reported as follows:

a. Destroyers - Commissioned destroyers operationally active:

	Last Week	This Week
(1) BAY OF BISCAY & ENGLISH CHANNEL PORTS	4	4
(2) NORTH SEA & BALTIC PORTS	4-6	6-4
(3) NORWAY PORTS	10-12	10-12

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b. Torpedo Boats - Commissioned first line torpedo boats operationally active:

	Last Week	This Week
(1) BAY OF BISCAY & ENGLISH CHANNEL PORTS	10-12	10-12
(2) NORTH SEA PORTS	3	3
(3) BALTIC PORTS	About 12	About 12
(4) NORWAY PORTS	2	2

c. Submarines - Photographic reconnaissance discloses submarines in port, not in shelters, as shown below:

	Last Week	This Week
(1) Alongside in BAY OF BISCAY PORTS	12	14
(2) Alongside in NETHERLANDS & NORTH SEA PORTS	26	19
(3) Alongside in BALTIC PORTS	97	152
(4) Alongside in NORWAY PORTS	11	10

5. MISCELLANEOUS (Secret - from reports mentioned above) Daily average of submarines operating in the North Atlantic during the week estimated at 95. No reports of sea-mining. Air activity over ICELAND shown decrease over previous week with only one unimportant attack on surface craft. Over western Front defensive air activity decreased and offensive slightly increased. No night bombing reported.

SECTION II - TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL TRENDS

6. LARGE UNIDENTIFIED GERMAN AIRCRAFT (RECHLIN 104) (Confidential - from A.A. Command Intelligence Review No. 143.) Two large unidentified enemy aircraft of the same type were photographed on the field at the German Air Force Experimental Station at RECHLIN on 28 June by the R.A.F. The sketch below shows general characteristics of the aircraft.



This plane has a wingspan of 103 to 105 feet (about the same as the Flying Fortress), and is 74 to 77.5 feet in length. It is a twin-engine shoulder-wing monoplane, with a long and unusually deep nose. Shadow in the photographs indicated that the fuselage is probably also very deep to a point just behind the trailing edge of the wing, where it suddenly narrows in section, as in the Hampden. From this point to the tail unit the fuselage resembles a boom, and is less than three feet broad. It is pointed out, however, that the shadow in the photos suggesting a deep fuselage may be cast by some large solid object between the fuselage and the ground.

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The tail unit is set high, with twin fins and rudders set outboard of the horizontal stabilizers. They are probably rectangular with rounded corners. The underslung engine nacelles are slim and deep. Propeller shadows can be seen, and there are dark marks across the wings aft of the engine nacelles. No gun turrets can be positively identified.

In general appearance, the plane resembles the new He 219 (described in AA Comd Weekly Intelligence Review No. 131) but it is considerably larger in all dimensions. Until specific information is received, it will be referred to by the provisional designation, Rechlin 104, (airfield on which seen plus span in feet).

SECTION III - POLITICAL

(Secret - from G-2 Periodic Report ETO)

GERMANY:

The greatest interest has been shown in Germany over the fighting on the Eastern front. This may be partly explained by the fact that most Germans have at least one relative stationed in Russia, but there is also a deep realization in Germany that the fate of the Reich depends on the fighting in Russia....Allied landings anywhere on the continent will increase the feelings of uneasiness in Germany and will lead to demands that Germans be returned from Russia to defend the home front....The news that the Allies had landed in SICILY led to sell-outs of newspapers all over the Reich. The Germans have so long been told that the British and American armies are worthless thatSicilian successes have made a deep impression. The imminent capitulation of Sicily, the failure of the offensive on the Eastern Front and the collapse of U-boat successes are causing the higher-ups in Germany to come to the conclusion that the war is as good as lost. If this feeling can be brought home to the soldiers in the field, military action against German units will be facilitated. German failures will be understood very quickly by German soldiers, since soldiers have a better understanding of the meaning of defeats than the relatively uninformed civilian in the Reich.

ITALY:

Despite Allied bombs and exhortations, the Facists appear to have the situation still fairly well under control. They have tightened their police hold, and, by hiding in press and radio nothing of the desperateness of Italy's position, they hope to arouse the people to such unit as the sanctions of 1935 inspired. Opposition, united in the still mysterious Partito d'Azione, appears to be increasing, but it must not be over-rated; it will probably be of more use to the Allies in governing Italy than in ousting the Facists....A highly important experiment is going on in Sicily. The Allies have set up an Administration under military control for military ends. General Sir Harold Alexander, deputy C-in-C of the Allied Forces, has been appointed the Military Governor; under is AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory) with machinery to deal with finance, law, public safety, public welfare, civilian supply administration.

FRANCE:

Vichy has sold ten of her ships to the Turkish government. It is not yet known whether Turkish crews are to man these ships. It seems doubtful that they will sail from French harbors with French crews on board, and should Turkish crews be sent to France to man these ships, permission will first have to be granted from the Allies to sail through their controlled waters. It is therefore possible that the Turkish government is just a purchasing agent for the Allied nations.

RUSSIA:

Close on the heels of many rumors concerning peace talks between Russia and Germany comes an announcement by Tass, the official Soviet News Agency, that "reports about peace negotiations with Germany and mediation by Japan is a fabrication from beginning to end"...."This statement was issued in answer to an American broadcast made by the "political commentator Pearson'"....The shortage of food threatens to become seriously critical if Russia has to go through another winter of war. While it may be assumed that there will be enough food for the Army and for the farmers, the cities will face a critical situation.

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SECTION IV - ECONOMICAL
(Secret - from G-2 Periodic Report ETO)

GERMANY:

All men between 16 and 65 in the Gau Oberdonau are to mobilized into a Gau Defence Corps. According to the local Gauleiter this call is all the more necessary for the maintenance of public order because this Gau has the highest quota of all Reich Gaue of foreigners and prisoners amounting to 36 per cent of the population. The Gau Oberdonau extends from the Bavarian frontier down the Danube to to include Linz and has in recent years had a remarkable industrial expansion.... A 5.50.18 car tire made by Continental, Hannover, in April 1942, has just been examined. It is proved to be made almost entirely of synthetic rubber, there only being a thin film of natural rubber between the plies in order to obtain adhesion....There is evidence that tar oil is being shipped from Stockholm and Gothenburg to Gydnia. This oil is carried not in barrels but in ships' tanks and the traffic has been going on for some time. The oil is produced from coal imported from Germany. Although the quantities of tar oil exported to Germany may be very small, it may be of significance that Germany should be importing tar oils derived from coal which she has exported to Sweden....The diversion of shipping from ROTTERDAM to EMDEN continues. A recent reconnaissance has shown that whereas active tonnage at ROTTERDAM amounted to 35,000 g.r.t. as against an average of 100,000 g.r.t. in July last year, 70,000 g.r.t. was present at EMDEN as compared with an average of 46,000 g.r.t. in July 1942.

ITALY:

It is reported that all Italian workers in Germany and in the occupied territories have been ordered to return to Italy by August 31st. This movement from Germany is known to have started already, but it is not known how many of the 270,000 Italian workers in Germany have already gone home.

NOTE: Plane shown on attached sheet, for study and identification , is British "Lancaster" 4 motored bomber.
Tank shown on attached sheet, for study and identification, is German 6-wheeled Medium Armored Car, Sd. Kfz. 231 (ex. A.S.P.6).

Eugene L. Long
EUGENE L. LONG,
Major, F.A.,
Ass't. A.C. of S., G-2.

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





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Last week's plane: U. S. P-40F (Warhawk) fighter.
Span 37' 4"
Length 33' 5"

Recognition Features: Mid-wing; in line engines underslung; long blunt nose; wings have dihedral from inboard engines and in plan rectangular center section and straight taper to rounded tips; long deep fuselage with dorsal and tail gun turrets; square cut tail plane; tall outrigged twin fins and rudders with curved taper on leading and trailing edge rounded top and bottom.

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

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Last week's armored vehicle: Humber Armored Car II.

Length	15'
Width	7' 3"
Height	7' 8"
Weight	6 3/4 tons
Speed	50 m.p.h.
Armament	15mm H.M.G., 7.92 M.G.
Crew	3 men

Points for Recognition: 6 wheels, rear wheels with common mudguard. Long streamlined front hood. Squat streamlined German turret. May carry grid W T aerial as shown.

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Date: 7 August 1943
Initials: ELL ELL.

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 37
For week ending 7 August, 1943

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

SECTION I CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND LOW COUNTRIES. (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 26) It is estimated that there are 47-52 German Divisions in France and the Low Countries, divided as follows:

	Offensive	Defensive	Unident	Total Field Divisions	Luftwaffe
France:	18 (a)	13	5 (b)	36 (a,b)	4
Belgium	2	2	1	5	0
Holland	2	1	2	5	1

All enemy divisions are German except for four Italian divisions in southeastern France which are included in the total of offensive divisions.

2. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE. (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 26) It is estimated that there are still 35 German Divisions in western Europe in addition to those in France and the Low Countries. They are as follows:

	Offensive	Defensive	Unident	Total Field Divisions	Luftwaffe
Denmark	1	3	0	4	1
Norway	6	5	0	11	1
Finland	7	0	0	7	0
Germany (including Poland & Bohemia)	2	8 (c)	0	10 (c)	1

3. THE GERMAN AIR FORCE. (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 20) The most important development in the distribution of the GAF has been the steady increase of IE strength in the Mediterranean at the expense of the other fronts. At the end of the North African Campaign the GAF had an IE strength of 891 aircraft in the Mediterranean. There is now a total IE of 1425 aircraft as compared with 1216 on 12 December 1942. This weeks increase was 165 aircraft at the expense of the Western front from which an IE of 60 were withdrawn, and the Russian front, which was also drained by an IE of 60 aircraft. 50 HE 111's were moved to the Mediterranean. (IE-Indicates T/E strength in aircraft - not actual strength.

4. ORDER OF BATTLE.

a. Italy (S. of 43°N.). Approximately 65% of the Luftwaffe in the MEDITERRANEAN is based in the area, ITALY (South of 43°N.), with an IE of 912 operational aircraft, which is an increase of 198 over last week. This increase was achieved mostly by the withdrawal of all aircraft from SICILY. Over three groups

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of long range bombers were moved to this area which makes a total of over ten groups located there. Two groups of fighter-bombers, a group and two squadrons of single - engine fighters and a squadron of army co-operation aircraft have been transferred to this area from SICILY. The group of dive bombers which appeared last week has now been withdrawn.

5. THE GERMAN FLEET. (Secret from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 26)

a. Sea. - Latest information of location of major units of the German fleet is as follows:

(1) Battleship

(a) TIRPITZ - Active. Observed (photographic reconnaissance) in ALTEN FJORD, on 14 July 1943.

(2) Battle Cruisers

(a) SCHARNHORST - Active. Observed (photographic reconnaissance) in ALTEN FJORD, on 9 July 1943.

(3) Pocket Battleships.

(a) ADMIRAL SCHEER - Active. Reported by a fairly reliable ground source as being in SWINEMUNDE 10 July 1943, and having departed by 15 July 1943. See also paragraph 2c(2).

(b) LUTZOW - Active. Observed (photographic reconnaissance) in KAA FJORD, a branch of ALTEN FJORD, on 14 July 1943.

(4) 8" Cruisers.

(a) HIPPER - Active. Reported by usually reliable ground source as being in PILLAU on 2 July 1943.

(b) PRINZ EUGEN - Active. Observed (photographic reconnaissance) at GDYNIA on 27 July 1943.

(5) 6" Cruisers.

(a) LEIPZIG - Active. Reported by fairly reliable ground source as being in LIBAU, LATVIA, on 5 June 1943.

(b) NURNBERG - Active. Observed (photographic reconnaissance) at SWINEMUNDE on 26 July 1943.

(c) EMDEN - Active. Observed (photographic reconnaissance) at SWINEMUNDE on 26 July 1943.

(d) KOLN - Active. Observed (photographic reconnaissance) at KIEL on 25 July 1943.

(6) Old Battleships.

(a) SCHLESIEN and SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN - Possibly active. One of this class observed (photographic reconnaissance) at GDYNIA on 27 July 1943. Both vessels were reported by a usually reliable ground source as being at GDYNIA on 2 July 1943. See also paragraph 2c (2).

(7) Aircraft Carrier

(a) GRAF ZEPPELIN-Inactive. Observed (photographic reconnaissance) moored in an inlet two miles East of STETTIN on 26 July 1943.

(8) Destroyers - Commissioned destroyers operationally active:

	Last Week	This Week
(a) BAY OF BISCAY & ENGLISH CHANNEL PORTS	4	4
(b) NORTH SEA AND BALTIC PORTS	6-4	6-4
(c) NORWAY PORTS	10-12	10-12

(9) Torpedo Boats. - Commissioned first line torpedo boats operationally active:

	Last Week	This Week
(a) BAY OF BISCAY & ENGLISH CHANNEL PORTS	10-12	10-12
(b) NORTH SEA PORTS	3	3
(c) BALTIC PORTS	About 12	About 12
(d) NORWAY PORTS	2	2

(10) Submarines - Photographic reconnaissance discloses submarines in port, not in shelters, as shown below:

	Last Week	This Week
(a) Alongside in BAY OF BISCAY PORTS	14	10
(b) Alongside in NETHERLANDS AND NORTH SEA PORTS	19	31
(c) Alongside in BALTIC PORTS	152	103
(d) Alongside in NORWAY PORTS	10	7

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MISCELLANEOUS.

Enemy air activity over Iceland decreased this week. Approximately two sorties were flown and no attacks were made. On the Western Front enemy operations were limited to routinue reconnaissance flights and defensive patrols. Defensive sorties decreased. There was one small sea-mining operation.

NOTE: Plane shown on attached sheet, for study and identification, is U.S. Ventura bomber (B-34).
Tank shown on attached sheet, for study and identification, is the German 8-wheeled heavy armored car. (Sd. Kfz. 231)

EUGENE L. LONG,
Major, F.A.,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2

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



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Last week's armored vehicle: 6-wheeled Medium-Armored Car Sd. Kfz. 231 German (ex. A.S.P. 6)

Length	18' 4"
Width	6' 1"
Height	7' 4"
Weight	6 tons
Speed	30 m.p.h.
Armament	one 2cm. H.M.G., one M.G.
Crew	4 men

Points for Recognition: Eight wheels. Streamlined hull with squat streamlined German type turret mounted well forward. Snub nosed. May carry frame aerial.

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





A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: Lancaster, British bomber. Four Merlin engines.
Span 102'
Length 69' 6"

Recognition Features: Mid wing; radial engines centrally mounted close to fuselage; wings have marked dihedral from roots and in plan marked straight taper; broken by flap projection giving a kink to trailing edge to small tips; flap guides visible; fuselage deep with large dorsal turret and step for under gun position; wide span tail plane; egg shaped twin fins and rudders mounted slightly inboard.

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Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 38
For week ending 14 August 1943

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 Office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

SECTION I - CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND LOW COUNTRIES. (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 27) It is estimated that there are 48-52 German Divisions in France and the Low Countries, divided as follows:

	Offensive	Defensive	Unident	Total	Luftwaffe Field Divisions
France	19	14	4	37	4
Belgium	2	2	1	5	0
Holland	2	1	2	5	1

All enemy divisions are German except for four Italian Divisions in South-eastern France which are included in the total of offensive divisions.

2. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE. (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 27) It is estimated that there are still 36 German Divisions in Western Europe in addition to those in France and the Low Countries. They are as follows:

	Offensive	Defensive	Unident	Total	Luftwaffe Field Divisions
Denmark	1	3	0	4	1
Norway	6	5	0	11	1
Finland	7	0	0	7	0
Germany (including Poland & Bohemia)	3	8	0	11	1

3. THE GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 21) The most important development in the distribution of the GAF has been the steady decrease of planes in the Mediterranean. There is now a total IE of 1128 aircraft as compared with 1425 reported in last weeks Summary. (IE indicates T/E strength in aircraft - not actual strength.) It is assumed that most of these evacuated units will remain inactive for some weeks while they refit and reorganize.

4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 27) There are no reported important changes in the disposition of the major elements of the German fleet. Other dispositions are as follows:

a. Destroyers. Commissioned destroyers operationally active:

	Last week	This week
(1) BAY OF BISCAY and CHANNEL PORTS	4	4
(2) NORTH SEA & BALTIC PORTS	6-4	6-4
(3) NORWAY PORTS	10-12	10-12

b. Torpedo Boats. Commissioned first line torpedo boats operationally active:

(1) BAY OF BISCAY and ENGLISH CHANNEL PORTS	10-12	10-12
(2) NORTH SEA PORTS	3	3
(3) BALTIC PORTS	About 12	About 12
(4) NORWAY PORTS	2	2

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c. Submarines. Photographic reconnaissance discloses submarines in port, not in shelters, as shown below:

	Last week	This week
(1) Alongside in BAY of BISCAY PORTS	10	5
(2) Alongside in NETHERLANDS and NORTH SEA PORTS	31	32
(3) Alongside in BALTIC PORTS	103	73
(4) Alongside in NORWAY PORTS	7	7

5. MISCELLANEOUS (Secret - from reports mentioned above) Enemy operations on the WESTERN FRONT during the period ending 31 July were the heaviest this year. Defensive fighter activity was on a very intensive scale due to the daily raids by the Allies. Reconnaissance activity continued to increase. Offensive activity increased. There was some sea-mining. The daily average German submarines reported operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC during the period is 90. There were no sinkings during this period by enemy submarines in the NORTH ATLANTIC and MEDITERRANEAN approaches.

SECTION II - TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL

(Secret - from G-2 Periodic Report No. 27) - The following information on the new German self-propelled gun, the "Ferdinand", has been received from Allied Force Headquarters:

(1) General

Weight	70-72 tons
Length	22 feet, 11 3/4 inches
Height	9 feet, 10 inches
Width	11 feet, 5 3/4 inches
Track Width	2 feet, 5½ inches
Clearance	1 foot, 7½ inches

(2) Armor

(a) Hull - front	200 mm (7.87 in)
Sides (vertical)	160 mm (6.29 in)
Rear	110 mm (4.33 in)
Belly	40 mm (1.57 in)
(b) Fighting Compartments.	
Front (vertical	200 mm (7.87 in)
Sides (sloping)	95 mm (3.74 in)
Rear (sloping)	85 mm (3.34 in)
Roof	40 mm (1.57 in)
Mantlet plate	110 mm (4.33 in)

(3) Armament. One 88 mm super long gun fitted with a muzzle brake, and one M.G. 42.

(4) Ammunition Carried. 70 - 90 rounds for gun, 2,000 rounds for M.G.

(5) Suspension. Six independently sprung bogies, diameter 80cm. (2 feet, 7½ inches) evenly spaced and not overlapping.

(6) Performance

Maximum speed	12½ m.p.h.
Cruising speed	6 - 9 m.p.h.
Maximum gradient	30°

(7) Drive. The power unit consists of two Maybeck HL 120 TRM engines, each of 300 H.P. The drive is gasoline electric via rear driving sprockets. Fuel capacity 242 gallons in two tanks situated centrally on each side of the hull. Water cooled engine, capacity approximately 18 gallons.

(8) Crew. Total, six - driver, mechanic, radio operator, commander layer, two loaders.

(9) This equipment is very much larger and heavier than anything previously produced by the Germans. It is 14 tons heavier than the Pz Kw VI, the Germans' heaviest tank. The armor thickness is almost double that of the Pz Kw VI. The guns are employed in heavy anti-tank abteilungen, each of three gun companies, a headquarters company, and a repair company. Each company has three platoons of four guns, plus two guns in the company headquarters making a total of 14 guns. The Abteilung headquarters has two guns, one Pz Kw III, and four motorcycles. The total for the whole Abteilung is, therefore, 44 guns.

(10) No ferdinand S.P. guns have been so far reported in SICILY. However, a 105mm mounted on a Pz Kw III chassis has been reported recently captured on the 8th Army front.

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SECTION III - POLITICAL

(Secret - from G-2 Periodic Report No. 27) - Submitted by Military Attache to Governments in Exile.

SWEDEN: Sweden's action in closing rail traffic to German troops and supplies causes difficulties to Germany, who can do little to retaliate.

ITALY: Failure of Badoglio government to make peace causes disappointment both in Italy and in Allied nations; delay makes Allied invasion inevitable.

GERMANY: With example of Mussolini's fall before him, Hitler will contunue aggressive action in order to prevent democratic influences getting control of Germany.

FRANCE: Final agreement on powers of Committee of National Liberation, with Giraud head of the Armed Forces and De Gaulle President, leads to expectations of recognition by U.S., England and Russia. Allies wish to deal with Committee in military matters only.

RUSSIA: Russian post-war intentions toward Germany and Baltic states revealed in official actions, looking toward domination in Eastern and Central Europe.

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE: Occupied countries increase sabotage and form military units to aid invaders, while German sattelites seek freedom from alliance with the Reich.

NORWAY: Increase in friendly relations with Sweden follows Sweden's refusal to allow transit of Germans to occupied Norway.

FINLAND: Finland is asserting more and more her independence from Germany but sees no way of withdrawing from the war.

HUNGARY: Many signs of increasing independence of German domination; Hungary wants to get out of the war now in order to keep what she has acquired through German efforts.

BULGARIA: Bulgaria making unofficial proposals leading to neutral status. King Boris wants to avoid radical and pro-Russian revolt which would end his reign.

SPAIN: General Orgaz wants to replace Franco as head of the Spanish government in order to bring Spain into the war on the side of the Allies.

SWITZERLAND: Defenses on southern border being strengthened against any foe.

NOTE: Plane shown on the attached sheet, for study and identification is a German Bomber - JU 88.
Tank shown on the attached sheet, for study and identification is a British Light Tank - "Tetrarch".

Eugene L. Long
EUGENE L. LONG,
Major, F.A.,
Ass't A. C. of S., G-2.

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



FRIEND OR FOE

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: 8 - Wheeled heavy armoured car. Sd. Kfz. 231 (8-Rad)
German
Length 19'
Width 6'6"
Heighth 8' (all approx.)
Weight 8½ tons.
Speed 30 m.p.h.
Armament one 2c.m. H.M.G. one M.G.
Crew 4 men

Points for Recognition. Hexagonal turret with rectangular gun mounting. Protuding driver's cab in centre front. Large sprocket and three large bogey wheels of equal size.

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





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Last week's plane: U.S. Ventura Bomber (B-34).
Span 65' 6"
Length 49' 10"

Recognition Features: Low wing; radial engines underslung; bulbous, glazed nose; wings have dihedral from roots and in plan straight center section and broken straight taper giving elliptical appearance; fuselage torpedo shape with compact glazed cockpit well forward; tailplane tapered with blunt tips; single fin and rudder prominent with marked straight taper on leading edge and curved trailing edge. May be seen with rounded unglazed nose as Night Fighter.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

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By auth: C.G., V Corps.
Date: 21 August 1943.
Initials: ELL.

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 39
For week ending 21 August 1943

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

SECTION I - CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 28). The number of German Divisions in France and the Low Countries is estimated at 49, divided as follows:

	Offensive	Defensive	Unident	Total	Luftwaffe Field Divisions
France	*17	14	*3	34	4
Belgium	2	2	1	5	0
Holland	2	1	2	5	1

All enemy divisions are German except for one (1) Italian Division in southeastern FRANCE.

*This is a decrease of two offensive and one unidentified divisions.

2. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 28). No change is reported in the number of divisions in DENMARK, NORWAY, FINLAND, and GERMANY; the total remains at 36 divisions (of which 17 are offensive) and 3 are Luftwaffe Field Divisions.

3. THE GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 22). The most significant change in the disposition of the German Air Force was the increasing of the single and twin-engine fighter strength on the WESTERN FRONT at the expense of the MEDITERRANEAN and the RUSSIAN FRONT. One group of two squadrons of single-engine fighters and one group and one squadron of twin-engine fighters were moved to the WESTERN FRONT to increase the fighter strength already there. More than fifty (50) percent of the single-engine fighters and more than three quarters of the twin-engine fighters in the German Air Force are located on this FRONT.

4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO Periodic Report No. 28). There are a few reported changes in the disposition of the major elements of the German Fleet, the changes are as follows: The pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER-Active. Reported by a fairly reliable ground source as having departed COPENHAGEN southbound on 10 August 1943. In all probability it still remains in the BALTIC area. The 6" Cruiser LEIPZIG - Active. Reported by fairly reliable ground source as being in GDYNIA on 1 August 1943. The 6" Cruiser EMDEN - Active. Reported by usually reliable ground source as being in COPENHAGEN 29 July 1943, and having departed from that port southbound by 4 August 1943. In all probability it still remains in the BALTIC area. Submarines - Photographic reconnaissance discloses submarines in port, not in shelters, as shown below:

		Last Week	This Week
(1)	Alongside in BAY OF BISCAY PORTS	5	8
(2)	Alongside in NETHERLANDS & NORTH SEA PORTS	32	29
(3)	Alongside in BALTIC PORTS	73	110
(4)	Alongside in NORWAY PORTS	7	7

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5. MISCELLANEOUS (Secret - from reports mentioned above). Enemy operations on the WESTERN FRONT were on a very small scale during the period ending 7 August. Defensive fighter activity was on a very small scale due to the lack of large scale raids by the Allies. Reconnaissance activity declined. Offensive activity was practically negligible. There was no sea-mining. Enemy activity over ICELAND consisted of approximately seven sorties flown but no attacks were made. Ground troops fired on a JU-88 over VATTARNES on 1 August but made no claims. Seven minutes later the same plane appeared over SEYDISFJORDUR where ground forces again fired on the plane and claimed possible hits by 37-mm gunfire. Two USAAF P-38's were airborne on 5 August to intercept a German FW-200 10 miles east of GRIMSEY ISLAND. The enemy aircraft was shot down into the sea and seven members of the crew were captured.

SECTION II - ECONOMIC

1. Shipbuilding - HOLLAND - It is reported that at the KONINKLIJKE MAATSCHAPPI "De Schelde", VLISSINGEN, the shipbuilding and the engine building department has been greatly extended under German pressure. At the moment this department has branches at SWIJNDRECHT (RINGDIJK) and at DORDRECHT (ZEEHAVEN, DORDTSCHEKIL).

Another report is that the "SUMATRA" and "CELEBES", each of 10,000 tons, are building at NEDERLANDSCHE SCHEEPSBOUW Mij. AMSTERDAM. These ships are intended to bring cargo from Japan, endeavouring to run the blockade round CAPE HORN. The capacity of the engine of the "CELEBES" is considerable in relation to the size of the ship - being twice its normal capacity. The total armament is 7 guns. On the after deck there is one gun of 10.5 c.m. flanked by 2 guns of 7.5 c.m. On the bridge there are 2 guns between 4.5 and 6 c.m. and 2 guns about 2 c.m. There is probably one searchlight on the bow. The ship was berthed at the SUMATRAKADE (Sheds VII and VIII) in May and so far nothing is known about its departure. The m.s. "SUMATRA" is nearing completion - the compass had been regulated and the tanks have been filled with diesel oil. DANUBE - A new type vessel propelled by a propeller placed on a reversible pillar at the stern of the vessel has been developed for use on the Danube, according to the DEUTSCHE UKRAINE ZEITLUNG of July 4. If the tower is turned 90 degrees the vessel turns on the spot. As this new type craft has a draught of only 50 cm. it will be possible to cover 2,000 kilometers of waterways which heretofore have not been navigable. Five vessels of this type are under construction. GERMANY - Since early March, when the construction of armed 80 ft. trawlers in large numbers near SWINEMUNDE was noted, the development both of building capacity at the MOVENKAMEN shipyard and of output of these trawlers has been rapid. Recent aerial reconnaissance reveals that the yard is working at increased pressure and is constantly expanding, further reclamation of land on the site being in progress.

2. Explosives - HOLLAND - The German authorities have decided that the newly built sheet roller plant of the Royal Netherlands Blast Furnaces, Velson, will be broken down and removed to Germany. The demolition will take place under German supervision. FRANCE - It is learned that the Nobel Dynamite Factory at HONFLEUR has been taken over by the Todt Organization, and that the whole output of dynamite is being used for constructional work under the control of that organization. It is said that all workers under 35 years of age will be sent to Germany and replaced by German workers. This report is of particular interest since the other important Nobel Dynamite Factory in France, that at Port Vendres, was taken over by the Germans some while ago.

SECTION III - POLITICAL

(Secret - from G-2 Periodic Report No. 28) - Submitted by Military Attache to Governments in Exile.

GENERAL: Diplomatic activity during week rivals military action. Both sides reexamining plans; hence conference in SOFIA, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, HELSINKI, BERLIN, ROME, OTTAWA and QUEBEC. All sides plainly realize that war is the carrying out by force of foreign policy. Allies may not figure how best to invade ITALY; Germans must consider whether they can hold any part of ITALY, and how they can scrape up troops to defend the Balkans; ITALY must consider how she can wriggle out with best possible terms, and Germany's "Allies" must plan their escape from the inevitable German doom.

ITALY: Badoglio plainly is holding out for better terms than "unconditional surrender" and has been impressed by German threats to fight major engagements

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on Italian soil. Only present solution for Allies is to bomb and invade peninsula.

GERMANY: German training in discipline, lack of political sense, and dislike of reality, as well as present fear of reprisals, make it unlikely that Naziism will collapse as Fascism did. On the contrary, we may expect that Hitler will solidify his position, though this will mean that when the collapse finally comes, it will be all the more complete. German fear of Russians make it possible that Allies may be approached by Germany with an offer to surrender, on condition that Russians are kept from occupying Germany.

RUSSIA: Russian military victories increases her prestige and power to demand her desires in Central Europe after the war - such as the boundries of Poland and Finland and disposition of the Baltic States. She will not tolerate a Central European confederation acting as a buffer between her and western Europe.

HUNGARY: Intends to retain close understanding with ITALY, and would like an armistice along with ITALY if she can somehow disassociate herself from GERMANY. At all events, it is clear that if possible she will not fight for Germany.

BULGARIA: King Boris would like to keep his throne and extricate himself at same time from German alliance and yet keep MACEDONIA and THRACE; so far he has found no way to effect this rather fantastic combination.

TURKEY: Adopting more pro-Allied foreign policy which will probably not bring her in the war but may give the Allies other Turkish cooperation. Turkey fears that, if left out of any Peace Conference, she will lose prestige in BALKANS and all possibility of getting some of the DODECANESE ISLANDS.

SWITZERLAND: Should all of Italy fall into Allied hands, Germans might violate SWISS neutrality so that they could hold the SWISS mountain bastion protecting Germany.

PORTUGAL: Has resumed trans-visas for Frenchmen passing through PORTUGAL, and has explained previous suspension of visas on grounds that Washington and London have failed to understand PORTUGAL'S position.

LOW COUNTRIES: Food situation bad; most men of active age have been shipped to Germany as laborers. Doubtful if, in case of Allied invasion in Low Countries, people there could offer much help to invaders in the form of action and armed revolt.

NOTE: Plane shown on the attached sheet, for study and identification is the German FW-189, Army Cooperation Plane.
Tank shown on the attached sheet, for study and identification is a British Infantry Tank - "MATILDA".

Eugene L. Long
EUGENE L. LONG,
Major, F.A.,
Ass't. A.C. of S., G-2.

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

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: JU 88 (modified) German Bomber, with two B.M.W. 801 engines.
Span 65' 6"
Length 47' 2"

Recognition Features: Low wing; in line engines; engines extend beyond central nacelle which is well glazed and extends to a point beyond trailing edge of wing; wings have straight center section and then dihedral and in plan swept back appearance with straight trailing edge; engine nacelles extend as twin booms ending in twin fins and rudders, with rectangular tail plane inset.

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



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A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: British Light Tank "Tetrarch".

Length	14' 2" (including gun)
Width	7' 7"
Height	7' 0"
Weight	7.84 tons
Speed	40 m.p.h. (road - maximum)
Armament	one 40-mm gun, one 7.92-mm m.g.
Crew	Three

Points for Recognition: Cast and round pillbox turret. Round cupola wireless aerials mounted on the back of the turret. Bogey wheels almost completely obscured by armored skirting with 5 rectangular mud chutes. Cast rounded nose; driver's cab centrally placed.

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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

By Auth: C.G., V Corps
Date: 28 August 1943.
Initials: ELL.

Copy No. 73

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 40
For week ending 28 August 1943

NOTE: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

SECTION I - CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 29) (1) The number of enemy divisions in France and the Low Countries is estimated at 47, divided as follows:

	Offensive	Defensive	Unident	Luftwaffe Field Divisions	Total
France	17	13	4	3	37
Belgium	2	2	1	0	5
Holland	1	1	2	1	5

All enemy divisions are German with the exception of one Italian division in Southeastern FRANCE. (2) The presence of divisions in the BREST and WALCHEREN sectors is not established, but it is certain that these sectors are occupied, although possibly not by complete divisions.

2. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 29) No change is reported in the number of divisions in DENMARK, NORWAY, FINLAND and GERMANY; the total remains at 36 divisions (of which 17 are offensive) 3 are Luftwaffe Field Divisions.

3. THE GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 23) The only significant change in the disposition of the German Air Force was the strengthening of the single-engine fighters based on the WESTERN FRONT, at the expense of the RUSSIAN FRONT. The fighter strength in DENMARK was increased by one group and the RUSSIAN FRONT was weakened by the withdrawal of a group. More than fifty per cent of the single-engine fighters of the LUFTWAFFE are now located on the WESTERN FRONT.

4. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 29) There are a few reported changes in the disposition of the major elements of the German Fleet, the changes are as follows: The pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER - Active. Reported last week as having left COPENHAGEN southbound, was observed (photographic reconnaissance) at SWINEMUNDE on 18 August 1943. The 6" Cruisers NURNBERG and EMDEN are not accounted for in this period. Both were observed (photographic reconnaissance) at SWINEMUNDE on 26 July 1943, and the EMDEN was reported as having departed COPENHAGEN by 4 August 1943. Photographic reconnaissance of SWINEMUNDE on 18 August 1943, did not disclose either vessel present. In all probability both vessels remain in the BALTIC area. Submarines - Photographic reconnaissance discloses submarines in port, not in shelters as shown below:

	Last Week	This Week
a. Alongside in BAY OF BISCAY PORTS	8	6
b. Alongside in NETHERLANDS & NORTH SEA PORTS	29	29
c. Alongside in BALTIC PORTS	110	111
d. Alongside in NORWAY PORTS	7	8

The daily average of German submarines reported operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC during the period is 80.

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5. MISCELLANEOUS (Secret - from reports mentioned above) Enemy operations on the WESTERN FRONT were on a heavier scale during the week ending 14 August than during the previous week, due to better flying weather. Defensive activity was much higher. Reconnaissance activity increased. Offensive activity increased but was still in a very low scale.

SECTION II - ECONOMIC

1. PRODUCTION OF ARMS AND ARMAMENTS (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 29) FRANCE - It is reported that the Tarbes artillery and ammunition works (Hautes-Pyrenees), which up to this year had not been utilized by the Germans has recently been adapted in part for work on their behalf. At the end of May or beginning of June certain French equipment in the main gun shop was replaced by the Germans with more up-to-date machinery; these milling machines and lathes, which are of particular length, are said to be intended for use shortly for the manufacture of 150-mm. howitzers. A further workshop has been used since the 15th May for the production of 75-mm. A.A. gun breeches. The cartridge factory is turning out 6/700,000 rounds of S.A.A. per day. Tarbes was one of the newest and best equipped of French arsenals. AUSTRIA - An article in the July 31 issue of the Stockholm newspaper Nya Dagligt Allehanda gives considerable information concerning the transference of German industry to the area around Vienna. It states that the Herman Goering Works and Lentz have been expanded considerably and also states that skilled and reliable workers and all available machines have been moved from the Ruhr to this area. It is claimed that Krups in Austria has been considerably expanded and that the armament works surrounding Enzessfeld Hirtenberg and Berndorf were considerably extended by the removal to such places from factories in the Ruhr. It is even claimed that Kasseler Heinschelwerke, one of Germany's best known and reputed factories, was moved to Vienna. Riesenerzbergwerk in Steiermark was extended on a large scale. The armament factories in the Murztal in the vicinity of Karpfenberg and Knuttelfeld have now become of the greatest importance. The munitions factories near Steiermark south of Vienna have been enlarged and improved and are continuously under extension. These factories are said to be staffed to a large extent with foreigners; Russian prisoners, mostly from the Ukraine and White Russia, Poles, Greeks and Yugoslavs and lately several thousand very skilled Frenchmen.

2. TRANSPORT (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 29) GERMANY - It is becoming increasingly evident from aerial reconnaissance and from other sources that the heavy air raids which have been made during the past three months have caused serious damage to the German railway system. Places particularly affected are Cologne, Wuppertal, certain towns in the Ruhr, and Hamburg. The effect has been a temporary paralysis of rail transport in the areas concerned, but through traffic seems to have been much less seriously affected as possibilities of movement by alternative routes avoiding the bombed areas have existed in most cases. DENMARK - No fewer than 56 flak wagons were seen at Stralsund towards the end of July. The vehicles appeared from their formation to be in course of transit. They were almost certainly en route for Norway, the abnormally large number being doubtless due to the German desire to secure the passage of these vehicles through Sweden before the termination of the arrangements for the transit of war material through Sweden.

3. ECONOMIC EFFECT OF AIR RAIDS (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 29) Photographs show the following results of the U.S.A.A.F. attack on August 1st:

RUMANIA:

a. Colombia-Aquila: (Throughput capacity 485,000 t.p.a.) This refinery is so severely damaged that almost complete rebuilding would be necessary before it could resume operation

b. Astra-Romana: (Throughput capacity 1,750,000 t.p.a.) Whereas a large number of incidents are apparent, the damage is unlikely to be sufficient to cause complete stoppage after the few weeks necessary for essential repairs to be carried out have elapsed. The efficiency of this plant is, however, likely to be impaired for a considerable time.

c. Phoenix (Orion): (Throughput capacity 800,000 t.p.a.) This refinery has sustained damage which will have put it out of action for at least a short period; it is not possible to estimate from the photographs the full effect of the damage, which may be considerable, on the operating capacity of the plant.

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d. Concordia (Vera): (Throughput capacity 1,300,000 t.p.a.) Six tanks with a total storage capacity of about 30,000 tons have been destroyed, and of the process tanks 11 were destroyed and 4-6 damaged. One of the distillation units appears to have suffered fairly heavily. That may not affect the output of the refinery to a serious degree. It is possible, however, that the general dislocation of the refinery is more extensive than can be seen from the photographs.

SECTION III - POLITICAL

RUSSIA - The failure of any Russian representatives to attend the Quebec conference and the blunt statement made by Tass, the official Soviet news agency, that the Soviet Government had not received an invitation to be present caused considerable stir both in United Nations circles and among the members of the Axis and their sattelites. In London and Washington it was generally felt that Russian participation would have been a very desirable matter, though it was carefully pointed out that perhaps the scope of the talks did not warrant Russia's attendance, while the timing made it impossible for Marshal Stalin to be there personally. Certain sources indicated that the Soviets were as much disappointed as were the Americans and the British that a joint conference could not have been held, and that the cause was not disagreement on matters of policy but the difficulties of timing. That such a meeting should be held as soon as possible was the general opinion. Axis spokesmen made much of the matter and attempted to prove that this was further evidence that the unity of the United Nations was largely mythical and that a break was just around the corner.

NOTE: 1. Par. 2, Appendix No. 1, V Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 33, Hq. V Corps, subject, "Instructions Concerning Publicity on the Information Pertaining to Prisoners of War", dated 10 July 1943, is rescinded.

2. Plane shown on the attached sheet, for study and identification is the American transport Douglas C-53 A.
Tank shown on the attached sheet, for study and identification is the German Pz. Kw. IV.

Eugene L. Long
EUGENE L. LONG,
Major, F. A.,
Ass't A. C. of S., G-2.

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PA

WHAT IS THIS PLANE







A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: FW-189, German Army Cooperation Plane.
Span 60' 4"
Length 39' 4"

Recognition Features: Low wing; radial engines; long nose; wings have dihedral from roots and high aspect ratio; long torpedo-shaped fuselage; tail plane set low; large upright single fin and rudder faired into fuselage. The fin and rudder are almost exactly like that on the A-20 or Boston III.

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



Note: Latest models have long barreled gun with bulging muzzle brake.



FRIEND OR FOE?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: British Infantry Tank "MATILDA".
Length - 19 ft. 9 in.
Width - 8 ft. 6 in.
Height - 7 ft. 9 in.
Weight - 26 tons.
Speed - 15 m.p.h.
Armament - 2 pdr., 7.92 M.G.
Crew - 4

Points for recognition: Cast and round pillbox turret. Round cupola; wireless aerials mounted on the back of the turret. Bogey wheels almost completely obscured by armoured skirting with 5 rectangular mud plates. Cast rounded nose; drivers cab centrally placed.

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Auth: C.G., V Corps
Date: 4 Sept. 1943
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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 41
For week ending 4 September 1943

Note: The purpose of this summary is to give high-lights of current tactical and technical trends of particular interest. It does not attempt to give a summary of the current situation. In each case, the classification and source of the material are indicated. Officers desiring further study of the documents referred to herein may obtain them on loan from the G-2 office. Further dissemination of this material will be governed by the classification stated and the provisions of AR 380-5.

Section I - Current Intelligence

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret - from current reports) It is estimated that there are now 46 to 50 German divisions in France and the Low Countries, of which about 9 are along the Mediterranean coast and would probably not be available for defense of the Western coast. Although 20 of the above divisions are classified as offensive, it is probable that not more than 2 to 5 have any degree of mobility. The distribution by countries is as follows:

a. France - 18 offensive divisions (of which not more than 4 are mobile), 13 defensive divisions, 4 unidentified divisions, 3 Luftwaffe Field Divisions, and 4 sectors that are normally occupied by divisions, but in which the presence of divisions is not now confirmed.

b. Belgium - 1 offensive division, 2 defensive divisions, 1 unidentified division (an S.S. motorized division, probably still in formation).

c. Holland - 1 offensive division, 1 defensive division, 2 unidentified divisions, 1 Luftwaffe field division.

2. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 30)

a. There are about 12 combat divisions in Germany, including Poland and Bohemia, of which 3 are classed as offensive and 1 is a Luftwaffe field division.

b. No recent changes have been reported in Norway or Finland; the garrison of the former country still consists of 12 divisions (6 offensive, 5 defensive, 1 Luftwaffe field division), and 7 German divisions are believed to be in Finland.

c. Although current reports give the German forces in Denmark at 3 defensive divisions and 1 Luftwaffe field division, this estimate is possibly inaccurate due to the current difficulties.

d. One Italian division is thought to still be in Southeastern France.

3. GERMAN TROOP MOVEMENTS (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 30) A number of German troop movements have recently been reported, but are unconfirmed, so are not considered in Par. 1 of this Summary. These movements include the departure of the 14th and 24th Panzer Divisions, S.S. Panzergrenadier Division 10, and the 44th and 65th Infantry Divisions from Western France to Italy; the 60th and 386th Motorized Division and the 94th and 305th Infantry Divisions from Southeastern France to Italy; and the 7th Italian Infantry Division from Southeastern France to Italy. If these reports are correct, there are probably only two mobile divisions (the S.S. Panzergrenadier Division 9 - which has been renamed S.S. Panzergrenadier Division HOHENSTAUFEN - and an unidentified S.S. Panzergrenadier division) now remaining in Western France and the Low Countries, and that there are no remaining Italian divisions in France.

4. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 30) The only significant change in dispositions reported during the past week was the reinforcement of Germany proper by almost two groups of twin-engine fighters.

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5. THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 30) Latest reports indicate that the TIRPITZ, SCHARNHORST, and LUTZOW are still in ALTEN Fjord (Northern Norway), with other major elements that are operationally active located in the BALTIC Sea. No change is reported in the number of destroyers and torpedo boats that are operationally active, but a slight decrease in submarines is reported. Photographic reconnaissance during the past week disclosed the following number of submarines in port (not in shelters): 5 in Bay of BISCAY ports (against 6 of the previous week), 27 in Netherlands and NORTH Sea ports (against 29 the previous week), and 110 in BALTIC ports (against 111 the previous week). The cruisers NURNBERG and EMDEN are not yet accounted for, although they probably are still in the BALTIC. A ground source reported that Germany is preparing to transfer the German warships anchored in Norwegian ports to DANZIG and PILLAU. At present, besides the three ships in ALTEN Fjord, there are 11 destroyers in Norwegian waters. The TIRPITZ has not docked since December 1941, the LUTZOW since October 1942, and the SCHARNHORST since November 1942. To preserve the fighting efficiency of these vessels, it would seem desirable for the Germans to bring them back to Germany to dock. Except in the evacuation of Northern Norway, there appears no reason why Germany should withdraw her main units from those waters without replacement, so the report may indicate a transfer of ships now in the BALTIC to Norway.

Section II - Tactical and Technical

6. GERMAN RADAR TECHNIQUE (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest, Eight U.S. Air Force, Vol. III, No. 9) Information on German radar equipment has been gleaned from interrogation of prisoners of war recently arrived in England from the Mediterranean Theater, and by the capture of a number of technical documents. A condensation of this information is as follows:

a. Four principal radar installations are used for ground operation, the FREYA, the FREYA A.N., the WURZBURG, and the GIANT WURZBURG. The ordinary FREYA GERAT is mobile and is mounted on the same chassis as the 88-mm AA gun. A newer version can be dismounted and flown to new locations or transported by land in three large trucks.

b. The cabins of the standard FREYA and the newer version are of comparatively unsubstantial wood and metal, and offer little protection against machine gun fire. Aerials, which can be raised or lowered, must be dropped in high winds to prevent the entire station from blowing over; the station can operate with aerials lowered, but efficiency is reduced. The prisoners stated that the original FREYA would work satisfactorily up to about 112 miles.

c. A modification which can be fitted to any original FREYA set to improve the accuracy of the bearing is known as the FREYA A.N. The A.N. attachment can be switched on and off at will, but when on, the operational range of the set is reduced by about one-third. However, the bearing accuracy is thereby increased to such an extent that the position of the aircraft can be determined within 32 feet at a range of 25 miles.

d. The WURZBURG is said to be used for antiaircraft control, and the data from these instruments are believed in some cases to be fed automatically into a predictor.

e. Night-fighter control is governed by the GIANT WURZBURG, with a maximum accurate range of about 37 miles. The prisoners stated that the position of an aircraft flying above 3,300 feet could be estimated accurately to within 164 feet at a range of 31 miles.

f. Prisoners discussed the effects of radar jamming in North Africa, Malta, and Pantelleria before Allied bombers attacked. It was apparently very helpful to the Germans, for when it started it gave them the first indication of an impending attack, and operation of FREYA sets continued during jamming, although with reduced range and accuracy.

Section III - Miscellaneous

7. USE OF CODE WORDS (Restricted) The following is an extract of a cablegram received from the War Department pertaining to use of code words in connection with air casualties: Use of code word ANGRY in connection with casualty reports, battle or non-battle, to designate personnel in flying status will be discontinued, and the following variations

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substituted --pilot (including co-pilot and command pilot), ANGLP; navigator, ANGVN; bombardier, ANGOB; observer, ANGSO; flight surgeon, ANGEN; photographer, ANGHF; radio operator-gunner, ANGGR; engineer-gunner, ANGNE; armorer-gunner, ANGRA; gunner, ANGUG; all other personnel in flying status, including passengers not covered by classifications, ANGPD.

8. Identification of plane and tank silhouettes accompanying this week's Summary are as follows:

a. Plane - HE-110.
b. Tank - Churchill.

James K. Gaynor
JAMES K. GAYNOR
Major, Infantry
Asst. A.C. of S., G-2

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





A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane to ether with a new plane will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's Plane: Douglas DC-4 Span 117' 6" Length 93' 10".

Recognition features: Mid-wing with radial engines centrally placed. Straight center section with dihedral on outer wing panels. Multi-taper on wings with elliptically curve tips. Cut-away in trailing edge of tail plane. Single turret and high, pointed fin and rudder.

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



FRIEND OR FOE?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: German Tank "Pz. Kw. IV"

Length	-	19 ft. 4 in.
Width	-	9 ft. 7 in.
Height	-	8 ft. 6 in
Weight	-	22 tons.
Speed	-	22 m.p.h.
Armament	-	one 7.5 cm. gun, two M.G's.
Crew	-	5

In the most recent model the 7.5 cm. gun has a much longer barrel with bulged muzzle brake projecting beyond front of hull.

Points for recognition: Squat streamlined turret. Commander's lookout cupola built on the rear of the turret. Large front driving sprocket. Eight small bogie wheels. Wide built out superstructure.

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Auth: C.G., V Corps
Date: 18 Sept. 1943
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Office of the A.C. of S., G-2

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 43
For week ending 18 September 1943

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret - from current reports) It is estimated that there are 37 German divisions in France and the Low Countries, of which 12 are offensive (including only 4 mobile divisions - the 14th Panzer, SS Panzergrenadier 10, an unidentified SS Panzergrenadier, and the 60th Motorized), 16 defensive, 5 unidentified, and 4 Luftwaffe field divisions. The only change reported since last week was the identification of the division in the ST. NAZAIRE area, formerly carried as unidentified, as the 384th Infantry Division.

2. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 32) There are thought to be 38 German divisions (17 of them offensive) in Denmark, Norway, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Bohemia; the only change reported was the confirmation of the conversion of two depot divisions in Germany into Reserve divisions. Although there are many depot and administrative divisions (variously estimated to number 40 to 45) in Germany, these are not considered in the weekly estimate, as they are organized for the processing of recruits and have practically no combat value. (Note: Last week's summary estimated 32 divisions in this area, but the estimate should have been 36, on the basis of current information.)

3. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 26)

a. During the preceding week, the build-up of fighters and bombers on the Western Front continued. This increase was first noticed shortly after Sicily was invaded, and total strength has now reached a record high for this front. By the addition of 123 aircraft (initial equipment), mainly from the Mediterranean, the overall figure is now 1,869, as compared with the previous high of 1,428 for July 1941. It appears that the Luftwaffe has had its day, and is now slowly withdrawing to the defense of the Fatherland.

b. In the area of France west of the SEINE River, a full group of fighter-bombers returned to the area from the Mediterranean, and with the two squadrons present should renew the "hit and run" raids of the past, concurrent with the new "moon phase".

4. GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITY (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 32) a. The daily average of German submarines reported operating in the North Atlantic during the week was 60. There were no sinkings reported during the week (ending at noon 11 September) by enemy submarines in either the North Atlantic or the Mediterranean approaches.

b. The number of submarines in port, not in shelters, as shown by photographic reconnaissance increased from 6 to 15 along Bay of BISCAY ports, decreased from 27 to 17 along ports in Netherlands and the NORTH Sea, and decreased from 110 to 73 in BALTIC ports. There was no change in Norwegian ports, the figure remaining at 11.

5. THE BRENNER PASS (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 32) According to reliable reports, the BRENNER PASS route was still out of service on 8 September.

6. ECONOMIC (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 32) The German press is once more devoting attention to the subject of labor mobilization. Despite the importation of foreign labor since the spring and the mobilization of reserves of female labor inside Germany, the manpower situation is at present stated to be strained to the utmost. Two methods are to be employed to obtain fresh labor for the armaments industries. There is to be comb-out of labor from other occupations and at the same time a review of evasions and deferments. Industries from which labor may be combed out during the next few weeks are agriculture (after the harvest period), textiles, trade and adminis-

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tration, and even mining, transport, and chemicals.

7. Identification of plane and tank silhouettes accompanying this week's summary are as follows:

a. Plane - Wellington (British) twin-engined Bomber.
b. Tank - Dainler (British) Armored Car (Heavy).

NOTE: This weekly summary will be destroyed in accordance with the provisions of AR 380-5 after it has served its purpose; no certificate is required, but the responsibility for its destruction will rest with the organization to which it is issued. This will also apply to all past issues of the weekly summary.

Thomas J. Ford
THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

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



FRIEND OR FOE?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: Canadian Tank "Ram"

Length	- 18' 6"
Width	- 9' 4"
Height	- 8' 7"
Weight	- 28½ to 30 tons
Speed	- 25 m.p.h.
Armament	- One 2 pdr. gun and 2 Browning .30 LMG's
Crew	- 5 men

Points for recognition: Track assembly as for Grant Tank. Round flat topped cast turret with vertical back and receding front. High Superstructure.

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





A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: British Beaufort, Torpedo, Bomber, Reconnaissance plane.

Span	57'	10"
Length	44'	1½"
Height	14'	3"

Recognition Features: Mid-wing monoplane, radial engines, centrally mounted, marked equi-taper on wings, rounded tips, moderate dihedral, tapered tailplane, round tips, long nose to fuselage, nose and tail turrets, high triangular fin and rudder, round tip.

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Date: 25 Sept. 1943
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HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 44
For week ending 25 September 1943

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES (Secret - from current reports). It is estimated that there are still 37 divisions in France and the Low Countries, of which 4 are mobile, 9 others are classed as offensive, 16 are defensive, 3 are unidentified, and 5 are Luftwaffe Field Divisions. Changes in the order of battle reported since last week include: Verification that a division in MARSEILLES, France, previously carried as unidentified, is the newly formed 356th Infantry Division; the identification of the 171st Reserve Division in the OSTEND sector of the Belgian Coast; and acceptance of the presence of another Luftwaffe Field Division in Holland. The 171st Reserve Division is the first reserve division identified in the coastal sector of the Atlantic or Channel Coasts of France and the Low Countries, and since reserve divisions are believed to be of low quality, is an indication of the extent to which the local garrisons have been weakened. The German strength in France and the Low Countries is now less than at any time since the fall of France. There is not one single division both of good quality and at full strength in Western Europe

2. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 33). No changes have been reported in the number of German divisions in Denmark, Norway, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Bohemia. It is still estimated that there are 38 divisions in these countries, of which 17 are offensive.

3. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 27)

a. In continuation of its present policy of strengthening the Western Front, the fighter strength of the Luftwaffe increased by 96 planes over last week's report. Long-range bomber strength decreased by 33 planes due to the shifting of a group, partly back to the Mediterranean and partly to non-operational. The total number of planes of all types reported on this front as of 11 September 1943 was 1929.

b. Although supported by the arrival of a group of single-engine fighters, actual strength of fighter craft on the Mediterranean Front decreased due to a failure to replace losses. The number of bombers of all types increased by 33. Over-all strength on this front, as of 11 September 1943, was 1014 planes.

c. All figures quoted above for the aircraft are in initial equipment, which means the number of planes that would be present if all identified air force units were at T/BA strength. Actual strength on the Western Front is estimated as 105% of initial equipment (20% above I.E. for single-engine fighters), while it is estimated at 85% of I.E. in the Mediterranean (70% of I.E. for single-engine fighters).

4. GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 33).

a. No sinkings by enemy submarines were reported in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean approaches for the week ending 13 September. It was estimated that there were 45 German submarines operationally active in the North Atlantic, 30 in Norwegian waters, and 15 in the Mediterranean.

b. Photographic reconnaissance disclosed enemy submarines in port, not in shelters, as follows: 19 in Netherlands and North Sea ports (an increase of 2 over the previous week); 69 in Baltic ports (a decrease of 4 since the previous week); 13 alongside Norwegian ports (an increase of 2); and 15 in Bay of Biscay ports (no change).

c. It was estimated that on 1 August 1943, there were 213 German submarines under construction in various yards and 64 others being fitted out.

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5. THE ITALIAN FLEET (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 33) The disposition of the Italian naval units on 16 September was as follows: 7 major units, 13 minor craft, and 17 submarines at Malta; 6 major units at ALEXANDRIA; 7 small craft and 1 submarine at PALERMO; 1 cruiser and 4 smaller craft interned at PORT DE MAHON; 1 cruiser and a torpedo boat at BRINDISI; with 1 battleship (the ROMA), 2 destroyers, and 3 torpedo boats having been sunk. One battleship (under repair), 3 cruisers (2 of them damaged), 22 to 24 destroyers (10 under repair), 40 to 42 torpedo boats (10 under repair), and 44 submarines (15 under repair), were either missing or in the hands of the Axis.

6. ECONOMIC NOTES (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 33)

a. Four independent reports have stated that the Germans are closing down aircraft and other works in Greece and are withdrawing their labor and plants.

b. Girls called up for labor service and official war service in Germany are now liable for service with the GAF as signallers. These girls would be 17 or 18 years old. This is the first report of the conscription of girls in the armed forces, recruitment having previously been on a voluntary basis.

c. It has been reported from INNSBRUCK that Italian troops have blown up one of the longest tunnels on the south side of the BRENNER PASS and also some viaducts and parts of the BRENNER road. These reports are not yet confirmed.

d. It was reported by a reliable source that the MT. CENIS tunnel on the main railroad line between LYON and TURIN was blown up on 11 September, 800 meters from the Italian exit for a distance of 170 meters, and that it would take one month to repair. The automobile road through the pass was also blown up for a distance of 1100 meters and will take three months to repair.

7. Identification of plane and tank silhouettes accompanying this week's summary are as follows:

a. Plane - Whitely - British Bomber.
b. Armored Vehicle - German Assault Gun.

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Thomas J. Ford

THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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



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Last week's armored vehicle: Daimler Armoured Car.

Length	13'0"
Width	8'2"
Height	7'5"
Weight	7¼ tons
Speed	45 m.p.h.
Armament	one 2 pdr., and one 7.92 Besa M.G.
Crew	3 men

Points for recognition. Octagonal pot-shaped body, large wheels.

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





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Last week's plane: British Wellington III Bomber.

Span	86'2"
Length	61'0"

Recognition features: Mid-wing monoplane: two radial engines, long nacelles: slight taper wings, square tips, dihedral on outer portion: slab sided almost parallel fuselage, long nose, rear turret projects aft: twin fin and rudder above and well inboard of tips of rectangular tailplane.

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Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 45
For week ending 2 October 1943.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 34).

a. France and the Low Countries. It is estimated that there are now 40 German Divisions in France and the Low Countries; an increase of 2 offensive and 1 defensive divisions since last weeks report. One of these divisions, as yet unidentified, is probably from Russia and is located in the ST. OMER area of France. Of the divisions reported, 32 are in France, 4 are in Belgium and 4 are in Holland.

b. Other Countries of Western Europe. The number of German Divisions in these countries is reported to be 40 distributed as follows: 5 in Denmark, 13 in Norway, 7 in Finland and 15 in Germany (including Poland and Bohemia), an increase of 2 over the previous week's summary.

2. MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES IN THE GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 34).

a. Newly Formed Divisions. The existence of 3 new SS Divisions and 1 new Infantry Division is now accepted. The SS Divisions NORDLAND and NEDERLAND (exact location and type is not yet known) have been identified in Germany. The SS Division LEIBSTANDARTE ADOLPH HITLER, a Panzergrenadier Division, is nearing completion in the YPRES area of Belgium. The 242 Infantry Division is in the process of formation in Northern Germany.

b. The 233 Reserve Division, formerly at FRANCKFORT/ODER, Germany, has moved from Holland into France. The SS BOSNIEN Mountain Division has moved from Germany into the CEVENNES Mountains of France. The 156 Reserve Division, formerly believed to be in Poland, is now thought to be holding the BOULEGNE sector of the Coast of France.

3. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 28).

a. The fighter strength of the Westefn Front showed another sharp rise over last week's report with the addition of one group of single engine and two groups of twin engine fighters. The steady rise in fighters, which has been evidenced during the past five and a half months, has now quickened its pace. The operations of the Luftwaffe from Western France is directly related to the submarine blockade maintained by Allied naval and air forces. As the German High Command has definitely counted on submarine warfare to cripple the Allied war effort, it stands to reason that he would take strenuous efforts to release his "wolf pack" from their pens. The units based on Western France for operations over the BAY OF BISCAY maintain regular patrols and have had a certain measure of success. It cannot be stated that these units have altogether countered the Allied blockade, but they have been a deterring factor in the vigil maintained over submarine traffic. The change over last weeks report is an increase of 90 fighter planes on this front.

b. In the Mediterranean, incomplete information indicated that the Luftwaffe is adopting a policy of conservation. The bombing and fighter effort in this theater is being directed wholly in support of ground forces. Since the previous week's report there has been a decrease of 30 long range bombers in this sector.

4. GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITY (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 34) During the week ending 25 September 1943, it was estimated that 59 enemy submarines were operating in the Northern Atlantic, Norwegian waters and Mediterranean approaches.

5. MOVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from Current Reports) All larger naval units, with the exception of the pocket battleship LUTZOW and the battle cruiser SCHARNHORST, are accounted for. The battleship TIRPITZ was still observed, by aerial photo reconnaissance since 22 September, to be still in ALTEN FJORD, while the pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER was at GDYNIA on 18

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September. The SCHARNHORST had left ALTEN FJORD as determined by photo reconnaissance since 22 September and a German warship, believed to be the LUTZOW, escorted by three destroyers, passed through the sound between SWEDEN and ZEALAND at 0700 hours 29 September headed southward.

6. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC NOTES (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 34).

a. It is now confirmed that the MONT CENIS tunnel was dynamited by the Italians on 11 September at a point about 800 meters from the Italian exit, and the minimum time estimated for repairs is one month. Exceptionally heavy traffic was reported through the BRENNER PASS on 19 - 20 September. The United States air raid on 2 September did some damage which had been repaired by 9 September. on 10 September, traffic was resumed with an allowed limit of 10 tons per axle, but by 19 September traffic was again normal.

b. Activity amongst merchant-vessel blockade runners in French ports continues. No less than 7 ships appear to be either ready or preparing for sea in the BAY OF BISCAY. All the Italian ships have been taken over by the Germans, and if necessary, the latter should have no difficulty in manning those suitable for blockade running. A large Japanese submarine is reported to have arrived in a BISCAY port; rubber was included in her cargo. Unless there are good tactical reasons for her voyage, the prime motive must be ascribed to the Japanese desire to increase her present rate of shipment from Europe of small articles of high value to her war effort, e.g., armaments, prototypes, working drawings, mecury etc.

c. It is reliably reported that the number of Italian workers remaining in Germany on 31 August, was about 113,000. Present indications are that the Germans intend, if possible, to recruit labor on a large scale from Northern Italy to Germany.

d. (Confidential - from Weekly Air Intelligence Digest No. 13) When airdromes in the region of ROME come intoAllied possession, parts of Germany now generally out of range of British-based bombers will be open to concentrated air attack. Near ROME there are a number of airdromes and landing grounds capable of taking care of our medium and heavy bombers. Within a radius of 600 miles of this area lies practically the whole of CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AUSTRIA and HUNGARY, and in combination with the coverage from England, over three quarters of the whole of Greater Germany will be within range of Allied bombers. That part of Greater Germany which can thus be covered consists of a triangular zone in Southwest Germany, stretching roughly from CHEMNITZ to the northeast, FRANKFURT to the west and MUNICH to the south, and includes such important cities as STUTTGART, NURNBERG, MANNHEIM, KARLSRUHE, DARMSTADT, FREIBURG and WURZBURG. Thus with the exception of Norway in the North, Poland and occupied Russia in the East and the eastern half of the Balkans, the great majority of German Europe falls within this radius.

7. Identification of plane and tank silhouettes accompanying this week's summary are as follows:

a. Plane - Halifax Bomber - British.
b. Armored Vehicle - 4 Wheeled light armored car - German.

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Thomas J. Ford
THOMAS J. FORD,
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



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A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: German Assault Gun. This is the German 7.5 cm. tank gun piece mounted on the Pz. Kw. III chassis. As with the Pz. Kw. IV, a longer gun is mounted on the latest models.

Points for Recognition: Open turret. Four wheels. Front hood, mudguards and mounting of spare wheel give the vehicle a motor car appearance.

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





A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: British bomber, "Whitley."

Span	84'	0"
Length	72'	6"

Recognition Features: Mid wing; in line engines; blunt nose with gun turret; wings have dihedral from inboard engines and in plan rectangular center section and almost equal straight taper to square cut tips; deep fuselage with dorsal and rear gun turrets; square cut tail plane; large characteristic twin fins and rudders outrigged.

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Date: 9 Oct. 1943
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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 46
For week ending 9 October 1943

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 35).

a. France and the Low Countries. The number of divisions in this sector remains at 40. The 25th Panzer Division, which had been in Norway, has moved to Northern France, while the 389th Infantry Division has moved from France into Germany. Other changes include: the transfer of the 526th Division, formerly a Frontier Division in Belgium to Western Germany, while the 157th Reserve Division, which had been previously reported as having left France, is now identified in the GRENOBLE Area of Southeast France.

b. Other Countries of Western Europe. The number of German Divisions in these countries has increased by one since last week's report. The 22nd Luftwaffe Field Division, formerly in the North Sector of the Russian Front, has moved to Germany.

c. Unidentified Divisions. A new division is believed to be forming in Eastern Belgium. On the other hand, an unidentified division, previously carried at DUNKIRK, France, is dropped, since the 18th Luftwaffe Field Division is now believed to occupy this sector.

2. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from Current Reports).

a. The long-range bomber strength on the Western Front has been reduced by a group. The build-up of single-engine fighters appears to be temporarily levelling off, 787 being reported in this sector, an increase of only 9 over the previous week's report. The number of twin-engine fighters however has shown a sharp increase. The defense of the homeland appears to be the paramount concern of the German Air Force today. More than a group of these fighters has been moved to Germany, while for the first time a squadron of twin-engine fighters has strengthened the area, BODO to FRONSOE, Norway, indicating possible attempts to intercept Allied meteorological flights in the north area or defensive tactics against Allied bombings in Norway. There is a possibility that this unit may be equipped with the new type of control bombs for use on Allied convoys to North Russia. Daily patrols over the BAY OF BISCAY by JU 88's in opposition to Allied anti-submarine forces continue. FW 200's from BORDEAUX, operated mostly at night in search of Allied shipping in the BAY and along the Northwest Coast of Spain.

b. In the Mediterranean the most significant trend was a steady decline in the German air strength. The withdrawal that began around the middle of July showed only a slight levelling off prior to the Allied invasion of Italy, and since the middle of August has dropped rapidly. It can be anticipated that this retirement of air units will continue, especially as the Allied advance denies the use of air fields in Italy and the neighbouring islands.

3. GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITY (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 35) During the week ending October 2, 1943, it was estimated that there were 74 submarines operating at sea in the North Atlantic, Norwegian waters and Mediterranean approaches. The estimated number of submarines operationally active and those at sea are shown below. (Submarines in BALTIC ports are training and fitting out and are not carried as operational).

	Operating from Ports	
	In Port	At Sea
BAY OF BISCAY PORTS	88	65
NORWEGIAN PORTS	16	9
MEDITERRANEAN PORTS	10	5

4. MOVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from Current Reports) The battle cruiser SCHARNHORST is the only major unit of the German Fleet unaccounted for. Photo reconnaissance, on 7 October, located the pocket battleships LUTZOW and ADMIRAL SCHEER at GDYNIA.

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5. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC NOTES (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 35).

a. It has now been confirmed that up to September 27 about 100,000 g.r.t. of shipping, previously under Italian control, have passed into Allied hands, including the liner (SATURINA, 24,000 g.r.t.) and 2 tankers aggregating 11,000 g.r.t. Three other liners it had been hoped to secure at TARANTO, had already sailed for North ADRIATIC ports.

b. The signs of improvement in food rations previously noted in Axis Europe, have continued, particularly with regard to bread. In addition to the changes in Germany and the Protectorate, there have been bread ration increases in Belgium, Hungary, Bucharest and Greece. Rumania's crop has evidently been so large that the increased ration applies to "black" or "popular" bread, while white flour and bread are now unrationed.

c. The Finns are fully aware of the importance to them of the fall of SMOLENSK. Finnish newspapers have warned that a German retreat in the BALTIC area would change the basis of Finlands attitude to military and political realities. The Finnish base their hopes of getting out of their present tangle on American sympathies and have been partly encouraged by Secretary Hull's comments on the independence of small nations and his reference to Finland as "a marginal or borderline case".

d. The greater the military pressure asserted by United Nations upon Germany the more closely will the Nazi Party tighten its control of the Home front. With the tides of war flowing steadily against Germany, the Nazis have given the screw another turn with the elevation of Himmler to be Minister of Interior and Commissioner General for Reich administration and Hitler's decree of 2 September, which concentrated economic control in the hands of Albert Speer. The elevation of Himmler and Speer has been interpreted as designed to forestall any hopes of disgruntled industrialists of Wehrmacht officers to escape the consequences of defeat by establishing a counterpart to the BADOGLIO government. There is important evidence for the opinion that both German industrialists and officers realize that Germany is doomed to defeat and would welcome almost any avenue of escape. But is must be remembered that the ruling group in Germany today is composed not only of Nazis in the narrower sense such as Himmler, Speer and Kehrl, but also of entreprenours such as Zangen, Schieber and Roechling, and of Wehrmacht officers such as Keitel and Thomas. Hence too much weight must not be attached to reports of friction between the party and the armed forces or industrialists. German industry is too heavily committed to the Nazi cause to hope to escape the consequences of defeat.

7. Identification of plane and tank silhouettes accompanying this week's summary are as follows:

a. Plane - Sunderland - British Flying Boat.
b. Armored Vehicle - English Mark III Valentine.

NOTE This weekly summary will be destroyed in accordance with the provisions of AR 380-5 after it has served its purpose; no certificate is required, but the responsibility for its destruction will rest with the organization to which it is issued. This will also apply to all past issues of the weekly summary.

THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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(Add) 1 copy for Directors Group.

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

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: British bomber, "Halifax".
Span 99' 0"
Length 70' 1"

Recognition Features: High wing with fixed wing-tip floats; four radial engines; equi-taper on leading and trailing edge of wings; wingtips slightly pointed; very deep, two-stepped hull; equi-taper on leading and trailing edges of tailplane; very large, tall fin and rudder.

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



FRIEND OR FOE

A suffuicient number of copies are issued herewth for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: German 4-wheeled light armored car (Sd. Kfz. 13)

Length	13' 10"
Width	5' 7"
Height	4' 11"
Weight	2 tons
Speed	40 - 50 m.p.h.
Armament	one M.G.
Crew	2 - 3 men.

Points for Recognition: Vertical sides to turret. Bulge at the back of turret for wireless set. Aerials mounted on back of turret. Six bogey wheels of unequal size with a gap in between the 3 wheel bogies. The tank can be distinguished at a great distance by the reflection of the light on the reduction gear on the rear driving sprocket. Prominent driver's cab, corrugated rear deck.

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SECRET
Auth: C.G., V Corps
Date: 16 Oct. 1943.
Initials: _____

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 47
For week ending 16 October 1943

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from ETO G-2 Periodic Report No. 30).

a. France and the Low Countries. There are now 43 divisions in this sector, an increase of 3 since last weeks report. Two divisions, which had been destroyed in TUNISIA, are reforming in France, the 21st Panzer Division in BRITTANY and the 334th Infantry Division in Southwest France. The other is the 264th Infantry Division, now identified at ST. OMER. Other changes are the identification of the 240th Coastal Division, the departure of the 343d Infantry Division, now unlocated, and the identifications of the 242d Infantry Division in LIEGE, Belgium, (formerly classified as unidentified) and of the 19th Luftwaffe Field Division in the WALCHEREN Area of Holland, previously believed to be in Southern France.

b. Other Countries of Western Europe. The number of divisions in Denmark, Norway, Finland and Germany (including Poland and Bohemia) remains unchanged at 40. The 210th Infantry Division, formerly believed to be in Finland, has been identified in Northern Norway where its status has been changed to that of a Coastal Division.

c. Unidentified Divisions. Two unidentified divisions have been picked up in France, one at ST. BRIEUC and the other at CALAIS.

2. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from ETO Air Activity Report No. 30).

a. The declaration of war by Italy on Germany and the increasing Allied activity, ground and air, all around the perimeter of the "Fortress of Europe", is forcing the Luftwaffe to withdraw in some places, and in other cases to undertake the defense of areas not formerly requiring such defense. It becomes necessary in view of the changing situation, to revise the geographical subdivision in considering GAF strength. South Germany, including Austria, is now considered a front of its own, and in the future will be considered separately in addition to the Western Front and the Mediterranean and Balkans.

b. Mediterranean - The defection of Italy has forced the Germans to undertake alone the defense of this entire front. The GAF has now disposed units in Yugoslavia and Albania to replace former Italian air garrisons. Since the air threat to Rumania and Bulgaria comes from the south, this area is picked up as a part of the Mediterranean front. Activity during the past week has been confined for the most part to attacks on the islands of COS and LEROS, recently occupied by Allied air units. From latest available reports, it appears that there are 378 long range bombers, 90 bomber reconnaissance 60 dive bombers, 69 fighter bombers, 228 single-engine day fighters, 21 twin-engine fighters and 9 twin-engine day fighters, in this theater.

c. South Germany and Austria. Much German industry has been moved to this area because it is out of practical range of bombers based in England. Now, however, Italian airfields made available to the Allies provide more and more bases from which Allied aircraft can attack these industries. The fighter strength necessary to defend this front must be obtained by dispersion of forces formerly mainly concentrated on the Western Front. Thus, the importance of this new front lies not only in the damage that can be done to German industry, but also in the dispersion of German fighter forces. Incomplete reports indicate the presence of 90 single-engine day fighters and 30 twin-engine day fighters.

d. Western Front. So far there has been no appreciable drain on the fighter strength here due to the threat to the new front discussed above. As Allied attacks intensify against Southern Germany, however, we may well expect to see a dispersion of fighter strength to that area. Air strength in this area is reported to consist of 228 long-range bombers, 105 bomber reconnaissance, 60 fighter-bombers, 69 single-engine night fighters, 660 single-engine day fighters, 591 twin-engine night fighters and 204 twin-engine day fighters.

3. ITALY. (Secret - from Current Reports). a. It is estimated that German troops in the forward areas southwest of ROME total 95,000. Of the divisions which have been in contact with our forces it is believed that the 15th

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Panzer Grenadier Division is fairly well up to strength but that the others are only 40% to 60% of strength due to casualties. The 2d Parachute Division appears to be committed to the ROME area, while the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division has taken up a position between the Hermann Goering Division and the 26th Motorized Division further south. The 162d Infantry Division is now located in Northern Italy having come from the Russian Southern Front.

b. When Italy capitulated to the Allies she had 62 Field Divisions. Their present status, according to latest reports, is as follows: The Germans have disarmed 35 divisions and secured the active cooperation of 4 others; 14 are either cooperating with or have been disarmed by Partisans in the Balkans; 9 are cooperating with the Allies. Of the 20 to 25 Italian Coastal Divisions, about 11 are now operating with the Allies.

c. The problem of communications is adding to the headache of the Germans in Italy. They need a direct line from MUNICH to INNSBRUCK and the TYROL into the BRENNER PASS and VERONA (the junction for MILAN to the west and VENICE to the east) and finally to BOLOGNA, the distribution point for ROME and the south. In addition they also need routes from France, one via LYONS through the MONT CENIS TUNNEL and the other along the Coast from MARSEILLES. From the east, the major route is from VIENNA or BUDAPEST through Yugoslavia to TRIESTE. For the Germans, the situation is complicated not only by bombings on railway centers such as BOLZANO and BOLOGNA, but also by sabotage in Italy and Yugoslav partisan activity. The MONT CENIS TUNNES is reported to have been put out of service for several months as a result of sabotage. Further attacks on relatively few centers of communications will tie up the whole system and close the exits from the trap of Northern Italy.

4. MOVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN FLEET (Secret - from Current Reports) Aerial reconnaissance of 10th October, reported the presence of the major portion of the German fleet at GDYNIA, including the LUTZOW, PRINCE EUGEN, LEIPZIG, NURNBERG, and GNEISENAU. Similar reconnaissance located the TIRPITZ and SCHARNHORST at ALTEN FJORD and the ADMIRAL SCHEER at SWINEMUNDE.

5. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC NOTES (Secret - from Current Reports).

a. The German shipbuilding industry is concentrating on U-boat construction. The number of hulls seen in various stages of construction has risen from about 244 in September 1942, to about 270 in September 1943. The 500-ton type of U-boats constitute 76% of those in German shipyards. Numerous reports indicate that the hulls of German submarines are now being fitted externally with a form of synthetic rubber sheath with the object of interfering with anti-submarine detecting devices. Tests are being conducted on six vessels operating in the Atlantic in conjunction with experiments on a new type of silent motor.

b. French Fleet. Latest details on the condition of ships of the French fleet, which was scuttled by their crews at TOULON on 27 November 1942, were revealed when the port was covered for the first time in 1943 by reconnaissance aircraft based in England. Salvage work was still continuing on an impressive list of vessels which include the battleship PROVENCE the battle-cruisers DUNKERQUE and STRASBOURG, and seven cruisers, as well as many smaller French naval craft. Those vessels which have been raised from their berths are being dismantled, ostensibly to fulfill Germany's need for scrap iron. The battleship DUNKERQUE, which was one of the crack ships of the French fleet and one of the newest (it was finished in 1935) has had its bows and a large part of its superstructure removed. Most of the superstructure of her sister ship, the STRASBOURG, built in 1936, has also been removed. The pre-World War I battleship PROVENCE has been similarly dismantled.

7. Identification of plane and tank silhouettes accompanying this week's summary are as follows:

a. Plane - Martlet (Grumman), carrier-based fighter.
b. Armored vehicle - Humber armored car No. 1, British.

NOTE: This weekly summary will be destroyed in accordance with the provisions of AR 380-5 after it has served its purpose; no certificate is required, but the responsibility for its destruction will rest with the organization to which it is issued. This will also apply to all past issues of the weekly summary.

THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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

A sufficent number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: British Flying Boat, " Sunderland"
Span 112' 9"
Length 85 ' 4"

Recognition Features: Mid-wing, moderate dihedral from wing roots with square wing-tips; radial engine, short nose and tubby fuselage; angular tailplane with angular cut-outs; spine sweeping into prominent, angular fin and rudder. Very little taper on leading edge of wing.

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



FRIEND OR FOE

A suffuicient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this tank, together with a new tank, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: British Infantry Tank Mk. III "VALENTINE".

Length	17' 9"
Width	8' 6"
Height	7' 6"
Weight	16 tons
Speed	15 m.p.h.
Armament	2 pdr., 7.92 M.G.
Crew	3 or 4 men, according to turret.

Points for Recognition: Has a shallow and angular turret with sloping sides and circular base. W.T. aerial mounted on back. Receding turret face. Two smoke dischargers mounted on right of heavy Machine Gun. High blunt nose with prominent driver's cab mounted on top. Streamlining slopes back towards the rear.

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Auth: C.G., V Corps
Date: 23 Oct. 1943.
Initials: ___

HEADQUARTERS V CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 48
For week ending 23 October 1943

1. ORDER OF BATTLE IN WESTERN EUROPE (Secret - from G-2 Periodic Report No. 37).

a. France and the Low Countries. 42 divisions are now reported in this sector, a decrease of 1 offensive division. The SS Mountain Division KROATIN (offensive) has moved from France to Germany. The 17th and 18th Luftwaffe Field Divisions in France and the 16th and 19th Luftwaffe Field Divisions in Holland are now listed as defensive divisions.

b. Other Countries of Western Europe. Reports of the number of divisions in Denmark, Norway, and Germany show a decrease of one. There is now a total of 39. This decrease is accounted for by the fact that an unidentified field division, previously thought to be carried in Germany, is now known to have been carried in error and is therefore dropped. The SS Panzer Division NORDLAND (Offensive) has left Germany, probably for Southeastern Europe. The 22nd Luftwaffe Field Division is now listed as a defensive division.

2. GERMAN AIR FORCE (Secret - from Current Reports).

a. Mediterranean and Balkans. In this sector the DODECANESE were the scene of the greatest German air activity. The Island of COS was heavily attacked, prior to an Axis landing, by 80 JU 88's and 100 JU 87's. This is the first time that JU 87's (a dive-bomber of early war type) have been used in any strength in the Mediterranean in many months. The Island was lightly held by the Allies, and its distance from any Allied airbase made the use of this type of aircraft favorable. The Island of LEROS was likewise attacked by JU 88's, JU 87's and HE 111's. On 16 October, 31 JU 87's and 15 JU 88's attacked the harbour rendering it temporarily unserviceable due to delayed action bombs. The only noticeable change in the strength of operational combat units since last week's report was a decrease by 9 of long range bombers.

b. South Germany and Austria. As had been anticipated, the build up of fighter strength in this sector has begun with the addition of 30 single-engine day fighters, 39 twin-engine day fighters and 30 twin-engine night fighters. The twin-engine fighters, which are being used in increasing numbers against daylight bomber attacks, are thought to be equipped with 210mm mortars.

c. Western Front - including Western Germany. The fighter strength in this area has shown a decrease over last week's report. Whether these fighters have been with-drawn to reinforce South Germany or Austria can not now be stated as a definite fact, but it does seem highly probable. Disposition of German Airforce as of 9 October 1943:

Single-engine fighters	630 (day)
	69 (night)
Twin-engine fighters	204 (day)
	570 (night)
Long-range bombers	237
Bomber reconnaissance	105
Dive bomber	0
Fighter bomber	60

3. ITALY. (Secret - from Current Reports) That the German 305th Infantry Division has moved south into the LEGHORN area, where the 90th Light Division is believed to be located, is generally accepted. The 162nd Infantry Division was recently moved from Russia to Northern Italy. The use of non-magnetic mines by the enemy has been reported.

4. MOVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN FLEET. There have been no reported movements in the German fleet since the previous report. Russian photographs of ALTEN FJORD on 16 October show no change in position of the TIRPITZ and SCHARNHORST since 9 October. Oil was seen extending over a wide area and the SCHARNHORST is now protected by a boom.

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5. MISCELLANEOUS. In the Atlantic, where the tempo of submarine warfare has increased, the following tactics have been demonstrated: The night merchant vessels in convoy are subjected to simultaneous attacks from all directions, escort units are attacked by U-boats operating in pairs. Fully cognizant of the fact that radar, fitted in air and surface vessels, has played a large part in the successful detection of U-boats, the Germans have so far produced 3 counter-measures to detection by Radar, none of which have been fully successful: (1) German search receivers. This equipment installed in U-boats is designed to detect the transmission of a Radar beam. (2) Radar. Radar is being extensively fitted in U-boats, principally to obtain sufficient warning of approaching attacks. (3) Radar decoy balcons. These decoy balcons, called "AMPHRODITE" by the Germans, were introduced in June 1943, with the objective of producing false Radar echoes. These small baloons have metal strips attached which emanate a large Radar reflection. They are anchored to a float by small wires and are released by submarines whenever surface or air attacks are imminent. Their use has been reported in a recent convoy attack to divert attention of surface escorts. It is likely that the echoes from a decoy baloon will have a peculiar character and will be recognizable as such by an experienced Radar operator.

6. Identification of plane and tank silhouettes accompanying this week's summary are as follows:

a. Plane - Thunderbolt P-47
b. Armored Vehicle - S.D. K.F.Z 222 (Light) - German 4-wheeled armored car.

NOTE: This weekly summary will be destroyed in accordance with the provisions of AR 380-5 after it has served its purpose; no certificate is required, but the responsibility for its destruction will rest with the organization to which it is issued. This will also apply to all past issues of the weekly summary.

Thomas J. Ford
THOMAS J. FORD,
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



Friend or Foe ?

A sufficient number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this vehicle, together with a new vehicle, will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's armored vehicle: Humber Armored Car No. 2.

Length	13'
Width	7' 3"
Height	7' 8"
Weight	6 3/4 Tons
Speed	50 m.p.h.
Armament	15mm H.M.G. 7.92 MG
Crew	3 men

Points for Recognition : Open turret. Four wheels. Beetle back. Typical German streamlined hull.

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

A sufficent number of copies are issued herewith for posting on each company bulletin board. The identification of this plane together with a new plane will accompany next week's summary.

Last week's plane: Grumman Wildcat
(Martlet I to IV
Single Seat Fighter
Span 38 feet
Length 28 feet, 5 inches

Recognition features: Low mid-wing with slight taper on leading edge and semi-elliptical trailing edge on wings; eight (8) guns, four (4) in each wing; deep, heavy fuselage with egg-shaped engine cowling; straight taper on leading edge and curved taper on trailing edge of tail fin; "wing-nut" tailplane.

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HEADQUARTERS
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AG 313.1 [illegible] - GO [illegible] (Ear) [illegible] 227
[illegible] 28 August 1945

SUBJECT: After Action Report.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Historical Record, Headquarters VI Corps, for month of July and August 1944, dated 21 October 1944 with Annexes 1 through 7 and 9, are inclosed.

2. Copies of and supporting documents to the inclosed report, together with annexes 8 and 10 through 18, are being retained by this headquarters for further study.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

AGO
SEP 2 1946

[illegible] CAGLE
Captain, AGD
Assistant Adjutant General

1 Incl:
As stated less copies of and supporting documents w/d annexes 8 and 10 through 18

27367

Numbered by BBA

7836

22 MAY 1946

[illegible] of AC of S, G-2, WDGS

Ray M. Stroupe
RAY M. STROUPE
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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO #46, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Auth: CG VI Corps
Initials: [illegible]
Date: 21 Oct 1944

AG 314.7

21 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Historical Record, Headquarters VI Corps, July and August 1944.

TO: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (through channels).

By August 11, the stage was set for the VI Corps' third major amphibious operation within a year - the invasion of Southern France in the CAP CAVALAIRE - AGAY sector. Seven weeks of intensive planning, and training of the three assault divisions and their many attached units had been completed 1/; personnel, equipment and supplies had been loaded in the vast armada of ships assembled in the Naples area. On the evening of 12 August the VI Corps commander, Major General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., and party boarded the U.S.S. CATOCTIN. From August 12th - 15th the convoy proceeded in a northwesterly direction and by the night of 14-15 August was lying offshore the coast of southern France in the target area. D day H hour was announced as 15 August, 0800B hours.

SECTION I - "D" DAY

1. Prior to the main assault, special supporting operations had been carried out according to plan by the following units:

a. The Groupe de Commandos (French) had successfully assaulted the beaches in the vicinity of CAP NEGRE on the night of 14-15 August. Opposition was received from an inland battery of guns, but supporting naval fire was called for and received to assist in neutralizing this resistance. A counterattack was launched by the enemy in unknown strength but was beaten off with heavy casualties to the Germans. French casualties throughout the assault and subsequent advance were very light 2/.

b. At 0130B, 15 August, successful landings had been made by the 1st Special Service Force on the islands of Port Cros and Levant. Only moderate resistance was encountered, and by noon of 16 August both islands were occupied with the exception of one small fort on Port Cros. Our casualties were light while more than 200 prisoners were taken 3/.

c. Commencing at 0422B, parachute and glider drops by units of the 1st Airborne Task Force had been made in the general vicinity of LE MUY. This airborne attack achieved excellent results. Enemy forces in the area were dispersed and a command post was established in the vicinity of LE MATIN 4/.

d. According to plan, at first light until 0730B 15 August, strong formations of Allied heavy, medium and fighter bombers had attacked the beaches, gun positions, strongpoints and other enemy installations in the assault area. From 0720B until 0800B (H hour) an intensive all-out

1/. Notes on the VI Corps Operational Planning for Operation ANVIL - Annex #1.

2/. G-2, G-3 Journal, 13-16 Aug, Entries #29, 176 and 186.

3/. G-2, G-3 Journal, 13-16 Aug, Entry #184; G-3 Reports Nos. 1 and 2, 15 & 16 Aug.

4/. G-2, G-3 Journal, 13-16 Aug, Entry #89; G-3 Report No. 1, 15 Aug.

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shelling of beach defenses and strongpoints by Allied naval units consisting of battleships, cruisers, destroyers and rocket ships further had softened up the assault area.

2. At 0800B 15 August simultaneous beach assaults were made according to plan by the 3rd, 45th and 36th Infantry Divisions in the CAP CAVALAIRE to ROAY area (See Operation Maps to Field Order No. 1 for detailed locations of all beaches). The weather was clear and warm, the sea calm, and a slight ground haze existed. On the left flank, successful assaults were made by the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments of the 3rd Division against light enemy opposition consisting of small arms, mortar and light artillery fire. The advance rapidly proceeded inland, while the 30th Infantry landed over Red Beach and advanced north towards GOGLIN. At this time the Corps Commander sent a directive to the Commanding General, 3rd Division, to press advance with utmost speed, and to contact the French Commandos on the left and 45th Division on the right. At 1300B, the 3rd Bn 7th Inf, moving west along the coastal highway, established contact with the French Commandos, at which time this force reverted to Corps control and was attached to 3rd Division. While the 15th Inf was engaged in clearing the ST. TROPEZ peninsula of all enemy forces (completed at 2100B), the 30th Inf continued to advance north on the right of the 7th Inf against light opposition. Securing COGOLIN by mid-afternoon, the 30th Inf entered GRIMAUD at 1700B, with the 3rd Bn veering west towards COLLOBRIERES 5/.

3. The 45th Division assault in the central sector by the 157th and 180th Infantry Regiments was equally successful and beaches were rapidly secured despite opposing small arms and mortar fire. The 179th Inf debarked upon the newly won beaches and assembled north of STE. MAXIME in Corps reserve. Two directives were then issued by the Corps Commander to the 45th Division Commander: (a) Have 180th Inf advance towards ARGENS River and assist the 36th Division in clearing beach 264A, and (b) Clear beaches and STE. MAXIME and advance to FREJUS Valley as Combat Command 1 of the 1st Armored Division (Fr) was to land over 45th Division beaches. The 3rd Bn 157th Inf captured STE. MAXIME in the afternoon of D day after engaging the enemy in stiff street fighting. The 1st and 2nd Bns 157th Inf advanced west from the beaches, by-passing STE. MAXIME, with the 1st Bn heading northwest towards PLAN DE LA TOUR. 45th Division recon elements, preceding the foot troops, had reached both PLAN DE LA TOUR and GRATTEMOUF, reporting them to be clear of the enemy. This thrust was opposed only by token resistance in the form of small arms and sniper fire. The 1st and 3rd Bns 180th Inf advanced north towards ST. AYGULF and beach 264A along the coastal highway and Road 7, while the 2nd Bn swung northwest to capture GRATTEMOUF. 6/.

4. On the right flank, 36th Division assaults at H hour on beaches 264B and 265A by the 141st and 143rd Infantry Regiments were successful against light opposition. However, the landing of the 142nd Inf, scheduled at H plus 6 hours on D day over beach 264A was not carried out as originally planned since the naval fire had not sufficiently reduced enemy beach obstacles and defenses. In accordance with an alternate plan, the 142nd Inf landed over the adjacent beaches and in conjunction with the 143rd Inf attacked west at 2000B with the mission of capturing FREJUS and ST. RAPHAEL, and by midnight our forces were approaching ST. RAPHAEL against moderate enemy resistance. The 141st Inf advanced rapidly north towards the Beachhead (Blue) Line in the right sector 7/.

5. The VI Corps command post closed on the U.S.S. CATOCTIN and opened 1 mile northeast of STE. MAXIME at 152100B August. At 152300B, the 45th Cav

5/. G-2, G-3 Journal, 13-16 Aug, Entries #217 and 252; U.S.S. Barnett Journal, 15 Aug, Entry #39; G-3 Reports Nos. 1 and 2, 15 & 16 Aug.

6/. G-2, G-3 Journal, 13-16 Aug, Entries #188, 208, 215 and 263; G-3 Reports Nos. 1 and 2, 15 & 16 Aug.

7/. G-2, G-3 Journal, 13-16 Aug, Entry #251; G-3 Reports Nos. 1 and 2.

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Rcn Troop gained contact with elements of the 1st Airborne Task Force approximately 2 miles due south of LE MUY, at which time the 1st [illegible] reverted to Corps control. During the night 15-16 August, the main elements of Combat Command 1, 1st Armored Division (Fr) debarked over the 45th Division beaches and closed in an assembly area 8/.

6. The Mediterranean Air Force had damaged enemy aircraft and airfields to such an extent that the Luftwaffe was unable to take advantage of the profitable target offered by the invading armada. Throughout the entire 24-hour period of D day, only one flight of enemy aircraft in unknown strength approached the transport area at 2120B and released glider bombs, one of which hit and sank a LST. From prisoner of war identifications it appeared that 4 Bns of the 765th Grenadier Regiment, and other elements of the 242d Division were defending the area west of CAP CAVALAIRE to GULF D'AGAY and represented the only major enemy units opposing the VI Corps assault. Enemy infantry resistance at the beaches was scattered and for the most part consisted of small arms, mortar and artillery fire. Underwater obstacles on the whole were ineffective. It was apparent that the enemy lines were stretched too thin to offer more than scattered resistance. As of 152400B, 2041 prisoners of war were taken by VI Corps units 9/.

7. RESULTS OF D-DAY OPERATIONS: The assaults made by all VI Corps units in the ST. TROPEZ - FREJUS sector of Southern France were executed according to plan, advances inland towards the Beachhead Line were initiated, and all initial objectives were successfully occupied 10/.

SECTION IV - D plus 1

1. During 16 August, rapid advances were made on most sectors against generally light and scattered enemy opposition. On the left flank of the beachhead in the 3rd Division sector the 1st and 2nd Bns 7th Inf pushed westward along Route 98, while the 2nd Bn after clearing a road block at the junction U-248050 headed southwest and southeast, approaching BORMES. The 1st Bn turned north on Road 31 as the 3rd Bn 7th Inf continued to advance west along the coastal highway, encountering stiff resistance, which was by-passed to the north, and reached ST. CLAIR before nightfall. On the 7th Infantry's right flank, 30th Inf elements made considerable advances to the west with the 3rd Bn capturing COLLOBRIERES and continuing along Road 14 to reach a point approximately 3½ miles east of PIERREFEU. Concurrently, the 1st Bn advanced northwest on Route 558, cleared the enemy from LA GARDE FREINET, and turned west on Road 25 to capture LES MAYONS. The 2nd Bn continued the advance west, taking GONFARON and reaching the outskirts of CARNOULES without meeting serious enemy opposition. During the period, the 15th Inf moved to assembly areas east of COLLOBRIERES preparatory to relieving elements of the 30th Inf 11/.

2. In the central sector of the beachhead, 45th Division elements made good progress against light opposition. The 1st Bn 157th Inf raced northwest through PLAN DE LA TOUR and occupied VIDAUBAN without contacting the enemy. The 3d Bn continued their advance southwest along Route 98 and upon reaching the road junction U-440157 made contact with 3rd Division elements. The Bn then moved to an area approximately 3 miles south of VIDAUBAN, while the 2d Bn started shuttle movement to the vicinity of LE LUC. The 179th Inf, in assembly near STE. MAXIME, commenced movement to a new assembly area about two miles west of VIDAUBAN. The 2d Bn 180th Inf, advancing west from

8/. G-3 Report No. 2 - 16 Aug.

9/. G-2 Report No. 1 - 16 Aug.

10/. G-3 Report No. 1 - 15 Aug.

11/. War Room Journal, 16 Aug, Entries #46, 92, 243, 249 and 268.

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ANNEX

GRATELOUP reached positions east of VIRAUBAN by the end of the period. On the division right flank the 3d Bn pushed north along Road 7 towards BOUCHEMAINE while the 1st Bn, on the coastal highway, attacked north at OGNON and captured ST. AIGNAN against heavy resistance, taking 50 prisoners. VILLEPEY was subsequently seized, and beyond this town long range enemy artillery fire was encountered, but the advance continued towards ROCHEMENE.

3. a. On the right flank of the beachhead, held by the 36th Division, the 141st Inf entered FREJUS at 0700B, liquidated enemy resistance, and headed towards LE MUY along Route 7 while one Bn swung north on Road 4 towards CAMP DE CAZE where heavy resistance was encountered. The 143d Inf attacked ST. RAPHAEL, encountering some armor, road blocks and mines. After clearing this town, mopping up operations were commenced on Red Beach (2444) where considerable resistance was offered by the enemy. Towards evening, the 143d Inf, having cleared Beach 2444, moved to the CAMP DE CAZE area and relieved elements of the 142d Inf which had received orders to strike for LE MUY with the remainder of the Regiment. By the end of the period, the 143d Inf had advanced north on Road 4 and established a road block at BAGNOLS while other elements advanced north from FREJUS on Route 7 and Road 22.

b. The 142d Inf, advancing west along Route 7, encountered considerable resistance at FORT in the form of anti-tank guns supported by infantry and tanks. One tank and five anti-tank guns were knocked out by our artillery and supporting naval fire in the ensuing battle, and by nightfall our troops were maneuvering to outflank this enemy strongpoint. On the division right flank, the 2d Bn 141st Inf continued the advance north and established a road block on Route 7, three miles west of LA NAPOULE. The enemy launched an attack in Bn strength at 0900B against this road block but was dispersed by our small arms and artillery fire. The 1st Bn pushed northwest along the coastal highway against steadily increasing enemy resistance, contacting the French Naval Assault Groups (Route Force) in the vicinity of S-29554 at 1630B, and reaching a point approximately 3 miles south of LA NAPOULE by nightfall. The 3rd Bn cleared the territory between the 1st and 2nd Bns, and their advance was somewhat slower 12/.

4. The 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion (an element of the 1st ARMY) was attached to the 45th Division and ordered to attack LE MUY. By 1915B this force closed in the LE MUY area after neutralizing all resistance, and reverted to control of parent unit 13/. Combat Command 1 of the 1st Armored Division (Fr) completed disembarkation over the 45th Division beaches and moved to a forward assembly area in the vicinity of OGNAROM on the night of 16-17 August 14/.

5. During the period, good weather facilitated air corps operations, and the XII TAC furnished direct support to ground troops and bombed rear area targets, using heavy and medium bombers. One flight of 10-11 enemy aircraft (JU-88's) dropped anti-personnel bombs in the general area southwest of ST. MAXIME, causing some casualties. Our antiaircraft destroyed one of these raiders and claimed one probable 15/.

6. a. Four days before embarkation from NAPLES, the Commanding General had directed that planning be instituted for the formation of a Provisional Armored Group from elements of the assault divisions and their attachments

12/. War Room Journal, 16 Aug, Entries #37, 73, 83, 110, 111, 129, 296, 297 and 298; War Room Journal, 17 Aug, Entries #9 and 14.

13/. War Room Journal, 16 Aug, Entries #75 and 98.

14/. War Room Journal, 16 Aug, Entry #92.

15/. G-2 Report No. 2 and G-3 Report No. 3 - 17 Aug.

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so that shortly after the landing this force could be assembled and driven through any gap in the enemy's lines. The staff had been organized and plans studied for the probable use of the Group. That time was now at hand.

b. Just before midnight of 16-17 August, telephonic instructions were issued to the 3rd, 36th, 45th Divisions and 344th Engineer (GS) Regiment to assemble various combat and service elements in the vicinity of LE MUY at 1600B 17 August to form this Provisional Armored Group (Task Force Butler) 16/. Upon arrival in the assembly area all elements were relieved from previous assignment or attachment and attached to Task Force BUTLER for operations. The directive of the Corps Commander indicated the following possibilities:

(1) To move to the DURANCE River in the vicinity of ST. PAUL and seize and hold the bridges to the west thereof.

(2) To move to the DURANCE River, cross in the vicinity of ST. PAUL or MANOSQUE and then drive further west to the RHONE Valley.

(3) To move to the DURANCE River and then north to GRENOBLE or west to the vicinity of MONTELIMAR 17/.

7. On 16 August a field message was published by Hq VI Corps to all units concerned, setting forth the following missions: 3d Division to seize line REAL MARTIN River in left of zone and hold until relieved by elements of II French Corps, to assemble bulk of division in area LE LUC (excl) - GONFARON - LES MAYONS without delay and to prepare on Corps order to advance west on 17 August with the bulk of one infantry regiment supported by artillery and armor; 45th Division to assemble without delay in the area VIDAUBAN - LE LUC, prepared to advance to the northwest on 17 August with the bulk of one infantry regiment supported by artillery and armor; 36th Division to destroy enemy in zone and relieve 1st ABTF without delay, to protect right flank of Corps, and to prepare to assemble the division less one RCT for advance to the north on Corps order; 1st ABTF to hold the area DRAGUIGNAN - LES ARCS - LE MUY until relieved by the 36th Division and upon completion of relief to assemble in the vicinity of LE MUY in Corps reserve; Task Force Butler to assemble in the vicinity of LE MUY early 17 August prepared to initiate advance north on Corps order early 18 August; Combat Command 1, 1st Armored Division (Fr) (Combat Command SUDRE) to assemble in the GONFARON - LE LUC area without delay and to reconnoiter vigorously to the west, prepared on Corps order to initiate advance in the same direction. In VI Corps field message dated 171700B August, H hour was announced as 180900B August 18/.

SECTION III - 2 plus 2

1. a. The already strong Allied foothold on southern France continued to be rapidly expanded and strengthened on 17 August. On the left flank, 3rd Division elements made steady advances against light and disorganized enemy resistance from individual strongpoints located generally on main highways. The 3d Bn 7th Inf, advancing west on the coastal highway, captured BORMES and continued west along Route 98, followed by the 2d Bn which had been advancing on BORMES from the north but had been delayed by enemy road blocks defended with small arms, machine gun and mortar fire. In this sector the French Commandos had moved west from CAP BENAT and were engaged

16/. War Room Journal, 16 Aug, Entries [illegible], 287, [illegible] and 289.

17/. In connection with all activities of Task Force Butler, see Annex [illegible], Summary of Operations "TASK FORCE BUTLER" dated 6 September 1944.

18/. Field Messages, Hq VI Corps, dated 16 August and 171700B August 1944.

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In clearing the ene[illegible] way from the area LE LAVANDOU to CAP BENAT, occupying [illegible] localities an[illegible] the intervening territory by the end of the period. An advance reco[illegible] detachment proceeded to the outskirts of LA LONDE and [illegible] the enemy to be evacuating that town. The 1st Bn, following behind the 2d Bn, had turned northwest on Road 41 which was reported by recon elements to be clear of the enemy, and reached PIERREFEU where relief of Co G 15th Inf was effected. One company, preceded by recon elements, moved west to GURES without contacting the enemy, while another company pushed south along Road 112 to reach the road junction at U-075040 where a road block was established.

b. The 15th Inf, which had assembled east of GOLFGRIMES, sent the 1st Bn at daylight to relieve elements of the 30th Inf occupying CAMBOULES. Upon completion of relief the Bn advanced west on Route 97 and Road 111, passing through ROUBAUD, and headed northwest on Road 1 towards GARGOULT while the 3d Bn moved through CAMBOULES, sweeping north to BRESE and west along Road 15 to within a mile of FONDALOUHIERE. The 2d Bn 15th Inf completed movement from the regimental assembly area to PIERREFEU and then moved north to CAMBOULES to relieve the 3d Bn 30th Inf. The 3d Bn 30th Inf had a skirmish just west of PIERREFEU on the morning of August 17th which dispersed the enemy and netted 29 prisoners, facilitating the capture of the town by relieving elements of the 15th Inf. The 2d Bn 30th Inf, upon being relieved at CAMBOULES, advanced northwest from GONDARON, captured FLASSANS without opposition and swung west on Route 7 towards BRIGNOLES followed by the 3d Bn which remained in reserve at FLASSANS. About 2000 yards east of BRIGNOLES advance recon elements were held up by anti-tank fire, but before nightfall this resistance was overpowered and positions were occupied by recon forces 400 yards east of BRIGNOLES with infantry in close support. The 1st Bn 30th Inf pushed north from LES MAYONS towards LE BEC while Co B traveled west on Road 25 to establish contact with the 2d Bn at GONDARON, and then rejoined the remainder of the Bn. By 0930B LE BEC was cleared of the enemy and the Bn continued west along Route 7 to rejoin the 30th Inf advancing on BRIGNOLES 19/.

2. In the central sector, 45th Division troops continued to advance without serious opposition, encountering only a few isolated enemy strongpoints which were quickly reduced. The 179th Inf completed movement to assembly areas west of VIDAUBAN. By afternoon all elements were again on the move to pursue the fleeing enemy. The 1st Bn, followed by the 3d Bn, advanced west on Route 7 and swung northwest on Road 17 towards LE THORONET, reaching a point three miles southeast of this town by nightfall and encountering no opposition. The 2d Bn, advancing west from VIDAUBAN along the alternate route (Road 21) to LE THORONET, passed more than one-third of the distance when [illegible] elements of the 157th Inf, advancing northwest through [illegible] on Routes 13 and 110, [illegible] artillery fire at the [illegible] and proceeded on to the outskirts of [illegible] where they [illegible] the town, finding friendly recon and [illegible] forces in the area. By 1730B the 1st Bn 179th Inf [illegible] the town of LE THORONET followed by the 3d Bn. By nightfall [illegible] the [illegible] and [illegible] northwest of [illegible] the town, the 2d Bn, advancing northwest on Route 13, [illegible] in the vicinity of LE [illegible] (Provence) [illegible] for the night. [illegible] 2000 yards east of LE [illegible] [illegible] artillery fire, 40 prisoners and [illegible] the 157th Inf [illegible] to rejoin the regiment. By nightfall the 45th Div [illegible] the following [illegible] the 1st Bn 179th Inf, followed by the 2d Bn [illegible] along Route 7, [illegible] which was found to be occupied by the enemy. There the Bn then moved to the vicinity of

19/. [illegible] (Day Book Journal), 19 Aug, Entries #16, 30, 48, 52 and 83; [illegible] 67, Entries 77 and 18.

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LE MUY and were to assemble near VIDAUBAN the following morning. During this period, the 2d Bn 180th Inf remained east of VIDAUBAN at U-3333. 20/.

3. Elements of the 1st ABTF had entered LES ARCS and DRAGUIGNAN while other elements moving south contacted 36th Division elements approximately two miles north of LE MUY. Paratroopers occupied CALLIAN (U-562565) and MONTAUROUX (U-572565), receiving supplies successfully by parachute drop 21/.

4. a. On the Corps right flank, advances by 36th Division elements encountered no enemy resistance except along the coastal highway south of LA NAPOULE. On the division left flank the 142d Inf attacked west at 0530B on the road to LE MUY. By mid-morning a Bn reached LE MUY and proceeded on to DRAGUIGNAN. No resistance was met and contact was made with the 1st ABTF north of LE MUY, at which time arrangements were initiated for their relief by the 36th Division. By evening the 1st and 2d Bns were in DRAGUIGNAN while the 3d Bn attacked northwest along Route 555, meeting stiff resistance. It was believed that an enemy Corps Headquarters command post was in the vicinity. 36th Division recon troops patrolled the roads from LA MOTTE northeast to BAGNOLS and east of DRAGUIGNAN along Route 562.

b. In the central sector, elements of 3d Bn 143d Inf continued to maintain a road block at BAGNOLS and established additional ones at U-585470 on Road 22 and at U-623449 on Route 7 where recon elements had been contacted before daylight. Co A 143d Inf captured an enemy regimental headquarters (765th Grenadier Regiment) consisting of 14 officers and 150 enlisted men at U-594380. The 2d Bn 141st Inf advanced approximately ½ mile east on Route 7 to within two miles of LA NAPOULE against stiffening opposition while the 1st Bn on the coastal highway reached THEOULE, being slowed considerably by heavy shelling from enemy guns believed to be on ILE STE. MARGUERITE. Naval fire was requested and duly furnished, but the enemy gunfire continued unmitigated. Naval gunfire support was again requested to be placed on the peninsula south of CANNES and the islands lying offshore. At the close of the period 141st Inf elements were preparing to relieve the 143d Inf of road blocks in the old 143d Inf sector. The 2d Bn 143d Inf moved to LE MUY for assembly with Task Force Butler while the remainder of the regiment assembled in the CAMP DE CAIS area and commenced movement to the vicinity of DRAGUIGNAN 22/.

5. Combat Command 1, 1st Armd Division (Wr), under command of Brigadier General SUDER, moved west and north from the LE LUC - GONFARON - PIGNANS area, clearing through FIASSANS and swinging north on Road 130 to reach CABASSE. Along Route 7 traffic difficulties resulted since this road was to be used jointly with the 3d Division 23/.

6. During the period, all component elements of the Provisional Armored Group (Task Force Butler) assembled in the vicinity of LE MUY except engineer and ordnance units, and prepared to move out the following morning (18 August) 24/. The VI Corps command post closed 1 mile northeast of STE. MAXIME and opened at U-315250 171900B August 25/.

20/. WBJ, 17 Aug, Entries #19, 24, 28, 69, 87 and 102; New CP, Entries #4 and 11; WBJ, 18 Aug, Entry #3.

21/. WBJ, 17 Aug, Entry #42; WBJ, 18 Aug, Entry #80.

22/. WBJ, 17 Aug, Entries #18, 37, 42, 54, 62, 73, 82A and 106; WBJ, 18 Aug, Entry #81.

23/. G-3 Reports Nos. 3 and 4, 17 & 18 Aug; WBJ, 17 Aug, New CP, Entry #18.

24/. WBJ, 17 Aug, Entry #94.

25/. G-3 Report No. 4, 18 Aug.

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SECTION XV - D plus 3

1. On the Corps left flank 3rd Division elements continued to advance throughout 18 August against increasing enemy resistance. The 2d Bn 7th Inf on the coastal highway sent a patrol towards LA LONDE and was engaged by the enemy in a heavy fire fight. By noon this resistance was overcome and advances were made to within one mile of LA LONDE. The Groupe de Commandos (Fr) relieved 2d Bn 7th Inf and continued the advance northwest while the 2d Bn moved to an assembly area near FLASSANS in division reserve. The 3d Bn by-passed LA LONDE to the north and then advanced to high ground northeast of HYERES in the vicinity of U-1302 after overcoming stiff resistance while 1st Bn positions remained relatively unchanged. The 1st Bn 15th Inf continued advancing on Road 1, taking GARGOULT, and proceeded southwest to capture NEOULES and reach the road junction at T-960183. The 3d Bn pushed west, capturing FORCALQUEIRET and LA ROQUE-BRUSSANNE, and sped north along Road 105 to reach the road junction at T-950280 where preparations were made to place artillery fire on Route 7. 601st Tank Destroyer Bn recon elements proceeded to MAZAUGUES and northwest to T-872282 without contacting the enemy. The 2d Bn 15th Inf moved from CARNOULES to FORCALQUEIRET and advanced north on Route 554, engaging the enemy in a fire fight and reaching U-045265 before nightfall. On the division right flank the 2d Bn 30th Inf attacked BRIGNOLES at 0600B, followed by the 1st Bn. Opposition was strong and street fighting continued throughout the period. The 1st Bn swung northwest to outflank the enemy, while the 3d Bn moved from assembly areas at FLASSANS to the eastern outskirts of BRIGNOLES 26/.

2. In the sector between the 3d and 45th Divisions, Combat Command 1, 1st Armd Division (Fr), moved out from CABASSE towards CARCES, encountering enemy AA, artillery and infantry fire. After a heavy fight, this zone of resistance was wiped out and several artillery pieces and numerous prisoners were captured. Upon reaching CARCES, the armored forces swung southwest on Route 562, reaching LE VAL by 1600B, and regrouped east of this town with intentions of resuming the advance towards BRAS at dawn 19 August 27/.

3. Considerable advances were made by the 45th Division in the central sector of the front on 18 August. The 179th Inf, advancing on alternate roads towards LE THORONET, was held up by machine gun and anti-tank fire, but after overcoming this opposition proceeded on to capture the town. Advance recon elements raced forward to CARCES and northwest towards BARJOLS without opposition. Preceded by tanks, 2d Bn 179th Inf entered CARCES, contacting a French Rcn Squadron of Combat Command 1. Recon elements headed southwest to BRIGNOLES, while the 1st and 3d Bns sped northwest, through COTIGNAC, and contacted the enemy at BARJOLS where heavy fighting took place. By nightfall the town was not yet in our hands, the enemy still offering stiff resistance. On the division right flank a similar advance was made by the 157th Inf. Preceded by recon troops that encountered no resistance, the 1st Bn, followed by 3d Bn, advanced rapidly northwest out of LORGUES on Road 17, capturing SALERNES and TAVERNES. The 1st Bn attacked VARAGES, wiping out all enemy resistance and capturing several prisoners. The 2d Bn moved from east of LE LUC to rejoin the remainder of the regiment, passing through the 3d Bn at TAVERNES, and reached a point east of VARAGES by the close of the period. The 1st and 3d Bns 180th Inf moved from LE MUY to VIDAUBAN, whereupon the entire regiment closed in an area west of LORGUES by mid-afternoon, remaining in division reserve 28/.

26/. WRJ, 18 Aug, Entries #13, 44, 65, 68, 76, 93, 129, 131, 154 and 158; G-3 Report No. 5, 19 Aug.

27/. WRJ, 19 Aug, Entry #59.

28/. WRJ, 18 Aug, Entries #16, 17, 21, 35, 58, 90, 116, 142 and 155; WRJ, 19 Aug, Entry #9.

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4. On the Corps right flank, 36th Division positions remained relatively unchanged while recon elements ranged far to the north without contacting the enemy. The 142d Inf, after being passed through by Task Force Butler, maintained positions northeast and northwest of DRAGUIGNAN, the latter area receiving sporadic enemy mortar fire. Whole forces, proceeding northwest, moved ahead through CALLAS, BARGEMON, BROVES, LA BASTIDE, and occupied CASTELLANE by 2000B. While enroute, this column was bombed and strafed by our own aircraft at U-375490. The 141st Inf on the division right flank continued to relieve 143d Inf elements of road blocks, and there were no material changes in frontline positions. The 1st Bn on the coastal road was still receiving periodic artillery fire from ILE STE. MARGUERITE during the period. In the 141st Inf sector, aggressive recon units made a spectacular drive to the north, contacting paratroops at GRASSE and CALLIAN, and continued on to MONS. Upon reaching Route 85, the advance proceeded southeast, passing through ST. VALLIER, and approached the northwestern outskirts of GRASSE at 1845B. Above GRASSE on Road 56 this column was also strafed by our own aircraft, resulting in the destruction of three vehicles and causing numerous casualties. The 143d Inf, less elements being relieved of road blocks by 141st Inf elements, completed assembling in the DRAGUIGNAN area. Elements of the 1st Bn moved to vicinity of PENNAFORT (U-421479) with the mission of reducing an enemy road block at the junction of Route 562 and Road 5 the following morning 29/. At this time, troops of the 1st ABTF began to assemble in areas east of DRAGUIGNAN and south of BAGNOLS 30/.

5. a. At 0600B 18 August, the Provisional Armored Group, officially designated as Task Force Butler, and commanded by Brigadier General Frederic B. Butler, moved out of DRAGUIGNAN. The force was composed of the following units: Hq Task Force Butler (personnel from Hq VI Corps), 117th Cav Rcn Squadron, 59th Armored FA Bn, 753d Tank Bn (less 1 Medical and 1 Light Tank Co), 2d Bn 143d Inf, Co C 636th Tank Destroyer Bn, Co F 344th Engineer GS Regiment, Co C 111th Medical Bn (plus detachment from Clearing Co), 3426th Quartermaster Truck Co and Det 87th Ordnance HM Co. One recon force proceeded north in the direction of CASTELLANE and northwest of DRAGUIGNAN to protect the right flank. Another force moved west in the direction of BARJOLS protecting the right flank, while the main body moved along the main axis in the direction of RIEZ. During this first day of operation, no enemy forces were contacted along the main route of advance DRAGUIGNAN - SALERNES - MONTMEYAN - RIEZ. However, recon elements on either flank made contact with the enemy. To the east, our troops moving north along the DRAGUIGNAN - CASTELLANE road met considerable enemy resistance immediately north of DRAGUIGNAN. The Commanding General of the LXII Reserve Corps, Lt Gen NEULING, was captured along with approximately 400 additional officers and men from his headquarters and other units.

b. Despite this coup the enemy continued to delay further advances of our elements in that direction, and as soon as elements of the 36th Division moved in, the column was ordered to side slip to the west, following behind the main body and then veering northwest along Route 557, through AUPS, continued on Road 109 to strike Road 11 south of MONTAGNAC. On the west, recon elements made contact with the enemy at BARJOLS, but by-passed this resistance and proceeded rapidly onward to the north, reaching Route 552 at ST. MARTIN DE BROMES. By 1700B the Command Post of Task Force Butler was established at RIEZ with the main body just southeast of the town. All recon elements contacted the main body and outposts were established at ALLEMAGNE, VALENSOLE and north of FUMOLSSON. Subject to availability of gasoline, intentions for the next day's operations were: (1) To push on along the axis RIEZ - BRIDGE T-8507, and (2) To send a recon troop to develop the situation in DIGNE where approximately 600 Germans were reported by civilians. A message was sent to the Air Officer, VI Corps,

29/. WEJ, 18 Aug, Entries #60, 64, 104, 107, 119C, 126 and 141.

30/. G-3 Report No. 4 - 18 Aug.

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requesting cancellation of all bridge bombing missions in the DURANCE Valley as their destruction would hinder the Task Force's progress 31/.

6. On 181800B August, Hq VI Corps published a Field Message to all units concerned, in substance as follows: 3rd Division to seize and hold the line defined by road ROQUEBRUNNE - MOUREN - BRIGNOLES - SOLLIES PONT, RJ (065033) - RJ (115995) - LES SALINS D'HYERES; hold line with at least three battalions and French Groupe de Commandos until relieved by French Army "B" on or about D plus 6; clear BRIGNOLES 18 August and continue advance along axis Highway 7 on morning of 19 August. 36th Division to move one Regimental Combat Team from present positions to immediate vicinity of CARCES on morning 19 August; upon completion of movement the RCT to be on one hour alert; RCT to reconnoiter the routes from CARCES to BARJOLS, BRIGNOLES and ST. MAXIMIN 32/.

SECTION V - D plus 4

1. Rapid advances to the north and northwest continued throughout 19 August on all sectors of the VI Corps front with the exception of the right flank which remained generally stabilized. In the 3d Division sector, the 3d Bn 7th Inf reorganized after taking high ground east of HYERES while the Groupe de Commandos (Fr) continued the advance in that sector, reaching a point three miles north of HYERES, and then attacked enemy positions in the vicinity of CLAPIER (U-1002). Other elements of the French Commandos which had previously relieved 2d Bn 7th Inf engaged the enemy in heavy fighting one mile south of LA LONDE where five pillboxes, four 150mm guns and approximately 100 prisoners were captured. 1st Bn positions remained unchanged; previous road blocks were maintained while reconnaissance forces pushed south and southwest of CUERS. The 2d Bn moved to vicinity of GARGOULT (U-0121) to relieve 1st Bn 15th Inf, placing one company in MEOUNES and outposting the high ground north of GARGOULT.

2. Combat Command 1 (Fr), protecting the 3d Division right flank, pushed west from LE VAL, clearing EBAS, ST. MAXIMIN, and continued to advance southwest. After a very stiff fight, the 30th Inf occupied BRIGNOLES on the morning of 19 August. The regiment continued west along Route 7, with the 3d Bn turning northwest along Road 53 to reach EBAS and ST. MAXIMIN; then proceeding northwest along Road 103, while the 1st Bn on Route 7 passed through TOURVES, ST. MAXIMIN, POURCIEUX, and reached the area T-7237 before midnight, encountering no enemy opposition. The 1st Bn 15th Inf, after being relieved by 2d Bn 7th Inf, assembled in the vicinity of ROQUEBRUNNE and pushed rapidly northwest to reach T-8027, with recon elements continuing to advance southwest, while the 3d Bn advanced from T-950275 to an area approximately two miles west of TOURVES. After cleaning out the pocket of enemy resistance at LA CELLE, the 2d Bn proceeded by motor along Route 7 to the vicinity of T-7736, and proceeded on foot southwest towards TOURVES. During the period the 7th Inf was relieved by elements of French Army "B" which had disembarked over the beaches on 18-19 August. 33/.

3. Effective 191200B, the Groupe de Commandos (Fr) was relieved of attachment to 3d Division and reverted to 7th Army control. Effective 192100B, Combat Command 1, 1st Armd Division (Fr), was relieved of attachment to VI Corps and reverted to control of French Army "B" 34/.

31/. WRJ, 18 Aug, Entries #119B and 157; WRJ, 19 Aug, Entries #17 and 18.

32/. Field Message, Hq VI Corps, 181800B Aug 1944.

33/. G-3 Spot Reports as of 0600B and 1000B, 19 Aug; G-3 Situation Rpts. 8 and 9, 19 Aug; WRJ, 18 Aug, Entry #86; G-3 Reports Nos. 17, 18 & 19 Aug.

34/. G-3 Report No. 6 - 20 Aug.

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4. In the 45th Division sector of the Corps front, the 1st Bn 157th Inf continued to advance west from VARAGES against very light opposition, reaching RIANS, while the 2d and 3d Bns engaged the enemy moving northwest from BARJOLS which was under attack by the 179th Inf. After all enemy resistance was liquidated, the 2d and 3d Bns followed the advance of the 1st Bn. By midnight the 3d Bn, passing through the 1st Bn at RIANS, had reached the eastern outskirts of JOUQUES on Route 561, while the 2d Bn remained about 2 miles east of RIANS. The 179th Inf continued to engage the enemy in BARJOLS, eliminating all resistance by early afternoon, and assembled the entire regiment in preparation for movement to RIANS, while the 180th Inf moved from west of LORGUES to a new assembly area approximately five miles east of RIANS on Route 561. 35/.

5. On the Corps right flank, the 143d Inf relieved the 142d Inf in defensive positions in the DRAGUIGNAN area, after which the 142d Inf commenced movement to the vicinity of CANNES. Elements of the 141st Inf attacked CALLIAN from the west, meeting heavy machine gun and small arms fire. Fighting continued throughout the day and by nightfall the town was partially occupied by our troops. The 36th Div Rcn Troop assembled in the vicinity of CASTELLANE. The 141st Inf continued to hold the Corps right flank, preparing for relief by the 1st Airborne Task Force. Effective 192400B, the 1st ABTF was relieved of attachment to VI Corps and reverted to 7th Army control 36/.

6. On August 19th, a report was submitted by the 36th Division on the operations of the French Naval Assault Groupe that landed in the vicinity of POINTE DES TRAYAS, to the right of the 141st RCT, on D day. Upon reaching the beaches, this force immediately encountered mines and barbed wire defenses. Due to the confusion and noise of exploding mines, they were discovered by the enemy who immediately opened fire on them, resulting in heavy casualties to the French. It was concluded that the operation of the French Naval Assault Groupe failed. The remaining personnel of this force assembled, moved to vicinity of GRIMAUD, were relieved of attachment to VI Corps and reverted to control of 7th Army 37/.

7. a. Already well to the north of the main VI Corps front, Task Force Butler continued to advance at a staggering rate of speed throughout 19 August. With aggressive recon forces covering either flank, the main column advanced along the route RIEZ - VALENSOLE - ORAISON - PEYRUIS - SISTERON. The bridge across the ASSE River was found to be intact though the bridge immediately south of ORAISON had been destroyed and our column forded the dry river bed with little difficulty. West of ORAISON, the partially damaged bridge across the DURANCE River was made passable and the main column crossed at that point. The enemy was contacted in the vicinity of CHATEAU-ARNOUX where approximately 175 prisoners were taken. Other light enemy forces were driven back by forward elements which occupied SISTERON in the late afternoon. The area north and west was outposted. A second column consisting of one reinforced recon troop assisted by local F.F.I. attacked at 0800B in the direction MEZEL - DIGNE to clear the road. Enemy troops at CHATEAUNEUF (U-1190) surrendered to advance elements at 0900B without a fight and other enemy elements along the road south to CASTELLANE were cut off so that they could not enter the area.

b. Our troops then quickly advanced to DIGNE where they were heavily attacked by the enemy. Resistance also developed at LES MEES and

35/. G-3 Spot Reports as of 0600B and 0830B, G-3 Sitreps Nos. 8 and 9 - 19 Aug.

36/. G-3 Spot Reports as of 0600B and 0830B, G-3 Sitreps Nos. 8 and 9 - 19 Aug; WBJ, 19 Aug, Entries #94 and 125; G-3 Report No. 6 - 20 Aug.

37/. WBJ, 19 Aug, (New GP) Entry #17; G-3 Report No. 5 - 19 Aug.

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MALLIAI. In order to drive out these rearguard forces and to press on additional troops to assist in the capture of DIGNE, a column of 1 company of medium tanks and a company of infantry was moved to DIGNE via LES MEES, MALLIAI. By 2000B all resistance ceased at DIGNE, with approximately 600 prisoners being taken, including a Brigadier General. MALLIAI was taken by our troops at 1430B, and at 1730B the enemy who attempted to resist our occupation of MALLEMOISSON (P-025015) were dispersed. The main body reached a point northwest of SISTERON about 1800B, outposted the general area and conducted reconnaissance for advance to the north, while a command post was established in SISTERON 38/.

8. The VI Corps command post closed at U-315250 and opened two miles north of BRIGNOLES (025325) at 2200B, 19 August. 39/.

SECTION VI - D plus 5

1. VI Corps troops continued their relentless, steady advance to the west, northwest and north throughout 20 August, encountering enemy resistance at scattered strongpoints. On the Corps left flank, relief of 7th Inf elements was completed by French Army "B", after which the Regiment commenced movement to assembly areas approximately 4 miles north of TRETS. The 1st Bn 15th Inf continued their advance to the west along Route 560 and overcame stiff resistance to take the road junction at T-644236, north of ROQUEVAIRE. The 2d Bn on Route 8-bis pushed on to capture TRETS and continued west to reach the eastern outskirts of GARDANNE where heavy enemy resistance in the form of artillery, mortar, machine gun and small arms fire was encountered. The 3d Bn moved from west of TOURVES along Route 7, swinging southwest towards TRETS and advancing to the vicinity of BELCODENE along Route 8-bis by nightfall. The 1st and 2d Bns 30th Inf rapidly advanced west along Route 7 towards AIX, with the 2d Bn passing through the 1st Bn at T-680387 and making contact with 15th Inf elements to the south. The 2d Bn encountered no resistance until reaching the junction of Routes 7 and 96, where the enemy made a futile attempt to halt our advance with a road block, and pushed on towards AIX, closely followed by the 1st Bn. The 3d Bn 30th Inf advanced northwest from ST. MAXIMIN, reached the high ground in the vicinity of PUITS DE RIANS (T-740452), and proceeded west towards AIX via THOLONET. After overcoming road blocks northeast and southeast of AIX during the afternoon, the entire 30th Inf was assembled approximately 1000 yards east of the town by 1730B. German troops on bicycles attempted to reinforce the garrison at AIX from the north along Route 96 but were dispersed and turned back by our forces. Heavy artillery and mortar fire was being received from German positions in and around the town. After dark, a few enemy planes dropped flares over the area, and fighter cover was requested from 7th Army to support a coordinated attack the next morning by the 30th Inf. 40/.

2. In the Corps central sector where 45th Division troops were rapidly approaching the DURANCE River, the 2d Bn 157th Inf commenced motor movement from RIANS north to ST. PAUL. Troops dismounted and proceeded west on foot towards a bridge spanning the DURANCE River at T-688600. The bridge was only partially destroyed and our foot troops crossed the river at this point while Engineers worked with utmost speed to construct a vehicular crossing further to the east. Reports were received that F.F.I. forces were fighting the enemy in MIRABEAU and PERTUIS in anticipation of the arrival of American forces. The 2d Bn advanced north and west to capture MIRABEAU and PERTUIS with practically no opposition, while the 1st Bn

38/. Annex #2.

39/. G-3 Report No. 6 - 20 Aug.

40/. aRJ, 20 Aug, Entries #12, 28, 41, 64, 84, 91, 109, [illegible] and 115.

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followed the same route, crossed the river in the vicinity of ST. PAUL and assembled on the north bank. The 3d Bn 157th Inf overcame an enemy road block on the eastern outskirts of JOUQUES on Route 561 in the morning and pressed on to high ground north of the town. By evening the Bn was moving on BRAMONT, having crossed the DURANCE River and passing through MIRABEAU. 45th Division Recn troops, going north on Route 96, reached a point just south of MANOSQUE without contacting the enemy. At 0600B, the 1st Bn 180th Inf started motor movement to the west along Route 561 with PEYROLLES as their objective, the remainder of the regiment following on foot. The advance continued without opposition until reaching PEYROLLES where small arms and medium artillery fire was encountered. By 1700B our forces had battled their way through the town and were engaging the enemy on the western outskirts. By nightfall, all resistance had been liquidated or dispersed and the Bn continued west to MEYMARGUES. In the afternoon, the 179th Inf moved from BARJOLS to an area south of RIANS 41/.

3. On the Corps right flank in the 36th Division sector, no enemy activity took place after CALLIAN had been completely cleared of the enemy at 1630B by the 141st Inf, capturing the entire remaining garrison. The 1st ABTF relieved the 141st Inf in position which completed the relief of the 36th Division. The 36th Division Recn Troop proceeded northwest from CASTELLANE to SISTERON while the 143d Inf (-2d Bn), preceded by a recon company of the 636th Tank Destroyer Bn, passed through DRAGUIGNAN, moving north and northwest. The advance progressed rapidly along Routes 555 and 85, clearing through BARRENS, MALIJAI, VOLONNE and reached SISTERON at 1900B without enemy opposition. Task Force Butler was contacted and further orders were awaited. The 142d Inf moved from assembly areas east of CANNES to CASTELLANE, and prepared to continue northwest, while the 141st Inf assembled in the vicinity of DRAGUIGNAN 42/.

4. On the morning of 20 August, Task Force Butler was assembled northwest of SISTERON awaiting further orders from VI Corps. Elements which had cleared DIGNE of the enemy rejoined the main body. However, on information that enemy foot and horse-drawn elements were moving south from GRENOBLE and that a force was in GAP two steps were taken. The main column, preceded by recon forces, moved north along the route LARAGNE - SERRES - ASPRES - ST. JULIEN - COL DE LA CR HAUTE to seize and hold the pass while aggressive recon forces fanned out to the north, northwest and west to protect the flanks of the main body. A second column swung east from ASPRES and, supported by the F.F.I., attacked the town of GAP in the late afternoon. After a short engagement, the enemy surrendered. Approximately 1000 prisoners were taken, mostly administrative, supply and limited service personnel, and a large ration dump and a demolition supply dump were also captured 43/.

5. Meanwhile, before noon Major General TRUSCOTT had received the approval of the Army Commander on plans to start Task Force Butler for MONTELIMAR, followed by the 36th Division, with the objective of outflanking the enemy from the north by blocking the RHONE Valley. The Maquis (F.F.I.) were reported to be extremely well organized on both sides of the RHONE River and were expected to be of great assistance in contemplated operations. Instructions were given to Task Force Butler by Maj Gen TRUSCOTT in the evening as follows: To put out recon forces on the road nets to the north and west, examining the possibility of advancing the next day to the vicinity of MONTELIMAR to block enemy forces withdrawing up the RHONE Valley from the south; and also to be prepared to continue the

41/. WRJ, 20 Aug, Entries #11, 22, 25, 44, 68, 73, 74, 93 and 110.

42/. WRJ, 20 Aug, Entries #13, 39B, 56, 72, 94 and 102.

43/. Annex #2.

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advance on GRENOBLE. At 2045B, the following urgent message was sent to Task Force Butler: "You will move at first light 21 August with all possible speed to MONTELIMAR (N-925540). Block all routes of withdrawal up the RHONE valley in that vicinity. 36th Division follows your 44/.

6. One troop of the 117th Cavalry Recn Squadron (Reinforced) moved to the GAP area, sending out recon forces and establishing a road block north of the town; also pushing recon north on the MONTMAUR (8159) - ST. DISDIER (8377) road. One recon platoon and a battery of the 59th Armored FA Bn remained south of LALLEY (6576) to block the road at this point and pushed recon forces towards MONESTIER. The above forces were to remain in position until relieved by elements of the 36th Division 45/.

7. During the period the XII TAC continued to support the VI Corps advance by attacking enemy installations, communications and transport, resulting in the destruction or damage of large numbers of locomotives, railroad cars, motor transports and gun positions; also flying numerous armed reconnaissance missions 46/.

8. As of 202400B August, the total number of prisoners captured by the VI Corps in France exceeded 12,000, representing elements of the following additional enemy divisions which had been rushed into the lines in a vain attempt to stop the rapid advances of our troops: 244th Inf Div, 338th Inf Div, 189th Reserve Div, 198th Inf Div, 148th Reserve Div, and 157th Reserve Div. 47/.

9. Effective 202400B August, the following units were relieved of attachment to VI Corps and 35th AAA Brigade and reverted to control of 7th Army: Hq & Hq Btry 68th AAA Group, Hq & Hq Btry 105th AAA Group, 68th AAA Gun Bn, 216th AAA Gun Bn, Btrys A & D 72d AAA Gun Bn, 108th AAA Gun Bn, 895th AAA AW Bn, 433d AAA AW Bn, 457th AAA AW Bn, 102d Bar Bln Btry, 103d Bar Bln Btry, 104th Bar Bln Btry. In addition, Hq & Hq Btry 36th FA Group, 937th FA Bn and Co B and one Recn Plat 645th Tank Destroyer Bn were relieved from attachment to VI Corps and attached to the 1st Airborne Task Force 48/.

SECTION VII - D plus 6

1. During 21 August VI Corps troops continued to make gains in all sectors and established numerous road blocks while regrouping and shifting of troops was carried out. At 1220B Maj Gen Truscott issued telephonic instructions to the 3d Division: To halt the bulk of the division and not to go beyond the line LE PUY - ROCHAC — nothing but reconnaissance in advance of that line. Elements of the 11th Panzer Division had been identified in the division sector and there were possibilities of receiving a counterattack 49/.

2. a. In the 3d Division sector on the Corps left flank, the 2d Bn 15th Inf, followed by the 1st Bn, captured GARDANNE at 0845B and proceeded to the high ground west of the town while road blocks were established in

44/. WBJ, 20 Aug, Entry #32.

45/. WBJ, 20 Aug, Entries #29, 33, 45, 97, 100 and 112.

46/. WBJ, 21 Aug, (New CP) Entry #25.

47/. G-2 Report No. 6, 21 Aug.

48/. G-3 Report No. 8, 22 Aug.

49/. WBJ, 21 Aug, Entry #60.

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the vicinity of ROCNAC and to the southwest. The 1st Bn established a road block southeast of GARDANNE at T-595305, and later in the period moved by motor to the northwest to the vicinity of LUYNES. Recon elements made contact with Combat Command Sudre approximately a mile south of ROQUEVAIRE before noon. The 3d Bn moved on through GARDANNE and occupied the high ground northwest of the town, establishing numerous road blocks in the territory to the west, the most outlying block being at AQUEDUD. North of the 15th Inf sector, the 30th Inf attacked AIX at 0600B and had occupied the entire town by mid-morning. Very little resistance in the form of some machine gun and scattered small arms fire was encountered, since the enemy had withdrawn during the night. The 2d Bn established a road block south of AIX at T-5039 while the 3d Bn sent recon forces to the west, northwest and southwest. Contact was made with the 15th Inf to the south and other elements reached LOURMARIN across the DURANCE River where an enemy force was located but not engaged.

b. The 1st Bn 7th Inf arrived in the AIX area by mid-morning, prepared to support the 30th Inf attack. Since the town was already in our hands, the Bn was attached to the 30th Inf and advanced northwest out of AIX along Route 7. Leading elements engaged in a fire fight with enemy infantry and tanks identified as being from the 11th Panzer Division. A road block was established one mile northwest of LIGNANE, while recon elements continued to push towards ST. CANNAT. The 30th Inf entrucked from AIX to the defense line T-371400 - T-420490, meeting very little opposition. The remainder of the 7th Inf moved to a new assembly area northeast of AIX at T-5445, with the 2d Bn taking over all road blocks of the 15th Inf below ST. MAXIMIN while the 3d Bn outposted the area to the northwest of the new assembly area 50/.

3. On the 3d Division left flank, elements of French Army "B" had attacked TOULON from the north and northwest and occupied part of the city despite fierce enemy resistance. Other elements continued their rapid advance west, approaching the outskirts of MARSEILLES 51/.

4. In the 45th Division sector, the 1st Bn 180th Inf, advancing from MEYRARGUES, cleared a pocket of enemy resistance west of the town after engaging the enemy in a stiff fight, captured LE PUY in the afternoon, and proceeded northwest along Route 561, reaching T-4560 without contacting the enemy. The 2d and 3d Bns which had been following the 1st Bn occupied positions slightly north and northwest of MEYRARGUES where light resistance was encountered. In the afternoon, instructions were given to 45th Division ordering the 179th Inf (-3d Bn) to proceed at once to the ST. AUBAN area (south of VOLONNE). The Regiment (-3d Bn) closed in the new area before 2100B while the 3d Bn remained in its present location south of RIANS. The 1st and 3d Bns 157th Inf moved to assembly areas in the vicinity of MOULIN DU PAS (T-6267) on the morning of 21 August, with the 1st Bn advancing on through LA BASTIDE DES JOURDANS and reaching the road junction at T-695777. The 2d Bn 157th Inf remained in PERTUIS, establishing a road block east of CADENET. 45th Division recon patrols reached APT where approximately 100 enemy troops were observed. A 600-man group of F.F.I. was contacted in the vicinity of CERESTE where the 157th Inf had established a road block 52/.

5. The 36th Division continued its shuttle movement to the north. The 141st Inf completed movement from DRAGUIGNAN to DIGNE, prepared to continue

50/. WRJ, 21 Aug, Entries #9, 35, 37, 38, 46 and 49; New CP, Entries #5 and 9; WRJ, 22 Aug, Entry #1; G-3 Report #7, 21 Aug.

51/. G-3 Reports Nos. 7 and 8, 21 & 22 Aug.

52/. WRJ, 21 Aug, Entries #4, 5, 34, 43, 67 and 74; New CP: Entries #1, 10, 20, 21 and 31; WRJ, 22 Aug, Entry #2.

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to ASPRES on the morning of 22 August. The 143d Inf commenced movement from CASTELLANE to vicinity of GAP, with the 1st Bn and 1304 FA Bn [illegible] the first shuttle, reaching GAP via SISTERON at 1800B and relieving [illegible] of Task Force Butler which had established a road block north of the [illegible] at COL BAYARD. At the close of the period the remainder of the 143d Inf was enroute to GAP with 2d Bn enroute to MENOSQUE and GUILLAUME to establish road blocks. The 143d Inf (-2d Bn) completed shuttle movement from [illegible] to ASPRES where the 3d Bn with recon forces advanced north to COL DE LA [illegible] HAUTE, relieving Task Force Butler elements at the road block there and prepared to advance north towards GRENOBLE at daylight while the 1st Bn moved east with recon forces to relieve the 1st Bn 143d Inf maintaining the road block north of GAP at COL BAYARD and prepared to move on GRENOBLE at daylight 53/.

6. On the morning of 21 August, elements of Task Force Butler which had established a road block north of GAP at COL BAYARD were attacked by an enemy force estimated at two Bns that had moved southeast from LA MURE during the night, but they successfully repulsed all the enemy thrusts. Information was received that the towns of MONSTIER and MURS had been cleared of the enemy by F.F.I. forces but that fighting was still in progress at VIF. As of 211000B August, Task Force Butler was attached to the 36th Division. Preceded by recon units, the main body moved west from Highway 75 along the route CHATILLON - BIX - SAILLANS - GREST - MARSANNE. Recon forces screened the advance by pushing along the main road nets to the south, west and north. With the command post established at MARSANNE and the main body in close proximity, recon screens entered the ROMANS Valley, reaching LIVRON and pushing to within a few kilometers of MONTELIMAR and VALENCE. Throughout this entire lightning advance, no contact was made with enemy forces with the exception of a 30-vehicle convoy that was attacked and destroyed by our forces north of LIVRON. During the night our patrols cut the road west of CONDRIEAC but were driven out by superior forces. Before the end of the period, road blocks which had been established by elements of Task Force Butler south of LALLEY and north of GAP were taken over by 36th Division elements 54/.

7. The VI Corps command post closed north of BRIGNOLES and opened three miles west of RIANS (T-715515) at 211700B August 1944. Effective 21 August, the 36th FA Bn, 634th FA Bn and Hq & Hq Btry 6th Armored FA Group were relieved from attachment to VI Corps and attached to II French Corps 55/.

SECTION VIII - D plus 7

1. On the Corps left flank, a new phase line was established on 22 August by the 3d Division as follows: From LA MOLLE (T-390610) - 335[illegible] - 290510 - 250430, and by 2200B units had advanced and reorganization was completed along that line with the 2d Bn 15th Inf on the left, 30th Inf in the center and 7th Inf on the right, while the 1st and 3d Bns 15th Inf covered the neck of land south of LAKE DE BORNE 56/.

2. The 15th Inf continued to advance west and southwest, with the 2d Bn sending out recon elements to ST. CHAMAS, which met no resistance. [illegible] upon the Bn advanced to positions west of LA FARE while the 1st and 3d Bns proceeded southwest to occupy positions south of CAIAS and CABRIES [illegible]

53/. WRJ, 21 Aug, Entry #22; WRJ, 22 Aug, Entry #2A.

54/. WRJ, 21 Aug, Entries #33, 36, 58 and 61; New CP, Entry #12; [illegible]

55/. G-3 Report No. 8, 22 Aug.

56/. WRJ, 22 Aug, Entry #75; G-3 Report No. 9, 23 Aug.

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of ST. VINCENT and GREMAS, preceded by recon forces which had entered [illegible]. The 1st Bn contacted French elements in the vicinity of [illegible]. In the central sector of the division front, 30th Inf troops [illegible] road blocks from [illegible] north and northeast to [illegible], while patrols pushed west and northwest, entering LAMBESC and [illegible] without opposition. Towards the close of the period, the 3d Bn 30th Inf moved by [illegible] to MALON and established defensive outposts in the vicinity while the 1st and 2d Bns assembled in preparation for movement to the new phase line. On the division right flank, the 7th Inf established road blocks and conducted reconnaissance to the north and west, reaching ST. CANNAT and LAMBESC where, encountering the enemy, and contacted elements of 1st Bn 180th Inf in the vicinity of ROGNES during the morning. The 1st Bn 7th Inf advanced northwest along Route 7 and occupied LAMBESC, setting up defensive positions to the northwest of town before nightfall, while the 3d Bn moved to LA ROQUE after relieving the 1st Bn 180th Inf east of the town. A road block was set up in the town where tank fire was received during the day while the main body remained 1000 yards to the east. In the late afternoon, the 2d Bn 7th Inf moved from assembly areas in the vicinity of AIX to ST. CANNAT 57/.

3. At 221930B, Major General Truscott issued orders to the 45th Division commander, Major General Eagles, directing the 179th Inf to continue the advance north and report to Major General Dahlquist at ASPRES at which time the regiment would pass to 36th Division control; and to send the 180th Inf to ASPRES the following day with intentions of advancing on GRENOBLE, whereupon the 3d Division would assume responsibility for the 180th Inf sector.

4. In the 45th Division sector, on the 3d Division right flank, the 1st Bn 180th Inf occupied ROGNES, receiving some small arms and self-propelled gun fire, but the main enemy forces had withdrawn from the town during the preceding night. At noon, patrols continued west to LAMBESC and PELISSANNE without opposition and contacted elements of 7th Inf while a patrol northwest out of LAMBESC on Route 7 drew tank fire. The 2d and 3d Bns 180th Inf assembled north of MERYARGUES preparing for movement to the vicinity of ASPRES. The 2d Bn 157th Inf remained at PERTUIS during the period with patrols going to GAIGNEST and LAURIS without contacting the enemy, and further reconnaissance revealed the bridges south of PERTUIS and GAIGNEST to have been blown by the enemy. The road block east of GAIGNEST was moved to one mile east of LAURIS. The 1st Bn 157th Inf (Reinforced) advanced rapidly north to Route 100 and west towards APT which was attacked from the north and south, and from the east by supporting F.F.I. forces, resulting in the capture of the town by 152CB against moderate resistance. Road blocks were established to the west, southwest and south while patrols covered the road north to ST. SATURNIN. The 3d Bn remained in position on the high ground in the vicinity of MOULIN DU PAS throughout the period. The 1st and 2d Bns 179th Inf remained in assembly areas near ST. AUBAN, operating road blocks in the vicinity of FONDALCHIER and ST. MICHEL and sending out security patrols, while the 3d Bn moved from REANS and joined the remainder of the regiment. At 200CB, orders were received to move the 179th Inf to an assembly area in the vicinity of GRENOBLE, attached to 36th Division upon arrival. With 1st and 3d Bns enroute at the close of the period, the 2d Bn remained at ST. AUBAN until relief could be effected by 180th Inf elements 58/.

5. a. Throughout 22 August 36th Division troops, in the most northerly sector of the Corps front, moved to the west and east from ASPRES while 143d Inf elements raced north against practically no opposition. At daylight,

57/. WBJ, 22 Aug, Entries #10, 27, 28, 54, 75, 79, 83, 84 and 95; WBJ, 23 Aug, Entry #2.

58/. WBJ, 22 Aug, Entries #7, 13, 22, 26, 29, 32, 38, 47 and 77.

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the 3d Bn 143d Inf, preceded by recon forces, advanced rapidly north on Route 75, sweeping through CLELLES, MENESTRIE, VIF, and reaching PONT DE CLAIX by 1045. Patrols entered GRENOBLE without opposition, whereupon the main forces moved into the city at 1400B, established a command post and blocked the roads to the north, west and southwest out of the city. Recon forces proceeded north of GRENOBLE and 8 kilometers northeast on Route 90, making no contact with the enemy. The Maquis (F.F.I.) reported holding all bridges north of GRENOBLE on a route clear to LYON. To the right of this advance, the 1st Bn 143d Inf also jumped off at daylight from COL BAYARD north of GAP, striking for GRENOBLE along Route 85. The column cleared through ST. BONNET, CHAUFFAYER, CORPS, LA MURE without contacting the enemy but were occasionally delayed by demolitions. At VIZILLE a pocket of enemy forces was encountered and quickly liquidated by artillery fire with the assistance of 3d Bn elements that had advanced from PONT DE CLAIX to complete the trap, netting 30 prisoners. The 1st Bn reached GRENOBLE at 2040B, contacting the 3d Bn which had arrived considerably earlier.

b. The 142d Inf completed movement to assembly areas in the vicinity of GAP, while 2d Bn elements proceeded north to maintain the COL BAYARD road block north of GAP, and east to establish blocks on roads leading out of BRIANCON and GUILLESTRE. Upon establishing the road blocks, patrols reconnoitered to the north along Route 94 in the direction of BRIANCON where, according to persistent Partisan reports, large numbers of German troops were concentrating. At 1730B seven enemy planes bombed the GUILLESTRE area, causing no damage to our installations. The 141st RCT completed movement from DIGNE to vicinity of ASPRES, while the 3d Bn established road blocks to the west of the route of advance at CHATEAUNEUF (G-7313), MOYENS and BARRAS. As per order of the Commanding General VI Corps, the 141st RCT, reinforced by the 141st and 977th FA Bns, was to proceed west from ASPRES with all possible speed to join Task Force Butler in blocking the BREME Valley in the MONTELIMAR area. Movement was commenced at 1430B, and at the close of the period, 141st and 977th FA Bns were in positions near MARSANNE preparing to execute fire missions across the BREME River, while the 141st RCT (-3d Bn) was enroute to the MARSANNE area, with the 3d Bn moving towards ASPRES with intentions of rejoining the Regiment 59/.

6. Meanwhile, Task Force Butler established defensive positions along the general line SAVASSE - GONDILLAC - MIRMANDE parallel with Highway No. 7. At about 0900B, enemy tanks and other vehicles were observed moving south in the area between CHENT and LIVRON apparently on reconnaissance missions. Small enemy groups were in contact with our recon elements and forward outpost positions north of MONTELIMAR during the morning. In the afternoon, there was movement of small enemy detachments to the northeast of MONTELIMAR and at approximately 1530B a column of 20-30 enemy personnel carriers led by armor moved north along the road CHANDOL - CHAMI - PUY ST. MARTIN. The force reserve, then north of PUY ST. MARTIN was ordered to attack and destroy the enemy. When fired on by our artillery, anti-tank guns and tanks, the enemy column broke into smaller groups in an attempt to withdraw. A number of the enemy vehicles were destroyed, particularly in and about MARAS, and prisoners were taken, at a loss of several American vehicles. By nightfall, enemy units had withdrawn south of the BREME River. At the close of the period MIRMANDE and MONTELIMAR were still in enemy hands, and the 1 117th Cavalry Rcn Squadron had established road blocks at ALIXE and at the road junction southeast of MONTBOUCHAN 60/.

7. Instructions from 7th Army were received at 1125B, 22 August, as follows: In order to maintain contact between VI Corps and 1st ABN, and

59/. WBJ, 22 Aug, Entries #21, 33, 40, 46, 48, 64, 73 and 74;
WBJ, 23 Aug, Entries #1, 13, 20 and 48.

60/. WBJ, 22 Aug, Entries #74 and 80; Annex #8.

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at the same time to allow VI Corps units to exploit fully to the north, the 1st ABTF will cover the road net COMPS - CASTELLANE - DIGNE by motorized patrols. A contact point for both VI Corps and 1st ABTF will be established at DIGNE by VI Corps. The 36th Division was given the responsibility of maintaining a contact group at DIGNE, and as of the close of the period no contact had been established with the Airborne Forces 61/.

8. Effective 220001B August, the 48th Engineer Combat Bn was attached to VI Corps, while Btry B 534th AAA AW Bn was relieved of attachment to VI Corps and reverted to 7th Army control 62/.

SECTION IX - D plus 8

1. a. Throughout 23 August, VI Corps troops advanced steadily against light opposition, except in the MONTELIMAR area where all available enemy forces fought desperately to keep open their escape route up the RHONE Valley. On the Corps left flank in the 3d Division sector the 3d Bn 15th Inf remained in position on the regimental left flank, blocking the roads out of MARSEILLES. Troops advanced to MARIGNANE, LE ROVE and MARTIGUES, and recon detachments entered LA COUROUBE and LAURONS without contacting the enemy. The 1st Bn 15th Inf assembled in regimental reserve in the vicinity of T-437348, sending security detachments to protect the water reservoir at T-4233 and Aqueduct at T-4039. At 2115B, a substantial enemy force supported by 88mm gunfire attacked northwest along Route 538, attempting to break through the road block at LES PENNES MIRABEAU which was being maintained by a detachment of Co L 15th Inf. Co A was rushed from the 1st Bn assembly area to reinforce the road block and engaged the enemy in a fire fight, breaking up the attack by artillery and mortar fire.

b. North of LAKE DE BERRE the 2d Bn advanced west on a north to south front, occupying the towns of ST. CHAMAS, CORNILLON, PONT DE BAUD and CHARS without opposition. Upon arrival in SALON, the 3d Bn 30th Inf established road blocks covering all approaches to the town and conducted reconnaissance 15 miles west of SALON towards MOULIERS where approximately 100 enemy troops were observed. Airstrips southeast and west of SALON were reported to be capable of accommodating heavy bombers and fighters, respectively. By morning of August 23d the 2d Bn had completed movement to an assembly area one mile east of SALON being placed in reserve, while the 1st Bn occupied positions west of LAMANON with road blocks covering all approaches. At 1730B LAMANON was attacked and occupied without encountering any resistance.

c. On the division right flank, the 1st Bn 7th Inf occupied PONT ROYAL and ALLEINS after recon forces found them clear of the enemy. Further reconnaissance to the northwest along Route 7 contacted the enemy at T-256428 where a vehicle was destroyed and prisoners taken and at ORNAS where our forces were heavily engaged by the enemy. The 3d Bn advanced from LA ROQUE to occupy positions east of CHANEMIL, while the 2d Bn remained in reserve at ST. CANNAT throughout the period. On the evening of 23 August, Major General Frederick issued the following instructions to Maj Gen O'Daniel: To effect relief of the 157th Inf north of the DURANCE River by the 7th Inf and be prepared to advance west by noon of 24 August. On the Corps left flank, elements of French Army "B" continued mopping up operations in MARSEILLES and TOULON against scattered strong pockets of enemy resistance 63/.

2. In the 45th Division sector on 23 August the 1st Bn 157th Inf continued to maintain road blocks in the vicinity of APT, also taking over

61/. WBJ, 22 Aug, Entries #36 and 43; WBJ, 23 Aug, Entry #13.
62/. S-3 Reports Nos. 8 and 9, 22 & 23 Aug.
63/. WBJ, 23 Aug, Entries #23, 25, 33, 34, 38, 54, 57, 62, 76, 99 and 100. S-3 Reports Nos. 9 and 10, 23 & 24 Aug.

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2d Bn 179th Inf road blocks in the vicinity of FORBACHER and ST. [illegible]. Patrols ranged north as far as BANCH without contacting the enemy. Information was received that the 179th Inf would be relieved by two Rgts Inf (34 Div) before noon of the next day, the 179th Inf then passing to Corps control. The 2d Bn in [illegible] road blocks to the west while the 34 Bn remained on the [illegible] in the vicinity of [illegible] BAS. With relief of 180th Inf [illegible] being completed by 34 Division elements at 0900B, at [illegible] 34 Bn 180th Inf commenced movement from the MEURTHEUNE area to vicinity of [illegible] (J-2029) via ARNAY and GAP. By late afternoon the 34 Bn had closed in the [illegible] area and took elements north to GUILLESTRE to relieve the 2d Bn 142d Inf of road blocks in that area by nightfall. Persistent reports were received from the Maquis to the effect that a strong enemy force was located 13 kilometers southeast of COL DE LARCHE, but our aerial and motor reconnaissance failed to disclose the presence of such a force. By nightfall, the 34 Bn was still enroute to the EMBRUN area. The 1st Bn 180th Inf remained in MEURTHEUNE, preparing to move north the following morning. The 1st Bn 179th Inf completed movement to GRENOBLE by dawn of 23 August, followed by the 34 Bn which arrived in the late afternoon. Relief of the 143d Inf (-2d Bn) was effected without delay, after which the 179th Inf reverted to 45th Division control. Towards the close of the period, recon forces had proceeded 10-15 miles north and northeast of GRENOBLE without contacting the enemy. The 2d Bn remained in position at ST. AUBAN operating road blocks and security patrols to the west and northwest while awaiting relief by elements of the 180th Inf. Command of the GRENOBLE - ARPENNAY - GUILLESTRE area passed to 45th Division at 232215B August. 64/.

3. a. On 23 August, the 143d Inf (-2d Bn) maintained road blocks on the perimeter of GRENOBLE and pushed reconnaissance far to the north and northeast without contacting enemy forces. An airstrip near GRENOBLE was reconnaitered and reported to be capable of accomodating all types of aircraft up to transport planes. Upon being relieved by two Bns of the 179th Inf in the late afternoon, the 143d Inf (-2d Bn) immediately commenced movement to BOURG DE PEAGE via the road TULLINS - VINAY - ST. MARCELLIN and were still enroute at the close of the period. According to Maquis reports, the road was clear and BOURG DE PEAGE was held by Maquis forces who were awaiting the arrival of American troops. The 142d RCT (-2d Bn) commenced movement at daylight from the GAP area to NYONS via SERRES and BOSANS, having the mission of protecting the southern flank of the 36th Division by holding the line NYONS - VALREAS - GRIGNAN with strong road blocks supported by the 132d and 155th FA Bns. By evening, the forces had closed in NYONS without opposition. The 2d Bn 142d Inf continued to maintain road blocks in the GUILLESTRE area. Persistent reports were received relative to a strong enemy force approaching from the southeast via COL DE LARCHE, but motorized and cub plane reconnaissance failed to disclose the presence of such an enemy force. By nightfall, the 2d Bn was relieved by 180th Inf elements and prepared for movement to rejoin the remainder of the 142d Inf at NYONS the following morning 65/.

4. The 141st RCT completed movement to the MARSANNE area and by 1700B were established in positions along the general line LIVRON to ST. MARCEL with the principal mission of cutting the main highway on the east bank of the RHONE River. As of 0900B, 23 August, Task Force Butler was dissolved and component elements thereof were attached to the 36th Division. In the MONTELIMAR sector during most of the day there was continuous enemy traffic moving north and south on both sides of the RHONE River and three RR trains had attempted to move north past our positions southwest of CHABILLAC. Attempts to cut the highway physically were unsuccessful. Our artillery

64/. WRJ, 23 Aug, Entries #21, 24, 46, 48, 50, 63, 79, 80, 92, 96 and 107; WRJ, 24 Aug, Entry #9; G-3 Report No. 10, 24 Aug.

65/. WRJ, 23 Aug, Entries #5, 8, 9, 22, 52, 53, 71, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 90, 91, 104 and 105.

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and destroyed the locomotive of a 60 car train and a 88 gun on a 25 car train. It appeared that these bits effectively blocked all rail traffic movement on the east bank of the RHONE. A third train of 15 cars came into the area but was fired upon by our artillery it moved back to [illegible] and unloaded. Approximately 100 enemy vehicles were destroyed by artillery and tank fire. During the late morning an enemy column of [illegible] vehicles preceded by tanks and armored cars was detected moving north on the CHARIOL - GRAND road. Our infantry, tanks and tank destroyers advanced from PUY ST. MARTIN, engaged the enemy force at our road block at GRAND and succeeded in dispersing the enemy column by artillery fire, destroying 4 tanks and 10 other vehicles, while sustaining personnel and vehicle losses. In the afternoon, the 2d Bn 141st Inf supported by two Bns of field artillery launched an attack from the MARSANNE area on MONTELIMAR. At the close of the period elements were one kilometer north-east of MONTELIMAR engaged in heavy fighting with the enemy. The 1st Bn 141st Inf was in position west of COMBILLAS, repulsing enemy attempts at infiltration, while the 3d Bn established positions on the high ground southeast of LORION 64/.

5. Aerial reconnaissance during 23 August revealed an ever-growing enemy withdrawal up the RHONE Valley with approximately 450 - 500 motor transports, including some tanks and guns, being observed moving north on both sides of the River. In accordance with VI Corps air requests, the Air Corps planned heavy efforts for 24 August on enemy columns in the RHONE Valley from AVIGNON to MONTELIMAR. The SIXTEENTH airfield at O-8513 was reported to be ready for operational use, and AA defenses were being established prior to the anticipated arrival of C-47 transport planes on 24 August and Spitfires on 25 August 67/.

SECTION X - P pins 9

1. Throughout 24 August VI Corps operations consisted chiefly of shifting and transporting troops to designated locations in relation to the MONTELIMAR area where a gigantic trap could be sprung to destroy the bulk of the 19th German Army now in retreat up the RHONE Valley. The new mission of 36 Division was as follows: As relieved by French Army "B", to move all elements north of the ROMANCHE River; push reconnaissance, backed by tanks, tank destroyers, artillery and infantry, out to the objective line GAUMONT (T-096605) - JONCHERETTES (T-082863) - MALAN (T-240990) - BUIS (O-345235). When established on above line, to push reconnaissance out and prepare to advance northwest towards MONTELIMAR; and extend vigorous reconnaissance west towards GAVAILLON, CARPENTRAS, PERNES and AVIGNON 68/.

2. In the 36 Division sector on the Corps left flank, the 2d Bn 30th Inf relieved the 7th Inf before daylight and maintained positions along the line LAMANON - MALLEMORT - CHARIEUAL - LA BOUCHE, with recon forces advancing to SENAS and ORGON without opposition. The 1st and 3d Bn positions remained unchanged as relief was expected by elements of French Army "B", however, 3d Bn patrols advanced to ARLES finding the town practically clear of the enemy. The 1st Bn 15th Inf, in division reserve, moved to assembly areas near ST. CANNAT by 1000B, while the 2d and 3d Bns were relieved before nightfall by elements of French Army "B" and proceeded to the NW. CANNAT assembly area. At the close of the period, the 15th Inf was completely assembled and commenced movement to an assembly area north of

66/. WBJ, 23 Aug, Entries #81, 96, 98 and 106; WBJ, 24 Aug, Entry #19; G-3 Report No. 10, 24 Aug.

67/. WBJ, 23 Aug, Entry #93; WBJ, 24 Aug, Entries #1, 2 and 20.

68/. Field Message, Hq VI Corps, dated 241100B August; Summary of VCOG, 24 Aug.

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the DURANCE River in the vicinity of APT. Upon being relieved by the 2d Bn 30th Inf, the 2d and 3d Bns 7th Inf started movement by motor at 0600 ~~to relieve the 157th Inf, with the 1st Bn assembling [illegible]~~ [illegible] MOUR awaiting the return of transportation. By 1300B, the 2d Bn 7th Inf occupied positions at GADENET with forward elements one mile west of LAURIS, and the 3d Bn arrived in the MONTFURON area, with the 1st Bn enroute to an area southeast of BONNIEUX. Relief of the 157th Inf was completed before 1800B, and at the close of the period the 1st Bn 7th Inf was advancing northwest along high ground towards the highway; the 2d Bn pushed west and northwest along Route 573 to occupy CAVAILLON without opposition; while 3d Bn elements maintained road blocks in the vicinity of APT, ST. MICHEL and FORCALQUIER 69/.

3. a. On 24 August the following verbal orders of the Corps Commander were issued to the 45th Division: To assemble 157th RCT in the vicinity of SERRES, pushing reconnaissance west to contact 36th Division at NYONS; seize and hold BRIANCON.

b. In the division sectors the 157th Inf was relieved by the 7th Inf and by evening had assembled in the vicinity of FORCALQUIER and reverted to 45th Division control. At the close of the period the regiment was awaiting transportation for movement to SERRES. The 1st Bn 157th Inf maintained road blocks and conducted patrolling north of GREOULX without contacting the enemy. However, the 3d Bn was engaged at their road block in GREOULX by a small enemy detachment of two vehicles which had advanced southwest on Route 573. Both vehicles were destroyed. The 2d Bn moved from ST. AUBAN to vicinity of LARAGNE where blocks were established on roads to the west. In the GUILLESTRE area elements of the 2d Bn 180th Inf continued to maintain road blocks and established a new block at COL DE VARS. Detachments of the 117th Cav Rcn Squadron and elements of the 180th Inf reconnoitered the road net BRIANCON - GUILLESTRE - BARCELONNETTE without contacting the enemy except at ST. PAUL where enemy machine gun fire was encountered. Towards the close of the period a reinforced platoon of infantry entered BRIANCON without opposition. The 3d Bn arrived in the GAP area during the morning and moved to an assembly area southeast of GREOULX while the 2d Bn main elements assembled in the vicinity of GREOULX. The 1st Bn 180th Inf completed movement from BRIANCON to GAP during the period. In accordance with instructions from VI Corps, 45th Division elements relieved 36th Division elements of maintaining a reconnaissance patrol at NYONS. The first contact was made with the 1st ABN patrol at 2030B. 70/.

4. a. Meanwhile, the following verbal orders of the Corps Commander were issued to the 36th Division: To assemble Task Force Butler in the vicinity of PUY ST. MARTIN in division reserve; 141st RCT (-2d Bn) to assume [illegible] F.F.I. and Engineer demolition party now across [illegible] to complete demolition mission; physically block Route 7; and prepare plans to attack south. 71/.

b. In the [illegible] area the 2d Bn 141st Inf, attacking [illegible] from the northeast, was counterattacked on the right flank by a [illegible] enemy force containing small arms and artillery fire at [illegible] and [illegible] each off. The fire of field artillery and the 3d Bn 141st Inf were [illegible] to enable the 2d Bn to withdraw. Three enemy vehicles [illegible] destroyed in LORMES were destroyed by our artillery fire during [illegible] Enemy forces were reported to be well established on the west [illegible] RHONE River in the vicinity of [illegible] and to have destroyed a [illegible]

69/. [illegible], 24 Aug, Sections [illegible], 37, 40, 49, 57, 64, 72, 86, 92, [illegible] 116; [illegible], 23 Aug, Sections [illegible] and 6.

70/. [illegible], 24 Aug, Sections [illegible], 25, 27, 31, 34, 36, 38, 46, 74, [illegible] 96, 97, 98 and 109; G-3 Spot Report as of [illegible] August [illegible]

71/. Summary of [illegible], 24 Aug.

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vehicles with small arms fire. At the close of the period, the 141st Inf was engaged in establishing defensive positions northeast of MONTELIMAR. Our positions in the MARSANNE area were shelled throughout the period by heavy artillery believed to be a 200mm or larger AA gun. [illegible] was observed between VALENCE and LYON during the day which would indicate that a large enemy force was being built up in the MONTELIMAR area with possibilities of a forthcoming major enemy attempt to break through our block and escape to the north. The detachment from the 111th Engineer Bn had failed to accomplish its demolition mission on the night 23-24 August.

g. The 142d Inf (-2d Bn) moved north from NYONS and MONTBRISON to establish defensive positions along the RIMANDOULE River, east of the 141st Inf positions just south of PUY ST. MARTIN, while elements maintained strong road blocks south of ALIXPAC (O-070455) and LA ROCHE ST. SECRET (O-133430). The 2d Bn completed move from GAP to the NYONS area and maintained road blocks at NYONS, LA BAUME and SCHSPIERRE. No enemy activity was encountered in the 142d Inf sector. The 143d Inf (-2d Bn), moving southwest on Route 92, occupied BOURG DE PEAGE without opposition and sent recon forces towards VALENCE prior to attacking as ordered by the CG 36th Division. The recon troops met strong opposition on the outskirts of VALENCE and the attack was not launched as originally planned. In accordance with orders from the 36th Division, 143d Inf (-2d Bn) by-passed VALENCE on the east and at the close of the period were enroute to CREST via Route 538.

h. Task Force Butler was reconstituted on 24 August and component elements were directed to assemble in the vicinity of PUY ST. MARTIN by dark in division reserve. By evening the force was assembled, and as reconstituted consisted of the following troops: 117th Cavalry Rcn Squadron (-Troop A), 3d Bn 143d Inf, 753d Tank Bn (-1 Medical and 1 Tank Company), 1 Co 634th TD Bn, 92d Armored FA Bn, Co F 344th Engineer GS Regiment. Its missions were as follows: (1) In the event of a major attack by the enemy to retire to the high ground vicinity 1264 and 145655 and hold; (2) In the event of a major attack by the enemy to retire to the high ground vicinity 1166 and 130664 and hold the pass to CREST; (3) To counterattack in the direction of MANAS, regain and hold high ground from 0759 to 1160; (4) To counterattack in the direction of MONTELIMAR, regain and hold high ground north of the town. 36th Division assumed responsibility for supply and maintenance of Task Force Butler 72/.

SECTION II - B plus 10

1. a. Throughout 25 August contact with the enemy was maintained in the MONTELIMAR area where attacks and counterattacks by both sides continued in mounting fury and strength, while rapid gains continued to be made in the AVIGNON - ORANGE - CARPENTRAS area. The following instructions were given by the Corps Commander to the 36 Division: Advance to new objective line ORANGE - AVIGNON River - NYONS; seize AVIGNON if possible without becoming embroiled in heavy fighting - otherwise isolate the city on the north; continue advance in strength beyond objective line; and gain contact with 36th Division elements at NYONS 73/.

b. On the Corps left flank 36 Division motorized patrols and green troops occupied the road note northwest towards the new objective line without encountering the enemy south of AVIGNON. Heavy forces of the 2d Bn 7th Inf moved northward from CARPENTRAS to clear through ORANGE and AVIGNON, then turned north for ORANGE where some very good action was encountered. The 2d Bn advanced to [illegible] with green troops proceeding

73/. HQ, 36 Aug, Entries 65, 80, 117 and 119; HQ, 25 Aug, Entries 73, 18 and 19; G-3 Weekly for period ending 26AUG45 and Unit Report as of 26AUG45 (August); G-2 Report No. 18, 25 Aug; Annex 2A.

73/. Summary of VOGL, 25 Aug.

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to SAINT-TROPAZ without opposition. The 1st Bn continued advancing westward and upon reaching [illegible] contacted by [illegible]. Other [illegible] [illegible] taking road blocks in the [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] roads and [illegible] 87. [illegible] - GRENOBLE without contacting the enemy, [illegible] - GRENOBLE motor to the [illegible] area. The 1[illegible] Inf completed [illegible] from the [illegible] GAP by 1[illegible] moving south to [illegible] before [illegible] The 30th Inf, upon being relieved by elements of French Army "B", assembled at SALON and completed movement to an assembly area near AIX. At the close of the period the regiment was in process of shuttle movement to VARCES via SAULX. On the 3d Division left flank, French Army "B" continued advancing after completely relieving all 3d Division elements and captured TARASCON and ARLES, while other French forces continued to reduce pockets of enemy resistance in TOULON and MARSEILLES 74/.

2. a. The following verbal orders were issued by the Corps Commander to the 45th Division: Move 3d Bn 157th Inf and 191st Tank Bn to MYONS, attached to 36th Division upon arrival; move 179th RCT (-3d Bn) to GRENOBLE in Corps reserve; Brig Gen Church, Commanding the Corps reserve, to extend vigorous reconnaissance and follow up action from GRENOBLE along the north bank of DRONE River through ALLEX and LIVRON to the ROHNE River, clearing the enemy from the area 75/.

b. The 157th Inf completed movement to SERRES by 1200B and sent recon elements to MYONS, contacting the 2d Bn 142d Inf. The 3d Bn 157th Inf and 191st Tank Bn proceeded by motor to the MYONS area, and upon arrival were attached to the 36th Division and moved to ROMAN (northwest of PUY ST. MARTIN), while the remaining elements of 157th Inf reverted to Corps reserve and commenced movement to GREST. The 179th RCT (-2d Bn) continued to maintain road blocks and operate patrols in the GRENOBLE area, one recon unit reaching CHAMBERY without opposition. Approximately 1000 prisoners from the 157th Reserve Division were captured in the vicinity of DOMENE. The enemy surrendered en masse when surrounded by our units on one side and with their escape route to the northwest cut off by the F.F.I. The 2d Bn 179th Inf remained at LAMAGNE maintaining road blocks to the west. In the GRILLEMORE sector the 2d Bn 180th Inf continued to reconnoiter the road nets in the area and maintain road blocks. The reinforced platoon located in BRIANCON made no contact with the enemy and established a road block northwest of the town. The 3d Bn remained in assembly southeast of GRENOBLE while the 1st Bn completed movement from GAP to VIF (south of GRENOBLE) prepared to support the 179th Inf in GRENOBLE 76/.

3. a. In the MONTELIMAR area 36th Division troops were in close contact with enemy forces throughout 25 August. Our main frontline dispositions northeast of MONTELIMAR remained the same, with the 142d Inf covering the left flank, 141st Inf on the right flank, and several battalions of field artillery established on the ground overlooking the ROHNE Valley and Route 7. During the preceding night, enemy pressure forced the withdrawal of the 141st Inf road block at SAULCE (south of LORIOL). At 1400B, the 141st Inf, supported by two companies of 2d Bn 143d Inf, launched an attack from LES TOURETTES to cut the highway and re-establish a road block. The attack succeeded and by 1900B a strong road block was established at LA GONCHONNE on Route 7. Before noon, an enemy column of approximately 100 vehicles preceded by tanks was

74/. WBJ, 25 Aug, Entries #10, 24, 29, 31, 35, 42, 46, 50, 64 and 66; New GP, Entries #9, 37 and 43; WBJ, 26 Aug, Entries #5 and 8.

75/. Summary of VOCG, 25 Aug.

76/. WBJ, 25 Aug, Entries #9, 18, 39, 47, 57, 58, 60 and 63; New GP, Entries #5 and 55; WBJ, 26 Aug, Entry #3; G-2 Report No. 11, 26 Aug.

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[illegible] south from LORIOL. On orders from CG 36th Division to [illegible] to prevent the night flank, Task Force Butler, then in [illegible] to prevent the enemy column. At GRENE the column was [illegible] to intercept the enemy column. At GRENE the column was [illegible] by the tanks and tank destroyers of Task Force Butler, resulting in the [illegible] of six enemy vehicles and forcing the column to withdraw. The 141st Inf completed movement from [illegible] to the vicinity of [illegible] in the morning. The 2d Bn was attached to Task Force Butler, two companies of the 2d Bn were establishing the 141st Inf to cut Route 7, while the 1st Bn moved into the line to fill the gap between 141st and 143d Inf regiments.

3. During the afternoon, repeated counterattacks in small strength were launched by the enemy all along the front northeast of MONTELIMAR, one of which succeeded in penetrating GRENE. A strong force of enemy infantry supported by tanks attacked the 111th Engineer Company holding the line at [illegible] and succeeded in forcing our withdrawal to within 1½ miles south of [illegible]. Artillery and tank destroyer fire by the 141st RCT stopped the enemy advance, while the 1st Bn 143d Inf, then moving into position, counterattacked to restore our lines and recapture ROMEIRE. Towards evening, an enemy column of 20 tanks was observed approaching from ALIXE (G-0477) where it turned east and headed for GRENE. Artillery fire was directed on this column and forced it to withdraw. During the period, air support was requested to assist in the destruction of the growing German forces in the MONTELIMAR area, but both safety line difficulties caused by the constantly changing front lines delayed its immediate arrival 77/.

4. The VI Corps command post closed west of RIANS and opened in the vicinity of ANPHES at 1700B 25 August 1944. 78/.

SECTION XIV - D plus 11

1. Shortly after midnight of 25-26 August, the 1st Bn 143d Inf driving south met a German attack at ROMEIRE. A counterattack was launched immediately and after a brisk fire fight the enemy was forced to withdraw to the south, beyond the town. During the same period, a strong enemy armored group, proceeding north from MONTELIMAR had succeeded in breaking the road block established on Route #7 by the 2d Bn 143d Inf and elements of the 141st Inf in the vicinity of LA GOUCHONDE. In this sector there had been no mortars or artillery employed by the enemy, the strength of the attacking forces in the several thrusts being confined to tanks. The enemy was using these armored elements as a screen, while attempting to withdraw the bulk of his motorized and horse-drawn units and supplies to the north to evade the trap. Three strong German attacks were launched during the day in the area ROMEIRE - SAUZET and farther west to Highway #7 as the enemy sought to break out from the MONTELIMAR pocket and maintain contact with forces between MARSANNE and LORIOL. However, the 141st and 143d RCTs maintained their positions while the BUTLER Task Force held the road blocks on Highway #7 at three different places in the LA GOUCHONDE area despite a day-long struggle with panzer units which repeatedly forced these harvesters in a vain attempt to escape north towards LORIOL. These panzer regiments, the 15th, 110th and 111th, were subjected to steady interdictory fire by long-tons of the 777th FA Bn supporting the 36th Division as they strung out on the highway - their escape route blocked by the lack of a suitable ford over the DROME River between LORIOL and LIVRON 79/.

77/. WBJ, 25 Aug, Entries #11, 25, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 45, 53, 65, and 67; New CP, Entries #2, 3, 23, 32, 34, 52, 54 and 97; WBJ, 26 Aug, Entry #3; G-2 Report No. 11, 26 Aug.

78/. G-3 Report No. 12, 26 Aug.

79/. WBJ, 26 Aug, Entries #1, 3, 19, 48, 57, 61, 76, 99 and 103.

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2. To the north, the 157th Inf had moved west through GRENT and crossed the Saône north of the Doubs River after a severe fire fight, establishing road blocks to the north and northwest. South of the river, Task Force BUTLER captured GRAYE and extended its lines due west toward LORIOL and southwest through MARSANNE, where they encountered a stiff fire fight, and on to LA COUCOURDE. Despite the persistent armored opposition all the way, they succeeded in establishing a line along Highway #7 where they could manner enemy movement along this road 80/.

3. Moving north from AVIGNON, which had been occupied and cleared by the 3d Recon Troop, the 7th Inf Recon Troop reached ORANGE in the early morning but were kept from entering the town by a superior enemy force of tanks, flamegons and infantry which was firmly entrenched. However, on the approach of supporting units of the 1st and 2d Bns 7th Inf, ORANGE was cleared of resistance with little effort. To the right, the 15th and 30th Infantry pushed steadily north and northwest with six battalions abreast to free VAISON and NYONS and main contact with elements of the 36th Division at NYONS. By the close of the day, the 1st Bn 7th Inf had reached MONTAS on Route #7 north of ORANGE and had recon elements as far as BOLLENE. The ring around MONTELIMAR had been tightened, despite the delay in the advance of the 3d Division caused by the difficulties in bringing gasoline over their extended supply routes 81/.

4. Meanwhile, the 45th Division Recon Troop had pushed far to the north and northwest of GRENOBLE and found the road not clear of the enemy in the extended area VIENNE - VAULX MILIEU - BOURGOIN - MONTREVEL - BURCIN - ST. ANDRE LE GAZ - ST. JEAN DE BOURNAY. Telephone communication was established with the F.F.I. at LA TOUR DU PIN and CHARNECY, to the north and northeast of GRENOBLE. The French reported that approximately 1000 enemy were in the vicinity of ALBERTVILLE (Z-1984) and that a large enemy motorized force was across the Italian border, just east and northeast of BRIANCON. In this right center, elements of the 2d and 3d Bns 100th Inf with "A" Troop of the 117th Cav Recon Squadron maintained road blocks in BRIANCON as well as at GRILLENOTRE, ST. PAUL and COL DE LAUTARET to the south. Between the latter two towns the F.F.I. supported armored units of the 117th Cav Recon Sqdn in driving the enemy back from their stronghold at MENTONNES. To the north, recon elements of the 179th Inf established road blocks near GRANCHE (Z-0969) and sent artillery support to the Maquis at AQUEBELLE and LA CHAPELLE, both towns being cleared of the enemy by nightfall. 82/.

SECTION XIII - 8 - 18 Aug 44

1. Stubborn enemy resistance continued throughout 17 August north of MONTELIMAR and in the LA COUCOURDE area. The 2d and 3d Bns 141st Inf threw back vicious counterattacks from [illegible] and also in the [illegible] sector to the southeast, but at the end of the period both bases remained in enemy hands. Task Force BUTLER resumed the attack against LA COUCOURDE [illegible] pulling their forces from the bend to the east [illegible] of artillery, while also pushing patrols to the northwest where they [illegible] up two enlisted trucks at [illegible]. In the left of the division sector, the 1st and 2d Bns 157th Inf continued [illegible] operations in [illegible] and then pushed southward to establish [illegible] with [illegible] and infantry 1000 yards to the left of [illegible]. The [illegible] continued to [illegible] enemy in the [illegible] area. [illegible] to [illegible] Highway #7 [illegible] and [illegible] Highway [illegible] in [illegible] support of [illegible] forces pushed the enemy south of the northward [illegible] towards. 83/.

82/. [illegible], 16 Aug, Bulletins [illegible] and 117.

81/. [illegible], 16 Aug, Bulletins [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] and 131.

80/. [illegible], 16 Aug, Bulletins [illegible] and [illegible].

83/. [illegible], 17 Aug, Bulletins [illegible], 13, 73 and 136, G-3 [illegible] No. 14, 20 Aug.

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2. The 3d Division plunged northward at an accelerated pace, main elements moving to within five miles of MONTELIMAR by the end of the day. Recon units of the 15th Inf were probing the town's outskirts by nightfall while to the east the 1st and 2d Bns 30th Inf had cleared through GRIGNAN and TAULIGNAN and had reached COLOMBIER and GOUDHE where they made contact with the left flank of the 36th Division. Relatively little opposition was encountered except for machine gun and 88mm fire when the 1st Bn 15th Inf entered BONLIEU, which was by-passed by the main body of the regiment. On the Corps left flank, the 7th Inf ranged north on Highway #7, clearing the towns of LAPALED and PIERRELATTE and cleaning out the many other isolated pockets of resistance along the RHONE River. 84/.

3. To the north, the 3d Bn 179th Inf pushed out northeast from GRENOBLE two-thirds of the distance to LYON, reaching BOURGOIN after meeting only negligible resistance. However, patrols of the 45th Division Recon Troop, ranging southeast from GRENOBLE towards VALENCE and VOIRON, had a sharp clash with the enemy moving northeast at ST. LATTIER. Apparently the hostile forces had turned northeast from BOURG DE PEAGE towards ST. MARCELLIN on finding their escape route to the north cut off by the F.F.I. occupation of TOURNON. 85/.

4. In the afternoon of August 27, a Corps field message was issued ordering the organization of a Provisional Flank Protection Force (Task Force BIRO) to relieve the 2d and 3d Bns 180th Inf on the Corps right flank in the BRIANCON sector. Composing this force were Troop "A" 117th Cav Recon Sqdn, 2d Chemical Bn (less 2 co), one company each from the 2d and 83d Chemical Bns, two platoons of the 180th Inf Anti-Tank Co, and one battery of the 272nd FA Bn. Its mission was to prevent enemy infiltration or penetration on the Corps right flank between COL DE LARCHE north to AIGUEBELLE and to maintain contact with the 1st Airborne Task Force on the right through a detachment at DIGNE.

SECTION XIV - Page 13

1. After the Task Force BIRO command post had been opened at BRIANCON on 28 August, the two battalions of the 180th Inf moved northwest to GRENOBLE, preparatory to joining the other 45th Division elements in the push to the north. During the day the 179th Inf continued to push rapidly northwest towards LYON, command posts of the 2d and 3d Bns having been established in VOIRON and BOURGOIN respectively, while recon units of the MTF had vigorously patrolled the surrounding towns of ST. JEAN, ST. [illegible] to the northeast and west of GRENOBLE, and southwest to ST. MARCELLIN where the 45th Division Recon Troop had established road blocks the previous day to halt enemy forces moving northeast from VALENCE and the MONTELIMAR pocket. 86/.

2. The main forces of the 11th France and 159th Reserve Divisions had succeeded in escaping from the MONTELIMAR pocket, moving north to VIENNE and LYON, where F.F.I. units had established themselves in the suburbs. The French partisans reported approximately 10,000 of the enemy in the LYON sector with strong fortifications and road blocks around the entire city. 87/.

3. However, the attack ring closing around the MONTELIMAR pocket had succeeded in cutting off many other hostile forces. On the north flank, Task Force BUTLER converged on LYON, with the 1st Bn 141st Inf, successively

86/. [illegible], 27 Aug, Bulletin #75, 112 and 116.

87/. [illegible], 27 Aug, Bulletin #76, 8, 14 and 102.

88/. [illegible], 28 Aug, Bulletin #76, 89, 107 and 108.

89/. [illegible], 28 Aug, Daily File; G-2 Report No. 13, 28 Aug.

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[illegible] strong opposition from enemy tanks and flak guns, while the 143d Inf [illegible] to move the remnants of LIVRON. The enemy [illegible] counter-attacks in the evening and started to push the [illegible] back but they failed to withstand allied fire. On the west flank, the 143d Inf held strongly in the [illegible] sector and the 142d Inf outflanked the remaining positions, [illegible] from the vicinity of LA GOUDOUNNE, while the division artillery, using direct and tank fire, swept up and down the highway delivering a steady stream of fire on the completely disorganized, [illegible] columns of enemy vehicles which included [illegible] and supply-laden goat cart and [illegible]. On the southeast, the 1st and 3d Bns 7th Inf and the 2d Bn 30th Inf, moved ahead to within two miles of MONTELIMAR while the 1st Bn 15th Inf, pushing directly north, had cleared through the town shortly after noon after overcoming stiff resistance. South of MONTELIMAR, the remaining two battalions of the 15th Inf had encountered and engaged a double-tracked column of approximately 300 German vehicles and guns which were stretched along the highway over a distance of two kilometers. 88/.

4. During the day all resistance had ceased in MARSEILLES and TOULON, thus freeing the French forces for a faster movement to the north on the west bank of the RHONE River. 89/.

SECTION IV - D plus 14

1. By mid-morning of 29 August the "MONTELIMAR INCIDENT" was closed. All but isolated resistance had completely ceased. While the 15th Inf cleared the area surrounding the town, the 7th Inf closed in from the east on the hills north of MONTELIMAR preparatory to contacting and relieving the 143d Inf which was engaged in mopping up in the LA GOUDOUNNE sector. White flags of surrender appeared all through the hills in this area, and in a short time the entire area was freed of organized enemy forces. Prior to relief by the 7th Inf, the 143d Inf had captured more than 600 of the enemy, including Brigadier General OTTO KIENZLE, commander of the 198th Infantry Division. 90/.

2. During the day, the 36th Division was completely relieved in the MONTELIMAR sector by the 3d Division and subsequently headed north for a concerted drive on VALENCE and LYON. To the north, the 142d Inf had relieved the 157th Inf of the 45th Division north of ALLEX, and continued the advance on LIVRON to the west against artillery, tank, mortar and scattered machine gun fire. By the end of the day the 2d Bn had cleared LIVRON and the 3d Bn had passed through to extend to the north and northwest. On the right, the 3d Bn 141st Inf had pushed north to clear the road leading to BOURG DE PEAGE and VALENCE from the south and had reached a point just below CHABEUIL (G-1292). 91/.

3. After relief of the 36th Division had been completed, the 3d Division consolidated its positions on the east and west of Highway #7, the 7th Inf in MONTELIMAR, the 15th in LA GOUDOUNNE area and the 30th assembled in ROCHEFORT to the southeast. Small remaining pockets of resistance were mopped up as the 15th Inf prepared to move northeast via BOURG DE PEAGE to the VOIRON area. 92/.

88/. WRJ, 28 Aug, Entries #12, 43, 55, 62 and 64; G-3 Report No. 15, 29 Aug.

89/. WRJ, 28 Aug, Entries #16 and 81.

90/. WRJ, 29 Aug, Entry #21; G-2 Report No. 14, 30 Aug; G-3 Report No. 16, 30 Aug.

91/. WRJ, 29 Aug, Entry #127; G-3 Report No. 16, 30 Aug.

92/. WRJ, 29 Aug, Entries #23 and 96.

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[illegible]

5. During the day, most [illegible] prisoners were taken from the 143d and 145th Panzer Grenadier Regiments, the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 1st and 2d SS Regiments, the 1st Battalion of the 2d Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 3d Regiment. Among the prisoners, the Germans, Poles and even some Russians. 93/.

6. In the south, in the 45th Division zone, the 1st Bn 179th Inf [illegible] reported that [illegible] 94/.

6. On the Seventh Army front, Task Force ZERO (TF77) was attached by a superior force coming northeast from Italy and was forced to evacuate BRIANCON and STAUPIN [illegible] after a vain attempt to defend the town. Following a stiff near guard action, [illegible] were withdrawn to the southwest in a tunnel at BOIS DE LAVERNEZ and to the south at St. GERVIS and St. GIRONS, north and west of GRENOBLE. Contact with the enemy was lost and patrols reconnoitering BRIANCON reported the enemy had withdrawn, but the Task Force did not attempt to retake the town, concentrating instead on the organization and strengthening of their defensive positions to the north and south. 95/.

SECTION XVI - [illegible] 15

1. The enemy was still on the run up the RHONE Valley towards LYON with the 36th Division in close pursuit during 30 August. A futile rear-guard action was staged by approximately 1000 enemy at the junction of the RHONE and BRESE Rivers but the 141st Inf had sealed the last escape route to the north and west. Advancing north and northwest from GIVORS, the 1st and 3d Bns 141st Inf had cleared BRONIS, MEYZIEU, CHANEYZIEU, ALBIAN and made contact with elements of the 1st Bn 179th Inf near BOURG DE FRANS, and by nightfall had cleared the town against stiffening resistance, and had pushed a reinforced company to the southwest to VAUGRIS which was found clear of the enemy except for scattered pockets on the outskirts. The 141st Inf continued its move northward from GIVORS to BRONIS preparatory to assisting the 141st Inf in the conquest of the remaining enemy elements in the VAUGRIS area. 96/.

2. The 34 Division concluded mopping up operations in the MONTELIMAR - LYNCH sector and reorganized their troops for the move to VOIRON as soon as they were relieved by the MAQUIS. Exact figures of the heavy enemy losses in the MONTELIMAR pocket were unavailable because of the vast conglomeration of dead men and animals and debris of wrecked vehicles heavily strewn along Highway 87 for a distance of 18 kilometers. However, more than 2500 prisoners had been taken by the 34 and 36th Divisions and it was estimated that the enemy lost: 2000 vehicles of all types, most of them totally destroyed; 1000 horses; 32 75mm and 88mm guns; six railroad

93/. G-2 Report No. 15, 31 Aug.

94/. WBJ, 29 Aug, Entries #100 and 121; G-3 Report No. 16, 30 Aug.

95/. WBJ, 29 Aug, Entries #94, 121, 128, 139 and 143.

96/. WBJ, 30 Aug, Entries #69, 82 and 118; G-3 Report No. 17, 31 Aug; G-2 Journal, 31 Aug, Entry #34.

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guns, two of which were 380mm; 50 AA guns; 10 self-propelled guns; and large quantities of organizational and personal supplies and equipment. 97/.

3. To the north, the 45th Division made rapid strides toward BOURG EN BRESSE with the mission of trapping enemy elements in the LYON area and closing all escape routes to the troops which were being pursued by the 36th Division from the south. In the left prong of the advance, the 2d Bn 179th Inf, followed by the 1st Bn, occupied GRENIEU, LOKETTES and MEXIMIEUX (T-2104). The enemy reacted to a small degree in MEXIMIEUX, but the town was cleared after a short skirmish and the 45th Recon Troop pushed ahead toward CHALAMONT (T-1915). Recon elements of the 645th TD Bn pushed north toward AMBERIEU, freeing the towns of MENIEU, MONTLUZIN and LAGNIEU enroute, followed by the 2d Bn 180th Inf which assembled in ST. SORLIN and MONTALIEU and the 3d Bn which closed in BRENAU to clean out small pockets of enemy. Resistance was negligible in this thrust to the north, and by midnight recon units had cleared through AMBERIEU and were well on their way to PORT D'ALIX. 98/.

4. On the far right flank, Task Force BERO maintained road blocks north and south of BEZANCON, awaiting relief by the 2d DIM of French Army "B" which was enroute from LE LUC. At the same time, the 3d DIA was heading toward GRENOBLE to take over American positions along the French border sector. 99/.

5. At 302230B August, a field message was issued directing the 3d Division to assume responsibility of the protection of the Corps right flank, from BEZANCON to the north. During the day, Task Force BUTLER had been disbanded in the vicinity of GIVRY and its elements returned to their parent units. 100/.

SECTION XVII - 31 plus 1d

1. The advance to the north continued on 31 August. Elements of the 141st Inf cleared out the one remaining pocket of resistance in VAIRNOX by noon after a stiff fire fight and then continued pushing to the north from BOURG EN PRESSE toward BOURGPAINS, clearing and occupying the towns of GIRMENIX, MARNY and BEYSSERIEUX enroute. The 142d Inf drove north, from LAYNOX to BOURG EN PRESSE, meeting only isolated resistance which was easily neutralized during the advance, while the 143d Inf followed along behind the 141st Inf in the drive toward BOURGPAINS, where progress was halted by strongly held enemy road blocks to the south of the town. Remaining out to the southwest of BOURG EN PRESSE, the 36th Recon Troop had made contact with elements of the 179th Inf east of BOURGPAINS. 101/.

2. In the center sector of LYON, 45th Division elements had encountered resistance from every point as they pushed to the west and the south. Road blocks were established by the 179th Inf south of the AIN River - one between (T-1790) south of BOURGPAINS (T-2114) and at PONT - and by the 180th Inf at PONT D'AIN and at the east junction east of PONCIN (T-2485). Patrols in from the BOURGPAINS area to Jons and Montrevel, formed elements of the 180th Inf had reached LAGNIEU, with the remainder of the regiment following. In the sector of the 36 Division, the 15th Inf had reached the

97/. WDC, 30 Aug. Relation 8th and 15th.

98/. WDC, 30 Aug. Relation 8th and 15th; G-3 Report No. 16, 31 Aug.

99/. WDC, 30 Aug. Relation 8th and 15th.

100/. G-3 Report No. 17, 31 Aug.

101/. WDC (Report), 31 Aug. Relation 8th and 4th; WDC (Journal), 31 Aug. Entry 4.

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assembly area north of VOIRON, the 30th Inf was enroute, and the 7th Inf cleaned out remaining pockets in the MONTELIMAR area and prepared to move north the next day. 102/.

3. In the short period of seventeen days, VI Corps troops had accomplished their most successful operation of the current war by advancing from the invasion beaches of Southeastern France to points almost 300 miles to the north, thereby liberating from German control an area of approximately 17,500 square miles. This lightning drive on the east side of the RHONE River had closed the escape routes for many thousands of enemy still in Southwestern France while cutting off the German supply and evacuation arteries to and from Northwestern Italy. Thousands of tons of enemy materiel had been captured or destroyed and more than 23,000 prisoners, including four general officers and one rear admiral, had been taken, mainly from the 198th, 338th and 716th Infantry Divisions and the 11th Panzer and 1st Flieger Divisions - all elements of the Nineteenth German Army.

102/. WBJ, 31 Aug, Entry #50; G-3 Report No. 17, 31 Aug.

L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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ANNEX

ANNEXES

TO

VI CORPS HISTORY

JULY AND AUGUST 1944

ANNEX #1 - Notes on Operational Planning for Operation ANVIL

ANNEX #2 - Operational Summary of Task Force BUTLER, dated 6 September 1944, with Map and Overlay

ANNEX #3 - Combat Troop List

ANNEX #4 - Casualty Report of VI Corps Troops

ANNEX #5 - Roster of Officers

ANNEX #6 - Changes in Officer Personnel

ANNEX #7 - Report of Strength, Battle Casualties, Decorations and Awards - August 1944.

ANNEX #8 - Map of VI Corps Route of Advance and Daily Progress

ANNEX #9 - VI Corps Field Order No. 1 (Operation ANVIL)

UNDER SEPARATE COVER: (1 copy only)

ANNEX #10 - G-2 Journals (July and August 1944)

ANNEX #11 - G-3 Journal (July 1944)

ANNEX #12 - G-2, G-3 Journal 13-16 Aug, 15 Aug (Aboard U.S.S. Barnett), and War Room Journals (August 1944)

ANNEX #13 - G-3 Siturep and Spot Reports (August 1944)

ANNEX #14 - G-3 Reports, Field Messages, and Summary of Verbal Orders of the Corps Commander (August 1944)

ANNEX #15 - G-3 Air Journals (August 1944)

ANNEX #16 - G-4 Journal with Supporting Papers (August 1944)

ANNEX #17 - VI Corps Tentative Outline Plan, and Outline Plan to Operation ANVIL

ANNEX #18 - Combined G-2, G-3 Journal - Task Force BUTLER

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 464, U. S. Army

10 August 1944

NOTES ON THE CONDUCT OF VI CORPS OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR OPERATION ANVIL

1. Introduction to ANVIL:

The inception of Operation ANVIL as applied directly to VI Corps took the form of a visit by the Corps Commander, his Chief of Staff, and his chiefs of section to the headquarters of the Seventh Army Commander (Force 163) at ALGIERS. Here they were briefed on the forthcoming operation, and were given an Army outline plan and supporting material.

2. The Planning Headquarters:

a. For planning purposes the Corps Headquarters was divided into a planning staff and an operating headquarters. Tentative plans for the breakdown of the headquarters to accommodate this scheme were made in ROME. Prior to the movement of the headquarters from ROME to the NAPLES area, an advance detachment consisting of the Chief of Staff and the Headquarters Commandant proceeded to NAPLES to select appropriate sites for the planning headquarters and the Corps Headquarters proper. The site for the former installation was an Italian barracks located in downtown NAPLES near the waterfront, which barracks had been maintained by FSS as a rest center. The Corps CP proper was located near the town of BAGNOLI, a suburb some five miles W of NAPLES.

b. The barracks selected for the planning headquarters was ideal in nearly every respect. It consisted of a four-winged building built about a large square, and was surrounded by a high wall thru which there were but two entrances. The building had two levels, access to the upper level being gained by two stairways. This arrangement of entrances and stairways made the problem of guard and security comparatively simple. The building itself consisted of some 30 rooms, all of which were satisfactory for office purposes. Sufficient sanitary facilities were present. Special rooms were selected for EM lounges, an officers' lounge, and three messes. These installations together with living quarters for both officers and EM, the headquarters commandant's office, and a visitors room, were located on the ground floor. The rooms on the upper floor were subdivided among all the units that would ultimately comprise the central syndicate. The subdivision allotted:

2 rooms for the Corps G-3
2 rooms for the Corps G-2
1 room for the Corps G-4
1 room for the Corps Commander
1 room for the Corps Chief of Staff
1 room for the War Room
1 room for the Corps Arty
1 room for each Naval Sub-Task Force Commander (3 rooms)
3 rooms for the 3d Division planning staff
3 rooms for the 36th Division planning staff
3 rooms for the 45th Division planning staff
1 room for the AG (Distribution)

The Corps Special Staff Sections maintained planning representatives as follows:

Sig with G-3
AA with G-3
Engr with G-4
Ord with G-4
QM with G-4
Surg with G-4

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ANNEX # 1

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c. The Corps planning headquarters was first to arrive and install itself in the planning syndicate. The next to arrive was the Naval Training Commander and his staff. The planning staffs of the divisions and their naval components were next to arrive, closing in within a week of the opening of the syndicate. The 3d Inf Div's naval component served in a dual capacity, in that it also supervised and coordinated naval training as applied to all divisions and the ITC. The Naval Task Force Commander and his staff arrived in NAPLES about one month following the opening of the syndicate, and established a separate headquarters. Army headquarters (Force 163) arrived in NAPLES on 10 July.

3. Training:

a. Once firmly established in the planning syndicate, the Corps Commander directed his G-3 to prepare an outline for a Corps training directive applicable to the problem at hand. The outline was to form the basis of a personal letter-directive from the Corps Commander. This letter was distributed approximately one week after the opening of the syndicate, and was followed closely by another letter outlining the status of the ITC, and its duties in cooperating with the divisions and the Navy.

b. In order to keep an accurate check on the status of unit training, an officer of the G-3 Section was given the task of maintaining a large chart which indicated the principal training subjects of all combat elements of the Corps down to and including battalions. A quick glance at this chart enabled one to determine the training activity for any particular day. It proved to be of invaluable assistance in arranging training and liaison visits.

c. The ITC (Commanded by Brig Gen Wolf) consisted of a special staff together with special equipment for amphibious training. It was attached to VI Corps upon the latter's arrival in the NAPLES area. The ITC was established at SALERNO. The scope of its instruction included waterproofing, TQM schools, obstacle gapping, DD tank training, demonstrations, landing craft technique problems, craft landing problems, and exercises from both craft and combat loaders up to and including RCTs. A special Navy staff operated with the Commanding General ITC for the purpose of coordinating Naval problems. In addition to the amphibious training conducted at the ITC, units undergoing its course of instruction conducted other applicable training during open periods. The 45th and 36th Divs, in that order, were put thru a 20-day course of instruction. The 3d Div, by virtue of its previous experience in this type of training, conducted its own training along similar lines in the POZZUOLI area.

d. Training of NSPCPs was conducted at the ITC under a special Army and Navy staff.

e. The RCTs rounded up their training in each division with a well-planned landing exercise. By the time these exercises were prepared, planning had progressed to the extent that the problem applied directly to the mission that the RCT would ultimately have. This objective aspect was especially valuable from the training standpoint.

f. Each division conducted a full-scale rehearsal prior to final loading and sailing. The 3d Inf Div conducted its exercise on 21 July; the 45th Inf Div and 36th Inf Div conducted their exercises on 7 August. Total unloading of vehicles from LCTs was made, DD tanks were launched, and all assault personnel landed. LSTs did not drop pontoons. The principal value of the exercises was, of course, to provide a test of communications, soundness of loading, and the schedule and technique of the landing of the various elements.

4. Planning:

a. Corps Outline Plans:

(1) Concurrently with the preparation of the training directive, the planners proceeded to digest the Army plan. Several conferences with the Corps Commander were held in which the

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Corps mission was carefully studied, and various approaches to the execution of the mission were developed. Ultimately a tentative Corps outline plan was drafted and issued to divisions for planning purposes. Since it was deemed necessary to supply the divisions with an allocation of their craft, the tentative Army craft allocation, which was broken down by Army to include divisions, was issued. At this point a new Army outline plan arrived. This plan was considerably different from the original and gave rise to a new study on the part of the Corps Commander and his planning staff. After reviewing the new plan and accompanying material, the Corps Commander sent a letter to the Force Commander outlining to him certain objections to the Army plan. The principal points covered in this letter were:

(a) Change in allocation of beaches in order to avoid the landing of the center division astride the SAN TROPEZ gulf.
(b) Change in the landing order of divisions as follows: From R to L - 36th, 45th, and 3d, whereas the Army plan indicated from R to L - 3d, 45th, and 36th.
(c) A request that instead of leading two divisions completely for shore-to-shore landing, and the remaining division (center division) completely for ship-to-shore landing, each division have approximately two RCTs loaded for shore-to-shore landing, and the remaining RCT loaded for ship-to-shore landing.
(d) A strong recommendation that the Naval Task Force Commander and the Air Commander establish planning headquarters on the Corps level (this was never done).
(e) Question as to whether the Corps Commander was correct in his understanding that he was the actual commander of the assault.
(f) An explanation to the effect that the initial phase line indicated on the new Army plan was too far inland, and a recommendation that the line given in the original plan be adopted with minor changes.

(2) The second and final Corps Outline Plan followed the first by some two weeks, and embodied several minor changes in boundaries and landing beaches. It was presented in field order form to establish annex numbers, and to assist divisions in preparing their own field order drafts.

b. Troop List:

(1) The Corps G-3 next proceeded to develop a Corps troop list based on the tentative phased troop list provided by Army. Careful study of this list revealed that certain units which the Corps desired were not listed, while certain units were deemed unessential. The G-3 duplicated the Army troop list and distributed it to the other sections and special staff with a request that they indicate in the section pertaining to them whether they desired any additional units, plus the substitution or deletion on other units. When these lists were returned to the G-3, he was able to prepare a tentative desired troop list accompanied by a request for certain additional units, and a separate memorandum indicating desired deletions or substitutions. This new tentative troop list was not broken down into assault and follow-up, but included all units with figures on their T/O strengths of personnel and T/BA strengths for vehicles. The list was then forwarded to the Force Commander for consideration.

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(2) The follow-up troop list offered certain problems which could not readily be solved in terms of personnel and vehicle lifts. The principal difficulty was centered in the necessity for divisions and Corps troops to manipulate personnel and vehicle figures to meet an arbitrary lift based on personnel and vehicle totals, whereas if the divisions and Corps troops had known the craft, they could have pre-stowed and organized follow-ups with as much accuracy as the assault.

c. Problems Concerning Craft Characteristics:

(1) Certain LSTs were provided with 6 davits while others were equipped with but 2. The former category was suitable for loading and landing of assault battalions on the basis of 5 LSTs per assault battalion, making available 25 LCVPs to them. The latter group was suitable for vehicle and general personnel lift only.

(2) Of the LCTs assigned there were two general categories, the long and short models. The latter type, when equipped with a ramp extension, could accommodate the launching of DD tanks at sea, and it became necessary, therefore, to nominate sufficient of these craft for each division to accommodate plans for launching a maximum of 16 DD tanks per division (4 craft). (Divisions ultimately used DD tanks as follows: 3d Inf Div - 8; 45th Inf Div - 12; 36th Inf Div - 16).

(3) Since divisions were also provided with two engineer gapping teams equipped with special tanks, one of the latter type of LCT had to be ear-marked for each of these teams.

(4) It is well to note here certain of the problems attendent upon the use of small craft on XAPs. Although in general, two XAPs carry sufficient small craft to accommodate one assault battalion davit-loaded, the maneuver requirements relative to the XAPs made their use in the assault impracticable. This was due to the requirement on the part of the Naval Task Force Commander that these ships go together in one convoy, and that those elements pertaining to each division break away from the main convoy only after daylight. H hour had been set for three hours after daylight. It was figured that the minimum time between break-away, and the time small craft could reach the beach after divisional elements had gone to their respective rendezvous, lowered boats, and the boats proceeded to shore, would be four hours. This made the troops loaded aboard the XAPs available for reserve use only. Numerous conferences were held on the feasability of allowing the divisional XAPs to go with the division convoys, but this plan was vetoed. The problem of how far off-shore the XAPs would launch small craft was also discussed, and due to the threat of shore batteries, a tentative minimum initial distance off-shore of 21,000 yards was established for the transport area.

(5) Due to the allocation of 6-davit and 2-davit LSTs, certain problems concerning pontons were presented. Of the 3d Inf Div's 22 LSTs only two were of the 2-davit type, and carried but two pontons. The ponton requirements, however, for beaches 259 and 261 was 9. The 45th Inf Div and 36th Inf Div, on the other hand, had seven 2-davit LSTs apiece carrying fourteen pontons - considerably more than required for their beaches. It was planned, therefore, to have the 3d

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Inf Div's two pontoon-carrying LSTs, plus one pontoon-carrying GCI (Air Corps radio control LST) drop pontoons on beach 260. Four of the 45th Inf Div's pontoon-carrying LSTs plus another pontoon-carrying GCI would drop pontoons on beach 261. The 45th Inf Div's remaining 5 pontoon-carrying LSTs would drop on their own assault beaches. The 36th Inf Div would drop all of its pontons on its own beaches.

d. Craft Allocation:

(1) Concerning craft allocation, the material received by Corps from Force included a tentative allotment of craft for the assault, as stated above, but, figured craft for follow-ups in terms of personnel and vehicle lifts, and not numbers of craft. During the course of a second visit to the Army Headquarters at ALGIERS by the Corps Commander and his staff (which visit, incidentally, was prompted by the reply of the Army Commander to the letter written him by the Corps Commander concerning the Army Plan), it was explained that the allocation of craft was far from firm, and that changes were to be expected. Accordingly, when a revised allocation was received from the Force it was carefully studied and revised to provide divisions with the same number of craft previously given them to as similar an extent as possible. The main difficulty in planning craft loads was attendent upon the increase in the troops which Corps had listed for the operation, and which were included on the desired troop list as a basis for planning troop and vehicle lifts. In the Corps lift for assault it became readily apparent that with the addition of certain Arty and AA units, the allotted lift had been exceeded. It became necessary, therefore, for both division and Corps troops to scale down the assault lift to meet craft capacities. This was, of course, no problem once the allocation of craft became firm. It should be pointed out here that the Corps troops TQM responsibilities were assigned to an officer of the G-4 Section, while the work involved in the Corps troops troop list was assigned to an officer of the G-3 Section.

(2) Craft allocation became an increasingly difficult problem due to the absence of a firm allocation, and because of several changes in division plans for landing which were developed as the natural result of more detailed study of their problems. One particularly difficult situation developed concerning LSTs, and gave rise to the necessity for a command decision by the Army Commander. The original Army allocation provided for sixty 6-Davit LSTs of which Corps gave divisions twenty each. Divisions on this basis planned to lift four assault battalions apiece. Subsequently, however, the number of 6-Davit LSTs were reduced to fifty. This necessitated a major change in the plan for lifting assault battalions, and it was decided to re-allocate the fifty as follows: 3d Inf Div - 20; 45th Inf Div - 15; 36th Inf Div - 15. Obviously this altered the landing plans and loading plans of the 45th and 36th Inf Div to a great extent.

(3) It developed finally that the Navy considered itself able to deploy the combat loaders from a central convey into division transport areas, and to permit their small craft to participate in the assault at H hour. This plan changed the conception of the assault as follows:

(a) 3d Inf Div loaded three battalions on their allocated twenty 6-davit LSTs, three battalions in combat loaders, and three battalions in LCIs.

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(b) 45th Inf Div loaded three battalions in their allocated fifteen 6-davit LSTs, three battalions in combat loaders, ~~and three battalions in LCIs.~~

(c) The 36th Inf Div loaded three battalions in their allocated fifteen 6-davit LSTs, three battalions in combat loaders, ~~and three battalions in LCIs.~~

e. Stowing:

(1) The 3d Inf Div's loading plans for craft were looked upon with somewhat more favor than those of the other two divisions for the reason that they reduced the assault scale transportation for all assault elements below the scales of the 45th Inf Div and 36th Inf Div, thereby permitting the craft landing of more fighting materiel, and enabling the loading of more artillery, tanks, TDs, and AA in craft than the other two divisions. The 45th Inf Div in fact, due to what was felt to be too large an assault scale, particularly for infantry and artillery, was unable to bring in its complete force of AA and artillery in its entire assault lift including combat loaders. By the way of further comparison of the types of loadings, the 3d Inf Div loaded most organic Div vehicles and least maintenance, while the 36th Inf Div loaded more beach group vehicles. This problem continued to receive additional study.

(2) The Corps Headquarters afloat was arranged as follows:

(a) On the command ship of the Army Commander and the Naval Task Force Commander were the Corps Commander, C/S, G-2, G-3, G-4, A-3, Signal Officer, and a minimum party of clerks and signal personnel - a total of about fifty.

(b) On an XAP of the 45th Inf Div was loaded the remainder of the advanced headquarters under the command of the Deputy to the Corps Commander. This group consisted of personnel only, and was further reduced by such personnel as accompanied the LCTs - mainly signal personnel.

(c) On an AKA of the 36th Inf Div, earmarked for unloading over 45th Inf Div beaches were the minimum operating vehicles of the Corps headquarters, signal battalion, Corps artillery, AA Hq, and reconnaissance squadron headquarters.

(d) The remainder of the Corps headquarters personnel and vehicles, plus the other Corps units (Engr, Ord, Arty, AA, Sig), were loaded among five MT ships and a personnel ship.

f. Landing Problems:

(1) As planning progressed, it became evident that an H hour assault by the 36th Inf Div over beach 264A presented grave risks (this was the most heavily defended of all assault beaches). The plan was altered, therefore, to provide for the LST-loaded battalions of the 36th Inf Div to land over the AGAY beaches, followed in column by the LCI-loaded battalions. A delayed assault in small craft by the RCT in combat loaders was to be made on beach 264A in conjunction with the ground action of the H hour forces against ST RAPHAEL and FREJUS. This assault was ultimately timed for H + 6.

g. Communications:

(1) In order to facilitate the establishment of satisfactory Corps communications on D day, provision was made to set aside five LCTs from the overall allocation for Corps use. Of these five, three were loaded with wire teams and appro-

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priate radio vehicles to accompany each division. The other two contained additional signal equipment and command vehicles for the Corps headquarters itself, and were earmarked for landing on the beaches of the 45th Inf Div.

h. Maintenance:

(1) The maintenance problem asserted serious influence on all plans. Whereas the Army had originally contemplated three principal maintenance beaches, 259 for the left division, 261 for the center division, and 264A for the right division, the final plan left beaches 259 and 261 in the zone of the left division. This necessitated the selection of suitable maintenance beaches for the center division. The center division's beaches were found suitable for limited maintenance only, so it became necessary to provide for the landing of the beach group battalion of the reserve RCT of the 45th Inf Div over the northern end of beach 261, after it had been cleared by the 3d Inf Div, and to develop that beach as an additional means of landing 45th Inf Div vehicles and supplies. An administrative boundary to provide the 45th Inf Div with a road exit into its zone from this beach was selected, and was to be effective on order of the Corps Commander at an appropriate time on D day.

i. Air:

(1) Concerning the Air Plan, the experience of the Corps on the Anzio Beachhead was of great value in preparing a maximum effort. It was indicated at the outset that powerful air forces would be available. In order to use this force properly to support the landing, the Corps concentrated its effort on the targets in the assault area and in the method of engaging them. The overall air plan up to D - 1 (which included the tactical cover plan in the MARSEILLES area on D - 1), plus the post-D day plan, were left to Army and the Air Corps. The Corps insisted upon great detail in preparation of the D day program itself. Data on all available targets was made, and photos were procured for each target under consideration. After a series of conferences with the Army and Navy in which naval gunfire plans were coordinated, the final list of targets was drafted. The next step called for the disposition of the air effort by weight on the various targets. The plan in general called for a heavy effort commencing at first light, with the bombing of gun flashes in the assault area by fighter-bombers, followed by the bombing of gun positions and beaches. Strong points adjacent to the beaches were engaged by fighter-bombers at H hour. In figuring weight of effort, forty heavy bombers were allocated to each 1000 yards of beach, and by the same token 120 medium bombers were allocated to the same distance. The effort was so planned as to provide for planes in the air throughout the day. Concerning the use of forward control, two lines were established inland from the beaches within which no armed reconnaissance was permitted except on air-briefed or pre-briefed targets accepted by the Air Corps. The first of these lines was effective until H plus 6 hours, at which time the second limiting line became effective. During the period H - 30 to H hour no bombing was scheduled so as to provide full opportunity for the observation of Naval gunfire. As mentioned above, however, fighter-bombers appeared at and just after H hour. The 100-pound frag bomb and incendiary bomb were used almost exclusively.

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5. Troop Concentration:

a. The problem of concentrating the many troops nominated for the operation was complex. To begin with, the issuing of orders to these various troop units was out of the control of Corps. Force requested AFHQ to issue movement orders on nominated units, AFHQ in turn issued orders to Fifth Army and NATOUSA to release the various units, and order them to proceed to the NAPLES area where they were to be attached to VI Corps for operations and training, and to SOS for supply and administration. VI Corps received copies of the orders by way of information only, and it became necessary to establish close liaison with Army and with PBS in order to ascertain what units were under orders, when they were scheduled to move, and when they were scheduled to arrive.

b. The Corps receiving plan was simple and effective. Each division was assigned an area (one of these was the ITC area). Initially these areas were selected by PBS and the divisions moved into them under orders from higher headquarters at a time when they were not under Corps control. When Corps assumed control in the NAPLES area, it made arrangements to assemble in the divisional areas the tactical attachments to the divisions plus the divisional beach group elements. As units reported into PBS in accordance with the orders they had received for movement, PBS directed them to appropriate assembly areas and provided transportation to assist in these moves where necessary. The Corps G-3 Section which coordinated this assembly had given PBS overlays of all the assembly areas together with a list of the troops expected. The Corps troops were likewise given an assembly area, and the same procedure applied for their movements. A large chart based on the troop list was maintained up to date by an officer of the G-3 Section to show at all times the location, movement, and order status of all units.

6. Mounting:

a. In accordance with the Army mounting plan which provided for the staging of the entire assault Corps from NAPLES, plans were laid on and executed to move the 36th Inf Div from SALERNO upon completion of its ITC training, and the 45th Inf Div from S of SALERNO, to areas immediately N of 3d Inf Div bivouac in the vicinity of POZZUOLI. Mounting plans called for the 3d Inf Div to load first from the POZZUOLI - NISIDA - NAPLES facilities, followed by the simultaneous loading several days later of the other divisions at the POZZUOLI - NISIDA and main NAPLES port facilities. M/T ships of all divisions were loaded in NAPLES.

7. Liaison:

a. One of the most important details of the operation was the provision for exchange of liaison. Arrangements were made for the following:

(1) Exchange with CC SUDRE.
(2) Exchange with II Corps (Fr).
(3) Exchange with Army (Corps sent 2 officers).
(4) Liaison officer from 3d Inf Div (arty liaison primary duty) to Fr Groupe de Commandos - Fr Commando Ln officer to 3d Inf Div.
(5) Exchange of Ln officers between 45th Inf Div and 36th Inf Div, and Airborne Task Force.
(6) Br Ln officer from 2d Ind Preht Brig with 36th Inf Div Hq.
(7) 2 Br FOO parties with 2d Ind Preht Brig tied in with 36th Inf Div Arty.
(8) SCR 193 Corps and Div Command net tie-in with Airborne Task Force.
(9) SCR 608 and 284 tie-in of Airborne Task Force with 45th Inf Div and 36th Inf Div Artys.
(10) Ln officer from Fr Naval Assault Party with Bn of 141st Inf (36th Inf Div).
(11) Ln officers from CC SUDRE with 36th Inf Div and 45th Inf Div.
(12) Ln officer and MP detail from CC SUDRE with Beach Bn develop-

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ing beach over which CC SUDRE would land.
(18) In with Airborne Task Force with Corps Hq.

b. The Corps Commander added to his headquarters three officers to function as his personal representatives with each of the division commanders. These officers were briefed by him personally, and were loaded aboard ships with the divisioncommanders. Each officer had an SCR 195 radio loaded on the Corps signal LCT that accompanied division headquarters craft to shore. The officers rendezvoused with their radio vehicles following the landing, and thereafter kept the Corps Commander informed as to the progress of the division. This radio net was known as the Spook Net.

c. To coordinate the landing and passage of II Corps (Fr), a control Hq composed of two officers from Army, an officer from Corps, and an officer from II Corps (Fr) was provided for. This Hq was to assemble at the Corps CP late on D day, and set up its CP at COGOLIN on D plus 1. Responsibility for effecting the passage rested with Corps.

8. Miscellaneous:

a. Some three weeks after establishment of the planning syndicate the Commanding General and the S-3 of CC 1, 1st French Armd Div, reported from ORAN for preliminary discussion of their participation. The S-3 remained for several days during which time he completed and was given approval on a loading plan based on his craft allocation. On 17 July the Corps Commander with staff representatives flew to ORAN and inspected the combat command.

b. A feature of interest which was scheduled daily at the planning syndicate was an orientation for all commanders and their staffs on the current world military situation and other points of particular interest concerning the job at hand.

c. Concerning the plans for the employment of AA battalions, it was decided to attach all AA elements to the 35th AAA Brigade. Certain battalions were attached to group headquarters under the Brigade. One group was then placed in direct support of each division. A fourth group headed up remaining battalions for the protection of Corps artillery and Corps rear installations. The AA order of battle placed in direct support of each division a SP battalion, a Bofors battalion, and a gun battalion. The extra group contained two Bofors battalions and one gun battalion. This overall plan permitted great flexibility in the capabilities of the AA.

d. On 16 July the Corps Commander conducted his first briefing of the operation for his division commanders and their naval opposites.

e. The Naval Task Force Commander (Vice Admiral Hewitt) conducted his final briefing for key commanders on 6 August. The Corps Commander conducted his final briefing on 9 August. In attendance were:

The Secretary of the Navy
Vice Admiral Hewitt
Div Commanders and Naval Opposites
Airborne Commander
XII TAC

f. In order to provide for a check on the progress of unloading on the far shore, plans were made to have divisions make reports of status of unloading every four hours. In addition, an officer in each of the G-3 and G-4 sections made up lists of craft showing units aboard so that they could check units if only the ship numbers were referred to in the unloading reports.

1 Incl. - Calendar of Principal Events.

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CALENDAR OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS

VI Corps relieved by IV Corps	11 June
VI Corps Hq move to ROME	11 June
First visit of CG and Gen Staff to ALGIERS (Return with first Army Outline Plan)	16 - 18 June
3d Inf Div move from ROME to POZZUOLI	19 June
45th Inf Div move from ROME to SALERNO	22 June
36th Inf Div move from ROME to PAESTUM	4 July
Chief of Staff and Hq Comdt move to NAPLES	20 June
VI Corps Hq move to NAPLES	23 June
Arrival 3d Inf Div Planning Staff at Blockhouse	25 June
Arrival 45th Inf Div Planning Staff at Blockhouse	26 June
Arrival 36th Inf Div Planning Staff at Blockhouse	27 June
Arrival 3d Inf Div Naval Component at Blockhouse (Rear Admiral LOWRY)	28 June
Arrival 45th Inf Div Naval Component at Blockhouse (Rear Admiral MOON)	30 June
Arrival 36th Inf Div Naval Component at Blockhouse (Rear Admiral RODGERS)	30 June
3d Inf Div Amphib training	24 June - 14 July
45th Inf Div Amphib training	27 June - 13 July
36th Inf Div Amphib training	8 July - 22 July
VI Corps Training Directive issued	24 June
Second Army Outline Plan received	26 June
General TRUSCOTT's letter to General PATCH concerning Army Outline Plan	27 June
General PATCH's reply to Gen TRUSCOTT's letter	28 June
Second visit of CG and Gen Staff to ALGIERS	29 June - 1 July
First VI Corps Outline Plan issued	2 July
First VI Corps allocation of craft issued	2 July
Final Corps Outline Plan issued	15 July
First briefing by CG	16 July
CG inspection of CC SUDRE at ORAN	17 - 18 July
Naval gunfire plans completed	29 July
Army Field Order received	30 July
Air Plan completed	3 August
VI Corps Field Order issued	4 August
3d Inf Div rehearsal (GAETA)	31 July
45th Inf Div rehearsal (SALERNO)	7 August
36th Inf Div rehearsal (GAETA)	7 August
Naval Task Force Commander's final briefing (Vice Admiral HEWITT)	6 August
CG's final briefing	8 August
VI Corps Hq embarks:	
USS SANTA ROSA	9 August
USS BETELGEUSE	9 August
USS BARNETT	9 August
USS CATOCTIN	11 August

Note: CG and party boarded USS CATOCTIN on evening 12 August.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46

6 September 1944

TASK FORCE BUTLER

1. ORGANIZATION

Four days before embarkation of VI Corps from NAPLES, the Commanding General directed that planning be instituted for the formation of a Provisional Armored Group from the Assault Divs and their attachments so that immediately after the landing this force could be assembled and driven through any gap in the enemy's lines. Immediately the staff was organized and plans studied for the probable use of the Group. The directive of the Corps Commander indicated the following possibilities:

a. To move to the DURANCE River in the vic of ST PAUL and seize and hold the bridges to the W thereof.

b. To move to the DURANCE River, cross in the vic of ST PAUL or MANOSQUE and then drive further N to the RHONE Valley.

c. To move to the DURANCE River and then N to GRENOBLE or W to the vic of MONTELIMAR.

2. STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF THE GROUP

CG - Brig Gen Butler
Prov Armd Group Hq (Personnel from VI Corps Hq)
117 Recn Sqdn
59 Armd Field Arty Bn
753 Tank Bn (less 1 Med and 1 Lt Tank Co)
2d Bn, 143 Inf
Co C, 636 TD Bn
Co F, 344 Engr
Co C, 111 Medical Bn (plus Det from Clearing Co)
3426 QM Trk Co
Det 87 Ord Hvy Maintenance Co

3. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

17 Aug. In compliance with orders issued by CG VI Corps, TFB assembled in the vic of LE MUY. Orders were issued for the force to move out at 0530B 18 Aug and march on RIEZ.

18 Aug. The 117 Recn Sqdn with E Co, 143 Inf, one plat C Co, 636 TD Bn, and one Btry 59 AFA Bn, attached, moved out as the leading element of TFB. One recn element proceeded N in the direction of CASTELLANE and NW from DRAGUIGNAN to protect the right flank. Another element moved N in the direction of BARJOLS protecting the left flank, while the main body moved along the main axis in the direction of RIEZ.

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During this first day of operation no enemy were contacted along the main route of advance DRAGUIGNAN -- SALERNES -- RIEZ. However, ren elements on either flank made contact with the enemy. To the E our troops moving N along the DRAGUIGNAN -- CASTELLANE road met considerable enemy resistance immediately N of DRAGUIGNAN. The CG of the LXII Res Corps, Lt Gen MEULING, was captured along with approx 400 additional officers and EM from Corps Hq, from 522 AT Bn and other unidentified elements. Despite this coup, the enemy continued to delay further advance of our elements in that direction, and as soon as elements of the 36th Div moved in, the right flank column was ordered to side-slip to the W. On the W, our ren elements made contact with an unidentified Ost Bn at BARJOLS which delayed the advance of our ren elements. During this swift advance 200 enemy troops which had been hiding in the vic of SALERNES had been by-passed. The pocket was cleaned out by following divisional elements and the FFI the following day. No enemy contact was made during the night.

19 Aug. The main column advanced along the route RIEZ -- VALENSOLE -- ORAISON -- PEYRUIS -- SISTERON. The bridge acrossthe ASSE River was found to be intact though the bridge immediately S of ORAISON had been destroyed and our column forded the dry river bed with little difficulty. W of ORAISON, the bridge across the DURANCE River which had only been partially damaged was made passable and our main column crossed at that point. The enemy was contacted in the vic of CHATEAU ARNOUX; some 175 PWs were taken at this point. Other light enemy forces were driven back by our forward elements who occupied SISTERON during the late afternoon. The area N and W was outposted. A second column consisting of one ren troop reinforced assisted by local FFI, attacked at 0600B in the direction MEZEL -- DIGNE to clear the road. Enemy troops at CHATEAU-REDON (U-1198) surrendered to our advance elements at 0900B without a fight and other enemy elements along the road S to CASTELLANE were cut off so that they could not enter the area. Our troops then quickly advanced to DIGNE where they were heavily attacked by the enemy. Resistance also developed at LES MEES and MALLJAIS. In order to drive out these rearguard forces and to press on additional troops to assist in the capture of DIGNE, a column of 1 Co of medium tanks and a Co of Inf was moved to DIGNE via LES MEES, MALLJAI. By 2000B all resistance ceased. Approx 600 PWs were taken including a Brig Gen commanding the district. Elements identified in the area by PWs were II Bn 194 Sich Regt, 13 Co 194 Sich Regt, 4 Landschuetzen Bn 609, a det of 1 Co, Landschuetzen Bn 629 and 217 Field Hospital, 16 Engr Regt Flug Res, 209 Krs Bn. MALLJAI was taken by our troops at 1430B and enemy troops which had been supported by 81mm mortars and AT guns were dispersed or captured. At 1730B, the enemy who attempted to resist our occupation of MALLEMOISSON (R-25015) were dispersed. The main body reached a point NW of SISTERON about 1800B, outposted the general area and conducted ren for advance to the N.

20 Aug. Further orders were awaited from Corps. However, on information that enemy foot and horse-drawn elements were moving S from GRENOBLE and that a force was in GAP two steps were taken. The main column moved N along the route SISTERON -- ASPRES -- COL DE LA HAUTE to seize and hold the pass. A second column supported by the FFI attacked the town of GAP during the late afternoon. After a short engagement the enemy surrendered. Approx 1000 PWs were taken, mostly administrative, supply and limited service personnel. Units identified by these PWs were the 157 Res GR Restverband, the 555 Liaison Staff, 692 MP Det, Custom Border Police, 1057 Medical Co, 12 Air Warning Co. A large ration dump and a dump for demolition supplies were also captured near this town.

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21 Aug. On orders from VI Corps the direction of attack was changed from N to W with the mission of seizing and holding the high ground NW of MONTELIMAR and blocking enemy withdrawal from the S up the RHONE Valley. One troop of the 117 Rcn Sqdn, reinforced, was ordered to block in the GAP area and to push out rcn to the N from GAP, also N on the MONTMAUR (8159) — DIEDIER (8377) road. One rcn plat plus a Btry of Field Arty was to block the road in their position S of LALLEY and to push patrols to MONESTIER, both of the above to remain in position until relieved by the 36th Inf Div. There was no activity during the night but early next morning enemy troops which had been moving S from LAMBRE attempted to occupy COL BAYARD (0-9663). However, our troops kept them N of this point. It is estimated that approx 2 Bns of the 157 Regt were involved in this movement S to attempt to retake GAP. TFB was attached to the 36th Div as of 1000B. Advance elements moved N and by 1000B had reached DIE without contact. When the rcn screen reached the RHONE Valley they attacked an enemy column of approx 30 vehicles moving N out of LIVRON. The vehicles were destroyed, many of the personnel were killed and wounded and 11 PWs from the 2 Co North CAUCASIAN Labor Bn were taken. TFB CP was established at 015627. No other contact with the enemy was made during the day. During the night, patrols cut the road N of CONDILLAC but were driven out by superior forces.

22 Aug. TFB took up a defensive position in the vic of CONDILLAC (9663). At about 0900B, enemy tanks and other vehicles were observed moving S in the area between CHEST and LIVRON apparently on rcn missions. Approx 200 enemy without vehicles were observed in the woods in the vic of LIVRON (N-9877). Small enemy groups were also in contact with our rcn elements and forward outpost positions N of MONTELIMAR during the morning.

In the afternoon, there was movement of small enemy detachments to the NE of MONTELIMAR and at approx 1530B, a rcn in force was made by 4 Co 11 Pz Rcn Bn. A column of 20-30 enemy personnel carriers led by a tank or SP gun moved N along the road CHAROLS — CLEON — PUY ST MARTIN. The force reserve, then N of PUY ST MARTIN was ordered to attack and destroy the enemy. When fired on by our arty, AT guns and tanks, the enemy column broke into smaller groups in an attempt to withdraw. A number of enemy vehicles were destroyed in the road net in that area, particularly in and about MANAS and prisoners were taken. We lost several vehicles. By nightfall, enemy units had withdrawn S of the RUBION River.

During most of the day there was continuous enemy traffic moving N and S, on both sides of the RHONE River and 3 RR trains had attempted to move N past our positions vic 910610. Attempts physically to cut the road were unsuccessful. Our arty hit and destroyed the locomotive of a 60 car train and a RR gun on a 25 car train. It appeared that these hits effectively blocked all rail traffic movement on the E bank of the RHONE. A third train of 15 cars came into the area but when fired at moved back to MONTELIMAR where it unloaded. Many vehicles were destroyed by arty and tank fire.

Elements of 141 Inf were moved into the area by the CG 36th Div. The principal mission of the Regt was to occupy the high ground 6 to 8 kms N of MONTELIMAR and cut the main Hwy on the E bank of the RHONE. During the late morning and enemy column of 50-60 vehicles led by tanks and armored cars advanced on CLEON. The reserve was committed from the vic of PUY ST MARTIN. The enemy advance was stopped and four tanks and ten other vehicles destroyed.

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23 Aug. TFB was dissolved as of 0900B and all elements of the Task Force were attached to the 36th Div.

24 Aug. TFB was re-constituted as of 1600B and directed to assemble in vic of PUY ST MARTIN by dark in Div reserve. The balance of the day was taken up with assembly of the force and removal of CP to new location at LE BUIS.

As re-constituted, TFB consisted of the following troops:

117 Recn Sqdn (- Troop A)
143 Inf (- 2 Bns and AT Co)
753 Tank Bn (- 1 Med and 1 Lt Co. Note: One of the attached Med Cos was diverted by Div as were 6 TDs)
1 Co 636 TD Bn
93 AFA Bn
F Co, 344 Engrs (reinf)

Its missions were as follows:

a. In the event of a major attack by the enemy to retire to the high ground vic 1264 and 145655 and hold.

b. In the event of a major attack by the enemy to retire to the high ground vic 1168 and 130684 and hold the pass to CHEST.

c. To counterattack in the direction of MANAS, regain and hold high ground from 0759 to 1160.

d. To counterattack in the direction of MONTELIMAR, regain and hold high ground N of the town.

36th Div assumed responsibility for supply and maintenance of TFB.

25 Aug. Having broken the road block which was reported to have been established by 36th Div in the vic of N-9363, the enemy, continued to withdraw to the N through LORIOL. On orders from the CG 36th Div to move all elements to protect the right flank, the 753 Tank Bn was ordered to move all tanks and TDs under control with utmost speed from PUY ST MARTIN N to ANTECHAMP and then NW to GRANE to meet the column of enemy vehicles and tanks advancing on GRANE. At 1225B, the 143 Inf was ordered to move the Regt less 2 Bns to the high ground S of CHEST along the line 110685 -- 129684 to block the pass and then advance N on GRANE to engage and destroy the enemy column. C troops of the 117 Recn Sqdn was ordered into the gap S of GRANE and the remainder of the sqdn to screen the area GRANE -- CHEST until the arrival of the Inf. On the S flank, F Co of the 344 Engrs blew bridges at BONLIEU and GERWAIS over the RUBICON River. In the action near GRANE, 753 Tank Bn reported one enemy tank and one enemy half-track destroyed with a loss of one of our own tanks. The arty claim 3 enemy tanks. Toward the end of the day orders were issued by 36th Div for TFB to attack LORIOL from the S. Elements of the force remaining under command moved to new assembly areas preparatory to attacking LORIOL. (NOTE: Tanks, TDs Engrs and rifle Co were diverted).

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26 Aug. Early in the morning the orders for attack on LORIOL were cancelled and the force as then constituted was ordered to counterattack through the CONDILLAC gap to reestablish the road block (938639) along Hwy 7. At 1130B, the 3 Bn 143 Inf reported that it occupied the high ground S of COUCOURDE. At 1330B, TFB received a warning order from 36th Div that after the counterattack had been completed and the road block secured, TFB would be relieved and its force re-organized in order to advance N on LORIOL. It was then to move E on CREST along the S bank of the DROME River. Upon reaching CREST, TFB was to be re-assembled and re-equipped for further movement N.

The enemy again attacked in the vic of the road block at 1530B; this time by an estimated 1 Bn of Inf supported by tanks from nearby woods. However, the attack was once again driven off with losses to the enemy. During each of these attacks enemy arty was active and heavy. At 1730B, 36th Div informed TFB that 3 Bn 157 Inf would replace 143 Inf for the continuation of the attack on COUCOURDE. 1 Co 191 Tank Bn was also attached.

27 Aug. 3 Bn 157 Inf was held up 200 to 300 yards E of COUCOURDE by fire from Inf and five enemy tanks. One of these was finally knocked out. The 2 Bn of the 143 Inf reached the high ground just S of the town on the hill called FOURS-CHAUX (9462) during the morning; they had earlier repulsed a counterattack from the S at MAGNANON (9660). By 1530B, our Inf were in the last row of houses in town, the they received heavy tank fire from the slopes to the NE of town. At 1555B, CG of Div Arty reported that enemy traffic on the road had been stopped and vehicles were assembling in brush at 922775. TFB at 2200B was ordered to disengage from the COUCOURDE area, assemble all forces possible, move N through MARSANNE and debouche into the Valley via MIRMANDE then to attack LORIOL to the N and move E to CREST.

28 Aug. At 0700B, TFB closed in the MIRMANDE area and at 0800B the CP opened vic 005703. The attack jumped off at 0900B and troops met determined enemy rear guard action in their movement N and N from MIRMANDE which slowed their progress considerably. By 1000B, leading elements had reached 9973. By 1040B, 3 Bn 157 encountered a pocket of enemy in a group of buildings about 200 yds N of the road. They were armed with MGs and 20mm guns. Heavy mortar fire was being received from vic 980723. By 1115B, our tanks report their leading elements are along the 71 grid line. By 1200B, many enemy vehicles were observed at the crossroads at 956748 where they were fired on by our arty. About the same time our rear elements were engaged in a fire fight with MG and mortar fire coming from 985718. By 1240B, our tanks reported that they are along the 71 grid line and not meeting much resistance. Though many identifications were secured during the day, it was apparent that the rear guard action was continuing in an organized manner by elements of the 111 FGR supported by a miscellany of detachments. They gave ground slowly. By the end of the afternoon our troops were on the outskirts of LORIOL and the main route of withdrawal had been cut. During the evening, our leading elements established two road blocks in LORIOL but just prior to midnight enemy Inf supported by tanks drove our troops from the road blocks and out of town. Estimated enemy casualties: PWs taken during the day: 155, identifying the following units:

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Hq 338 Inf Div (Motorcycle Messenger)
601 Labor Bn (Russians)
61 AT Bn, 11 Pz Div
~~7 Co 229 Res Bn, part of 111 PGR~~
2 Co 111 PGR, 11 Pz Div
15 Arty Regt, 189 Res Gren Div
Engr Bn "BOEHMEN" (Bohemia)
And members from Luftwaffe, Navy, Org TODT

29 Aug. As of 0845B, the Wilbur Force, then held up 4 kms E of LORIOL by enemy tanks and Inf, was attached to TFB. Maquis in woods E of LORIOL were organized to prevent enemy infiltration into that area. By 1040B, a hvy concentration of enemy Inf, tanks and vehicles of all types were observed at the junction of the DROME — RHONE Rivers. The enemy there appeared to be very much disorganized and all were attempting to use the fords to escape N across the River. Our arty and air took a heavy toll and during the morning, the enemy stopped crossing the fords of the DROME River to the N. However, all traffic which had passed through the blockades of the 36th Div continued to move N into concentration areas immediately S of the DROME River. One column of vehicles managed to get through from the S at approx 1630B but by 1740B they were observed between the 66 and 69 grids in flames. Our attack on LORIOL was strongly resisted until the town itself was reached whereupon the troops surrendered readily as did the 7 Co of the 757 GR which had been left to guard the ford N of LORIOL. With the exception of sporadic stubborn resistance from organized positions, the mass of men and vehicles in the area W of Hwy 7 appeared to be in a state of confusion.

Due to the bewilderment of PWs it was impossible to obtain from them any clear estimate of casualties other than that they were very heavy in both men and materiel. About 300 PWs were taken during the period.

30 Aug. At 0600B, the final attack of TFB jumped off. The first objective was the junction of the RHONE — DROME Rivers and then mopping up SW and S. During the night, our troops had been held up in their advance W by MG and MP fire and in the morning they were 800 yds from the junction of the RHONE — DROME Rivers still mopping isolated pockets of resistance. Much of the enemy personnel in this area during the previous day escaped individually and in small groups on foot N over the DROME River during the night as it was possible to ford this river at any point. At about 1000B 1 Bn of the 143 which was moving S reported that enemy resistance was stiffening, but the junction was soon made with 3d Div elements moving N and mopping up was completed by nightfall. TFB was disbanded and elements returned to their parent units.

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

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

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

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

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
Orange
Nîmes
Beaucaire
Tarascon
Arles
Lake Scamandre
Montpellier
Vauvert
Aigues-Mortes
Le Pontet
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Caumont
Cavaillon
Gravesan
Milhaud
Calvisson
Générac
Lunel
Lansargues
Mirmande
Le Valat
Le Cailletet
Coubesseu
Rodessan
Gaujan
Vergèze
Sylvéréal
Ste Anastasie
St Chapte
Ste Cécile
Sérignan
Caristie
Roquemaure
Châteauneuf
Sorgues
Avignon
Le Pontet
Villeneuve
Tavel
Lirac
Rochefort
Pujaut
Villeneuve
Les Angles
Pont St Esprit
Bagnols
Lagnes
Le Thor
Jonquerettes
Cabrières
Lédignan
Orthoux
Cazouls
Lézignan
Ste Croix
Ste Ange
Gard
Rhône
Rhône
Durance
Vaucluse
Bouches-du-Rhône
Gironde
Ardèche
Drôme
Lozère
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

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

BIGOT-ANVIL
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By Authority of
CG VI Corps
Initials
1 Aug 44

VI CORPS COMBAT TROOP LIST
OPERATION "ANVIL"

~~1 August 1944~~

Hq & Hq Co VI Corps

3d Inf Div
- 7th Inf - 10th FA Bn (105mm How)
- 15th Inf - 39th FA Bn (105mm How)
- 30th Inf - 41st FA Bn (105mm How)
- 9th FA Bn (155mm How)
- 10th Engr C Bn
- Atchd:
  - 331th FA Bn (155mm How)
  - 33th FA Bn (155mm Gun)
  - 69th Armd FA Bn (105mm How SP)
  - Det 2d FA Obsn Bn
  - 756th Tk Bn (75mm Gun)
  - 601st TD Bn (3" Gun SP)
  - 3d Cml Bn (Mtz)(4.2" Mort)
  - 36th Engr C Regt (Beach Group)

36th Inf Div
- 141st Inf - 131st FA Bn (105mm How)
- 142d Inf - 132d FA Bn (105mm How)
- 143d Inf - 133d FA Bn (105mm How)
- 155th FA Bn (155mm How)
- 111th Engr C Bn
- Atchd:
  - Hq & Hq Btry 36th FA Gp
    - 937th FA Bn (155mm How)
    - 977th FA Bn (155mm Gun)
    - 93d Armd FA Bn (105mm How SP)
    - Det 2d FA Obsn Bn
  - 753d Tk Bn (75mm Gun)
  - 636th TD Bn (3" Gun SP)
  - 2d Cml Bn (Mtz)(-Co A)(4.2" Mort)
  - 540th Engr C Regt (Beach Group)
    - 48th Engr C Bn

45th Inf Div
- 157th Inf - 158th FA Bn (105mm How)
- 179th Inf - 160th FA Bn (105mm How)
- 180th Inf - 171st FA Bn (105mm How)
- 189th FA Bn (155mm How)
- 120th Engr C Bn
- Atchd:
  - Hq & Hq Btry 35th FA Gp
    - 938th FA Bn (155mm How)
    - 976th FA Bn (155mm Gun)
    - 59th Armd FA Bn (105mm How SP)
    - Det 2d FA Obsn Bn
  - 191st Tk Bn (75mm Gun)
  - 645th TD Bn (3" Gun SP)
  - 83d Cml Bn (Mtz)(-Co D)(4.2" Mort)
  - 40th Engr C Regt (Beach Group)

Hq & Hq Btry VI Corps Arty
- Hq & Hq Btry 6th FA Gp
  - 141st FA Bn (155mm How)
  - 2d FA Obsn Bn (-)

Hq & Hq Btry & AAACD 35th AAA Brig
- 433d AAA AW Bn (40mm Gun)
- 451st AAA AW Bn (40mm Gun)
- 108th AAA Gun Bn (90mm Gun)
- 21st Cml Decon Co (-)
- Hq & Hq Btry 5th AAA Gp (Supporting 3d Inf Div)
  - 441st AAA AW Bn (37mm Gun SP)
  - 534th AAA AW Bn (40mm Gun)
  - 72d AAA Gun Bn (90mm Gun)
  - 104th AAA Bar Bln Btry (VLA)
- Hq & Hq Btry 68th AAA Gp (Supporting 36th Inf Div)
  - 443d AAA AW Bn (37mm Gun SP)
  - 895th AAA AW Bn (40mm Gun)
  - 68th AAA Gun Bn (90mm Gun)
  - 102d AAA Bar Bln Btry (VLA)
- Hq & Hq Btry 105th AAA Gp (Supporting 45th Inf Div)
  - 106th AAA AW Bn (37mm Gun SP)
  - 107th AAA AW Bn (40mm Gun)
  - 216th AAA Gun Bn (90mm Gun)
  - 103d AAA Bar Bln Btry (VLA)

Combat Command 1st Armd Div (Fr)
- 2d Cuir (Tk Bn)(75mm Gun)
- 3d Zouaves (Armd Inf Bn)
- 1st Bn 66th RAA (Armd FA Bn)(105mm How SP)
- 5th Co 3d RCA (Armd Rcn Bn)
- 2 Cos 9th RCA (TD Bn)(3" Gun SP)
- 2d Co 88th Engr C Bn

117th Cav Rcn Sq

57th Sig Bn

Atchd to VI Corps - H hour D day
- Groupe de Commandos (Fr)

Atchd to VI Corps on contact
- 1st Airborne Task Force
  - 517th Prcht Inf Regt
  - 2d Independent Prcht Bde (Br)
  - 1st Bn 551st Prcht Inf Regt
  - 509th Prcht Inf Bn
  - 550th Glider Inf Bn
  - 460th Prcht FA Bn (75mm How)
  - 463d Prcht FA Bn (75mm How)
  - 602d Glider FA Bn (75mm How)
  - AT Co 442d Inf Regt
  - Co A 2d Cml Bn (Mtz)(4.2" Mort)
  - Co D 83d Cml Bn (Mtz)(4.2" Mort)
  - 596th A/B Engr Co

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Hq VI Corps Plot AG 370
W.E.W./J.A.C. Date 16 Sep 45

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ANNEX #2

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CASUALTY REPORT OF VI CORPS TROOPS

AMERICAN

Date for pd ending 2359	Killed, Captured and Missing	Hospitalized (Non-Battle Casualties and Wounded)	Replacements and RTD'S	Enemy PW's Captured
15 August	183	479	23	2129
16 "	115	417	38	2641
17 "	152	390	495	1808
18 "	94	484	145	1078
19 "	56	500	90	1298
20 "	36	252	325	919
21 "	56	358	163	1051
22 "	26	206	57	536
23 "	16	123	9	113
24 "	12	298	105	231
25 "	79	210	134	989
26 "	40	334	28	591
27 "	87	342	101	46
28 "	115	653	104	492
29 "	159	387	68	1793
30 "	54	191	74	1633
31 "	51	243	92	1702
TOTALS	1331	5867	2051	19050

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ANNEX A

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RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO #46, U. S. Army

SECTION I — ASSIGNED OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICERS — 5 August 1944

COMMANDING GENERAL

Major General Lucian K. Truscott Jr, 07096, U. S. A.
Capt Jack E. Bartash, 0454295, CAC (ADC)
Capt James M. Wilson Jr, 01166869, FA (ADC)

ASSISTANT TO CORPS COMMANDER

Brigadier General Frederic B. Butler, 012047, U. S. A.
1st Lt Alan E. Gould, 01295868, Inf, (ADC)

CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION

Col Don E. Carleton, 015415, GSC
Col John F. Cassidy, 012718, GSC
CWO John M. Jackson, W-2114227

G-1 SECTION

Maj John W. Wibel, 0339093, GSC
Capt Robert G. Perriello, 0389394, QMC
1st Lt Leo M. Armstrong, 0405177, Inf

G-2 SECTION

Col Joseph L. Langevin, 012640, GSC
Lt Col Theodore J. Conway, 019015, Inf
Maj Don W. Dixon, 0343066, FA
Maj Dexter S. French, 0277582, GSC
Maj Sanford H. Webster, 023222, Inf
Capt Joseph Haines III, 01284699, Inf

G-3 SECTION

Col Ben Harrell, 019276, GSC
Lt Col Donald A. MacGrath, 0260431, Cav
Lt Col William B. Rosson, 023556, GSC
Maj Leonard C. Cooke, 0316938, CAC
Maj Kermit R. Hansen, 0379451, Inf
Maj John L. Cooper, 0351994, Cav
Maj Marion W. Crouse, 0391054, Cav
Capt Rhoman E. Clem, 0320752, Inf
Capt William R. Rose, 0352042, CAC
Capt Rieder W. Schell, 0415566, Inf
Capt Edward L. Dobbins, 0452060, Inf
Capt Edward M. Murray, 0452479, Inf
Capt John Schadler Jr, 0383957, QMC

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ANNEX #5

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G-4 SECTION

Col Edward J. O'Neill, 015952, GSC
Lt Col Burton E. Miles, 0347690, GSC
Capt Ralph L. Harper, 0303227, Inf
Capt Robert E. Clark, 0910354, QMC

ADJUTANT GENERAL SECTION

Col Michael L. Connors, 0309882, AGD
Capt Harry S. Alcorn, 01000079, AGD
Capt Courtney L. Vallentine, 01000884, AGD
1st Lt William F. Rickett, 02055429, AGD
WOJG George T. Smith Jr, W-2103260

CHAPLAIN SECTION

Lt Col William E. King, 0268277, Ch Corps
Maj Jordan E. Brown, 0402849, Ch Corps
CWO Francis M. Mugavin, W-2109915

CHEMICAL SECTION

Lt Col Harrison S. Markham, 020073, CWS
1st Lt Orris R. Evers, 02046557, CWS

ENGINEER SECTION

Col William N. Thomas Jr, 07648, CE
Maj Robert H. Darling, 0316638, CE
Capt Joseph M. Devine, 0421809, CE
1st Lt Edgar D. Lee, 0456581, CE

FINANCE SECTION

Col Howard L. Leighton, 0124567, FD
Capt Frederick H. Dietz, 01280038, FD

INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION

Col Nyal L. Adams, 07471, IGD
Maj James M. Pennycuick, 0307472, IGD

JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION

Lt Col Robert L. Lancefield, 018037, JAGD
Capt Jack M. Cotton, 0293310, JAGD

MEDICAL SECTION

Col Rollin L. Bauchspies, 017819, MC
Capt Carlson B. Menkel, 0347833, MC
Capt Sigfrid G. Kinkopf, 0454084, MAC
Capt James L. Rounds, 0490026, MAC
WOJG Donald L. Sutliff, W-2108239

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ORDNANCE SECTION

Col Walter G. Jennings, 0174217, Ord Dept
Maj John P. Merrill, 0181405, Ord Dept
Maj Stanley M. Smolensky, 025333, Ord Dept
Capt Henry J. Egal, 01549932, Ord Dept
CWO Edward C. Kelly, W-2114233

QUARTERMASTER SECTION

Col Lawrence L. Skinner, 015325, QMC
Maj James G. Hattox, 0276850, QMC
Capt John A. Bradish, 0284157, QMC
1st Lt Clifford D. Anderson, 02055463, QMC

SIGNAL SECTION

Col Richard J. Meyer, 019147, Sig C
Capt Wilbur D. Vincent, 0378299, Sig C
1st Lt Luther D. Bridgman, 01635621, Sig C

SPECIAL SERVICE SECTION

Maj Gale A. Mathers, 0310331, Inf
1st Lt Daniel T. Fogarty, 01822550, FA

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT & PROVOST MARSHAL

Maj Albert Barkin, 0321172, Inf

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Capt Armstrong C. Swails, 0327127, Inf
Capt Robert M. Ferrell, 01697057, MC
Capt Isidore Nemerowsky, 01690212, DC
1st Lt Paul B. McGuire, 01285738, Inf
1st Lt Guy E. Norbury, 01031352, Cav
1st Lt Edmund A. Bogart, 01015527, Inf

MILITARY POLICE PLATOON

1st Lt Sam F. Doering, 0409112, CMP
1st Lt John J. Mulhern, 01308680, Inf

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SECTION II

ATTACHED FOR CURRENT OPERATIONS

G-2 SECTION

Capt John P. Rieger, 01013512, Inf
Capt K. H. Beglin, 263272 (Br)
1st Lt Lauren C. Kingman Jr, 0363398, AC
1st Lt Kenneth F. Kauffman, 0423401, AC
1st Lt William L. Kramer, 01395937, TC
1st Lt Charles F. Marshall, 01014422, AC
1st Lt Alfred G. Pundt, 01052530, CAC

G-3 SECTION

Lt Col Harold S. Bibo, 0309157, GSC
Lt Col Leland R. Drake, 020242, CAC (DS)
Maj George H. Walton, 0918397, AC

ENGINEER SECTION

Capt Harry A. Morris, 01285090, CE
Capt Matthew H. Gilbert, 0352947, CE

MEDICAL SECTION

Lt Col Walter Stamps, 0357847, MC

SIGNAL SECTION

1st Lt William J. Stopple, 0467394, Sig C

SPECIAL SERVICE SECTION (BEACHHEAD NEWS)

Capt James C. Grimes, 0391443, FA

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

1st Lt Aces M. Westerman, 01293636, Inf

LIAISON OFFICER

Capt J. William Arnold (French)

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CHANGES IN OFFICER PERSONNEL

AUGUST 1944

I - ASSIGNMENTS; ATTACHMENTS

Date	Officer	Remarks
1	Lt Col Walter Stamps, MC	Atchd fr Hq Seventh Army
2	Capt J. William Arnold (Fr)	Atchd fr Mission Militaire Francaise
3	Capt Matthew H. Gilbert, CE 1st Lt Charles F. Marshall, AC	Atchd fr 376th Engr Bn as of 1 Aug Atchd as of 5 July
6	Capt Willard W. Jensen, Sig C Capt P. R. Whiston (Br)	Atchd fr AFHQ Atchd as of 5 Aug
7	Maj Thomas W. Wood, CE	Atchd fr 670lst Hq & Hq Co (ITC)
9	Maj Campbell Dickson, Spec Res Maj Enrico Dell'Osso, Inf Capt Grady C. Durham, Inf 1st Lt Charles J. Rohr, Spec Res	Atchd fr 2678th Civ Affairs Regt (Ovhd) " " " " " " " " "
15	1st Lt Herbert Ribner, Chap C	Atchd fr 7th Repl Depot
24	Lt Col Edgar C. Doleman, Inf	Asgd fr Hq Seventh Army - Jd 26 Aug
27	1st Lt Nicolas N. Bajenow	Atchd as of 23 Aug fr Hq Fifth Army

II - RELIEF FROM ASSIGNMENT; DETACHMENTS

3	Maj Russell Hicock, Sig C	(On DS at C & GS School) Reld fr asgnmt - Asgd Hq Fourth Army
11	Capt K. H. Beglin (Br)	Reld fr atchmt
27	Col Ben Harrell, GSC	Reld fr detail in GSC. Reld fr asgnmt and asgd 3rd Inf Div as of 23 Aug

III - PROMOTIONS

13	Capt Robert E. Clark, QMC	Promoted to Major, eff 10 Aug
22	1st Lt Kenneth F. Hauffman, AC (Atchd)	Promoted to Captain, eff 27 June

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ANNEX #6

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IV - MISCELLANEOUS

Date	Officer	Remarks
1	Maj John W. Wibel, GSC	Reld fr detail in IGD eff 4 July - Detailed in GSC 1 Aug
7	Lt Col Walter Stamps, MC	Reld fr asgnmt Hq Seventh Army and fr atchmt Hq VI Corps as of 4 Aug and Asgd to Hq VI Corps
8	Capt Willard W. Jensen, Sig C	Reld fr asgnmt to 2623d Sig Regt and fr atchmnt to Hq VI Corps and Asgd Hq VI Corps as of 6 Aug
22	Maj Thomas W. Wood, CE	Reld fr atchmt and atchd 40th Engr C Regt as of 10 Aug
27	Lt Col Theodore J. Conway, Inf	Detailed in GSC - Announced as A.C. of S., G-3

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 464, U. S. Army

SUBJECT: STRENGTH, BATTLE CASUALTIES, DECORATIONS AND AWARDS - AUGUST 1944

I. STRENGTH:

Hq VI Corps

		Assigned	Attached	Total	Net Increase
Officers	1 Aug 44 -	69	13	82	
	31 Aug 44 -	70	21	91	9
Warrant Officers	1 Aug 44 -	5	0	5	
	31 Aug 44 -	5	0	5	0

Hq Co VI Corps

Officers	1 Aug 44 -	7	1	8	
	31 Aug 44 -	7	1	8	0
Enlisted Men	1 Aug 44 -	362	27	389	
	31 Aug 44 -	351	41	392	3

II. BATTLE CASUALTIES:

Hq VI Corps: Capt SIGFRID G. KINNOFF, 0454084, MAC - Missing in Action as of 25 August 1944.

Hq Co VI Corps: NONE.

III. DECORATIONS AND AWARDS:

Hq VI Corps: The Corps Commander presented the following awards to officers of this headquarters on 1 August 1944 at Naples, Italy:

1. LEGION OF MERIT to Lt Col RICHARD J. MEYER, 0191147, Signal Corps, for services in Italy from 8 February 1943 to 29 February 1944.

2. BRONZE STAR MEDAL to 1st Lt LEO M. ARMSTRONG, 0405177, Inf (then of 157th Infantry Regiment) for meritorious service in direct support of combat operations in Sicily from 1 May to 30 July 1943.

3. BRONZE STAR MEDAL to 1st Lt DANIEL T. FOGARTY, JR., 01822550, MAB, (Then of 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion) for meritorious service in combat from 1 November 1943 to April 1944 in Italy.

Hq Co VI Corps: NONE.

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2 Incls.
#1 - HATOUSA G.O. Nol 65, 1944.
#2 - Hq 45th Inf Div G.O. No. 150, 1944.

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HEADQUARTERS
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NUMBER 65)

9 July 1944

E X T R A C T

AWARD OF LEGION OF MERIT

By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, as amended, the Legion of Merit was awarded by the Theater Commander to the following named personnel for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services:

* * *

RICHARD J. MEYER, 010147, Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps, Headquarters VI Corps, for services in Italy from 8 February 1943 to 29 February 1944. Entered United States Military Academy from New York.

* * *

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

s/H. V. Roberts
t/H. V. ROBERTS
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

William F. Rickett
WILLIAM F. RICKETT,
1st Lt., A. G. D.,
Asst Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS
FORTY FIFTH INFANTRY DIVISION

LSL/wmg

APO 45, c/o Postmaster
New York, New York
28 June 1944

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 150)

EXTRACT

x x x

Award of Bronze Star Medal IV

x x x

IV — AWARD OF BRONZE STAR MEDAL.

Under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, as amended, a Bronze Star Medal is awarded to the following individuals:

LEO M. ARMSTRONG 0405177 INF, First Lieutenant, Headquarters 157th Infantry Regiment, for meritorious service in direct support of combat operations from 1 May to 30 July 1943 in Sicily. As TQM officer for his regiment, First Lieutenant Armstrong had charge of the loading of all personnel and equipment in preparation for departure to an overseas destination. The organizational ability he displayed in this and the initial landing in Sicily were greatly responsible for the success of all missions assigned to his regiment. Entered military service from Denver, Colorado.

x x x

DANIEL T. FOGARTY JR 01822550 NMB, First Lieutenant, VI Corps (then 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion), for meritorious service in combat from 1 November 1943 to April 1944 in Italy. As liaison officer between Special Service Force Troops and Allied Infantry Regiments, First Lieutenant Fogarty displayed unusual efficiency and capability in the execution of his duties. He also assumed the duties of a special service officer in his battalion which was an important factor in keeping the morale of the men at a high peak through critical phases of combat operations. His untiring efforts merit praise. Entered military service from Savannah Beach, Georgia.

By command of Major General EAGLES:

HQ 45TH INFANTRY DIVISION
OFFICIAL
ADJT. GENL'S. OFFICE

GEORGE E MARTIN
Col GSC
CofS

OFFICIAL:

HENRY B MOACH
Lt Col AGD
Adj Gen

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FIELD ORDER Nº 1
OPERATION ANVIL

Classification ~~cancelled or~~ changed to
SECRET ~~RESTRICTED~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
Auth: Ltr Hq VI Corps of AG 371, 21 Oct 44
Initials [illegible] Date [illegible]

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HQ VI CORPS
30 JULY 1944

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ANNEX - 9

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BIGOT - ANVIL
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By Authority of
CG VI Corps
Initials JH
30 July 44

VI CORPS
NAPLES, ITALY
30 July 1944

FO 1

Map: FRANCE 1/100,000

1. a. Int: Annex 1.
   b. (1) Friendly:
      (a) Seventh Army supported by Naval Western Task Force and XII TAC assaults coast of southern FRANCE in the SAN TROPEZ - FREJUS area by sea and air, seizes and secures beachhead for assault and capture of TOULON.
      (b) 1st Airborne Task Force (RUGBY Force)(Opn Overlay #1) lands in LE MUY area at 0422B on D day, prevents movement of enemy forces into assault area from direction of LE MUY and LE LUC, and assists 36th Inf Div by attacking defenses NW of FREJUS from the rear; atchd to VI Corps (KODAK Force) when contact established.
      (c) 1st Special Service Force (SITKA Force) assaults the islands of PORT CROS and LEVANT under cover of darkness night D-1-D day, destroys all enemy defenses on the islands prior to H hour, turns over garrison of the islands to a Fr Zouaves Bn on or about D plus 1, evacuates prisoners to vic beach 259 and withdraws to mainland under Army control.
      (d) Fr Groupe de Commandos (ROMEO Force) lands vic CAP NEGRE under cover of darkness on night D-1-D day, destroys all enemy coastal defenses on CAP NEGRE, blocks the coastal road vic CAP NEGRE, seizes and holds high ground 3 kms N of CAP NEGRE; atchd to KODAK Force at H hour.
      (e) Demolition party, Fr Naval Assault Groupe (ROSIE Force) lands vic POINTE DES TRAYAS night D-1-D, blocks the CANNES - ST RAPHAEL and CANNES - FREJUS rds, and falls back to high ground SW of LA NAPOULE; atchd to KODAK Force when contact established.
      (f) II Fr Corps (GARBO Force) (Opn Overlay #2) debarks rapidly over secure beaches in the ST TROPEZ - CAVALAIRE area after D day, assembles and organizes vic COGOLIN, prepared on Army order to pass thru elements of KODAK Force within zone and attack TOULON; maintains contact with KODAK Force on R; after capture of TOULON prepares to continue adv in zone to W and NW.
      (g) I Fr Corps arrives in assault area by D plus 40.
   (2) Supporting:
      (a) Air - Annex 2.
      (b) Naval Gunfire - Annex 3.

2. Mission VI Corps (KODAK Force) (Opn Map):
   a. On D day H hour assaults simultaneously beaches from CAP CAVALLIRE to LAGAY employing three divisions abreast, destroys enemy beach defenses, and advances rapidly inland to contact RUGBY Force, ROMEO Force, and ROSIE Force; extends beachhead rapidly to BLUE line, and after reorganization continues adv to W and NW; secures airfield sites in the ARGENS VALLEY between FREJUS and LE LUC from observed enemy arty fire; after passage of lines by GARBO Force, continues adv within zone; protects Army R during assault and subsequent adv; captures LE MUY on D day; releases RUGBY Force, ROMEO Force, ROSIE Force, and CG SUDRE to Army control on Army order.
   b. D day H hour to be announced.
   c. Craft Allocation - Annex 4.

TROOPS - Annex 5.

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a. 36th Inf Div (CAMEL Force):
   (1) Commander: Maj Gen DAHLQUIST.
   (2) Troops: Annex 5.
   (3) Craft: Annex 4.
   (4) Mission: On D day H hour assault beaches 264B and 265A, clear landing beaches of all resistance, capture CANNES and clear beach 265; assault beach 264A at H plus 6, capture FREJUS and continue adv rapidly to gain contact with RUGBY Force and ROSIE Force and to seize and hold BLUE Line in zone, destroying all enemy therein; maintain contact with 45th Inf Div; protect Corps R; ROSIE Force atchd CAMEL Force when contact established, and will be assembled vic FREJUS when tactical situation permits; adv from BLUE Line on Corps order.

b. 45th Inf Div (DELTA Force):
   (1) Commander: Maj Gen EAGLES.
   (2) Troops: Annex 5.
   (3) Craft: Annex 4.
   (4) Mission: On D day H hour assault beaches 263A, 263B, and 263C, clear landing beaches of all resistance, capture STE MAXIME and clear beaches 262, 262A, and 263; adv rapidly, seize high ground S of ARGENS RIVER overlooking beach 264A, capture VILLEPEY, and assist 36th Inf Div in clearing beach 264A; continue adv to contact RUGBY Force and to seize BLUE Line in zone, destroying all enemy therein; maintain contact with 3d Inf Div; land and employ reserve regt only on authority of CG VI Corps; advance from BLUE Line on Corps order.

c. 3d Inf Div (ALPHA Force):
   (1) Commander: Maj Gen O'DANIEL.
   (2) Troops: Annex 5.
   (3) Craft: Annex 4.
   (4) Mission: On D day H hour assault beaches 259 and 261, clear landing beaches of all resistance, capture ST TROPEZ, and clear the ST TROPEZ PENINSULA; assist 45th Inf Div in clearing beach 262; continue adv rapidly to gain contact with ROMEO Force and to seize BLUE Line in zone, destroying all enemy therein; protect Corps L; ROMEO Force atchd ALPHA Force when contact established, and will be assembled vic LA MOLE when tactical situation permits; adv from BLUE Line on Corps order.

d. Corps Arty - Annex 6.

e. AAA - Annex 7.

f. 117th Cav Ren Sq (-3 reinf troops):
   (1) Commander: Lt Col HODGE.
   (2) Mission: Land with Hq VI Corps prepared on Corps order to assemble squadron for aggressive ren in zone of Corps attack.

g. Engr - Annex 8.

h. Corps Res:
   (1) CC SUDRE:
      (a) Commander: Brig Gen SUDRE.
      (b) Mission: On Corps order land over beaches as directed by CG VI Corps with first priority to beach 264A, assemble vic FREJUS or as directed by CG VI Corps, prepared for offensive action to the NW.
   (2) Fr Groupe de Commandos (ROMEO Force):
      (a) Commander: Lt Col BOUVET.
      (b) Mission: On Corps order when assembled vic LA MOLE by ALPHA Force, will be detached ALPHA Force, and will remain vic LA MOLE in Corps res.
   (3) 1st Airborne Task Force (RUGBY Force):
      (a) Commander: Brig Gen FREDERICK.
      (b) Mission: On Corps order when relieved by 36th Inf Div and 45th Inf Div, assemble vic LE MUY.
   (4) Fr Naval Assault Groupe (ROSIE Force):
      (a) Commander: Commander SERIOT.
      (b) Mission: On Corps order when assembled vic FREJUS by CAMEL Force, will be detached CAMEL Force, and will remain vic FREJUS in Corps res.

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x. (1) AT - Annex 6.
(2) Radio silence instructions - Annex 10.
(3) Divisions will reconnoiter vigorously all roads in zone, employing mecz detachments landed with leading elements.
(4) Upon reaching the BLUE Line divisions will extend inf rcn to the Red Rcn Line (Opn Map), and mecz and armd rcn to maximum possible depth.
(5) All personnel will be thoroughly briefed. Minimum essential instructions only will be issued prior to 4 hours after last touching near shore.
(6) All watches will be synchronized with ship's time prior to debarkation.
(7) All personnel will be cautioned that American and British pcht and glider troops will be operating inland from beaches. Glider shuttles are scheduled in the area at about 0800B and 1800B on D day. All troop carrier aircraft will be painted with black and white stripes on wings and fuselage. Gliders will not be painted with these black and white stripes.
(8) Yellow smoke will be used to identify friendly ground troops to friendly aircraft.
(9) Divisions will seize and secure suitable landing strips for Cub planes at the earliest possible moment, reporting location to Corps over command channels.
(10) Every possible weapon will be so loaded in craft as to permit firing during the approach to the beach.
(11) Any use of toxic chl agents by the enemy will be reported to Hq VI Corps without delay.
(12) Commanders will emphasize to all troops that success in this operation depends upon a vigorous assault conducted with utmost speed.

4. a. Adm - Annex 9.
b. DELTA Force land battalion beach group of res RCT over the E end of Beach 261 on order CG VI Corps after beach has been cleared by ALPHA Force; battalion beach group will operate the northern sector of the beach for the landing of DELTA Force vehicles and supplies.
c. Administrative bdry between ALPHA Force and DELTA Force indicated on Opn Map effective on order CG VI Corps.
d. Beach groups detached KODAK Force and placed in direct support at H hour.

5. a. Sig Com: Annex 10.
b. Axis Sig Com VI Corps: STE MAXIME - LE LUC.
c. CPs:
(1) Afloat:
(a) Seventh Army Adv - USS CATOCTIN
(b) Seventh Army Main - USS HENRICO
(c) VI Corps - USS CATOCTIN
(d) VI Corps Alternate - USS BARNETT
(e) 36 Inf Div - USS DUANE
(f) 45th Inf Div - USS BISCAYNE
(g) 36th Inf Div - USS BAYFIELD
(2) Ashore: Opn Map
d. Succession of Command:
(1) MG Sam TERROIN
(2) MG Jac BARLOW
(3) MG Geo ROBERS
(4) MG Ben DYBSTEL

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Annexes: 1 - Int
2 - Air
3 - Naval Gunfire
4 - Craft Allocation
5 - Troop List
6 - Arty and AT
7 - AAA
8 - Engr
9 - Adm (Adm Instr # 1 Opn ANVIL)
10 - Sig

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[illegible]

(d) [illegible] Force)(Ops Overlay #1) lands in [illegible] at D day, destroys enemy [illegible] from [illegible] of 12 MTB and 12 MTC, [illegible] by [illegible] defenses [illegible] of PORQUE [illegible] to VI Corps (ROMAN Force) when contact [illegible].

(e) [illegible] Force (SIXTH Force) assaults [illegible] islands of [illegible] under cover of darkness night D-1-D day, destroys all enemy defenses on the islands prior to H hour, [illegible] over garrison of the islands to a fr [illegible] on or about D plus 1, evacuates prisoners to vic beach 299 and withdraws to [illegible] Army control.

(f) [illegible] Commander (ROMEO Force) lands via CAP [illegible] under cover of darkness on night D-1-D day, destroys all enemy [illegible] on CAP [illegible], blocks the coastal road via CAP [illegible], [illegible] and holds high ground [illegible] of CAP [illegible]; attks to [illegible] force at H hour.

(g) Demolition party, [illegible] Naval Assault Group (ROBIN Force) lands via POINTE DES PRATIS night D-1-D, blocks the CANNES - ST RAPHAEL and CANNES - FREJUS rds, and falls back to high ground 5M of LA NAPOULE; attchd to ROMAN Force when contact established.

(h) II Fr Corps (GARBO Force) (Ops Overlay #2) debarks rapidly over assault beaches in the ST TROPEZ - CAVALAIRE area after D day, assembles and organizes via COGOLIN, prepared on Army order to pass thru elements of ROMAN Force within zone and attack TOULON; maintains contact with ROMAN Force on R; after capture of TOULON prepares to continue adv in zone to V and MM.

(i) I Fr Corps arrives in assault area by D plus 40.

(2) Supporting:

(a) Air - Annex 2.

(b) Naval Gunfire - Annex 3.

2. Mission VI Corps (ROMAN Force) (Ops Map):

a. On D day H hour assaults simultaneously beaches from CAP CAVALLIRE to LAGAY employing three divisions abreast, destroys enemy beach defenses, and advances rapidly inland to contact ROGBY Force, ROMEO Force, and ROBIN Force; extends beachhead rapidly to BLUE Line, and after reorganization continues adv to V and MM; secures airfield sites in the ARGENS VALLEY between FREJUS and LE LUC from observed enemy arty fire; after passage of lines by GARBO Force, continues adv within zone; protects Army R during assaults and subsequent adv; captures LE MUY on D day; releases ROGBY Force, ROMEO Force, ROBIN Force, and CC SUDRE to Army control on Army order.

b. D day H hour to be announced.

c. Craft Allocation - Annex 4.

TROOPS - Annex 5.

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36th Inf Div (CAMEL Force):
(1) Commander: Maj Gen DAHLQUIST.
(2) Troops: Annex 5.
(3) Craft: Annex 4.
(4) Mission: On D day H hour assault beaches 264B and 265A, clear landing beaches of all resistance, capture AGAY and clear beach 265; assault beach 264A at H plus 6, capture FREJUS and continue adv rapidly to gain contact with RUGBY Force and ROSIE Force and to seize and hold BLUE Line in zone, destroying all enemy therein; maintain contact with 45th Inf Div; protect Corps R; ROSIE Force atchd CAMEL Force when contact established, and will be assembled vic FREJUS when tactical situation permits; adv from BLUE Line on Corps order.

b. 45th Inf Div (DELTA Force):
(1) Commander: Maj Gen EAGLES.
(2) Troops: Annex 5.
(3) Craft: Annex 4.
(4) Mission: On D day H hour assault beaches 263A, 263B, and 263C, clear landing beaches of all resistance, capture STE MAXIME and clear beaches 262, 262A, and 263; adv rapidly, seize high ground S of ARGENS RIVER overlooking beach 264A, capture VILLEPEY, and assist 36th Inf Div in clearing beach 264A; continue adv to contact RUGBY Force and to seize BLUE Line in zone, destroying all enemy therein; maintain contact with 3d Inf Div; land and employ reserve regt only on authority of CG VI Corps; advance from BLUE Line on Corps order.

c. 3d Inf Div (ALPHA Force):
(1) Commander: Maj Gen O'DANIEL.
(2) Troops: Annex 5.
(3) Craft: Annex 4.
(4) Mission: On D day H hour assault beaches 259 and 261, clear landing beaches of all resistance, capture ST TROPEZ, and clear the ST TROPEZ PENINSULA; assist 45th Inf Div in clearing beach 262; continue adv rapidly to gain contact with ROMEO Force and to seize BLUE Line in zone, destroying all enemy therein; protect Corps L; ROMEO Force atchd ALPHA Force when contact established, and will be assembled vic LA MOLE when tactical situation permits; adv from BLUE Line on Corps order.

d. Corps Arty - Annex 6.

e. AAA - Annex 7.

f. 117th Cav Rcn Sq (-3 reinf troops):
(1) Commander: Lt Col HODGE.
(2) Mission: Land with Hq VI Corps prepared on Corps order to assemble squadron for aggressive rcn in zone of Corps attack.

g. Engr - Annex 8.

h. Corps Res:
(1) CC SUDRE:
(a) Commander: Brig Gen SUDRE.
(b) Mission: On Corps order land over beaches as directed by CG VI Corps with first priority to beach 264A, assemble vic FREJUS or as directed by CG VI Corps, prepared for offensive action to the NW.
(2) Fr Groupe de Commandos (ROMEO Force):
(a) Commander: Lt Col BOUVET.
(b) Mission: On Corps order when assembled vic LA MOLE by ALPHA Force, will be detached ALPHA Force, and will remain vic LA MOLE in Corps res.
(3) 1st Airborne Task Force (RUGBY Force):
(a) Commander: Brig Gen FRUDENBERG.
(b) Mission: On Corps order when relieved by 36th Inf Div and 45th Inf Div, assemble vic LE MUY.
(4) Fr Naval Assault Groups (ROSIE Force):
(a) Commander: Commander SERIOT.
(b) Mission: On Corps order when assembled vic FREJUS by CAMEL Force, will be detached CAMEL Force, and will remain vic FREJUS in Corps res.

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[illegible]

(6) [illegible] will be synchronized with ship's time prior to debarkation.

(7) All personnel will be cautioned that American and British prcht and glider troops will be operating inland from beaches. Glider shuttles are scheduled in the area at about [illegible] and 1800h on D day. All troop carrier aircraft will be painted with black and white stripes on wings and fuselage. Gliders will not be painted with these black and white stripes.

(8) Yellow smoke will be used to identify friendly ground troops to friendly aircraft.

(9) Divisions will seize and secure suitable landing strips for Cub planes at the earliest possible moment, reporting location to Corps over command channels.

(10) Every possible weapon will be so loaded in craft as to permit firing during the approach to the beach.

(11) Any use of toxic gas agents by the enemy will be reported to Hq VI Corps without delay.

(12) Commanders will emphasize to all troops that success in this operation depends upon a vigorous assault conducted with utmost speed.

4. a. Adm - Annex 9.
b. DELTA Force land battalion beach group of res RCT over the E end of Beach 281 on order CG VI Corps after beach has been cleared by ALPHA Force; battalion beach group will operate the northern sector of the beach for the landing of DELTA Force vehicles and supplies.
c. Administrative bdry between ALPHA Force and DELTA Force indicated on Opn Map effective on order CG VI Corps.
d. Beach groups detached KODAK Force and placed in direct support at H hour.

5. a. Sig Com: Annex 10.
b. Axis Sig Com VI Corps: STE MAXIME - LE LUC.
c. CPs:
(1) Afloat:
(a) Seventh Army Adv - USS CATOCTIN
(b) Seventh Army Main - USS HENRICO
(c) VI Corps - USS CATOCTIN
(d) VI Corps Alternate - USS BARNETT
(e) 3d Inf Div - USS DUANE
(f) 45th Inf Div - USS BISCAYNE
(g) 36th Inf Div - USS BAYFIELD
(2) Ashore: Opn Map
d. Succession of Command:
(1) Maj Gen TRUSCOTT
(2) Maj Gen DAHLQUIST
(3) Maj Gen EAGLES
(4) Maj Gen O'DANIEL

TRUSCOTT
Maj Gen

OFFICIAL:

Harrell
HARRELL
G-3

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Annexes: 1 - Int
2 - Air
3 - Naval Gunfire
4 - Craft Allocation
5 - Troop List
6 - Arty and AT
7 - AAA
8 - Engr
9 - Adm (Adm Instr # 1 Opn ANVIL)
10 - Sig

DISTRIBUTION:	COPY NO.		
Seventh Army	1-45	CG	88
II Corps (Fr)	46-47	Brig Gen Butler	89
3d Inf Div	48-57	C/S	90
36th Inf Div	58-63	DC/S	91
45th Inf Div	64-69	G-1	92
CCI 1st Armd Div (Fr)	70-71	G-2	93-94
1st SS Force	72	G-3	95-98
1st Airborne Task Force	73	G-4	99
Groupe de Commando (Fr)	74	Engr	100
COMNAVNAW	75	Sig	101
Rear Admiral Lowry	76	CWS	102
Rear Admiral Moon	77	QM	103
Rear Admiral Rodgers	78	Ord	104
XII TAC	79	Surg	105
VI Corps Arty	80-82	War Room	106
35th AAA Brig	83-85	Historian	107-108
117th Cav Ron Sq	86	Extra	109-125
57th Sig Bn	87		

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

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

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
LA ROQUEBRUSSANE
Forcalquairet
St. Gardeoul
Bocbaron
Pin de St Clements
Pas du Bréguet
Mèounes
Belgentier
Castelles de
Boisse
Solliès-Ville
Ft Est du Coudon
FORÊT DOMANIALE DES MORIÈRES
FORÊT DES PIERREFEU
FORÊT DES MAURES
BORMES-LES-MIMOSAS
Bois Mataou
Sommet de Perrol
Le Pédon
Le Temple
Les Maysons
Les Garde-Freinets
Les Vergnes
Les Clapiers
Les Ribes
Les Mèdes
Les Laurons
Les Ferrages
Les Ayres
Les Gaves

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

DROP SCHEDULE AND OBJECTIVES

0422 to 0512 - 509th Prcht Bn drops in DZ-C and seizes area 4.

Elements 517th RCT drop in DZ-A and seize areas 1, 2, and 3.

Elements 2nd Prcht Brig (Br) drop in DZ-O, seize area 5 (Glider Landing Area), and occupy LE MUY.

When established on objectives, paratroop detachments will attack enemy defenses toward FREJUS within the BSL.

[illegible] 71 Gliders land in area 5 - 61 loaded with British Troops, 10 loaded with TASK FORCE HQ.

[illegible] Additional Gliders and Carrier Planes bring in 1st Bn 551st Prcht Regt and 550th Glider Bn, plus additional Arty, AT weapons, Engrs, and remainders.

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

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

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

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

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

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BIGOT-DRAGOON

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46

SECRET
Authy CG VI Corps
Initials:
Date: 7 August 44

Amendment No 1
to
Annex No 1 (Intel)
to
FO No 1
Operation ANVIL

7 August 1944

CHANGES to ANNEX No 1

1. Delete Par 5 b (1) and 5 b (2) and insert the following:

(1) The initial supply of maps including one full distribution as prescribed in Par 42, Change 1 of FM 30-20, dated 6 January 1941, plus a 50% reserve will be furnished by the Corps Engineer. Maps will be broken down and packaged by Div Engineer Map Detachments in sealed packages in accordance with their respective Div G-2 Map Distribution Lists at the bivouac of the 661st Engr Topo Co, which is under guard with personnel restricted. These sealed packages of unit maps and the Seventh Army Map Identification Code and Key in sealed envelope will be issued at the 661st Engr Topo Co bivouac to unit S-2's seventy-two (72) hours prior to final embarkation. Unit S-2's will be responsible to deliver these sealed packages and envelopes to the commanding officer of troops on board ship who in turn will be responsible for the prescribed security of these maps and the Seventh Army Map Identification Code and Key until the prescribed time of final distribution. Sealed maps and envelopes may be opened after dropping of pilot, or if no pilot, four (4) hours after sailing. For those ships that stop at CORSICA, the sealed packages and envelopes will not be opened until the ships have been four hours at sea from that island.

(2) Subsequent map supply will be by requisition to Corps Engineer through channels.

2. Change par 5 c (2) to read 5 c (4). Insert in par 5 c the following:

(2) Mosaics (Scale 1/25,000) covering the identical area of the 1/25,000 GSGS 4411 map sheets will be available for distribution to Inf companies, arty Btries and all organic and attached units of similar size.

(3) Contact prints and enlargements of both verticals and obliques of the assault beaches will be distributed as required by Div G-2's.

3. Change Par 7 (Counterintelligence) 1, (1) (b) to read "Somewhere in Southern FRANCE."

AMENDMENT TO G-2 ESTIMATE

(Appendix No 1 to Annex No 1, FO No 1, Operation ANVIL)

Recent Trends

Developments in Northern FRANCE and ITALY bear directly on the situation that may be expected to exist in the beachhead area on D-Day. No major change of the total enemy strength in the GULF of LIONS area has yet taken place, but the following trends should be weighed in any analysis of enemy capabilities.

a. Northern ITALY

Withdrawal to the GOTHIC Line, and what now appears to be a predetermined coastal defense policy, have combined to place four divisions in the GENOA area. Two of these divisions are German (34 Inf Div and 42 Lt Div) and

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two are thought to be Italian. It is believed likely that in the event of an invasion of Southern FRANCE, the two Italian divisions (SAN MARCO and (?) MONTE ROSA) might take over coastal defense duties, thus freeing one or both German divisions for employment in FRANCE. The likelihood of this taking place has already been pointed out in the notes to Appendices 2 & 3 of the Intelligence Annex.

b. Northern FRANCE

It seems inevitable that the results of the present rapid advance in BRITTANY will soon be felt in Southern FRANCE. Present information indicates that the 158 and 708 Divisions have already started movement to the N. There is every likelihood that a third division (159) may soon follow these two. In addition, the 9 Pz Div has initiated movement N in the RHONE Valley. Whether further withdrawals will be made from Southern FRANCE remains to be seen, but the following factors should ultimately influence enemy action in the target area:

(1) Seizure of BRITTANY and its major ports will permit a rapid Allied build-up in Northern FRANCE. Enemy reaction may take one of two forms: movement of forces from Southern FRANCE to attempt to block the Allied advance, or evacuation of these forces to prevent their being cut off by an Allied push to the E. While either course will effectively reduce enemy strength in Southern FRANCE, it is doubtful if forces in the target area will initiate withdrawal prior to the landing.

(2) As the RHONE Valley is the logical axis of withdrawal of forces in Southern FRANCE, it must be kept open at all cost. Therefore, it is likely that the enemy's reaction to a successful landing in the target area will be to block our advance toward the RHONE Valley with forces generally E of MARSEILLE while elements W thereof initiate their withdrawal to the N.

Conclusions

a. On the basis of such changes as have already taken place in the target area, the enemy's capabilities remain unchanged, with the defense of TOULON remaining the favored capability.

b. The departure of the 9th Pz Div, presumably for the NORMANDY area, has decreased materially the enemy's mobile reserve in Southern FRANCE, as well as his armored strength.

c. On the basis of present enemy dispositions and comparative build-up, it appears that the enemy eventually will be forced to evacuate Southern FRANCE after our landing, fighting a delaying action northward up the RHONE Valley.

CHANGES to APPENDIX No 2

1. At top of column 4 delete Location 22 July and insert Location 8 August.

2. Delete line beginning 9 Pz Div. 9 Pz Div now accepted in Army Group B area.

3. In line beginning 11 Pz Div delete BORDEAUX (4)*, 390 (6), 156 (7), 26 (8), 260 (9), 39 (10), 48 (11) and 58 (12) and insert CASTRES (4), 285 (6), 114 (7), 19 (8), 190 (9), 29 (10), 41 (11), 51 (12), and enter whole line under CENTRAL PYRENEES AREA and delete from BORDEAUX AREA.

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4. In line beginning 189 Res Div delete 189 Res Div, 9 Bns (2), CENTRAL PYRENEES (4), 285 (6), 114 (7), 19 (8), 190 (9), 29 (10), 41 (11), 51 (12) and insert Elts 189 Res Div (1), 5 Bns (2), MONTPELLIER (4), 165 (6), 66 (7), 11 (8), 110 (9), 17 (10), 33 (11), 43 (12) and enter whole line under MONTPELLIER -- PERPIGNAN AREA.

5. Enter Elts 189 Res Div (1), 2 Bns (2), (no tanks or arty) (3), CLERMONT -- FERRAND (4), Tng & Repl (5), 220 (6), 88 (7), 15 (8), 147 (9), 22 (10), 32 (11), 42 (12) under GRENOBLE AREA.

6. Enter Elts 189 Res Div (1), 2 Bns (2), (no arty or tanks) (3), TARBES (4), Eng & Repl (5), 285 (6), 114 (7), 19 (8), 190 (9), 29 (10), 41 (11), 51 (12), under CENTRAL PYRENEES AREA.

7. Delete unlocated Div and insert 716 Inf Div.

8. Enter under TOULON -- GRASSE area unidentified Tank Bn (1), 35 Tanks (3), BRIGNOLES (4), Mobile Reserve (5), 25 (6), 10 (7), 2 (8), 16 (9), 3 (10), 19 (11), 24 (12).

9. Set up SAVONA -- VENTIMIGLIA AREA and enter under it 34 Inf Div (1), 9 Bns (2), 36-105G/M, 4-105 G, 8-150 H (3), SAVONA -- VENTIMIGLIA (4), Coastal Defense (5), 220 (6), 88 (7), 15 (8), 147 (9), 22 (10), 32 (11), 42 (12).

10. Set up GENOA AREA. Enter under it 42 Lt Div (1), 6 Bns (2), 24-105G/M, 12-150 M (3), GENOA (4), Coastal Defense (5), 240 (6), 96 (7), 16 (8), 160 (9), 24 (10), 38 (11), 48 (12).

11. Enter under MONTPELLIER -- PERPIGNAN AREA independent Tank Bn, 45 Med Tanks (3), SETE (4), Mobile Reserve (5), 240 (6), 96 (7), 16 (8), 160 (9), 24 (10), 38 (11), 48 (12).

12. Delete note E and reletter note F note E.

* Numbers in parenthesis indicate columns affected by change.

CHANGES to APPENDIX No 3

1. Under D plus 2 delete lines beginning 9 Pz Div and 33 Pz Regt.

2. Enter lines beginning 11 Pz Div and 15 Pz Regt in D plus 3 column. Delete 2 Bns and insert 4 Bns. Delete 6000 (strength) and insert 10,000. Change figures in remarks on line beginning 11 Pz Div from 48-58 to 41-51 hours.

3. Under D plus 4 delete unlocated Div and insert 716 Inf Div.

4. Under D plus 4 enter Independent Tank Bn, no Inf Bns, 45 Tanks. Remarks: It is believed that an independent tank Bn, formerly near BORDEAUX, has been brought as mobile reserve to SETE area.

5. Under D plus 1 enter unidentified Tank Bn, no Inf Bns, 35 Tanks and remark: In immediate reserve and could arrive on D-Day but probably not assembled until end of D-Day.

6. Enter entire line under D plus 5 beginning 198 Inf Div under D plus 7.

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7. Enter line under D plus 7 beginning 189 Res Div under D plus 5, delete 2 Bns and 1200 and insert 4 Bns and 2400 (strength). Delete remarks and insert in lieu thereof: Could arrive in 33-43 hours but unlikely to employ more than 4 Bns and then only as a maximum effort.

8. Under D plus 8 enter 34 Inf Div, 9 Inf Bns, 36-105G/H, 4-105 G, 8-150 H. Estimated strength 8000. Remark: Div recently arrived from RUSSIAN front and believed detailed on coastal defense duty and is refitting. Could arrive by D plus four but movement may be delayed by movement of 148 Res Div until D plus 8.

REVISED TOTALS

DELETE

	Strength	Bns	Max Pos Divs	Prob Divs	Strength	Bns	Max D	Prob D
D plus 1 - unchanged								
D plus 2	28300	29	3+	3	20300	25	3+	3
D plus 3	32200	34	4	3½	34200	34	4	3½
D plus 4	47900	45	5½	5	43900	43	5	4½
D plus 5	51900	49	6	5+	46300	47	5½	5
D plus 6	53700	52	6½	5½	48100	50	6	5½
D plus 7	54900	54	6½	6	52100	54	6½	6
D plus 8	56100	56	7	6+	61300	65	8+	7+
D plus 10	do	do	do	do	do	do	do	do

CHANGES to APPENDIX No 4

INDEX:

Add: 716 Inf Div

CHARTS:

Delete: 9 Pz Div Chart (10 July 44)

Insert: 9 Pz Div Chart (21 July 44)

716 Inf Div Chart

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CHANGES to APPENDIX No 4

Below are listed the more important changes noted in beach defenses up to 1 August 1944:

Beach 259

Sec III, Par 2: Add: "36 to 38 tetrahedra have been laid about 60 yds offshore in approx 5 to 6 ft of water between U-422070 and U-424072. They are spaced 14 to 18 ft apart."

"At U-4115058A there are 13 raft-like objects about 15 ft square. 12 of these objects are on the beach at the water's edge while one is out in the water about 8 yds from the beach. It is suspected that these are some type of obstacle being constructed in sections on the beach and floated or pulled out into the water to form an underwater obstacle. At present these extend about 95 yds along the beach at this point. (Air Photos 25 & 30 July 44)."

Sec III, Par 3: Delete: "12 pillboxes."
Insert: "17 pillboxes."
Add: "Tetrahedra have been placed on the W end of the beach. These begin at a point 50 yds W of the foot of the jetty and extend along the beach for about 147 yds (U-41380544 to U-41240546). At the end nearest the jetty there are three rows of tetrahedra approx 16 ft between rows. In a distance of 40 yds these three rows become only one row and continue as a single row for 17 yds where it picks up as a double row 12 ft between rows and continues as such the remaining 90 yds. The tetrahedra are spaced about 9 ft between centers and are probably 3 to 4 ft at the base. (Air Photos 25 July 44)"

Sec III, Par 5: Add: "3 gun Lt CD Btry, U-421071, camouflaged and probable only,
2 Lt guns, U-516092.
2 gun Lt CD Btry, U-481050, probable only."

Beach 260

Sec III, Par 3: Delete previously reported probable pillbox on Western half of beach. Add 3 pillboxes in Western half of beach.

Add: "Additional pillbox in Eastern half of beach."
"Wire along Western part of beach."

Sec III, Par 5: Add: "2 gun Lt CD Btry, U-481050, probable only."
"2 Lt guns, U-516092."

Beach 260A

Sec III, Par 5: Add; "2 Lt guns, U-516092."

Beach 261

Sec III, Par 2: Delete: "The possible stakes.....of the beach at 514127."
Add: "The stakes are obstacles to craft and are spaced irregularly 13 to 15 ft apart, extending southward along the inner sandbar to approx U-516107. Mines are believed to be located on the top of some stakes and the stakes are believed to be wired together.

Insert between "apart" and "Along the beach": "A second row of piles may be laid along the outer sandbar which runs from U-514127 to U-518105.

Sec III, Par 5: Add: "2 gun Lt CD Btry, U-524094."

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Beach 262

Sec III, Par 5: Btry P10 now has 3 positions occupied.

Beach 262

Sec III, Par 5: Btry P10 now has 3 positions occupied.
Add: "4 gun Med FA Btry, U-493229, 2 positions unoccupied."

Beach 263

Sec III, Par 5: Btry P10 now has 3 positions occupied.
Add: "4 gun Med FA Btry, U-493229, 2 positions unoccupied."

Beach 263A

Sec III, Par 3: Add: "Stakes now obstruct beach and extend a considerable distance inland."
Add: "One additional pillbox at Northern end of beach."

Sec III, Par 5: Btry P10 now has 3 positions occupied.
Add: "4 gun Med FA Btry, U-493229, 2 positions unoccupied."

Beach 263B

Sec III, Par 3: Add: "One additional pillbox Southern end of beach now under construction."

Sec III, Par 5: Btry P10 now has 3 positions occupied.
Add: "4 gun Med FA Btry, U-493229, 2 positions unoccupied."

Beach 263C

Sec III, Par 5: Add: "4 gun Med FA Btry, U-493229, 2 positions unoccupied."

Beach 264

Sec III, Par 4: Delete: "Strongpoint behind beach."
Insert: "Trench and pillbox."

Sec III, Par 5: Add: "3 gun FA Btry U-485366, probable.
3 or 4 gun Lt CD Btry U-575394. Btry wired in facing S.
3 gun Med CD Btry U-529372.
3 gun Med CD Btry U-507376.
3 gun Med Btry U-506381, probable only.
2 gun Lt Btry U-509381, probable only.
2 or 3 gun Med CD Btry at U-521366."

All 4 positions at 554371 now occupied and of med caliber.
Delete probable CD Btry P46 at 541319.
2 gun Btry 535374, 1 position occupied.
Btry P10 now has 3 positions occupied.

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Beach 264A

Sec III, Par 3, Line 19: Delete "An anti-tank".
Insert "The AT wall referred to in Sec II above."
Insert between "At the top" and "From": "Maximum depth of foundations 3 ft. Compacted earth piled on land side to a max level one foot. No footing."

Line 24: Add: "One source suggests that high explosive shells would overturn and break up this wall as bond at base is weakened by settlement of earth. Armor piercing shells would be less effective."

Sec III, Par 3: Add: "At S end probable pillbox and MG entrenchment."
Delete: "Single gun at S end of beach, (563329)."

2 additional pillboxes in center of beach.

Sec III, Par 4: Add: "One additional pillbox approx 400 yds behind the Southern end of beach."
"One additional pillbox just outside of FREJUS along the road to ST RAPHAEL. 4 additional AT guns in position behind beach and an additional casemate under construction in the center of the beach and another probable casemate about 100 yds behind center of the beach."

Strongpoint approx 1½ km NE of FREJUS.

Sec III, Par 5: Add: "3 gun FA Btry U-485366, probable.
3 or 4 gun Lt CD Btry U-575394. Btry wired in facing S.
Btry P10 now has 3 positions occupied.
3 gun Med CD Btry 529372
3 gun Med CD Btry 507376 also 3 gun Med Btry 506381, probable only.
2 gun Lt Btry, 509381, probable only."

Delete: "Probable CD Btry P46 at 541319."

Add: "2 or 3 gun Med CD Btry at 521366.
2 gun Btry with 1 position occupied, 535374.
All 4 positions at 554371 now occupied and of med caliber."

Beach 264B

Sec III, Par 5: Delete gun Btry Q23.
Btry P10 now has 3 positions occupied.
Add: "2 gun Lt CD Btry 604366, probable only. 4 gun CD Btry 554370, 1 position unoccupied.
3 gun Med CD Btry 507376 also 3 gun Med Btry 506381, probable only.
3 gun Med CD Btry 529372."

All 4 positions at 554371 now occupied and of med caliber.

Beach 265

Sec III, Par 3: Additional pillbox and 1-50mm gun on the SW flank of beach.

Sec III, Par 5: Delete gun Btry Q23.
Btry P10 now has 3 positions occupied.
Add: "2 gun Lt CD Btry 604366, probable only. 4 gun CD Btry 554370, 1 position unoccupied."

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Beaches 265A, 265B, 265C

Sec III, Par 5: Delete gun Btry Q23.

Btry P10 now has 3 positions occupied.

CHANGES to APPENDIX No 8

Deletions:

1. The following divisions are accepted as destroyed on the beachhead: 243 Inf Div, 275 Inf Div, 353 Inf Div, Pz Lehr Div, 5 Para Div.

2. 19 Pz Div has left HOLLAND for the RUSSIAN Front where it has been identified.

Additions:

1. An unidentified division is reported at ANTWERP.

2. 6 Para Div, recently formed, has been identified in NE FRANCE.

Changes in location:

1. The following divisions have been identified on the beachhead: 116 Pz Div (formerly in the PARIS area); 2 Para Div (formerly in BRITTANY); 326 Inf Div (formerly in the AMIENS area); 363 Inf Div (formerly in NW BELGIUM).

2. 89 Inf Div left HOLLAND and is now in the LE HAVRE area.

3. 48 Inf Div, previously unlocated, now in the OSTENDE (BELGIUM) area.

4. 716 Inf Div, previously unlocated, now in the PERPIGNAN area.

5. 9 Pz Div left SOUTHERN FRANCE and was last reported moving N from LYON.

6. 11 Pz Div left the BORDEAUX area and has now been identified in the CASTRES area.

7. 189 Res Div - Elements and Hq of this division have been identified in the MONTPELLIER area with other elements remaining near CLERMONT - FERRAND and near TARBES.

8. 158 Res Div is reported moving N.

9. 708 Inf Div is reported moving N.

CHANGES to APPENDIX No 9

Deletions:

1. 9 Pz Div is accepted in Army Group 'B' area.

2. 158 Res Div is reported moving N.

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3. 708 Inf Div is reported moving N.

4. 242 Assault Gun Brig reported moving N. It has been traced as far as BORDEAUX.

Additions:

1. 716 Inf Div is now located in the PERPIGNAN area.

2. 11 Pz Div now identified in CASTRES area.

3. Elements and Hq of 189 Res Div identified in the MONTPELLIER area.

4. Hq 17 Sicherungs Brig identified at CLERMONT -- FERRAND.

5. 1000 Sicherungs Regt (Mtz) and elements of 200 Sicherungs Regt (Mtz) identified in the CLERMONT -- FERRAND area.

CHANGES to APPENDIX No 10

UNIT	DELETE	ADD
8 Res Jgr Regt Hq		At NICE
148 Res Div Services		At NICE
Inf Cos shown in area ST JEAN-VILLEFRANCHE		Belongs to 164 Res Bn
1 Co, 164 Res Bn		At NICE
El 444 Bn, 239 Res GR	From ANTIBES	
2 CA Btries		S of JUAN-LES-PINS
Hq 8 Res Arty Regt		At MOUGINS
4 Co, 231 Res GR Bn		At MOUGINS
148 Div Services -- Rations		At MOUANS SARTOUX
Hq 148 Res Div		At GRASSE
Hq 8 Res Sig Bn		At GRASSE
Bn shown at LA NAPOULE		Identified 444 Bn, 239 Res GR
Unidentified Arty Bn at ST RAPHAEL		Probably 1038 Arty Bn
Bn of 765 GR at LE PUGET -- SUR ARGENS		Identified III Bn, 765 GR
1048 Tk Bn	From LE MUY	
1048 Asst Gun Btry		At LE MUY
A Bn 1195 CA Regt		At DRAGUIGNAN
A CA Btry		At head of GULF of ST TROPEZ
Three CA Bns		In ST TROPEZ area
Equivalent of one CA Bn		Along coast CAP BENET-LE LAVENDOU-CAP NEGRE
1190 Arty Bn	'El' from LE LAVENDOU	Full Bn N of LA VERRERIE
El 203 Ost Bn		S of LA LONDE -- LES MAURES
A Co of 242 Fus Bn		NE of LA CRAU
Arty Btry of 242 Fd Repl Bn		At LA GARDE
1199 Arty Bn		S of LA GARDE
242 MP Co at HYERES	(is Plat only)	
Arty Bn shown NW of HYERES		Identified III Bn, 242 Arty Regt
A CA Btry		On CAP MUDES ILE PORQUEROLLES
Two CA Btries		On ILE LEVANT

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UNIT	DESTR	ADD
Inf Bn shown W of CARQUEIRANNE	242 Div	918 GR
242 Engr Bn		At TOULON
Inf Bn shown NW of ST MANDRIER	242 Div	918 GR
Marine Inf Unit shown at TOULON	(3-4,000)	Identified Regt KLAUSSEN
2 CA Bns (Approx 36 guns)		CAP SICIE to CAP CEPET (Incl ST MANDRIERE)
Hq 242 Arty Regt		Probably at OLLIOULES

TRUSCOTT
MAJ GEN

OFFICIAL: Langevin
LANGEVIN
G-2

Appendices 11 - 14 omitted in original report. BBA

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

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

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

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BIGOT-A

RDER OF BATTLE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES

1944 [redacted] SECRET



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

APPENDIX No. 8 TO ANNEX No. 1 TO F O No. 1,
OPERATION ANVIL

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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BIGOT-ANVIL
SECRET
By Authority of
CG VI Corps
Initials
Date: 2 Aug 44

HQ VI CORPS
NAPLES, ITALY
4 August 1944

ANNEX NO 2 - AIR SUPPORT
TO FO #1 (ANVIL)

Map: France 1:100,000

1. General
   a. Organization
      XII Tactical Air Command reinforced:
      4 Fighter groups
      5 Fighter-Bomber groups
      7 Medium Bomb groups
      21 Heavy Bomb groups
      3 Tactical Reconnaissance squadrons
      Approximately 200 Navy carrier-based planes

   b. Aircraft of Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division will operate between west coast of ITALY and vicinity of LE PUY, FRANCE commencing prior to first light on D day, in connection with the operation of 1st Airborne Task Force (RUGBY FORCE). Transport planes, gliders and necessary day and night fighter cover will be included.

2. Air Mission from D-35 to D-1 inclusive
   a. To neutralize and destroy enemy air forces which threaten the assault area.

   b. To isolate general battle area by attacks against main road and rail lines. Program to cover wide area to avoid premature indication of attack area to enemy.

   c. From D-10 to D-1, to attack coastal defense batteries selected by Navy in areas from GENOA to the SPANISH border.

   d. On D-1 and night D-1/D, to execute bombing attacks from ILE DU LEVANT to MARSEILLE in accordance with Tactical Cover Plan (Operation NUTMEG). Gun installations on Islands of LEVANT, PORT CROS, PROQUEROLLES and GIENS Peninsula to be included in attacks prior to first light on D day.

3. Air Mission on D day
   a. Prior to H hour:
      (1) The Air operation in direct support of the ANVIL assault on D day prior to H hour has been designated Operation YOKUM.
      (2) Purpose of Operation YOKUM is to cause maximum destruction to enemy coastal and beach defenses within the assault area with all forces available.
      (3) Following targets will be engaged:
         (a) Counterbatory attacks, coordinated with Naval gunfire, on any enemy artillery that can be brought to bear on shipping of any type in the assault area.
         (b) Enemy guns and other military installations which bear directly on the ability of our ground forces to advance over the beaches.
         (c) Beach obstacles and defenses to be bombed by Heavy and Medium bombers using light weight demolition and fragmentation bombs with instantaneous fuses.
         (d) Enemy light artillery and other military installations that are capable of delaying the planned D day advances in general.
         (e) Destruction of any enemy airdromes operational in or within close fighter operating range of the assault area.
      (4) Operation YOKUM provides for bombing attacks from first light until H-30 minutes. Eight Navy fighter-bombers will be on call at 0730B, 16 fighter-bombers of XII TAC at 0800B and 8 rocket projector planes at 0800B.

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(5) For specific targets see Inclosures 1 and 2.

b. At and after H hour:

(1) The Air Operation in direct support of the ANVIL assault beginning H hour on D day has been designated "Operation DUCROT".

(2) Purposes of Operation DUCROT are:

(a) To cause maximum destruction to enemy coastal and beach defenses within the assault area.

(b) To isolate the battlefield area by the destruction of rail and road bridges across the RHONE - ISERE - DURANCE RIVERS, and by blocking of defiles and rail lines running through the ALPS from the ISERE southward.

(c) To attack any enemy troop movements within the XII TAC area.

(3) The following target priorities will be followed:

(a) Up to H plus 6½ hours the maximum effort will be directed against:

(1) Counterbattery attacks, coordinated with Naval gunfire, on any enemy artillery that can be brought to bear on shipping of any type in the assault area.

(2) Enemy guns and other military installations which bear directly on the ability of our ground forces to advance over the beaches. Particular emphasis to be placed on the period from H hour to H plus 2, when friendly field artillery will not be set up ashore; and period H plus 5½ to H plus 6½, to assist 36th Infantry Division assault on Beach 264A.

(3) Beach obstacles and defenses on Beach 264A and road loading from Beach 264A to FREJUS, to be bombed by Heavy bombers from 1230 to 1300B.

(4) Enemy light artillery and other military installations which are capable of delaying the planned D day advance in general.

(b) After H plus 6½ hours, guns still threatening shipping or the ground forces will be attacked, but the bulk of fighter bomber effort will be diverted to armed recces to attack any troop or vehicle concentrations moving into the assault area. Prior to H plus 6 armed reccos will operate H-hour Restriction Line (Overlay, Inclosure 2) to alternate armed recce targets, which are DURANCE RIVER bridges (Inclosure 1). After H plus 6, armed reccos will operate outside H plus 6 Restriction Line (Overlay).

(c) The balance of Heavy bombers not employed on the beaches, plus a turn-around on all Medium bomber groups, will be employed on bridges across the RHONE - ISERE - DURANCE RIVERS.

(4) For specific targets see Inclosures 1 and 2.

(5) Call missions will be requested over Corps Command Net until VI Corps Headquarters is established ashore. Thereafter call missions will be sent either over normal Air Support Net or Command Net. Such missions will require diversion of missions from scheduled targets and a minimum of 2½ hours must be expected before execution, if target is located within applicable Restriction Line. If target is outside Restriction Line, missions will be briefed in the air by forward controller or Headquarters ship and execution within 30 minutes may be expected. In grave emergencies, call missions on easily identifiable targets of highest importance inside Restriction Line will be sent over Corps Command Net direct to Commanding General VI Corps, and execution within 30 minutes is anticipated.

c. Fighter planes will maintain standing patrol over the beaches beginning at 0550B. A patrol of 6 additional Spitfires will be furnished between 0600B and 0800B as additional low cover over the assault area.

4. Air Mission after D day

a. Day and night fighter protection of shipping and beaches as long as tactical situation requires.

b. Targets of opportunity to be attacked by scheduled flights operating under forward controller.

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c. Prearranged missions requested through Seventh Army Air Support Control.

d. Communication targets in rear of battle area.

5. Tac/R and Arty/R as requested by G-2. Planes will operate over assault area commencing 0635B on D day.

6. PRU located at airfields in CORSICA initially.

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Maj Gen

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HARRELL
G-3

Incls - 1 - Detailed Attack Schedule
2 - Overlay

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INCLOSURE 1)
TO :
ANNEX 2)
TO :
FO 1 (ANVIL))

~~TOP~~ SECRET

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46

BIGOT-ANVIL
~~TOP~~ SECRET
By Authority of
CG VI CORPS
Initials
4 August 1944

4 August 1944

DETAILED ATTACK SCHEDULE

CORPS TGT NO (Overlay)	AERIAL OBJECTIVE NUMBER *	LOCATION	TARGET	NO & TYPE A/C EACH MISSION	TIME ON TARGET	BOMB LOAD
	1-Y	Any gun flashes in area S2353 to S2550 to S3159 to S5060 (S256523)		4 F.B	From 0550 to 0610	
	2-Y	Any gun flashes in area S2353 to S2450 to U5931 to U5636 (S214512)		4 F/B	From 0550 to 0610	
	3-Y	Any gun flashes in area U5831 to U5636 to U5320 to U4823 (U531252)		4 F/B	From 0550 to 0610	
	4-Y	Any gun flashes in area U4823 to U4117 to U4414 to U5418 (U516176)		4 F/B	From 0550 to 0610	
	5-Y	Any gun flashes in area U5416 to U5015 to U5008 to U5408 (U516103)		4 F/B	From 0550 to 0610	
	6-Y	Any gun flashes in area U4810 to U5205 to U3708 to U3802 (U412052)		4 F/B	From 0550 to 0610	

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CARS (or No Overlay)	AERIAL OBJECTIVE NUMBERS	LOCATION	TARGET	NO & TYPE A/C EACH MISSION	TIME ON TARGET	BOMB LOAD
	7-Y	Any gun flashes in area U2905 to Z3296 to Z2095 to U2002 (Z276958)		4 F/B	From 0550 to 0610	
	8-Y	Any gun flashes in area Z1984 to Z1084 to Z1099 to U2001 (Z121888)		4 F/B	From 0550 to 0610	
		(If no flashes seen by 0610 designated strong points will be bombed as alternates)				
	9-Y 48-D	Z276958	4 120mm CD	4 F/B 4 F/B 6 F/B 6 M/B	0615 0635 0640 0935 1510 0650 0710 0725	Incendiary Incendiary 2 x 1000 Incendiary/Demo
	10-Y	Z121888	2 105mm CD 1 155mm CD	4 F/B 6 M/B	0620 0635 0655 0715 0725	Incendiary Incendiary/Demo
	11-Y 37-D	U546259	3 220mm CD	4 F/B 6 M/B 4 F/B	0610 0625 0645 0650 0710 0725 0805	Incendiary Incendiary/Demo 2 x 1000
	12-Y 94-D	U497171	4 How CD	4 F/B 6 M/B 4 R/P (F/B)	0630 0650 0700 0730 0930	Incendiary Incendiary/Demo
	13-Y	S205513	5 150mm CD	4 F/B 6 M/B	0610 0630 0650 0705 0715 0730	2 x 1000 Frag/Demo
	14-Y 36-1	S236526	6 DP	4 F/B 6 M/B 4 F/B	0615 0640 0700 0710 0725 0805	Incendiary Incendiary/Demo 2 x 1000
	15-Y 66-1	S274542	4 DP	4 F/B 6 M/B 4 F/B	0620 0655 0705 0720 0815	Incendiary Incendiary/Demo 2 x 1000

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CORPS TGT NO (Overlay)	AERIAL OBJECTIVE NUMBER	LOCATION	TARGET	NO & TYPE A/C EACH MISSION	TIME ON TARGET	BOMB LOAD
8	16-Y 17-D	U496122	4 103mm DP	4 F/B 6 M/B 4 F/B	0620 0640 0655 0710 0725 0800	2 x 1000 Frag/Demo 2 x 500
9	17-Y	Z185869	4 164mm CD	4 F/B	0610 0625 0640 0700 0715	Incendiary
10	18-Y 20-I	U522180	1 CD	4 F/B	0610 0620 0640 0655 0710 0725 0900	Incendiary 2 x 500
11	19-Y 21-I	U523179	2 CD	4 F/B 4 R/P (F/B)	0615 0620 0625 0655 0725 0830	Incendiary
12	20-Y 23-I	U525177	1 CD	4 F/B 4 R/P (F/B)	0610 0615 0625 0640 0710 0930	Incendiary
13	21-Y 71-D	U441188	4 150mm CD	4 F/B	0620 0635 0650 0705 0720 0955	2 x 1000
14	22-Y	U442186	2 Lt CD	4 F/B	0640 0655 0725	2 x 1000
15	23-Y 26-I	U598865	4 105mm CD	4 F/B	0615 0630 0645 0700 1000	2 x 1000
16	24-Y	S263538	2 Lt CD	4 F/B	0620 0650 0710	2 x 1000
17	25-Y 35-I	S223510	2 Lt CD	4 F/B	0615 0635 0700 0805	2 x 1000
18	26-Y 65-I	S225515	2 Lt CD	4 F/B	0610 0625 0665 0815	2 x 1000

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CORPS TGT NO (overlay)	AERIAL OBJECTIVE NUMBER	LOCATION	TARGET	NO & TYPE A/C EACH MISSION	TIME ON TARGET	BOMB LOAD
19	27-Y	S328527	4 Lt CD	4 F/B	0625 0645	2 x 1000
20	28-Y	S248527	2 CD	4 F/B	0630 0650	Incendiary
21	29-Y	S214518	4 CD	4 F/B	0620 0700 0720	2 x 1000
22	30-Y	U516092	4 150mm CD	4 F/B	0610 0625 0640 0655 0710 0725	2 x 1000
23	31-Y 42-D 70-D	U448178	2 CD	4 F/B	0615 0630 0645 0700 0715 0730 0845 0850	Incendiary
24	32-Y	U601337	4 Lt CD	4 F/B	0650 0710 0725	2 x 1000
25	33-Y 25-I	U604337	2 Lt CD	4 F/B	0630 0700 0720 1000	2 x 1000
26	34-Y	S334692	4 149mm	4 F/B	0655 0715 0730	2 x 1000
27	35-Y	U521165	4 CD	4 F/B	0650 0705 0720	2 x 1000
28	36-Y 22-I 69-I	U448107	4 CD	4 F/B	0630 0645 0700 0715 0730 0845 0900	2 x 1000
29	37-Y	U500156	2 Lt CD	4 F/B	0650 0705 0720	2 x 1000
30	38-Y	Z135998	4 150mm CD	6 M/B	0710 0730	Incendiary/Demo
31	46-Y	Z152855	2 CD	4 F/B	0635	Incendiary
32	47-Y	Z170854	4 155mm	4 F/B	0645	Incendiary

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CORPS TGT NO (Overaly)	AERIAL OBJECTIVE NUMBER	LOCATION	TARGET	NO & TYPE A/C EACH MISSION	TIME ON TARGET	BOMB LOAD
33	48-Y 50-D	U529334	2 Lt Fld	4 F/B	0645 1020	Incendiary
34	49-Y	U256032	4 CD	4 F/B	0705	2 x 1000
35	50-Y	U514340	4 Fld	4 F/B	0705	2 x 1000
36	51-Y 33-D	U439122	4 Lt CD	4 F/B 4 F/B	0715 0850	2 x 1000 Incendiary
37	52-Y 34-D	U533256	4 CD	4 F/B 6 F/B	0730 0755	2 x 1000 2 x 1000
38	53-Y 40-D 72-D	U402163	2 Lt CD	4 F/B	0730 0850 0955	Incendiary
39		U341026	2 CD	4 F/B	0610 0620 0630 0645	
		(To be attacked by missions diverted from other targets at scheduled times, only if specifically directed by Headquarters Ship)				
40	18-D	U484104	4 CD	4 F/B	0800	2 x 500
41	19-D 68-D	U441118	2 CD	4 F/B 4 R/P (F/B)	0825 0830	2 x 1000
42	33-D	U502220	4 DP	6 F/B	0755	2 x 1000
43	38-D	U545303	4 CD	4 F/B	0805	2 x 1000
44	41-D	U465190	2 CD	4 F/B	0850	Incendiary
45	43-D	U514336	4 CD	6 F/B	0910 1210	Incendiary
46	44-D	U507376	4 Lt CD	6 F/B	0910 1210	Incendiary

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CORPS TGT NO (Overlay)	AERIAL OBJECTIVE NUMBER	LOCATION	TARGET	NO & TYPE A/C EACH MISSION	TIME ON TARGET	BOMB LOAD
47	45-D 73-D	U575394	4 Lt CD	4 F/B	0935 1130	2 x 1000
48	46-D 74-D	U554370	4 CD	4 F/B	0935 1130	2 x 1000
49	47-D	U287014	4 Lt CD	4 F/B 6 F/B	0935 1510	Incendiary 2 x 1000
50	49-D	U529372	4 CD	4 F/B	1020	Incendiary
51	51-D	U362095	3 CD	4 F/B	1020	2 x 1000
52	52-D	U439156	Strong Point	4 F/B	1020	2 x 1000
53	53-D	U520374	4 Lt CD	6 F/B	1040 1340	Incendiary
54	54-D 58-D	U515328	4 Fld	6 F/B 4 F/B	1040 1340 1105	Incendiary
55	55-D	U509381	4 Lt CD	4 F/B	1105	2 x 1000
56	56-D	U520366	4 Lt CD	4 F/B	1105	2 x 1000
57	57-D	U532372	4 Lt CD	4 F/B	1105	Incendiary
58	59-D 89-D	Z120988	Rd Bridge	6 F/B 4 F/B	1640 1800 2000	2 x 1000
59	60-D 88-D	Z115995	Rd Bridge	6 F/B 4 F/B	1640 1800 2000	2 x 1000
60	61-D 64-D 86-D	S308631	Rd Bridge	6 F/B 4 F/B	1810 1940 1700 1900	2 x 1000

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CORPS TGT NO (Overlay)	AERIAL OBJECTIVE NUMBER	LOCATION	TARGET	NO & TYPE A/C EACH MISSION	TIME ON TARGET	BOMB LOAD
61	62-D 87-D	S306633	Rd Bridge	6 F/B 4 F/B	1610 1700 1900	2 x 1000
62	63-D 84-D	S305651	Rd Bridge	6 F/B 6 F/B	1940 1500	2 x 1000
63	67-D	U524095	Strong Point	4 F/B	0825	2 x 1000
64	75-D	U559307	Strong Point	4 F/B	1300	2 x 1000
65	76-D	U561351	Strong Point	4 F/B	1300 1405	2 x 1000
66	77-D	U541319	Strong Point	4 F/B	1310	2 x 1000
67	78-D 81-D	U585345	Strong Point	4 F/B	1310 1330	2 x 1000
68	79-D	U559321	Strong Point	4 F/B	1320	2 x 1000
69	80-D	U551342	Strong Point	4 F/B	1320	2 x 1000
70	82-D	U554335	Strong Point	4 F/B	1330 1400	2 x 1000
71	83-D	U615574	Rd Bridge	8 F/B	1400	2 x 1000
72	85-D	Z134977	Rd Bridge	8 F/B	1600	2 x 1000
	39-Y	Beach 259		180 M/B	Between 0700 & 0730	Frags & 100-lb Dem
	40-Y	Beach 261		120 H/B	Between 0700 & 0730	" " " " "
	41-Y	Beach 263A		40 H/B	Between 0700 & 0730	" " " " "
	42-Y	Beach 263B		40 H/B	Between 0700 & 0730	" " " " "

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CORPS OBJ NO (Overlay)	AERIAL OBJECTIVE NUMBER	LOCATION	TARGET	NO & TYPE A/C EACH MISSION	TIME ON TARGET	BOMB LOAD
	43-Y	Beach 263C		40 H/B	Between 0700 & 0730	Frags & 100-lb Demo
	44-Y	Beach 264B		60 H/B	Between 0700 & 0730	" " " " "
	45-Y	Beach 265A		124 M/B	Between 0700 & 0730	" " " " "
	1-D 2-D	Beach 264A		60 H/B	Between 1230 & 1300	" " " " "
		Road - Beach 264A to FREJUS (Two last listed missions will have a 4000 yard phase line for troops approaching from land side up to 1300 hours)		30 H/B	Between 1230 & 1300	" " " " "
	3-D	N850204	Pont St Esprit rd bridge	30 H/B	1300	
	4-D	N880419	Donzere Pont du St Fusselue rd bridge	30 H/B	1330	
	5-D	N878450	Viviers rd bridge	30 H/B	1415	
	6-D	N871528	Latiel rd bridge	30 H/B	1445	
	7-D	O-010957	Valence rd bridge	30 H/B	1530	
	8-D	N843325	Bourg St Andiol bridge	30 H/B	1600	
	10-D 13-D	O-8918 -	Sisteron RR bridge & rd bridge	36 M/B	1600 1615	
	11-D	S844559	Arles rd bridge	36 M/B	1615	
	12-D	S892797	Aramom rd bridge	36 M/B	1615	

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CORPS TGT NO (Overlay)	AERIAL OBJECTIVE NUMBER	LOCATION	TARGET	NO & TYPE A/C EACH MISSION	TIME ON TARGET	BOMB LOAD
	14-D	S949997	Roquemaure rd bridge	36 M/B	1615	
	15-D	S862699	Torascon rd bridge	36 M/B	1630	
	16-D	S978864	Avignon rd bridge	36 M/B	1630	
	27-D	Sisteron (O-8918) to Pertius (T-5957)	Railcuts	8 R/P	1200 1330	
	28-D	Pertius (T-5957) to Aix (T-5141)	Railcuts	8 R/P	1430	
	29-D	Aix (T-5141) to (T-8036)	Railcuts	8 R/P	1600 1800	
	30-D	Avignon (S-9787) to Miramis (T-1546)	Railcuts	8 F/B	1830	2 x 500#
	31-D	Arles (S-8557) to Miramus (T-1546)	Railcuts	8 R/P	1900	
	32-D	Meyrarques (T-5854) to Draquignan (U-3147)	Railcuts	8 F/B 8 R/P	1930 2000	

Following are alternate targets for Armed Recces, to be flown from Restriction Line inland to alternate targets, bombing any large enemy concentrations. Times indicated are time over alternate target;

	90-D	S985825	Rd Bridge	8 F/B	1230	2 x 1000
	91-D	T548568	Rd Bridge	8 F/B	1245 1630 1815	2 x 1000
	92-D	T073797	Rd Bridge	8 F/B	1345	2 x 1000
	93-D	T685600	Rd Bridge	8 F/B	1415 1645 1845	2 x 1000

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[illegible] NO (Overlay)	AERIAL OBJECTIVE NUMBER	LOCATION	TARGET	NO & TYPE A/C [illegible] MISSION	TIME ON TARGET	BOMB LOAD
	94-D	T166733	Rd Bridge	8 F/B	1430	2 x 1000
	95-D	T980616	Rd Bridge	8 F/B	1445 1715 1945	2 x 1000
	96-D	T285638	Rd Bridge	8 F/B	1515	2 x 1000
	97-D	U302755	Rd Bridge	8 F/B	1530 1730 2015	2 x 1000
	98-D	T440613	Rd Bridge	8 F/B	1545	2 x 1000

Fighter-bomber and Medium-bomber missions prior to H-hour will be assigned alternate targets from the following:

LOCATION	TARGET	LOCATION	TARGET	LOCATION	TARGET
U515141	4 75mm CD	U516245	Strong Point	U519144	Strong Point
U441076	4 CD	U440076	Strong Point	U439156	Strong Point
U391041	4 CD	U585345	Strong Point	U539307	Strong Point
S340702	4 155mm CD	S214512	Strong Point	U539321	Strong Point
U405066	CD	S256528	Strong Point	U411060	Strong Point
Z124887	8 75mm CD	S257532	Strong Point	U411056	Strong Point
U515103	Strong Point	S259535	Strong Point	U511319	Strong Point
U515219	Strong Point	U528252	Strong Point	S234538	Strong Point
U561351	Strong Point	U522250	Strong Point	U533334	Strong Point
				U531342	Strong Point

* "Y" after Aerial Objective Number indicates AO number in Operation YOKUM. "D" after Aerial Objective Number indicates AO number in Operation DUCROT.

Code: F/B - Fighter Bombers
M/B - Medium Bombers
H/B - Heavy Bombers
R/P - Rocket Projector Planes
CD - Cost Defense Guns
DP - Duel Purpose Guns

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

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

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

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

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By Auth of
CG VI Corps
Initials BH
30 July 1944

HEADQUARTERS, VI CORPS
APO 46, U.S.Army

NO. 125

Ho 3 — Naval Gunfire Support
FO 1 (ANVIL)

Maps: France - 1/100,000

1. a. Enemy coast defenses - Appendix Ho 12 to Annex 1 FO 1 (ANVIL) VI Corps Defense Overprint.

b. Other support available.

(1) Fire Support Group with SITKA Force, CO REAR ADMIRAL DAVIDSON, USN.

1 BB 8 - 13.4" Guns

1 CA 9 - 8" Guns

1 CL 8 - 5½" Guns

3 DD 5 - 5" Guns

2. Mission: Fire support groups of Western Task Force supports landing of KODAK Force by prearranged bombardment of enemy defenses and supports advance inland of that force by prearranged close and deep supporting fires, and fires on targets of opportunity.

3. a. Organization for Combat.

(1) Fire Support Group for 36 Div, CO REAR ADMIRAL DEYO, USN.

1 BB 12 - 12" Guns

1 CA 9 - 8" Guns

5 CL 15 - 6" Guns, 10 - 6" Guns, 8-5½"Guns, 8 - 6" Guns, 8 -6" Guns

11 DD 5 - 5" Guns

14 LCTR 1042 - 5" rockets

2 LCF Flak - (40mm)

2 LCG 2 - 4.7" Guns

(2). Fire Support Group for 45 Div, CO REAR ADMIRAL BARBEY, USN.

2 BB 10 - 14" Guns

3 CL 15 - 6" Guns, 8 - 6" Guns, 8 - 6" Guns

11 DD 5 - 5" Guns

6 LCTR 742 - 5" rockets

2 LCF Flak - (40mm)

2 LCG 2 - 4.7" Guns

(3) Fire Support Group for 3 Div, CO REAR ADMIRAL MANSFIELD, RN.

1 BB 8 - 15" Guns

1 CA 9 - 8" Guns

5 CL 8 - 6" Guns

7 DD 5 - 5" Guns

10 LCTR 1042 - 5" rockets

2 LCF Flak - (40mm)

2 LCG 2 - 4.7" Guns

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b. Plan of fire will be in accordance with Gunfire Support Plan, Annex B to Operations Plan 4-44, Naval Commander Western Task Force. This support will consist of a 40 minute preparation prior to H hour, designed to neutralize all known enemy batteries and defensive installations; prearranged close and deep supporting fires after the landing; fires on targets of opportunity as observed by air or ground observers.

(1) Priority of targets in preparation.

(a) Heavy and medium guns which can hit ships at sea.
(b) Guns which can hit landing craft approaching the shore.
(c) Guns which may be brought to bear on landing beaches.
(d) OP's which may direct any of the above type guns.(Smoke)
(e) Guns which can fire on troops advancing inland.
(f) Minor defenses, crossroads, road bottle-necks, communications installations.

(2) Fires after H Hour.

(a) Continued neutralization of still active enemy batteries and defenses.
(b) Call fires by spotter parties.
(c) Targets of opportunity by air spotter.
(d) Fires in support of advance inland regulated by phase and no-fire lines as established by seaborne forces and airborne forces.

(3) Coordination of fires between divisional areas of responsibility.

(a) Active guns firing from one division area into an adjacent division area will be fired upon after clearing with the division in which the gun is located, unless the gun is clearly visible or known to be remote from any friendly troops. In case the hostile gun is firing upon a beach and endangering or preventing a landing it will be fired upon by any observer who locates it, without clearance.

(4) Fire support areas - Appendix 1 to Annex 3 FO #1 (ANVIL) VI Corps. Fire Support and Transport areas.

(5) Restrictions on Naval gunfire - Appendix 6B to Annex 6 FO 1 (ANVIL) VI Corps. No-fire lines.

c. Observation.

(1) Shore fire control parties are allotted as follows:

1st Airborne Task Force	-	2 (Br) 1 (US)
SSF	-	3 (US)
French Commandos	-	2 (Br)
3 Division	-	9
45 Division	-	9
36 Division	-	9

(a) Of the 9 parties in each division, four are organic, five are attched from Army troops. When the need for the Army parties no longer exists, they will be detached for duty elsewhere.

(b) SFCP's will be landed in early waves of assault. 3 Div will land 7 in assault, 45 Div will land 8 in assault, 36 Div will land 8 in assault. Reserve parties will land with their reserve battalions.

(c) Parties will land with hand-carried SCR 609 radios, to be followed as soon as possible with vehicular mounted SCR 284 radios.

(d) If due to enemy action, fire support ships are unable to continue a mission, SFCP's will be notified of that fact in the clear.

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(2) Floating fire control parties will be organized as follows: 2 f[illegible] Div, 2 from 45 Div, 3 from 36 [illegible] These parties will [illegible] in naval control craft operating [illegible] landing beaches. These parties will insure observation of the shore during the period from H - 10 to H plus 60, when obstacles are being cleared and before SFCP's are set up and operating.

(3) The following observation agencies will also be utilized in naval gunfire.

(a) Navy fighters operating from carriers.
(b) 111 Ron Squadron P-51 Arty / R
(c) SOC planes (12) carried on cruisers & battleships.
(d) Artillery Cub planes.
(e) Artillery Forward Observers.
(f) Direct observation from firing ships.

4. Ammunition available to fire support groups.

a. Not to exceed 20% of magazine capacity of BB's & CA's will be fired in preparation prior to H Hour. Not more than 30% of CL & 50% DD magazine capacity may be fired, prior to H Hour.

b. 50% of magazine capacity may be fired in prearranged schedule fires, and observed fires D Day on all ships except destroyers. Destroyers may exceed this percentage up to maximum capacity.

c. Ammunition percentages available:

US & British ships: 20% AP 80% HE
French ships: 50% AP 50% HE
Each DD carries: 50 rds WP smoke. No other smoke is available. Div CO's may order any percentage of smoke desired in LCTR's.

d. Amounts of ammunition available:
(Magazine capacity)
8" and above - 150 RPG
6" - 200 RPG
5" - 400 RPG

e. Approximately 1 reload for each firing ship, except French ships, will be available in operations area.

5. a. Codes: Mediterranean Bombardment Code 1944, & Joint Assault Code.

b. CP's Afloat

3 Div FSG - HMS ORION
45 Div FSG - USS TEXAS
36 Div FSG - USS TUSCALOOSA
SSF FSG - USS AUGUSTA

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX 3 FO # 1 ANVIL H.Q. VI CORPS
FIRE SUPPORT & TRANSPORT AREAS —



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ANNEX 3 FO # 1 ANVIL H.Q. VI CORPS
& TRANSPORT AREAS —



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

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

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 4[illegible]

FINAL
ANNEX NO 4 - CRAFT ALLOCATION
TO FO #1 (ANVIL)

3D INF DIV (REINF)

SHIPPING	PERS	VEH
Transdiv #1		
(1) HARRIGOT (APA 45)	1240	90
GILLS (APA 26)	1300	90
HUNDELL (XAP 76)	1600	60
THURSTON (XAP 77)	1550	70
OSWEGO (AKA 14)	170	150
[illegible] (APA 15)	80	150
20 LST/6 Davits	8000	1200
1 LST/2 Davits	400	60
1 LST/Flight Deck	400	60
(2) 9 LCT III	315	90
8 LCT IV	280	80
5 LCT V	175	35
16 LCT VI	560	112
47 LCI (L)	9400	-
10 M/T	3000	1200
(3) 1 LSI (L) DERBYSHIRE	2237	-
Total 3d Div	29432	3337
Corps	35	10
Army	1240	90
Total	30707	3437

(1) Army Command Ship. Personnel space for 900 available to 3d Div. Army personnel and vehicles to land over Beach 261.
(2) 2 LCT III reserved for Corps. This LCT to land with Div Hq LCT.
(3) Space for 900 personnel reserved for Army. This personnel to be landed over Beach 261.

45TH INF DIV (REINF)

SHIPPING	PERS	VEH
Transdiv #5		
STANTON (XAP 69)	1700	80
(1) BARNETT (APA 5)	1200	90
DICKMAN (APA 13)	1800	100
LYON (XAP 71)	1630	80
ARCTURUS (AKA 1)	100	150
PROCYON (AKA 2)	64	150
15 LST/6 Davits	6000	900
1 LST/Flight Deck	400	60
6 LST/2 Davits	2400	360
(2)10 LCT III	350	100
8 LCT IV	280	80
(3)6 LCT V	210	42
16 LCT VI	560	112
38 LCI (L)	7600	-
(4)15 M/T	4500	1800
1 LSP ASCANIA	2067	-
1 LSI (L) DILWARA	1770	-
(5)(6)1 PER SHIP MARINE ROBIN	2500	-
(5)(6)1 PER SHIP SANTA ROSA	2500	-
Total 45th Div	30926	3477
Corps	5770	627
Air Corps	935	-
Total	37631	4104

(1) Corps alternate command ship. Space for 20 officers and 60 EM will be reserved for Corps
(2) 2 LCTs IIIs reserved for Corps. These LCTs to be loaded with Div Hq LCTs.
(3) 1 LCT V reserved for Corps. This LCT to be landed with Div Hq LCTs.
(4) 5 M/Ts reserved for Corps.
(5) Reserved for Corps.
(6) 935 spaces reserved for Air Corps - to be divided equally between both ships.

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36TH INF DIV (REINF)

SHIPPING	PERS	VEH
Transdiv #3		
CARROLL (APA 28)	1350	70
JEFFERSON (APA 30)	1200	70
DIX (XAP 67)	1400	90
NIGHTINGALE (XAP 70)	1700	80
CEPHEUS (AKA 18)	80	150
ACHERNAR (AKA 53)	80	150
(1) BETELGUESE (AKA 11)	180	150
15 LST/6 Davits	6000	900
1 LST/Flight Deck	400	60
6 LST/2 Davits	2400	360
(2) 9 LCT III	315	90
8 LCT IV	280	80
5 LCT V	175	35
16 LCT VI	560	112
30 LCI (L)	6000	-
10 M/T	3000	1200
1 LSI (L) KOREN	1200	-
1 PER SHIP SQUIRE	3500	-
Total 36th Div	29605	3437
Corps	215	160
Total	29820	3597

CC 1, 1ST FR ARMD DIV

SHIPPING	PERS	VEH
6 LST/2 Davits	2400	360
5 M/T	1500	600
1 LSI (L) WINCHESTER CASTLE	700	-
Total CC 1	4600	960
Total	4600	960

(1) Reserved for Corps Hq. To land over 45th Inf Div beaches.
(2) 1 LCT III reserved for Corps. This LCT to land with Div Hq LCT.

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23 July 1944

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

ANNEX NO 5 - TROOP LIST
TO FO #1 (ANVIL)

	Personnel	Vehicles
1. CORPS TROOPS:		
Hq & Hq Co VI Corps		
Hq & Hq Btry VI Corps Arty	115	45
141st FA Bn (155mm How)	531	127
Hq & Hq Btry 6th FA Gp	92	22
2d FA Obsn Bn (-dets)	454	110
Hq & Hq Btry & AAAOD 35th AAA Brig	118	27
433d AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	817	174
451st AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	817	174
108th AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)	743	185
21st Cml Decon Co (-3 plats)(Smoke Troops)	68	12
Hq & Hq Btry 5th AAA Gp)	71	14
441st AAA AW Bn (SP)) In support	709	145
534th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)) of 3d Inf	817	174
72d AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)) Div	743	185
104th AAA Bar Bln Btry (VLA))	255	12
Hq & Hq Btry 105th AAA Gp)	71	14
106th AAA AW Bn (SP)) In support	709	145
107th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)) of 45th Inf	817	174
216th AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)) Div	743	185
103d AAA Bar Bln Btry (VLA))	255	12
Hq & Hq Btry 68th AAA Gp)	71	14
443d AAA AW Bn (SP)) In support	709	145
895th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)) of 36th Inf	817	174
68th AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)) Div	743	185
102d AAA Bar Bln Btry (VLA))	255	12
117th Cav Ron Sq (-3 reinf trs)	174	72
343d Engr GS Regt (-2 bns)	222	66
344th Engr GS Regt (-1st Bn)	772	177
Survey Plat 661st Engr Topo Co	115	25
1st Plat 424th Engr DT Co	46	22
Contact Plat 469th Engr Maint Co	37	16
Treadway Bridge Co 378th Engr Bn (Sep)(-2 dets)	106	71
Bailey Bridge Co 378th Engr Bn (Sep)	225	123
206th MP Co	170	26
146th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	7	3
261st Ord M Maint Co (AA)(-3 dets)	103	41
87th Ord HM Tk Co (-3 dets)	120	55
3426th QM Trk Co	115	102
57th Sig Bn	827	307
Det A 117th RI Co	108	39
3201st SI Det	27	10
One C Det SIAM 3151st Sig Mon Co	15	5
Det 163d Sig Photo Co	6	4
Air Support Control Party	8	7
6781st CIC Det (Prov)	14	11
Securite Militaire (CIC)	6	4
PW Interrogator Teams	12	8
Battle Order Personnel	6	2
Public Relations Personnel	29	14
Photo Interpreters	6	2
Civil Affairs Personnel	6	2

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2. COMBAT COMMAND 1ST ARMD DIV (FR) (To consist of approx the following):

	Personnel	Vehicles
Det Quartier General & Cie (Det Hq & Hq Co) (de Q.G. No 91)	80	16
5e Regt de Chasseurs d'Afrique (-) (Tk Regt)	869	210
1re Demi Brigade de Zouaves (-)(Armd Inf Regt)	1200	180
Det 3e Chasseurs d'Afrique (Det Rcn Bn)	400	100
Cie de Combat du Genie No I/88 (Engr C Co)	225	50
68e Artillerie d'Afrique (-)	550	150
Det 15e Bataillon Medical (Med Bn)	125	50
Det Cie Mixte de Transmission No 91/84 (Sig Composite Co)	125	35
11e Groupe d'Escadrons de Reparation (-) (Ord Maint Bn)	440	125
Det Groupe d'Exploitation No 15 (Det QM Bn)	25	4
CID avec 300 hommes de renfort (Replacements)	400	13
Cie des Services No 491 (Serv Co)	165	56
Atchd:		
1er Cie 9th Regt de Chasseurs d'Afrique (y compris Det Cie de Reconnaissance)(TD Bn)	130	25
Det 661/2 Cie de Reparation Engins Blindes (Ord Hv Maint Co Tk)	100	32
Det 711 Cie de Ravitaillement en Essence (QM Gas Sup Co)	27	11
62 Cie de Minition (Ord Am Co)	215	30
Det 163d Sig Photo Co	3	2
Cestion de Subsistance d'Etapes (QM Dep Sup Det No 324)	56	8
1st Sig Center Team	21	8
Securite Militaire (CIC)	11	7
Public Relations Personnel	5	1
3. 3D INF DIV:	14,283	2140
Atchd:		
634th FA Bn (155mm How)	531	127
36th FA Bn (155mm Gun)	557	115
Det 2d FA Obsn Bn	4	1
69th Armd FA Bn	545	152
756th Tk Bn	751	211
601st TD Bn	898	267
C Troop (reinf) 117th Cav Rcn Sq	224	72
Det 6th Cml Dep Co	13	2
Det 11th Cml Maint Co	14	2
3d Cml Bn (Mtz)	1010	200
2d Bn 343d Engr GS Regt	550	60
Det Treadway Bridge Co 378th Engr Bn (Sep)	17	5
Det 6617th Engr Mine Clr Co (Gapping Team)	34	6
10th Fd Hosp (-Hosp Unit)(-12 Nurses)	151	16
6703d Blood Transfusion Unit (Fwd Dist Sec)	3	1
Det 2d Aux Surg Gp (-12 Nurses)	47	3
5 Gen Surg Teams (#2,3,10,12,21)		
1 Thoracic Team (#1)		
1 Shock Team (#6)		
1 Neuro Team (#2)		
1 Orthopedic Team (#1)		
1 Maxille Facial Team (#1)		
1 Dental Prosthetic Team		
95th Evac Hosp (Semi-mbl)(400 bed)(/ 24 Nurses)	320	48
Hq & Hq Det 43d Ord Bn	35	6
14th Ord M Maint Co	169	80
3432d Ord M Auto Maint Co	120	71
64th Ord Am Co	186	24
143d Ord Bomb Disp Sq	7	3
Det 261st Ord M Maint Co (AA)	22	11
Det 87th Ord HM Tk Co	28	10
1st Plat 46th QM GR Co	23	7

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	Personnel	Vehicles
Det 163d Sig Photo Co	6	4
Det D-1 SIAM 3151st Sig Mon Co	31	12
Naval Combat Int Team	7	2
Naval Shore Fire Control Party	94	17
Naval Gunfire Ln Personnel	2	0
Air Support Control Party	11	7
~~370th Replacement Bn (400 Replacements)~~	~~(37)~~	~~2~~
PW Interrogating Team	18	12
Battle Order Personnel	3	1
Public Relations Personnel	8	3
CIC	7	4
Securite Militaire (CIC)	4	1
Office Strategic Services		
Photo Interpreters	5	2
Civil Affairs Personnel	4	2
Beach Group		
36th Engr C Regt	2072	364
1st Naval Beach Bn	444	70
72d Sig Co Spec	220	30
Det 207th Sig Dep Co plus Det 177th Sig Rep Co	56	10
Hq & Hq Det 52d Med Bn	47	12
376th Med Coll Co	103	20
377th Med Coll Co	103	20
378th Med Coll Co	103	20
682d Med Clr Co	117	19
616th Clr Co (-1 Plat)	95	13
1 Sec 377th PW Esct Gd Co	31	1
Dets Boat Gds:		
157th MP PW Det	33	0
706th MP PW Det	33	0
790th L MP PW Det	33	0
A Co 759th MP Bn	165	1
1st Plat 21st Cml Decon Co (Smoke Troops)	34	9
Det 63d Cml Dep Co	18	2
3d Plat 450th Engr Dep Co	33	3
69th Ord Am Co	186	24
3407th Ord M Auto Maint Co (DUKW)	120	56
Det 77th Ord Dep Co	11	1
Det 977th Ord Dep Co	11	1
Hq & Hq Det 530th QM Bn	17	1
4133d QM Serv Co	219	4
4134th QM Serv Co	219	4
4135th QM Serv Co	219	4
4136th QM Serv Co	219	4
3277th QM Serv Co	219	4
3357th QM Trk Co	115	102
3634th QM Trk Co	115	102
Det 6690th Regulating Co	75	6
Hq & Hq Det 52d QM Bn (Mbl)	27	7
3333d QM Trk Co (DUKW)	115	55
3334th QM Trk Co (DUKW)	115	55
3335th QM Trk Co (DUKW)	115	55
~~3336th QM Trk Co (DUKW)~~	~~115~~	~~55~~
3353d QM Trk Co (DUKW)	115	0
3355th QM Trk Co (DUKW)	115	0
1 Sec 3856th QM Gas Sup Co	27	12
Plat 93d QM Rhd Co	75	3
332d Air Force Serv Gp (Beach Detail)	22	4
111th RAF Beach Sec (Brick Unit)	27	6
4. 45TH INF DIV	14211	2389
Atchd:		
Hq & Hq Btry 35th FA Gp	98	24
938th FA Bn (155mm How)	531	127
976th FA Bn (155mm Gun)	557	115
Det 2d FA Obsn Bn	4	1
59th Armd FA Bn	545	152

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	Personnel	Vehicles
191st Tk Bn	751	211
645th TD Bn	898	267
B Troop (reinf) 117th Cav Rcn Sq	192	73
Det 6th Cml Dep Co	13	2
Det 11th Cml Maint Co	14	2
83d Cml Bn (Mts)(-1 Co)	874	165
1st Bn 343d Engr GS Regt	550	60
Det 6617th Engr Mine Clr Co (Gapping Team)	34	6
Hosp Units 10th & 11th Fd Hosps (-12 Nurses)	162	16
Det 2d Aux Surg Gp (-11 Nurses)	47	3
4 Gen Surg Teams (#3,14,17,18)		
1 Shock Team		
1 Orthopedic Team (#2)		
1 Dental Prosthetic Team (#1)		
1 Maxille Facial Team (#___)		
93d Evac Hosp (Semi-mbl)(400 bed)(423 Nurses)	319	48
w/Plat 549th QM Lndry atchd	62	8
Hq & Hq Det 45th Ord Bn	35	6
45th Ord M Maint Co	189	80
3408th Ord M Auto Maint Co	120	71
66th Ord Am Co	186	24
144th Ord Bomb Disp Sq	7	3
Det 261st Ord M Maint Co (AA)	22	11
Det 87th Ord HM Tk Co	28	10
3d Plat 46th QM GR Co	23	7
Det 163d Sig Photo Co	6	4
Det D-4 SIAM 3151st Sig Mon Co	33	10
Naval Combat Int Team	7	2
Naval Shore Fire Control Party	94	17
Naval Gunfire Ln Personnel	2	0
Air Support Control Party	10	8
381st Replacement Co (600 Replacements)	635	1
PW Interrogators	18	3
Battle Order Personnel	3	1
Public Relations Personnel	15	5
CIC	7	5
Securite Militaire (CIC)	4	1
Office Strategic Services		
Photo Interpreters	5	3
Civil Affairs Personnel	4	2
Beach Group:		
40th Engr C Regt	2072	364
4th Naval Beach Bn	455	70
71st Sig Co Spec	220	30
~~Det 207th Sig Dep Co plus Det 177th Sig Rep Co~~	56	10
Hq & Hq Det 58th Med Bn	47	12
388th Med Coll Co	103	20
389th Med Coll Co	103	20
390th Med Coll Co	103	20
514th Med Clr Co	117	19
2d Plat 616th Clr Co	42	6
B Co 759th MP Bn	165	16
1 Sec 377th PW Esct Gd Co	31	1
Dets Boat Gds:		
133d Prov MP PW Det	33	0
175th Prov MP PW Det	33	0
191st Prov MP PW Det	33	0
3d Plat 21st Chl Decon Co (Smoke Troops)	34	9
Det 63d Cml Dep Co	18	2
2d Plat 450th Engr Dep Co	33	3
682d Ord Am Co	186	24
3487th Ord M Auto Maint Co (DUKW)	120	56

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	Personnel	Vehicles
Det 77th Ord Dep Co	11	1
Det 977th Ord Dep Co	11	1
Hq & Hq Det 240th QM Bn	17	1
3250th QM Serv Co	219	4
3251st QM Serv Co	219	4
3252d QM Serv Co	219	4
3253d QM Serv Co	219	4
4053d QM Serv Co	219	4
3633d QM Trk Co	115	102
3425th QM Trk Co	115	102
Det 6690th Regulating Co	75	6
Hq & Hq Det 147th QM Bn (Mbl)	27	7
829th QM Trk Co (DUKW)	184	55
830th QM Trk Co (DUKW)	184	55
831st QM Trk Co (DUKW)	184	55
832d QM Trk Co (DUKW)	184	55
1 Sec 3894th QM Gas Sup Co	27	12
Plat 94th QM Rhd Co	75	3
____ Air Force Serv Gp (Beach Detail)	22	4
____ RAF Beach Sec (Brick Unit)	27	6
5. 36TH INF DIV:	14,350	2113
Atchd:		
Hq & Hq Btry 36th FA Gp	98	24
937th FA Bn (155mm How)	531	127
977th FA Bn (155mm Gun)	557	115
93d Armd FA Bn	545	152
Det 2d FA Obsn Bn	4	1
753d Tk Bn	751	211
636th TD Bn	898	267
A Troop (reinf) 117th Cav Rcn Sq	189	65
2d Cml Bn (Mtz)(-1 Co)	874	165
Det 6th Cml Dep Co	13	2
Det 11th Cml Maint Co	14	2
1st Bn 344th Engr GS Regt	550	60
Det Treadway Bridge Co 378th Engr Bn (Sep)	21	7
Det 6617th Engr Mine Clr Co (Gapping Team)	34	6
11th Fd Hosp (-Hosp Unit)(-12 Nurses)	151	16
Det 2d Aux Surg Gp (-10 Nurses)	43	3
5 Gen Surg Teams (#6,16,18,22,24)		
1 Neuro Team (#3)		
1 Shock Team (#4)		
1 Thoracic Team (#4)		
1 Orthopedic Team (#3)		
1 Dental Prosthetic Team		
11th Evac Hosp (Semi-mbl)(400 bed)	296	48
Hq & Hq Det 44th Ord Bn	35	6
46th Ord M Maint Co	169	80
3406th Ord M Auto Maint Co	120	71
680th Ord Am Co	186	24
145th Ord Bomb Disp Sq	7	3
Det 261st Ord M Co (AA)	22	11
Det 87th Ord HM Co	28	10
4th Plat 46th QM GR Co	23	7
Det 163d Sig Photo Co	6	4
Det D-2 SIAM 3151st Sig Mon Co	39	9
Naval Combat Int Team	7	2
Naval Shore Fire Control Party	108	18
Naval Gunfire Ln Party	2	0
Air Support Control Party	8	7
____ Replacement Co (600 Replacements)	635	1
PW Interrogating Team	18	12
Battle Order Personnel	3	1
Public Relations Personnel	8	3

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	Personnel	Vehicles
CIC	7	4
Securite Militaire (CIC)	4	1
Office Strategic Services		
Photo Interpreters	5	2
Civil Affairs Personnel	5	2
Beach Group		
540th Engr C Regt)	2072	364
48th Engr C Bn)		
81st Naval Beach Bn	444	70
74th Sig Co Spec	220	30
Det 207th Sig Dep Co plus Det 177th Sig Rep Co	56	10
~~Hq & Hq Det 56th Med Bn~~	47	12
885th Med Coll Co	103	20
886th Med Coll Co	103	20
887th Med Coll Co	103	20
891st Med Clr Co	117	19
1st Plat 638th Clr Co	42	6
C Co 759th MP Bn	165	16
1 Sec 377th PW Esct Gd Co	31	1
2d Plat 21st Cml Decon Co (Smoke Troops)	34	9
Dets Boat Gds:		
192d Prov MP PW Det	33	0
601st Prov MP PW Det	33	0
_____ Prov MP PW Det	33	0
Det 63d Cml Dep Co	18	2
1st Plat 450th Engr Dep Co	33	3
3405th Ord M Auto Maint Co	120	56
603d Ord Am Co	186	24
Det 77th Ord Dep Co	11	1
Det 977th Ord Dep Co	11	1
Hq & Hq Det 259th QM Bn	17	1
~~3286th QM Serv~~ Co	219	4
3287th QM Serv Co	~~219~~	~~4~~
3288th QM Serv Co	219	4
3289th QM Serv Co	219	4
3299th QM Serv Co	219	4
3300th QM Serv Co	219	4
Det 3690th Regulating Co	75	6
Hq & Hq Det 53d QM Bn (Mbl)	27	7
3337th QM Trk Co (DUKW)	115	55
3338th QM Trk Co (DUKW)	115	55
3339th QM Trk Co (DUKW)	115	55
3340th QM Trk Co (DUKW)	115	55
3354th QM Trk Co (DUKW)	115	0
3356th QM Trk Co (DUKW)	115	0
3359th QM Trk Co	115	102
3360th QM Trk Co	115	102
1 Sec 3856th QM Gas Sup Co	27	12
2d Plat 94th QM Rhd Co	75	3
_____ Air Force Serv Gp (Beach Detail)	22	4
_____ RAF Beach Sec (Brick Unit)	27	5

TRUSCOTT
Maj Gen

OFFICIAL:

HARRELL
G-3.

1 Incls: Troop List - D day and Follow-up (to be issued later).

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as for OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPERATION ANVIL
VI CORPS dated 15 July 44

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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BIGOT-ANVIL

BIGOT ANVIL
SECRET
By authority of
CG VI Corps
Initials
31 July 44

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46

ANNEX NO 5 - TROOP LIST
TO FO 1 (ANVIL)

Unit	Assault		Total Follow-up	
	P	V	P	V
VI CORPS TROOPS				
Hq & Hq Co VI Corps	393	86	132	34
Hq & Hq Btry VI Corps Arty	100	23	27	27
Hq & Hq Btry 6th FA Gp	75	22	39	14
141st FA Bn (155mm How)	428	90	81	37
2d FA Obsn Bn (-dets)	32	8	418	118
Hq & Hq Btry & AAAOD 35th AAA Brig	55	19	88	32
433d AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	517	95	307	79
451st AAA AW Bn(Mbl)	0	0	854	231
108th AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)	559	96	193	89
21st Cml Decon Co (-3 plats) (Smoke Troops)	48	10	10	6
117th Cav Rcn Sq (-3 reinf tps)	103	33	94	31
343d Engr GS Regt (-2 bns)	12	6	210	60
344th Engr GS Regt (-1 bn)	590	60	182	115
Survey Plat 661st Engr Topo Co	33	6	0	0
Contact Plat 430th Engr Maint Co	0	0	37	16
1st Plat 424th Engr DT Co	0	0	46	25
Trdwy Br Co 378th Engr Bn (Sep) (-2 dets)	54	27	59	27
Bailey Br Co 378th Engr Bn (Sep)	43	14	0	0
Mem Plat Co D 378th Engr Bn (Sep)	43	14	0	0
661st Engr Mine Clr Co (-3 dets)	0	0	154	55
206th MP Co	155	21	15	2
281st Ord M Maint Co(AA)(-3 dets)	21	16	82	49
87th Ord Hv Tk Co (-3 dets)	78	32	42	49
140th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	6	3	1	1
3426th QM Trk Co	45	40	70	51
57th Sig Bn	610	98	339	219
Det A 117th RI Co	0	0	108	37
3201st SIS Det	0	0	24	10
Cne C Det SIAM 3151st Sig Mon Co	7	2	8	3
Det 163d Sig Photo Co	6	4	0	0
Air Support Control Party	8	4	0	2
6781st CIC Det (Prov)	14	11	0	0
Securite Militaire (CIC)	10	4	0	0
PW Interrogator Teams	6	1	0	3
Battle Order Personnel	6	2	0	2
Photo Interpreters	6	2	0	0
Civil Affairs Personnel	6	2	2	3
Public Relations Personnel	27	8	0	0
TOTAL	4096	859	3622	1427

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Unit	Personnel	Vehicles
[illegible] approx the following:		
[illegible] Hq Co		
[illegible] Cuirassiers (Tk Bn)	112	33
[illegible] Zouaves (Armd Inf Bn)	930	263
[illegible] Bn 66th FA	804	141
[illegible] Co 11th G.E.R.D. (Div Ord Maint)	672	225
[illegible] Co 15th Med Bn (Clr Station)	205	65
Attchd:	153	40
[illegible] Co 3d RGA (Recn Bn)	176	93
1 Co 88th Engrs (w/bridging elements)	108	27
2 Coe 9 RGA (TDs)	260	50
Elts 671/2 Ord H Maint Co (Tk recovery)	52	13
Elts 661st Co (Replacement Tks)	0	6
(Crews from 671/2)		
Elts 66th Ord Am Co	107	20
Elts 709th QM Gas Sup Co	27	11
Lot Big Center Team	8	0
Total	3614	987

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	Assault		Total Follow-up	
	P	V	P	V
3D INF DIV	15110	2325	400	285
Atchd:				
834th FA Bn (155mm How)	618	144	31	35
36th FA Bn (155mm Gun)	542	126	45	33
Det 2d FA Obsn Bn	4	1	0	0
69th Armd FA Bn	487	107	60	65
Hq & Hq Btry 5th AAA Gp)Atchd 35th AAA	33	8	5	3
441st AAA AW Bn (SP))Brig, in support	730	185	63	49
534th AAA AW Bn (Mbl))3d Inf Div	544	107	210	143
72d AAA Gun Bn (Mbl))	545	117	70	62
104th AAA Bar Bln Btry (VLA))	40	5	25	14
756th Tk Bn	709	164	49	44
601st TD Bn	566	181	62	71
C Troop (Reinf) 117th Cav Rcn Sq	213	70	7	5
Det 6th Cml Dep Co	16	1	1	1
Det 11th Cml Maint Co	33	2	1	1
3d Cml Bn (Mtz)	489	121	210	87
2d Bn 343d Engr GS Regt	637	66	35	40
Det 6617th Engr Mine Clr Co (Gapping Team)	20	4	0	0
Det Treadway Br Co 378th Engr Bn (Sep)	17	5	0	0
10th Fd Hosp (-Hosp Unit)(-12 Nurses)	201	23	15	13
w/ 6703d Blood Trans Unit (Fwd Dist Sec)	3	1	0	0
Det 2d Aux Surg Gp (-12 Nurses)	47	3	0	0
95th Evac Hosp (Semi-mbl)(400 bed) (/ 24 Nurses)	383	3	45	48
Hq & Hq Det 43d Ord Bn	8	5	0	0
14th Ord M Maint Co	120	35	55	43
3432d Ord M Auto Maint Co	50	2	200	41
64th Ord Am Co	104	4	22	18
143d Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	6	1	2	2
Det 261st Ord M Maint Co (AA)	17	4	10	7
Det 87th Ord HM Tk Co	18	4	10	6
1st Plat 46th QM GR Co	22	7	0	0
Det 163d Sig Photo Co	4	4	2	0
Plat D-1 3151st SIAM Co	16	4	15	8
Naval Combat Int Team	2	2	5	0
Naval Shore Fire Control Parties w/Naval Gunfire Ln Personnel	21	18	75	0
Air Support Control Party	12	6	4	1
379th Replacement Co (600 Repls)	0	0	612	1
PW Interrogating Team				
Battle Order Personnel				
Public Relations Personnel				
CIC) Securite Militaire (CIC))	9	6	0	0
Photo Interpreters	5	2	0	0
Civil Affairs Personnel	7	3	0	0
Total	7298	1561	2023	841

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Unit	Assault		Total Follow Up	
	P	V	P	V
3D INF DIV BEACH GROUP				
36th Engr C Regt	1592	230	230	250
1st Naval Beach Bn	365	25	8	7
72d Sig Co Spec	237	45	0	0
Det 207th Sig Dep Co plus Det 177th Sig Rep Co	53	3	12	11
Hq & Hq Det 52d Med Bn 376th Med Coll Co 377th Med Coll Co 378th Med Coll Co 682d Med Clr Co 616th Clr Co (-1 Plat)	485	96	10	9
1 Sec 377th PW Esct Gd Co	44	1	0	0
Dets Boat Gds: 157th MP PW Det Det G 706th MP PW Det L 790th MP PW	99	0	0	0
A Co 759th MP Bn	164	6	0	10
1st Plat 21st Cml Decon Co (Smoke Trs)	2	3	2	1
Det 63d Cml Dep Co	20	1	2	1
3d Plat 450th Engr Dep Co	33	3	0	0
69th Ord Am Co	155	2	10	8
3407th Ord M Auto Maint Co (DUKW)	109	11	50	76
Det 77th Ord Dep Co	11		10	5
Hq & Hq Det 530th QM Bn 4133d QM Serv Co 4134th QM Serv Co 4135th QM Serv Co 4136th QM Serv Co 3277th QM Serv Co	962	18	5	2
3634th QM Trk Co	102	49	10	53
Hq & Hq Det 52d QM Bn (Mbl) 3333d QM Trk Co (DUKW) 3334th QM Trk Co (DUKW) 3335th QM Trk Co (DUKW) 3336th QM Trk Co (DUKW) 3353d QM Trk Co (DUKW) 3355th QM Trk Co (DUKW)	363	215	55	41
1 Sec 3856th QM Gas Sup Co	21	3	10	9
1st Plat 93d QM Rhd Co	79	3	0	0
Det 6690th Regulating Co	72	4	2	2
Det A 184th QM Dep Sup Co	11	0	0	0
332d Air Force Serv Gp (Beach Detail)	27	5	2	2
111th RAF Beach Sec (Brick Unit)	13	2	1	1
Total	5019	725	419	489

NOTE: Follow-up to be phased in mutually by Beach Group Commander and Beach Control Headquarters.

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Unit	Assault		Total Follow-up	
	P	V	P	V
45TH INF DIV	15206	2073	1303	406
Atchd:				
Hq & Hq Btry 35th FA Gp	0	0	103	31
938th FA Bn (155mm How)	541	104	333	56
976th FA Bn (155mm Gun)	62	34	225	135
Det 2d FA Obsn Bn	4	1	0	0
59th Armd FA Bn	577	108	42	42
Hq & Hq Btry 105th AAA Gp)Atchd 35th	69	15	0	0
106th AAA AW Bn (SP))AAA Brig, in	612	120	138	128
107th AAA AW Bn (Mbl))support 45th	0	0	835	212
216th AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)(-))Inf Div	304	53	453	147
103d AAA Bar Bln Btry (VLA)	165	10	99	10
191st Tk Bn	755	91	266	104
645th TD Bn	533	161	179	87
Troop B (Reinf) 117th Cav Rcn Sq	155	49	47	27
Det 6th Cml Dep Co	31	0	1	2
Det 11th Cml Maint Co	19	3	0	0
83d Cml Bn (Mtz)(-Co D)	447	97	238	69
1st Bn 343d Engr GS Regt	473	54	79	74
Det 6617th Engr Mine Clr Co (Gapping Team)	15	3	0	0
Hosp Units 10th & 11th Fd Hosp (-12 Nurses)	114	16	0	0
Det 2d Aux Surg Gp (-11 Nurses)	47	3	0	0
93d Evac Hosp (Semi-mbl)(400 bed) (-23 Nurses)	300	49	0	0
w/Plat 549th QM Ldry Co	36	11	0	0
Hq & Hq Det 45th Ord Bn	2	1	14	12
45th Ord M Maint Co	0	0	126	65
3108th Ord M Auto Maint Co	0	0	202	94
66th Ord Am Co	168	5	13	20
141th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	7	3	0	0
Det 261st Ord M Maint Co (AA)	22	11	0	0
Det 87th Ord HM Tk Co	28	7	0	0
3d Plat 46th QM GR Co	25	7	0	0
Det 103d Sig Photo Co	3	4	0	0
Plat D 3151st SLAM Co	27	15	0	0
Naval Combat Int Team	3	0	0	0
Naval Shore Fire Control Parties w/Naval Gunfire Ln Personnel	104	18	0	0
Air Support Control Party	6	4	2	2
361st Replacement Co (600 Repls)	0	0	635	1
PW Interrogators	8	4	0	0
Battle Order Personnel	4	1	0	0
Public Relations Personnel	15	5	0	0
CIC	7	3	0	0
Securite Militaire (CIC)	5	1	0	0
Photo Interpreters	2	2	0	0
Civil Affairs Personnel	0	4	0	0
Total	5695	1077	4030	1318

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[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	22	15	3	8
[illegible] Dep / Det 177th Sig Dep Co	46	26	10	7
[illegible]	20	0	6	18
[illegible] Coll Co				
[illegible] Coll Co				
[illegible] Coll Co				
314th Med Clr Co	489	75	18	21
2d Plat 410th Clr Co				
Co B 759th MP Bn				
1 Sec 377th PW Esct Bd Co	69	1	63	15
Det Spec Gds	43	1	0	0
1382 Prov MP PW Det	82	0	0	0
176th Prov MP PW Det				
181st Prov MP PW Det				
2d Plat 21st Cml Decon Co (Smoke Trs)				
Det 53d Cml Dep Co	33	9	0	0
2d Plat 450th Engr Dep Co	12	0	3	1
682d Ord Am Co	1	2	32	1
3487th Ord M Auto Maint Co (DUKW)	8	9	10	10
Det 77th Ord Dep Co	66	55	20	16
Hq & Hq Det 280th QM Bn	11	0	0	0
3250th QM Serv Co				
3251st QM Serv Co				
3252d QM Serv Co	427	17	0	0
3253d QM Serv Co				
4053d QM Serv Co				
3833d QM Trk Co	215	3	0	2
3425th QM Trk Co	104	108	18	12
Hq & Hq Det 147th QM Bn (Mbl)	20	30	71	64
829th QM Trk Co (DUKW)				
830th QM Trk Co (DUKW)				
831st QM Trk Co (DUKW)	266	186	69	58
832d QM Trk Co (DUKW)				
1 Sec 3894th QM Gas Sup Co				
1st Plat 94th QM Bhd Co	22	5	0	6
Det 6690th Regulating Co	69	0	0	0
Det C 184th QM Dep Sup Co	-	0	75	6
Air Force Serv Gp (Beach Detail)	11	0	0	0
RAF Beach Sec (Brick Unit)	18	-	-	-
	19	1	3	2
Total	4138	881	536	475

NOTE: Follow-up to be phased in mutually by Beach Group Commander and Beach Control Headquarters.

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Unit	Assault P	Assault V	Total Follow-up P	Total Follow-up V
36TH INF DIV	12578	1568	2772	234
Atchd:				
~~Hq & Hq Btry 36th FA Gp~~	~~93~~	~~24~~	~~96~~	~~23~~
937th FA Bn (155mm How)	493	51	105	69
977th FA Bn (155mm Gun)	410	53	120	92
93d Armd FA Bn	370	87	175	83
Det 2d FA Obsn Bn	4	1	0	0
Hq & Hq Btry 68th AAA Gp) Atchd 35th	58	12	90	20
443d AAA AW Bn (SP)) AAA Brig	506	160	0	55
895th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)) in support	472	66	290	0
68th AAA Gun Bn (Mbl)) 36th Inf	543	87	192	75
102d AAA Bar Bln Btry (VLA)) Div	136	6	107	18
753d Tk Bn	300	71	175	42
636th TD Bn	495	97	220	38
A Troop (Reinf) 117th Cav Rcn Sq	177	57	0	0
2d Cml Bn (Mtz)(-A Co)	564	103	48	65
Det 6th Cml Dep Co	11	2	0	0
Det 11th Cml Maint Co	14	2	0	0
1st Bn 344th Engr GS Regt	505	53	85	79
Det Treadway Bridge Co 378th Engr Bn (Sep)	21	7	0	0
Det 6617th Engr Mine Clr Co (Gapping Team)	10	2	0	0
11th Fd Hosp (-Hosp Unit)(-12 Nurses) w/6703d Blood Trans Unit	139	16	60	0
Det 2d Aux Surg Gp (-10 Nurses)	33	3	0	0
11th Evac Hosp (Semi-Mbl)(400 bed)(+22 Nurses)	269	46	65	0
Hq & Hq Det 44th Ord Bn	20	4	25	0
46th Ord M Maint Co	129	55	60	65
3406th Ord M Auto Maint Co	0	0	202	94
145th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	7	3	0	0
Det 261st Ord M Co (AA)	12	6	0	0
Det 87th Ord HM Co	22	8	0	0
680th Ord Am Co	171	20	20	5
4th Plat 46th QM GR Co	23	7	0	0
Det 163d Sig Photo Co	6	4	0	0
Plat D-2 3151st SLM Co	16	4	0	0
Naval Combat Int Team	7	2	0	0
Naval Shore Fire Control Party w/Naval Gunfire Ln Party	110	18	0	0
Air Support Cont Party	7	6	0	0
380th Replacement Co (600 Replacements)			635	1
PW Interrogating Team	11	7	0	0
Battle Order Personnel	4	2	0	0
Public Relations Personnel	6	2	0	0
CIC	12	6	0	0
Securite Militaire (CIC)	4	2	0	0
Photo Interpreters	7	3	0	0
Civil Affairs Personnel	7	3	0	0
TOTAL	6209	1168	2704	620

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46, U. S. Army

TIGOT - ANVIL
TOP SECRET
By Authority of
CG VI Corps
Initials: bH
1 August 1944

COPY NO.____

SECTION - I
ARTILLERY

Annex No 6 - Artillery
~~to FO #1 (ANVIL)~~

Maps: France 1/25,000 1/100,000

1. a. Annex No 1, FO #1 (ANVIL) Hq VI Corps: Intelligence.
b. Other Artillery: 460 FA Bn (75 Pack Para.), 463 FA Bn (75 Pack Para) 602 FA Bn (75 Patk Glider) and 1 Btry 2d Para. Brig (Br) will drop with First Airborne Task Force D day.

Follow-up artillery available to VI Corps:

D plus 15 - 933d FA Bn 155H
194th FA Bn 8" H
17th FA Bn 155H
Hq & Hq Btry 17 FA Gp

D plus 25 - 776th TD Bn
Hq & Hq Btry 405th FA Gp

D plus 30 - 935th FA Bn 4.5" G

2. a. Artillery with the Corps lands according to landing schedules, supports advance of the Corps inland. Div Artys be prepared to support landing with fire of 105 How, mounted in DUKWS.

b. Supports 1st Airborne Task Force on call until VI Corps assumes control of that force.

c. Be prepared to neutralize enemy batteries firing on the MAINLAND from PORQUEROLLES and CAPE GIENS.

d. Support II French Corps during relief of 3 Div by that Corps. Be prepared to continue the support of II French Corps with 2 Bn of Corps Arty on order from Army Commander.

3. a. Division Artillery.

(1) Attachments:

(a) 3d Division
69th AFA Bn
634th FA Bn
36th FA Bn
601st TD Bn
Det 2 FA Obsn Bn
5 SFCP's

(b) 45th Division
645th TD Bn
Hq & Hq Btry 35th FA Gp - CO. COL HANDY
938th FA Bn
976th FA Bn
59th AFA Bn
Det 2 FA Obsn Bn
5 SFCP's

(c) 36th Division
636th TD Bn
Hq & Hq Btry 36th FA Gp - CO. COL HILL
93d AFA Bn
937th FA Bn
977th FA Bn
Det 2d FA Obsn Bn
5 SFCP's

(d) All attached Corps Artillery units revert to Corps control upon establishment of Corps communication on shore.

(2) Positions and changes of position of artillery with the Corps to be reported to CP VI Corps Arty.

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(3) Areas reserved for assembly of Corps controlled units, see inclosure 6 A - Position area overlay.

(4) Liaison

(a) Right to left between Div Artys.

(b) 3d Div Arty establish liaison with French Groupe de Commandos.

(c) CC SUDRE of 1st French Armored Div establish liaison with 45th Div Arty.

(d) First Airborne Task Force will establish communication with 36th Div Arty and 45th Div Arty by SCR 284 radio, through Parachute & Glider Arty Bns. 36th Div Arty will establish liaison with Combat Command 1st French Armd Div when they are committed.

b. Corps Artillery.

(1) Organization for combat.

Hq & Hq Btry VI Corps Arty
Hq & Hq Btry 6 AFA Gp. CO. COL DE SHAZO
141st FA Bn
2d FA Obsn Bn (less Dets.)

CO 6 AFA Gp will establish liaison with Div Artys of 3 Div and 45 Div prepared to assume command of Corps Artillery units with those Divs on order.

(2) Initial assembly areas - Inclosure 6 A - Opn overlay.

(3) Corps Artillery Air OP's.

(a) L5's will be flown to CALVI, CORSICA, to be flown to operations area on call.

(b) L4's not taken on D day lift will be flown to AJACCIO, CORSICA, by D plus 3 to be lifted on first LST flat top turn around D plus 5. They will be flown from flight decks upon arrival in assault area.

(4) 2d FA Obsn Bn.

(a) One reconnaissance party attached initially to each division. Revert to Bn control on landing of Hq. Btry.

(b) Survey section land D day, establish control and extend to Division Artys and Corps Bns.

(c) 1 Sound & Flash Battery land D plus 5 establish sound & flash bases.

(d) Establish metro station D plus 8 in coordination with Radar Control 35 AAA Brigade.

(5) Corps Arty Bns establish liaison right to left.

X (1) Survey.

(a) The mapping in the area concerned is based on French triangulation established in 1850 AD. No detailed descriptions of the stations are available. Consequently it must be assumed that only a small percentage of Trig. points are recoverable. 1/25,000 maps have been brought up to date by photographic methods and will be excellent for fire charts. In initial stages it may be necessary for Obsn Bn survey section to obtain coordinates from the map and establish azimuth by astronomical observations. This will be sufficiently accurate for artillery fire. Overall control when established by Army Engineers will be carried forward to artillery units by Obsn Bn. After survey information center is established, special control requests will be fulfilled on 24 hour notice.

(2) Observation.

(a) Four British Parachute Observation parties will be dropped on morning of D day with the First Airborne Task Force. These parties will be near 45 - 36 Div boundry in vicinity of LE HUY. Communication will be established between these parties and 45th and 36th Div Artys by Br No. 22 radios in the hands of British Liaison Officers who will be at each Div Arty CP. Liaison officers can be attached to any unit desired by Div Arty CG.

(b) Requests for Arty / R missions to be submitted to Corps G-2, prior to 1800 hours on day before mission is desired.

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(3) Division Artys establish own metro station initially. 2d Obsn Station to set up approximately D plus 8.

(4) Initial no-fire lines, See Troop Corps de Comp ydes. First Airborne Task Force, see inclosure No 6 B - No-fire overlay. Subsequent no-fire lines of Airborne Task Force will be reported to 36th Div Arty and 45 Div Arty every 2 hours on even hours. No-fire lines of French Commandos will be reported to 3 Div Arty every 2 hours on even hours. 45 Div Arty and 36 Div Arty report no-fire lines to Airborne Task Force every 2 hours on even hours.

4. a. Supply, administration, evacuation - Adm. Annex No. 10 FO #1 (ANVIL) Hq VI Corps.

b. Ammunition supply plan.

(1) Basic load.

(a) All units loaded complete with basic load.

(2) Initial resupply.

(a) 5 U/F available on D day convoy (Anticipated discharge D plus 1 to D plus 5). This is total available and includes that on organizational transportation, LCT's and LT ships.

(3) Maintenance plan (Ref: 7 Army revised phasing of maintenance, dated 15 April 1944).

Daily average of total ammunition.

D to D plus 60 -	92 1/3 RPG	105 How
-	52 5/6 RPG	155 How
-	52 5/6 RPG	155 Gun
-	66 RPG	TD

Units of fire:

105	-	175 RPG
155H	-	100 RPG
155G	-	100 RPG
TD 3"	-	125 RPG

(4) The above figures represent the average total to be lifted and does not take into account loss due to handling and enemy action, so total available on the beach will be decreased by any such losses.

(5) Toxic chemical shells will not be used.

(6) Base ejection 105 colored smoke shells will be available on each Division beach dumps in following quantities: 52 rounds each of violet, orange, red and green.

(7) 155mm Howitzer, M1 and M1918: A supply of projectiles HE M102 with white bag propelling charge will be landed over each beach for use with the M1 Howitzers. As soon as it becomes available, ammunition refills will be made from this type ammunition until 30% of basic load has been reached. This percentage will be maintained thereafter.

5. a. Axis signal communication: Zone of 45 Div.

b. Codes & Ciphers (Effective D day to D plus 5) Sig Set 17, CCBP 0122 - D 6, combined communication authenication System, CCBP 0130 - B2 Combined Assault Code.

c. Radio net to be established - Corps fire control net opens as soon as sets are established on shore. 45 Div Arty is NCS until Corps Arty CP opens. All stations will monitor for first five minutes of each quarter hour for CW signals if voice range is not adequate.

d. Corps Arty information centers will be established near both landing beaches, See Inclosure 6 A - Position area overlay.

e. VI Corps and VI C Arty CP, Inclosure 6 A - Position area overlay.

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SECTION II
ANTI-TANK

1. General:

a. Terrain in the assault area except for the ARGENS VALLEY and the [illegible] CARQUEIRANNE - LE LUC CORRIDOR is generally unsuited for the large-scale employment of armor. The extensive road net, however, favors free and rapid movement of both enemy and friendly armored elements. Known enemy armored formations in the assault area exclusive of small detachments consist of a tank battalion tentatively carried in the BRIGNOLES area, and an assault gun unit (TD) in the LE MUY area.

b. It is to be expected that the enemy will employ his armor along the same lines as in Italy. Small groups of tanks and SP guns are certain to operate aggressively in close conjunction with leading infantry elements, and full use will be made of the firepower they possess.

c. It is possible that the enemy may launch an armored counterattack against our forces in the ARGENS VALLEY. Such an attack is possible on D day. Since this critical area is divided between the 45th Inf Div and the 36th Inf Div, close coordination for AT defense between these units is essential.

d. The presence of the 9th Pz Div in the NIMES area, coupled with the fact that the enemy is almost certain to resist stubbornly the assault on TOULON, invites the employment of this unit east of TOULON at an early date. The most likely areas of employment are HYERES on the axis of the coast road, and the TOULON - CARQUEIRANNE - LE LUC CORRIDOR NE of TOULON. Battle groups of the 9th Pz Div can initiate action in these areas as early as the morning of D plus 2. An armored attack of battalion size can be made later on that day.

2. Responsibility for AT Defense:

a. Divisions will be responsible for AT defense with respective zones.

b. Divisions will coordinate defense of approaches along division boundaries.

c. Divisions will request assistance from Corps when necessary.

3. AT Measures:

a. In the landing phase TD's, tanks, and infantry AT guns will be landed early, and will accompany forward infantry elements.

b. During the advance, TD's and infantry AT guns will habitually accompany forward infantry elements and tanks.

c. Bazookas and AT grenades will be carried by all infantry formations, and will be employed aggressively.

d. Enemy armor will habitually be engaged by massed fire of supporting artillery.

e. Divisions will maintain mobile reserves of TD's on division or regimental level as dictated by the tactical situation.

f. Recn will be pushed forward vigorously to locate enemy armor, and to provide timely warning.

g. During the advance, AT mines will be laid only for security in temporary stabilized situations, and for road blocks. In such instances, they will be covered by fire of small arms and AT weapons. Mines will be recovered prior to the forward movement of the troops laying them. For units engaged in holding missions, AT mine fields may be laid to block avenues of approach. In these instances the fields will be marked, recorded, and reported to VI Corps Engineer in accordance with existing instructions.

h. Demolition and cratering as a means of AT defense will be employed only in emergency when other means have failed. Otherwise, demolition and cratering will be undertaken only on authority of the Commanding General VI Corps.

4. AT Warning:

a. In order to insure timely warning of armored threats which may require the movement of AT elements or the employment of Corps artillery, the following procedure will apply:

(1) Whenever 10 or more enemy tanks are observed:

(a) Immediate local AT measures will be taken.

(b) Report indicating time observed, number, and direction of movement will be made by divisions directly to Corps Counterbattery Section by the most expeditious means at hand.

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(2) Where possible, telephone will be used. If report by telephone is not practicable, the Corps counterbattery radio net will be used.

(3) If Corps Counterbattery Section cannot be contacted, report will be made to G-3 VI Corps.

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Maj Gen

OFFICIAL:

HARRELL
G-3

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

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

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

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

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POSITION
AREA

141 F A BN.
6 F A GP.

XXXV 45 3-6

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ANNEX 6A - POSITION AREA OVERLAY
TO FO #1 (ANVIL)

FRANCE

SCALE 1: 25,000

MAPS: XXXV 45 1-2
XXXV 45 3-6
XXXV 45 3

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MAJ. GEN.

OFFICIAL:

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

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— NO FIRE OVERLAY —

APPENDIX 6B TO ANNEX 6
TO FO #1 (ANVIL)
H.Q. VI CORPS



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

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MAP - FRANCE
Scale 1:100,000
Sheets: 15Q, 16Q, 15R

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Maj. Gen.

OFFICIAL:

HARRELL
G-3

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By Authority of
CG VI Corps
Initials
28 July 1944

HQ VI CORPS
NAPLES, ITALY
28 July 1944

ANNEX NO 7 - ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
TO FO #1 (ANVIL)

1. a. Enemy Aviation. See Intelligence Section of AAA Plan (ANVIL), Hq 35th AAA Brigade, dated 15 July 1944.

b. Friendly Aviation. See Intelligence Section of AAA Plan (ANVIL), Hq 35th AAA Brigade, dated 15 July 1944.

2. Organization of AAA for assault.

a. 35 AAA Brigade	Attached VI Corps
35 AA Operations Det	Assigned 35 AAA Brigade
108 AAA Gun Bn	Attached 35 AAA Brigade
433 AAA AW Bn	Attached 35 AAA Brigade
451 AAA AW Bn	Attached 35 AAA Brigade
(1) 5 AAA Group	In support 3 Div
441 AAA AW Bn (SP)	Attached 5 AAA Group
534 AAA AW Bn	Attached 5 AAA Group
72 AAA Gun Bn	Attached 5 AAA Group
104 AA Bln Btry (VLA)	Attached 5 AAA Group
One (1) Platoon 21 Cml Decon Co (Smoke)	In support 3 Div
(2) 68 AAA Group	In support 36 Div
443 AAA AW Bn (SP)	Attached 68 AAA Group
895 AAA AW Bn	Attached 68 AAA Group
68 AAA Gun Bn	Attached 68 AAA Group
102 AA Bln Btry (VLA)	Attached 68 AAA Group
One (1) Platoon 21 Cml Decon Co (Smoke)	In support 36 Div
(3) 105 AAA Group	In support 45 Div
105 AAA AW Bn (SP)	Attached 105 AAA Group
107 AAA AW Bn	Attached 105 AAA Group
216 AAA Gun Bn	Attached 105 AAA Group
103 AA Bln Btry (VLA)	Attached 105 AAA Group
One (1) Platoon 21 Cml Decon Co (Smoke)	In support 45 Div

3. Missions.

a. Support assault forces by:

(1) Providing heavy and light AAA protection for landing beaches, airfields, field artillery, vital installations and lines of communication.

(a) 90mm batteries to be in position ready for action by dusk D-Day.
(b) Radars to operate as prescribed in Operations Memorandum No. 26, Hq 35th AAA Brigade (attached to AAA Plan (ANVIL)).
(c) Controlled automatic weapons barrages to be established in accordance with Operations Memorandum No. 24, Hq 35th AAA Brigade (attached to AAA Plan (ANVIL)), such barrages to be ready for action by dusk D-Day.

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(d) Providing an AAAIS to be established with 35 AAOD as soon as possible D-Day (see Operations Memorandum No. 25, Hq 35th AAA Brigade (attached to AAA Plan (ANVIL)).

(e) Defending beaches with one (1) Barrage Balloon Btry (VLA) per division.

(f) Defending beaches with one (1) Cml Decon Platoon (Smoke) per division.

(g) Reinforcing field artillery fires with 90mm batteries. All 90mm guns employed in forward areas must be prepared to fire normal field artillery missions on call. Careful and complete plans will be made, by gun battalion commanders, for these fires, prior to the operation, by consultation with their respective division field artillery commanders.

b. Additional roles:

(1) Seacoast. All AAA units emplaced along the coast will site certain weapons for dual AA-CD role. These weapons will be employed in a CD role only in an emergency such as a direct attack or when requested by the naval commander in their particular area. The naval commander may request such action through the Antiaircraft Artillery Defense Commander (AADC).

(2) Anti-tank. Except in emergency, AAA weapons are not sited primarily for AT defense. However, wherever a mechanized threat exists, and particularly in the beachhead in its early stages, certain weapons will be sited for dual AA-AT firing, and all AA weapons will be prepared to fire at mechanized targets of opportunity.

4. General.

a. Rules for AAA firing:

(1) An Inner Artillery Zone (IAZ) by night for the beachhead forces will be in effect as outlined in Operations Memorandum No. 61, AFHQ, dated 22 July 1944, subject: "Control of Aircraft and AA Defense in Amphibious Operations now being planned".

(2) Rules for AAA firing will be observed as outlined in Operations Memorandum No. 61, AFHQ, dated 22 July 1944, subject: "Control of Aircraft and AA Defense in Amphibious Operations now being planned".

(3) Troops other than antiaircraft will not engage aircraft unless directly attacked.

b. AAAIS:

(1) Each AAA unit will establish an AAAIS as guns go into position. All facilities for obtaining information of approaching aircraft will be utilized, including special observers on likely avenues of approach. All information will be transmitted to 35 AAOR by most rapid means available. 35 AAOR will be set up ready for operation D-Day, until such time AAA units will receive early warning from SOR aboard ship. This information will be transmitted by SOR in the form of a "chatter" broadcast in the clear on 237[illegible] mcs (AM) and 27.3 mcs (FM), giving information of aircraft [illegible]ations

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and movements by reference to known points.

(2) SOR will give normal MAFOG data to 35 AACR, transmitting and receiving on 2370 kcs (AM). After SOR comes ashore, the principal means of communication will be by telephone, supplemented by radio, on the 2370 kcs (AM) frequency.

(3) AACR will transmit to AAA units on 2095 kcs and receive from such units on 3807.5 kcs.

(4) Navy air raid warnings:

(a) The following signals will be broadcast by the naval commander in the flagship:

ALERT	WHISTLE SIGNAL	FLAG HOIST	W/T or R/T	MEANING
Red	a series of short blasts	Red	Red Anvil	air attack imminent
Yellow	3 short blasts, pause, 3 short blasts	Yellow	Yellow Anvil	air attack expected
All Clear	1 long blast	Haul down	White Anvil	Raiders passed

(b) The above signals may be broadcast by the fighter director ship when so delegated by the naval commander.

(5) Radio silence during sea voyage will be strictly observed.

c. Passive Air Defense:

(1) Where an SOR is in operation, the Air Force Controller orders civilian air raid alerts. Otherwise this is a responsibility of the AA Defense Commander. Where a PAD Control Center is in operation the PAD Controller effects air raid alert warnings to civilians and military personnel not engaged in active air defense, upon notification of an alert by the Air Force Controller or the AA Defense Commander.

d. Smoke:

(1) Whenever practicable, if the wind is blowing from the shore, smoke will be made from shore each day at ½ hour before dawn until ½ hour after dawn and ½ hour before dusk until ½ hour after dusk, beginning dusk D-Day and during all red alerts during the hours of darkness unless ordered by the Beach Group Commander and/or the Navy to withhold or cease smoke.

e. AADC:

(1) The [illegible] of the air groups in support of divisions are having assigned Antiaircraft Defense Commanders (AADC) at their respective divisional areas.

f. [illegible]

(1) [illegible]

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g. Priorities for AAA defense:

(1) Based on importance to the initial success of the landing, and previous experiences with enemy air activity, priorities for AA defense for the period D to D plus 10 are established as follows:

(a) Beaches and shipping (minor ports).
(b) Airports and landing strips.
(c) Field Artillery.

(2) These cannot be regarded as exclusive priorities unless losses of AAA in landing or enroute and concentration of enemy air activity make it impossible to give all three reasonable protection.

h. Command Post (CP) 35 AAA Brigade:

Location ashore to be reported on landing.

TRUSCOTT
Maj Gen

OFFICIAL:

Harrell
HARRELL
G-3

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BIGOT-ANVIL

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

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By Authority of
CG VI Corps
Initials: [illegible]
1 August 1944

ANNEX NO 8 - ENGINEER
TO FO #1 (ANVIL)

Map Reference: FRANCE, GSGS 4249, 1/100,000, GSGS 4411, 1/25,000.

1. Corps Engineers support assault and subsequent advance of Corps.

a. During initial landing stage, assist Div Engrs in opening road net in each Div sector.
b. As soon as possible, provide lateral communication between 36th Inf Div and 45th Inf Div by opening and maintaining Route N98 from RJ 4416 to AGAY.
c. After initial landing stage, open and maintain Corps road net.
d. Construct and maintain Treadway and Bailey bridges.
e. Assist Corps in establishing barrier line if necessity demands.
f. Assist Corps Arty in forward displacement.
g. Construct Air O.P. landing strips for Corps Arty.
h. Provide trig control for Corps Arty.
i. Assist AAA, as soon as possible after landing, to dig in guns and radar.
j. Provide check point beacons for Air Force.

2. a. 343rd Engr Gen Serv Regt (-2 Bns)

(1) Det Regt'l Hq to be lifted on the D-convoy and prepare on Corps order to assume command of Bns under Corps control.

b. 1st Bn, 343rd Engr Gen Serv Regt

(1) Atchd to 45th Inf Div for assault and reverts to Corps control on Corps order after initial landing stage.

c. 2nd Bn, 343rd Engr Gen Serv Regt

(1) Atchd to 3rd Inf Div for assault and reverts to Corps control on Corps order after initial landing stage.

d. 344th Engr Gen Serv Regt (-1 Bn)

(1) Provides traffic crossing over ARGENS River, generally along Route N98, with least practicable delay. Contacts 45th Inf Div on left and 36th Inf Div on right.
(2) Takes over maintenance of Route N98 from RJ 4416 to AGAY from Divs as soon as possible after above task is complete.

e. 1st Bn, 344th Engr Gen Serv Regt

(1) Atchd to 36th Inf Div for assault and reverts to Corps control on Corps order after initial landing stage.

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1. f. Co D, (Treadway Bridge Train), 378th Engr Bn (Sep) (-Det)

(1) Provide Treadway bridge as required for initial crossing of ARGENS River and thereafter as required and approved by the Corps Engineer.

(2) ~~Provide Det with 100' Trestle Treadway to 2nd Bn,~~ 343rd Engr Gen Serv Regt, to be used as required during the initial landing stage.

(3) Provide Det with 180' Floating and Trestle to 1st Bn, 344th Engr Gen Serv Regt, to be used as required during the initial landing stage.

g. Co D, (Map Depot Dets), 378th Engr Bn (Sep)

(1) Establish Map Depot in or in the close proximity of ST. MAXIME.

h. Co C, (Bailey Bridge Train), 378th Engr Bn (Sep)

(1) Provide Bailey bridging as required and approved by the Corps Engineer.

i. 1st Plat, 424th Engr DT Co

(1) Support engineer units of Corps as directed by Corps Engineer.

j. Contact Plat, 469th Engr Maint Co

(1) Maintain engineer mechanical equipment as required by engineer units.

k. Survey Plat, 661st Engr Top Co

(1) Provide trig control for Corps Arty, increase density of control, determine accuracy of map control, assist in the provision of data for the execution of a radial line block plot extension based on established survey and extending into enemy territory.

3. Airfields. Areas indicated on attached overlays are reserved exclusively for Air Corps installations. After the terrain has been taken and secured so that engineer units are able to initiate work, these areas will not be occupied by Divisional rear elements, Corps troops, headquarters or supply installations.

4. a. Engineer Sitrep. All Engineer units will submit to the Corps Engineer by 0800 hrs, a daily Sitrep covering the period from 1800 to 1800 hrs.

b. Minefield Records. Minefield record forms of enemy and friendly fields will be completed as soon as possible and two copies will be forwarded to the Corps Engineer.

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

Overlay to Map of FRANCE, 1/25,000, Sht. No. XXXIV-46, 5 & 6.

Sheet No. 2 to accompany Annex No. 8 - ENGINEER - to TO #1 (ANVIL).

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

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

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

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

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

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Sheet No. 7 to accompany Annex No. 8 - ENGINEER - to FO #1 (ANVIL)

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

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

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

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

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

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

3 August 1944

ANNEX No 9 - ADMINISTRATION (ADM INSTR No 1, OPN ANVIL)
TO
FO 1 (ANVIL)

ANNEX No 9 to FO 1 (ANVIL) included in copies 1 - 45 only, otherwise distribution already made to interested parties.

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REVISED EDITION: Destroy Annex No 11
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HQ VI CORPS
NAPLES, ITALY
27 July 44

ANNEX NO 10 - SIGNAL
TO FO #1 (ANVIL)

Maps: FRANCE 1/100,000

1. SITUATION:
   a. Situation: - Operation ANVIL
   b. Command Posts:

	AFLOAT	ASHORE
VI Corps	USS CATOCTIN	ST. MAXIME
3 Inf Div	USS DUANE	CAVALAIRE sur MER
36 Inf Div	USS BAYFIELD	DRAMMONT
45 Inf Div	USS BISCAYNE	1 mi NW ST MAXIME

   c. Signal Troops: - See Appendix A
   d. Enemy Facilities: - See Appendix B

2. SIGNAL MISSION: - To provide Signal communications afloat and ashore for VI Corps.

3. SIGNAL PLAN:
   a. Signal Communications Afloat: - See Appendix C
   b. Signal Communications Ashore: - See Appendix D

4. SIGNAL SUPPLY: See VI Corps Administrative Instructions

5. MISCELLANEOUS:
   a. Basic Doctrine:
      (1) Current SOP VI Corps, as modified by this plan, and current SOI, will govern the signal communication system of VI Corps.
      (2) Communication to and between ships will be under jurisdiction of the Navy.
      (3) All signal communication during the amphibious phase of the operation will be coordinated by agreement between Army and Navy Signal Officers concerned.
      (4) Communication for Shore Fire Control Parties and Div Arty Fwd Obsrs will be coordinated by Div Arty O's and Naval Gunfire Liaison O's.
   b. Signal Security:
      See Par 2 b. VI Corps Training Memorandum No 6 dated 4 July 44.
   c. Photographic Records:
      (1) Photographic detachments have been provided for divisions and Corps.
      (2) Photographic personnel will carry special identification.
      (3) Commanders will allow official photographers complete freedom of movement insofar as is compatible with the tactical situation.
   d. Signal Equipment:
      (1) [illegible]
      (a) [illegible]
      (b) [illegible]

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which may be required during the ship-to-shore approach movement, or for the purpose of inserting new batteries prior to embarkation into landing craft. These waterproof bags will be collected and turned in to division signal companies or Corps Sig Bn at the conclusion of the assault phase, and held pending orders from this headquarters.

(2) Telephone:

(a) All equipment being carried will be in best possible condition. Dry cells will be new and additional dry cells will be packed with the equipment.

(b) All switchboards, telephones, telegraph sets, reel units, batteries and tool kits will be waterproofed in accordance with existing practice.

(3) It is essential that all signal equipment be thoroughly dried and all salt removed within 48 hours after landing. Equipment exposed to a sea atmosphere will rust and corrode if the salt deposit is not removed within this period of time.

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4 Incls:
Incl 1 - Appendix A Signal Troops
Incl 2 - Appendix B Enemy Facilities
Incl 3 - Appendix C Signal Communications Afloat
Incl 4 - Appendix D Signal Communications Ashore

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27 July 44

APPENDIX A
to
ANNEX NO 10 - SIGNAL
TO FO #1 (ANVIL)

SIGNAL TROOPS

VI CORPS SIGNAL TROOPS

57 Sig Bn
Det A 117 RI Co
3201 SIS Det
"C" Det 3151 SIAM Co (1-O, 6-EM, 2 veh)
Det 163d Sig Photo Co
Det 2 AS Com Sq D
Signal Center Team No 1 (LIAISON) (-)

3d INF DIV SIGNAL TROOPS

3d Sig Co
Det 163d Sig Photo Co
"D" Det 3151 SIAM Co
72d Sig Co Spec
Det 2 AS Com Sq
S & I - Det 207th Sig Dep Co (1-O, 23-EM, 1 veh)
Det 177th Sig Rep Co (1-O, 31-EM, 9 veh)
Det Signal Center Team No 1

45th INF DIV SIGNAL TROOPS

45th Sig Co
Det 163d Sig Photo Co
"D" Det 3151 SIAM Co
71st Sig Co Spec
Det 2 AS Com Sq
S & I - Det 207th Sig Dep Co (1-O, 23-EM, 1 veh)
Det 177th Sig Rep Co (1-O, 31-EM, 9 veh)

36th INF DIV SIGNAL TROOPS

36th Sig Co
Det 163d Sig Photo Co
"D" Det 3151 SIAM Co
74th Sig Co Spec
Det 2 AS Com Sq
S & I - Det 207 Sig Dep Co (1-O, 23-EM, 1 veh)
Det 177th Sig Rep Co (1-O, 31-EM, 9 veh)

CC 1

Det Signal Center Team No 1

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NAPLES, ITALY
27 July 44

APPENDIX B
to
ANNEX NO 10 - SIGNAL
TO TO #1 (ANVIL)

ENEMY FACILITIES

1. POLICY REGARDING CAPTURED ENEMY SIGNAL EQUIPMENT OR INSTALLATIONS.

a. When enemy signal installations captured intact come into our possession, they will be placed under guard, and be reported to Signal Officer, VI Corps immediately through channels, as indicated in par 4 e of Intelligence Annex to Outline Plan.

b. In the past much damage and wanton destruction has been inflicted on valuable equipment that could be used to further our own purposes.

c. It is not necessary to destroy equipment totally in order to render it valueless to the enemy. Radio transmitters, telephone exchanges, and telephone repeaters are rendered inoperative by opening power switches or removal of fuses.

d. The enemy is well trained in the destruction of abandoned equipment. The quantity found intact is severely limited, therefore it is important that all signal equipment captured intact be maintained in an undamaged condition, and reported immediately.

2. DATA ON ENEMY COMMUNICATION FACILITIES.

a. Wire

(1) General Information.

(a) [illegible] Routes will be found along all the more important railways. These routes are on the opposite side of the track to railway circuits. Where railways do not provide a suitable route, C.M. lines normally follow roads.

(b) UG Cables are always laid at the side of roads at a depth of 80 cm. In inhabited neighborhoods, an iron wire grid is placed over the cable. This grid is 30 cm wide, and placed in the ground about 20 cm. above the cable. Its sole purpose is to indicate the presence of the cable to minute digging [illegible].

(c) Marking of Cable Routes - where the cable runs along the same side of the road as a PTT overhead line, a blue plate (10cm x 20cm) is placed on each pole of the overhead line, on the side nearest the road, and 1.8 meters above the ground. Footing stones usually are in the form of a horizontal square of 30 cm sides, and project a few cm above the ground. All of the stones are numbered in the direction [illegible] from Rome, starting [illegible] placed at [illegible]

(d) [illegible]

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(b) Repeater Stations (for UG Cable).
1 CANNES
2 VIDAURAN
3 TOULON
4 MARSEILLES

(c) Submarine Cables
1 TOULON - AJACCIO (cut Aug 1943)
2 MARSEILLES - BIZERTE (3 Cables)
3 " - ORAN (2 Cables)
4 " - ALGIERS (3 Cables - cut)
5 " - STORA
6 " - BARCELONA (Broken)
7 " - BONE (2 Cables, Cut)
8 Cables are known to exist between CAPE BENAT and ILE du LEVANT and ILE de PORTCROSS. Also there are three cables between Pte de L'ESTEREL, and I. De PORQUEROLLES.

(d) UG Cable - An underground cable is known to exist along the road CANNES - FREJUS, VIDAURAN, GONFARON, PUGET VILLE, PIERREFEU, TOULON, AUBAGNE, MARSEILLES.

(3) Known enemy installations.
(a) UG Cable - MARSEILLES - TOULON (German Army)
(b) TG Ckts - AVIGNON - MARSEILLES (German Army)
(c) TG Ckts - TOULON - MARIGNANE (Luftwaffe)
(d) TG Ckts - MARSEILLES - SETE (German Army)
(e) Telephone exchange for the FREJUS airport is in the Hotel AZUR at the crossing of the FREJUS - STE MAXIME roads. Swbd reported to be in contact with BERLIN.

b. Radio.
(1) Known existing radio transmitters and their locations.
(a) FREJUS - The transmitter is located at the seaplane base about 300 yds from the coast. There are two lattice masts about 130 feet high. A direction finder is in the western part of the field, but its exact location is unknown.
(b) TOULON - Five known stations.
1 At the N.E. end of the battery on the POINTE de PIPADY S of TOULON - Single lattice mast 183' high.
2 At the Marine Perfecture, PALACE d'ARMES.
3 On the quay of the submarine station N of the Canal du MOURILLON (known to communicate with submarines at sea).
4 At Fort LAMALGUE.
5 West of ST AUGUSTRIN - A powerful transmitter of recent construction, four lattice masts 800' high. Until captured by the Germans, it was used to provide a radio link with colonies in AFRICA and the Far East.
(c) HYERES - Two known stations.
1 One mile N.E. of center of HYERES, SW of Golf Hotel.
2 On the N.W. side of HYERES - Le PALIVESTRE airfield.
(d) St RAPHAEL - In a building at the junction of AVE VICTOR HUGO and AVE ANATOLE.

(2) Radar. Intelligence reports for this area are by no means complete. The stations listed below, therefore, are not to be considered as the only stations existing in the locality.
(a) TOULON - CAP SICIE - AW station.
(b) St RAPHAEL - CAP de DRAMMONT - AW station.
(c) CAPE CAMARAT - ISLE d'HYERES - AW station.
(d) CAP SICIE - Ship reporting station.

See attached Overlay - Data on Enemy Communication Facilities

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

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

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

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Initials BN
27 July 1944

HQ VI CORPS
NAPLES, ITALY
27 July 1944

APPENDIX 6
to
ANNEX NO 10 - SIGNAL
TO FO #1 (ANVIL)

COMMUNICATIONS AFLOAT

1. Message Center.

a. Message Centers will be operated continually on the Hq Ship and on the Alternate Command Ship from time of embarkation until the Hq CP has opened ashore.

b. Prescribed Cryptographic Systems. The systems below are prescribed for all U.S. Formations until the date indicated.

(1) SIGABA : CCBP 0131 - From H-hour until further notification by this Hq.
(2) M-209 : Joint SIGSOT - From H-hour until 0001B D + 5.
(3) Combined R/T Code : ASSAULT CCBP-0130 B-2, From H-hour until 0001B, D + 5.
(4) Double Transposition : Theater
(5) AFCODE : Current SOI
(6) Map Coordinate Code : Current SOI
(7) Combined Authenticator : 0122, edition B-6, H-hour until notified by this Hq. The first method of challenge and reply as prescribed on Page III will be used.

c. Distribution of Cryptographic Systems (attached pg 3). Before encryptographing messages addressed to other services, message centers will check the distribution chart to ascertain what system the addressee holds.

d. Time.

(1) "B" Time will be used throughout.
(2) Army units prior to debarkation will obtain official Navy time afloat from ship's chronometer.

2. Radio Communications Afloat:

a. VI Corps Nets, Afloat (See diagram of nets and data chart).

(1) The Corps command nets C-1 and C-2 will open when radio silence is broken. Both nets will be used to transmit traffic from and to the Divisions and laterally between the divisions.
(2) The Corps Troops net C-4 will open at 0630B. Units will report into net as soon thereafter as is possible.
(3) The Corps Liaison Net C-7 will open when so directed by the Corps Signal Officer.
(4) The Special net C-12 will open 0630B and will have check calls every half hour on the half hour thereafter. A three day's supply of batteries will be taken aboard with each set.
(5) The Air Support net will operate afloat to the Divisions as soon as the Division CP's open ashore. Requests for air support afloat will be passed over the C-1 or C-2 nets to the USS CATOCTIN.
(6) PRU broadcast transmissions will be intercepted by a receiver on board the VI Corps Hq ship.

b. Radio silence will be maintained on all sets including receivers in all ships until 0630B, D-day, except on frequencies in the 30.7 to 42.0 mc band (all FM sets) where strict radio silence will be maintained until H-hour. The foregoing conditions may be relaxed only by the (Naval) Officer in tactical command. An occasion might be the complete and unquestionable loss of tactical surprise. All ship's radio receivers operating on Army or joint shore party nets will go on listening watch at 0600B, D-day.

c. Link signs will be followed by /S to denote that the calling station is at a headquarters afloat.

d. Lateral communication with the French Corps will be provided over the A-1 Net.

e. VI Corps SOI Item XB-32 Radio Frequency Assignments will be effective "D" Day.

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3. Alternate Command Ship Communications.

a. Radio. Three radio sets on the Alternate Command Ship will stand to operate in the A-1, C-1 and C-4 nets in an emergency. All traffic passed the C-1, C-2, C-4, C-7, A-1 and Tac R nets will be copied and turned over the message center. An SCR-300 will be provided to operate in the C-12 net.

b. Message Center. All necessary cryptographic systems will be available so that all radio traffic passed on the Hq Ship may be broken. The clear text of the traffic will be delivered to the appropriate staff section.

4. Operating Personnel and Equipment Afloat (For use of HQ VI Corps).

a. Hq ship U.S.S. CATOCTIN.

SECTION	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	EQUIPMENT
Message Center	1 (57 Sig)	3 Code Clerks (57 Sig Bn) 9 Code Clerks (Ship Det) 3 Clerks (57 Sig Bn)	2 SIGABA (7A)
Radio	1 (57 Sig)	1 Sgt (57 Sig Bn) 4 Operators (57 Sig Bn) 10 Operators (ship det)	4 Trans (ship) 8 Rec (ship)

b. Alternate Command Ship.

SECTION	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	EQUIPMENT
Message Center		3 Code Clerks (57 Sig Bn) 3 Clerks (57 Sig Bn)	1 SIGABA (57 Sig)
Radio		1 Sgt (57 Sig Bn) 7 Oper (57 Sig Bn)	3 Trans (Ship) 6 Rec (Ship)

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27 July 1944

HQ VI CORPS
NAPLES, ITALY
27 July 1944

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APPENDIX C
to
ANNEX NO 10 - SIGNAL
TO FO #1 (ANVIL)

DISTRIBUTION OF CODES AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS

	SIGABA						M-138-A		DOUBLE TRANS-POSITION		JOINT M-209 KEY (SIGSOT)	COMBINED ASSAULT CODE	COMBINED AUTHENTICATOR	AFCODE
	CCBP 0101	CCBP 0102	CCBP 0131	THEATER	JOINT	WAR DEPT	THEATER	WAR DEPT	THEATER	WAR DEPT				
AFHQ	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
MAAF	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
NAVAL CINC MED	X	X	X		X						X	X		
XII TACTICAL AIR COMMAND	X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X		
SEVENTH U.S. ARMY HQ	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FR. ARMY HQ	X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	
U. S. CORPS HQ	X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X
FRENCH CORPS HQ	X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	
U. S. DIVISION HQ	X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X
U. S. BRIGADE HQ											X	X	X	X
U. S. REGT OR GROUP											X	X	X	X
U. S. BATTALION											X	X	X	X
U. S. NAVY FLAG SHIP	X	X	X		X						X	X		
BRITISH NAVY FLAG SHIP	X	X	X		X						X	X		
FRENCH NAVY FLAG SHIP	X	X	X		X						X	X		
U. S. MAJOR WAR VESSEL	X		X								X	X		
BRITISH MAJOR WAR VESSEL	X		X									X		
FRENCH MAJOR WAR VESSEL			X								X	X		
U. S. MINOR WAR VESSEL											X	X		
BRITISH MINOR WAR VESSEL												X		
U. S. LST AND LCI											X	X		
U. S. SHORE PARTIES												X		
1ST AIR BORNE TASK FORCE											X	X	X	X
117 RCN SQ											X	X	X	X
(FR) ARMD COMBAT COMMAND											X	X	X	
(FR) COMMANDOS											X	X		
U. S. LCT												X	X	

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Maj Gen

OFFICIAL: Harold Harrell
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TO ANNEX NO 10 - SIGNAL
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HQ VI CORPS
NAPLES, ITALY
27 July 1944



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MARINO, ITALY
27 July 44

APPENDIX C
to
ANNEX NO 10 - SIGNAL
TO FO #1 (ANVIL)

DATA CHART FOR RADIO NETS AFLOAT

Serial No.	Stations in Net	Code Signs	Freq	Procedure	Operated By	Remarks
A-1	7A (NCS) 7A Alt Comd Ship II Corps (Jr) *VIC Alt Comd Ship	 C6-R34 C6-R44	2875 P 5520 A	Link	1st Sig Bn 1st Sig Bn FR Sigs 57 Sig Bn	Army Comd Net
C-1	VIC HQ (NCS) 3 Inf Div 36 Inf Div 45 Inf Div 1 AB Task Force *VIC Alt Comd Ship	 C7-R34 C5-R76 C19-R80 C6-R55	2105 P 4440 A	Link	Ships Det 3 Sig Co 36 Sig Co 45 Sig Co 512 Sig Co 57 Sig Bn	Corps Comd Net
C-2	VIC HQ (NCS) 3 Inf Div 36 Inf Div 45 Inf Div	 C7-R42 C5-R46 C19-R72	2560 P 5660 A	Link	Ships Det 3 Sig Co 36 Sig Co 45 Sig Co	Corps Alternate Comd Net
C-4	VIC HQ (NCS) CC 1 Armd (Jr) HQ VIC Arty *VIC Alt Comd Ship	 C1-R38	3845 P	Link	Ships Det CC 1 Armd Sig VIC Arty 57 Sig Bn	Corps Troop Net Stations to report in net H hour
C-7	VIC HQ (NCS) CG (Jeep) Jeep 1 (3 Inf Div Jeep 2(36 Inf Div Jeep 3(45 Inf Div	 C1-R12 C1-R44 C1-R58 C1-R75	2705 P	Link CW or R/T	Ships Det HQ Co VIC 57 Sig Bn 57 Sig Bn 57 Sig Bn	Operates whenever required
C-12	VIC HQ (NCS) VIC Alt Comd Ship 57 Sig Bn (LCT) HQ VIC LCT	 C1-R52 C1-R45 C1-R85	Channel 6	R/T	57 Sig Bn 57 Sig Bn 57 Sig Bn 57 Sig Bn	Checks each ½ hour after H-hour
	INFORMATION ON OTHER ARMY LINKS AFLOAT					
A-8	7 Army FHQ(CORSICA) Arty Net		3895 P 6290 A		982 Sig Co	Listen Only
A-14	111th Squadron 225th Squadron 2/33 Squadron	Pillage Stupor Fratzy	5040	R/T & W/T	111th Sq 2 AS Com Sq 2 AS Com Sq	Listen Only Daylight
A-23	Fighter Director Ship SCR # 2 SCR # 1	56T("BABY") 27U("BACKBONE") 51X("[illegible]")	Freq [illegible] [illegible]	 [illegible] [illegible]	XII TAC XII TAC 35 AAA Brig	SCR-608 Liaison and early warning Net

*Stations on Alternate Command Ship Stand by to enter net in an emergency.

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NAPLES, ITALY
~~27 July 1944~~

APPENDIX D
to
ANNEX NO 10 - SIGNAL
TO FO #1 (ANVIL)

COMMUNICATIONS ASHORE

1. Message Center.

a. The VI Corps message center will be established ashore as soon as the CP is selected.

b. Prescribed Cryptographic systems.

(1) SIGABA: CCBP 0131
(2) M-209 : Joint SIGSOT until 0001B, D + 5; SOI items thereafter.
(3) Combined Authenticator - 0122
(4) Combined R/T Code: Assault CCBP-0130 in use until 0001B; D + 5.
(5) All others: See current SOI.

2. Radio:

a. As soon as possible radio sets will come ashore and will enter nets shown in the attached diagram. Stations ashore will enter nets as an out station using the VIC Adv Call Sign. Stations afloat will drop out of their respective nets when the CP opens ashore and closes afloat. In the event that an insufficient number of AM sets are available ashore to open all of the nets, the following order of priority will govern: C-1, A-1, C-4, C-7, PRU, C-2, A-2 and C-11.

b. Radio Teletype Links: Nets C-3A and C-3B will open as soon as the sets can be located ashore. Stations are to be located in the vicinity of the CP's on the highest ground available. Care must be taken to select a location where the best line-of-sight communication can be obtained. In the event that contact is not immediately established stations will check in each half-hour on the half-hour until contact is made or other instructions are received.

c. C-11 Net. VI Corps Rear Echelon will go on listening watch "D" day and will continue on listening watch until contact is made with VIC Hq.

d. Communication to Paratroops and Commandos. Communication at Corps and Division level to the Hq of the 1st Airborne Task Force will be provided by the Corps Command Net C-1. Provisions will be made by the 36 Inf Div and 45 Inf Div to provide radio communication at Divisional or Regimental level with the elements of paratroopers dropping in their sectors. Provisions will be made by the 3 Inf Div to establish communication with the French Groupe de Commandos attacking to the left of the 3 Inf Div sector.

e. Communication with CC-1, 1st Armd Div (Fr). CC-1 will enter the C-4 net at H-hour, D-Day and will maintain contact with Corps in this net until further orders are issued. All traffic between Corps and CC-1, and vice versa, will be passed in English. Translation and interpretation will be done by CC-1.

f. Communication to USS CARONYN. Initially will be provided by the A-1 and A-2 nets. When the Army CP opens ashore - traffic addressed to the USS CARONYN will be sent through Seventh Army.

3. Wire:

a. Current VI Corps SOP will govern all wire installations.

b. Service open wire circuits may be obtained by Division forward of Division CP, except for such circuits being taken over by the Corps Signal Officer. Corps should be prepared to take over all such circuits upon request of Corps Signal Officer.

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ANNEX NO 10 - SIGNAL
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NAPLES, ITALY
27 July 1944

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27 July 1944

CORPS RADIO CIRCUITS - ASHORE



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HQ VI CORPS
NAPLES, ITALY
27 July 1944

DATA CHART FOR RADIO NETS ASHORE

Serial No	Stations in Net	Code Signs	Freq	Procedure	Operated By	Remarks
A-1	7A HQ (NCS) IIC HQ (FR) VIC HQ	 C-6 R-44 C-1 R-62	2875 P 3840 A 5520 A	Link	1st Sig Bn Fr Sigs 57 Sig Bn	7A HQ will be a-board USS CATOCTIN until 7A CP Ashore
A-2	7A HQ (NCS) VIC HQ	 C-1 R-27	2995 P 5460 A	Link	1 Armd Sig Bn 57 Sig Bn	7A HQ will be a-board USS CATOCTIN until 7A CP ashore
A-8	7A PRU (NCS) VIC ARTY IIC (FR) ARTY	 C-6 R-3 C-6 R-93	3695 P 6260 A	Link	1st Sig Bn 57 Sig Bn Fr Sigs	
A-19	7A ASC (NCS) VIC ASP 3 Inf Div ASP 36 Inf Div ASP 45 Inf Div ASP	 C-6 R-4 C-6 R-8 C-6 R-17 C-6 R-51	2390 P 5730 A	Link	2 AS Com Sq 2 AS Com Sq 2 AS Com Sq 2 AS Com Sq 2 AS Com Sq	Net will open when VIC CP opens a-shore releasing ships trans to 7A
C-1	VIC HQ (NCS) 3 Inf Div 36 Inf Div 45 Inf Div 1 AB Task Force	 C-7 R-34 C-5 R-76 C-19 R-80 C-6 R-55	2105 P 4440 A	Link	57 Sig Bn 3 Sig Co 36 Sig Co 45 Sig Co Prcht Sig Co	Corps Command Net
C-2	VIC HQ (NCS) 3 Inf Div 36 Inf Div 45 Inf Div	 C-7 R-42 C-5 R-46 C-19 R-72	2560 P 5660 A	Link	57 Sig Bn 3 Sig Co 36 Sig Co 45 Sig Co	Alt Corps Comd Net to open if C-1 Net is overloaded.
C-3A	VIC HQ (NCS) 3 Inf Div	LQAQ LQRW FIXED	Channel 295P 271A	Teletype	57 Sig Bn 3 Sig Co	Corps Comd Net Rad TT-Equip, Driver & technician supplied from 57 Sig Bn
C-3B	VIC HQ (NCS) 36 Inf Div	LQAQ LQRH FIXED	Channel 322P 271A	Teletype	57 Sig Bn 36 Sig Co	Corps Comd Net Rad TT-Equip, Driver & Technician supplied from 57 Sig Bn
C-4	VIC HQ (NCS) HQ VIC Arty CC 1 Armd Fr	 C-1 R-38	3845 P	Link	57 Sig Bn VIC Arty CC Sigs	Corps Troop Net
C-5	VIC Arty (NCS) Counter Btry Net		2375 P	Link CW & R/T	VIC Arty	Out Stations as prescribed by Corps Arty Com O
C-6	VIC HQ (NCS) Plane #1 Plane #2 Plane #3	 C-1 R-81 C-1 R-46 C-1 R-70	Channel 12	Link R/T	57 Sig Bn O-Obs O-Obs O-Obs	SCR 300 Special Purpose Net
C-7	VIC HQ (NCS) 6 Radio Jeeps		2705	Link	57 Sig Bn	Spec Liaison Net Jeep Opr equipped with M-200 [illegible]
C-11	VIC HQ (NCS) VIC HQ (Sr)	 C-1 R-40	3175 P 7175 A	Link	57 Sig Bn 57 Sig Bn	To pass all traffic [illegible]
A-12	111th Squadron 229th Squadron 271st Squadron	34 Flags [illegible] [illegible]	5040		111th Sqdn 2 AS Com Sq 2 AS Com Sq	[illegible]
	Spec CP Spec Sqd Spec Sqd		2520 7025 [illegible]		57 Sig Bn	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 US ARMY

CONFIDENTIAL

5 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Historical Record, Hq & Hq Btry VI Corps Artillery, 15 August to 30 August 1944.

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758, U. S. Army, Attention: Historical Officer.

1. At the beginning of the operation for the invasion of Southern France the following officers comprised the staff of Hq & Hq Btry:

Commanding General	Brigadier General Carl A. Baehr
Ass't Artillery Officer	Colonel Kermit L. Davis
Executive	Colonel Harry J. Lemley, Jr.
S-2	Major Francis E. Kramer
CBO	Major Charles P. Williamson
S-3	Lt Colonel John M. Boyett
S-4	Major Clarence E. Forehand
Air Officer	Captain Oscar G. Goodhand
Communications Officer	Captain Harry M. Foos, Jr.
Hq Btry Commanding Officer	1st Lt. John F. Williams
Surgeon	Captain John A. Fatcheric
Asst S-3	Major Robert J. Byrne, Jr.
Asst S-3	Captain Charles F. Stubbs
Asst S-3	Captain Earl D. Schroeder
Asst S-3	Captain Paul C. Evans
Asst S-3	1st Lt. Charles L. Perrin
Asst S-3	1st Lt. Emery F. Nelson
Asst S-4	1st Lt. William D. Addison
Asst Air Officer	Captain Cloyd V. Taylor
Asst S-2	Captain Everett G. Hobbs
Air Liaison Pilot	1st Lt. Robert L. Gibson
Asst S-2	1st Lt. George E. Gilbert
Air Liaison Pilot	1st Lt. James A. Shelton
Air Liaison Pilot	1st Lt. Gerald J. Priebe
Air Liaison Pilot	1st Lt. Al C. Wickliffe, Jr.
Aide-de-Camp	1st Lt. Harold H. Park, Jr.
Btry Officer	CWO Wayne McV. Weigley

2. Organization of VI Corps Artillery for the operation is as listed below:

General Support:
2 FA Obsn Bn
141 FA Bn

Attached 3 Inf Div:
69 AFA Bn

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6 FA Gp
36 FA Bn
634 FA Bn

Attached 36 Inf Div:
93 AFA Bn
36 FA Gp
937 FA Bn
977 FA Bn

Attached 45 Inf Div:
59 AFA Bn
35 FA Gp
938 FA Bn
976 FA Bn

3. During the period for a week preceeding August 15, Hq & Hq Btry VI Corps Artillery loaded on assault vessels in the vicinity of the port of Naples. General Baehr and Lt. Park were aboard the USS CATOCTIN, Colonel Davis aboard the USS BARNETT, Colonel Lemley, Lt Colonel Boyett, Captain Stubbs and Captain Foos on the USS BETTLEGUESE, Major Byrne in charge of the equipment on the USS ALBERT J. MICHAELSON, the remainder being on the USS MARINE ROBIN.

The administrative and motor maintenance sections under CWO Weigley remained in the NAPLES area to come on later shipping.

First elements of the Headquarters landed about 1500B hours on D day and a CP was opened at ST MAXIME at 1800B on August 15. The headquarters landed practically without incident except that Captains Evans and Schroeder together with Sgt Marks and Pvt Gregg were put off in chest deep water from an LCI.

It was reported on the morning of the 16th that the LST transporting A Btry, 937 FA Bn and A Btry, 977 FA Bn had been struck by bombs in an attack at dusk on the 15th and all equipment of these units was lost.

The next two days were spent in locating units and gathering information of front line elements and by maintaining officers on the beaches assisting elements of the Corps Arty find their respective headquarters.

On the 18th, 59 AFA Bn was relieved of attachment to 45 Div and attached to TASK FORCE BUTLER and 141 FA Bn attached to 45 Div and on the 19th, 36 FA Gp and 937 FA Bn were relieved attachment 36 Div and attached 1st A/B TASK FORCE. On the 20th 6 FA Gp was relieved attachment to VI Corps and attached II French Corps and the 36 FA Bn and 634 FA Bn relieved attachment VI Corps and attached II French Corps effective upon relief of 3 Div by II French Corps.

The CP was moved to South of LELUC on the evening of the 18th with an advance CP opening that night and the remainder of the headquarters moving on the 19th. Contact was maintained with artillery units by visits and when the distances were not too great, by radio.

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On the 19th the CP was moved to vicinity of BRIGNOLES and on the 21st an advance CP left BRIGNOLES enroute to SISTERON. The advance CP met General Baehr at SISTERON, and proceeded to vicinity SERRES, arriving there before dark. The 141 FA Bn and 977 FA Bn had been ordered to march to that area and closed during the night.

Reconnaissance party for the Corps Arty accompanied by the Battalion CO and parties of the 141 and 977 left before daylight on the 22d and proceeded to MARSANNE to contact Hq TASK FORCE BUTLER and to make plans for employing the 141 and 977 FA Bns. The Hq arrived about 1400 and the CP was opened and communications established by 1800B.

On the 23d, the 36 Div Arty having arrived, the advance CP marched to bivouac area vic ASPRES.

The main CP in the meantime had moved from BRIGNOLES to vic RIANS on the 21st and on the 25th joined the advance CP near ASPRES. On the 25th General Baehr accompanied by the counterbattery section and the communications officer returned to the MARSANNE area to coordinate the Corps Arty.

On the 27th, Captain Stubbs, Captain Hobbs and Captain Schroeder proceeded to MARSANNE to go on TD with the 141 FA Bn, who had lost several officers thru enemy action. These officers were relieved in a few days and returned to this headquarters.

On the 31st, the main CP and the advance CP, which had been in MARSANNE, moved to vicinity of VOIRON. Also the administrative section under M/Sgt Dunham rejoined the headquarters on this day.

There were no casualties sustained by this Headquarters during the period.

For the Commanding General:

William D. Addison
WILLIAM D. ADDISON,
1st Lt., F. A.,
Adjutant.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO #46, U. S. Army

477-100-800

SECRET
By Auth: CG VI Corps
Initials:
Date: DEC 2 1944

DEC 2 1944

SUBJECT: Historical Record, Headquarters VI Corps, September 1944.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (through channels).

SECTION I

1. As September opened, VI Corps troops in Southern France were at MEXIMIEUX, PONT D'AIN and AMBERIEU to the east and north of LYON as well as in the vicinity of BEAUREPAIRE and ST. RAMBERT on the RHONE River to the south of LYON. In the BRIANCON area Task Force BIBO was in the process of being relieved by the 2d DIM, while at GRENOBLE the 3d DIA relieved Corps troops in that area and was grouping preparatory to movement to the AIX LES BAINS - ANNENCY sector. These two French colonial divisions with supporting troops composed French Army "B" which had taken control of the sector on the VI Corps right. Enemy units opposite VI Corps were withdrawing to the north and northeast though not in disorder. The German Nineteenth Army composed the bulk of these troops together with numerous service units from the DORDOGNE area.

2. In conjunction with the enemy's usual strong rear guard action, intended to ensure the complete evacuation of his troops from LYON and vicinity, counter-attacks by heavily armored combat patrols were launched on 1 September against the tightly held 45th Div road blocks at PONT D'AIN (T-3321), the road junction east of CHALAMONT (T-1915), MEXIMIEUX (T-2200), DAGNEUX (Y-1298) and north of LAYETTES (Y-2491), these attacks aimed mainly at the bridge crossings of the AIN River. Penetrations were made at PONT D'AIN and MEXIMIEUX. In the former town the 180th Inf strongly countered the enemy thrust and regained control of the town while elements of the 179th Inf and 117th Cav Ron Sqn staged a severe though successful fight in a railroad station just to the west of the town. In MEXIMIEUX, enemy armor, artillery and infantry made four separate attacks to seize the 179th regimental CP but failed in all attempts, though one group of the enemy succeeded in reaching the east of the town where they destroyed the AIN River crossing at that point. Near the end of the period, the 179th Inf had control of the situation and was again in possession of the town. Although the road block at DAGNEUX was broken by the enemy, 117th Cav Ron troops refused to give ground on this road (Route #84) which led northeast out of LYON. At the AIN crossing north of LAYETTES, the fighting was stiff but decisive in favor of the 117th Cav Ron Sqn and 179th Inf elements. The bridge near POMOIN (T-3725) just north of PONT D'AIN was intact which allowed the 180th Inf and "B" Troop of the 117th Cav Ron Sqn to advance virtually unopposed to the north and east of BOURG (T-2338) where "B" Troop established road blocks and a command post at TREMPORT (T-3346). 1/.

3. Attacking North on the east of the RHONE, the 36th Div cleared BEAUREPAIRE before noon and advanced steadily on LYON, eliminating scattered resistance along the way. By the end of the day, a line had been established from the RHONE River south of LYON, east through ST. SYMPHORIEN (Y-9674) - MYNS (Y-0477) - MEYRIEUX (Y-1474) and contact made with the 3d Div at the road junction Y-1577, southeast of ST. LAURENT (Y-1180) where 36th Div Cav Ron patrols struck an enemy road block 2/.

1/. War Room Journal, 1 Sept, Entries #1, 69 and 106; G-2 Report No. 18-2 Sept.

2/. War Room Journal, 1 Sept, Entries #81, 121, 124.

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S E C R E T

[illegible] During the day a field message was issued directing the 45th Div to attack as soon as possible along the FONT D'AIN - BOURG road and to maintain bridgeheads on the AIN river until relieved. The 3d Div was to assemble west of [illegible] (Z-3311) and be prepared to pass through elements of the 45th Div east of the [illegible] river and attack in the direction of CHAMPAGNE (Z-1915) - CHATILLON (Z-2612) or to pass through the 45th Div, by-passing resistance to the [illegible] in the direction of BOURG and MACON. The 36th Div was to continue its advance North to the [illegible] River, establish and maintain liaison with F.F.I. elements engaged with the enemy in the vicinity of [illegible].

5. As the 7th and 15th Inf continued to assemble in the LAPNIEU - AMBERIEU area, the 2d Bn of the 30th Inf relieved the 3d Bn 179th Inf on their right in the vicinity of [illegible] DE [illegible] (Y-2187) where a fight developed that cost the enemy its position in this area as well as 150 prisoners. Recon elements of the 30th Inf headed west and occupied ST. LAURENT (Y-1179) and made contact with 36th Div elements east of LYON 3/.

SECTION II

1. The 36th Div with three regiments abreast pressed south towards LYON [illegible] ber. The 142d Inf on the left came up astride route 77, the 1st Bn reached [illegible] (Z-3377) and the 3d Bn [illegible] (Y-0078). To their right, the 141st [illegible] the LYON - [illegible] road to ST. [illegible] (Z-0361) and [illegible] (Z-[illegible]). On the division right, the 141st Inf pushed along to the [illegible] (Z-[illegible]), the 2d Bn establishing its command post at [illegible] (Z-[illegible]). [illegible] officer patrols from the 142d Inf were sent [illegible] of LYON where it was found that all bridges had been blown except [illegible] railroad span. The southern part of town was found clear and [illegible] Equis. The only American unit to enter the city was this [illegible] patrol which had been requested by the French Patriots. Enemy elements [illegible] the junction of the SAONE and RHONE [illegible]. This force was neutralized by the French forces and the American patrol.

[illegible] 7th, [illegible] troops encountered their heaviest opposition. The 1st [illegible] their strong grip in the [illegible] right, less the 1st Bn had begun to [illegible] vicinity of [illegible] (Z-433) and [illegible] (Z-3242). [illegible] to [illegible], the 157th Inf made [illegible] despite [illegible] form of long range [illegible] (Z-2726), and continued on to take [illegible] (Z-[illegible]) [illegible]. To the right of this road, the 130th [illegible] small arms, mortar and artillery fire slowing the [illegible] to the outskirts of [illegible] (Z-2135). On the [illegible] (Z-[illegible]) [illegible] high ground to the [illegible] where a [illegible] fight took place before the [illegible].

[illegible] North of [illegible], troops [illegible] of the 117th Cavalry Sqn were halted in [illegible] (Z-2302) [illegible] units were [illegible] the [illegible] reached [illegible] VIL [illegible] enemy [illegible] VIL [illegible] two main [illegible] 157th and [illegible] elements in this [illegible].

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4. During the day, Task Force Butler had been completely relieved by the French and elements of this force returned to their parent units 7/. The VI Corps Command Post moved to a new location North of [illegible] at 1048.

SECTION III

1. In accordance with previous instructions, Troop B 117th Cav Ron Sqn attacked MONTREVEL on the morning of 3 September and before noon had cut all roads to the north, destroyed two Mk IV tanks, two self-propelled guns and had taken 65 prisoners. At this point, Troop A entered the town to aid Troop B. In the afternoon, enemy tanks and infantry coming from [illegible] and the Southwest launched a heavy attack to break through the town. After a fierce battle the superior enemy forces captured almost all of Troop B and all but one platoon of Troop A, as well as their equipment. Troop C and the 21 [illegible]th Inf, sent to MONTREVEL as reinforcements, arrived to find the town in enemy hands. Troop B counterattacked from the outside of town in an effort to allow withdrawal, but the enemy had all routes well-guarded and drove off this unit. Further attack was not pressed on MONTREVEL at this time since the remainder of the 117th Cav Ron Sqn was ordered to protect the left flank of the 3d Div and reconnoiter the route North and West to LONS LE SAUNIER and [illegible] 8/.

2. During the day, severe fighting also took place on the approaches to BOURG from the East and Southeast where the 157th and 180th Inf sought to break through the enemy's defenses at COMMIERS (T-2829) and [illegible] (T-3138). By nightfall the German forces were overcome in both towns and had withdrawn towards BOURG, the 2d Bn of the 157th Inf capturing COMMIERS and the 3d Bn securing CEYZIAT while the remainder of the 180th Inf which had cleared [illegible] (T-3138) in the morning established road blocks on the routes leading northeast out of BOURG. The 179th Inf occupied high ground to the North of [illegible] without opposition 9/.

3. As VI Corps changed its route of advance to the northeast, the 3d Div assembled North of PONT D'AIN and as rapidly as pooled transportation facilities of their own and the 36th Div would allow, continued movement north to LONS LE SAUNIER (T-4692) and [illegible] (C-7556) in accordance with a field message dated 031000B September. By the end of the day, the infantry leading the column had reached a point just south of St. [illegible] (T-4043) 10/.

4. In the LYON sector, the 36th Div sent patrols to the city, which was completely in F.F.I. hands by noon. The 36th Div then proceeded struck northwest towards [illegible] (S-9248) as infantry which had encircled Lyon on the east and South bank of the RHONE River turned over their positions to the French and prepared for movement by motor and marching north and west of [illegible]. The 36th Div patrols found the enemy had evacuated the towns of [illegible] (T-3807), MARLIEUX (T-1222) and St. [illegible] (T-1237), and as the 141st Inf assembled at [illegible] (Y-0396) the 142d Inf commenced movement to CHATILLON, and the 143d Inf headed for [illegible] 11/.

5. During the day the 1st Armored Division of French Army "B" had advanced up the west bank of the SAONE River, coordinating and keeping pace with VI Corps on the left flank while on the Corps right the 3d Div extended its vigorous reconnaissance North and Northeast ahead of the VI Corps advance with patrols of

7/. WAJ, 2 Sept, Entry 14

8/. WAJ, 3 Sept (American CP), Entries 11 and 32, 84; 117th Cav Ron Sqn S-3 Report No. 19 - 3 Sept

9/. WAJ, 3 Sept, Entries 20, 71 and 83.

10/. WAJ, 3 Sept (Bourgoin CP) 40 ; 3d Div S-2 Report [illegible]

11/. WAJ, 3 Sept (Bourgoin CP) Entry 28 and (American CP) [illegible] 44; S-2 Report No. 21.

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the RSA extending to LONS LE SAUNIER 12/.

6. VI Corps CP moved to AMBERIEU (T-3412) at 1145B 13/.

SECTION IV

1. Before daylight of 4 September, the rapid strides of the 7th Inf had carried the forward elements to VOITEUR (O-5000) approximately seven miles North of LONS LE SAUNIER. The 1st and 3d Bns attacked POLIGNY (O-5709) at dawn, but no enemy resistance was encountered and by 0830B the leading troops were twelve miles north of POLIGNY, having passed through ARBOIS (O-6217) to MOUCHARD (O-6326). Protecting the Corps right and the 7th Inf advance, the 15th Inf had advanced during the night through ARINTHOD (T-4859) and OREGELET (T-5274). In the morning, after consolidating in LONS LE SAUNIER, the 15th Inf continued East and North, the 2d Bn establishing road blocks outside of CHAMPANOLE (O-7199) and at CROTENAY (O-6500) as the 1st Bn went North to VERS (O-7307) and MONTROND (O-6606), with patrols of the latter Bn heading for SALINES (O-6924). In the afternoon, the 3d Bn 7th Inf remained North and West of VOITEUR, the 2d Bn stayed in the ARBOIS area, both as a left flank protection force, while the 2d Bn (reinforced) pushed on up through QUINGEY (O-6840) to ARGUEL (O-7751), just South of BESANCON, where positions were organized for an assault on this town. Coming up from the rear, the 30th Inf consolidated in LONS LE SAUNIER preparatory to branching out North and Northeast through the 7th and 15th Inf to the area south of BESANCON. Protecting the advance of the 3d Div, Troops A and C 117th Cav Rcn Sqn pushed strong patrols to the West and Northwest without making enemy contact, though one battle patrol of the 7th Inf engaged in a short fire fight at MONT SOUS VAUDREY (O-4826) Northwest of ARBOIS 14/.

2. In the 45th Div area, the 157th Inf broke the enemy resistance southeast of BOURG in the early morning and by 1000B had entered and cleared the town of the enemy except for scattered snipers. A roving patrol neutralized these points while the bulk of the 157th Inf joined the 179th and 180th Inf in assembly areas east of BOURG, preparatory to the move North to LONS LE SAUNIER where they would relieve elements of the 3d Div maintaining a rearguard in and to the West of the town 15/.

3. On the Corps left flank, the 36th Div, meeting no enemy opposition, advanced North on a front from the east bank of the SAONE River to BOURG. By 1130B the 141st Inf on the left had reached ST. LAURENT opposite MACON, the 143d Inf in the center was Northwest of BOURG near MONTREVEL and the 142d Inf on the right had passed through BOURG in the morning without seeing the enemy. By the end of the period, the 36th Div had reached its objective, approximately twenty miles northwest of BOURG on a line: PONT DE VAUX (T-0063), ST. TRIVIER (T-1166), VARENNES (T-2363), held by the 141st, 143d and 142d Inf, respectively 16/.

SECTION V

1. By way of SALINES (O-6921) and AMANCEY (O-8433) the 1st Bn 15th Inf advanced North on BESANCON early on 5 September securing the town of FONTAIN (O-7951) after a short fight and continuing North, with the 2d Bn 7th Inf attached, to occupy the high ground facing BESANCON from the South. Thus, the town was flanked on two sides, elements of the 7th Inf and Troop A 117th Cav

12/. 3d Div G-3 Report No. 27 - 3 Sept.

13/. G-3 Rpt #20 - 3 Sept 1944.

14/. WRJ, 4 Sept, Entries #24, 26, 42, and 112.

15/. WRJ, 4 Sept, Entries #17, 44, 49.

16/. WRJ, 4 Sept, Entries #36, 46, 53 and 92.

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Recon Sqn having crossed the DOUBS River in the vicinity of BEURE (O-7752), cut Highway #73 and set up a road block southwest of BESANCON. Enemy opposition consisted chiefly of tanks, self-propelled guns and scattered infantry action; one group of sixty enemy tanks coming South as reinforcements turned back to the North without having been committed. Coming up on the right of BESANCON, the 2d Bn 15th Inf cleared through ORNANS (O-8941) and reached TARCENAY (O-8646) and by the end of the day recon was pushing North and Northeast, making enemy contact in the latter direction at MAMIROLLE (O-8951). The 30th Inf at SALINES pushed the 3d Bn in the direction of ORNANS and L'HOPITAL (O-9448) where they aided the 4 RTT in overcoming a strong enemy rear guard 17/.

2. In conjunction with the 3d Div, the 117th Cav Recon Sqn continued aggressive combat patrolling on the division's left flank and covered the bridges crossing the DOUBS River from CHAUSSIN (O-3323) to the South of DOLE (O-3936). Troop C captured CHAUSSIN and secured intact the bridge to the West, and the bridge South of DOLE at O-4028 after clearing MONT SOUS VAUDREY (O-4826). Six other bridges over the DOUBS River in this left sector had been blown by the retreating Germans. Elements of Troop A had secured two LOUE River crossings north of ARBOIS and one over the DOUBS River just South of BESANCON. Patrols pushing to DOLE met considerable resistance while to the Northeast 117th Recon Sqn elements reached COURTEFONTAINE (O-6442) with little trouble 18/.

3. Maintaining the security of LONS LE SAUNIER area with the 157th Inf, the 45th Div moved northeast to PONTARLIER (P-0619), recently captured by the 3d DIA. From this town the 179th and 180th Inf drove north on BAUME LES DAMES (P-0570) where a recon troop and a Bn of the 3d DIA were cut off by the enemy. The 179th Inf (-2d Bn) on the right, headed for VERCEL (P-0850), and reached ST. GORGON (P-0333) by the end of the day, while on the left the 3d Bn 180th Inf cleared through ORNANS and reached SAULES (O-9343). 180th Inf recon patrols pushed Northeast to GONSANS (P-0055) and L'HOPITAL (O-9448) and ETALANS (O-9846) to make contact with the French and found the area clear of the enemy, although some German elements were still in the vicinity of VALLAHON (P-0447). Two ME-109's strafed a column of the 180th Inf near SALINES, killing 24 and wounding 10 of our troops. The raiders were engaged by our AA with unknown results 19/.

4. On the Corps left flank, the 36th Div continued steadily North without contacting the enemy except at one point where the division recon troop engaged in a fire fight with a German delaying detachment south of the DOUBS River at NEUBLANS (O-2717). By the end of the period, the 141st Inf, passing through LOUHANS (O-2083) which had been evacuated by the enemy in the morning, was at ST. GERMAIN (T-2198), the 143d Inf in the vicinity of SENS (T-2788). The 142d Inf closed near BLETTERANS (T-3798) and sent the 3d Bn and 132d FA Bn to MONCHAUD (O-6325) to assist Troop C, 117th Cav in blocking the routes over the DOUBS River from the Northwest. To their left, the 1st Armd Div (Fr) had captured CHALON and continued its drive towards DIJON and the area north of the DOUBS River 20/.

5. In the morning of 6 September, the VI Corps Command Post opened at LONS LE SAUNIER 21/. In the afternoon a field message was issued directing the following: The 3d Div to concentrate in the BESANCON - ETALANS (O-9948) - ORNANS area, prepare to seize BESANCON or block any enemy movement South and move the division east; the 45th Div was to concentrate in the VERCEL (P-0750) - MAISEY (O-9863) - SAULES (O-9343) - MOLE (O-0340) area, prepare to seize

17/. WRJ (Lons Le Saunier Cl) 5 Sept, Entries #3, 13, 21, 27 and 39.

18/. WRJ, 5 Sept, Entries #6 and 73; 117th Cav Recon Sqd S-3 Report - 6 Sept.

19/. WRJ, 6 Sept, Entry #16; 45th Div G-2 Report No. 92 - 6 Sept.

20/. WRJ (Lons Le Saunier), 5 Sept, Entries #22, 68, 87 and 91.

21/. WRJ, 6 Sept, Entry #7.

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crossings over the DOUBS river near BAUME, prepare to advance on [illegible] (O-0891) or MONTBELLIARD (P-3680); the 36th Div was to concentrate in the MOUCHARD area protecting the Corps left flank and prepare to follow through and [illegible] 45th divisions.

SECTION VI

1. In accordance with VI Corps Field Message, the 36th Div moved Northeast on 6 September, establishing the 141st Inf at [illegible] (O-6710), the 142d Inf at MOUCHARD (O-6325) and the 143d Inf in the vicinity of [illegible] (O-4325). The 36th Div Rcn Troop made vigorous reconnaissance to the North and Northwest of the 3d Div left sector finding the towns of LE LOUE (O-4431), [illegible] (O-4728), CRISSEY (O-5731), SAINTAIS (-5331) and CHAILLEY (O-5632) between the DOUBS River and the southern edge of the FORET DE CHAUX clear of the enemy. [illegible] North, this unit reached [illegible]AYS (O-5744) on the southern bank of the DOUBS River without enemy contact although enemy vehicle troops could be observed [illegible] CROGNAIS on the opposite bank 22/.

2. In the BESANCON sector, the 3d Div grouped their forces for a final assault on the city which was now surrounded on three sides, the enemy's remaining escape route being to the Northeast. To the West and Northwest, the 7th Inf, crossing the DOUBS River, set up a line [illegible] (O-7654) - [illegible] (O-7457) - POOLE (O-7658). The 15th Inf, overcoming enemy resistance at [illegible] (O-8654), CHAMPS (O-8656), MORRE (O-8254) [illegible] (O-8554) and O-8554, established vantage points to the South and on the high ground to the East with the 1st Bn on the left and the 2d Bn on the right. Enemy opposition was sporadic in this area with delaying forces of infantry having [illegible] guns, mortars and machine guns and also a few tanks and self-propelled guns. Near the end of the day, the 1st Bn 30th Inf took up positions adjacent South and Southeast of the approaches to BESANCON preparatory to an attack at 0200 hours 7 September. This move relieved the 2d [illegible] 15th Inf who crossed the DOUBS River at AVANNE (O-7481) in the 7th Inf sector and assembled preparatory to relief of the latter regiment 23/.

3. Troop "A", 117th Cav Rcn Squ conducted strong patrols along the 3d Div left flank along the North bank of the DOUBS River as far away as [illegible] Southwest of [illegible]. Troop "C" operated in the [illegible] area where contact was made with F.F.I. forces and the 36th Div Rcn Troop. During this period, two officers, [illegible] and two enlisted men among those captured at [illegible] returned to the [illegible] after escaping from the enemy 24/.

4. On the Corps right flank, the 120th [illegible] moved with all speed to [illegible], outflanking the 34 Div (FF) and continuing [illegible] L'ISLE (P-2060). Attacking [illegible] (P-0347) on the left [illegible] were engaged in [illegible] on the DOUBS River opposite [illegible] forces of the 34 Div which had captured [illegible] near the [illegible] Northwest [illegible] along [illegible] the outskirts of this town. All the bridges below [illegible] which hampered the left [illegible] 120th [illegible] (P-0066) in making a crossing to the south of the town. The 34 Div [illegible]

22/. WD, G Sept, (Salins Cl) [illegible] 10, 12 and 25.

23/. WD, G Sept, (Salins Cl), [illegible] 18, 20, 24, 26, 42 [illegible].

24/. WD, G Sept, ([illegible] Cl), entry [illegible] (Salins Cl) [illegible].

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of VAUDAMON and through VERCEL (P-0851) where, with the assistance of the ARTY, enemy resistance was overcome. Following this encounter the 3d Bn 179th Inf cleared through ORSANS (P-0757), reached VAUDRIVILLERS (P-0968) and prepared to move North on BAUME. The 1st Bn 179th Inf continued Northeast on the South of the DOUBS River towards CLERVAL (P-1474) and L'ISLE. At this time the 2d Bn was released from the 117th Cav Rcn Sqn and was enroute to its parent unit, while the 157th Inf assembled in COTE-BRUME (P-0148) 25/.

5. Though not in direct support, Allied planes were extremely active in front of VI Corps during the day. On the road nets to the Northeast over 100 motor transports were destroyed or damaged, and in the vicinity of BELFORT and MULHOUSE 30 locomotives were destroyed together with more than 100 railroad cars loaded with personnel and equipment. One grounded aircraft and an AA position were also knocked out 26/.

6. During the period VI Corps moved their command post west of SALINES at O-614308 27/.

SECTION VII

1. In the early morning of 7 September, the 1st Bn 30th Inf attacked the citadel in the southern part of BESANCON and was met by heavy small arms, machine gun and mortar fire while the 2d Bn entrucked, crossed the River at AVANNE, circled the city and attacked from the North. These moves were coordinated with 1st and 2d Bns 7th Inf which attacked the city from the west and 15th Inf elements swinging in from the East. During the day, the enemy put up heavy opposition from numerous strongpoints in BESANCON. 3d Div troops employed tanks, machine guns, grenades and small arms to good advantage in the main part of town which was taken by dark. In the southern part of BESANCON one 155mm howitzer of the 9th FA Bn fired over 60 shells at point blank range of 1000 yards before the German-held citadel surrendered. The citadel yielded some 200 prisoners, a few of which were from the newly identified 159th Reserve Division. Among those killed was a Major General SCHMIDT believed to have just taken command of the division. The 15th Inf, situated mostly north of BESANCON, was relieved in position by elements of the 141st Inf and then headed North and East in the direction of VESOUL while 7th and 30th Inf troops cleared out snipers and regrouped in BESANCON preparatory to their move North 28/.

2. With the 157th Inf in division reserve and operating road blocks and reconnaissance on the division flanks, the 180th Inf continued its attack on BAUME and the 179th Inf moving to the Northeast made crossings between BAUME and L'ISLE in the vicinity of CLERVAL (P-1474). The 2d Bn 180th Inf encountered resistance in BAUME from tanks and flakwagons during the afternoon. Later, the attack was resumed after an artillery preparation, but tank and heavy sniper fire forced them out of the town. To the Southwest, the 3d Bn 180th Inf made two ferry crossings in the vicinity of ROLLANS (O-9565) and seized the high ground to the North of the town. As the 3d Bn 179th Inf neared CLERVAL for a crossing, they met small arms and mortar fire. This opposition was by-passed and the DOUBS River was bridged to the south of CLERVAL and at the end of the period the 3d Bn and elements of 1st Bn were on the north side of the River. The 2d Bn moved Northeast on the south side of the River towards L'ISLE against ever increasing enemy resistance 29/.

25/. WAJ, 6 Sept, (Lons le Saunier CP) Entries #13 and 31; (Salines CP) Entries #11, 14, 38 and 40.

26/. WAJ, 6 Sept, (Lons le Saunier CP) Entry #28; (Salines CP) Entry #54.

27/. G-3 Report No. 24

28/. WAJ, 7 Sept, Entries #7, 12, 13, 34, 40, 67, 86, 98 and 101.

29/. WAJ, 7 Sept, Entries #10, 34, 70, 84, 96 and 100.

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3. On the Corps left, the 36th Div moved up to the vicinity of BESANCON. The 142d Inf initiated a crossing over the DOUBS River near ESBLIE (O-6744) where a partly demolished railroad bridge furnished access to the north bank for foot troops and light equipment. The 142d Inf followed by the 143d Inf crossed the river and occupied positions on high ground 9 kilometers to the north. The 141st Inf was attached to the 3d Div during the day, the 1st & 2d Bns moving up slowly as the crossing at AVANNE permitted only one lane of traffic. These Bns were enroute to relieve the 7th and 15th Inf elements on the highways leading northwest out of BESANCON and with the 973d FA Bn, interdicted enemy traffic, while the 3d Bn took over the road blocks from 3d Div elements in the vicinity of AVANNE 30/.

4. During the period, the 117th Cav Recn Sqn had continued its screening and harassing operation against enemy movement north of the DOUBS River along the roads leading northeast from DOLE. Reorganization of Troop "B" as a component part of the squadron took place during the period 31/.

SECTION VIII

1. Following the axis of the two main roads to the north, in the early part of September the 3d Div continued its attack in the direction of RESOUL (O-8728). The 1st Bn 7th Inf pushed northeast against light resistance and reached high ground (O-8171) between the L'OGNON River and COMMANDE-FIESLOT. The 3d Bn, following the 1st Bn, cleared the towns of BAVILLERS (O-8463) and BONNAY (O-8160). The 2d Bn remained on high ground north of the DOUBS River, northwest of [illegible]. The 15th Inf continued north towards MOZ (O-8276) against strong opposition in the form of organized defenses as well as a number of fire fights with isolated pockets of trapped enemy forces. As the 1st Bn protected the right, the 2d Bn fought north and by the end of the day had pushed through LEZAY-SAINTS (O-7561) and reached a point just south of the L'OGNON River. The 30th Inf cleared all remaining enemy resistance in [illegible] and prepared to move up on the left of the division advance. Of approximately 100 prisoners taken north of BESANCON during the day, the majority of them were from the newly identified 159th Reserve Division 32/.

2. While the 17th Inf continued in division reserve and protected the division right flank, the 2d Bn 172d Inf pressed their attack on CLERVAL and cleared the town of the enemy by 1500 after a short fire fight and advanced on L'ISLE to the northeast. The 1st Bn 172d Inf crossed the DOUBS River south of [illegible] and established north bridge [illegible] (P-1074) and SOYE (P-1380) where they engaged rear guard enemy units which forestalled the capture of these towns by the close of the day. The 3d Bn came up from the rear of the 1st Bn, cleared the [illegible] woods to the south of L'ISLE and prepared to assist the 1st Bn in the seizure of [illegible]. As the 2d Bn 180th Inf resumed its assault on [illegible], the 1st Bn crossed the river and moved on [illegible] with a small unit from the northeast while the remainder of the Bn headed for [illegible] (P-0872). The 3d Bn 180th Inf crossed the DOUBS River at [illegible] and proceeded on to gain the high ground [illegible] with little opposition. In the town of [illegible] (P-[illegible]), which had been [illegible] and isolated between the advance of the 3d and 45th Div units, the enemy had abandoned a fuel supply dump containing 100,000 litres of fuel oil and 700,000 litres of gasoline 33/.

30/. [illegible], 7 Sept, [illegible], 36, 37, 87, 88 and 90.

31/. 117th Cavalry Sqn S-3 [illegible] 23.

32/. [illegible], 9 Sept (Lessons [illegible]) [illegible] 31, [illegible], 6[illegible] and [illegible].

33/. [illegible], 8 Sept, (Lessons [illegible]) [illegible] 31, 38, 47, 82 and 87.

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3. In the 36th Div sector, the 141st Inf relieved elements of the 3d Div ~~in the BESANCON area and extended their lines north from the DOUBS River in this~~ sector. In the afternoon of 8 September, they attacked and captured CHEMAUDIN (0-8953) and GRANDFONTAINE (0-7050) where they set up a road block which an enemy counterattack failed to penetrate. The 3d Bn met resistance at FRANCIS (0-7254) to the North but overcame the enemy and regrouped for their advance north to the L'OGNON River, occupying the town by nightfall. While to the Southwest at ST. VIT (0-6347) the 142d Inf met German forces retreating up from DOLE. By the close of the period, stiff fighting was still in progress but the enemy opposition had been greatly reduced and patrols had skirted the town and set up a roadblock to the South. Southeast of ST. VIT Troop "A" 117th Cav Rcn Sqn engaged pockets of trapped Germans who tried to make an escape to the North. The 143d Inf assembled in the Besancon area as Corps reserve 34/.

4. During the day, several flights of low-flying enemy aircraft appeared over the DAUME and BESANCON area and strafed American road movements and bridge sites. Though friendly aircraft were not in evidence and AA defense was only scattered, damage was negligible. It was learned through the French, engaged in stiff fighting on the 45th Division right flank in the PONTE DE LAUDE - ST. HIPPOLYTE area, that 8000 troops of the 1st Panzer SS Division were in the BELFORT area and to the South. 35/.

5. The Corps command post moved south of BESANCON to C-848818 at 081100B. Field Order No. 2 was issued at 2000B directing the advance of VI Corps troops on VESOUL, VILLERSEXEL and to the North, the divisions to reduce the enemy and contain positions in their sectors. (See Annex #11).

SECTION IX

1. On 9 September, the 2d Bn 7th Inf moved west towards LUZ, encountering enemy resistance east of the town which slowed their advance but by 2300B they were within 500 yards from LUZ to the Northeast. The 3d Bn 7th Inf, on the division's right, entered L'ISLANS (0-9279) against light opposition and prepared to advance north and east. The 2d and 3d Bns 15th Inf moved up from the vicinity of VOUX (7866) where three strong enemy positions were broken and three 88mm guns were captured. Continuing north, these two units joined with the 7th Inf in the seizure of LUZ. Patrols entering the town were forced to withdraw and the community was still in enemy hands at the end of the period. The 1st Bn 15th Inf crossed the L'OGNON River in the vicinity of [illegible] (7266) and by nightfall had reached [illegible] (7268). There, after being relieved by the 141st Inf, they moved to the VOUX area. The 3d Bn cleared [illegible] and consolidated their positions pending relief by the 1st Bn. During the day, more than 800 prisoners were taken in the vicinity of VOUX and LUZ, mostly from the 159th Reserve Division, a Navy Artillery Bn and a Bn from the remnants of the 198th Inf Div which had been nearly wiped out [illegible] 36/.

2. As the 157th Inf crossed the [illegible] River in the vicinity of [illegible], and established road blocks to the Southwest, the 1st Bn 17th Inf moved to the North cleared the enemy from [illegible] (X-1880) after a [illegible] and sent patrols to L'ISLE. The 2d Bn 17th Inf continued along the bank of the DOUBS River to a point just below L'ISLE where they secured positions for the night, and sent patrols to the town without contacting the enemy. In the

34/. [illegible], 8 Sept (Besancon Cl) [illegible] 64, 70 [illegible] 67, 69.

35/. [illegible], 8 Sept, (Vesoul Cl) [illegible]; (Besancon Cl) [illegible] 67.

36/. [illegible], 8 Sept, Letters #12, 122, 121 and 126; [illegible] 21 - 10 Sept; 3d Div G- [illegible] No. 64 - 10 Sept.

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45th Div left, the 180th Inf advanced north against light resistance. The 3d Bn occupied FONTENOTTE (P-0172) and continued on through LUXIOL (P-0372) and entered VERNE (P-0374) where they received enemy tank and small arms fire from high ground north of the town. One small enemy group infiltrated but was cleaned up without difficulty. ~~The 1st Bn also drove north, clearing AUTECHAUX and occupying VERCHAMP (P-0676).~~ The 2d Bn remained in BAUME which had been totally cleared of the enemy. More than 100 prisoners were taken during the day, the majority of them from 11th Panzer Division units and hurriedly formed grenadier battalions 37/.

3. On the Corps left flank, the 36th Div extended north and northwest, its Rcn Troop reaching MARNAY (6060) where a fire fight ensued and forcing withdrawal from the town. The 141st inf on the right pushed towards the L'OGNON River and by nightfall had reached the south bank where they were halted by the blown bridge at EMAGNEY (0-6763). Relatively little resistance was encountered as they passed through AUDEX (0-6757), MOIRONTE (0-6758), MECOLOGNE (0-6358) and CHAUCENNE (0-6959). After clearing out the final resistance in the ST. VIT area, the 142d Inf drove north and seized VILLERS-BUZON (0-6654) and the surrounding high ground as well as the high points at FRANEY, south of RECOLOGNE. Moving southwest along the L'OGNON River, five crossings of which had been blown by the enemy, the 143d Inf reach CUGNEY (0-5254) without opposition. In the ST. VIT area, 300 prisoners were taken, mainly of the newly identified 195th Reserve Division. 38/.

4. The 117th Cav Rcn Sqn continued to reconnoiter between the DOUBS and L'OGNON Rivers and located two enemy batteries firing on our crossings near ETUZ (0-7368) and VORAY (0-7868). In the 36th Div sector they captured intact two batteries of 40mm AA and one battery of 20mm AA 39/.

5. During the period, Hq & Hq Btry 35th AAA Group, the 976th and 938th FA Bns were attached to the 45th Div40/.

SECTION X

1. The attack against enemy rear guard and delaying units south of VESOUL continued throughout 10 September. The 15th Inf astride the MIOZ - VESOUL road encountered machine gun, small arms and flakwagon fire; however, gains were made and the towns of MENOUCHE (0-8482) and PENNESIERES (0-8383) were in our hands by nightfall. On the right, the 2d and 3d Bns 7th Inf fought through AUBERTANS (0-8879) but were held up outside of AUTHOISON (0-8784) by heavy machine gun fire. On the division left, the 3d Bn 30th Inf made small advances and reached the enemy occupied town of FOND ROMAND (0-7982) but did not enter although the town was heavily shelled and surrounded. This unit assembled in place, preparatory to relief by elements of the 36th Div. An additional 277 prisoners were taken by the 3d Div in their zone from the 159th Reserve Div and the 198th Inf Div. 41/.

2. In the 36th Div sector on the Corps left flank, substantial gains were made during the day. Relatively little resistance was encountered by 142d Inf except at MOPY (0-6475) to the south of GY (0-6273). Using alternate

37/. WWJ, 9 Sept, Entries 38, 35 and 126; G-2 Report No. 26 - 10 Sept; 45th Div G-3 Report No. 26 - 10 Sept.

38/. WWJ, 9 Sept, Entries 11, 36, 66, 68, 106.

39/. WWJ, 9 Sept, Entries 74, 127 and 130; G-2 Report No 26 - 10 Sept; 36th Div G-3 Report No 367 - 9 Sept.

40/. G-3 Report No 26 - 9 Sept 1944.

41/. WWJ, 10 Sept (HQ of Besancon GP), Entries 12, 85 and 90; G-2 Report No 27 - 11 Sept.

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routes the 1st and 3d bns 142d Inf crossed the newly constructed bridge at [illegible] and went around this enemy stronghold to capture GY, thereby closing off the enemy's withdrawal from this town towards GRAY (O-4677). On the division's right, the 143d Inf advanced north and captured CISELAY (O-7275) and continued the advance north on routes reconnoitered by Troops E and F 117th Cav Recn Sqn, the former troop having reached a point about ten miles to the North near [illegible] (O-6384) without enemy contact. Coming up from the South, the 141st Inf prepared to take over the 143d Inf positions in the vicinity of CISELAY and aid in the 3d Division's advance on VESOUL. Prisoners captured by this division during the day were from a number of formerly identified enemy divisions including the 198th, 716th, 388th and 244th Inf Divisions and a FORCIAN Labor Bn, a total of 589 being sent to the rear 42/.

3. Operating far to the left, Troop "A" of the 117th Cav Recn Sqn entered DOLE against no opposition and found the town in the hands of the F.F.I. Northwest of DOLE on the SAONE River, AUXONNE (O-3148) was also cleared of the enemy by Troop "A" after a short fire fight. Hanging north along the River, [illegible] (O-3361) was occupied and a crossing made near APPONT (O-4372) and patrols reached a point southwest of GRAY which was still strongly defended by the Germans 43/.

4. On the Corps right flank, the 45th Div also made steady gains against heavy rear guard action. On the right the 21/in 179th Inf gained positions south of L'ISLE without opposition while the 1st Bn circled to the North meeting small arms fire but finally entered the town. Further North, the 3d Bn cleared [illegible] (P-1636) and continued on. In the center, the 157th Inf captured [illegible] (P-0882) and pushed North to the outskirts of [illegible] (P-1056) [illegible] the high ground to the East. The 180th Inf advanced slowly on [illegible] (P-0363) and [illegible] (P-0382), encountering only light resistance, and [illegible] (P-0677), [illegible] (P-0276), [illegible] (P-0373) and [illegible] (P-0579) after eliminating enemy resistance and capturing several enemy mortars and machine guns at the latter town. A total of 625 prisoners passed through the 45th Div cage during the day, identifying numerous nondescript units hastily organized and placed in the line. These elements were generally supported by small groups of men of from some experience, Panzer regiments 44/.

5. Improved weather conditions aided our air support units in a day long attack on enemy road communications and strongpoints in the [illegible] and [illegible] areas 45/.

6. During the day, the VI Corps Command Post was moved to the Northwest of [illegible] at 1030h. A field message was issued in the evening announcing the change of the 3d and 36th Division boundaries and directing the 36th Div to seize the high ground west of VESOUL, assist the 3d Div in the capture of this town and to push reconnaissance to the SAONE River in their zone 46/.

SECTION III

1. On 11 September, the 3d Div continued to meet strong resistance in front of VESOUL. The 18th Inf, advancing directly from the South met considerable fire from machine pistols, machine guns and flakwagons but broke through a heavily fortified road block and succeeded in pushing to the outskirts of the town. On the right, the 7th Inf advanced through [illegible] (O-8987)

42/. [illegible], 10 Sept, Entries #18, 78 and 86; G-2 Report No. 27 - 11 Sept.

43/. [illegible], 10 Sept, Entries #23, 86, and 90. 117th Cav Recn Sq S-3 Rpts #25 and 26 of 10 & 11 Sept 1944.

44/. [illegible], 10 Sept, Entries #8, 21 and [illegible] and 86; G-2 Report No. 27 - 11 Sept 45th Div S-2 Rpt #27 of 11 Sept 1944.

46/. [illegible], 10 Sept, Entries #13, 14 and 15.

48/. See Annex #1

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and DAMPIERRE (O-9436) against light enemy delaying action. Later in the day, high ground was taken near NEUREY (O-9094) southeast of VESOUL as enemy rear guards increased their opposition. On the division right flank, the 30th Inf moved by motor transport to MONTBOZON (O-9682) and prepared to attack north and seize PRESLE (O-9687) 47/.

2. In conjunction with the 15th Inf attack on VESOUL, the 36th Div pushed rapidly north and seized the town of CHARIEZ (O-8297), west of VESOUL. The 141st Inf, overcoming resistance at GRANDVELLE (O-7585), continued to advance north and secured the high ground at CAMP ROMAIN (O-8397) and ANDELARROT (O-8394) south of VESOUL. Contact was made with the 15th Inf on the right and preparations were made to attack VESOUL with the 15th Inf at daylight. Paralleling their advances, the 143d Inf seized the high ground north of the 141st Inf with little opposition and organized positions for securing the SAONE River bridge at PORT SUR SAONE (J-7805), the town of PUSEY (J-8401) and the high ground north of VESOUL, thereby cutting the enemy's escape route in that direction. The 142d Inf, holding positions on the Corps left, sent patrols west to GRAY which was found evacuated by the enemy. 48/.

3. Working with the 36th Div, the 117th Cav Rcn Sqn sent patrols along the road nets between the Corps left flank and the SAONE River, extending from AUXONNE northeast through GRAY and to PORT SUR SAONE which Troop "C" entered in the late afternoon. All the main bridges over the SAONE River were found blown by the enemy as they retreated north from DIJON which had been captured by the French on the Corps left 49/.

4. As the 179th Inf closed in around L'ISLE (P-2082) against considerable machine gun and artillery fire which was counterbatteried by 45th Div artillery, the 157th Inf drove north from UZELLE (P-0983) and also struck persistent small arms and machine gun fire as they advanced on and captured the towns of ABBENANS (P-0986) and BOURNOIS (P-1486) while patrols entered CUBRIAL (P-0685) and found the town evacuated by the enemy. On the division left, the 180th Inf seized and cleared the town of ROUGEMONT (P-0383) before noon. Resistance increased in the afternoon, the enemy employing machine gun, mortar, artillery and 20mm fire as the 2d Bn 180th Inf advanced on BONNEL (P-0287), but a heavy artillery preparation was laid on the Germans which forced them to withdraw, and by evening BONNEL was in the hands of the 180th Inf as well as CUBRIAL, and THIEFFRANS (P-0086). Considerable enemy equipment was taken in this action and contact was made with the 3d Div on the left 50/.

5. Contact was made during the day with the 3d U. S. Army at SOMBERNON (N-7959) when elements of the 1 DB of the II French Corps met elements of the 2 DB at 1500B 51/. The VI Corps command post moved to a new location at SORANS (O-8073) and opened at 1130B. During the period, 1300 prisoners were taken by Corps troops, over 500 each being captured by the 36th and 45th Divisions. Miscellaneous frontline and labor units continued to comprise the bulk of the prisoners.

SECTION XII

1. Striking from the high ground to the West on the morning of 12 September, the 141st Inf fought its way into VESOUL and cleared out the town by

47/. WRJ, 11 Sept, (Sorans CP), Entries #14 and 38; 3d Div G-3 Report No. 36 - 12 Sept.

48/. WRJ, 11 Sept, (Sorans CP), Entries #10, 24, 29, 32, 37 and 67.

49/. WRJ, 11 Sept, Entries #6, 28, 39 and 61.

50/. WRJ, 11 Sept, (Sorans CP), Entries #26, 27, 52 and 75.

51/. WRJ, 11 Sept, Entry #58, G-3 Report No. 28 - 11 Sept.

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noon except for scattered spots of resistance. To their left, the 143d Inf secured the main crossing at PORT SUR SAONE. Although there was only slight enemy activity in the town, a counterattack was launched from the [illegible] this thrust on the enemy's part to regain the bridge was successfully repulsed. Coming up from the South through VESOUL, the 142d Inf advance units passed through AUXON (J-8705) and reached FLAGEY (J-8707) by the end of the period 52/.

2. In the Corps central sector, the 3d Div continued their attack north and northeast, pivoting the advance on the 30th Inf. The 15th Inf passed through VESOUL and encountered machine gun and small arms fire near QUINCEY (O-8997) which was outflanked and where road blocks were set up. [illegible] (O-8999) was freed by the 1st Bn while the remainder of the regiment pushed through COLOMBE (O-9296) to the vicinity of [illegible] (O-[illegible]) which the 7th Inf had flanked and entered after a severe fire fight where they took approximately 150 prisoners. To the right, and in contact with the 45th Div, the 30th Inf established road blocks on the 3d Division's now open right flank, sending patrols to the east and northeast. Supporting tank and tank destroyer units knocked out eight machine gun nests, two trucks and three vehicles loaded with personnel in the 7th and 15th Inf sectors 53/.

3. On the Corps right flank, the 45th Div encountered strong opposition along their entire front. The 180th Inf early engaged the enemy and after overcoming small arms and mortar fire advanced and secured [illegible] L'ORNE (P-0898) capturing one howitzer, anti-tank gun, flak gun and several small vehicles. In the center, the 157th Inf slowly gained [illegible] the road to VILLERSEXEL (P-0892) from the South. Although an enemy counterattack split elements of the regiment in this area, the gap was closed and positions made secure for an assault on the town the next morning. In the L'ISLE area, the 179th Inf continued to exert pressure on the town though not entering as the enemy laid down a steady harassing fire throughout the day. During the period 250 prisoners were taken, mainly in the 157th and 180th sectors. The 117th Cavalry Sqn maintained constant armored patrols on the Corps left flank between [illegible] and PORT SUR SAONE during the period 54/.

SECTION XVII

1. On 13 September, gains were made along the entire Corps front, particularly in the 3d and 36th Div sectors where enemy resistance weakened, but the rear guard was forced to fall back to the [illegible] where L'ISLE began to take form. In this latter 45th Div sector, the [illegible] entered L'ISLE but did not encounter the enemy until they reached the eastern outskirt of the town. The 2d Bn remained on the south side of the River to protect the Corps right flank and maintain contact with the French. In the central Division sector, the 157th Inf passed through VILLERSEXEL [illegible] (P-0895) where high ground was secured. [illegible] (P-1087) placed artillery fire on enemy infantry and horse-drawn artillery and captured a large number of prisoners. [illegible] elements of the 180th Inf in the [illegible] (O-4868) area, [illegible] this regiment pushed north from VILLE[illegible] towards the [illegible] (P-0894) where enemy rear guards slowed the attack [illegible] 88mm fire 55/

3. In the central sector, the 3d Div advance slowed and could not fall [illegible] objectives prior to dark. The 7th Inf attacked through [illegible] (O-[illegible])

52/. 30th Div G-2 report No. 271 - 13 Sept.

53/. 3d Div G-2 report No. 77 - 13 Sept.

54/. 45th Div G-2 report No. [illegible] - 14 Sept. 117th Cav Sqn - 13 Sept.

55/. 45th Div G-2 report No. [illegible] - 14 Sept.

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and gained high ground surrounding the town to the North and Northeast. The 3d Bn in securing the hill to the east encountered severe artillery and mortar fire. In the center, the 15th Inf occupied LIEVANS (K-0201) and continued towards PORCY (K-0204) on the right with the 1st Bn, and on the left the 3d Bn attacked and seized SAULX DE VESOUL (J-9507) after neutralizing enemy small arms and machine gun fire. This Bn was relieved by elements of the 141st Inf and moved out in the direction of CHATENEY (J-9807) to the East of SAULX. Troops of the 30th Inf between NOROY and VILLERSEXEL continued pressure to the Northeast. In the day's action, patrols of the 39th FA Bn and 441st AAA AW Bn accounted for 110 prisoners and also the capture of three enemy machine guns 56/

3. In the 36th Div sector, the 2d and 3d Bns 141st Inf pushed north from PLAGEY (J-8907) breaking through an enemy road block in the vicinity of NEUREY (J-9013) to reach the outskirts of EQUEVILLEY (J-8815), while the 1st Bn struck east and occupied VELLEFRIE (J-9208) gaining contact with the 3d Div. As the 142d Inf detrucked in the SAULX area and commenced movement north towards LUXEUIL, the 143d Inf was relieved by elements of the 117th Cav Rcn Sqn in the PORT SUR SAONE area and assembled east of the river preparatory to moving north. Forward units reached RAVERNAY (J-8314) but were forced to withdraw from the town till reinforced by troops coming up from the rear 57/.

4. Enemy artillery was active during the day in the 3d and 45th Div areas. However, our counterbattery fire dispersed horse-drawn guns south of LURE (K-1206). Heavy harassing fires fell on the whole Corps front as the enemy withdrew the less mobile and heavier pieces to the Northeast, leaving duel purpose 88's and assault guns to cover the movement. In the 45th Div zone, several rounds of rocket fire, believed to be about 320mm, were received. Total prisoners for the day were 1044, about equally divided among the three divisions. Miscellaneous battle groups were recognized, and almost a whole TURKOMAN Labor Bn was captured as well as elements from the 9th and 16th Panzer Divs returning from the Normandy battleground 58/.

SECTION XIV

1. The VI Corps advance was slowed on the right during 14 September due to strong enemy delaying action in the 45th Div sector. In this area, the 179th Inf on the division right advanced northeast and were engaged by the enemy in the wooded area near BEVEUGE (P-1294). After overcoming heavy small arms and mortar fire with the aid of the 180th Inf, they finally entered ACCOLANS (P-1686) completing occupation by 1700 hours. The 157th Inf continued to attack northeast, and shortly after noon had cleared ST. FERJEUX (P-1481) without opposition and sent patrols towards COURCHATON (P-1788) where considerable enemy movement was observed coming from the East. More than 200 prisoners were taken in the day's action, mainly in ACCOLANS and ST. FERJEUX. Elements of the 179th Inf remained in their positions surrounding L'ISLE 59/.

2. In the central sector, the 3d Div resumed its steady pace northeast in the direction of LURE though meeting enemy resistance which increased noticeably in the afternoon. The 15th Inf fought into FOUCY at noon and on clearing the town towards the Northeast were engaged by enemy artillery, mortar, machine gun and small arms fire. In spite of this heavy fire from well dug in enemy positions, the 1st Bn advanced to the outskirts of GEMEVEUVILLE

56/. 3d Div G-3 Report No. 38 - 14 Sept.

57/. G-3 Report No. 31 - 14 Sept.

58/. G-2 Report No. 30 - 14 Sept.

59/. 45th Div G-3 Report No. 31 - 15 Sept.

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(K-0305) and were later drawn back while an artillery barrage was laid on the town. On the right, the 30th Inf entered [illegible]WANS (P-0696) without opposition, then swung to the east and northeast to clear the town of L[illegible]VILLE (P-0996) after encountering considerable enemy fire. Outpost patrols met only slight [illegible] resistance. The [illegible] moved steadily forward and secured the high ground south of [illegible]WANS (P-0898); then continued to move ahead against increasing artillery fire. A total of 347 prisoners were taken during the day, [illegible] mostly hastily-formed battle groups 60/.

2. While the 117th Cav Rcn Sqn maintained vigorous patrols along the [illegible] River and gained contact with the French between CO[illegible]TAINE and [illegible], the 26th Div moved steadily towards LUXEUIL. Advancing north [illegible] 2nd encountered strong enemy delaying forces during the entire period. After breaking a road block north of S[illegible]LX (J-3607) where eleven enemy vehicles were destroyed and [illegible] prisoners taken, the 1st and 3d Bns reached [illegible] (K-0117) where they were held up by severe small arms fire. To the right, the 2d Bn, meeting less enemy fire, cleared [illegible] (K-0411) and [illegible]S (K-[illegible]513) and headed north towards LUXEUIL. On the division left, the 103d Inf established road blocks to the east of their northward drive to clear [illegible] (J-8814). Continuing on against mortar and 20mm fire on their flanks, they reached LA [illegible] (J-3913) and were pushing towards LUXEUIL to their right and [illegible]NY on their left. A number of German guns and vehicles were destroyed in this division's sector during the period, and the prisoner count was 31, bringing the total to over 700 for the day 61/.

SECTION IV

1. There was little change in the 45th Div front on 18 September. However, vigorous patrolling to L'[illegible] and the northeast produced a strong reaction from the enemy. In the morning, VILLA[illegible]S (P-1195) was occupied by the 180th [illegible] 179th [illegible] road north from L'ISLE towards [illegible]NY (P-1088). Several supporting fires were fired into the French sector to the right by the 45th Div artillery during the period 62/.

2. In the Corps center or 3d Div sector, the advance continued towards [illegible], moving around the city from all sides. The 1st Bn 7th Inf entered LA [illegible] (K-2306), prepared defensive positions and attacked, seizing the high ground in the vicinity of [illegible]VY (K-3003) after a fight where the enemy had to [illegible] positions with grenades and bayonets. The 2d Bn secured [illegible] (K-[illegible]), and in advancing were halted by strong enemy fire outside of [illegible]VY. Troops of the 15th Inf entered [illegible] (K-0804) shortly after noon and [illegible] to capture [illegible] (K-3003) in the face of [illegible] resistance. [illegible] (K-716), north of [illegible], was also taken by the 15th Inf against heavy machine gun, anti-tank and [illegible] fire. Forces of the 30th Inf maintained active patrolling on the division right and kept contact with the 45th Division 63/.

4. [illegible], 36th Div [illegible] the outskirts of LUXEUIL [illegible] the 141st Inf [illegible] while the 143d Inf [illegible]. The 142d [illegible] steady progress as opposition was [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible]. The 1-[illegible] Inf advanced northeast on LUX[illegible], [illegible] (J-9216), [illegible] (J-9417)

[illegible] 60/. [illegible] - 18 Sept.

61/. [illegible] 70 - 18 Sept. 71 - 18 Sept

62/. [illegible] 70 - 18 Sept.

63/. [illegible] 60 - 18 Sept.

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and ABELCOURT (J-9616) against an enemy rear guard action of mortar and self-propelled gun fire and set up positions to continue the attack early 16 Sept. The 141st Inf, with the 117th Cav Rcn Sqn, protected the Corps left flank along the SAONE and LAUTERE rivers 64/.

4. During the period, VI Corps Command Post was moved to COLOMBEY DE VESOUL (O-9198) 65/.

5. VI Corps issued a field message on 15 September wherein Corps troops were to concentrate north of the line PONT SUR SAONE - VESOUL - LURE and prepare to continue the advance north and east. The 1 DB (Fr), passing through the Corps right flank in the vicinity of VILLERSEXEL, was to relieve the 45th Div and 3d Div elements south of LURE. The units relieved were to assemble north of the above line, the 45th Div to go into assembly in the FAVERNEY area on the Corps left flank 66/.

SECTION XVI

1. The 142d and 143d Inf, continuing their assault, entered LUXEUIL on 16 September. The 142d Inf, entering from the South, established road blocks to the North and then pushed northeast and came within a short distance from ESBOZ (K-0821) where they caught up with the German rear guard. Entering LUXEUIL from the Southwest, the 143d Inf consolidated their positions in the town preparatory to relief by the 141st Inf which headed due north towards FOUGEROLLES (K-0429) 67/.

2. In the early afternoon, elements of the 15th Inf entered LURE and, on being relieved by the 7th Inf, pushed northeast towards ST SEIGLAIN (K-1412), LINEXERT (K-1214) and LANTELOT (K-1216) with the remainder of the regiment. The 7th Inf, passing through LURE after the capture of VY, met heavy enemy artillery north of the town where stiff opposition was also encountered. Road blocks were established and the unit withdrew to organize an attack to reduce the enemy on their front 68/.

3. On the right, 45th Div elements maintained aggressive patrolling and found the enemy alert on all fronts. Units of the 179th Inf, striking towards MUNTY (P-1985) were halted by extremely heavy German resistance.

4. On 16 September, Field Order No. 3 was issued wherein VI Corps was to continue the advance to the North on the axis VESOUL - ST. DIE - STRASBOURG, capture STRASBOURG, protect the left flank of Seventh Army, and establish and maintain contact with the 3d Army on the left 69/.

SECTION XVII

1. Attacking PLOMBIERES on 17 September, the 141st RCT met strong enemy delaying action after passing through the 143d Inf in the vicinity of LES GRANGES. The push continued up the FOUGEROLLES (K-0428) road with the 3d Bn moving west and north to relieve pressure. The 3d Bn went east to high ground south of the

64/. 36th Div G-3 Report No. 374 - 16 Sept.

65/. G-3 Report No. 32 - 16 Sept.

66/. See Annex No 11.

67/. 36th Div G-3 Report No. 375 - 17 Sept.

68/. 3d Div G-3 Report No. 41 - 17 Sept.

69/. See Annex #11.

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town, meeting enemy fire. The resistance against the 1st Bn lessened, and in the evening they entered FOUGEROLLES while the 2d Bn moved west to within a short distance of CORBENAY (J-9829). The 142d RCT, with LE VAL D'AJOL (K-1033) as an objective, struck northeast from LUXEUIL via MADDON (K-0925) ~~and advanced in a column of two battalions meeting strongly held road blocks~~ on both routes. One of these obstacles was broken and the 3d Bn made gains to just short of CHAPENDU (K-0725). The 143d Inf on the division's left, holding the line while passed through by the 141st RCT, sent a reinforced company to ST. LOUP (J-9428). The town was entered and occupied without enemy contact 70/.

2. While the 7th Inf established road blocks and patrolled to the South and East of LURE, the 15th and 30th Inf continued the advance to the North and East. The 1st Bn 15th Inf advanced from FRANCHEVELLE (K-0914) and gained the high ground west of ST. GERMAIN (K-1411) as the 2d Bn reorganized and attacked from the LURE area. Despite heavy artillery, mortar, flakwagon and machine gun fire, this force moved ahead along the road and railroad and set up road blocks about four miles east of LURE. To the South, the 3d Bn took up positions in the ROYE (K-1505) area. The 30th RCT, pressing north, cleaned out and occupied LANTENOT (K-1214), BEL GUT (K-1318) and MADDON (K-0925), establishing road blocks to the East of each town. The enemy launched a counterattack in the afternoon against LANTENOT but was repelled by artillery, mortar and small arms fire. In the vicinity of MADDON, resistance consisted of approximately 200 enemy with bazooka teams, flakwagons and tank fire. This force developed a counterattack, but 30th Inf elements reduced the thrust with artillery, tank destroyer and mortar fire 71/.

3. On the Corps right flank, the 45th Div maintained defensive positions in their sector, operating strong patrols to the front and on the flanks. On the left, the 117th Cav Ron Sqn operated vigorous patrols towards [illegible] (J-8132) and MAINS LES [illegible] (J-9441).

4. A field message was issued by VI Corps suspending field order No. 3 of 16 September and directing the advance to be halted pending relief of the 45th Div by the II French Corps; other units to maintain vigorous reconnaissance to their front 72/.

SECTION XVIII

1. The 18th of September showed little change in front line positions. On the right, the 179th Inf in the vicinity of L'ISLE was relieved by elements of the 1st DFL and moved to an assembly point near [illegible]. Pending relief, the 180th Inf operated patrols to the East, finding [illegible] (P-1543), MICHAPAMS (P-1763), and ARMSAMS (P-1347) clear of the enemy. The 179th Inf, sending out reconnaissance, encountered some opposition east of [illegible] (P-1691), the town itself being unoccupied 73/.

2. On the 3d Div sector, little enemy contact was made except for patrols as the 7th and 30th Inf regrouped and organized for offensive movement, while the 15th Inf secured strong positions from ST. [illegible] (K-1411), east of LURE and south to the railroad at ROYE (K-1505) 74/.

70/. 36th Div G-3 Report No. 376 - 18 Sept.

71/. 3d Div G-3 Report No. 42 - 18 Sept.

72/. See Annex #11.

73/. 45th Div G-3 Report No. 40 - 19 Sept.

74/. 3d Div G-3 Report No. 42 - 18 Sept.

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3. In the 36th Div sector, positions were consolidated while the 36th Div Rcn Troop ranged northeast through PLOMBIERES to XERTIGNY (K-0346) which had been evacuated by the enemy. To their left, the 117th Cav Rcn Sqn pushed north through BAINS LES BAINS and then branched Northwest and Northeast to reach J-8644 near GRUEY and LA CHAPELLE (J-9746) respectively, with only delaying enemy rear guards being encountered as they continued towards DARNEY (Z-7444) and LERRAIN (Z-8250) 75/.

SECTION XIX

1. Going rapidly north and east on 19 September, the 117th Cav Rcn Sqn headed for EPINAL (V-0515). In the afternoon, their advance was slowed considerably by enemy opposition to the South and West of the town. Strongly armed road blocks at ST. LAURENT (V-0448) and CHANTRAINE (V-0354) guarded the entrances to EPINAL where, according to F.F.I. and civilian reports, the enemy was situated in some strength, but was moving to the east side of the MOSELLE River, having blown all crossings except one. One unit, reconnoitering northwest through DARNEY, reached VITTEL (Z-6757) where they contacted engineer elements of the THIRD U. S. ARMY 76/.

2. Relief of the 45th Div was completed during 19 September and the sector passed to the control of the 1st DMI at 192400B. The 45th Div moved its command post to ST. LOUP (J-9428) and prepared to advance on EPINAL in conjunction with the 117th Cav Rcn Sqn. The 179th Inf, on the move, had made contact with rear elements of the 117th Cav Rcn Sqn before the end of the period. The 157th and 180th Inf prepared to move north from their assembly area in the vicinity of BOUGEMONT 77/.

3. In the 3d Div sector, the 1st Armd Div (Fr) relieved the 7th Inf on the division right flank as well as elements of the 15th Inf. These 3d Div troops regrouped and made preparations to attack northeast early 20 September with the mission of securing bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River. Similarly, in the 36th Div zone, the 142d Inf entrucked and started for REMIREMONT which recon patrols reported strongly held by the enemy. At the end of the day, 142d Inf elements had reached the outskirts of the town after striking many strongly held road blocks which were finally reduced by tank and tank destroyer fire supporting the advance. The 141st and 143d Inf prepared to follow, pass through, and establish crossings over the MOSELLE River north of the 3d Div sector 78/.

4. During the period, the VI Corps Command Post was moved to the town of LUXEUIL, closing at 1200 hours 79/. A field message was issued at the same time directing Corps troops to execute Field Order No. 3 commencing 200630A September 1944.

SECTION XX

1. Throughout 20 Sept VI Corps units continued to advance northeast towards the MOSELLE River against heavy opposition in some sectors. On the

75/. 117th Cav Rcn Sqn S-3 Report No. 34 - 19 Sept.

76/. 117th Cav Rcn Sqn S-3 Report No. 35 - 20 Sept.

77/. 45th Div G-3 Report No. 36 - 20 Sept; WRJ, 19 Sept, Entry #40.

78/. WRJ, 19 Sept, Entries #24, 31 and 39.

79/. WRJ, 19 Sept, Entry #3.

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corps left flank in the 35th Div sector, the 141st RCT attacked north from the [illegible] area at 0630, and advanced rapidly along road 26. No contact was made with the enemy and the entire regiment assembled slightly east and northeast of [illegible] DOIS (V-0038) by 1400. By the close of the period, patrols had located a suitable crossing of the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of ELOIZE (V-1545) and plans were made for the 141st RCT to cross the river at this point as early as possible. In the division right flank, the 142d Inf had been given the mission of reducing and capturing [illegible]. The 3d Bn, approaching the town from the West, was held up in the early morning by a strong enemy road block at K-1343 but after reducing the road block, continued the advance to the fort on the western outskirts of the city where our troops were heavily engaged by artillery fire. At 0630, the 142d RCT (-3d Bn) attacked towards [illegible] from the [illegible] area with the 2d Bn astride roads 12 and 23, and the 1st Bn working along a parallel road east to the East. The advance progressed slowly against stiffening opposition, [illegible] (K-2437) being captured before the close of the period, and positions organized in the vicinity K-1341 preparatory to resumption of the attack north in the morning. During the period, the 143 RCT, following behind the 141st RCT, moved from the [illegible] area to [illegible] (K-1141) and then commenced movement to the [illegible] DOIS area, with the mission of exploiting any crossings made by the 141st RCT over the Moselle River. At this time, a directive was issued to the 3d 35th Inf Div changing the direction of advance towards St. DIE 80/.

3. [illegible] corps right flank, two regiments of the 7d Div launched an attack at 0330, 20 September, driving northeast towards the Moselle River. Due to heavy enemy resistance and the heavily wooded countryside, gains were slow but steady. In the division left the 7th Inf attacked northeast from assembly areas at K-163280 and K-142262, making slow progress against artillery, mortar, machine gun and small arms fire, and by the close of the period, had advanced to points generally along the line K-163370 - K-163270, in close contact with the enemy. On the right, the 30th Inf attacked northeast in the early morning from positions at K-142220 and K-170100. The advance pressed forward in the face of heavy opposition, especially in the sector west of [illegible] (K-2020) where the 3d Bn encountered heavy artillery fire and minefields. At the close of the period, the 2d Bn was west of [illegible] (K-1025), 1st Bn was approaching [illegible] (K-1925) and the 3d Bn just west of [illegible] engaged in heavy fighting. The 14th Inf remained in division reserve, with the 2d Bn [illegible] northeast of [illegible]. The 1st Bn continued to hold positions along the line [illegible] - [illegible], until being relieved by elements of the 45th Div [illegible], in the afternoon, whereupon the regiment completed [illegible] assembly areas at [illegible] (K-142225), [illegible] (K-1017) and [illegible] (K-1116) 81/.

4. Upon being relieved by elements of the 45th Div (rr) the [illegible], the 30th Inf began [illegible] to its new sector south of [illegible]. The 1st and 2d Bns 179th Inf, supported by tanks, tank destroyers and [illegible], crossed [illegible] the morning of 20 September, [illegible] 179th [illegible] with [illegible] locating and securing a suitable crossing [illegible] MOSELLE [illegible]. The 179th Inf then con- [illegible] light small arms fire while [illegible] (K-0324) along road 18, [illegible] road in the area. Elements of the 117th Cav Rcn Sq, approaching [illegible] the [illegible] strong points and blocks and [illegible] strong. The 3d Bn 179th Inf

[illegible] 46, 47, 51, 57, 61, 64.

[illegible] 72.

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remained at J-9113. During the period the 157th Inf completed movement to assembly areas approximately three miles north of BAINS LES BAINS (J-9342) and the 2d Bn 180th Inf moved to a new area south of ST. LOUP (J-9528) with the balance of the regiment remaining south of VILLERSEXEL (K-1893) preparing to move the next day 82/.

4. A VI Corps Field Message was issued on the evening of 20 September, as follows: 3d Division to secure crossings over MOSELLE River, advance without delay and seize GERARDMER; maintain liaison with French on the right and protect Corps right flank; reconnoiter to the East and be prepared to move north or northwest on Corps order. 36th Div to secure crossings over MOSELLE River; advance without delay and seize ST. DIE, being prepared to continue the advance northwest on Corps order; and reconnoiter to the East and Southeast. 45th Div to seize EPINAL; secure crossings in the vicinity; advance to the Northeast without delay and seize MARSEINVILLERS and BACCARAT; protect Corps left flank; and maintain contact with XV Corps on the left at contact points designated in the field message. 117th Cav Rcn Sqdn to assemble in vicinity of MARCOUNEY, gain and maintain contact with the enemy; maintain contact between VI Corps right and II Corps (Fr) left flank; and protect Corps right flank 83/.

SECTION XXI

1. On the Corps left flank, the 45th Div elements continued to register local gains against moderate enemy resistance during 21 September, being concerned chiefly with the crossing of the MOSELLE River. The 157th Inf commenced shuttle movement to the BOCQUEGNEY (Z9468) - MARMEGOUDES (Z-9786) area, traveling along the road net MISSY (Z-9342) - LONGEMOYE (Z-8952) - DAMAS (Z-9058). The 1st Bn completed movement before noon without opposition and patrolled through FOUGEMEY (Z-9759), DOMEVRE (Z-9958) and [illegible] (Z-9836). A suitable crossing was located over the MOSELLE River at CHATEL (Z-9968) which was in the 2d DB (Fr) sector, and the 1st Bn crossed at this point by motor before the close of the period, with the mission of swinging south and attacking the high ground east of EPINAL the following morning. The remainder of the 157th Inf closed in the BOCQUEGNEY assembly area by 1400B, whereupon the 3d Bn advanced northeast to THAON (V-0363) and engaged in clearing the enemy from the town, planning to cross the River the next day. The 180th Inf completed movement to new assembly areas in the vicinity of MAIGNY (Z-9746) before evening. The 3d Bn then attacked northeast and by the close of the period, had advanced to within two kilometers of EPINAL. On the division right flank, the 179th Inf continued to send out patrols to locate suitable location for crossing the MOSELLE River. ARCHES & ARCHETTES (Z-1047) was selected as the most suitable locality and recon troops infiltrated across the River at this point with the mission of occupying the hill at V-110488. Elements pushed north to occupy the ridge at V-0350, 0361 and 0382, while recon forces pushing towards EPINAL made no contact with the enemy. Movement to the ARCHES area was completed in the afternoon and preparations made for crossing the MOSELLE River upon order during the night. 84/.

2. 36th Div troops in the Corps central sector encountered fierce and determined enemy resistance, especially in the objective area of [illegible], but succeeded in forcing a bridgehead over the MOSELLE River south of ELOYES where little opposition was encountered. On the left, elements of the 141st Inf advanced on ELOYES, occupying the portion of the town west of the MOSELLE

82/. WRJ, 20 Sept, Entries #34, 62, 67, 70, 74; G-3 Reports Nos. 37 and 38 - 20 and 21 Sept.

83/. Hq VI Corps, Field Message, 201230A Sept 1944 - See Annex #11.

84/. WRJ, 21 Sept, Entries #20, 31, 34, 36; (New G1) Entries #14, 22, 28 and 34; WRJ, 22 Sept, Entry #8; G-3 Reports Nos 38 and 39 - 21 & 22 Sept.

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River, against heavy small arms, mortar and artillery fire from the east bank, while the bulk of the regiment waded across the river south of ELOYES at V-165414. By 1100A, the 141st was 1000 yards east of this crossing, meeting only scattered resistance, and had established a road block at V-175417, the 3d Bn from positions at V-170405, was preparing to launch an attack south towards REMIREMONT to assist the 142d RCT. The 143d RCT completed movement to the RACH AUX BOIX area by morning, and then proceeded east to cross the MOSELLE River at the 141st Inf crossing and by 1400A the foot troops of all three Bns were east of the MOSELLE. Two Bns of the 143d Inf then pushed north to occupy Hill 605 (V-1743) southeast of ELOYES, and Hill 783 (V-1844) east of ELOYES, and by the close of the period, were advancing on the town itself. On the right, 143d Inf elements closing in on REMIREMONT met fierce enemy resistance throughout the day and made only local gains in most sectors, the 3d Bn capturing the fortress west of REMIREMONT at K-1743 and pressing on against stiff resistance to reach the edge of town by evening where bitter street fighting took place. Gains by the other two battalions, attacking from the South, were negligible. 85/.

3. On the Corps right flank, 3d Div elements engaged in active patrolling throughout the previous night and maintained contact with the enemy. Fierce enemy resistance and repeated counterattacks were encountered throughout the day and our positions remained unchanged except in the 7th Inf sector where slight gains were made. On the left, the 3d Bn 7th Inf advanced slowly northeast to reach K-130343 and then turned southeast towards Fort de Rupt (K-7334) while the rest of the regiment advanced east to reach positions just west and north of LA LONGINE (K-1829). On the right, the 30th Inf successfully repelled 9 enemy counterattacks of platoon to company strength on the high ground west of [illegible], while maintaining positions west of LA [illegible] and [illegible] to the South. Heavy fighting took place in this sector, with enemy forces bitterly contesting our local advances. The 15th Inf remained assembled in division reserve in the area [illegible] - [illegible] 86/.

4. The 117th Cav Rcn Sq (M) completed movement to vicinity of [illegible] by evening of 21 September, and prepared to execute its new assignment relieving elements of the 3d Div, protecting the 3d Div right flank and maintaining contact with the II Corps (Fr) 87/.

5. At 1300A, 2 enemy aircraft (ME-109's) made an unsuccessful attack on one of our sub air bases south of [illegible], otherwise there was no enemy aerial activity along the VI Corps front. The [illegible] continued to support our advance with armed reconnaissance missions [illegible] well over the enemy rear areas 88/.

6. At 211400A September the VI Corps CP and rear echelon closed [illegible] LUNEVILLE (K-0321) and opened north of [illegible] (K-5121).

SECTION III

1. The first 22 September VI Corps troops continued [illegible] against heavy and determined enemy resistance. Bitter fighting took place in all sectors, especially in the heavily [illegible] sectors where troops stubbornly defended every strong point. In the left flank, in the 36th Div [illegible]

85/. [illegible], 21 Sept, [illegible] 1, 13, 14, [illegible], 20, 27, and 40; [illegible], 21 Sept, [illegible] 21 and 22 Sept.

86/. [illegible], 21 Sept, [illegible] 7, [illegible], [illegible] 13, 20 and 30; [illegible], 22 Sept, [illegible] - 22 Sept.

87/. [illegible] 3 reports for 20 and 22 - 21 [illegible].

88/. [illegible] - [illegible].

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1st Bn 157th Inf, followed by the 2d Bn, swung south to occupy VAXONCOURT (V-0367) after crossing the Moselle River at CHATEL. At 0700A, these elements attacked south towards EPINAL and immediately encountered enemy opposition, the advance moving slowly through heavily wooded areas, as resistance grew stiffer and at the close of the period, had reached V-030653. The 3d Bn completed clearing all enemy elements from THAON on the west side of the canal, then moved north to IGNEY (V-0165) where troops crossed the MOSELLE River in the afternoon and had established positions in the general area V-020650 by nightfall. To the south, 180th Inf elements resumed their attack on EPINAL from the west and southwest. Elements moving east from LES FORGES (Z-9954), encountered heavy enemy resistance consisting of small arms, machine gun, mortar and artillery fire on the western outskirts of EPINAL, while the advance from the Southwest on Road 11, was halted by strong enemy road blocks, snipers and small arms fire, at V-033533. In the evening traffic was observed moving to the portion of EPINAL east of the river and the remaining bridge was blown. On the division right flank, the 179th Inf, led by the 2d Bn, began crossing the MOSELLE River approximately 1/2 mile northwest of ARCHES in the early morning against heavy machine gun and mortar fire. By noon the crossing was completed, whereupon the rest of the regiment followed across and by the close of the period had occupied Hill 504 (V-0949), ARCHETTES and occupied Hill 412 (V-1148) 89/.

2. In the Corps central sector, 36th Div troops continued their attacks on REMIREMONT and maneuvered to envelop the town from three sides. On the left, the 143d Inf advanced north from the area V-168412 against stiff resistance to reach the southern approaches to ELOYES, and by 2200A had occupied the town against moderate resistance, and were engaged in mopping up scattered snipers. Directly to the south, the 141st Inf (-2d Bn) launched an attack south towards REMIREMONT early in the morning, with the objective of assisting the 142d RCT in trapping and liquidating German forces in the vicinity. The advance progressed against moderate opposition, the 141st occupying Hill 807 (K-1946), mopping up snipers and proceeding south to cut the REMIREMONT - ST. AME road where a road block was established at K-200436 before nightfall. The 2d Bn remained in the western portion of ELOYES during the period, having been attached to the 143d Inf as of 0800A. With 142d Inf already street fighting in Western REMIREMONT, the 1st Bn attacked from positions three miles south of the town, and seized their initial objective at K-175425, despite bitter enemy resistance. By the close of the period, the 3d Bn had occupied approximately 2/3 of the town, while the 1st Bn had reached the southern outskirts and established a road block at K-187428. Engineers completed construction of an infantry support bridge, 3-ton capacity, at V-161414 by 0800A, while preparations were under way to install a bridge at ELOYES which could accommodate heavy equipment such as tanks 90/.

3. On the Corps right flank, 3d Division troops made slow gains against continued heavy enemy resistance which lessened considerably towards the end of the period. On the left, 7th Inf elements attacked southeast in the morning towards an old fort on high ground in the vicinity of K-218336 and promptly met determined resistance from well dug in enemy positions in heavily wooded areas, small arms fighting continuing throughout the day. Directly to the South, other elements met similar resistance in attempts to clear the area between K-185315 and K-190326, and were halted there at the end of the period. The 2d Bn on the right remained in position in contact with the enemy just west of LA LONGINE waiting for the 30th Inf to come up on the right. After relief in positions west of LA PEX and MELAY by the 117th Cav Rcn Sqdn early in the morning, the 30th Inf (-2d Bn) attacked north at 1200A from positions

89/. WRJ, 22 Sept, Entries #17, 32, 43, 61, 70, 83 and 86; G-3 Spot Report as of 230100A Sept.

90/. WRJ, 22 Sept, Entries #11, 27, 33, 44, 49, 53, 64, 71 and 90; G-3 Spot Report as of 230100A Sept; G-2 Report No. 39 - 23 Sept.

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along the secondary road run northeast from [illegible] in the vicinity of K-190283 following a 30-minute artillery preparation by four battalions of field artillery. Elements on the left advanced without resistance, but stiff resistance developed on the right on this line and our troops engaged the enemy at close range with hand grenades, small arms and machine gun fire. By [illegible] of the [illegible] both [illegible] were receiving small arms, mortar and scattered artillery fire, as they reached the line K-181281 to K-190273. The [illegible] in reserve [illegible], protecting the right flank of the attack and maintaining road blocks at K-190256 and K-190246, while the [illegible] remained in division reserve during the entire period, with locations unknown 21/.

4. On the right of the VI Corps front, elements of [illegible] Corps (Arr) captured the towns of [illegible] against stiff resistance 22/.

5. At 1100, two [illegible]-190's strafed troops along the [illegible] road east of [illegible]. The planes approached from the southeast, flying extremely low, and were engaged by the 103th [illegible] with unknown results. No damages or casualties were reported 23/.

SECTION III

1. [illegible] persistent pressure and persistent attacks of VI Corps' troops, enemy resistance lessened somewhat on 28 September and gains were [illegible] all fronts by our forces. In the 45th Div sector, the 157th Inf, with two battalions abreast, resumed the attack south towards [illegible] on the east [illegible] River. Dense woods occupied by the enemy slowed the [illegible] fire fights were in progress throughout the morning, leaving elements reaching V-038340 by the close of the period. [illegible] reserve at V-017860 during the [illegible] in the east sector, and 10 in the early afternoon with the [illegible], remaining elements reaching V-002370 by the close [illegible] 180th Inf attached [illegible] from the west [illegible] little activity west of the [illegible] Elements battling [illegible] of the city crossed the River at V-038645 [illegible] in mid-afternoon, and by evening after [illegible] River had advanced north-[illegible] (V-0707) and reached V-0[illegible]. [illegible] elements [illegible] resistance, crossing the [illegible] River at [illegible]. On the division [illegible] at daylight [illegible] (V-120[illegible]) [illegible] reserve in the vicinity of [illegible] during the morning and moved [illegible] in the afternoon 24/.

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Captured [illegible] and continued on to V-152483 where they were stopped by anti-tank and small arms fire. Elements on the right heading for the high ground in the vicinity of V-2050, reached V-186490 before being halted by small arms, mortar and artillery fire at nightfall. The 141st RCT (-2d Bn) continued to advance south and west to bottle up the remaining enemy forces in REMIREMONT. By 1100A they had reached the bridge site at REMIREMONT on the east side of the river and secured the northern end of the town, and to the Southwest had cut the ST. AME - REMIREMONT road, set up a road block at K-200438 and pushed west to reach K-190451. Recon elements of the 636th TD Bn proceeded east to ST. AME where contact was made with the enemy. The 2d Bn 141st Inf was relieved of attachment to the 143d Inf at 0600A and moved from the western portion of ELAYES to positions at V-167407 across the MOSELLE River. With the 3d Bn as a spearhead, 142d Inf closed in on REMIREMONT, engaged the enemy in street fighting within the city, and had liquidated all resistance by noon. In the afternoon two battalions of the 142d Inf crossed the MOSELLE River at REMIREMONT and commenced the relief of 141st Inf elements just to the east while the 3d Bn garrisoned REMIREMONT and established road blocks at K-190425 and K-180395 to protect the right flank until 3d Div troops could be contacted. Although the bridge sites at ELAYES and FOUGEROLLES were not practicable for the installation of a Bailey Bridge, two bridges, one for light vehicles up to three tons and another for tanks and heavy equipment had been constructed in the vicinity of V-163418 at REMIREMONT 95/.

3. On the Corps right flank, enemy resistance was broken at dusk the previous evening in the 3d Div sector, and during the night the enemy evacuated his positions and withdrew. Patrols reported no contact during the night, and during 23 September 3d Div troops advanced steadily towards the MOSELLE River against scattered resistance. On the left, the 7th Inf attacked northeast with three battalions abreast, at 0630A, driving all enemy forces out of FORT DE MOTI (K-2134) during the morning. Elements to the North reached the high ground overlooking the MOSELLE River at K-214342 before nightfall and sent patrols east to the river, while on the right, LA LONGINE (K-1729) was cleared and Hill 719 (K-213318) occupied before darkness. The 3d Bn 15th Inf commenced movement from assembly areas at [illegible] (K-0928) to vicinity of K-213331, attached upon arrival to the 7th Inf, with the mission of protecting their right flank, during the regiment's crossing of the MOSELLE. The remainder of the 15th Inf remained at HADDON in division reserve. On the division central sector, two battalions of the 30th Inf resumed the attack northeast at daylight along high ground to the right of Road 6. The advance progressed steadily against light resistance, the BAR teams nearly abreast, and by the close of the period had reached the general vicinity of K-202300 - K-210297.* To the South, the remaining battalion attacked northeast from positions west of ESMOULINGES to close the gap between them and main force and had cleared through ESMOULINGES and [illegible] (K-1928), by nightfall and at the close of the period was enroute to the vicinity of K-20.233 96/.

4. The 117th Cav Rcn Squn continued to protect the 3d Div right flank on a line from vicinity K-203278 to vicinity of [illegible]. Contact was maintained with French elements on the right and patrols outposted the line FAUCHEY to [illegible]. Elements of Troop B, which had moved into ESMOULINGES, were driven out by superior enemy forces late in the afternoon, whereupon a road block was established just to the west of town. Combat Command 1, 1st Armd Div (FF) prepared to follow the 3d Div route of advance in preparation for attacking thru the right flank of 3d Div 97/.

95/. [illegible], 23 Sept, Entries [illegible]; [illegible], 24 Sept, Entry [illegible]; G-3 S of [illegible] 24 [illegible] Sept; 3rd Div G-3 Report [illegible] 42 - 24 Sept.

96/. [illegible], 23 Sept, Entries [illegible], 22, [illegible], 42, 43, 44; G-3 Report [illegible] 41 - 24 Sept; 3d Div G-3 Report No. 48 - 24 Sept.

97/. [illegible], 24 Sept Entries [illegible] and 48; 3d Div G-3 Report No. 48 - 24 Sept.

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5. During the period, the 120th Engr C Bn completed construction of a Class 40 trestle-treadway bridge at ARCHES (V-100470) by 0830A, and the bridge at REMIREMONT being constructed by the 36th Engr C Regt was expected to be completed by 240200A Sept 98/.

SECTION XXIV

1. VI Corps troops continued to advance steadily against stiff enemy resistance throughout 24 September. On the Corps left flank, considerable enemy activity was observed throughout the period on the GOLBEY (V-035560) - DOGEVILLE (V-035560) road and engaged by 45th Div Artillery. The 2d Bn 157th Inf continued east against stiff opposition to reach DOMEVRE by noon, but was kept from advancing farther by tenacious enemy action. The main body continued south, receiving considerable small arms and 20mm fire from GIRMONT and Hill 375 (V-054634) to the East. An intensive artillery barrage caused the enemy to evacuate GIRMONT, allowing the 157th to clear the town and take 150 prisoners, before continuing east towards Hill 375 (V-0563) and to the South. In the division central sector against moderate resistance, 180th Inf cleared the enemy from the eastern portion of EPINAL by noon except for isolated pockets. The advance continued east of the MOSELLE River elements reaching the high ground at V-0652 where stiff fighting took place with the enemy throughout the period, while to the Northeast another group reached the outskirts of JEUXEY before nightfall after overcoming determined enemy opposition. Completion of a Bailey Bridge in EPINAL during the period facilitated the passage of armor and artillery to the east bank of the MOSELLE River. On the right flank, the 179th Inf attacked northeast at daylight and advanced against moderate resistance to occupy LA BAIFE and Hill 474 (V-130525) by late afternoon, while maintaining road blocks in the vicinity of MOSSOUX. By the close of the period, forward elements were 500 yards northwest of CHARMOIS (V-1553) 99/.

2. In the Corps central sector, 36th Div Troops continued to register gains all along their front. On the left, the 143d Inf continued the attack on DOCELLES and by the close of the period, the town, although still in enemy hands, was almost completely surrounded. Elements held the high ground to the North and were within 500 yards of DOCELLES to the South, while on the east flank 143d units had pushed to the high ground south of FAUCOMPIERRE (V-2149) without contacting the enemy. After passing through the 141st Inf east of REMIREMONT, the 142d (-3d Bn) attacked north and northeast with the objective of seizing TENDON and high ground in the vicinity of V-2348. During the afternoon, increasing enemy resistance was encountered, and the advance hindered by densely wooded areas and continual rain. However, by nightfall elements had reached high ground overlooking TENDON and had cut the TENDON - LE THOLY road at V-233450, where road blocks and defensive positions were organized for the night. On the division right flank the 141st RCT (-3d Bn) attacked northeast at 1230A towards ST. AME, and by evening had reached K-223445 on the right against small arms, mortar and 20mm fire from ST. AME. Elements on the left progressed rapidly to capture FUTIERES (V-2347) but encountered strong enemy positions along the line K-227476 - K-228463 in the evening and remained in the general vicinity for the remainder of the period, receiving enemy self-propelled, mortar and artillery fire. The 3d Bn remained in reserve near ST. ETIENNE (V-1945) during the period, maintaining a road block at K-200438 100/.

98/. WAJ, 23 Sept, Entries #15 and 75.

99/. WAJ, 24 Sept, Entries #14, 22, 34, 38, 43, 63, 73, 78 and 79; G-3 Spot Report as of 242400A Sept.

100/. WAJ, 24 Sept, Entries #11, 15, 41, 47, 62, 72, 80 and 87; G-3 Spot Report as of 242400A Sept; 36th Div G-3 Report No. 383 - 25 Sept.

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3. In the 44th Div sector on the Corps right flank, the 7th Inf captured intact a bridge over the MOSELLE River at K-324338, despite enemy attempts to detonate the prepared high-explosive demolition charges. The entire 1st Bn had crossed before noon and after clearing RUPT of scattered enemy snipers had continued the advance northeast to capture Hill 827 at K-245343 before nightfall, being engaged in mopping up scattered groups of enemy forces at the close of the period. Gains were also made to the North as other elements seized a small bridge in the vicinity of K-208360 in the afternoon and crossed in the face of intense small arms and machine gun fire, to secure MUNCHAMP (205365) by evening and organize defensive positions in the vicinity for the night. On the division right flank, the 30th Inf (-2d Bn) resumed the attack east during 24 September, making only minor gains against stiff resistance, reaching positions along the line K-229312 - K-229317 and occupying high ground at K-223306 by nightfall. In the afternoon, the 2d Bn moved northeast to the vicinity of K-209294 where defensive positions and road blocks were set up in the general area with the 2d Bn of the 15th Inf to protect the regimental right flank at K-200275, K-203259 and K-198235. The 3d Bn 15th Inf continued to protect the 7th Inf right flank by maintaining road blocks, holding high ground at K-2132 and protecting the bridge at K-224338.101/.

4. The 117th Cav Recn Sqdn continued to protect the VI Corps right flank, maintaining contact with 3d Div on the left and II Corps (Fr) on the right. Enemy forces withdrew from ESMOULIERES, and recon elements patrolled to the north and northeast in this sector 102/.

5. During the period, enemy aerial activity increased somewhat with two ME-109's strafing troops along the road south of the MOSELLE River in the 45th Div sector, and the bridges at ARCHETTES and [illegible]. Battery D 72d AAA Gun Bn engaged the enemy planes and destroyed one. One of our artillery cub planes was shot down by enemy AA 103/.

SECTION XXV

1. Throughout 25 September, VI Corps troops continued to advance steadily into the Vosges foothills despite cold, rainy weather, heavily wooded terrain and stiff enemy opposition. In the 45th Div sector, 157th Inf on the left continued to make substantial gains on its north flank. DOMEVRE was cleared of all enemy resistance by evening and Hill 375 at V-0863 captured and mopped up by mid-afternoon when the advance continued south to reach the line V-0868 - V-0761 just west of DIGNONVILLE by nightfall. Other elements resumed their advance south to capture LOUVIGNY by 1200A, contacting 180th Inf patrols at JEUXEY, and then attacked northeast in the afternoon against light resistance to reach positions at V-088820, V-08.822 and V-087809. In the division central sector, the 180th Inf resumed the attack northeast in the early morning, and advanced steadily against moderate opposition, the left column clearing JEUXEY without opposition, after eliminating heavy enemy resistance, and reaching LONGCHAMP while the right column secured DEYVILLERS after overcoming stiff resistance including heavy enemy artillery fire. On the division right flank, 179th Inf attacked north on Route 59-bis in the early morning, encountering light resistance to reach V-138862 by the close of the period, and northeast to capture [illegible] before noon against light opposition, remaining in that vicinity the remainder of the period, holding road blocks and patrolling

101/. WRJ, 24 Sept, Entries [illegible]; G-3 Spot Report as of 242400A Sept; 3d Div G-3 Reports Nos. 48 and 49 - 24 and 25 Sept.

102/. WRJ, 24 Sept, Entry [illegible]; G-2 Report No. 41 - 24 Sept.

103/. WRJ, 24 Sept, Entries [illegible], 38 and 41.

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throughout the sector. 104/.

7. On the 36th Div front in the Corps central sector, aided by extremely difficult terrain and thick woods, enemy forces continued to offer bitter resistance at road blocks and strongpoints along our axis of advance. Agents reported the movement of considerable enemy infantry and artillery west from [illegible] (V-3642) on Route 417 during the afternoon, indicating the possible arrival of enemy reinforcements in the 36th Div sector. On the left, the 143d Inf continued to exert pressure on DOCELLES from all sides, with elements battering their way into the town by 1900H, but suspending the attack at that time due to darkness. Other elements continued to hold high ground north of DOCELLES, repulsing persistent enemy attempts to infiltrate, and maintained positions to the East on high ground south of FAUCOMPIERRE. To the Southeast, the 142d Inf advanced slowly towards [illegible] against heavy resistance to reach the outskirts of the town by the close of the period; cut the TRIDON - LE [illegible] road at V-233445, held positions and established four road blocks in the vicinity, resisting attacks in the afternoon by strong enemy forces; and secured the ground and road net in the vicinity V-188426 to the South. Towards the close of the period, orders were issued to disengage and move back to high ground at V-188436 - V-203445 in accordance with a regimental consolidation plan. On the division right flank, 141st Inf elements entered ST. AUBIN against stiff resistance shortly after midnight under cover of an artillery preparation by the 131st and 141st FA Bns. Fierce fighting continued until noon before all enemy forces were cleared from the town, while other elements cut and the road junction at V-233452 by 0930H after overcoming heavy resistance and blocked approaches to the North, East and South. 105/.

8. On the Corps right flank in the 3d Div sector, the 7th Inf made substantial gains east of the [illegible], advancing north from [illegible] (K-205365) in daylight, to capture [illegible] (K-2140) before noon and occupy Hill 722 (K-2241) and to reach [illegible] (K-2142) by nightfall against light opposition. Other elements to the South cleared enemy resistance in the [illegible] area, occupied Hill 867 (K-2426) and continued southeast towards LA [illegible] (K-233323), against heavy enemy opposition consisting of small arms, mortar and artillery fire which inflicted numerous casualties, to reach K-2434. On the right, the 30th Inf resumed its attack [illegible] 0730H to reach positions in the vicinity of K-243316 and K-2022[illegible] after engaging the enemy in heavy fighting and attacked east and in the late afternoon to reach positions southwest of LE [illegible] (K-2432) before nightfall. The 3d [illegible] Inf, attached to 7th Inf, continued to protect the [illegible] while the remainder of the [illegible] protected the division right flank from positions in the general vicinity of K-1[illegible]. 106/.

[illegible] poor visibility hampered our air corps operations, [illegible] throughout 26 September 107/.

[illegible] XXVI

1. On the Corps left flank during 26 September, 45th Div troops made substantial gains on the extreme north flank against little opposition,

104/. [illegible]-3 [illegible] 0800H, 1200H - [illegible] Sept; G-[illegible] Spot Report as of 0230H - 27 Sept; 4[illegible] G-3 Lights Nos. 41 & 42 - 26 & 28 Sept

105/. [illegible] 7; 36th [illegible] G-3 Lights Nos. 3[illegible] & 344 - 25 & 26 Sept; G-[illegible] Lights as of 0800H, 1900H - 26 Sept; 0200H - 28 Sept; G-2 Report No. 42 - 27 Sept.

106/. [illegible] -7 Reports Nos. 42 and 43 - 25 and 26 Sept; FAJ, 25 Sept, Entry [illegible]; 45th Div G-3 Reports Nos. 48 and 50 - 25 & 26 Sept; G-2 Spot Reports as of 0200H, 1200H and 1900H - 25 Sept; 0200H - 26 Sept.

107/. G-2 Report No. 42 - 27 Sept.

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enemy defenses consisting mainly of mined road blocks, many of which were not defended. The 157th Inf continued northeast towards SERCOEUR (V-105625) with two battalions, sending elements north from DIGNONVILLE which captured VILLONCOURT (V-090633) by mid-morning and turned east to assist in the reduction of SERCOEUR, which was cleared of the enemy by 1400A. The advance continued rapidly northeast to PADOUX (V-133654) which was occupied before nightfall despite stubborn resistance, while recon elements turning west from VILLONCOURT found BAYECOURT (V-073638) unoccupied but the road heavily mined. In the division central sector the 180th Inf continued the attack northeast at 0600A, being engaged by strong enemy forces on the western edge of VAUDEVILLE (V-113594) . The town was cleared of the enemy by evening, and troops pressed on towards DONPIERRE (V-1362) reaching V-120610 before being stopped by heavy artillery fire. Other elements mopped up the wooded areas south of DEYVILLERS (V-0956) during the morning and then proceeded northeast towards AYDOILLES (V-135575), reducing an enemy road block in the vicinity of V-116570 with tank support and placing a road block just beyond that point by nightfall. The 179th Inf resumed the attack north towards AYDOILLES at dawn against light resistance but a strong enemy road block delayed the advance, and positions were organized just south of AYDOILLES at nightfall. Other elements held positions in the vicinity of CHARMOIS, maintaining road blocks and protecting the division right flank during the period 108/.

2. In the Corps central sector, 36th Div troops were occupied mainly with regrouping and consolidating of positions during 26 September. However, gains were made on the left by the 143d Inf which attacked DOCHELES and had completely cleared and secured the town from all directions by noon. Patrols ranged north to LE ROULIER where enemy forces were contacted, while other elements headed east to XAMONTARUPT (V-193487) clearing the town and establishing positions east thereof on the hill at V-201484. Further south, 142d Inf elements withdrew under cover of darkness from previous positions in the TENDON area in accordance with a regimental consolidation plan to prevent enemy infiltration on the exposed right flank and established defensive positions in the vicinity of high ground at V-200445 and V-195466. The 3d Bn in defensive positions at V-185425 was relieved without incident shortly before midnight of 26-27 September by the 3d Bn 141st Inf. On the right, the remainder of the 141st RCT was relieved by elements of the 3d Div in the ST. AME area during the period and reverted to division reserve 109/.

3. On the Corps right flank, resistance lessened during the night in the 3d Div sector, and our troops advanced against light opposition except in the vicinity of FERDHUPT and northeast of DOMMARTIN where determined resistance was encountered. On the left, the 7th Inf occupied high ground below DOMMARTIN in the vicinity of K-2142 and continued northeast against heavy small arms, mortar and artillery fire to reach K-245442 by 1600A. Other elements cleared scattered resistance in the RUPT area, seized Hill 867 to the East and attacked northeast towards THIEFOSSE (K-2839) against stubborn pockets of resistance, making substantial gains to reach K-267385. On the right the 30th Inf continued attacking east with two battalions in the direction of LE THILLOT and by noon had reached their objectives at K-2729 and K-270305 where positions were organized in anticipation of being relieved by elements of II Corps (Fr). Relief was accomplished by Combat Command 1, 1st Armd Div (Fr) on the afternoon and evening, and the 30th Inf moved to assembly areas near CORRAVILLERS (K-210308) before nightfall. The entire 15th Inf completed movement to the REMIREMONT area by noon and during the evening under cover of darkness relieved 141st Inf elements in position, and made preparations for two battalions to attack northeast from the ST. AME area the following

108/. WRJ, 26 Sept, Entry #81, G-3 Reports Nos. 43 & 44 - 26 & 27 Sept; G-2 Report No. 43 - 27 Sept; 45th Div G-3 Reports Nos 42 and 43 - 26 & 27 Sept.

109/. G-3 Reports Nos 43 and 44 - 26 & 27 Sept; 36th Div G-3 Reports Nos. 384 and 385 - 26 & 27 Sept.

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morning 110/.

4. The 117th Cav Ron Sqn continued to screen the Corps right flank and maintained contact with 3d Div and 1 DB (Fr). Aerial operations were nil on both sides due to cloudy weather and poor visibility during 26 September.

5. Effective this date, the following units were attached to VI Corps: 933d FA Bn and Hq & Hq Co 1st Armored Group, while Hq & Hq Btry 91st AAA Group was attached to VI Corps and 35th AAA Brigade as of 27 September 111/.

SECTION XXVII

1. Despite adverse weather conditions and poor visibility, VI Corps troops continued to advance throughout 27 September, with significant gains being made on the left flank against light opposition. In the 45th Division sector, after 157th Inf patrols from PADOUX (V-098675) to BADMENIL and Hill 353 (V-153647) found these localities unoccupied by the enemy, one column advanced northeast to occupy BULT (V-160667) by evening without opposition, while another column on the left resumed the advance northeast along Road 46 and by evening had occupied VOMECOURT (V-166683) against light resistance, established road blocks for the night and pushed patrols northeast endeavoring to contact the enemy. In the division central sector, the 180th Inf occupied DOMPIERRE at 0300A after combat patrols found the town clear of the enemy, and then attacked east at 0600A to capture GIRECOURT (V-155615) by mid-morning. One column then headed northeast to reach DESTORD (V-174644) which was secured by evening despite an enemy counterattack on the southern outskirts of town, while another column continued east from GIRECOURT to occupy GUGNECOURT (V-170613) in the evening against considerable opposition and capture 64 prisoners. The enemy counterattacked our positions in GUGNECOURT from three sides under cover of darkness and succeeded in forcing our troops to withdraw to the West where they reorganized for the night. On the right, the 179th Inf captured AYDOILLES after overcoming numerous obstacles and minefields and attacked towards MEMENIL (V-163585) during the afternoon, capturing FONTENAY (V-148580) and reaching the outskirts of MEMENIL where heavy resistance was encountered at the close of the period 112/.

2. In the Corps central sector, 36th Div troops progressed steadily against moderate enemy resistance. On the left, 143d Inf elements occupied positions north of DOCELLES on Hill 500 (V-1651) and established a road block at V-168508, with a patrol finding LE ROULIER clear of the enemy. High ground north of the DOCELLES - FAUCOMPIERRE road in the vicinity of V-1950 was taken and positions and road blocks organized, while a patrol to LE BOULAY found the town unoccupied but the enemy defending road blocks north of the town. Elements on the right attacked north at 0800A and before noon had seized Hill 644 (V-204501) where positions were consolidated and a road block established at V-212490, contact being maintained with the 142d RCT on the right. The 142d attacked northeast at 0900A from previous defensive positions with the mission of clearing TENDON and the TENDON - LE THOLY road, and made substantial progress against heavy resistance, including artillery fire, entering TENDON in mid-afternoon and clearing the town shortly thereafter. Areas to the north and east were mopped up during the remainder of the period, with outposts reaching the vicinity of V-225483 and V-216453. The 141st RCT (-3d Bn) remained in assembly areas as division reserve during the period, while the 3d Bn held high ground in the vicinity of V-220415 to protect the right flank of the 142d RCT 113/.

110/. G-3 Reports Nos. 43 and 44 - 26 & 27 Sept; 3d Div G-3 Reports Nos. 50 and 51 - 26 & 27 Sept; G-2 Report No. 43 - 27 Sept.

111/. G-3 Report No. 46 - 29 Sept.

112/. G-3 Reports Nos. 44 and 45 - 27 & 28 Sept; 45th Div G-3 Reports Nos. 43 and 44 - 27 & 28 Sept.

113/. G-3 Reports Nos. 44 and 45 - 27 & 28 Sept; 36th Div G-3 Reports Nos. 385 and 386 - 27 & 28 Sept.

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3. In the 36 Div sector on the Corps right flank, the 15th Inf attacked [illegible] with two battalions at 0600A from positions at K-205473 and K-21[illegible] and advanced to vicinity of K-2348 and K-2547 against heavy resistance, [illegible] an enemy counterattack at K-231[illegible]. South of ST. [illegible], the 7th Inf made slight advances on a broad front. Elements on the left progressed east to reach K-2[illegible]36 before nightfall and fire artillery on enemy concentrations at VAGNEY, while in the center elements moved east of RUPT to vicinity of K-250340. On the right, the advance continued towards NEUFRUPT at 0720A, against heavy small arms and machine gun fire, and positions were set up at K-2734. The 30th Inf completed movement from CORRAVILLERS to a new assembly area east of REMIREMONT by nightfall 114/.

4. The 117th Cav Ron Sqn continued to protect the Corps right flank and maintained contact with II Corps (Fr) on the right.

SECTION XXVIII

1. During 28 September, the enemy offered determined resistance to our advance across the entire Corps front except on the north flank where little contact was established but increasing numbers of mines and booby traps were discovered. The enemy's build up of artillery continued, and strong artillery opposition was encountered during the day.

2. In the 45th Div sector, the 157th Inf attacked northeast from VOMECOURT at 0715A to capture ST. GORGON (V-1970) by mid-afternoon and continued on to secure high ground north of the town at V-197706. Combat patrols advanced to the outskirts of RAMBERVILLERS where the enemy was contacted, and to ST. HELENE (V-2066) to join 180th Inf elements in the evening. Other elements remained at VOMECOURT and BULT operating road blocks and security patrols, and removing anti-tank mines and demolitions in that area. To the right, the 180th Inf made substantial gains to the East. Elements attacking northeast from DESTORD at 0730A secured the town of ST. HELENE against light resistance and established road blocks on all approaches from the north and east and sent patrols towards AUTREY after dark to secure the high ground west of the town shortly after midnight. Elements on the right occupied NONZEVILLE (V-180635), PIERREFONT (V-192633) and GUGNECOURT (V-1761) in the early afternoon after overcoming stiff resistance and then advanced east towards GRANDVILLERS against heavy artillery and mortar fire, reaching positions at V-181612 for the night. On the division right flank, the 179th Inf occupied MEMENIL (V-164585) without opposition, but was halted by strong enemy forces well-entrenched on high ground east of the town in the vicinity of V-165588 and V-165580, while elements to the Southeast made only slow progress through the Foret de Faite, reaching the vicinity of V-175565 by nightfall 115/.

3. In the Corps central sector, 36th Div troops encountered numerous road blocks supplemented by closely knit patrols operating both on our front and flanks. The 143d Inf continued to hold high ground northwest of DOCKLLES and consolidated positions on the high ground north of the DOCKLLES - FAUCOMPIERRE road, maintaining road blocks at V-180509 and V-194494. On the regimental right flank, elements holding the high ground along Ridge 644 (V-205495) advanced east to capture ST. JEAN DU MARCHE (V-215498) despite stiff resistance. The 142d Inf, in the TENDON area, attacked east with the objective of seizing Hill 827 at V-235463. Stiff resistance was encountered and by late afternoon elements had reached only the lower slopes of Hill 827

114/. G-3 Reports Nos. 44 and 45 - 27 & 28 Sept; 3d Div G-3 Reports Nos. 51 and 52 - 27 & 28 Sept.

115/. WRJ, 28 Sept, Entry #94; 45th Div G-3 Reports Nos. 44 and 45 - 28 & 29 Sept; G-2 Report No. 45 - 29 Sept.

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from the North and the South, the latter column having cut the TENDON - LE THOLY road at V-240445. The 141st RCT (-3d Bn) moved to an assembly area near XAMONTARUPT and made preparations for attacking northeast through the 142d RCT early the following morning, while the 3d Bn, under division control, continued to hold positions in the vicinity of V-220415, protecting the right flank of the 142d RCT and repelled an enemy counterattack in the morning 116/.

4. In the 3d Division sector, enemy forces, aided by the terrain, continued to offer aggressive and determined resistance to our advances. On the left, the 15th Inf continued its advance north and east of ST. AME against well-defended enemy positions, heavy artillery, mortar and tank fire. By nightfall, elements had advanced to new positions west and southwest of CLEURIE at V-201401, K-229477 and K-235467, had retained the high ground northeast of ST. AME at K-252454 against strong enemy pressure during the period, and had reached the area K-244469 on the right. On the division right flank, the 7th Inf remained in position west of the VAGNEY (K-265495) - THIEFOSSE (K-280395) road, pushing strong recon forces towards both towns and mopping up scattered groups of enemy forces in the vicinity during the day. Other elements continued to attack FERDRUPT and by mid-afternoon had secured the town which was held despite subsequent enemy counterattacks and heavy artillery fire. The 30th Inf remained in assembly areas in the vicinity of REMIREMONT, preparing to attack northeast on the left of 15th Inf the following morning 117/.

5. During 28 September, 425 prisoners were captured by VI Corps troops, the majority being taken by the 45th Div on the northern flank of the Corps front. Aerial operations were nil on both sides due to the continual rainy weather and poor visibility 118/.

SECTION XXIX

1. On the Corps left flank in the 45th Div sector during 29 September, the 157th Inf held the high ground south and southeast of RAMBERVILLERS in the vicinity of V-1872 and maintained a line to the South to VOMECOURT, while patrols ranging forward to maintain contact with the enemy engaged in a fire fight at V-197717 and directed fire on enemy mining the road between RAMBERVILLERS and JEANMENIL. In the division central sector, the 180th Inf continued the advance eastward. After several fire fights, elements entered AUTREY (V-2267) in the late afternoon and shortly after dark repulsed a strong enemy counterattack by infantry with tank support without loss of ground. Other elements supported by tanks resumed the two-pronged attack on GRANDVILLERS from the vicinity of GUGNECOURT and PIERREPONT, and reached positions just west and north of the town by nightfall despite heavy small arms and mortar fire from enemy strongpoints. On the division right flank, the 179th Inf (-1st Bn) with strong tank support resumed the attack on VIMENIL and occupied the town by 1730A after heavy fighting throughout the day, while the forces attacking northeast through the Foret de Faite, retarded by a series of small arms fights throughout the day, reached V-205591 by nightfall. The 1st Bn moved from reserve at AYDOILLES through GUGNECOURT to the GRANDVILLERS area, relieving elements of the 180th Inf after dark 119/.

2. In the 36th Div sector, on the left, the 143d Inf, after relief in

116/. G-3 Reports Nos. 45 and 46 - 28 & 29 Sept; 36th Div G-3 Reports Nos. 386 and 387 - 28 & 29 Sept.

117/. WRJ, 28 Sept, Entry #93; G-3 Reports Nos. 45 and 46 - 28 & 29 Sept; 3d Div G-3 Reports Nos. 52 and 53 - 28 & 29 Sept; G-2 Report No. 45 - 29 Sept

118/. G-2 Report No. 45 - 29 Sept.

119/. G-3 Reports Nos. 46 and 47 - 29 & 30 Sept; 45th Div G-3 Reports Nos. 45 and 46 - 29 & 30 Sept.

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positions east of DOCELLES by 141st Inf elements before noon, attacked northeast towards BRUYERES, forward elements nearing DEYCIMONT and LEPANGES against moderate opposition by the close of the period. In the division central sector, just after midnight of 28-29 September the 141st Inf (-3d Bn) attacked through 142d Inf elements with the mission of seizing HOUX (V-227495). However, at 0330A, while crossing the stream just south of HOUX at V-231483, the RCT came under extremely heavy concentrations of enemy artillery fire which disorganized the attack and necessitated withdrawal for reorganization in the vicinity of TENDON. After relieving the 143d Inf in positions along the high ground north of the DOCELLES - FAUCOMPIERRE road during the morning with a view to shifting the weight of attack to the left in zone, the 141st (-3d Bn) again attacked northeast at 1430A, and leading elements were approaching high ground at V-215509 at the close of the period. The 3d Bn 141st Inf was relieved by 3d Div elements in the vicinity of V-2042 in the morning and moved to vicinity of XAMONTARUPT, attached to the 142d Inf. On the right, the 142d RCT resumed the attack on Hill 827 before daylight and secured the top of the hill by mid-morning against stubborn resistance. The remainder of the period was spent in combing the hill slopes and mopping up the scattered enemy detachments which continued to resist with small arms and mortar fire 120/.

3. On the Corps right flank, 3d Div troops continued their attack to the North and Northeast in the face of determined, well-organized enemy resistance. The 30th Inf attacked northeast with two battalions through the 3d Bn 15th Inf at 0700A, but by mid-morning the leading troops were held up by enemy small arms, machine gun and artillery fire at the edge of a clearing in the vicinity of V-205410 and further advances during the period were negligible, positions being established also at V-211405 and V-215408 during the afternoon under harassing mortar and artillery fire. The 1st Bn relieved 141st Inf elements at V-206418 and occupied high ground at V-2142, in regimental reserve. In the division central sector, the 15th Inf, while holding a defensive line, consolidated positions and reorganized in preparation for a continuation of the advance. The 3d Bn, after being passed through by 30th Inf elements at daybreak, attacked east towards an enemy strongpoint south of CLEURIE and made local gains in the sector to hold positions at K-233470 and K-241481 at the close of the period. The bulk of the RCT, holding high ground northeast of ST. AME against strong enemy resistance, repulsed several counterattacks during the hours of darkness and was holding positions at K-245476, K-254455 and K-254472, K-254464 and K-248456 by the close of the period. On the division right flank, the 7th Inf continued to clear the sector west of the VAGNEY - THIEFOSSE road of isolated groups of enemy forces and repulsed a counterattack at 1835A. At 2100A, the Bn was at K-248433 and was engaged in infiltrating off high ground towards VAGNEY. Elements on the right flank at FERDRUPT consolidated positions at K-270340 and K-276325 in preparation for relief by elements of the 1st Armd Div (Fr). 121/.

4. With the return of good weather on 29 September, the XII TAC carried out armed reconnaissance missions in the RHINE Valley between MULHOUSE and STRASBOURG, destroying locomotives and railway rolling stock, while enemy aerial activity was confined to one ME-109 which was observed flying low in the vicinity of VILLONCOURT apparently on a reconnaissance mission and was engaged by our AA with unknown results 122/.

120/. G-3 Reports Nos. 46 and 47 - 29 & 30 Sept; 36th Div G-3 Reports Nos. 387 and 388 - 29 & 30 Sept; WRJ, 29 Sept, Entry #70; G-3 Journal, 30 Sept, Entry #7.

121/. G-3 Reports Nos. 46 and 47 - 29 & 30 Sept; 3d Div G-3 Reports Nos. 53 and 54 - 29 & 30 Sept; WRJ, 29 Sept (New CP), Entry #66.

122/. G-3 Report No. 47 - 30 Sept; G-2 Report No. 46 - 30 Sept.

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5. The 117th Cav Rcn Squadron returned to VI Corps control at 1430A 29 September and completed movement to vicinity of LONGCHAMP (V-0959) in the 45th Div sector 123/.

6. At 291230A September 1944, the VI Corps Command Post closed north of FLOMBIERES (K-091441) and opened at POUXEUX, FRANCE (V-121460).

SECTION XXX

1. During 30 September moderate to stiff resistance continued across the entire VI Corps front and no change was noted in the enemy's attitude which remained defensive, but aggressive. On the Corps left flank in the 45th Div sector, the 157th Inf with the 1st Bn as a spearhead attacked RAMBERVILLERS at 0700A after a 15-minute artillery preparation and encountered strong resistance from within the city. By 1615A, all resistance was cleared though enemy mortar and artillery fire was received during the remainder of the day, as positions were organized to the east and southeast on roads leading out of RAMBERVILLERS. In the division central sector, the 180th Inf consolidated its positions. Elements in the vicinity of AUTREY directed artillery, mortar, tank and tank destroyer fire on enemy troops, vehicles, machine gun positions and strongpoints in the vicinity of HOUSSERAS during the afternoon and patrols encountered machine gun and sniper fire from north of FREMIFONTAINE. Elements at PIERREPONT, attacking east, were halted by a strong enemy force at V-214634, and subsequent attacks with tanks in support against the enemy positions were unsuccessful. On the division right flank, 179th Inf elements attacked GRANDVILLERS at daylight and were engaged in house-to-house fighting with the enemy throughout the day, holding the majority of the town by the close of the period. The 117th Cav Rcn Sqn supported forward elements of the 45th Div during the period, operating patrols 124/.

2. In the 36th Div sector, the 143d RCT on the North advanced northeast against moderate opposition, reaching high ground in the vicinity of V-202544 and positions above FAYS (V-205557) on the left, while elements on the right cleared DEYCIMONT (V-1953) by noon without opposition and were approaching LEPANGES (V-2153) from the west and southwest against enemy small arms fire by nightfall. In the division central sector, the 141st RCT (-3d Bn) continued the advance east and northeast, but made slight gains against stiff resistance. The 1st Bn occupied high ground at V-215509 and pushed on to V-215519 by nightfall, while the 2d Bn occupied ST. JEAN DU MARCHE before daylight, and advance elements reached V-223499 before the close of the period. The 2d Bn, attached to 142d Inf, moved out from the XAMONTARUPT area and occupied high ground in the vicinity of V-224484. On the division right flank, the 142d RCT held positions in the vicinity of Hill 827 (V-2346) during the period. At noon, the enemy launched a strong counterattack preceded by a 200 round artillery preparation against Hill 827 but it was repulsed 125/.

3. In the 3d Div sector, bitter resistance opposed our advance over the entire front during the day. On the left, the 30th Inf launched a coordinated two-battalion attack to the northeast at 0700A from positions at V-205420 and V-205406. The attack progressed slowly over rugged and wooded terrain, meeting strong opposition from enemy snipers, mortar and artillery fire. By nightfall,

123/. 3d Div G-3 Report No. 54 - 30 Sept.

124/. G-3 Journal, 30 Sept, Entries #8, 19, 22, 39 and 40; 45th Div G-3 Report No. 46 - 30 Sept; G-2 Report No. 47 - 1 Oct.

125/. WRJ, 30 Sept, Entries #9, 47, 61 and 93; G-2 Report No. 47 - 1 Oct.

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advance elements had reached only V-215426 and V-213412, but were holding fast at the close of the period. In the division central sector, the 15th Inf continued to clear up scattered pockets of resistance, making local gains, and regrouped in preparation for a coordinated attack with the 30th Inf on the morning of 1 October. At the close of the period, all elements were holding fast in positions along the general line K-2448 - K-2646. On the right, the 7th Inf (-2d Bn) advanced slowly to the northeast, advance elements reaching new positions by nightfall at K-252440, K-256378, K-259368 and K-260374 against scattered resistance. The 2d Bn continued to hold positions in the vicinity of FERDRUPT awaiting relief by elements of II Corps (Fr), and repulsed a counterattack during the period 126/.

4. The 117th Cav Rcn Squadron was relieved of attachment to 3d Div, moved to the Corps left flank, and commenced its new mission of extending reconnaissance to the North, Northwest and Northeast of the VI Corps zone of advance.

5. At 1030A, 30 September, two ME-109's strafed the bridge at REMIREMONT and were engaged by our AA with undetermined results 127/.

6. A Field Message was issued to all divisions and the 117th Cav Rcn Sqn at 301200A September, outlining missions and objectives as follows: (a) 45th Inf Div: To complete capture of RAMBERVILLERS, block to the east and northeast thereof with one reinforced regiment, and protect the Corps left flank; seize objective line east of BROUVELIEURES and BRUYERES (as indicated on overlay) and prepare to assemble in the RAMBERVILLERS area on Corps order, (b) 36th Inf Div: To seize objective line as indicated on overlay and clear enemy from the zone; assist 45th Div in attack on BRUYERES, and prepare to take over area and missions of 45th Div on Corps order, (c) 3d Inf Div: To seize objective line and block to the south as indicated on overlay, protect Corps right flank and maintain contact with 1st Armd Div (Fr), (d) 117th Cav Rcn Sqn: To continue reconnaissance to the north and northeast of 45th Div and maintain contact with the 2d DB (Fr) to the left in the XV Corps zone 128/.

7. During the month of September the VI Corps had continued its spectacular advance which had started along the French Riviera on 15 August. Though progress had been slowed to a walk during the last ten days, after forward elements had crossed the MOSELLE River and reached the foothills of the VOSGES Mountains, VI Corps troops had pushed approximately 230 miles north on a broad front during the month and had captured 14,290 Prisoners of War. Opposing the advance at the close of September were elements of the 16th, 189th, 198th, 338th and 716th Infantry Divisions, all components of the 19th German Army.

Edward H. Brooks
EDWARD H. BROOKS
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

126/. WRJ, 30 Sept, Entries #9, 47, 61 and 93; G-3 Report No. 47 - 30 Sept.

127/. G-2 Report No. 47 - 1 Oct.

128/. Field Message, Hq VI Corps, 301200A Sept 1944 - See Annex #11.

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ANNEXES

TO

VI CORPS HISTORY

SEPTEMBER 1944

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ANNEX #2 - Casualty Report of VI Corps Troops

ANNEX #3 - Roster of Officers

ANNEX #4 - Changes in Officer Personnel

ANNEX #5 - Report of Strength, Battle Casualties, Decorations and Awards - September 1944

ANNEX #6 - Memorandum by Lt. Gen. Truscott to VI Corps Troops

ANNEX #7 - Congratulatory Message from Fifth Army

ANNEX #8 - Map of VI Corps Route of Advance

UNDER SEPARATE COVER: (1 copy only)

ANNEX #9 - G-2 Journals

ANNEX #10 - G-3 Journals

ANNEX #11 - VI Corps G-3 Reports, Field Orders and Field Messages - Sept 1944

ANNEX #12 - War Room Journals

ANNEX #13 - G-3 Reports, S-3 Reports and Field Messages of VI Corps Troops

ANNEX #14 - G-3 Air Journals

ANNEX #15 - G-4 Journal with Supporting Papers

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By Authority of
CG VI Corps
Initials
24 Sept 44

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

VI CORPS COMBAT TROOP LIST
241200A Sept 44

Hq & Hq Co VI Corps

3d Inf Div
7th Inf - 10th FA Bn (105mm How)
15th Inf - 39th FA Bn (105mm How)
30th Inf - 41st FA Bn (105mm How)
9th FA Bn (155mm How)
10th Engr C Bn
Atchd:
69th Armd FA Bn (105mm How SP)
756th Tk Bn (75mm Gun)
601st TD Bn (3" Gun SP)
3d Cml Bn (Mtz)(4.2" Mort)

36th Inf Div
141st Inf - 131st FA Bn (105mm How)
142d Inf - 132d FA Bn (105mm How)
143d Inf - 133d FA Bn (105mm How)
155th FA Bn (155mm How)
111th Engr C Bn
Atchd:
93d Armd FA Bn (105mm How SP)
753d Tk Bn (75mm Gun)
636th TD Bn (3" Gun SP)

45th Inf Div
157th Inf - 158th FA Bn (105mm How)
179th Inf - 160th FA Bn (105mm How)
180th Inf - 171st FA Bn (105mm How)
189th FA Bn (155mm How)
120th Engr C Bn
Atchd:
59th Armd FA Bn (105mm How SP)
191st Tk Bn (75mm Gun)
645th TD Bn (-Co B, 1 Rcn Plat)(3" Gun SP)
83d Cml Bn (Mtz)(-Co D)(4.2" Mort)

Hq & Hq Btry VI Corps Arty
2d FA Obsn Bn
Hq & Hq Btry 6th Armd FA Gp (Supporting 3d Inf Div)
36th FA Bn (155mm Gun)
634th FA Bn (155mm How)
Hq & Hq Btry 17th FA Gp (Supporting 36th Inf Div)
977th FA Bn (155mm Gun)
141st FA Bn (155mm How)
17th FA Bn (155mm How)(Supporting 45th Inf Div)

Hq & Hq Btry & AAAOD 35th AAA Brig
Hq & Hq Btry 91st AAA Gp
67th AAA Gun Bn (90mm Gun)
72d AAA Gun Bn (90mm Gun)
*108th AAA Gun Bn (90mm Gun)
*216th AAA Gun Bn (90mm Gun)
534th AAA AW Bn (40mm Gun)
433d AAA AW Bn (40mm Gun)
Hq & Hq Btry 5th AAA Gp
441st AAA AW Bn (37mm Gun SP) (Supporting 3d Inf Div)
443d AAA AW Bn (37mm Gun SP) (Supporting 36th Inf Div)
106th AAA AW Bn (37mm Gun SP) (Supporting 45th Inf Div)

Engr
36th Engr C Regt
48th Engr C Bn

117th Cav Rcn Sq

57th Sig Bn

VI Corps Units atchd to 1st A/B TF
Co B, 1 Rcn Plat 645th TD Bn (3" Gun SP)
Co D 83d Cml Bn (4.2" Mort)

* Atchd on arrival

Conway
CONWAY
G-3

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46, U. S. Army

SECTION I — ASSIGNED OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICERS — 14 September 1944

COMMANDING GENERAL

Major General Lucian K. Truscott Jr., 07096, U. S. A.
Capt Jack E. Bartash, 0454295, CAC (ADC)
Capt James M. Wilson Jr, 01166869, FA (ADC)

ASSISTANT TO CORPS COMMANDER

Brigadier General Frederic B. Butler, 012047, U. S. A.
1st Lt Alan E. Gould, 01295868, Inf, (ADC)

CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION

Col Don E. Carleton, 015415, GSC
Col John P. Cassidy, 012718, GSC
CWO John M. Jackson, W-2114227

G-1 SECTION

Maj John W. Wibel, 0339093, GSC
Capt Robert G. Perriello, 0389394, GSC
1st Lt Leo M. Armstrong, 0405177, Inf

G-2 SECTION

Col Joseph L. Langevin, 012640, GSC
Lt Col Edgar C. Doleman, 019131, Inf
Maj Don W. Dixon, 0343066, FA
Maj Dexter S. French, 0277582, GSC
Maj Sanford H. Webster, 023222, Inf (DS)
Capt Joseph Haines III, 01284699, Inf

G-3 SECTION

Lt Col Theodore J. Conway, 019015, GSC
Lt Col William B. Rosson, 023556, GSC
Maj Leonard C. Cooke, 0316938, CAC
Maj John L. Cooper, 0351994, Cav
Maj Marion W. Crouse, 0391054, Cav
Capt Rhoman E. Clem, 0320752, Inf
Capt William R. Rose, 0352042, CAC
Capt Rieder W. Schell, 0415566, Inf
Capt Edward M. Murray, 0452479, Inf
Capt John Schadler Jr, 0363957, QMC

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G-4 SECTION

Col Edward J. O'Neill, 015952, GSC
Lt Col Burton E. Miles, 0347690, GSC
Maj Robert E. Clark, 0910354, QMC
Capt Ralph L. Harper, 0303227, Inf
Capt Edward L. Dobbins, 0452060, Inf

ADJUTANT GENERAL SECTION

Col Michael L. Connors, 0309882, AGD
Capt Harry S. Alcorn, 01000079, AGD
Capt Courtney L. Vallentine, 01000884, AGD
1st Lt William F. Rickett, 02055429, AGD
WOJG George T. Smith Jr, W-2108260

CHAPLAIN SECTION

Lt Col William E. King, 0265277, Ch Corps
Maj Jordan E. Brown, 0402849, Ch Corps
CWO Francis M. Lugavin, W-2109915

CHEMICAL SECTION

Lt Col Harrison S. Markham, 020073, CWS
1st Lt Orris R. Evers, 02046557, CWS

ENGINEER SECTION

Col William H. Thomas Jr, 07648, CE
Maj Robert H. Darling, 0316638, CE
Capt Joseph M. Devine, 0421809, CE
1st Lt Edgar D. Lee, 0456581, CE

FINANCE SECTION

Col Howard L. Leighton, 0124567, FD
Capt Frederick H. Diets, 01280038, FD

INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION

Col Nyal L. Adams, 07471, IGD
Maj James M. Ferguson, 0307472, IGD

JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION

Lt Col Robert L. Lansfield, 018037, JAGD
Capt Jack M. Cotton, 0291316, JAGD

MEDICAL SECTION

Col Rollin L. [illegible], 017819, MC
Lt Col Walter [illegible], 0357047, MC
Capt Carlton [illegible], [illegible], MC
Capt Sigfrid G. [illegible], [illegible], MAC
Capt James [illegible], [illegible], MC
WOJG Donald L. Sallir, [illegible]

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ORDNANCE SECTION

Col Walter G. Jennings, 0174217, Ord Dept
Maj John P. Merrill, 0181405, Ord Dept
Maj Stanley M. Smolensky, 025333, Ord Dept
Capt Henry J. Egal, 0154932, Ord Dept
CWO Edward C. Kelly, W-2114233

QUARTERMASTER SECTION

Col Lawrence L. Skinner, 015325, QMC
Maj James G. Hattox, 0276850, QMC
Capt John A. Bradish, 0284157, QMC
1st Lt Clifford D. Anderson, 02055463, QMC

SIGNAL SECTION

Col Richard J. Meyer, 019147, Sig C
Capt Wilbur D. Vincent, 0378299, Sig C
Capt Willard W. Jensen, 0454648, Sig C
1st Lt Luther D. Bridgman, 01635621, Sig C

SPECIAL SERVICE SECTION

Maj Gale A. Mathers, 0310331, Inf
1st Lt Daniel T. Fogarty, 01822550, FA

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT & PROVOST MARSHAL

Maj Albert Barkin, 0321172, Inf

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Capt Armstrong C. Smith, 0327127, Inf
Capt Robert M. Ferrell, 01697057, MC
Capt Isidore [illegible], 01690212, DC
1st Lt Paul B. McGuire, 01285788, Inf
1st Lt Guy E. Norbury, 01031352, Cav
1st Lt Edmund A. Bogart, 01015527, Inf

MILITARY POLICE PLATOON

1st Lt Sam F. Doering, 0409112, CMP
1st Lt John J. Mulhern, 01308680, Inf

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SECTION II

ATTACHED FOR CURRENT OPERATIONS

G-2 SECTION

Capt P. R. Whiston, 254588 (Br)
Capt John F. Rieger, 01013512, Inf
Capt Kenneth F. Kauffman, 0423401, AC
1st Lt Lauren C. Kingman Jr, 0863398, AC
1st Lt William L. Kramer, 01895937, TC
1st Lt Charles F. Marshall, 01014422, AC
1st Lt Alfred G. Pundt, 01052530, CAC

G-3 SECTION

Lt Col Harold S. Bibo, 0309157, GSC

ENGINEER SECTION

Capt Harry A. Morris, 01285090, CE
Capt Matthew H. Gilbert, 0352947, CE

SPECIAL SERVICE SECTION (BEACHHEAD NEWS)

Capt James C. Grimes, 0391443, FA

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

1st Lt Aces M. Westerman, 01293686, Inf

LIAISON OFFICER

Capt J. William Arnold (French)

CIVIL AFFAIRS

Maj Campbell Dickson, 0521064, (Spec Res)
Maj Enrico Dell'Osso, 0257798, Inf
Maj Grady C. Durham, 0313390, Inf
1st Lt Charles J. Rohr, 0519483, (Spec Res)

ATTACHED FROM FIFTH ARMY

1st Lt Nicolas N. Bajenow, 01038511 (ADC)

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CHANGES IN OFFICER PERSONNEL

SEPTEMBER 1944

I - ASSIGNMENTS; ATTACHMENTS

Date	Officer	Remarks
15	2nd Lt Richard Hall, CMP	Atchd as of 11 Sept
	Maj Pierre Lantz (Fr)	Atchd as of 1 Sept
22	Lt Col William C. Hammond, Jr., CWS	Asgd & Jd fr Hq 45th Inf Div as of 24 Sept

II - RELIEF FROM ASSIGNMENT; DETACHMENTS

10	Lt Col Donald A. MacGrath, Cav	Reld fr Asgnmt - Asgd 36th Inf Div as of 31 Aug
	Maj Kermit R. Hansen, Inf	" " "
11	Lt Col Leland R. Drake, CAC	Reld fr atchmt (Absent)
	Maj George H. Walton, AC	Reld fr atchmt as of 16 Aug
	1st Lt Herbert Ribner, Chap C	Reld fr atchmt - Atchd 36th Inf Div as of 6 Sept
	1st Lt William J. Stopple, Sig C	Reld fr atchmt as of 31 Aug
15	1st Lt Charles J. Rohr, Spec Res	Reld fr atchmt as of 5 Sept
16	Lt Col Harrison S. Markham, CWS	Reld fr Asgnmt - Asgd CWS Training Div, War Dept
19	Brig Gen Frederic B. Butler, U.S.A.	Reld fr Asgnmt - Asgd 45th Inf Div as of 17 Sept
28	Maj Sanford H. Webster, Inf	Reld fr Asgnmt - Asgd 36th Inf Div
30	1st Lt Nicolas N. Bajenow	Reld fr atchmt as of 28 Sept

III - PROMOTIONS

12	Capt Grady C. Durham, Inf (atchd)	Promoted to Major, eff 12 Sep
19	Maj Gen Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., U.S.A.	Promoted to Lt Gen, eff 2 Sep
	Col Don E. Carleton, GSC	Promoted to Brig Gen, eff 6 S
24	Lt Col Theodore J. Conway, Inf	Promoted to Col, eff 17 Sept
29	Maj James G. Hattox, QMC	Promoted to Lt Col, eff 27 Sep
	Maj James M. Pennycuick, IGD	Promoted to Lt Col, eff 27 Sep
	Maj John W. Wibel, GSC	Promoted to Lt Col, eff 27 Sep

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III - PROMOTIONS (Continued)

Date	Officer	Remarks
29	Capt Jack E. Bartash, CAC (ADC)	Promoted to Major, eff 27 Sept
	Capt John A. Bradish, QMC	Promoted to Major, eff 27 Sept
	Capt Wilbur D. Vincent, Sig C	Promoted to Major, eff 27 Sept
	Capt James M. Wilson, Jr., FA (ADC)	Promoted to Major, eff 27 Sept
	1st Lt Luther D. Bridgman, Sig C	Promoted to Capt, eff 27 Sept
	1st Lt Edgar D. Lee, CE	Promoted to Capt, eff 27 Sept

IV - MISCELLANEOUS

11	Capt Sigfrid G. Kinkopf, MC	Missing in Action as of 25 Aug
12	Capt Sigfrid G. Kinkopf, MC	Returned to Duty
13	Capt Robert G. Perriello, QMC	Detailed in GSC as of 6 Sept
17	1st Lt Alan E. Gould, Inf	Reld fr Asgmnt Hq VI Corps - Asgd Hq Co VI Corps

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 346, U. S. Army

REPORT OF STRENGTH, BATTLE CASUALTIES, DECORATIONS AND AWARDS - SEPTEMBER 1944

I. STRENGTH:

Hq VI Corps:

		Assigned	Attached	Total	Net Change
Officers	1 Sept 44 -	70	21	91	
	30 Sept 44 -	65	17	82	-9
Warrant O's	1 Sept 44 -	5	0	5	
	30 Sept 44 -	5	0	5	0

Hq Co VI Corps:

Officers	1 Sept 44 -	7	1	8	
	30 Sept 44 -	8	2	10	+2
Enlisted Men	1 Sept 44 -	348	40	388	
	30 Sept 44 -	360	27	387	-1

II. BATTLE CASUALTIES:

Hq VI Corps: NONE (Note: Capt SIGFRID G. KINKOPF, 0454084, MAC, previously reported Missing in Action as of 25 August 1944, returned to duty 12 Sept 1944 as escaped Prisoner of War.)

Hq Co VI Corps: NONE

III. DECORATIONS AND AWARDS:

Hq VI Corps:

Former Members - AWARD OF LEGION OF MERIT

LAURENCE B. KEISER, 05316, Brigadier General, United States Army (NATOUSA G.O. No. 85, 1 Sept 1944)
JARRETT M. HUDDLESTON, 05451, Colonel, Medical Corps, Hq VI Corps (Posthumous) (NATOUSA G.O. No. 86, 2 Sept 1944)
CHARLES P. WILLIAMSON, 0315153, Major, Field Artillery, Hq VI Corps Artillery (NATOUSA G.O. No. 95, 24 Sept 1944)

AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL

BEN HARRELL, 019277, Colonel, Infantry, 3d Infantry Division (VI Corps G.O. No. 28, 13 Sept 1944)
NICOLAS N. BAJENOW, 01038511, First Lieutenant, Aide-de-Camp, Hq Fifth Army (Atchd to Hq VI Corps) Presented by the VI Corps Commander on 29 September in France. (VI Corps G.O. No. 31, 30 Sept 1944)

Present Members - AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL

JAMES G. HATTON, 0276850, Major, Quartermaster Corps, Hq VI Corps. Presented by the VI Corps Commander on 14 September in France. (VI Corps G.O. No. 29, 14 Sept 1944)

Hq Co VI Corps: NONE

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6 Incls:
#1 - MATOUSA G.O. No. 85, 1 Sept 1944
#2 - MATOUSA G.O. No. 86, 2 Sept 1944
#3 - MATOUSA G.O. No. 95, 24 Sept 1944
#4 - Hq VI Corps G.O. No. 28, 13 Sept 1944
#5 - Hq VI Corps G.O. No. 29, 14 Sept 1944
#6 - Hq VI Corps G.O. No. 31, 30 Sept 1944

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HEADQUARTERS
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 534

1 September 1944

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NUMBER 85)

EXTRACT

AWARD OF LEGION OF MERIT

By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, as amended, the Legion of Merit was awarded by the Theater Commander to the following named personnel for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services:

* * *

LAURENCE B. KEISER, 05316, Brigadier General, United States Army, for services in Italy from October 1943 to February 1944. Entered the United States Military Academy from Pennsylvania.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ R. H. Christie
R. H. CHRISTIE,
Colonel, AGD,
Acting Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

"Y"

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

H. S. ALCORN
Captain, A. G. D.
Asst Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 534

2 September 1944

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NUMBER 86)

EXTRACT

* * * *
Award of Legion of Merit (Posthumous). II
* * * *

II -- AWARD OF LEGION OF MERIT (POSTHUMOUS)

By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, as amended, the Legion of Merit was posthumously awarded by the Theater Commander to the following named officer for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services:

JARRETT M. HUDDLESTON, 05451, Colonel, Medical Corps, Headquarters VI Corps, for services in Italy from September 1943 to February 1944. Next of kin: Helen M. Huddleston, 2236 Hall Place, Washington, D. C.

* * *

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ R. H. Christie
R. H. CHRISTIE,
Colonel, AGD,
Acting Adjutant General.

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A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

H. S. ALCORN
Captain, A. G. D.
Asst Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 534

24 September 1944

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NUMBER 95) EXTRACT

AWARD OF LEGION OF MERIT

By direction of the President, under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, as amended, the Legion of Merit was awarded by the Theater Commander to the following named personnel for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services:

* * *

WALTER G. RICHARD, 31111192, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters VI Corps, for services in Italy from 20 February to 5 June 1944. Entered service from Manchester, New Hampshire.

* * *

CHARLES P. WILLIAMSON, 0315153, Major, Field Artillery, Headquarters VI Corps Artillery, for services in Italy from 18 February to 6 June 1944. Entered service from Providence, Rhode Island.

* * *

MIRON P. RUDOLPH, 06430, Colonel, Medical Corps, Headquarters Eastern Base Section, North African Theater of Operations, for services in North Africa from 22 July 1943 to 1 March 1944. Entered service from Louisville, Kentucky.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

GEORGE D. PENCE,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ H. V. Roberts
H. V. ROBERTS,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

H. A. ALCORN
Captain, A. G. D.
Asst Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 346, U. S. Army

13 September 1944

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NUMBER 28)

AWARDS OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Under the provisions of AR 600-45, a Bronze Star Medal is awarded to each of the following named officers:

BEN EARNELL, 019277, Colonel, Infantry, 3d Infantry Division (then Colonel, General Staff Corps, Headquarters VI Corps) for meritorious service in action from 4 April to 27 August 1944 in Italy and France. Entered United States Military Academy from Medford, Oregon.

ANDREW P. SULLIVAN, 011396, Colonel, Coast Artillery Corps, Headquarters Fifth Army (then 9th AAA Group) for meritorious service in action from 26 February to 28 April 1944 in Italy. Entered military service from Norfolk, Virginia.

By command of Major General TRUSCOTT:

DON E. CARLETON,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Michael L. Connors

MICHAEL L. CONNORS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46, U. S. Army

14 September 1944

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GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 29)

AWARD OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Under the provisions of AR 600-45, a Bronze Star Medal is awarded to the following named officer:

JAMES G. HATTOX, 0276850, Major, Quartermaster Corps, Headquarters VI Corps, for meritorious service in action from 17 August 1944 to 2[illegible] September 1944 in France. Entered military service from Wellesley, Massachusetts.

By command of Major General TRUSCOTT:

DON E. CARLETON,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Michael L. Connors

MICHAEL L. CONNORS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO #46, U. S. Army

30 September 1944

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NUMBER 31)

AWARDS OF THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Under the provisions of AR 600-45, a Bronze Star Medal is awarded to each of the following named individuals:

NICOLAS N. BAJENOW, 01038511, First Lieutenant, Aide-de-Camp, Headquarters Fifth Army, for meritorious service in action from 20 August to 28 September 1944 in France. Entered military service from Charlottesville, Virginia.

BEATTY G. BARNES, 37525251, Private, Headquarters Company VI Corps, for meritorious service in action from 22 August to 23 August 1944 in France. Entered military service from Kansas City, Missouri.

By command of Lieutenant General TRUSCOTT:

DON E. CARLETON,
Brigadier General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

C. L. VALLENTINE,
Captain, Adjutant General's Department,
Assistant Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO #45, U. S. Army

27 September 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: All Officers and Men of VI Corps and Attached Troops.

Seven weeks ago the VI Corps landed on the beaches in Southern France. In these seven weeks, ably supported by Naval and Air Forces and by our French allies and French Forces of the Interior, you have cleared the enemy beach defenses, you have encircled and isolated the ports of Toulon and Marseilles and facilitated their capture by our French allies. You have cleared the Durance Valley, encircling and destroying a large portion of the German Nineteenth Army; you have opened the Rhone River Valley. You have pursued the fleeing remnants of the once proud German Army almost to the border of Germany itself. Your pursuit has covered almost five hundred miles from the beaches. It has involved hard fighting against a desperate enemy. It has involved two major river crossings. You have encountered and overcome every obstacle that German ingenuity could devise. You have been required, with less than organic transport, to move yourselves and your weapons and to supply yourselves over hundreds of miles, distances that few would have considered possible.

Your operations have been of great assistance to the Allied Armies in Northern France and a vital factor in clearing Southwestern, Southern, and Eastern France of enemy forces.

This campaign will stand a monument to the training, fighting spirit, boldness, aggressiveness, determination, and willingness to undergo hardship of the American soldier and to the leadership of American officers of all ranks. To all officers and men I express my sincere appreciation for your hard and untiring efforts and my deep admiration for your accomplishments during this period.

Our task is not yet done. Hard fighting remains. The enemy, reorganized and reinforced, is on the border of his own country. Difficult and rugged terrain confronts us. Rain, cold, and snow will increase the difficulty of our operations. However, I face the future with complete confidence that, surmounting every obstacle and taking every objective in your accustomed manner, you will destroy the enemy before you and will be a vital factor in the final defeat of the enemies of our Country.

L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

NOTE: This message will be read to all troops immediately upon receipt.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO #46, U. S. Army

AG 201.2

13 September 1944

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Message.

TO : Commanders, All Units and Organizations.

The Corps Commander is pleased to transmit the following message received from the Commanding General, Fifth Army:

"Fifth Army today observes Salerno Day, first anniversary of Salerno landings. Our memories are brightened by brilliant success of VI Corps when it made history a year ago. Men of Salerno in your Corps today continue their successes in France, forging ahead as they did a year ago in landings that began a campaign which led to the fall of Rome. Fifth Army today thinks of your men in our first Salerno Day celebration. Best wishes for your continued success."

By command of Major General TRUSCOTT:

Michael L. Conroy

MICHAEL L. CONROY,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

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CASUALTY REPORT OF VI CORPS TROOPS

Date for pd ending 2359	Killed and Missing	Wounded	Non-Battle Casualties	Returned To Units	Replacements
1 Sept	54	101	130	71	192
2 "	206	120	188	97	6
3 "	11	57	151	34	234
4 "	187	15	100	92	5
5 "	38	19	137	123	64
6 "	22	8	73	75	7
7 "	41	100	209	60	4
8 "	60	61	138	541	3
9 "	56	100	185	51	0
10 "	32	150	193	56	206
11 "	82	133	180	397	278
12 "	111	233	221	261	6
13 "	93	124	252	359	11
14 "	62	151	259	354	9
15 "	67	188	261	374	64
16 "	34	134	232	206	0
17 "	144	77	205	260	115
18 "	39	65	188	124	2
19 "	1	107	180	289	556
20 "	38	30	112	149	0
21 "	33	150	251	144	37
22 "	161	184	239	97	68
23 "	97	214	241	301	16
24 "	55	150	317	408	93
25 "	50	130	258	256	636
26 "	106	150	345	350	932
27 "	90	86	345	159	466
28 "	53	216	391	478	363
29 "	166	250	303	168	6
30 "	142	228	322	191	14
TOTALS	2331	3731	6606	6525	4393

ANNEX #2

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

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

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

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

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VI Corps

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HEADQUARTERS, VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U.S. ARMY

R-12131-2

11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Unit History, 1-30 November 1944.

TO : Commanding General, Headquarters Seventh Army, APO 758, U. S. Army. (Attention: Historian).

Organization for combat at beginning of the period:

VI Corps Arty Hq	vic BRUYERES (V248581)
2 FA Obsn Bn	vic FAYS (V212554)
6 FA Gp	vic MORTAGNE (V263633)
(Mission: General support of VI Corps, reinforce fires of 3 Inf Div)	
36 FA Bn (155 G)	vic GRANDVILLERS (V200603)
634 FA Bn (155 H)	vic BROUVELIEURES (V251618)
938 FA Bn (155 H)	vic AUTREY (V223667)
17 FA Gp	vic BRUYERES (V246566)
(Mission: General support of VI Corps, reinforce fires of 36 Inf Div)	
141 FA Bn (155 H)	vic BRUYERES (V254569)
977 FA Bn (155 G)	vic BRUYERES (V245570)
35 FA Gp	vic BRUYERES (V248571)
(Mission: General support of VI Corps)	
194 FA Bn (8" H)	vic ST HELENE (V200662)
935 FA Bn (4.5" G)	vic VENVEZELLE (V263586)
995 FA Bn (8" H)	vic BRUYERES (V243573)
405 FA Gp	vic ST GORGON (V195700)
(Mission: General support of VI Corps, reinforce fires of 45 Inf Div)	
17 FA Bn (155 H)	vic JEANMENIL (V229711)
976 FA Bn (155 G)	vic AUTREY (V225666)
59 AFA Bn (105 SP)	vic RAMBERVILLERS (V178735)
(Direct support 117 Cav Recon Sqdn)	
69 AFA Bn (105 SP)	vic MORTAGNE (V263632)
(Attached to 3 Inf Div)	
93 AFA Bn (105 SP)	vic BELMONT (V263582)
(Attached to 36 Inf Div)	

The mission of VI Corps Arty was to support the action of the Corps, composed at the beginning of the period of three (3) Inf Divs, one (1) Regt Combat Team, one (1) Cav Recon Sqdn, and supporting units. The front line of the Corps was generally north and south, bounded on the north by ST BENOIT (V2674), in the center by LE HAUT JACQUES (V3564) and on the south by LAVALINE (V2754). Corps was exerting pressure along the entire front, but a concentrated, coordinated effort was not being effected at the beginning of the month. Artillery fire by Corps units was principally counter-battery, plus light harassing of enemy lines of communication at night, and supporting observed fires on

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personnel and vehicles during daylight hours. Corps artillery units maintained an aggressive attitude toward displacement by continuous reconnaissance for new positions in Div areas, often in front of the organic Div artillery.

2 FA Obsn Bn, at the first of the period had three sound bases and one flash base in operation. JEANDEUIL Base #1, 6 microphone, 2 second, was sighted generally northeast to cover the north sector of the Corps. JEANDEUIL Base #2, crossed on #1, was sighted east to cover the north central portion of the Corps front. A 5 microphone, 4 second, base in vic MEURTHES was sighted southeast to cover the south sector of the Corps. A 3 OP flash base east of MEURTHES observed into the south central sector.

In order to better coordinate fires of direct support nature, 59 AFA Bn was relieved of attachment to 405 FA Gp and attached to 45 Inf Div, effective 1 Nov 44.

Starting about 2 Nov, 100 Inf Div relieved 45 Inf Div of part of its sector in the north of the Corps front. 405 FA Gp was given the additional mission of reinforcing fires of this new division.

On 6 Nov 17 FA Bn, 976 FA Bn and 59 AFA Bn were relieved from attachment to VI Corps and attached to XV Corps to support the offensive being initiated there. In order to cover the sector vacated by these battalions 935 FA Bn was relieved of attachment to 35 FA Gp and 935 FA Bn was relieved of attachment to 6 FA Gp and both battalions were attached to 405 FA Gp. 69 AFA Bn was relieved from attachment to 3 Inf Div and attached to 100 Inf Div with the mission of direct support of 117 Cav Recon Sqdn.

103 Inf Div started relieving elements of 36 Inf Div about 6 Nov. Due to their proximity to this new division, 6 FA Gp was given the additional mission of reinforcing its fires.

On 9 Nov 45 Inf Div Arty was relieved of attachment to VI Corps. 405 FA Gp was relieved of responsibility of reinforcing fires of 45 Inf Div.

Between 4 Nov and 19 Nov, as elements of the Corps made local attacks to secure high ground and phase lines preparatory to a concentrated effort on the VOSGES, Corps Arty fired heavy, long-range, harassing fires, counterbattery and preparation programs, as well as close-in, observed and unobserved, supporting fires in support of the attacks.

93 AFA Bn was relieved of attachment to 36 Inf Div and attached to 3 Inf Div, and 141 FA Bn was relieved of attachment to 17 FA Gp and attached to 6 FA Gp, in order to give closer and more concentrated support to the Corps main effort on the VOSGES.

A program was fired by Corps artillery in preparation for the Corps attack over the MEURTHE River on 20 Nov. The preparation was started at 0615A and continued for 24 hours. Corps medium battalions were used in close support fires for the infantry, while the heavy artillery and 90mm AA batteries were fired on enemy batteries. A total of 42 enemy batteries were hit in the preparation. Heavy harassing was carried out and local preparations were fired frequently on strongly contested points until the break-through of the MEURTHE line and the pursuit through the VOSGES was effected.

Following the successful crossing of the MEURTHE River and the rapid pur-

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units of the enemy through the VOSGES and across the ALSACE plain to STRASSBOURG and the RHINE River. Corps Arty units displaced behind the supported elements as closely as possible, giving assistance on pockets of resistance that were encountered enroute.

VI Corps Arty CP displaced to BOURBONNE (V2266) on 22 Nov, to ST JEAN D'ORMONT (V4490) on 24 Nov, to SAALES (V5372) the following day, and to MUTZIG (V7993) on 27 Nov.

141 FA Bn was relieved of attachment to 6 FA Gp and attached to 17 FA Gp on 23 Nov. The battalion was given the mission of reinforcing fires of 103 Inf Div.

The mission of 405 FA Gp was changed from reinforcing fires of 100 Inf Div to reinforcing fires of 103 Inf Div following the relief of 100 Inf Div from VI Corps on 26 Nov. 17 FA Gp was given the mission of reinforcing fires of 36 Inf Div. 69 AFA Bn was relieved from attachment to 100 Inf Div and attached to 6 FA Gp, with mission of reinforcing fires of CC "A", 14 Armd Div.

29 FA Bn, 3 Inf Div, fired the first artillery round from VI Corps into Germany at 1017A on 27 Nov. 634 FA Bn fired the first round by Corps Artillery into Germany on 28 Nov.

In order to destroy the bridge at STRASSBOURG and effect other destruction missions 692 FA Bn (-) (240 H) was attached to VI Corps on 29 Nov. This battalion was further attached to 35 FA Gp, with mission of general support of the Corps.

Air OP's gave invaluable assistance during the entire month, in spite of the extreme difficulties encountered in finding suitable landing fields. Mountainous terrain and the soft, muddy, character of ground in the few level spots available made selection of fields near the command post practically impossible. Weather during the period was also adverse, with low clouds, continued rain and high winds. However the pilots were aggressive and they flew every minute of suitable weather, even at the risk of danger to personnel and planes due to a sudden change in flying conditions.

On 6 Nov a pilot from 36 Inf Div, while leading a flight of Cubs from DIJON to a forward field, lost his way in the low hanging clouds and flew across the enemy lines. All of the planes were hit by enemy fire. Two failed to return.

A Cub from 141 FA Bn was wrecked while attempting to land in a high wind on 27 Nov. Both the pilot and observer were injured.

2 FA Obsn Bn supported the Corps by establishing survey for all artillery units during the entire push across the VOSGES. They established sound and flash bases in the more critical areas since coverage of the entire front was impossible. At the end of the month one battery had a sound base and a flash base in operation north of STRASSBOURG, picking up locations of German guns firing from Germany, while the other battery had established a sound base covering the strongly defended area southeast of SELESTAT (V7662).

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Some AA batteries, placed in dual-purpose positions, were used extensively in their ground firing capacity prior to the crossing of the MEURTHE River. AA batteries, thus used, were attached to the nearest FA Gp, which was responsible for the assignment of missions, observation and communication. AA, firing in the artillery role, was used principally in counter-battery, harassing, interdiction and neutralization fires.

Corps Arty units were called on frequently during the month to furnish trucks to haul personnel, ammunition and supplies for the Corps.

Mr. George W. Carr, American Red Cross representative assigned to VI Corps Arty, claims to be the first American Red Cross director to enter STRASBOURG and reach the RHINE River. He distributed personal-need articles to members of 315 Inf in that city on 27 Nov.

There were no changes in personnel, no promotions and no casualties in Hq & Hq Btry, VI Corps Arty, during the month.

For the Commanding General:

WILLIAM D. ADDISON
1st Lt, FA
Adjutant

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 US ARMY

29 January 1945

SUBJECT: Unit History 1 October to 31 October, 1944.

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758, U. S. Army.
(Attention: Historian)

The opening days of October found the Corps Artillery supporting the Corps in the continuation of the attack after the crossing of the MOSELLE River. The Corps field order, dated 30 Sept, required the 45th Division on the R to capture RAMBERVILLERS and seize the line MOYENVIC-MOYENMOUTIER, assisted by the 36th Division attack in the center, and the Third Div to seize the ground in its zone (generally toward LE THILLOT) and block toward the south, also to maintain liaison with the 1st DB on the right. This plan required no changes in the support given by the Corps Artillery mainly, the 405 Cp in direct support of the 45th Div, the 117th Cp in direct support of the 36th Div, and the 6th Cp in direct support of the 3rd Div. On the 1st of October the unit CP was located in vicinity of MOYEN (V1545). The attack begun on the field order above had progressed rapidly in the R resulting in the early capture of RAMBERVILLERS, but elsewhere stiff resistance slowed the advance considerably. The 2nd FOB in general support established ammo dump base R of RAMBERVILLERS and another in vicinity of SENONES on the 2nd of October. The rapid advance of the Corps from southern France with consequent long and difficult supply lines had not begun to result in supply shortages, particularly in regard to ammunition and rations. Severe restrictions imposed by these shortages were reflected in the letter Hq VI Corps, dated 1 Oct, 1944, to all divisions and the Corps Artillery, prescribing allocation of critical types of ammunition for the period 1 Oct - 15 Oct. Thus, we were allowed only 15.4 rounds per piece per day of 155 gun M1M1, 16 for the 155mm howitzer M1, 16 of the 105mm howitzer 1917-18, and 26.4 for the 105mm howitzer M2, M4A, and of these amounts a 20% reserve could only be fired on the orders of the Corps Commander.

Conditions had now become favorable for the employment of AAA battalions in an artillery role and at a conference with 36 AA Brigade and 91 AA Gp representatives this Hq on the afternoon 2nd Oct, it was decided that all firing missions from Divisions would be coordinated by us, and on our approval, would be submitted to 36 AAA Gp for execution. Targets had to be profitable, that is, in the nature of counterbattery, large troop concentrations, and gp batteries. Harassing missions were not desired by the AA. Approx 5000 rounds of ammunition were available, and was allotted to divisions on the basis of 700 rounds per 7 day period per division. Remainder of ammo was to be held in reserve to be fired in emergencies, or when targets were out of artillery fire possibilities. Since of 16 guns each were available for this task, two batteries generally being located in each Div sector. The policy stated above was enunciated in a letter this Hq, dated 3rd Oct, addressed to the C. O. of each Division Artillery. On the 2nd Oct, the 433rd AAA AW Bn was ordered to provide AAA protection for the Corps Artillery, and since only two batteries were available, only the 8 inch

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hows and the 155mm guns were given this protection.

During the next few days the changing situation necessitated several changes in attachments. On Oct 3rd, the 928 FA Bn was attached to the 40th Gp, effective upon its arrival in the Corps sector, which occurred in the afternoon. On this same day a conference held at this Hq, consisting of representatives from XV Corps Arty and Seventh Army, and Col Lemley, decided that liaison was neither necessary or desirable at this time between Corps, but that FO locations on the Corps boundary would be exchanged using the FSS radio net.

The 87th Ord Co (HM) discontinued servicing Corps units the night of Oct 3, requiring that future task assignments be divided among those ordnance companies still present with the Corps. With the relief of the 25th Gp from attachment with the XV French Corps and restoring it to the Corps Artillery, a field message this Hq, dated 4 Oct ordered that the 25 Gp was to be in general support, and the 988th and 994th FA Bns were attached to it. Also the 976 FA Bn was attached to 40th Gp, and B Btry 36th FA Bn was relieved and reverted to Bn control. It was not until 1700A, 5th October that the 25th Gp assumed control in its area. In support of the French attack at 0400HA Oct on LE THILLOT, the S-3 gave the 6th Gp instructions to establish SCR 193 communication with the 1 FF Arty and to answer fire missions requested over it on active FF batteries. During the day 6th Gp fired on several enemy batteries in response to these radioed requests.

The early approach of winter in the VOSGES made the news doubly welcome on Oct 4th that 2100 suits of woolen underwear were available in the VESOUL Dump for Corps Artillery units. Soon after, on the 6th, overcoats were also made available for all units at this same dump. General Roehr, in response to request from G-2, VI Corps, on Oct 8th ordered Capt Hibbs to report to the G-2 for duty as our liaison officer, particularly to keep the G-2 informed of the enemy artillery situation. In response to request from G-4 VI Corps on this same date, the Corps Artillery furnished 35 x 2½ ton trucks to transport infantry from MARSEILLE to the front, a six to ten day round trip.

In view of the ammo shortage, on Oct 6th the S-3 prescribed that the 8" hows would be fired only on observed remunerative targets, and would not be used on unobserved missions except in case of dire necessity. The Executive also directed the 6th Group to establish lateral communication with the 17th Gp, who would establish it with 36th Gp.

The front was growing more stabilized, and as German resistance was stiffening, the Corps Artillery, in compliance with the Corps Commander's wishes, on Oct 8th requested defensive fire plans from each Division Artillery. From this date on, these plans were prepared daily, and checked by this Hq, which recommended changes and produced a fire plan to complement and support the division plans. During this period several attempts were made to contact F-M observed shoots on enemy batteries, but various circumstances, including lack of planes, prevented the accomplishment. However, our SCR 548 radios were checked and procedure perfected by communicating with TAC R planes on their normal photo and reconnaissance missions. B Battery 2 FGB, on Oct 8th closed its CHAMOIS base and installed another in vicinity of LE BOURGEN, facing east. A Battery on Oct 10th abandoned its existing base and established another at LE SYNDICAT, ranging to the NE.

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Tricky reinforcement arrived on the 11th Oct in the form of the 194th Bn. 8" howit which were attached to the Corps Artillery, going into position via [illegible] (1704) and placed under command of the 28th Gp.

In the first eleven days of the month the Corps Artillery fired a total of 72 observed and 170 unobserved missions, on targets ranging from counterbattery to personnel, MGs, and markers. A total of 148 [illegible] missions were executed. Bn FOO was very instrumental in locating these targets, 68 grund locations being plotted up during the period.

Growing stabilization of the front began to require closer contact and teamwork with adjacent Corps Artillery; thus on Oct 13th, 14 Bnbb, 970th Fk Bn was sent to XV Corps Arty as our liaison officer with instructions that we would fire when called, on active known batteries and on major enemy attacks for XV Corps. 14 Bnbb was to make frequent trips to keep both parties abreast of the situation.

One of the outstanding events of the month occurred on 14 Oct when, following report of 2000 by being threatened in an area V of [illegible], Corps Arty and 45th and 18th Div Arty laid down a TOT at 1600h, after which a flight of dive-bombers hit the area. Later available reports indicated good effect. TOT was also placed on the same area at 2040h and 2140h.

At a conference on Oct 15th with the Corps Air Officer, the S-2 arranged to furnish the air support with grid of battery locations that we desired to have bombed, whether they were located inside or outside bombing range.

Following a conference on Oct 19th between Col Lemley and CO 3d AAA Gp, the AAF fire employment of FAA was changed to the extent that the fire direction would be handled through the Fk Gps, but that copies of fire plans involving FAA units would be furnished the AA Gp. Also a portion of the same would be allotted to missions requested by each Div and a portion held by VI Corps Arty for our own use and for reserve.

Difficulties in orientation and obtaining accurate locations of targets were eased considerably by the issuance of complete basic photo cover on Oct 19th of the area NE of line [illegible]-[illegible] to line SE. [illegible]-[illegible] to all Corps Arty groups and battalions on the basis of one sheet per Gp and all Bns, plus one sheet per Fk Bn. By this time, 1/25000 scale maps of good accuracy also became available to our units in ample quantities.

The attack of the 45th and 36th Divisions advanced slowly, due to very stiff opposition, but gradually the enemy lost his hold on the [illegible] line. It was planned to assemble the 3rd Div in vic [illegible], and to hide this movement a Security and Cover plan was devised which required the Corps Arty to maintain increased ob plane activity on the southern portion of the [illegible] Div front; also the run for, construction of, and registration from dummy arty positions in this area, to simulate preparations for an attack toward [illegible]. In accordance with instructions dated Oct 17th from this Hq the 6 Fk Gp and 17 FA Gp executed this mission. In support of the grinding advance of the 45th and 36th Divs to the 3rd Div's jumpoff line, and subsequent breakthrough of the 3rd,

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the Corps artillery. In addition to the usual [illegible] and counter fire on call, [illegible] the [illegible] and [illegible] fire in the [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THEATER SERVICE FORCES
EUROPEAN THEATER

SECRET
By Authority of
CG, FEAT
Initials: MMC
Date:

AG 319.1 ETO-AGO

(Rec'd) 120 887
30 August 1945

SUBJECT: After Action Re[redacted]

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Historical Record, Headquarters VI Corps for the month of December 1944, and Unit History, Headquarters, VI Corps Artillery, for the month of December 1944, are inclosed.

2. Copies of and supporting documents to the inclosed reports, together with Annexes 7, 9 through 17, 18b and 19 through 37 to Inclosure 1, are being retained by this headquarters for further study.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

B. M. CAGLE
Captain, AGD
Assistant Adjutant General

27 AUG 27589
15 SEP 1945
Received

2 Inclos: As stated less copies and supporting documents w/h Annexes 7, 9 thru 17, 18b and 19 thru 37 to Incl 1.

Classification changed to
RESTRICTED 22 MAY 1946
by authority of AC of S, G-2, WDGS
by May M. Stroupe
MAY M. STROUPE
Capt., Inf

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 464, U.S. Army

SECRET
Auth. CG VI Army Corps
Initials
Date: MAR 22 1945

AG 314.7

MAR 22 1945

SUBJECT: Historical Record, Headquarters VI Corps, December 1944.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Through Channels).

INTRODUCTION

1. VI Corps operations in the ALSACE sector of Eastern France during December were divided into three phases: (I) the continued debouchement out of the eastern VOSGES Mountains on the right flank and the attack down the RHINE Valley toward COLMAR; (II) the turning of the Corps power to the North and the attack toward Germany, which resulted in crossings of the Reich frontiers by three infantry divisions on 15 December and continued into the main SIEGFRIED Line fortifications; (III) the cessation of the advance on orders from higher headquarters and the subsequent development of defensive positions running generally along the France-German border, North of STRASBOURG.

2. As the month opened, VI Corps troops held a 25-mile stretch along the West bank of the RHINE River in the STRASBOURG area on the left flank and a line running Southwest from the River to the eastern fringes of the VOSGES Mountains East of SELESTAT and the almost due West through the VOSGES to FRANCE. With the 36 Infantry Division occupying STRASBOURG, the rest of the Corps line from the RHINE into the VOSGES was held by the 2d French Armored Division, Combat Command "A" of the 14th Armored Division, and the 103d and 36th Infantry Divisions. Opposing enemy forces along this same line were: the 198 Infantry Division, the 106 Panzer Brigade, and the 708, 716 and 16 Infantry Divisions.

3. PHASE I - covering the period 1-4 December - saw VI Corps attacking South down the RHINE Valley towards COLMAR with the mission of linking up with forces of the First French Army advancing on COLMAR from the South. Emerging from the eastern fringes of the VOSGES Mountains, the 36th and 103d Infantry Divisions captured SELESTAT together while the 2d French Armored Division and Combat Command "A" of the 14th Armored Division cleared the RHINE Valley to the Northeast.

4. PHASE II - covering the period 5-23 December - saw VI Corps shift its weight to the North towards the German border in the WISSEMBOURG sector. Swinging to the new front, the VI Corps attacked with the 45th, 103d and 79th Infantry Divisions abreast, supported by the 14th Armored Division, and by 25 December all three infantry divisions had crossed the Reich frontiers near WISSEMBOURG. When the advance was halted on 23 December by orders from higher headquarters, forward elements had already penetrated some of the main SIEGFRIED Line positions.

5. PHASE III - covering the remainder of the month - was extremely quiet along the entire Corps front as defensive positions were established on the lines held at the time, generally along the German border. Toward the close of the month, there were strong indications of an enemy buildup on the Corps front, particularly on the left flank, and preparations were being made to repulse the imminent attack on the year ended.

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PHASE I

1 December

1. VI Corps continued to make progress on all fronts during 1 December as resistance decreased throughout the Corps zone except on the extreme northern flank where the enemy remained in some strength in the GAMBSHEIM (R-1110) area. Armored elements resumed their advance South down the RHINE Valley while the 36th and 103d Infantry Divisions continued to pour out of the VOSGES from the West and battled their way forward to the outskirts of SELESTAT. At this time, it appeared that the enemy, favored by poor weather, was continuing his general withdrawal from the RHINE Valley back to GERMANY.

2. At 0800A, Hq VI Corps O. I. No. 18 was issued directing: (a) the 103d Division to continue attack to the line ST. PIERRE (V-8076) - HILSENSCHWILLER (V-745725) and on Corps order to follow attack of 2d DB towards COLMAR; (b) the 36th Division to continue attack South and Southeast in zone to contact the 1st French Army; (c) 2d French Armored Division to continue attack South down the RHINE Valley and contact the 1st French Army, and (d) CC "A" 14th Armored Division to continue attack to the line SCHERWILLER - EBERSHEIM, prepared to assemble on order in Corps reserve or to assist attack of 36th Division1/.

3. On the Corps left flank in the STRASBOURG area, the 3d Division maintained previous positions while elements attempted to eliminate the enemy-held KEHL bridgehead on the eastern outskirts of the city. On the extreme left, the 117th Cav Rcn Sqn patrolled the sector adjacent to the RHINE and Northeast of STRASBOURG, and maintained contact with the 79th Division at WEYERSHEIM (R-0513). Patrols probing towards GAMBSHEIM met heavy fire, and it was believed the town had been converted into a formidable strongpoint. After receiving intermittent shelling ranging from 150mm to 240mm during the night, the 7th Inf (-3d Bn) launched a coordinated attack at daybreak on the KEHL bridgehead -- a small island of territory on the west bank of the RHINE held by the enemy to retain possession of the main bridge from STRASBOURG to KEHL, Germany. West of the bridge, heavy sniper and machine gun fire was encountered from enemy forces located in apartment houses and buildings, while to the South only light resistance was offered. By the close of the period, 7th Inf troops had cleared all enemy from the bridgehead with the exception of scattered snipers -- the bulk of enemy forces evacuating by boat to the east bank of the RHINE under cover of a heavy fog. Dirty prisoners taken in this engagement were identified as belonging from the 109th Artillery (Minerva) Co. The 15th Inf maintained observation posts along the RHINE from vicinity of V-0895 South to the fort at V-[illegible] and held main positions on a parallel line approximately two miles inland to the rear. Elements moved to GERSTHEIM (V-9775) and established positions at V-[illegible], attacking to the East and South. The 30th Inf (-1st Bn) remained in assembly areas at BOTTIGHEIM (V-[illegible]) and Southeast of GRAFFENSTADEN (V-[illegible]) while the "P" renewed efforts to bring about the capitulation of an estimated 800 enemy trapped in a fort just North of MITTEL. Despite direct fire by a 105mm howitzer and 105mm gun, this enemy group continued to hold out during the period and sent a radio message requesting equipment, food and medical supplies. 2/.

4. Pushing South down the RHINE Valley, the 2d DB (Fr) made good progress against light opposition, but encountered extensive minefields and blown bridges. On the left, CC "P" seized BOURTZWEIHER (V-[illegible]), losing two tanks to

1/. Annex No. 9.

2/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 169 - 2 Dec; Wkly, 1 Dec - Entries #11, 27 and 67.

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anti-tank mines while destroying a similar number of enemy tanks. Further advances towards FRIESENHEIM (V-9568) encountered heavy minefields covered by fire, and the column withdrew to ROOFZHEIM for the night. CC "V" passed through CC "D" at OBERNHEIM, moved West and then South towards HERRNHEIM (V-982785). However, heavy anti-tank, mortar and small arms fire caused the column to withdraw to the road junction at V-930744 for the night. Both combat commands were harassed during the period by medium caliber artillery fire coming from the vicinity of OTTENHEIM (R-015765) in Germany. Elements of CC "D" assembled at OSTHOUSE (V-9378) and attacked Southwest, seizing SAND (V-9376) and contacting CC "R" after overcoming numerous roadblocks and minefields. On the right, CC "R" attacked Southeast from vicinity of V-840734 against very light opposition, and seized SERMERSHEIM (V-864718) and KOGENHEIM (V-856710), beyond which blown bridges over the ILL River halted further progress. While the attached 30th Inf elements assembled in this area, preparing to secure a bridgehead across the river, CC "R" attacked Northeast and seized HUTTENHEIM (V-885735) and HENFELD (V-895747) without opposition. With many of its component elements already identified, the German 198 Infantry Division was presumed to be in the VI Corps zone once more and opposing the advance of the 2d DB 3/.

5. Continuing its advance through the VOSGES passes and on to the RHINE plain Northwest of SELESTAT, the 103d Division attacked Southeast with three regiments abreast against light and scattered enemy resistance. Early in the morning, CC "A" 14th Armored Division was attached to the 103d for operations and for the most part supported the 411th Inf. On the left, this RCT, which had occupied EPFIG (V-7973) during the night without meeting any resistance, attacked South and Southeast with its heavy armor support and occupied KERSHEIM before the end of the period. The 62d RCT on the left of this attack was temporarily delayed by a blown bridge at V-796709, but swung Southeast to enter KERSHEIM after overcoming small arms, machine gun and mortar fire on the outskirts. On the right flank, the 48th RCT moved South through ZELL (V-765731), DAMBACH LA VILLE (V-770695) and SCHERWILLER (V-765665), and then turned East towards KERSHEIM, reaching V-779659 by nightfall against resistance which was generally limited to large caliber artillery fire. In the division central sector, the 410th Inf, after being held up by entrenched machine gun positions and minefields covered by fire on the western outskirts of NOTHALTEN and BLIENSCHWILLER, entered both towns by 0800A and rapidly cleared all remaining resistance. By noon, a two-pronged drive developed south towards SELESTAT and positions were held at V-798665 and V-799678 at the close of the period -- the advance encountering practically no opposition. On the right, the 409th Inf cleared DAMBACH LA VILLE after a brief small arms fight and attacked South, occupying DIEFFENTHAL (V-766680) and contacting the 36th Division in the vicinity of SCHERWILLER. Joined by other elements of the regiment coming out of the woods West of SCHERWILLER, a coordinated two-pronged attack was launched Southeast towards SELESTAT against considerable machine gun fire, and by the close of the period troops had reached the vicinity of V-786649 and V-769640. Dense fog in the 409th Inf zone reduced observation to a minimum 4/.

6. On the Corps right flank, 36th Division troops continued to make progress on their left flank and by the close of the period had elements fighting in SELESTAT. Enemy opposition was generally scattered and light, increasing to moderate as SELESTAT was neared. On the left, the 141st RCT and attached 2d Bn 143d Inf continued advancing East towards SELESTAT. CHATEAUX

3/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 109; WRJ, 1 Dec - Entries #51, 60 and 66.

4/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 109; WRJ, 1 Dec - Entries #5, 14, 17, 18, 23, 44, 48, 58 and 75.

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[illegible] and [illegible] (Delta) were placed under counter-attack [illegible]

[illegible] the end of the [illegible] period, [illegible] and [illegible] of the [illegible] zone. In the [illegible] [illegible] to the south and southeast in the [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] in the zone. Seventh Army [illegible] (Delta) and [illegible] engaged with the enemy in the zone in the vicinity of the [illegible]. On the [illegible] the [illegible] for substantial contact with the enemy, [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] North and West of [illegible], [illegible] in great difficulties. Every activity in the [illegible] area was believed to be a screen for further withdrawals 5/.

7. Sixth Air support efforts by the XXX TAC were limited to one mission on the fort North of MUTZIG. No hostile aircraft appeared over the Corps zone during the period.

8. Just before the close of the period, VII Corps O.I. No. 29 was issued, directing: (a) the 103d Division to continue attack in zone and seize the [illegible] - [illegible] (T-7140); assemble one RCT in the [illegible] in [illegible] area for attachment to the 36 ID for operations; (b) the 36th Division to continue attack South and Southeast in zone and seize the line [illegible] (T-8746) - [illegible], keeping to the right of the main [illegible] - [illegible] railroad; (c) the 36 ID to continue attack South down the RHINE Valley to contact the 1st French Army and to relieve attached elements of the 36 Division as soon as an RCT of the 103d Division was available for employment, and (d) CC "A" 14th Armored Division to assemble in present location in Corps reserve, prepared for action to the South 6/.

2 December

9. During 2 December, the major action of the day occurred in the [illegible] area where the 36th and 103d Divisions renewed their attacks to capture the [illegible] in the face of very stubborn resistance with fire from all type weapons including tanks. The 3d Division zone remained quiet throughout the day, while to the South, gains up to two miles were made by the 2d ID despite intensified opposition.

10. On the Corps left flank, the 3d Division sector in the STRASBOURG [illegible] remained quiet. The 117th Cav Rcn Sqn maintained contact with the 79th Division on the left and continued to man outposts along the RHINE River in the [illegible] sector of the Corps zone. East of STRASBOURG, the 7th Inf completed liquidation of the enemy KEHL bridgehead except for scattered snipers. Although the three main bridges over the RHINE East of STRASBOURG were blown by the enemy during the night, 7th Inf troops established positions astride their approaches. Positions of the 15th and 30th Inf remained unchanged, with the former [illegible] continuing to man observation posts along the RHINE and maintain a blocking [illegible] in the vicinity of the OTTERSHEIM bridge. Co "F", 30th Inf continued to patrol the area surrounding the MUTZIG fort, the enemy still refusing to surrender 7/.

11. Continuing to attack South against stiffening opposition, the 2d ID gained approximately two miles along each of its three zones. CC "B", the eastern column nearest the RHINE, repulsed a company sized counterattack in [illegible]

5/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 109; WRJ, 1 Dec - Entries #21, 24, 46, 61, 68 and [illegible]

6/. Annex No. 9.

7/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 110 - 3 Dec; WRJ, 2 Dec - Entries #9 and 12.

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vicinity of ROSHEIM during the night, and at dawn resumed the attack South. After overcoming moderate resistance in a daylong fight, [illegible] was seized, and cleared by [illegible] [illegible] five SP guns, two 88mm flak guns, three AT guns and the capture of 200 prisoners. Although no material losses were suffered by CC "B", 18 men were killed and 38 wounded. CC "A", the central column attacking MARKOLSHEIM, was delayed by mines at V-928720 and attacked the town first with armored infantry and then with the bulk of the armor. After very bitter fighting in which one armored infantry company suffered 65 casualties, the town was cleared and occupied. Elements which had proceeded West from the road junction at V-930744 captured BEL (V-9275) with little opposition but were halted just South of the town by a road demolition. After completion of the bridge over the ILL River at ROSHEIM, CC "A", with the 1st Bn 30th Inf covering its advance, pushed Southeast to the vicinity of V-8959 where positions beyond a hedgerow were taken up for the night -- the advance encountering very heavy interdictory artillery fire. At the close of the period, all positions were firmly held pending further instructions. It was the belief of the 2d DD Command that the enemy had unified his defensive organizations of the COLMAR pocket and intended to defend every village, employing bridge demolitions and prepared anti-tank defenses -- tactics which would eliminate the shock value of armor and reduce its effectiveness to a minimum 8/.

4. CC "A" 14th Armored Division, which had been placed in Corps reserve, proceeded with regrouping and rehabilitation in assembly areas at V-7874, V-7787 and V-8368, and prepared to move North to join its parent unit. Elements in the vicinity of ERSTEIN received considerable mortar and artillery fire during the period and requested counterbattery missions to engage the sources of enemy fire 9/.

5. In the vicinity of SELESTAT, the 103d Division pushed into the city from the North and Northeast, meeting increased and determined enemy opposition. Along other sectors of the division front, enemy forces resisting from dug-in positions and strongpoints kept gains to a minimum. On the left, 411th Inf elements attacked South from ERSTEIN at 0900A through a marshy, wooded area which confined vehicular forces to the road. Heavy machine gun fire from well-organized positions together with supporting artillery fire from the South limited gains to two kilometers. However, continuance of the attack was abandoned upon receipt of instructions that a new O.K. was to be issued by Corps to change the division's entire mission. 411th Inf troops in ERSTEIN continued to encounter occasional sniper and automatic weapons fire and received considerable interdictory artillery and mortar fire from the vicinity of [illegible] (V-843682). In the division central zone, the 410th Inf continued advancing South down the main BFZZO - SELESTAT road, meeting no resistance, and reached the northern outskirts of SELESTAT early in the period. However, since this regiment (less one Bn) was slated for employment with the 2d DD, two battalions began assembling at STOTZHEIM and [illegible] while the remaining battalion held a line from V-8026A3 - V-815659, under considerable mortar and artillery fire, and was strafed by five ME-109's in the middle of the afternoon. Closing in on SELESTAT from the North and Northeast, the 409th Inf entered the northern portion of the city early in the day. Heavy house-to-house and street fighting raged throughout the entire period, resulting in the clearing and occupation of the northern portion of the city. The enemy defended with determination and tenacity, employing heavy small arms, automatic weapons, machine gun and mortar fire supported by tanks. Enemy armor succeeded in cutting off and isolating an infantry company during the course of the heavy fighting. 289 prisoners were taken, the majority from the 708th Inf Div and 2CE Mountain Bn although Battle

8/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 110; WHJ, 2 Dec - Entries #46, 47, 52 and 98; WHJ, 3 Dec - Entry #53.

9/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 110; WHJ, 2 Dec - Entries #23 and 30.

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Groups RIPPEL, HITTENMANN and HOFFMANN were also identified 10/.

6. On the Corps right flank, 36th Division elements attacked the southern half of SELESTAT in conjunction with the 103d Division, meeting very heavy opposition from all types of fire. Over the entire division front, strong scattered enemy groups continued to offer resistance from strongpoints in towns, and made several limited objective counterattacks. On the left, 141st Inf elements, with an attached Bn from the 143d Inf and strong tank support, continued attacking the southern half of SELESTAT and after heavy fighting throughout the day had cleared this portion of the city and cut the road leading Southeast to HEIDOLSHEIM. Enemy resistance consisted of small arms, machine gun, mortar, artillery and tank fire, supplemented by an estimated 100-man counterattack in the vicinity of V-7842 which was repulsed during the morning. In addition to 100 prisoners, a battalion CP was captured in SELESTAT. Other 141st Inf elements still in the VOSGES completed clearing THANNENKIRCH, reached positions overlooking HERRLISHEIM (V-7856), and were fighting in ST. HIPPOLYTE (V-7842) at the close of the period. In the division central sector, the 143d Inf [illegible] continued attacking Southeast through the FOREST DOMANIALE DE RIBEAUVILLE outside the main highway to RIBEAUVILLE and through the FOREST DE KINTZHEIM. Despite strong rear guard detachments and numerous road blocks of felled trees, fair progress was made to the Southeast with elements reaching V-651561, Hill 691 (V-662542), V-635570 and V-626560. A column advancing East on the main road to RIBEAUVILLE reached a point two kilometers from the town without meeting heavy opposition. On the right flank, the 141st Inf maintained pressure to the South and Southeast, making slight advances in the vicinity of LE BONHOMME. Elements moving to HILL 922 (V-543536) overlooking LE BONHOMME from the North, received small arms fire from the nearby enemy occupied town of FAUDUPT (V-548537) and contact was made with the enemy at the road junction in COL DE [illegible] (V-513519), but East of PLAINFAING (V-460515) patrols found the hills at V-469511 and V-484511 clear of the enemy 11/.

7. Fair visibility enabled fighter bombers to resume close support of VI Corps ground troops with 7 missions of 78 sorties being flown. The Fort North of MUTZIG was attacked with blase bombs which, as revealed by a subsequent examination, had practically no effect on the fortification or its tenacious occupants. Other targets attacked included gun positions, motor transport, bridges and railroad facilities. For the first time in many weeks hostile aircraft appeared over the VI Corps zone in considerable strength, indicating that the threatened envelopment of his forces in the COLMAR pocket was of grave concern. At noon, several ME-109's in a flight of 28 dived on eight of our fighter bombers and interrupted a bridge bombing mission in the STRASBOURG area. At 1440A, 5 ME-109's strafed front lines of 103d Division elements in the vicinity of V-805645, and at 1530A two aircraft from a flight of eight which bombed MATZENHEIM (V-9177) were claimed destroyed by our Air. Shortly after nightfall, two hostile aircraft entered the IAZ in the vicinity of STRASBOURG. One plane made a diversionary bombing raid in the vicinity of Q-9505, while the other made three low altitude flights in the vicinity of the fort North of MUTZIG in an apparent attempt to supply the trapped garrison. Three additional planes employed similar tactics at 1937A, one of which was destroyed by AA and crashed in flames 12/.

8. With improved weather conditions, the number of both air and ground observed field artillery missions increased considerably. A tower South of KEHL, thought to be an enemy OP, was fired on by 8" and 240mm howitzers. Several counter battery missions were fired during the day, with Air OPs turning in many of the targets.

10/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 110; WRJ, 2 Dec - Entries #10, 38, 54, 55, 69, and 83.

11/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 110; WRJ, 2 Dec - Entries #35, 54, 74, 75, 76 and 94.

12/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 110.

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9. Late in the period, Field Order No. 7 was received from Hq 7th Army giving the VI Corps new missions as follows: (a) Capture of [illegible] 2d French Armd Div and 36th Division, (b) Continue attack to the north with the 2d French Armd Div and 36th Division. Prepare to pass these units to control of 1st French Army on order of 7th Army, (c) Advance North and break the SIEGFRIED LINE in zone, (d) Protect the right (East) flank along the RHINE River. Effective at a date and hour to be announced, the following boundary was to be established between XV and VI Corps: [illegible] (Q-[illegible]) - BEKARTSWILLER (Q-7830) - WEIMERSWAI (Q-7634) - BARRENTHAL (Q-[illegible]) - [illegible] (Q-8742) - NEUHOFFEN (Q-9146) - OBERSCHEIDBACH (Q-9[illegible]) - [illegible] (Q-[illegible]) - Hill 524 (R-0158) - DAHL (R-0361). Effective at a date and hour to be announced, the following boundary was to be established between 7th Army (VI Corps right flank) and 1st French Army: JAGERHILL (V-1346) - BUTTENHEIM (V-[illegible]) - ST. ERE (V-4265) - GRANDFONTAINE (V-5768) - [illegible] (V-7044) - [illegible] (V-[illegible]) - PIOBSHEIM (V-9985) - OFFENBURG (W-1585), all to 1st French Army. For the effort to breach the SIEGFRIED LINE, the following additional divisions with all current attachments were attached to VI Corps effective 0600A 5 December 1944: 14th Armored Division, 45th Division and 79th Division 13/.

10. In conformity with this 7th Army Field Order, O.I. No. 22 was issued by Hq VI Corps, directing the following action: (a) 103d Division: To clear SELESTAT in conjunction with 36th Division, employing no more than one infantry regiment; relieve elements of CC "A" 14th Armd Division in KINTZHEIM without delay and hold the line RJ V-7936E - KINTZHEIM until relieved by 2d French Armored Division; on Corps order to assemble in ORSCHAI - MAIR - ST. PIERRE area, prepared to move North, (b) 36th Division: To continue present mission, prepared to come under command of 1st French Army on Corps order; relieve elements of 103d Division in SELESTAT after its capture, (c) 2d French Armd Division: To maintain pressure from present positions; relieve elements of 103d and 3d Divisions in zone prior to 0600A 4 December, prepared to come under command of 1st French Army on Corps order, (d) CC "A" 14th Armd Division: Be prepared on three hours notice after 0700A 3 December to move to join parent unit in vicinity of DETWILLER (Q-8017). Previous orders attaching elements of the 103d Division to 2d DB were revoked 14/.

3 December

1. During 3 December, preparations were started for the northward move towards the SIEGFRIED LINE. Reliefs were initiated and troops began to assemble in areas behind the fighting front. Heavy fighting continued in SELESTAT where elements of the 36th and 103d Divisions were slowly wresting the city from enemy hands. Advances Southeast through the VOSGES resulted in the occupation of RIBEAUVILLE against only slight opposition. The lack of light to moderate caliber artillery fire during recent periods indicated the bulk of enemy artillery was being displaced East of the RHINE River with self-propelled and tank fire being employed to support delaying actions.

2. On the Corps left flank in the STRASBOURG area, the entire 3d Division sector remained quiet throughout the period. Vigilant outposts maintained their watch on the RHINE, and occasional heavy machine gun and mortar fire were directed on motor movements by the enemy from the east bank. Heavy artillery fire of a harassing nature fell in the vicinity of R-058120 and West of the STRASBOURG - KEHL bridge during the day. 30th Inf elements remained in positions

13/. Annexes Nos. 10 and 11; (7A O.I. #27).

14/. Annex No. 9.

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[illegible] the [illegible] away group still holding out to the fort north of [illegible] 15/.

5. South of the 26 Division sector, the 26 RB held fire in all previous engagements [illegible] 16/.

6. On "A" 26th Armored Division, in force remain, [illegible] at 2700A, in [illegible] area in the vicinity of [illegible], according to [illegible] of [illegible] was certain. Prior to this movement, elements of CC "A" in [illegible] were followed by troops of the 26th Inf 17/.

7. In the 26th Division area, heavy fighting raged in [illegible] as the enemy was [illegible] by [illegible] and [illegible]. With only one regiment being actively engaged, the division commander [illegible] in the vicinity of [illegible] in preparation for movement to the north. On the left, troops of the 26th Inf relieved elements of CC "A" in [illegible] and assisted reconnaissance of [illegible], which was found clear of the enemy. The united area north of [illegible] was cleared of scattered enemy detachments [illegible]. Positions were consolidated in anticipation of the relief by the 26 RB which was completed by 1800A. The 26th Inf were prepared for movement to an assembly area in the vicinity of [illegible]. However, a small force of tank destroyers, artillery and infantry remained in the area for 24 hours in a security force to support the French. With [illegible] of 26th Inf already assembled at [illegible], remaining elements maintained positions southwest of [illegible] along the road from [illegible] - [illegible]. On the division right flank, the 109th Inf continued with its mission of clearing [illegible] in conjunction with the 26th Inf and engaged in heavy fighting in the northern half of the city. Fierce house to house and street fighting raged throughout the day with the enemy employing heavy caution gun and small arms fire from well-entrenched positions. However, a decrease in mortar and artillery fire was noted. Houses converted into strongpoints by the enemy were first fired upon by tank destroyers after which infantry rushed in to mop up. Shortly after mid-day, an estimated 150 enemy supported by tanks launched a counterattack from the eastern outskirts of the city but, after an hour of heavy fighting in which heavy casualties were suffered from tank fire, the attack was beaten off. A high percentage of misfires in our bazooka ammunition proved rather costly in this engagement. The infantry company which had been cut off the previous day also lost approximately 50% of its personnel to tank fire. Contact was maintained with 36th Division elements throughout the period, and by nightfall positions were held along the eastern edge of [illegible] from V-795637 South to V-795886, in close contact. Of the 213 prisoners taken during the period, the majority were from Battle Groups [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] 18/.

6. On the Corps right flank, 36th Division troops continued to make good progress Southeast through the VOSGES, occupying [illegible] on the fringe of

15/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 111 - 4 Dec.

16/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 111; WRJ, 3 Dec - Entries #34 and 68.

17/. G-3 Rpt No. 111.

18/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 111; WRJ, 3 Dec - Entries #8, 25, 28, 29, 39, 46 and 66.

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the RHINE Valley, while elements in SELESTAT remained in contact with the enemy throughout the period. Moderate enemy resistance from infantry weapons and increasing artillery fire opposed efforts to clear the forest edges from ST. HIPPOLYTE to RIBEAUVILLE. The 14th Inf, with an attached battalion of the 14th continued to engage the enemy in the southeastern portion of SELESTAT, making slow house-to-house progress against heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. Contact was constantly maintained with the 409th Inf on the left. Although blown by the enemy, the bridge over the ILL River at V-798619 was secured after a sharp small arms and machine gun fire fight. Elements moving South to establish a road block on the SELESTAT - COLMAR Highway were stopped in the vicinity of V-762590 by 20mm and self-propelled gun fire. Other 14th Inf elements completed the clearing of ST. HIPPOLYTE after a 3½-hour fight, while forces advancing Southeast from THANNKIRCH were held up in the vicinity of V-795580 by considerable small arms, mortar and self-propelled gun fire. In the division central sector, elements of the 14th Inf advanced Southeast astride the main road to RIBEAUVILLE and occupied the town against only slight small arms fire on the eastern edge. However, light artillery fire from the East and Southeast harassed troops in the town during the latter part of the period. Other elements of the regiment pressed South from the main STE. MARIE - RIBEAUVILLE road into the rugged and heavily wooded hill masses of the FORET DE RIBEAUVILLE, and against slight resistance reached the general line (V-659590 to V-681558, with elements on Hill 692 (V-665h) and Hill 938 (V-635h) engaged in light contact with the enemy. AUBURE was finally cleared after more than 24 hours of fighting. On the right, 14th Inf elements relieved troops of the 143d Inf in the vicinity of AUBURE and occupied positions just to the South along the wood line V-692590 - V-688555. From the Hill just Northeast of LE HOHNEUBRG, a column advanced East to the vicinity of V-683537 without contact but encountered some mortar fire. The 36th Cav Rcn Rgp maintained positions at V-658513 and V-687530, protecting the division and Corps right flank and sent periodic patrols South to contact the 3d DIA on the right 19/.

7. Improved weather conditions during the morning permitted the resumption of close support attacks by fighter bombers - 8 missions of 78 sorties being completed. Targets attacked included gun positions, troop concentrations and bridges on the RHINE River. Enemy aircraft were also very active during the period. At 1030A, one ME-109 without markings attempted to land on our airstrip in the vicinity of V-919938 and was heavily engaged by AA. The plane was believed to have crashed East of VERMENHEIM (Q-9808). At 1557A, five ME-109's strafed EBERAU (V-983873), leaving three buildings burning and then flew North to strafe a convoy crossing the bridge at V-995982. These planes were engaged by light AA and one was probably destroyed 20/.

8. During the period, Hq 7th Army O.I. No. 27 was received, directing the following to take effect at 0001A 5 December: (a) Boundary changes between XV Corps and VI Corps, and between 7th Army (VI Corps right flank) and 1st French Army as outlined in 7th Army Field Order No. 7; (b) The relief from attachment to VI Corps of the 2d French Armored Division and 36th Division with attached 753d Tank Bn, 636th TD Bn, 83d Chl Mortar Bn, 443d AAA AW Bn, Hq & Hq Btry 17th FA Group, 977th FA Bn, 111st FA Bn, 1st Bn 36th Engr C Regt and their passing to operational control of 1st French Army; (c) The 463d AAA AW Bn, 106th AAA AW Bn, 398th AAA AW Bn, 192nd Tank Bn, 93d Armored FA Bn, 2d

19/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 111; WWJ, 3 Dec - Entries #30, 52 and 70.

20/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 111.

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FA Bn, 938th FA Bn, 935th FA Bn, 976th FA Bn, 698th FA Bn, 575th FA Bn (-Btrys A & G), Hq & Hq Btry 405th FA Group, 645th TD Bn and 813th TD Bn are relieved from attachment to XV Corps and attached to VI Corps, (d) The 781st Tank Bn, 250th FA Bn and 975th FA Bn are relieved from attachment to VI Corps and attached to XV Corps 21/.

4 December

1. During 4 December, close contact with the enemy was maintained on only a small portion of the VI Corps front, as two divisions completed movement to the North in preparation for the assault on the SIEGFRIED LINE. The enemy remained inactive on the northern front and in the central zone left only snipers behind to cover withdrawals from SELESTAT which was cleared during the afternoon. In the southern zone, scattered groups offered moderate resistance at road blocks and on terrain features.

2. On the Corps left flank, the 3d Division continued to hold the RHINE River line in the STRASBOURG area, the enemy remaining inactive across the entire division front. Light, harassing mortar and artillery fire was received on advanced positions, with occasional 240mm shells falling in STRASBOURG during the afternoon, and long range enemy machine gun fire from East of the RHINE engaged vehicular movement in the vicinity of R-068053 and an OP at R-078053. The bridge East of GAMBSHEIM at R-098095 was blown by the enemy during the period. The 1st Bn 30th Inf was relieved from attachment to 2d DB and closed in an assembly area in the vicinity of ACHENHEIM (V-9097) at 1400a, reverting to control of parent unit. 30th Inf elements exploded a 3½-ton demolition charge against the fort North of MUTZIG, employing a captured German half track to roll the charge against the fort, and breached an eight foot hole in one wall. Under cover of darkness, nine enemy including two officers were captured after a small arms fire fight as they attempted to escape from the fort. Interrogation revealed an approximate 82 stragglers from miscellaneous units still in the subterranean recesses of the fort 22/.

3. No change in forward positions of the 2d DB occurred during the day, with forces holding firm along the general line FRIESENHEIM - ROSSFELD - RJ at V-890693 - EBERSMUNSTER - EBERSHEIM. Elements of CC "R" relieved 410th Inf troops remaining in the vicinity of the road junction at V-798642. During the period, forces were regrouped in preparation for further advances to the South 23/.

4. In the 103d Division zone, the 409th Inf cleared SELESTAT by late afternoon. The bulk of enemy forces had apparently withdrawn under cover of darkness, and only isolated snipers offered unorganized opposition which was quickly eliminated. During the morning, long range machine gun fire originating from the woods Southeast of SELESTAT and mortar and artillery fire harassed mopping-up operations in the city. At the close of the period, relief of the 409th Inf was being completed by the 3d Bn 142d Inf. The 411th and 410th Inf (-3d Bn) moved North by motor from assembly areas at EPFIG to the new division assembly area East of GOUGENHEIM (Q-8711). The 3d Bn 410th Inf was relieved by 2d DB elements in the vicinity of the road junction at V-798642 and moved to an assembly area North of SCHERWILLER 24/.

5. On the Corps right flank, 36th Division troops continued to register

21/. Annexes No. 10 and 11.

22/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 112 - 5 Dec.

23/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 112.

24/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 112; WRJ, 4 Dec (Mutzig OP) - Entry #20; (Saverne OP) - Entry #25.

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[illegible] to the southeast, clearing numerous towns against moderate resistance from scattered enemy groups defending terrain features and road blocks along the routes of advance. On the left, 1/26 Inf elements continued to hold positions in the southern portion of [illegible] during the day, supported by scattered snipers, and with the aid of tank and tank destroyer elements relieved two battalions of the 409th Inf in the northern part of the city [illegible]. The remainder of the division continued to push southeast along the corps right flank. The 1/26 Inf (-3d Bn) cleared the towns of [illegible] (V-7[illegible]), ORSCHWILLER (V-7360), ST. HIPPOLYTE (V-7359), [illegible] (V-7358) and [illegible] (V-7357), clearing scattered enemy from the nearby wooded areas against only light small arms resistance. The 1/26 Inf consolidated positions in [illegible] and vicinity, beating off three light counterattacks during the night and early morning hours, and completed clearing the surrounding wooded areas with elements occupying the towns of HERBSHEIM and [illegible] practically unopposed. On the right, the 1/21st Inf, less a Bn assembled at [illegible], continued to maintain pressure South and Southeast of FAURUPT (V-5554) and [illegible], making only local gains 25/.

6. CC "A" 14th Armored Division closed in assembly areas in the vicinity of DETTWILLER at 0400A and reverted to control of parent unit 26/.

7. No close air support missions were flown during the period because of poor weather conditions. However, enemy aircraft continued to be active over the Corps zone, with a total of 13 Me 109s and one FW-190 being identified. Numerous GP and artillery positions in the northern and central zones were strafed, injuring several men but causing no noteworthy damage. All planes were engaged by our AA which destroyed two and claimed one other "probable" 27/.

8. The VI Corps Command Post closed at MUTZIG and opened in SAVERNE (Q-7215) at 0418OOA December 1944.

PHASE XI

5 December

1. VI Corps reorganized during the period, turning to North and taking up a sector along the general line OBERBRONN - [illegible] - SCHWEYHAUSEN - GRIES - WEYERSHEIM - South of GAMBSHEIM, with the 45th and 79th Divisions abreast, while the 3d Division continued to hold the MOSELLE River line in the STRASBOURG area. The 14th Armored Division assembled in the GUTTENBERG (Q-3119) area and the 103d Division continued to assemble component units in the area East of GOUGENHEIM. The 36th Division and 2d DB were relieved from attachment to VI Corps at the beginning of the period and the Corps was relieved of its mission in the SELESTAT area. Enemy forces opposing the new VI Corps front consisted mainly of the 25th Volksgrenadier Division, 256th Infantry Division and elements of the 361st Volksgrenadier Division which maintained a general defensive attitude across the front during the period. The two former divisions had recently arrived from the HOLLAND area where they had been severely mauled and depleted in strength.

2. On the Corps left flank, in the 45th Division sector, the principal

25/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 112; WRJ, 4 Dec (Mutzig GP) - Entries #14 and 30

26/. G-3 Rpt No. 112.

27/. G-2 Rpt No. 112

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[illegible]

3. In the Corps central sector the 79th Division, with elements of three regiments — from left to right the 313th, 314th and 315th — held the church line [illegible] (Q-9726) to [illegible] (Q-9827), with the 77th Div [illegible] maintaining contact with the 1st Division on the left and the attached 26th Cav Ron Gp maintaining contact with the 112th Cav Ron Gp on the right in [illegible]. Active patrols along the division front maintained contact with the enemy who evidenced little activity. Sporadic mortar and artillery fire was received by all front line units during the period, with heavy artillery concentrations falling in [illegible] (Q-9723) and [illegible] at 2200A 29/.

4. On the Corps right flank, no changes in dispositions were made by the 28 Division during the period. The enemy resumed harassing enemy fire along the [illegible] River. The boundary of the enemy pocket of the fort North of [illegible] finally raised a white flag on the ramparts at 0730A and surrendered to Co E 304th Inf. The fort yielded a total of 82 prisoners, the majority of which belonged to the Signal Bn and 658 Artillery Regiment of the 708 Infantry Division 30/.

5. The VI Corps Command Post closed at SAVERNE and opened in DETWILLER (Q-8823?2) at 0515?0A December 19th 31/.

6. Effective 0000A 5 December, the following units were attached to VI Corps: 61ith TD Bn, Btrys C & D 439th AAA AW Bn, Btrys C & D 533d AAA AW Bn (on arrival in SAUERBOURG), and 684 AAA Gun Bn 32/.

7. Poor weather prevented close support missions during the period, and fighter bombers were diverted to armed reconnaissance missions beyond the Corps area, with attacks being made on rail targets and marshalling yards with good effect. Enemy aircraft were very active over the Corps area, however, a total of twenty-two ME-109's and two FW-190's making an appearance to strafe [illegible]

28/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 113 - 6 Dec; WBJ, 5 Dec (Reverse CP) - Entries #10 and 35; (Detwiller CP) - Entry #18.

29/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 113; WBJ, 5 Dec (Reverse CP) - Entry #34.

30/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 113.

31/. G-3 Rpt No. 113.

32/. G-3 Rpt No. 113; WBJ, 6 Dec - Entries #6 and 7.

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enemy transport and a convoy on the road in the vicinity of U-6534. 422 planes were engaged by AA which claimed only one plane as probably destroyed 33/.

5. VI Corps Field Order No. 9 was issued at 1800A outlining the missions of the divisions in the VI Corps attack to the North to breach the SIEGFRIED Line in zone in the WISSEMBOURG area. The general plan directed the 103d Division to relieve elements of the 45th and 79th Divisions in the GRUNDMACH - MERTZWILLER area in preparation; then the three infantry divisions to attack abreast to the Northeast from the general line - KIMBERGEN - MERTZWILLER - GRIES - GAMBSHEIM; with the 14th Armored Division prepared to pass through the 103d Division in the center of the Corps zone and attack North to seize crossings over the LAUTER River in the WISSEMBOURG area and to exploit to the North through the SIEGFRIED LINE 34/.

6 December

1. During 6 December, the VI Corps front remained stabilized with no major gains being registered. The enemy remained inactive in the central and southern zones but became aggressive on the northern front where a counter-attack forced 45th Division elements to withdraw from the portion of MERTZWILLER North of the river.

2. In the 45th Division zone, the 157th Infantry on the left maintained pressure against KIMBERGEN during the day. Elements moving to cut roads in the vicinity of Q-9834 encountered heavy fire and gains were negligible. Active patrols ranging across the regimental front detected considerable enemy activity and numerous concealed tanks, though in the wooded area on the left flank of the division an undefended road block and unoccupied positions disclosed an apparent enemy withdrawal. Elements of the 179th Inf moved North and occupied Hill 258 (Q-9831) by mid-afternoon, meeting only moderate opposition. At 2300A, 40-50 enemy launched an unsuccessful counterattack in an effort to retake the hill. Remaining forces of the 179th Inf held previous positions and engaged in vigorous patrolling. On the division right flank, in the MERTZWILLER area, the major activity of the period took place. A tremendous increase of artillery fire was received in MERTZWILLER during the day, an estimated 1000-round concentration of 150mm artillery, tank and self-propelled gun fire falling in a one-hour period during mid-morning. At 1500A, an approximate 500-round mixed concentration of shellfire followed by a counterattack of 75 enemy infantry supported by three tanks compelled 180th Inf elements to abandon the bridgehead across the LA KINTZEL DU NORD River at MERTZWILLER and retire to the South side of the river. 35/.

3. In the Corps central sector, the three regiments of the 79th Division maintained active patrols to hold contact with the enemy. The woods Northeast of GRIES was found to be strongly held by the enemy. On the right, the 94th Cav Ron Sqn sent patrols to test the strength of defenses in and around GAMBSHEIM, reaching R-095095, R-088100 and R-113101, but were unable to enter the town because of the heavy self-propelled gun and machine gun fire and withdrew under cover of darkness. Sporadic light and medium caliber artillery fire was received along the division front throughout the period, and forward

33/. G-2 Rpt No. 113.

34/. Annex No. 12

35/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 114 - 7 Dec; WD, 6 Dec - Entries 19, 13, 38, 41 and 53.

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elements were harassed by machine gun and flakwagon fire from positions North of the MODER River 36/.

4. On the Corps right flank, the 3d Division continued to maintain river patrols and outposts along the RHINE, making no changes in troop dispositions. The enemy remained relatively inactive during the period, placing long range machine gun fire from across the RHINE on an outpost of the 117th Cav Rcn Sqn at M-0462113. An estimated 100 rounds of medium or heavy caliber artillery fire fell in STRASBOURG during the night. The 117th Cav Rcn Sqn continued patrolling in the northern part of the division sector and maintained contact with the enemy 37/.

5. 409th Inf elements closed in the regimental assembly area in the vicinity of RUMERSHEIM (Q-9210) during the day to complete assembly of the 103d Division. The 14th Armored Division remained in Corps reserve in the DETTWILLER area 38/.

6. No close support aerial missions were flown during the day due to poor visibility and weather. However, several attacks were made by fighter bombers on the marshalling yards at KARLSRUHE. In the late afternoon, a flight of six FW-190's strafed areas in the vicinity of STRASBOURG while two ME-109's, apparently on reconnaissance, flew over the 79th Division sector. The planes were engaged by AA which destroyed one FW-190 and claimed a probable Me-109 39/.

7. At 1400A, Operation Plan "CACTUS" was issued by Hq VI Corps. The mission of the plan was to simulate preparation for an attack against enemy positions in the BISCHWILLER area and South thereof. Units to be employed were the 103d Division and 14th Armored Division. Simulated preparations for the attack were to include: Increased vehicular activity on main roads East and South of BRUMATH (Q-9615), visits by commanders and staff representatives of battalions to designated command installations in the prescribed sector, reconnaissance for and marking with unit signs of assembly areas and CPs to simulate a contemplated relief of units already in the prescribed sector, registration of artillery using single guns from several positions, initiation of reconnaissance in the area between 10 and 20 Northings on 8 - 9 - 10 December, simulation on nights of 8 - 9 and 9 - 10 December of a heavy concentration of medium tanks in HOERDT (R-0411), GEUDERTHEIM (R-0113) and WEYERSHEIM areas 40/.

8. O.I. No. 22 was issued at 1700A, directing generally: (a) the 103d Division to relieve elements of the 45th and 79th Divisions, in accordance with VI Corps Field Order No. 9, after the hours of darkness commencing on the night of 7 - 8 December; (b) that D day H hour for the missions contained in Field Order No. 9 would be 10 December, 0700A hours; (c) the 79th Division to attack as directed in Field Order No. 9 on D-1 at an hour to be selected by the Division Commander 41/.

7 December

1. VI Corps troops maintained pressure to the Northeast in the left zone

36/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 114; WRJ, 6 Dec - Entries #14 and 52.

37/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 114

38/. G-3 Rpt No. 114.

39/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 114

40/. Annex No. 13

41/. Annex No. 9

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on 7 December while attacking and partially clearing GAMBSHEIM on the right [illegible] Division elements in zone and assumed command of the sector [illegible] Order No. 9. Hostile activity declined somewhat over the previous period, the enemy following his familiar pattern of remaining passively defensive and reacting in proportion to our own aggressiveness.

2. On the Corps left flank, front lines of the 45th Division received scattered, light artillery fire during the night. Night patrols of the 157th Inf encountered strong enemy positions at Q-983389, and close contact was maintained with the enemy Southwest of MIEDERBRONN during the day. In the division central sector, advances to the Northeast by the 179th Inf met stubborn opposition; however, by nightfall, elements had reached the factory area at Q-940358, Southwest of REICHSHOFFEN. On the right, 180th Inf elements in the southern half of MERTZWILLER bore the brunt of the enemy's artillery fire during the period, receiving an estimated 300 rounds of 150mm, 200 rounds of 75mm SP and 300 rounds of 80mm mortar fire. Outposts along the southern banks of the LA ZINTZEL DU NORD River in MERTZWILLER were forced to withdraw because of the heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire from houses on the north bank. At 2100A, the 180th Inf (-1st Bn) was relieved in position by units of the 103d Division, and moved to assembly areas at OBERWILLER (Q-9834) and GUMBRECHTSHOFFEN (Q-9834). 45th Division Artillery positions were strafed by four ME-109's at 1400A, causing no damage or casualties 42/.

3. Units of the 103d Division relieved right flank elements of the 45th Division and left flank forces of the 79th Division, thus assuming command of the zone prescribed by VI Corps Field Order No. 9. One battalion each from the 410th and 411th Infs relieved all committed elements of the 180th Inf in the general vicinity of MERTZWILLER under cover of darkness. Reserve battalions of the 410th and 411th Infs assembled at Q-953875 and in the vicinity of BITSCHHOFFEN (Q-9229) shortly after the front line reliefs were completed 43/.

4. In the 79th Division sector, close contact was maintained with the enemy along the entire front with sporadic small arms and machine gun fire being received. Light artillery and mortar fire also harassed forward elements during the period, culminating in a 100 round concentration on SCHWEIGHAUSEN. The principal activity of the period was on the division right flank where the 94th Cav Ron Sqn, reinforced by armored infantry and tank elements of the 14th Armored Division, attacked GAMBSHEIM from the Southwest and North at 0830A after a 30 minute artillery preparation. Despite mortar fire from the woods North of GAMBSHEIM and heavy small arms and machine gun fire from the western approaches the town was entered and partially occupied, with street fighting still in progress at the close of the period. Well-directed mortar and artillery fire from the East bank of the RHINE was received in the town until 1900A 44/.

5. On the Corps right flank, 3d Division troops maintained the RHINE River outpost line with enemy infantry activity being negligible during the period. Co E 30th Inf joined parent unit in the vicinity of OBERHAUSBERGEN (Q-9601) after Engineers had completed the sealing of the Fort North of MUTZIG in compliance with verbal orders of the VI Corps Commander. The 117th Cav Ron Sqn continued patrolling to the North and Northwest, keeping in contact with 79th Division on the left 45/.

42/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 115 - 8 Dec; WRJ, 7 Dec - Entries #45, 66 and 88.

43/. G-3 Rpt No. 115.

44/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 115; WRJ, 7 Dec - Entries #47, 48, 49, 65 and 91.

45/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 115.

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ANNEX

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Lessons

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[illegible] 47/.

[illegible] 48/.

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artillery and mortar fire was received by patrols from [illegible] the period. [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] and the enemy patrols [illegible] reported that enemy patrols were heard by patrols that enemy patrols, especially in the [illegible] area, had [illegible] and it was believed that [illegible] were being [illegible] towards the [illegible] line. On the right, the 25th [illegible] was not attacked. The [illegible] Division elements observed [illegible] of all enemy forces by [illegible]. Heavy [illegible] fire was heard and patrols to the front [illegible] made. Elements of the 24th [illegible] Division [illegible] and [illegible] to prevent [illegible]. The report at [illegible] noted 87 prisoners from the 12 [illegible] [illegible] (256 YG 214), while American casualties were 4 killed and 27 wounded 49/.

5. On the Corps right flank, 24 Division troops in the STRASBURG area continued to patrol along the west bank of the [illegible] River with only slight enemy movement and activity being observed along the division front. Artillery fire was placed on enemy rail movements in the vicinity of [illegible] (V-4585). Enemy artillery fire was negligible, and the entire period was characterized by unusual quietness 50/.

8 December

1. During 8 December, 79th Division troops launched an attack against HAGUENAU and [illegible], making good progress against initially light resistance which stiffened as the period drew to a close. On the left, the 45th Division maintained pressure to the Northeast, taking [illegible]. The 103d Division remained in position, dispatching [illegible] 4th reserve regiment in preparation for the attack on 10 December. No hostile aircraft appeared over the Corps area.

2. On the Corps left flank, 45th Division troops maintained pressure to the Northeast. Elements of the 157th Inf cleared [illegible] and secured the road junction at Q-936288 by late afternoon after encountering moderate resistance from enemy snipers and machine gun fire. Road blocks were established North and West of the town along the general line Q-933393 - Q-937364. Troops of the 157th Inf which had outflanked [illegible] to the Northeast maintained pressure along the line Q-9363412 - Q-952405, while another force occupied high ground at Q-938410 where strong small arms fire was encountered and a 15-man enemy group was repulsed. Northeast of [illegible], the enemy had apparently made limited withdrawals as patrols to Q-947447 and Q-938436 made no contact with the enemy. On the right, the 179th Inf cleared the patch of woods at Q-935375 and occupied the top of Hill 258 (Q-930380) against little opposition. Patrols reported that the enemy continued to occupy the [illegible] - [illegible] area in moderate strength. The 180th Inf remained in reserve. 102 prisoners mainly from the 915th and 936th Grenadier Regiments, were taken by 45th Division troops during the period 51/.

3. In the 103d Division sector, extensive patrolling was carried out by elements of the 411th and 410th Infs in preparation for the attack on 10 December. Night patrols of the 410th Inf crossed the river during the night and made contact with the enemy at Q-939309 and Q-978896. Enemy activity was of a minor nature along the division front, and his defensive attitude continued. Small arms and machine gun fire was received by patrols attempting to cross the [illegible] River during the day. The 409th Inf completed movement to an assembly

49/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 116; Whj, 8 Dec - Entries #37, 66, 78 and 89.

50/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No.116; Whj, 8 Dec - Entries #80 and 34.

51/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 117 - 10 Dec; Whj, 9 Dec - Entries #38, 62 and 81.

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[illegible] in the vicinity of RIMBERDORF (Q-9085) - SCHALKENDORF (Q-8726), with [illegible] elements closing at 2435A 52/.

6. After a quiet night, the 79th Division attacked Northeast towards HAGUENAU and BISCHWILLER at dawn without the usual artillery preparation. The enemy was apparently caught off balance in the BISCHWILLER area as good initial progress was made there, and the rate of enemy artillery fire in the morning was quickly cut down by our counterbattery fire. On the left, the 314th Inf conducted vigorous patrolling towards HAGUENAU during the night and morning, and attacked Northeast at 1430A with three battalions abreast. Alert enemy defenses in this area met the attack with heavy small arms, mortar and artillery fire. However, by the close of the period, the southwestern outskirts of HAGUENAU had been reached and positions were held along the general lines R-017835 - R-018827, R-028827 - R-025830, and R-028825 - R-036207, with elements on the left meeting heavy small arms fire in the woods. In the division central sector, two battalions of the 315th Inf attacked Northeast at 0715A and immediately struck stiff resistance. Elements attacking MARIENTHAL (R-0680) battered their way to a point just South of the town against heavy small arms and mortar fire, also meeting heavy concentrations of artillery fire. Forces attacking Northeast just to the right of MARIENTHAL encountered strong small arms and machine gun fire supported by two self-propelled guns. At 1400A, a third attacking force of the 315th Inf jumped off from the vicinity of R-050800 and advanced North to the line R-057207 - R-050816 against heavy mortar and artillery fire. On the right, the two-column attack by the 313th Inf at 0645A towards BISCHWILLER apparently took the enemy by surprise as only light resistance was offered during the morning. The left column progressed rapidly through the woods East of GRIES, while the right column jumped off from KIRCHENHAUSEN (R-0536) and rapidly progressed Northeast through HANHOFFEN (R-090179) -- both columns meeting only light small arms and machine gun fire and converging at BISCHWILLER where tanks and tank destroyers joined leading infantry elements by mid-morning. The main bridge across the MODER River in BISCHWILLER had been prepared for demolition but was seized intact before the charges could be detonated. The town was quickly cleared against sniper and machine gun fire, with the heaviest fighting taking place in the factory area in the vicinity of R-087193. The attacking forces pressed on to the southern portion of OBERHOFFEN SUR MODER. In the afternoon, enemy resistance stiffened, with considerable mortar and artillery fire being employed against forward elements of the 313th Inf. During the period, more than 200 prisoners were taken by the 79th Division, the majority identified as being from the 456th and 476th Grenadier Regiments 53/.

7. On the Corps right flank, 3d Division troops maintained outposts on the RHINE River in the STRASBOURG area. Enemy infantry activity was negligible throughout the period, and there was little reaction to an artillery shoot conducted by the 3d Division Artillery. The 117th Cav Ron Sqn continued patrolling to the North and Northwest, and kept contact with the 79th Division on the left 54/.

8. The 14th Armored Division remained in Corps reserve. The 500th Armd FA Bn moved to positions to reinforce fires of the 103d Division Artillery 55/.

9. Just before noon, G.I. No. 23 was issued, outlining the following

52/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 117.

53/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 117; WRJ, 9 Dec - Entries #17, 19, 28, 31, 41, 46, 51, 64, 84 and 88.

54/. G-3 Rpt No. 117.

55/. G-3 Rpt No. 117.

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ANNEX

missions: (a) 94th Armored Division: To pass through 26th Division on [illegible] order attack East in multiple columns [illegible] the 79th Division; (b) 103d Division: To continue attack East to capture [illegible] and secure crossings over the Lauter River in that vicinity; (c) 3d Division: To move one regiment NOT to vicinity of [illegible] in [illegible] order, prepared to follow with remainder of the division 56/.

10 December

1. The VI Corps attack to the Northeast on 10 December, with the objective of reaching the SIEGFRIED LINE, made substantial progress in all sectors and resulted in the seizure of numerous towns. Resistance varied from light to moderate as the enemy attempted to defend key towns with inadequate forces and was therefore unable to prevent their envelopment. However, particularly stubborn opposition was offered from the East side of the railroad tracks in HAGUENAU during the period. There were indications that the pressure of the VI Corps attack had overwhelmed the enemy's opposition, and that preparations for withdrawals were being initiated. As the period drew to a close, resistance and artillery fire slackened noticeably.

2. On the Corps left flank, the 45th Division attacked Northeast at dawn, making good progress against moderate resistance. In the 157th Inf zone on the division left flank, elements attacked East at 0700A. Shortly after the attack got under way, the 7 and 8 Gun 226 Grenadier Regiment launched a counterattack from vicinity of Q-9[illegible] supported by heavy mortar and tank fire which penetrated the left rear of the attacking force. However, the enemy force was beaten off and forward movement progressed to Q-9[illegible] and Q-9724[illegible] against 20mm machine gun and tank fire. At the former point, an enemy pill box was being engaged at the close of the period. Other elements of the 157th Inf attacked East, reaching Q-969[illegible] and Q-96[illegible] where a grenade fight took place, and engaged in clearing JAGERTHAL (Q-963[illegible]) late in the period. On the right, the 180th Inf attacked through forward positions of the 179th Inf with two battalions abreast at 0530A, meeting a light volume of scattered artillery and mortar fire. One column cleared the factory area at Q-943358 and, after putting armor across the railroad bridge in the vicinity, attacked REICHSHOFFEN from the North and South. Mines, snipers and machine gun fire opposed the assault on the town; however, enemy forces were too thinly spread and the town was quickly cleared and secured. Troops then pressed East, reaching the line Q-954376 - Q-963366 against moderate resistance. Another column of the 180th Inf crossed the river at GUNDERSHOFFEN in the face of small arms and self-propelled gun fire and seized the town in the afternoon after a stiff fight in which small arms, machine gun fire and grenades were encountered. Troops then continued Northeast, reaching Q-974368 and Q-970356 by nightfall. After being passed through by the 180th Inf, the 179th Inf assembled and moved to protect the division left flank. Two battalions assembled in the vicinity of OBERROTHN and ZINSWILLER, while the remainder of the regiment took up positions along the line Hill 497 (Q-943423) - Hill 480 (Q-933414) - Q-909398 - Q-90[illegible]. Most of the 250 prisoners taken by the 45th Division during the period were from the 245 Inf Div. It was learned from PW interrogation that this division had orders to hold until 13 December and then fall back to the West Wall 57/.

3. To the right of the 45th Division, the 103d Division attacked Northeast

56/. Annex No. 9.

57/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 118 - 11 Dec; WRJ, 10 Dec - Entries #9, 25, 31, 56 and 72.

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at [illegible] with two regiments abreast, making considerable progress against light to moderate resistance. On the left, elements of the 44th Inf advancing Northeast by general attrition (Q-[illegible]) on both sides and around, entering HILL [illegible] (Q-[illegible]) and reaching [illegible] and another edge of FORSTHEIM (Q-[illegible]) by nightfall against artillery, small arms and mortar fire. Other 44th Inf elements, following up behind the attacking forces, crossed the river and, after overcoming small arms and automatic weapons fire at Q-953324, cleared [illegible] by mid-afternoon and had elements moving on FORSTHEIM. On the right, elements of the 140th Inf attacked across the LA SARRE DU NORD River and entered HERTZWILLER by noon after many hours of house fighting in which small arms, automatic weapons and mortar and fire were encountered. Troops then seized HILL 193 (Q-[illegible]) to the North and advanced to the edge of the woods at Q-[illegible] where STRONG resistance was encountered at the close of the day. Another force crossed the river West of HERTZWILLER late in the afternoon, and cleared the ZE LAND woods to a line Q-975319 - Q-975318. A third column advanced Northeast and had penetrated the FORST DE HAGUENAU to the points Q-[illegible] and Q-[illegible] by the close of the period protecting the division right flank. After dark, resistance along the entire division front was light and scattered as the enemy initiated withdrawals to the Northeast. The 409th Inf remained in reserve during the period, 58/.

4. After having received considerable heavy and light caliber artillery fire in HIRSCHLIEN, OBERHOFFEN and along front lines during the night, the 79th Division resumed its attack towards HAGUENAU and SCHWEIGHOUSE (R-3685) with three regiments abreast. Resistance varied from light to moderate, with the exception of extremely heavy opposition in the HAGUENAU area, and advances up to two kilometers were made. On the division left flank, the 314th Inf attack through the southeastern portion of HAGUENAU encountered artillery, mortar and heavy small arms fire from the 481 Grenadier Regiment which was established in well-entrenched positions behind the railroad tracks on the western edge of the city. At the close of the period, the 314th Inf held positions West of the railroad from R-[illegible] - R-[illegible] - R-[illegible]. In the central sector in the vicinity of HARTHEUHAL, the scene of bitter fighting the day before, the enemy had withdrawn during the night and the 315th Inf occupied the town at daylight without opposition and seized KAISERHOUSE (R-0721) by noon against light machine gun and mortar fire. A continuation of the attack Northeast towards CAMP D'OBERHOFFEN (R-0822) was stopped by a blown bridge over the MODER River at R-077212. However, elements of the regiment marched via HIRSCHLIEN to an assembly area just North of OBERHOFFEN at R-083211 and a force successfully entered and outposted CAMP D'OBERHOFFEN at the close of the period. On the division right flank, elements of the 313th Inf occupied OBERHOFFEN without opposition and attacked Northeast through the heavy woods, reaching the far edge along a line R-107219 - R-113214 against only light small arms resistance from troops of the 476 Grenadier Regiment. Elements of the 79th Cav Ron Troop which moved from the division left flank to support the 313th Inf attacking Northeast from OBERHOFFEN had occupied most of SCHIRRHEIN (R-120822) against light and scattered small arms fire by nightfall. On the division right flank, patrols of the 94th Cav Ron Sqn found the towns of OFFENDORF (R-1313) and HERRLISHEIM (R-1315) clear of the enemy 59/.

5. On the Corps right flank, the 36 Division continued to maintain an outpost line along the RHINE in the STRASBOURG area. The enemy remained inactive

58/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 118; WHJ, 10 Dec - Entries #35, 59 and 82.

59/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 118; WHJ, 10 Dec - Entries #11, 34, 52, 58 and 83.

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along the entire division front, with small arms and occasional artillery fire harassing the 3d Division outposts. The 117th Cav Rcn Sqn patrolled to the Northwest and maintained contact with the 79th Division on the left. The 14th Armored Division remained assembled in Corps reserve with its organic artillery supporting the attack of the 103d Division 60/.

6. The weather prevented close air support missions in support of the VI Corps attack, and fighter bombers were diverted to targets in GERMANY where bombs were dropped through the overcast. Three flights of three Me-109's each strafed various targets in the vicinity of GRUENBACH, bombed and strafed various targets and the bridge installation at MERZWEILER and strafed field artillery positions in the vicinity of BRONTILER. All flights were engaged by AA which succeeded in destroying two enemy aircraft 61/.

11 December

1. From the opposition encountered during 11 December, it was apparent that the enemy had again made a substantial withdrawal. Although artillery fire of medium and heavy caliber increased to moderate, infantry contact consisted only of resistance from small groups of enemy ranging from patrol size to 50-60 men. Satisfactory gains, including the capture of several large towns, were made as the northern and central Corps front moved ahead. An interesting sidelight of the day was the capture of approximately 29 PW's from the 245 Artillery Regt. Interrogation of the prisoners revealed that artillerymen were being employed as infantry after their units' organic weapons had been either destroyed or abandoned 62/.

2. On the Corps left flank, the 45th Division continued to push ahead with the more important gains being registered in the Right sector. In the Northern zone, the 179th Inf maintained its defensive positions in the rugged, mountainous FORET DE HIEDERBRONN area, protecting the division and Corps left flank. Reconnaissance patrols probing North and Northeast reached Q-947430 and river junction South of WINDSTEIN (Q-957433) without making enemy contact. Further South, the 157th Inf forged East to seize the town of NEHWILLER (Q-9840), and enter the northern end of LANGENSOULTZBACH (Q-999405). NEHWILLER was occupied early, after a short small arms fight with forty enemy, but a stubborn pocket of enemy, supported by one tank in the southern part of LANGENSOULTZBACH carried the fight for that town through the end of the period. Other elements of the 157th RCT, against light small arms and automatic weapons fire and moderate self-propelled gun and medium artillery fire, moved rapidly to the East to secure the high ground at Q-994435. In the 180th Inf zone on the division right flank, moderate to heavy resistance was met throughout the day. Moving East and Northeast toward FROESCHWILLER (Q-9938), troops were subjected to steady small arms and automatic weapons fire supplemented by mortar, self-propelled gun and artillery fire. The advance was impeded by a pillbox at Q-989385 and by numerous groups of 30-40 enemy offering resistance with small arms and self-propelled gun fire from the Northeast. Another obstacle which retarded progress toward the town were numerous minefields, including one extensive TOF7 mine field; the latter being used in large quantities for the first time on the Corps front. After enemy resistance on the eastern outskirts of town had been overcome, opposition decreased materially and FROESCHWILLER was secured and the high ground North of the town occupied 63/.

60/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 118.

61/. G-2 Rpt No. 118.

62/. G-2 Rpt No. 119 - 12 Dec 44.

63/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 119,- 12 Dec; WRJ, 11 Dec - Entries #38, 70, 83 and 99.

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3. To the right, the 103d Division continued to drive across the flat, rolling country in its sector with three regiments abreast. Only in the center was progress retarded as both flanks forged ahead to make substantial gains. The 411th Inf in a two pronged drive sent one column Northeast to occupy the town of EHERBACH (Q-9834), against scattered small arms fire, and clear the woods Northeast of it in the vicinity R-008353 - R-008360 against continued small arms fire and increased mortar and self-propelled gun fire. The other column drove North to occupy WOERTH (R-0037) against very light opposition. In the center of the Division zone, one battalion of the 409th moved to the East very slowly against heavy enemy resistance, reaching the southwest outskirts of GUNSTETT (R-0234) where vicious small arms and machine gun fighting took place throughout the day with the enemy also employing self-propelled guns and mortars late in the period. The balance of the 409th RCT assembled at GRIESBACH (Q-9532) and vicinity of Q-987333. On the Division right flank, ESCHBACH (R-0030) and WALBOURG (R-0332) were quickly overrun by elements of the 410th RCT with only slight opposition being encountered. Continuing East, these forces reached vicinity of R-043318 where they consolidated positions. Another column of the 410th Inf swept forward to take the towns of LAUBACH (Q-9831) and HEGENEY (R-0032) with advance troops entering the town of HIELISHEIM (R-042332). Heavy concentrations of 88mm artillery fire forced these forward elements to withdraw slightly to vicinity of R-041334. The rest of the 410th Inf advancing East along the northern fringe of the HAGUENAU Forest below WALBOURG encountered a manned road block at R-049307 supported by self-propelled gun fire which held up further advances 64/.

4. In the 79th Division sector, the attack was renewed with gains being registered along the entire front. Stubborn enemy resistance and many blown bridges in the southern zone held advances to a minimum but progress was rapid in the northern and central sectors, against light enemy opposition. On the left flank, the 314th Inf swept East to secure the town of HAGUENAU (R-0323), meeting only occasional sniper fire to contest the occupation. The town was mopped up and defensive positions immediately set up on the approaches from the North and East. A pioneer force of infantry and engineers swept the HAGUENAU - SOULTZ -SOUS -FORETS road leading Northeast for mines, and advanced to R-046260 without making enemy contact. South of HAGUENAU, the 313th RCT, with elements of the 79th Recn Troop spearheading the advance, moved rapidly Northeast in the direction of SOUFFLENHEIM (R-1625. Despite heavy 88mm and self-propelled gun fire, the advance continued forward to SCHIRRHEIN (R-1222) where an unknown number of enemy employed a factory as a strongpoint to retard progress. After a brief small arms fight, the enemy withdrew and the 313th resumed its advance to the Northeast, overrunning a road block supported by riflemen and two 40mm guns in the vicinity of R-155245 and another supported only by small arms fire at R-159249, and approached the defenses of SOUFFLENHEIM. Fierce fighting progressed for possession of the town with the enemy subjecting the 313th Inf to heavy concentrations of light artillery and mortar fire. Although hand to hand fighting was still going on in the town as the period ended, leading elements of the RCT had by-passed the town and crossed the EHERBACH River to establish a bridgehead in the face of intense small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. With two battalions in reserve, one battalion of the 315th RCT held firm to positions in the vicinity of R-114218 protecting the 313th RCT's line of approach and the division right flank. On the extreme right flank, ROHRWILLER (R-1217) and DRUSENHEIM (R-1518) were found clear of the enemy and occupied by elements of the 94th Cav Recn Sqn. The 117th Cav Recn Sqn was attached to the 79th Division at 0800A and commenced movement to the area North of GAMBSHEIM, while the 94th Cav Recn Sqn (-Troop A) reverted to control of 14th Armd Division

64/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 119; WRJ, 11 Dec - Entries #35, 46, 101 and 104.

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and moved to an assembly area at HOHFRANKENHEIM (Q-8814) 66/.

5. On the broad 3d Division front along the banks of the RHINE River, activity was limited to patrolling and maintenance of observation posts. In the STRASBOURG area, the 7th Inf extended to the left and relieved the 117th Cav Ron Sq in position. Relief was completed without incident by 2000 hours and the 7th assumed the responsibility of protecting that sector and the division left flank. During the remainder of the period, patrols made no contact with the enemy. South of STRASBOURG, the 15th RCT maintained its line, running parallel with the RHINE and approximately one mile in from the River bank. Outposts and OP's situated on the bank of the river encountered no hostile activity during the day except for sporadic mortar and artillery reactions to our smoke screens and artillery barrages. Protecting both the division and Corps right boundary, elements of the 30th Inf spent a quiet day with no enemy action observed. 66/.

6. While bulk of the 14th Armd Division remained in Corps reserve at HOCHFELDEN, Troop C, 94th Cav Ron Sq, reinforced with platoons of medium and light tanks and one squad of engineers, moved to an assembly area South of HAGUENAU and was designated Task Force ENGLAND 67/.

7. Rain and poor visibility prevented any Allied air missions in support of Corps, but in the afternoon an enemy flight of three Me 109's appeared out of the clouds in the vicinity of KINDWILLER (Q-8929) but was driven off by light AA before committing any hostile action 68/.

8. VI Corps O.I. No. 24 was issued at 0800A. The 117th Cav Ron Sqn was relieved from attachment to the 3d Division and attached to the 79th Division; the 3d Division was charged with relieving the 117th Cav Ron Sqn in zone and protecting the Corps right flank and rear South of GAMBSHEIM; the 79th Division was given the responsibility of protecting the Corps right flank North of GAMBSHEIM 69/.

12 December

1. Alarmed by our break-through in the Northwestern Corps zone, the enemy rushed reinforcements to this area on 12 December to slow our drive, but elsewhere along the Corps front contact was broken and American troops advanced unopposed throughout the day. The wholesale employment of demolitions by the retreating enemy forces proved to be the greatest obstacle during the day. Nearly all the bridges in front of the Corps advance were blown, and many road blocks, road cuts, blown railroad overpasses and mines were encountered 70/.

2. Employing key terrain features and towns along the axis of our advance as strongpoints, the enemy offered tenacious resistance throughout the period along the entire 45th Division front. In some places, reinforcements were brought up to bolster the enemy defenses and limited aggressive action was displayed. During the early morning hours an additional effort to retard progress was made when considerable enemy mortar and 75mm - 150mm artillery fire was laid down on forward elements in all division sectors. The 179th Inf, protecting the division left boundary and blocking the Corps left flank, extended elements to

65/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 119; WRJ, 11 Dec - Entries #39 and 100.

66/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 119; WRJ, 11 Dec - Entries #43, 69, 83 and 94.

67/. G-3 Rpt No. 119.

68/. G-2 Rpt No. 119.

69/. Annex No. 9.

70/. G-2 Rpt No. 120 - 13 Dec 44.

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[illegible] under [illegible] control of the First [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] Regt [illegible] of the [illegible] Regt [illegible] the First Bde [illegible] to come under control of XX Corps [illegible] the [illegible] Regt (-) the 1st Bde (-) kept to [illegible] the 2nd Bde (-) kept (joined on 14th Div) with one Bde (-) in [illegible] 79/.

13 December

2. US Corps troops continued to gain ground rapidly on 13 December. [illegible] of part of the enemy, utilizing opportunities to come to defensive [illegible] of the [illegible], as the bulk of the enemy [illegible] to withdraw. Although [illegible] and PW's taken from [illegible] that the [illegible] of the 12 Pz Div came again on our [illegible] there was no effect since that any reinforcements had [illegible] 79/.

3. The enemy opposing the 15th Division in zone reverted to familiar [illegible] this period by stubbornly resisting along the valleys and only [illegible] the high ground along our avenues of approach. [illegible] and [illegible] were employed whenever possible by the retreating [illegible] and numerous SMG and ZGW simulants tended to slow [illegible] the enemy. In the extreme left flank, the 177th ROT remained in position along the high ground in the vicinity of Q-9[illegible] and Q-9[illegible], blocking to [illegible] and back. This sector was very quiet although friendly patrols [illegible] Regiment reports the ROTHERMAUR River drew small arms fire from [illegible] in the vicinity of KIRCHDORF (Q-95L3). Toward the Division central [illegible] the 157th ROT passed its advance north over the mountainous terrain [illegible] (R-0[illegible]) after having closed down during the early morning hours [illegible] of rapid artillery fire. Against considerable small arms fire, leading [illegible] advanced to positions Northwest of LEMBACH on the high ground at [illegible] and [illegible]. Toward late evening, the supply problem again became [illegible] and mule trains were employed to haul the needed food and material [illegible] Regiment. On the right of the 157th Inf, the 180th ROT met stiff [illegible] throughout the day. A column of the 180th Inf, moving [illegible] the LEMBACH road encountered MATTERSALL (R-0158.30) after [illegible] small arms resistance. Further advance Northwest along roads [illegible] to be mostly about concentrated approximately 50 well dug-in enemy [illegible] and machine pistols along the line R-0394.39 - R-0434.37. [illegible] positions at R-0304.4[illegible] and R-0394.37 on the northern [illegible] of LEMBACH only to meet very heavy concentrations of small arms and [illegible] mortar fire. Another column of the 180th Inf moved Northwest [illegible] high ground running parallel with the LEMBACH road and reached positions [illegible], East of [illegible], against lighter resistance 79/.

4. Initial enemy resistance on the 102d Division front was light [illegible] but increased considerably on the right flank [illegible] Meeting was moderate with the bulk of the missions falling [illegible] Inf positions. As a result of the days activities, the entire di[illegible]

79/. Annex No. 11.

79/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 221 - 14 Dec.

79/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 222 - 14 Dec ; WBJ, 13 Dec - Entries [illegible] 36 and 43 (Pettmiller CP) - Entries #5, 7, 28 36 and 52 (Ann[illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

b. North and Northwest of the [illegible] Division area, the army [illegible] along the main line of [illegible] Regiment of [illegible] (N-4[illegible]) [illegible] most serious [illegible] [illegible] (N-[illegible]) [illegible] by 88 "P" against light opposition, the [illegible] flat rolling country with [illegible] (N-1[illegible]) and establishing a line [illegible] of the road after [illegible] were [illegible] Advance reconnaissance [illegible] mortar and artillery fire forced them to [illegible] closely behind 88 "P" through [illegible] North during this period to reach the town of [illegible] in conjunction with the 109th Inf. These [illegible] mortar and artillery concentrations throughout the balance of the period 80/.

5. The 79th Division spent now a day of severe fighting. All [illegible] along the SEUZENACH river, where most of the day's heavy [illegible] were bitterly contested as the enemy counterattacks, most of [illegible] from automatic weapons to large caliber artillery on both [illegible] division left flank, the fight for the town of [illegible] previous day, but by daylight all enemy resistance had been [illegible] elements of the 315th RCT moved out to the Northeast, [illegible] town of ZEMMRAGH (N-4[illegible]) and [illegible] enemy firmly entrenched in the vicinity of [illegible] by two assault guns, three mobile [illegible] and [illegible] troops to engage and eventually neutralize this [illegible] 315th bypassed to the North and seized [illegible] artillery fire. To the Southeast in the 313th RCT area of [illegible] fighting across the SEUZENACH river continued [illegible] SELTZ West of the river firmly in American hands all efforts were centered on

80/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 121; WBJ, 13 Dec (Dettwiller GP) - Entries #13 and [illegible] (Morsbronn GP) - Entries #34 and 45.

81/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 121; WBJ, 13 Dec 44 - Entries #36 and 37 (Morsbronn Entry # 41 (Dettwiller GP).

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[illegible]

6. The 34 Division sector remained quiet with no enemy activity above [illegible] and patrols from [illegible] to [illegible]. The 7th and 15th RCT continued to patrol and outpost the west bank of the Rhine [illegible] Bulk of the 30th Inf remained in Division reserve, resting and refitting 82/.

7. Seventh Army Operations Instructions No. 32 was received, designating the 34 Infantry Division to relieve the 36th Infantry Division, directing, under control of the First French Army, the relief of [illegible], 83/.

8. VI Corps O.I. No. 26 was issued at 2030A, directing: (a) The 34 Infantry Division (Reinf) to effect relief of the 36th Infantry Division (Reinf) in the [illegible] - [illegible] area, [illegible] operational control of the 34 Division to the First French Army. (b) The 36th Division to remain responsible for and protection of the flank of the Corps sector in the [illegible] area. (c) The attachment of the 47th RB Bn to the 36th Division. (d) The relief of the 756th TD Bn (-B Co) from attachment to 36th Division and attaching it to the 34 Division. (e) The assembly of the 63d Cml Bn in HAGUENAU after relief by a Cml Bn from XV Corps. (f) The relief of the 1st Bn 36th Engr C Regt from attachment to 36th Division and its return to control of parent unit; a battalion of the 40th Engr C Regt to effect the relief 84/.

9. VI Corps CP closed at [illegible] (Q-[illegible]) and opened one kilometer North of [illegible] (P-[illegible]) at 2400A.

24 December 1944

1. Substantial gains were again registered across the entire Corps front during 24 December. Early in the period under cover of darkness, the enemy made withdrawals toward the SIEGFRIED line, leaving only delaying detachments to retard the Corps advance. The greatest resistance was encountered along the main routes of advance, the Germans continuing to employ fixed and river and stream crossings as strongpoints. Enemy shelling was comparatively light during the day throughout the Corps sector.

2. In the 45th Division some close contact with the enemy was maintained throughout the day, but it was only toward late afternoon when difficulty was encountered that resistance increased sufficiently to retard forward action. On the extreme left flank protecting the Corps-Division boundary, the 179th Inf spent a quiet day patrolling and advancing its lines to Q-[illegible] - Q-[illegible] P-[illegible] when the area was found clear by the patrols. To the right of the

82/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 121; WBJ, 13 Dec - Entries #18, 37 and 43 (Intermediate CP); Entries #10, 16, 21, 22 and 50 (Rear Echelon CP).

83/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 121; WBJ, 13 Dec - Entries #15 and 39 (Intermediate CP).

84/. Annex No. 11.

85/. Annex No. 9.

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179th, the 357th Inf continued its attack over the wooded high ground North of ZIMMERN. Encountering light enemy and road obstacles offering small arms resistance during the morning hours, opposition increased gradually until strong pressure was required in the afternoon to force an enemy withdrawal. A minor road block (R-0828/8) was overrun and elements of the 357th pushed North outside the road to reach a line R-0828/8 - R-0828/7. One column of the 357 attached to the Northwest against small arms, mortar and light fire, that steadily increased in intensity, and reached the high ground in the vicinity of R-0828/7 - R-0844/5, west of ZIMMERN (R-0874/4). The 180th Inf, fighting against stubborn resistance on the outskirts of ZIMMERN, finally forced the enemy to retreat and then went on to secure the town against sniper and small arms fire. Elements moving West from ZIMMERN pivoted to the Northwest and pushed up the valley toward VIRNEN. Within this town a moderate force of enemy including elements of the II Bn 128 PzG, fought tenaciously throughout the afternoon and evening to stave off the town's capture. Continuous pressure by the 180th Inf caused enemy resistance to collapse and by 2000h, VIRNEN was in Allied hands. Fifty PzF's and one IV tank were taken in this engagement 86/.

3. Steady progress was made throughout the day in the 102d Division sector although resistance increased from moderate to heavy as the day wore on, and an unsuccessful counterattack was staged against the left flank. Heavy harassing fire, consisting of mortar, Nebelwerfer and artillery, were fairly constant all day with front line elements receiving the bulk of it. In the IE HOCHWALD Region, the 414th RCT advanced Northeast along the high ground and through the valley toward GLEMBACH (R-0884/5). PFAFFENBACH (R-8661/8) was overrun during the early part of the advance and an enemy 12mm patrol ambushed on the road in the vicinity of R-8574/2. Unmined road blocks at the base of Hill 503 (R-0794/3) were cleared during the morning as the elements of the 414th Inf approached the town of GLEMBACH. Heavy opposition mounted as the town was neared with strong mortar fire, heavy automatic weapons fire, and artillery concentrations coming from the ridge (R-0864/7) East of the town. Aided by strong artillery support, the 414th forged forward and after heavy fighting succeeded in capturing the town. At 1800h the enemy staged a counter-attack employing approximately 200 infantrymen and four tanks. The assault was repulsed after thirty minutes of fighting in which time the enemy suffered severe personnel losses and two of the four tanks. By the close of the period GLEMBACH was outposted and other elements of the 414th Inf had seized high ground North and East of the town at R-0794/0 and R-0794/6. Although numerous MAGINOT line pillboxes were encountered in the 414th Inf sector during this period, the enemy had failed to utilize any of them as a means of defense. Further South, in the 409th Inf area, enemy resistance was extremely light during the early part of the period and forward progress was rapid up the valley to the Northeast. KEYSMACH (R-3054/5), HEILSBACH (R-3054/0), IRACHBRONN (R-3041), BIRKENBACH (R-3141) and GIMBORNO (R-3154/8) were taken against negligible sniper fire and occasional small delaying detachments. Moving Northeast from GIMBORNO over flat rolling country, the 409th encountered slightly increased resistance in OBERNHEIM (R-3131/3) which steadily mounted in intensity after the town had been secured and elements pushed toward NOTT (R-3254/0). Employing machine gun and artillery support and using the southern outskirts of NOTT as a defensive line, the Germans dug in to make a determined stand. As the period ended, elements of the 409th were engaged in a bitter fight to overcome this stronghold. One battalion of the 410th RCT was attached during this period for the purpose of protecting the right flank

86/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 122 - 15 Dec; Wkly, 14 Dec - Entries 23, 36, 48, 93 and 98.

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from R-223430 - R-135450. The balance of the 410th Inf assembled at MEISENHOFEN in reserve 87/.

4. In the 14th Armd Division zone, the enemy had effected a substantial withdrawal during the hours of darkness, leaving only scattered rear-guard action to delay the division's advance. Blown bridges and lack of suitable fording sites were greater obstacles to the advance than the active physical resistance offered by the enemy. However, considerably progress was made and numerous towns captured. On the left flank, CC "A", moving across terrain perfectly suited to tank warfare, pushed rapidly to the Northeast. The towns of HOFFEN (R-3537), HERRENSWILLER (R-128375), SCHOENENBOURG (R-3339), HUNSPACH (R-150394), OBERSEEBACH (R-185419) and INGOLSHEIM (R-3441) fell with only token resistance being offered. At INGOLSHEIM, a blown bridge across the SCHWARZBACH River halted the forward section of CC "A" temporarily. After a temporary bridge had been put in and the advance renewed, enemy resistance increased in intensity as this armored column reached the southern outskirts of RITTERSHOFFEN (R-2644). At the close of the period, dismounted elements of CC "A" were in hand-to-hand combat with enemy infantry for possession of the town itself. To the right, CC "B" also made good progress throughout the day to keep abreast. Early in the period, all resistance in BUHL collapsed and the enemy made a hurried, but organized retreat. Pushing Northeast from BUHL with only scattered sniper fire and light artillery shelling to hamper movement, elements of CC "B" in rapid succession took the towns of STUNDWILLER (R-185362), GROSTWILLER (R-215370), TRIMBACH (R-2138) and SIEGEN (R-225398). By noon forward elements were on the ridge overlooking SALMBACH (R-2442) and preparing to take the town. Resistance increased at this time and fighting inside the town was still in progress as the period closed 88/.

5. Pushing ahead rapidly, in its zone running parallel to the RHINE River, the 79th Division advanced to within sight of the German border. With strong air support blazing a trail before them and only very light enemy shelling to harass their movements, the 79th Division troops moved forward as fast as destroyed bridges could be replaced. Over on the Division left flank the 315th RCT moved Northeast from NIEDERROSTHERN, meeting little opposition until the southern outskirts of SCHEIBENHARD (R-2942) were reached by forward elements late in the period. At this point contact was regained with the enemy and small arms and artillery fire received. After the town of SELTZ was finally secured and enemy pockets of resistance mopped up by CCCOA, the 313th Inf immediately resumed the advance North through the BOIS DE SELTZ, unopposed, and secured SCHAFFHOUSE (R-265345) against minor resistance. Continuing North, WINTERBACH (R-2737) was easily seized, but a noticeable stiffened resistance was encountered just beyond NIEDWILLER (R-2839). Moderate small arms, mortar and artillery fire met leading elements of the 313th RCT as they approached an enemy defensive line running along the high ground parallel to the NIEDERLAUTERBACH (R-2641) - LAUTERBOURG (R-3242) road late in the period. Still in reserve, the 314th RCT moved forward to new assembly areas in the vicinity of SCHAFFHOUSE and SELTZ. The 117th Cav Ron Sq (Attached) continued to patrol the division right flank and outposted MOTHEREN (R-305375) which was found clear of enemy. This sector remained quiet throughout the day 89/.

6. In the STRASBOURG area, the 3d Division maintained its lines extending North and South of the city with no enemy action taking place. Patrolling and reconnaissance was the extent of the day's activity in the sectors of the 7th

87/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 122; WRJ, 14 Dec - Entries #4, 48, 70, 77, 89, 90, 99 and 108.

88/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 122; WRJ, 14 Dec - Entries #14, 39, 57, 78, 79 and 10

89/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 122; WRJ, 14 Dec - Entries #15, 25, 28, 33, 63, 85 and 92.

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30th ROTC. In accordance with the instructions contained in Seventh Army G.O. No. 32, the 36 Division commenced relief of the 36th Division (under the First French Army) by moving the 30th ROT down to the 36th Division sector 90/.

7. A slight improvement in weather conditions permitted the XIX TAC to fly five missions totalling 60 sorties in support of Corps. Locomotives, freight cars, strongpoints at SAARBACH and [illegible] and SIEGFRIED Line defenses were attacked with most results uncertain due to a persistent ground haze 91/.

15 December

1. Three of the five divisions under VII Corps control crossed the German Border and commenced offensive operations on German soil on 15 December. The outer fringes of the SIEGFRIED Line were attacked in the face of enemy opposition that, although heavier than the previous period, still varied from light to moderate. Only in isolated instances - usually at key towns and strategic terrain features - was bitter resistance encountered. The enemy continued to use self-propelled gun and tank fire in support of his troops rather than artillery in an apparent effort to keep artillery positions in the SIEGFRIED Line secret as long as possible.

2. In the 45th Division sector, the advances of the day were preceded by a night of relative quiet with little change in positions and very light enemy shelling. On the division left flank, the 179th RCT, protecting the Corps and Division left boundary, continued its aggressive patrolling and reconnaissance, maintaining previously held positions and extending its lines to the North to occupy ground originally taken by the 157th RCT. Road blocks were then established in the vicinity of R-0194.83. Northeast of the 179th sector, the 157th Inf continued its attack against small arms, mortar and artillery fire that increased as the day wore on. Pushing North over the rugged high ground in the heavily wooded BOIS DE WINGEN, two battalions abreast made steady progress. A small arms engagement occurred in the vicinity of R-0824.78, but the opposing forces were quickly dispersed; at the road junction (R-0834.74) heavy small arms and mortar fire was received toward the close of the period. In general, a line running East to West along the high ground R-0824.99 - R-0474.99 - R-0334.97 - R-0344.94, was held as the period ended. The 180th RCT on the Division right flank attacked North after clearing PT. WINGEN-OU-HERIDOKFEL (R-0484.78) against negligible resistance, and met only scattered opposition of small arms fire from two and three-man delaying detachments, supported by light mortar fire. On 15, 180th Inf crossed the German border at R-0704.98 at 1350A and continued on to reach points R-0704.99 and R-0794.93 by the close of the period 92/.

3. After a night of aggressive patrol activity and the mopping up of several towns, first light found the 103d Division poised to attack along its entire front. Satisfactory gains were made although enemy resistance was much more stubborn than any encountered elsewhere in the Corps zone. Contrary to his previous tactics, the enemy resorted to the use of old French earth and log pillboxes during this period. Light and medium artillery were employed by the Germans to harass forward elements and interdict important roads and road junctions, several heavy concentrations falling in the GLIEDBACH and ROTT areas.

90/. G-3 Rpt No. 122; Annex No. 11.

91/. G-3 Rpt No. 122.

92/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 123 - 16 Dec 44; WRJ, 15 Dec - Entries 29, 30, 44, 49, 60 and 102.

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[illegible]

b. The 11th Armd Division made slow progress with enemy resistance [illegible] from [illegible] on the left flank to [illegible] on the right. Heavy fire, mortar and artillery fire was heavy at times [illegible] forward elements of the Division. Lack of bridges, and strong enemy positions on the far bank of the LAUTER River, prevented elements of the 11th Armd Division from entering Germany during this period. Pushing North on the Division left flank, CC "A" reached RIMBACH early in the morning after the army made a limited withdrawal. Although elements of enemy, the town continued to receive enemy fire, mortar and light artillery fire throughout the period. 500 yards North of RIMBACH, CC "A" was stopped and pinned down by intense, concrete fire and persuasive artillery fire. Dug-in enemy at the base of HILL 243 (R-2560A8) the were using the top of the hill as an OP for mortar fire, held the column in position at R-2551A50 and R-2552A50 throughout the rest of the day. At 2730A the enemy launched a strong counterattack in the vicinity of R-2712A60, employing twenty infantrymen with six Mark IV tanks in support. The attack was repulsed and two tanks knocked out in a short, but sharp fight. On the right flank, CC "B" encountered similarly strong opposition. RAIMBACH was cleared during the early morning hours and security patrols were placed in SCHIERTHAL (R-2804A35) where that town was found to have been evacuated by the enemy. But the attack [illegible] east from there the troops made little progress against enemy infantry strongly supported by AP, mortar and artillery fire which kept our forward elements [illegible] down and pinned to a minimum. As the period ended, American front lines were [illegible]

92/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 223; WRJ, 25 Dec - Entries #19, 40, 43, 55, 58, 60, 66, 83, 86 and 99.

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the wooded LE MOUSHEAD region at R-038448 - R-051447 - R-064441, enemy held the road junction at R-059433 with machine gun support on the near side of the LAUTER River and bulk of his troops continued along the far side in strong-dug-in positions 94/.

5. In the 79th Division zone the period opened with the situation relatively quiet and little or no enemy shelling. However, as our attacks got underway and the LAUTER River approaches were neared, enemy resistance and shelling increased proportionately. By late afternoon, furious battles were raging along the entire division front. Bridging material continued to be a critical factor as all bridges across the LAUTER River were found to be demolished. Friendly patrols probing ahead of the 315th RCT prior to daylight discovered RIMBELAUTERBACH (R-0841) and SCHEIDHARD occupied by the enemy, and drew small arms and self-propelled fire. Attacks by the 315th Inf jumped off against these towns during the morning and bitter fighting took place before both towns were captured after hand-to-hand fighting in which the Germans employed automatic weapons, self-propelled gun and tank fire supports. Heavy enemy shelling continued to fall in the towns throughout the day. Having driven the enemy forces out of both towns and back across the LAUTER River, the 315th RCT spread out along the river banks North of SCHEIDHARD preparatory to making the assault across the German border, sending one patrol from Co "F" across the river and into Germany for reconnaissance purposes. Over on the Division right flank, the 313th RCT attacked North to seize LAUTERBOURG (R-1841). Initial advances met only slight opposition, but fierce resistance developed within the town where the enemy employed self-propelled fire, tank fire, mortar fire and artillery fire up to 88mm in an effort to repulse our attack. After a house-to-house mopping up campaign that resulted in heavy casualties for both sides, the enemy was finally forced to retreat and fall back across the LAUTER River, destroying all bridges behind him. By the close of the period, bulk of the 313th was on the south banks of the LAUTER and ready to attack across it. The 314th RCT in division reserve moved up behind the attacking regiments and assembled at KRONTLIER and WINTERBACH. Elements of the 117th Cav Rcn Sq moved from MOTHERN to R-2844.00 and patrolled that area along the west bank of the RHINE River 95/.

6. On the Corps extreme right flank, the 3d Division sector remained quiet throughout the day. The 7th RCT to the left and the 15th RCT to the right maintained patrols and outpost lines during the period, with little or no enemy activity being observed. Opposite the 15th Inf sector on the far side of the RHINE, demolitions of some sort were carried on at W-038835, but poor visibility prevented closer observation. A few scattered rounds of machine-gun fire, fired from the East banks of the RHINE River fell in the 15th Inf zone of action. The 30th RCT, which had moved into the First French Army sector during the previous period was committed under their operational control. Due to considerable enemy activity in that area, elements of the 36th Division were not withdrawn to move to the 3d Division area so further relief was temporarily suspended 96/.

7. Corps and Division artillery were active during the period in support of the general advance and found many profitable targets. Massed fires were placed on enemy personnel concentrations, enemy batteries and lines of communication. Harassing fires on key lines continued steadily throughout the day 97/.

94/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 123; WRJ, 15 Dec - Entries #42, 53, 60 and 85; WRJ, 16 Dec - Entry #9.

95/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 123; WRJ, 15 Dec - Entries #21, 29, 46 and 85.

96/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 123; WRJ, 15 Dec - Entry #85.

97/. G-3 Rpt No. 123.

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6. The 17th Tk Bn, attached to 103d Division by VI Corps G. I. No. 26, 13 December 1944, commenced relief of the 756th Tk Bn (-1 Co) which in turn began movement to II French Corps area 98/.

16 December

1. In sharp contrast to the bitter fighting and stubborn resistance of the previous period, American troops moved steadily ahead on 16 December with only negligible resistance offered by the enemy along the entire Corps front. Substantial bridgeheads were pushed across the LAUTER River with very little difficulty and against enemy artillery that was practically non-existent. It was evident the Germans had withdrawn to their defensive positions within the SIEGFRIED Line and that due to the lack of sufficient personnel, employment of large delaying detachments for strong rear guard action was not possible. The biggest obstacle to the Corps advance was the enemy's extensive use of terrain barriers; such as road blocks, blown bridges and culverts.

2. In the 45th Division zone on the Corps left flank, the hours preceding daylight were quiet. There was very little enemy ground activity and, with the exception of one concentration placed on JAEGERTHAL (Q-964418), enemy shelling was also light. Following daylight, the Division attacked and progressed rapidly, against no resistance on the left flank and only slight resistance on the right. However, passive resistance in the form of minefields, road blocks, blown culverts and bridges were employed to the fullest extent by the retreating enemy. On the Division left boundary, the 179th RCT continued to patrol and protect the Division flank with no enemy action taking place. Although patrols found HIRSCHTHAL (R-0150) and WIDESTEIN (Q-9543) unoccupied, front line dispositions remained unchanged from the previous period. In the 157th RCT sector, considerable gains were made against slight enemy resistance. Pushing rapidly North and Northeast, elements of the 157th encountered an anti-tank ditch at R-044518 which was 25 feet wide and 14 feet deep. Along the NOTHWEILER (R-0552) - NIEDER SCHLETTENBACH (R-0854) road, the following obstacles were encountered successively: a timber road block with wire entanglements, a blown culvert, an abatis 500 yards long and then another blown culvert; numerous minefields were encountered by all advancing elements. Despite these formidable obstacles, NOTHWEILER was secured and passed and the front line was generally R-049529 - R-056526 and R-045535 at the close of the day. In the 180th RCT's path of advance, similar passive barriers were encountered, plus scattered small arms opposition from small enemy delaying detachments. Moving steadily Northeast through heavily wooded, mountainous country, the 180th reached BOBENTHAL (R-0951), seized the town in face of light resistance and many minefields and by 1330A had reconnaissance elements advancing to the Northeast. Pushing across the LAUTER River, they encountered an anti-tank ditch at R-091529 and small arms and mortar fire from hill at R-092534. Crossings at R-072543, just West of NIEDER SCHLETTENBACH, were also in progress as the period ended 99/.

3. Preceded by vigorous patrolling forward of front line positions, the 103d Division resumed its attack at daybreak. The advance was rapid with only scattered resistance encountered. Biggest problem of the period was the very difficult terrain over which the Division advance was progressing. Sharp rising, heavily-wooded peaks and high ridges necessitated the supply of forward elements by hand-carry in many cases. Although enemy opposition was negligible and few

98/. G-3 Rpt No. 123.

99/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 124 - 17 Dec; WRJ, 16 Dec - Entries #5, 29, 39, 46, 64, 71, 76, 79 and 97.

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PW's taken, interrogation revealed that the 220 Regt in was committed against the Division in an infantry role. In the 411th sector on the Division's left flank, early patrols discovered a road block at R-107487, but drew only light enemy fire. Main body of the 411th Inf following the general route of the early patrols met slight resistance of small arms fire and encountered some [illegible] heavily wooded hills and steep ravines proved to be the most difficult problem impeding the advance. By nightfall the LAUTER River had been crossed by [illegible] elements of the RCT and front lines ran generally R-[illegible] - R-[illegible] - R-[illegible]. The 409th Inf, with one battalion of the 11th RCT attached to protect its right flank, pushed out to the Northeast just West of [illegible] to secure WEILER (R-1214) and then continued forward against [illegible] which ranged from slight to no contact during most of the period. [illegible] in this sector continued to be the main factor responsible for slow progress. By the close of the day front line elements of the 409th had established a line generally R-138537 - R-158528 - R-159518. The 410th RCT, less the one battalion protecting the 409th Inf right flank in vicinity of R-135437 and R-142456, continued in Division reserve, although employed during the period to mopup bypassed woods and investigate fortifications from R-300460 to R-[illegible] 100/.

4. In the 14th Armd Division zone between the 103d and 79th Inf Divisions, substantial withdrawals by the enemy on the left flank permitted the attack to advance rapidly against minor opposition, but moderate resistance and shelling retarded progress on the right. CC "A" drove for [illegible] and had occupied the town by 1015A. No active resistance was encountered, but all bridges [illegible] the LAUTER River and the underpass at R-167474 were blown, which considerably delayed continuance of the attack. After crossing the river, main elements [illegible] turned due North up the main road while one spearhead veered to the East and headed for SCHWEIGHOFEN (R-149). The main column, meeting only some small arms opposition, reached and secured the town of SCHWEIGHOFEN (R-1689) and RECHTENBACH (R-165508) and held a line from RECHTENBACH East to road junction at R-187510 by the close of the period. The small column that had driven East was halted just short of SCHWEIGHOFEN when subjected to automatic weapons, anti-tank and artillery fire. Over to the East in the CC "B" area, the enemy offered considerable resistance throughout the day. Infantry elements forced their way across the LAUTER at three separate places (R-[illegible], R-[illegible], R-260436), but had to fall back when intense 88mm and 120mm mortar fire rained down on bridge sites, and dug-in enemy infantry on North bank of the river put up stiff resistance. In the vicinity of R-239453 Northeast of SCHLEITHAL [illegible] and reconnaissance elements were maintained on the far banks of the LAUTER 101/.

5. Early in the period, the 79th Division crossed the LAUTER River in strength. Opposition was very light, but as elements worked their way deeper into German territory toward late afternoon, resistance stiffened. On the left flank, North of SCHWEIGHARD, the 315th RCT had constructed two footbridges across the LAUTER at R-280430 and R-308423 prior to daylight, and at 0530A troops were crossing across. The river crossings were accomplished and the town of SCHWEIGHARDT (R-295426) on the far side seized without opposition. The RCT immediately focused out to establish road blocks at R-281431, R-292431, on the Northwestern and Northern outskirts of SCHWEIGHARDT and at R-306425 to the East. Combat patrols sent out from these strongpoints encountered an undefended road block at R-298446, observed an anti-tank gun at R-305430, two Mk V tanks at R-299449 and a small group of enemy in the woods at R-305436. One patrol moving

100/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 124; WRJ, 16 Dec - Entries #8, 9, 31, 52, 63, 88 and 96.

101/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 124; WRJ, 16 Dec - Entries #28, 43, 68 and 79.

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6. In accordance with VI Corps Operations Instructions No. 27, the 117th Cav Rcn Sq reverted to Corps control and took over the RHINE River sector located in the North generally [illegible] and in the South running generally between the 19 and 20 Northing. Patrolling patrols and outposts along the west bank of the RHINE in this sector, the 117th Cav Rcn Sq had no contact with the enemy during the remainder of the period 102/.

7. In the 36 Div sector, the period was again marked by an absence of enemy activity and quietness prevailed along the entire division front. The division left boundary was extended at 2400h to run generally between the 19 and 20 Northing, from [illegible] to the west bank of the RHINE River. Both the 7th Inf and 15th Inf, in sectors North and South of STRASBOURG respectively, continued to patrol and outpost the banks of the RHINE with no action other than sniper fire taking place 103/.

8. Improved weather conditions in the Corps area after noon permitted the XXI TAC to fly fighter-bombers in direct support of the Corps advance. Ten missions totalling 110 sorties were flown with various damage being inflicted on enemy railroad approaches leading into the area of the Corps attack 104/.

9. VI Corps Operations Instructions No. 27 were issued at 0000, directing: (a) Relief of the 117th Cav Rcn Sq from attachment to 79th Division and return to Corps control. (b) The 117th Cav Rcn Sq (Mtzd) to defend sector of the RHINE River generally between the 20 Northing and the 19 Northing; maintain contact with the 36th Division on right (when control of that sector was assumed by the 36th Div). (c) The 36th Division (when under Corps Control) to defend STRASBOURG and RHINE River line in sector; maintain contact with XV French Corps; move one Inf RCT on Corps order to reinforce 117th Cav Rcn Sq. (d) The 79th Division to protect Corps right (East) flank North of MOTHERN (R-3037); maintain contact with the 117th Cav Rcn Sq. (e) The 14th Armd Division to be prepared to counterattack on six hours notice with one combat command either in the 36th Inf Division or 117th Cav Rcn Sq sector. (f) The 36 Division to comply with orders to 36th Division until relieved by that unit. (g) VI Corps Artillery prepare to support either the 36th Division or 117th Cav Rcn Sq with

102/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 124; WRJ, 16 Dec - Entries 69, 10, 44, 67, 73 and 79; Annex No. 9.

103/. G-3 Rpt No. 124; Annex No. 9.

104/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 124; VI Corps G.I. No. 27, (Annex No. 9).

105/. G-3 Rpt No. 124.

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two battalions of artillery on four hours notice 106/.

10. The 533d AAA AW Bn (-Btry A) (Btry C, 413st AAA AW Bn Atchd) was relieved from operational attachment to the 35th AAA Brig and attached to the 137th Cav Rgm Hq for operations 107/.

11. At 0820, Lieutenant General PATTON, the Seventh Army Commander, informed Major General EROOKS by phone of the German ARDENNES offensive and directed that the VI Corps attack be continued aggressively to the North. The Corps Commander immediately gave telephonic directives to his division commanders to increase the tempo of their attacks in the morning to drive through the SIEGFRIED Line while the enemy strength was concentrated to the North 108/.

17 December

1. Contrary to the previous period in which considerable advances were made against only slight resistance, 17 December was a day of slow gains in the face of stubborn opposition. With the Corps forces in contact with the main SIEGFRIED Line defenses at last, it was quickly discovered that the line was fully manned and that the enemy had abandoned his withdrawal tactics for the alternative of making a stand to prevent further Allied gains. Intense fighting continued through the day with innumerable defensive obstacles of every conceivable type being observed. Pillboxes, casemates, AT ditches, dragon's teeth, wire, minefields and entrenchments, all covered by fire, were encountered. In practically all instances, permanent fortifications were supplemented by trenches and dug-in infantry with cross fires covering all avenues of approach.

2. On the Corps left flank, the 45th Division battled against some of the most stubborn resistance encountered by Corps troops during the period. Fierce fighting resulted when main elements of the Division attempted to cross the swollen LAUTER and close in on the SIEGFRIED defenses. Only slight contact was made with the enemy by the 179th Inf, protecting the Corps and Division left flank. With the exception of extension of positions to the North in the vicinity of KIRCHENTHAL (R-011489), which had been found unoccupied the day before, former positions and blocking points were maintained. The 157th RCT pushed forward slowly from positions North of NOTHWEILER until reaching the LAUTER River. At this point, manned pillboxes on high ground at R-058548, R-070543 and R-078543 were encountered and, under a withering hail of small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire, our troops were forced to stop and dig in. As darkness settled, an attempt was made to cross the river in rubber assault boats, but heavy mortar, automatic weapons and small arms fire compelled the attacking forces to turn back. In the 180th Inf sector North of KIRCHENTHAL the enemy spent the period with several heavy concentrations of long range 150mm artillery on forward areas. Intermittent self-propelled 88mm and 170mm fire harassed the sector throughout the balance of the day. Pushing through the heavily wooded region slightly Northwest of KIRCHENTHAL, elements of the 180th RCT moved slowly North under constant small arms harassing fire. Just short of the river, these forces were stopped by heavy small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire from well dug-in enemy on the far banks. Patrols attempting to cross the LAUTER at R-0753 and R-0853 late in the period were fiercely repulsed. Over to the East, other elements of the 180th had succeeded in crossing the river during the previous

106/. Annex No. 9.

107/. G-3 Rpt No. 124.

108/. WRJ, 16 Dec - Entries 89, 90, 91 and 92.

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period, but further attempts to gain ground were bitterly contested. From the high ground running East from R-097535 to R-101536 a series of manned pillboxes [illegible] pillboxes were constructed of concrete and steel and light artillery had little or no effect on them. All these strongpoints covered each other with cross fires, had an interlocking entrenchment system and were protected by wire entanglements and mines. Toward the end of the period, the combined assault of TD, bazooka and mortar fire succeeded in forcing the enemy to evacuate two pillboxes at R-102536 and R-090535; the enemy in these two fortifications being armed only with small arms and two machine guns 109/.

3. The 103d Division, in the sector Northwest of WISSEMBOURG, was still short of the main SIEGFRIED Line defenses as the period opened and consequently, enemy resistance was considerably lighter than that encountered by the 45th Division. Forward elements continued to probe ahead during the day to discover the type of defensive positions that lay ahead, the most advantageous avenues of approach and the best means of neutralizing these enemy strongpoints. Generally it was discovered that the main SIEGFRIED Line ran from NIEDER SCHLETTENBACH (R-0854) between the 54 and 55 Northings to OBER OTTERBACH (R-1752); there was nothing to indicate the depth of this line. During the course of day, a number of unoccupied pillboxes, apparently part of the enemy's outer line of defenses, were taken and either occupied or destroyed to prevent later usage by the Germans. On the Division left flank, the 411th RCT continued to advance North of the LAUTER River. Moving through the wooded hills in the vicinity of R-115530, elements engaged and dispersed an enemy patrol after a short exchange of small arms and automatic weapons fire. Two unoccupied pillboxes on the road heading to REISDORF (R-118545) were taken, but on the southern slopes of Hill at R-105540 two manned pillboxes protected by wire entanglements were encountered. Opposition offered from this point and from three additional manned pillboxes in the vicinity of R-11[illegible] was sufficient to prevent the regiment from advancing its front lines beyond R-118543 and R-104539. On the right flank, the 409th Inf conducted vigorous patrolling through the period and made contact with the SIEGFRIED Line defenses. Forward elements advancing North toward the DORRENBACH (R-165545) area seized four unoccupied pillboxes at R-159530, R-154532, R-156536 and R-156538; one of these four was concrete and the remainder were constructed of logs with protecting wire entanglements. Physical contact with the enemy was very light during the period, being limited to scattered small arms skirmishes with small enemy patrols. While patrols and combat elements were reconnoitering in preparation for the assault on the German main line of defense, regimental positions were maintained with relatively few changes taking place 110/.

4. The 14th Armd Division, in its zone between WISSEMBOURG and SCHEIBENHARD, encountered resistance that varied from moderate on the right flank to heavy on the left. Although the main SIEGFRIED defenses were not developed during the day, strong outpost lines of AT ditches, dragon's teeth, occasional roadblocks and pillboxes, all covered by intense concentrations of artillery fire, kept forward elements of the 14th Armd Division from registering any gains. CC "A" on the Division left flank bore the brunt of the fighting with the enemy reacting sharply to all efforts to move forward. On the open, rolling terrain in its zone, CC "A" was greatly handicapped by lack of cover and the many excellent observation points utilized by the enemy when employing his artillery. Throughout the morning, two columns of CC "A" - one fighting just North of RECHTENBACH toward OBER OTTERBACH and the other at the dragon's teeth East of KAPSWEYER (R-206496) - attempted to push through to objectives without success.

109/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 125, 18 Dec 44; WRJ, 17 Dec - Entries #11, 34, 44 and 58; WRJ, 18 Dec 44 - Entry #13.

110/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 125; WRJ, 17 Dec - Entries #31, 40, 95, 100 and 103.

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The column trying to overrun the dragon's teeth and seize SIEGFRIED (R-[illegible]) received a tremendous volume of 88mm and small arms fire, while the other column was subjected to intense medium artillery fire. In an effort to break the dead-lock and effect a break-through, all elements of CC "A" were withdrawn South of the SCHWEIGEN - SCHWEIGHOFEN line and two medium bomber missions of 120 sorties called down on the SIEGFRIED line defenses from GEIS OTTENBACH to, and exclusive of, SIEGFRIED. The air attack scored only limited success, however, as resistance remained stiff and artillery concentrations heavy when the CC "A" attack was resumed. The fighting continued throughout the remainder of the period with no change in positions. Over to the East on the Division right flank, CC "B" limited its activities to patrolling and reconnoitering the enemy's defensive positions in the densely wooded HIEN WALD region. Utilizing the bridge put in at R-[illegible], patrols wended up to the line R-[illegible] - R-[illegible], observing one machine gun strongpoint and scattered groups of enemy. The bulk of CC "B" remained on the south banks of the river, however, as the period closed 111/.

5. In the 79th Division zone North of LAUTERBOURG, the SIEGFRIED main line of defense was developed in and around the heavily wooded HIEN WALD region. All types of defensive works such as pillboxes protected by wire and tank ditches, road blocks, minefields and dragon's teeth - all covered by small arms and machine gun fire from well entrenched positions - were encountered. Heavy artillery was also active, placing fires on attacking elements of the Division and all main towns in the Division sector. On the left flank, the 315th RCT remained in former positions blocking to the West and Northwest just short of the HIEN WALD forest. Road blocks were maintained and strong patrols conducted vigorous reconnaissance forward of the front lines. This particular sector was the only one in the Division zone that remained quiet during the period. In the Division central sector, the 314th Inf jumped off in two-pronged attack toward HUCHELHEIM. One column pushed North through the woods and astride the HUCHELHEIM - SCHEIBENHARDT road to reach the road junction at R-[illegible] against light opposition. Defensive positions were set up between R-[illegible] and R-[illegible] to block any enemy action from the Northwest. The other column of the 314th RCT pushed North on the main road out of NEU LAUTERBURG and deep into the HIEN WALD forest. An undefended road block was overrun in the vicinity of R-[illegible], but shortly thereafter, felled trees, wire entanglements and dragon's teeth, covered by machine gun and mortar fire, were encountered at R-[illegible] and the column halted. As the period ended, elements of the 314th Inf were attempting to outflank the position to the East. In the 313th RCT zone of action on the Division right flank, elements attacked Northeast from the road junction (R-[illegible]). Pushing through thickly wooded country, they made early contact with the enemy and his SIEGFRIED line defenses at a manned road block (R-[illegible]). Small arms, machine gun and self-propelled gun fire, followed shortly by artillery, were brought down on the American column as it attempted to smash through. Numerous pillboxes, frequently at intervals of 100 yards, were encountered in the general vicinity of R-[illegible] - R-[illegible], and all were protected by tank ditches and wire entanglements. Pillboxes were manned by small arms and machine gun fire and in one instance, a light artillery piece of unknown caliber. To further strengthen these strong positions, infantrymen were stationed in the interlocking entrenchment system between pillboxes. In an effort to break-through, the 313th Inf called up tanks and tank destroyers to fire on the pillboxes. Immediately, the tanks and TD's were taken under heavy enemy artillery fire that had been previously zeroed in on areas forward of the pillboxes. One pillbox, at R-[illegible] was successfully knocked out by TD fire, but forward lines in general were unable to advance. At the end

111/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 125; WRJ, 17 Dec - Entries #31, 33, 37, 38, 59, 63, 73 and 75.

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of the period, elements held a line running generally R-1[illegible] - R-3[illegible] - R-3[illegible] - R-3[illegible] and were in close contact with the main SIEGFRIED fortifications across the entire front 112/.

6. The 117th Cav Rcn Sq in its sector bordering the RHINE River spent a relatively quiet period. Patrols in the vicinity of R-3237 observed enemy moving into positions on the far shore of the river. An enemy raiding party entered the RHINE in the [illegible] area (R-3036), forcing a squadron CP detail to evacuate the position, but the rest the later reoccupied without incident. Two enemy barges carrying what was believed to be patrol personnel were taken under artillery fire at R-[illegible] and sunk. Patrol activity continued throughout the period and contact was maintained with the 79th Division on the left flank and the 3d Division on the right 113/.

7. The 3d Division sector running parallel with the RHINE River and extending to the North and South of STRASBOURG continued inactive from the previous period. Patrols and outposts from both the 7th and 15th RCTs had no contact with the enemy. Artillery and AA ground fire were placed on enemy troops and rail movements on the far banks of the RHINE, but results were not observed. Toward the end of the period, elements of the 1Bist Inf (36th Div) completed relief of elements of the 15th Inf in position without incident. Relieved elements of the 15th Inf assembled in the vicinity of WOLFISHEIM (T-9598) 114/.

8. In addition to the 120-sortie medium bomber missions flown in support of the 14th Armd Division attack, the XIX TAC flew 11 missions of 140 sorties with fighter bombers in the Corps zone of attack. Railroads and railway equipment were the main targets for the day and attacks on the KARLSRUHE (R-4846) - RASTATT (R-3528) - LANDAU (R-8966) areas produced excellent results. Enemy air was slightly more active, three flights of two Me 109s each being observed and engaged by Corps antiaircraft. All flights appeared to be on reconnaissance missions and no hostile action was committed. One plane was hit by light antiaircraft and crashed at WEYHER (R-1284B3) 115/.

9. Improved visibility permitted excellent observation during the day and Corps Artillery fired missions on many profitable targets. Trains and motor vehicles were fired upon and massed fires placed on all reported troop concentrations. There was a marked increase in enemy artillery now that American forces had closed on the SIEGFRIED defenses and were attempting to breach them. After a four-day lull, harassing fire from medium caliber and long range artillery, estimated as 170mm, fell intermittently on forward positions, supply routes and rear installations 116/.

18 December

1. The period 18 December was marked by fierce resistance from the enemy and only slight gains in some parts of the Corps sector with limited withdrawals taking place in others. Any sign of an attack or preparation for an attack by Corps troops drew quick reaction from the opposing German forces and all efforts

112/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 125; WRJ, 17 Dec - Entries #22, 26, 30, 35, 49, 74 and 90.

113/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 125; WRJ, 17 Dec - Entry #46.

114/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 125; WRJ, 17 Dec - Entry #80.

115/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 125.

116/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 125.

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[illegible]

[illegible] 137/.

[illegible] the usual unexpected step, the 19th Division counterattacked [illegible] the [illegible] Division [illegible] the [illegible] Division [illegible] the [illegible] Division

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by the close of the period 118/.

3. On the 103d Division front Northwest of WISSEMBOURG, the period was one of hard fighting through rugged, wooded high ground. The enemy, firmly entrenched in his strong SIEGFRIED positions, fiercely contested every effort on part of the Division to advance. Pillboxes with naturally overlapping fields, plus heavy concentrations of mortar fire, were employed effectively to make progress a painstaking, expensive task. A new identification was made when several prisoners from the 10th FGR were captured during the course of the day. In the 44th Inf sector enemy patrols were active during the hours preceding daylight but enemy shelling was comparatively light. The 44th Inf advanced North at 1100A over difficult terrain of steep wooded hills and high ridges. Progressing slowly in the face of heavy small arms and machine gun fire from pillboxes and supporting dug-in positions, troops captured the hills at R-[illegible] and R-104540 against stubborn enemy resistance, with heavy fire continuing to come from pillboxes on Hill 518 (R-109546). After dark, four pillboxes in the vicinity of R-1154 were cleared out. Late in the evening, left flank elements of the 44th Inf received a 15-20 man counterattack from the vicinity of R-113535, but the German force was beaten off and positions retained. In an attempt to seize organized positions on the high ground R-1[illegible], elements of the 44th RCT attacked the defenses three times and were repulsed each time, suffering heavy casualties. The 409th RCT on the Division right flank attacked at 1200A and was immediately in close contact with the enemy. Progress was limited with very stiff resistance encountered from the enemy in his customary strong defensive SIEGFRIED positions. However, a group of pillboxes at R-[illegible] were knocked out and hills at R-153537 and R-158513 were captured after daylight enemy with small arms and machine gun fire had been routed. The pressure brought to bear by the 103d Division on its front caused several large groups of enemy to shift to the East and attempt to leave the woods in the vicinity of OBER OTTERBACH. To forestall this move, one column of the 409th RCT deployed to the East along points R-128536, R-144517 and R-165522 and, in conjunction with elements of the 14th Armd Division, set up a line to contain the shifting enemy troops. There were no changes in the 410th RCT dispositions during the period 119/.

4. Intense mortar, and artillery fire in the 14th Armd Division sector forced the left flank to make a slight withdrawal. Close contact along the entire front was maintained throughout the period, the enemy resisting quietly with machine gun and mortar fire on any movement. On the left flank, CC "A" exerted pressure on the German SIEGFRIED defenses at three main points. All elements were subjected to constant and intense small arms, and machine gun, mortar and artillery fire throughout the day. As the period progressed, enemy artillery and mortar fire increased in tempo with enemy snipers infiltrating on the left flank to add their harassing fire from positions in the woods. At 1500A the position became so untenable that the armored column was forced to withdraw to new positions about 600 yards South of OBER OTTERBACH. Two of the platoons from this column were cut off and surrounded during the retreat. The other two spearheads of CC "A" pushed their forward elements Northeast from SCHWEIGHOFEN and KAPSWEYER as far as R-199513 and R-214501 respectively to encounter dragon's teeth and strongly defended positions. Sniper and machine gun fire was met as well as heavy mortar and artillery concentrations. To the [illegible] in the HIEN WALD Region CC "B" patrolled the dense forest. Contact was light but numerous road blocks were encountered, many protected by wire entanglements

118/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 126 - 19 Dec 44; WRJ, 18 Dec - Entries #26, 37, 70, 83, 88 and 107.

119/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 126; WRJ, 18 Dec - Entries #11, 26, 47, 57, 67, 83, 92 and 100.

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and mine fields. The bridge at R-222494 was found to be blown 120/.

5. In the 79th Division sector bordering the RHINE River, close contact was maintained with the enemy. Hostile small arms, machine gun and mortar fire continued unabated and all efforts to advance met stubborn resistance. Elements of the 315th RCT maintained blocking positions deep in the BIEN WALD Forest in conjunction with 14th Armd Division troops. Vigorous patrolling was carried out to points R-860490 and R-895472 and physical contact with the enemy was slight, though numerous obstacles and barriers were encountered. With bulk of the 314th covering and protecting, elements of the RCT attacked North at 0730A. Enemy reaction was instantaneous and heavy small arms, machine gun and mortar fire were brought to bear on the attacking forces. Pillboxes, covered by small arms fire from entrenched infantrymen and protected by wire entanglements and anti-tank ditches, proved to be difficult obstacles and progress was slow. By the end of the day, leading elements were at R-328455 for a gain of one kilometer. The 313th Inf in its sector on the right flank also jumped off at 0730, but made no gains in the face of bitter resistance. Firmly entrenched in pillbox positions, the enemy covered the anti-tank ditches and dragon's teeth with intense small arms, machine gun and mortar fire, and also employed moderate artillery fire. Despite persistent attacks by the 313th RCT, the enemy held firm in his defenses and front line dispositions remained the same. Patrols of the 313th Inf moving Northeast along the fringes of the BIEN WALD found NEUBERG (R-375435) occupied by the enemy and drew small arms fire 121/.

6. In the 117th Cav Ron Sqn sector along the west banks of the RHINE there was a slight increase in enemy activity over the preceding period. An enemy patrol that forced OP personnel in the vicinity of MUNCHHOUSE to withdraw during the early hours could not be found although the area was thoroughly searched after daylight. Patrols and outposts during the period drew machine gun and bazooka fire from enemy on the west banks of the river 122/.

7. In the 3d Division sector above and below STRASBOURG little change took place along the static front. The 7th and 15th Infs (Minus) maintained patrols and outposts in very light contact with the enemy. At R-160180 a patrol drew small arms fire, but that was the extent of contact on the west banks of the river. Late in the period a loud speaker set up on the east bank of the river in the vicinity of KEHL stated that they (the Germans) would return soon to ALSACE and in strength. Artillery placed in the neighborhood of the amplifier effectively silenced it. One battalion of the 15th RCT relieved by elements of the 141st RCT (36th Div) started movement to II French Corps zone 123/.

8. Poor flying weather limited XII TAC support to five fighter-bomber missions totaling 60 sorties. Targets were enemy strongpoints directly in front of Corps near the front lines. Two enemy Me 109s flew reconnaissance mission over SELTZ and were engaged by Corps AA which claimed one of the planes as probably destroyed 124/.

9. Seventh Army Operations Instructions No. 34 were received, to relieve the 48th Engr C Bn from attachment to VI Corps and attach the 540th Engr C Regt in its stead, effective 0001A, 19 Dec 1944 125/.

120/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 126; WRJ, 18 Dec - Entries #40, 51, 58, 69 and 96.

121/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 126; WRJ, 18 Dec - Entries #34, 43, 51, 73 and 104.

122/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 126; WRJ, 18 Dec - Entries #53 and 91.

123/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 126; WRJ, 18 Dec - Entries #14, 39, 51 and 94.

124/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 126;

125/. Annex No. 11.

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[illegible]

[illegible] 2d Regiment on the Corps front.

[illegible] 1st Regiment [illegible] 1st Regiment [illegible] 1st Regiment [

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than from this source being considerable. Front line positions of the 313th RCT at the end of the day included, generally, R-[illegible], R-[illegible], R-[illegible] and R-[illegible]. The situation along the 79th RCT front was fluid throughout the week. No weakness could be found in the enemy's line; enemy fire was [illegible] heavy, accurate and preceded by heavy machine gun and mortar fire. Between times, elements of the 79th RCT continued attacking to the north. Of the nine pillboxes taken during the early heavy fighting, three were blasted out by the BRUNNEN - OBER OTTERBACH ridge at R-[illegible], but no great use the number of second pillboxes in this area that had materials taken were secured. At the period ended, the 79th was in close contact with the enemy generally along a line R-[illegible] - R-[illegible] - R-[illegible], with elements holding positions along the right flank at R-[illegible] and R-[illegible] to prevent enemy infiltration. The 313th RCT remained in assembly areas - in reserve 127/.

4. In the 44th Armd Division zone of action, close contact with the main SIEGFRIED Line defenses had not been made. However, enemy outposts were strongly manned and all attempts by the Division to advance were latterly contested with small arms, mortar and artillery fire. North of NIEDERSCHEID, CC "A" reorganized for more effective fire power along the line R-170536 - R-199509 - R-[illegible] and fired missions on the enemy defenses from this line. Elements fighting between OBER OTTERBACH and NIEDERSCHEID received intense machine gun, mortar and artillery fire throughout the period from positions near the former town. Elements of CC "A", probing the German defenses southeast of KAPUNEIN, received only moderate mortar and artillery fire, but hostile snipers covered the whole of the sector with constant and accurate fire. The sector of CC "B" in the KIEM WALD region continued relatively quiet, elements being in scattered contact with the enemy. Patrols encountered an increased number of roadblocks, but only one (R-[illegible]87) was found manned/sel. Blocking positions to the North were maintained during the period with patrols flanging out North of the LAUTER River and deep into the KIEM WALD forest 128/.

5. The 79th Division front continued active, all three regimental attacks meeting very heavy resistance. During the hours preceding daylight, patrols from both sides were active and close contact was maintained. Heavy artillery ranged across the Division front, pouring heavy concentrations into some sectors. Prior to attacking, the 315th patrolled vigorously forward of its lines into the KIEM WALD and encountered a defended road block at road junction (R-[illegible]85), and machine gun and small arms fire from dug-in infantry at R-[illegible]89. The attack jumped off to the North at 0830A and progress was slow from the start. Although enemy fortifications were not numerous, enemy forces utilized natural strongpoints in the KIEM WALD to stubbornly resist with small arms, machine gun and mortar fire. Attack was carried forward to the vicinity of R-[illegible] - R-[illegible] by late afternoon and these points were outposted while main elements withdrew slightly to R-[illegible] and consolidated. Further to the right and due South of NUNKIRCHEN, the 314th Inf attack also got under way at 0830A. The enemy reacted immediately with intense small arms and mortar fire from well entrenched positions. Defended road blocks at the road junction (R-[illegible]) were cleared and small pockets of enemy in the vicinity mopped up, but no further forward progress was made. On the division right flank in the 313th RCT sector, some of the most savage fighting of the campaign took place. The RCT attack jumped off on schedule under very difficult circumstances. It was necessary to bull-doze the long anti-tank ditch (R-[illegible]) in the path of the attacking Infantry, Tanks and TD's could move forward. The firmly entrenched enemy [illegible]

127/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 127; WRJ, 19 Dec - Entries #11, 37, 88, 10[illegible] and [illegible]

128/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 127; WRJ, 19 Dec - Entries #49, 73, 91, [illegible] and [illegible]

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waiting, and very heavy concentrations of small arms, machine gun and mortar fire, followed closely by artillery, hit the attacking elements. Some elements succeeded in breaching the anti-tank ditch and wire but, when three of the follow-up demolition teams were knocked out by enemy tank destroyer fire, attacking elements were forced to withdraw. The infantry concentrations supported by armor at 1[illegible] and 1[illegible] were successfully repulsed in this sector. At 1[illegible]0A another enemy attacker from the vicinity of R-[illegible] and advanced against heavy small arms resistance until stopped by enemy obstacles and dug-in positions at R-[illegible]. Hard fighting continued throughout the remainder of the period 129/.

6. The 117th Cav Rcn Sqn sector along the west banks of the RHINE River remained generally quiet during the period. Prior to daylight, an American patrol intercepted a six-man enemy patrol that had crossed the river South of [illegible] (R-[illegible]). After a brief exchange of small arms fire, the enemy patrol was dispersed and one prisoner captured. He claimed that his patrol's mission was to take prisoners for interrogation purposes. Patrols and outposts maintained by the 117th observed no other enemy activity during the day, but shortly after dark, an enemy patrol of unknown strength was encountered on the river bank at R-[illegible]. Following a small arms skirmish, the enemy patrol scattered 130/.

7. The 3d Division zone along the banks of the RHINE, North and South of STRASBOURG, also continued quiet. Division artillery fired harassing missions on the East bank of the RHINE which drew retaliatory machine gun fire from vicinity of the KEHL - STRASBOURG bridge. In the 7th Inf sector, the situation remained quiet through the period with the exception of two encounters with enemy patrols in the vicinity of GAMBSHEIM and OFFENDORF after dark. The enemy patrols withdrew after a short small arms fire fight. Relief of the 15th Inf was completed by the 141st RCT (36th Div) at 1830A and the regiment prepared to move to the XV French Corps zone 131/.

8. The 69th Armd FA Bn was relieved from attachment to the 103d Division and attached to the 117th Cav Rcn Sqn for operations at 1800A; VI Corps assumed operational control of the 540th Engr (C) Regt at 0001A; the 48th Engr (C) Bn reverted to Seventh Army control at 0001A; Batteries C and D, 439th AAA AW Battalion were relieved from attachment to VI Corps 132/.

20 December

1. In sharp contrast to the bitter fighting of the previous period, there was a marked decrease in both enemy activity and our own during 20 December. Generally, Corps troops staged limited withdrawals to consolidate and strengthen new positions without undue aggressiveness being shown by the enemy. Corps artillery increased during the day while enemy artillery, with one exception, declined in direct proportion to the decreased pressure encountered in SIEGFRIED Line positions. In the one exception - the 45th Division sector - German artillery continued to place heavy concentrations.

2. Unsuitable terrain covered by excellent enemy observation forced the 45th Division to make slight withdrawals during the day, after which defensive positions were organized. Although observation was generally poor throughout the period, enemy artillery continued to be heavy over the Division zone - one

129/.G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 127; WRJ, 19 Dec - Entries #14, 27, 30, 44, 80 and 93.

130/.G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 127; WRJ, 19 Dec - Entries #34 and 97.

131/.G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 127.

132/.G-3 Rpt No. 127; G-3 Rpt No. 129 - 22 Dec 44.

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[illegible] concentration of fires and [illegible] within the short span of one hour. [illegible] the 179th [illegible] elements of the 179th RCT [illegible] were made to contact the [illegible] [illegible] organized elements of the 179th [illegible] fire with the enemy. Upon relief by the 179th [illegible] assembled in the [illegible] - [illegible] [illegible] assembled in prepared positions with [illegible] [illegible] during the [illegible] small arms and mortars [illegible] these weeks and regard [illegible] attacking the attack. Late in the [illegible] of the 180th RCT the last fought for [illegible] around [illegible] terrain. Defensive positions were then set up in the forest bordering the southwest banks of the river. Further to the east on the dominating [illegible] R-099541 - R-094535, other elements held their positions throughout the period in the face of heavy enemy machine gun, mortar and artillery fire. A light counterattack of understrength strength coming from the North was repulsed during the morning without loss of ground. Despite the intense enemy shelling to which the ridge was subjected throughout the day a battalion relief was successfully accomplished late in the period 133/.

3. Fighting in the 103d Division sector continued without letup, but front line positions of the previous day remained stationary. There were no gains registered and although the enemy initiated three counterattacks, no withdrawals were made. The Division's possession of several strategic terrain features, which offered excellent fields of observation, were directly responsible for the enemy's stubborn attempts to retake lost ground. Bad weather, including snow, limited visibility during the period, but enemy fire of small arms, mortars and artillery was constant. The 411th RCT, on the heavily wooded mountainous left flank of the Division, stopped an early attack to take a [illegible] pillbox at R-130541. This new position and other positions gained the previous period were further consolidated and improved during the remainder of the day. Late in the period, elements of the 410th RCT relieved elements of the 411th RCT in position in the vicinity of R-1254 without incident. The 409th RCT on the Division right flank bore the brunt of the enemy's counterattacks during the day, repulsing three counterattacks against its positions on Hill 409 (R-[illegible]) with its dominering high ground. The first attack - the strongest of the three - was launched at 1000A by 150 infantrymen supported by two tanks with five additional tanks in reserve. The engagement lasted 55 minutes, during which time close hand to hand and small arms and hand grenade battles raged. The enemy finally withdrew after suffering heavy casualties. The next two counterattacks came at 1230A and 1500A respectively and were sufficiently small and unorganized to permit quick dispersal. All three attacks came from the North out of the

133/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 128 - 21 Dec; NRJ, 20 Dec - Entries #12, 34, 46, 55 and 80.

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main battle [illegible] (R-4[illegible]). Other elements of the 109th Inf, [illegible] portions [illegible] of their remaining main line, continued to strengthen and [illegible] outposts their lines 134/.

4. The situation across the 28th and [illegible] was [illegible] during the period, although [illegible] shelling and probing of [illegible] positions continued. Some [illegible] activity was [illegible] and [illegible] by the other two [illegible] outposts were [illegible] and [illegible] outposts. On the [illegible] flank, [illegible] to the left flank and main [illegible] one of the [illegible] and [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] to [illegible] along the [illegible] to [illegible]. The [illegible] [illegible] by [illegible] along this [illegible] the present [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] points [illegible]. Patrols [illegible] [illegible] to the [illegible] of [illegible] and [illegible], [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible], but [illegible] only a [illegible] from the [illegible], [illegible] small arms and [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] patrol [illegible] [illegible] in an [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible]. To the [illegible], the bulk of the [illegible] remained along the [illegible] of the [illegible], but [illegible] patrolling was carried out on the [illegible] flank. Patrol [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] into the [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] points [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] without [illegible] the [illegible] into [illegible] the [illegible], and patrol [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] at R-[illegible] and R-[illegible], and [illegible] small arms fire when it attempted to [illegible] on AT [illegible] at R-[illegible]. There was no change in the [illegible] main positions from the previous period 135/.

5. The 79th Division made slight withdrawals to better positions and improved and strengthen its lines. Heavy mortar and artillery shelling was slight across the Division sector during the hours before daylight and decreased still further during the day. On the left flank, elements of the 315th RCT withdrew from their [illegible] positions in the [illegible] area, vicinity of R-[illegible] and R-[illegible], and established new [illegible] at R-[illegible] and R-[illegible]. A covering force was left to man these new outposts while the RCT assembled in the vicinity of [illegible]. In the central sector, the 314th Inf established a road block on the [illegible] - [illegible] road at R-[illegible] and another at R-[illegible]. These road blocks were already manned but the bulk of the 314th RCT took up positions approximately 500 yards behind them. Patrols remained active throughout the period, in light contact with enemy forces. The right flank, protected by the 313th Inf, was the most active during the day. Some [illegible] were established with [illegible] line positions and the enemy reacted vigorously to all probing activities. Regimental positions, occupied on the 27th, were consolidated and improved while patrols continued aggressive reconnaissance. Heavy small arms and mortar fire fell sporadically on this sector. Heavy [illegible] observed [illegible] of [illegible] at R-[illegible] or constructing and strengthening [illegible] along the [illegible] marking at points R-[illegible], R-[illegible], R-[illegible] and R-[illegible]. Numerous German patrols were seen moving along the regimental right flank, and all those within range were engaged 136/.

6. A general quiet prevailed across the 127th Gov Ren Sq front on the [illegible]. With the exception of a few scattered rounds of enemy machine gun and mortar fire the sector remained inactive and patrols and outposts noted no enemy activity. During the hours following darkness the enemy on the far bank of the river employed various spaced flares, but the purpose that they served

134/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 128; WRJ, 20 Dec - Entries #16, 35, 57, 66 and [illegible]

135/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 128; WRJ, 20 Dec - Entries #18, 48, 54, 74 and [illegible]

136/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 128; WRJ, 20 Dec - Entries #30 and 66.

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[illegible]

[illegible]

137/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 128; WBJ, 20 Dec - Entry #79.

138/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 128; WBJ, 20 Dec - Entry #46.

139/. G-3 Rpt No. 128

140/. Seventh Army O.I. No. 35 - 20 Dec 44 - Annex No. 13.

141/. WBJ, 22 Dec - Entries #33, 37, 51 and 52; Seventh Army O.I. No. 37 - Annex No. 11; Seventh Army Field Order No. 8 - Annex No. 14

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[illegible] in place a TOT of mortar, 75 and 105mm artillery fire on the town of WISSEMBOURG - evidently with the intention of disrupting communications. Bulk of the 100th Inf also maintained their positions along the LAUTER River to the South and southeast of SIEBER SCHLETTENBACH. Patrols remained in contact with the enemy forces, but fighting was limited to small arms engagements and exchanges of mortar fire. Moderate enemy artillery fire harassed front line troops intermittently throughout the day. One battalion of the 180th RCT in Regimental reserve assembled in ROHRWEIL preparatory to relieving elements of the 411th RCT (103d Div) in position. The 179th RCT, placed in Division reserve the previous period, commenced relief of elements of the 409th and 410th Infs (103d Div) late in the period and relief was still in progress as the period closed 142/.

3. The 103d Division sector in the heavily wooded hills Northwest of WISSEMBOURG was very active during the hours before noon, but became comparatively static for the balance of the period. Two enemy counterattacks launched during the morning were repulsed, after which the enemy became passive and remained within his SIEGFRIED positions; reacting only when approached by American reconnaissance forces. With the Corps Commander's concurrence, the Commanding Generals of the 45th and 103d Divisions completed plans for the relief of the 103d Division in position by the 45th Division and the relief was in progress as the period closed. The 411th Inf on the wooded slopes South of BIEDERTHAL held its positions in a sector that continued quiet throughout the period. Patrols operating forward of the front line held contact with the enemy in his SIEGFRIED fortifications, but drew fire only when these positions were actually threatened. Relief of the 411th Inf in position by elements of the 179th and 180th Infs (45th Div) commenced during the afternoon and was still in progress as the period ended. Elements of the 410th RCT holding positions in the central sector also passed a quiet day. Patrols remained in contact with SIEGFRIED Line positions, but scattered fire fights were the extent of the day's activity. Preparations were made for relief in position by the 179th Inf and all was in readiness as the period drew to a close. The 409th Inf sector on the Division right flank was very active in the morning - the enemy staging two strong counterattacks - but the situation rapidly became static after midday and remained quiet for the remainder of the period. The first enemy attack was launched at 0815A from the direction of DONNELBACH (R-1654) with Hill 489 as its objective. After 75 minutes of intense small arms, machine gun fire and hand grenade battles, the Germans were driven off without loss of ground. The second counterattack supported by two tanks and one half-track came at 1000A against 409th RCT positions in the vicinity of R-153539. This one lasted 45 minutes, after which time the enemy withdrew without having gained his objective. Following the two attacks, the sector became quiet although patrols of the 409th Inf remained in contact with the German forces. As the period drew to an end, relief of the 409th Inf in position by elements of the 179th Inf (45th Inf Div) were underway and proceeding without difficulty 143/.

4. In line with the general quiet that prevailed across the Corps front, the 14th Armored Division sector remained inactive during the period with no change in positions taking place. Elements of CC "A" in strong positions North of RECHTENBACH and in and around KAPSWEYER employed tanks and assault guns for direct fire missions on SIEGFRIED strong points and maintained patrols forward of front lines. The enemy retaliated by placing light and medium caliber artillery of harassing nature on RECHTENBACH and intense mortar concentrations on

142/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 129 - 22 Dec; WRJ, 21 Dec - Entries #10, 31, 40, 91 and 100.

143/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 129; WRJ, 21 Dec - Entries #10, 30, 40 and 101.

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[illegible] On the Rhine, CCB 79th maintained its positions along the South bank of the LAUTER River while conducting aggressive reconnaissance on the north side. Patrols ranged into the [illegible] forest to hold light contact with the enemy forces. A German patrol was encountered and engaged in the vicinity of the bridge (R-8604.95) and after a short exchange of small arms fire the enemy force withdrew. One patrol reached R-8545 and observed an AT gun and [illegible] positions; at R-8548 another AT gun supported by rifle platoon was seen [illegible].

5. The situation on the 79th Division front remained unchanged during the period. With the lone exception of a brief hand grenade fight in the [illegible] sector at R-3394.9 shortly after the period opened, both enemy and allied activity was of a minor nature. Mortar and artillery duels continued throughout the day with bulk of the enemy fire falling on front line elements. [illegible] harassing artillery fell on American held towns immediately behind the lines. All committed elements of the three regiments maintained patrols forward of front lines in contact with the SIEGFRIED line defenses and continued to reorganize and consolidate positions held at the close of the previous period 144/.

6. The 117th Cav Rcn Sqn sector continued inactive with only sporadic enemy contact. Outposts and patrols observed very little enemy activity during their tours of duty. One patrol drew machine gun and mortar fire from the vicinity of R-8172.06 and assault weapon fire placed on that area scored direct hits 146/.

7. Relief of 3d Division elements in the STRASBOURG area was completed by the 36th Division and the latter division assumed control of the sector at [illegible]. Prior to its relief, the 3d Division's committed elements passed the period quietly in patrolling and maintaining outposts. Enemy remained passive and no hostile action was observed. The 3d Division with attached 756th TD Bn and [illegible] Bn was relieved of attachment to VI Corps effective on change of command (1430A). 147/.

8. Having assumed the control of and the responsibility for the 3d Division sector, the 36th Division employed the 143d RCT and 36th Rcn Troops to protect STRASBOURG and the sector to the North, while the 141st RCT took over the sector South of the city. Patrols and outposts of both regiments observed no enemy activity for the remainder of the period. The 142d Inf, still in the II French Corps zone of operations, prepared to move and join the Division as the reserve RCT 148/.

9. Although there were no close support missions flown in support of Corps by XIX TAC during the period, one flight of two enemy planes appeared over the Corps zone. The two hostile planes on a reconnaissance mission, flew back and forth across the Corps front between R-0842 and Q-7545 at [illegible]. Engaged by Corps HAA, one plane burst into flames and crashed at V-9798. 149/.

10. The 93d Armd FA Battalion was relieved of attachment to the 79th Division and VI Corps and commenced movement to II French Corps; 141st AAA AW Bn was relieved of attachment to 35th AAA Brigade and VI Corps and replaced by the 443d AAA AW Battalion, effective with the attachment of 36th Division; the

144/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 129; WRJ, 21 Dec - Entries #36, 87 and 99.

145/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 129; WRJ, 21 Dec - Entry #10.

146/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 129; WRJ, 21 Dec - Entry #67.

147/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 129; WRJ, 21 Dec - Entry #29.

148/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 129.

149/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 129.

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753d Tk Battalion was attached to VI Corps and the 756th Tk Battalion released from attachment; the 47th Tk Battalion (minus Co B) was relieved of attachment to 103d Division and attached to the 79th Division; 3d Cml Mortar Battalion (-Cos A,B) was detached from the 103d Division and attached to Task Force HUDELSON, the remainder of the battalion reverting to control of the 45th Division; 1st Battalion, 36th Engr C Regt closed in Corps area and reverted to control of parent unit, attached to VI Corps 150/.

11. Task Force HUDELSON was constituted by Corps order and consisted of CC "R" 14th Armd Division (Minus one Tk Bn), Co B 645th TD Bn, Co B 3d Cml Mortar Battalion and the 117th Cav Ron Sq (on relief in its sector). Mission of the Task Force was to take over the control and responsibility of the newly acquired territory on the Corps left flank 151/.

12. Seventh Army published and distributed Field Order No. 8, 21 December 1944, which directed VI Corps to: (a) Halt current offensive operations at once and organize and defend ground within newly established boundaries; (b) Extend left flank to a new boundary generally along line DANNE ET QUATRE VENTS (Q-6818) - WINNENAU (Q-7734) - LEMBERG (Q-7445) - BITCHE (Q-7850) WALSCHBRONN (Q-8161) - PINMASENS (Q-9066) (all to XV Corps) and relieve XV Corps units therein; (c) Establish a new boundary on the right flank between VI Corps and XXI Corps generally along line MUNCHHOUSE (R-3035) (to VI Corps) - SELTZ (R-2732) SOUFFLENHEIM (R-1625 - read SOUFFLENHEIM (R-1625) to HAGUENAU (R-0424) (All to XXI Corps). Pending the arrival of XXI Corps on VI Corps right flank, Seventh Army assumed responsibility for that sector 152/.

13. VI Corps issued O.I. No. 29 at 2300A, directing: (a) VI Corps to defend present positions within boundaries prescribed by Seventh Army FO No. 8, 21 December 1944. (b) The 79th Division with two attached tank battalions to relieve elements of 117th Cav Ron Sqn in sector without delay; to relieve elements of the 14th Armd Division in sector without delay; to maintain contact with Task Force HARRIS on right flank; to protect Corps right flank along RHINE River; to maintain contact with 45th Division on left flank (c) The 45th Division with attached troops to relieve elements of the 103d Division in sector by 221200A Dec; to maintain contact with Task Force HUDELSON on left flank (d) The 14th Armd Division (-) to assemble in the vicinity of SOULTZ (R-1138) upon completion of relief by elements of 79th Division; to prepare counterattack plans to meet enemy attack from the Northeast, North, or Northwest (e) Task Force HUDELSON to relieve elements of the 106th Cav Group in sector by 231800A Dec; to maintain contact with XV Corps on the left; to protect Corps left flank (f) The 103d Division, with 614th TD Bn and 534th AAA AW Bn attached, to pass to control of XV Corps upon completion of relief by the 45th Division (g) The 117th Cav Ron Sqdn to release attached units to control of parent units when relieved by Task Force HARRIS and report to Task Force HUDELSON (h) The 79th and 45th Divisions and Task Force HUDELSON to maintain aggressive patrols to prevent disclosure of intentions; to initiate defensive organization of MLR No. 1 in sectors; to reconnoiter and plan defensive organization of MLR No. 2 in sector (i) The 36th Division, and attached units (753d Tk Bn, 636th TD Bn, 443d AAA AW Bn, Hq & Hq Btry 5th AAA Gp, Btries B and D, 62d AAA Gun Bn, 513d AAA AW Bn (-2 Btries) to be released to Seventh Army Control effective 230000A Dec 1944. (j) All attachments to be effective at once and new boundaries to be effective upon completion of reliefs 153/.

150/. G-3 Rpt No. 129.

151/. VI Corps O.I. No. 29 - Annex No. 9.

152/. Seventh Army FO No. 8, 21 Dec 44 - Annex No. 14.

153/. VI Corps O.I. No. 29, 21 Dec 44 - Annex No. 9

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[illegible] the North from these positions resulted in only light contact with the enemy 254/.

[illegible]. After completion of relief by the 45th Division, all tactical units of the 102d Division had cleared the XV Corps area by 1400h enroute to XV Corps. The Division was relieved from attachment to XV Corps effective upon its arrival in the XV Corps area 255/.

[illegible]. The situation on the wide 12th Army Division front closely resembled that of the other divisions in the line. A fluid front continued throughout the period with infantry action negligible and both sides employing mortar and artillery fire freely. CC "A", protecting the division left flank on a line general 2[illegible] North of [illegible] and running southwest to [illegible], continued its direct fire missions on [illegible] strongpoints and conducted "[illegible] patrolling. The week ended with characteristics of mortar and artillery fire that varied from light to heavy. Heavy mortar and [illegible] fire was particularly intense along the ridge running North of [illegible] - evidently to deny CC "A" observation of the strategic observation points the ridge offered. Toward the close of the day, relief of CC "A" in position by elements of the 79th Division was under way

254/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 130, 23 Dec 44; VII, 22 Dec 44 - Entries 46, 47, 53, 54, 56 and 78.

255/. G-3 Rpt No. 130.

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and still in progress as the period ended. With the exception of a few enemy mortar and artillery concentrations, the CC "B" sector on the Division right flank remained quiet. Positions along the south banks of the LAUTER remained unchanged while patrols conducted aggressive reconnaissance in the BIEN WALD area on the North banks. Tank and assault gun fire missions continued against SIEGFRIED Line positions. Enemy shelling was sporadic and scattered but a 20-round concentration of 105mm fell in SALMBACH and a 35-40 round concentration of 120mm mortar fell in the vicinity of R-232426 during the morning. Evening patrols drew small arms and machine gun fire from the dense woods in the vicinity of R-264474 and rifle grenade fire at R-312470. As the period closed the 79th Division had commenced the relief of CC "B" in position. Reserve elements of the 14th Armd Division (CC "R") moved to new assembly areas at ZINSWILLER, GUMBRECHTSHOFFEN and GUNDERSHOFFEN 156/.

5. The 79th Division zone in the western part of the BIEN WALD area remained quiet throughout the period with ground activity limited to occasional patrol skirmishes and reconnaissance. Relief of the 14th Armd Division in positions was in progress at the close of the day. In the 315th RCT sector, enemy action was almost non-existent and patrols established contact only when SIEGFRIED fortifications were reached. Latter part of the day was spent in further consolidating positions and moving one battalion West to relieve elements of CC "A". New positions of this battalion at the end of the period were along the line R-192506 - R-200485 - R-204504 - R-210495. There were no changes in front line dispositions of the 314th Inf but positions were improved and strengthened. Active patrolling was carried on although enemy contact was scattered. On the Division right flank, the 313th RCT sector remained static. German and American patrols were active throughout the period and numerous skirmishes, all on a minor scale, resulted. At 1630A, one twenty-man patrol was observed at R-345448, just North of BERG; artillery was called down on the area and the patrol dispersed. One battalion of the 313th Inf moved West to vicinity of R-205468 - R-273430 and relieved elements of the 14th Armd Division in that area 157/.

6. The right flank sector bordering the west bank of the RHINE River remained unusually quiet during the relief of the 117th Cav Ron Sqdn by elements of Task Force HARRIS. Upon completion of relief at 2200A the 117th Cav Ron Sqdn prepared for movement to the MOUTERHOUSE area 158/.

7. The 36th Division continued to strengthen and consolidate positions in the STRASBOURG area. The 143d RCT protected the left flank South of BISCHWILLER and DRUSENHEIM down along the RHINE River to, and including, STRASBOURG. Patrols were active during the period, but except for a few exchanges of machine gun fire with enemy troops on the far bank of the river, quiet prevailed. South of STRASBOURG, on the Division right flank, the 141st RCT maintained patrols and outposts, observing no enemy activity. The 142d Inf closed in the Division area following its movement from the II French Corps zone and assembled at MUNDOLSHEIM (W-9704) GRIESHEIM (V-8589) and HOLTZHEIM (V-9395). As the period ended, the 36th Division and its attached troops passed from command of VI Corps and reverted to Seventh Army control 159/.

8. Continued bad weather greatly limited air support during the period, but 38 fighter bomber sorties were flown. Railroad approaches and marshalling yards in the region opposite the Corps zone were attacked with good results.

156/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 130; WRJ, 22 Dec - Entries #32, 41, 59 and 73.

157/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 130; WRJ, 22 Dec - Entries #17, 57 and 69.

158/. G-3 Rpt No. 130.

159/. G-3 Rpt No. 130.

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[illegible] enemy aircraft were over the Corps area in increased number during the period, [illegible] the enemy's usual tactics of flying over [illegible] approximately 37 German fighter planes [illegible] 26 hostile acts were committed against [illegible] four enemy JU 188's attacked a P-47 in the vicinity of [illegible] 14. Corps AA units engaged all enemy fighter [illegible] straying two aircraft 159/.

9. Task Force HUDELSON continued preparations for relief of the 106th Cav Gp (XV Corps) on the Corps left flank, [illegible] WILLER, PHILIPPSWEIER (Q-8843) and [illegible] (Q-9763). The 106th [illegible] in HEMERBACH (R-8436) and HEEL (R-3835) during the period, and was attached to VI Corps and the 79th Inf Division 160/.

10. Seventh Army Operations Instruction No. 39 of 22 December was received directing VI Corps to release the 531st AAA AW Bn (Mixed Btry A) with Btry B, 131st AAA AW Bn attached to Task Force HARRIS prior to 2359A on 24 December 161/.

11. At 1300A, VI Corps G.I. No. 30 was issued, directing (a) the 79th Division maintain one infantry battalion on a fourhour alerts to be assembled by Corps order only (b) All Corps troops in the line to [illegible] defensive organization and positions 162/.

23 December

1. Activity continued to be on a minor scale during the period 23 December. Reliefs and displacements within the Corps area proceeded satisfactorily and without incident throughout the day. Infantry action was negligible across the front except in the 45th Division sector where the enemy staged two small counter-attacks shortly after nightfall. While Corps artillery fired normal harassing missions during the period, enemy shelling was very light the greater part of the time, becoming active for a half hour at 1500A when one normal fire mission of 1000 rounds was placed on forward positions at R-3345 and R-3344, Southeast of BUCHELBERG, and again at 2000A when heavy artillery concentrations preceded the counterattacks against the Corps left flank.

2. At the start of the period, Task Force HUDELSON began the relief of the 106th Cav Group (XV Corps unit) in position and by 1500A had completed the relief and assumed command of the sector. Upon completion of the relief, the VI Corps left flank was extended to the West and the new left boundary ran generally East East of RITCHE - LEMBERG - OBERZENBRUCK - WIRMENHAN. During the remainder of the period, Task Force HUDELSON (with the 117th Cav Ron Sqn attached) established new positions and consolidated and strengthened old ones. Patrols and reconn elements of the Task Force probed forward of the front lines to determine enemy strength and dispositions. Contact was light although three separate groups of enemy -- approximately 50 in each group -- were observed in the road Northwest of DAMBACH (Q-9245). Two parachutists were seen dropping in the vicinity of Q-8143, but subsequent search failed to locate them 164/.

3. The 45th Division, with its front lines stretching across thickly wooded mountainous terrain, continued to strengthen and improve defensive positions. In

160/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 130.

161/. G-3 Rpt No. 130.

162/. Annex No. 11.

163/. Annex No. 9.

164/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 131 - 24 Dec; WRJ, 23 Dec - Entry #92.

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[illegible] of infantry and [illegible] respectively and were quickly [illegible] by our [illegible] and [illegible] patrols contacted with several [illegible] and [illegible] were encountered. A re-[illegible] [illegible] was [illegible] and [illegible] fire during the [illegible] the remainder of the [illegible] patrols reached the [illegible] [illegible] without making contact although [illegible] patrols made contact in the western portion of the [illegible] [illegible] and Q-[illegible] but not engaged. [illegible] patrols reached the [illegible] area North of [illegible] and [illegible] gun fire from Q-[illegible] and was forced to withdraw 171/.

b. The 44th Division sector remained fairly quiet although patrols were [illegible] patrols. Slight [illegible] were registered on the left [illegible] and [illegible] activity in other sectors and reacted [illegible] [illegible] continued to be active [illegible] patrols [illegible] improving [illegible] with construction and positions, stringing wire and laying [illegible] in the 157th Inf sector [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] some [illegible] of enemy forces. To take advantage of better [illegible] and facilitate contact with the enemy, front line [illegible] were established along a line Q-937[illegible] - [illegible]. The remainder of the 157th RCT, remained one [illegible] South of the LAUTER River be-[illegible] [illegible]. The 180th Inf continued to strengthen [illegible] [illegible] East North of the 53 Northing and South-[illegible] [illegible]. Both [illegible] Inf and German patrols were active [illegible] and small arms [illegible] were observed. An enemy [illegible] [illegible] to cross the LAUTER in the vicinity of R-087536 via a foot [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible], but were observed by American troops and driven [illegible] [illegible], a small [illegible] force infiltrated 180th RCT positions in the [illegible] area. A small arms fight followed in which all of the in-[illegible] were either killed or driven off. To the East 179th Inf dis-[illegible] [illegible] from the previous period. Patrols ranged the area forward of front line positions and held contact with the enemy throughout the period. [illegible] and artillery fire were sporadic during the day, falling on forward positions 171/.

c. At [illegible], the 79th Division Commander assumed control of the former 14th Armd Division sector, the new front extending Southeast from SCHERMICHEN to the [illegible]. On the left, the division boundary between the 79th and 45th Divisions was established generally along a line just West of REICHTENBACH - [illegible] - [illegible] (R-[illegible]) - PRESSCHORF - LIMBERHOFFEN. Due to the unsuit-ability of defensive positions employed by the 14th Armored Division, the 79th Division devoted the period to establishing new defenses and converting old ones to conform with factory requirements. In some cases, slight withdrawals were initiated to effect these changes. Two battalions of the 315th RCT held positions [illegible] and as far East as LAUTERBURG, although the elements in the [illegible] were in the process of retiring to a new line at R-391480 - [illegible] in the period ended. Activity in the sector was very slight with 315th RCT patrols in light contact with the enemy at widely separated points. Elements of the 315th Inf in reserve continued construction of a secondary defense line in

170/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 132 - 25 Dec; WRJ, 24 Dec - Entries #9, 27, 41, 59 and 73.

171/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 132; WRJ, 24 Dec - Entries #8, 22, 24, 40, 58 and 72.

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[illegible]

5. The 4th Armored Division [illegible] in [illegible] to the [illegible] [illegible] 173/.

6. Good weather with clear visibility permitted the operation of fighter-bomber aviation in the III Corps. [illegible] flown with most of the other divisions [illegible] continued to be active [illegible] types observed. All planes appeared to be [illegible] five of them strafed the area [illegible] within range were covered by light and heavy AA with a [illegible] destroyed and two probably destroyed 174/.

7. Batteries "C" of the 53rd and 101st AAA AW Bns were relieved from attachment to VI Corps and reverted to Seventh Army control at [illegible] 34 Cal Mortar Bn began movement to [illegible] (T-6102), being relieved from [illegible] ment to VI Corps and placed under operational control of III Corps [illegible] of the 83d Cal Mortar Bn was attached to each of the following [illegible] and Task Force HUNTLEIGH 175/.

25 December

1. General quiet prevailed across the entire Corps zone on Christmas Day. Divisions continued to organize and consolidate defensive positions with aggressive action limited to vigorous patrolling and reconnaissance activity. There was no change in the Corps's disposition of artillery which remained defensive in nature. Artillery fire[illegible] of the period [illegible] carried through unchanged with Corps and division artillery firing numerous missions and the enemy firing light harassing [illegible].

2. There was no change in positions in the Task Force [illegible] sector; outposts and main defenses were maintained throughout the period. Vigorous patrolling continued but enemy contact was scattered. The 117th Cav Rgt [illegible] patrolled forward of its front lines all day and although 40 enemy [illegible] soldiers and 20 labor troops were observed in dug-in positions at Q-[illegible], no other contact was made until evening. At 1935A, a reconnaissance patrol [illegible] small arms and machine gun fire from the houses in the vicinity of Q-[illegible] and Q-7814,98. Assault gun fire was called down on these strongpoints by the patrol and both machine guns were effectively silenced. Remainder of Task [illegible]

172/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 132; WRJ, 24 Dec - Entries 18, 29, 39, 62 and 86.

173/. G-3 Rpt No. 132.

174/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 132.

175/. G-3 Rpt No. 132.

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[illegible]

b. [illegible] 176/. [illegible]

b. Activity in the 79th Division zone of action fell to a new low during the period. Patrolling continued and although many patrols were dispatched frequently, no close contact was made. Division elements received reinforcements with the organization and construction of additional defensive and strengthening these during the week. While elements of the 315th RCT in the vicinity of [illegible] retained their positions, other elements to the east were forced to withdraw under cover of darkness to new defensive points [illegible] 177/.

[illegible]

176/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 133 - 26 Dec 44; WRJ, 25 Dec - Entries #16, 29, 36, 53, 62 and 77.

177/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 133; WRJ, 25 Dec 44 - Entries #12, 16, 54, 64 and 72.

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aggressive activity was shown by the enemy. Eighth RCT patrols reached R-[illegible] (Fleck [illegible]) 178/.

5. There were no changes in 24th Corps Division dispositions during the period. The Division (less elements with Task Force HUNDLEY) remained in Corps reserve, in readiness to counterattack on Corps order if and when necessary 179/.

6. The XXV TAC flew 23 sorties totaling 33[illegible] sorties and inflicted serious damage on many railway facilities and concentrations points forward of the Corps area. Six German aircraft were over the Corps area during the period - one on Monday (Christmas) - on reconnaissance missions. All flights were engaged by heavy and light AA and one ME-109 was destroyed 180/.

26 December

1. Again on 26 December a general calm existed over the Corps zone. Slight unopposed advances to stronger positions were made in the center, but the majority of frontline dispositions remained unchanged and contact with the German forces throughout the day was slight. Although an increase in enemy tank movement was both observed and heard, no enemy armor was sighted. Excellent weather permitted the continuation of artillery fire missions on enemy installations with good results. Enemy artillery continued to fall on forward positions, but remained harassing and light in nature.

2. Task Force HUNDLEY continued to support and protect the Corps left flank although contact with the enemy was limited to patrol and brief mortar and artillery duels. Several prisoners were taken during the period from the 52 Inf in GAY and interrogation revealed that this new unit's presence opposite Task Force HUNDLEY increased the enemy's defensive strength by at least 360 men. However, the fact that all members of the battalion less key personnel, were in the 18 - 20 age group and had very little previous combat experience made the unit's combat worth doubtful. Southeast of HUNDLEY on the left, the 117th Cav Rgt spent an uneventful period. Improvement and consolidation of positions continued while patrols ranged forward of these defenses. Contact with the enemy remained light and scattered. In the right half of the sector, other elements of Task Force HUNDLEY also passed the period in patrolling and strengthening defensive fortifications. Patrols conducted aggressive reconnaissance, but made contact only in scattered instances. One patrol attacked a pillbox in the vicinity of Q-[illegible] and succeeded in killing two of the enemy and forcing the remaining seven to withdraw. Enemy artillery was very light over the course of the period with the lone exception of one 100-round concentration on the town of PHILIPPEVILLE (Q-97[illegible]) 181/.

3. The 45th Division front continued stable during the period with enemy contact being maintained only by vigorous and aggressive patrolling. German patrol activity was negligible and for the first time in many days, they made no attempt to probe the Division front line positions. A slight shift was made in positions in one sector early in the day, but the major part of the Division frontline defenses remained unchanged. Reports that 8 enemy paratroopers had

178/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 133; WRJ, 25 Dec - Entries #10, 73 and 76.

179/. G-3 Rpt No. 133.

180/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 133; WRJ, 25 Dec - Entries #50, 56, 70 and 72.

181/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 135 - 27 Dec; WRJ, 26 Dec - Entries #34 and 60.

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stopped in the vicinity of GUNDERSHOFFEN (Q-9836) before first light resulted in a thorough search of that area during the day by motorized and foot patrols. No signs of the paratroopers, nor any indication that they had landed, were found. On the Division left flank, the reinforced battalion of the 157th RGT moved up-stream to the North to better defensive positions and a new line was established in the vicinity of Q-9844,52 - Q-9844,55 - Q-9844,52 and Q-9504,78 - Q-9604,77 - Q-9704,77. Defensive fires were registered in an area forward of the new lines, but the enemy displayed no aggressive action which warranted their use. Enemy activity in the vicinity of the roadblock at Q-9924,80 indicated it was being strengthened while other enemy troops were seen in dug-in positions on the hill Q-9924,74. Balance of the 157th Inf defending in positions along the river bank south of MERKWEILER were relieved early in the day by the 180th RGT and assembled at R-0254,00 and R-0254,45. The relieving elements of the 180th Inf took up positions on a line R-0385,36 - R-0585,36 - R-0585,32 - R-0605,42 - R-0705,42 about a kilometer South of MERKWEILER. Main force of the 180th remained in previously held positions and continued to strengthen and improve defensive strongpoints. Reconnaissance elements were active during the period and although fire fights were not numerous, considerable enemy activity was observed. Prepared positions along the nose of the hill from R-1005,40 - R-1005,37 - R-1065,34 were found to be occupied by the enemy in estimated platoon sized strength. Another estimated group of 70-100 Germans was observed digging in along the high ground at R-0985,44. Over to the East, the 179th RGT held its defensive positions on the wooded high ground generally between the 53 and 54 Northings. The sector was quiet throughout the period and active patrolling was required to maintain contact with the enemy 182/.

4. The 79th Division continued to improve and consolidate its defensive positions stretching from WIESSEMBOURG to the RHINE River on the Corps right flank. Outposts and blocks forward of main defenses were maintained during the period and patrols of all three regiments conducted reconnaissance missions. Contact was limited to a few brief small arms clashes against an enemy content to stay in his strong SIEGFRIED fortifications and wait. One reconnaissance patrol from the Division was employed to direct artillery fire on enemy personnel and pillboxes in the vicinity of R-317358, R-313361 and R-324363 with good results. Hostile mortar and artillery fire remained light and sporadic and fell mostly on the left flank. Contact with Task Force HARRIS on the right was maintained throughout the period 183/.

5. The 14th Armd Division remained assembled at MERKWEILER (R-0637), SCHWABWEILER (R-1033) and WALBOURG in Corps reserve. No changes occurred during the period.

6. There were no close support missions flown by XII TAC, but Corps Artillery fired a counterflak program when XII TAC bombed the bridge at RASTATT (R-3428). The program was highly successful, the bombing run being made without encountering any flak after all AA units in that location had been effectively silenced. Enemy aircraft continued to be active over the Corps zone - well over 50 enemy planes being plotted during the course of the period. One flight strafed and dropped AP bombs in the 79th Division sector, doing very little damage. Corps AA units claimed one plane destroyed and four probably destroyed 184/.

7. In accordance with Seventh Army Operation Instruction No. 42 of this

182/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 134; WRJ, 26 Dec - Entries #10, 27, 34, 41, 47, 60 and 71.

183/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 134.

184/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 134.

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date, VII Corps issued G. I. No. 14 at [illegible] to define the new boundary between VII Corps and Task Force [illegible] to be effective at [illegible] (to VII Corps) - [illegible] - [illegible] - [illegible] (all to W [illegible]) 184/.

[illegible]

1. The situation remained static and generally quiet on 27 December. The Corps right flank was greatly extended during the period to embrace the territory above and below [illegible] leaving the [illegible] Task Force, responsible for the protection and security of the [illegible] were placed under Corps control. All combat [illegible] to improve and consolidate their OPL's and MLR's in anticipation of strong enemy attacks.

2. In the Task Force [illegible] sector on the Corps left flank, the period preceding daylight were utilized to fire artillery [illegible] rounds - against enemy installations and concentrations on this front. [illegible] activity during this time and for the balance of the period was [illegible] The 117th Cav Rgn Gp's protecting the left flank got only one contact with the enemy; one patrol reaching the vicinity of Q-[illegible] encount an enemy reconnaissance group in a short fire fight, in which the enemy [illegible] M-1 rifles against the American patrols. All positions on the 117th Cav Rgn Gp front were strengthened and improved. The remainder of Task Force [illegible] passed a quiet day, adjusting and consolidating defensive strongpoints. Patrols were active but did not succeed in establishing close contact with the enemy. One patrol advanced Northwest of [illegible] and found that the villages in that area, which had been defended by enemy troops the previous period, were unoccupied 186/.

3. Main activity of the day within the Corps zone again occurred on the 45th Division front. Efforts to secure more favorable terrain for defensive positions on the left flank drew instant reaction from the [illegible] However, considerable gains toward the limited objectives were made. [illegible] the division front, except for patrol activity, remained static and quiet. While elements of the 157th Inf adjusted their defensive positions in the vicinity of DAUBACH, two battalions of the ROT, assembled at R-[illegible] and R-[illegible], moved out to attack Northwest toward strategic high ground forward of present positions where much stronger defenses could be established. Resistance came from small enemy groups, situated in well entrenched strongpoints that made progress difficult. Small arms and mortar fire were received from the high ground at Q-982424, Q-973424, vicinity of OBERSTEINBACH and [illegible] and these fires were supplemented later in the period with medium and heavy artillery. Near the close of the day forward elements had reached a general line Q-[illegible] - Q-969493 and R-004510 - R-018508 - R-[illegible] where the enemy launched three counterattacks. Despite heavy concentrations of American artillery the last attack succeeded in making some gains and cutting off one company of the 157th Infantry in the vicinity of Q-983504. In contrast to the moving situation on the Division left flank, the 180th ROT passed a relatively quiet day. Improvement of positions and the laying of minefields and tactical wire continued as reconnaissance patrols roved the wooded terrain forward of defenses to maintain contact. On the Division right flank North of WISSEMBOURG, the 179th ROT also spent the period quietly. Elements adjusted their positions and made slight

185/. Annexes Nos. 9 and 11.

186/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 135, 28 Dec; WRJ, 27 Dec - Entries 49 and 49.

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date, VII Corps issued G. I. No. [illegible] to define the next boundary between VII Corps and Task Force HARRIS to be effective at [illegible] (to VII Corps) - [illegible] - [illegible] - [illegible] (all to VII Corps) [illegible]

27 December

1. The situation remained static and generally quiet on 27 December. The Corps right flank was greatly enhanced during the period by occupying the territory above and behind [illegible] leaving the [illegible] Task Force, responsible for the protection and security of the [illegible] were placed under Corps control. All combat units continued to adjust, improve and consolidate their OPL's and MLR's in anticipation of enemy attacks.

2. In the Task Force HARRIS sector on the Corps left flank, the hours preceding daylight were utilized to fire artillery [illegible] rounds - against enemy installations and concentrations in this area. Patrol activity during this time and for the balance of the period remained [illegible]. The 137th Cav Rgt Sqdn protecting the left flank had only one encounter with the enemy; one patrol reaching the vicinity of Q-[illegible] engaged an enemy reconnaissance group in a short fire fight, in which the enemy [illegible] his M-1 rifles against the American patrol. All positions on the 137th Cav Rgt's front were strengthened and improved. The remainder of Task Force HARRIS passed a quiet day, adjusting and consolidating defensive strongpoints. Patrols were active but did not succeed in establishing close contact with the enemy. One patrol advanced Northwest of NEUHOFFEN and found that the pillboxes in that area, which had been defended by enemy troops the previous period, were unoccupied 186/.

3. Main activity of the day within the Corps zone again occurred on the 45th Division front. Efforts to secure more favorable terrain for defensive positions on the left flank drew instant reaction from the opposing [illegible]. However, considerable gains toward the limited objectives were made. Elsewhere, the division front, except for patrol activity, remained static and quiet. While elements of the 157th Inf adjusted their defensive positions in the vicinity of DAUBACH, two battalions of the ROT, assembled at R-[illegible] and R-[illegible], moved out to attack Northwest toward strategic high ground forward of present positions where much stronger defenses could be established. Resistance came from small enemy groups, situated in well entrenched strongpoints that made progress difficult. Small arms and mortar fire were received from the high ground at Q-982484, Q-973484, vicinity of OBERSTEINBACH and SCHONAU and these fires were supplemented later in the period with medium and heavy artillery. Near the close of the day forward elements had reached a general line Q-98350h - Q-969493 and R-004510 - R-018508 - R-013518 where the enemy launched three counterattacks. Despite heavy concentrations of American artillery, the last attack succeeded in making some gains and cutting off one company of the 157th Infantry in the vicinity of Q-98350h. In contrast to the moving situation on the Division left flank, the 180th ROT passed a relatively quiet day. Improvement of positions and the laying of minefields and tactical wire continued as reconnaissance patrols roved the wooded terrain forward of defenses to maintain contact. On the Division right flank North of WISSEMBOURG, the 179th ROT also spent the period quietly. Elements adjusted their positions and made slight

185/. Annexes Nos. 9 and 11.

186/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 135, 28 Dec; WRJ, 27 Dec - Entries #9 and 49.

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ANNEX

withdrawals to better defensive positions along a general line R-[illegible] - R-[illegible] while other front line dispositions remained unchanged 187/.

4. The 79th Division, along the LAUTER River between MUNCHHOUSE and the RHINE, had no change in dispositions during the period. Patrolling forward of front lines to maintain contact with the enemy was the extent of ground activity overall. Artillery with direct fire results, but all very at a short range. Observation confirmed the fact that the enemy was employing the respite well to further strengthen and improve his positions, particularly in the region just Northeast of Rott. Division and Corps artillery units continued to fire against harassing shelling on enemy strongpoints, personnel concentrations and communications and the enemy responded with sporadic fires placed on front line elements and towns immediately behind the lines. The 315th RCT continued to improve defenses in the SCHWEIGHEIM area with no change in dispositions. One patrol encountered a numerous enemy group in the town of [illegible] and in the ensuing fire fight, killed four and captured the remaining three who were identified as elements of the 481 Regt of the 256 VG Division. In the division central sector, the 313th Inf CP1 and MIE positions remained unchanged. All elements of the RCT continued to improve and further fortify defensive positions South of the LAUTER River. Defending the LAUTERBOURG - [illegible] area on the right flank the 314th RCT remained in currently held positions and followed the pattern of the day by patrolling actively forward of the front lines. A patrol reached the area of R-329456, but received such strong opposition from that vicinity that it was forced to return. Division run elements remained in contact with Task Force Harris on the right and continued to protect the Division right boundary 188/.

5. The 14th Armd Division (-) remained in Corps reserve with no change in the location of its units.

6. Seventh Army Operations Instructions Nos 44 and 45 of this date extended the VI Corps southern boundary to include the sectors along the RHINE River from MUNCHHOUSE to PLOBSHEIM which were occupied by Task Forces HARRIS (less one Regt), HERREN and LINDEN, effective at 1800A, and attached all three groups to VI Corps at the same time. Task Force HARRIS (-) (253d and 255th Inf Regts) held the sector between MUNCHHOUSE and STATTMATTEN (R-195218); Task Force HERREN (274th, 275th and 276th Inf Regts) held the river line from STATTMATTEN, South to its right boundary RIESCHEIM (R-[illegible]) - W-[illegible]; Task Force LINDEN (222d, 232d and 242d Inf Regts) held the river from that line just North of STRASBOURG to the new VI Corps - II French Corps boundary running generally MOLSHEIM (W-820935) - FRUERSHEIM (R-955875) - the RHINE River bank at W-0286. Activity during the remainder of the period was confined to patrolling and outposting the western banks of the RHINE in this long dormant sector 189/.

7. The following units were attached to VI Corps during the period to support the three task forces: Hq & Hq Btry 33d FA Brig, 155th FA Bn, 132d FA Bn, 69th Armd FA Bn, Rem Co 636th TD Bn, Hq & Hq Btry 5th AAA Gp, 62d AAA Gun Bn, 533d AAA AW Bn (-Btry A), Btry C 431st AAA AW Bn, 753d Tk Bn, 40th Engr C Regt (-3d Bn), 677th Engr L Equip Co 190/.

8. VI Corps O. I. No. 35 was issued at 1800A, directing: (a) the 79th

187/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 135; WRJ, 27 Dec - Entries #7, 27, 33, 58, 59 and 75.

188/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 135; WRJ, 27 Dec - Entries #13, 33, and 59.

189/. G-3 Rpt No. 135; Annex No. 11

190/. G-3 Rpt No. 135.

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Division, 45th Division and Task Force HUDELSON to organize the MAGINOT Line (generally) as an MLR for use should a retrograde movement be necessary; (b) the 14th Armd Division to continue present mission in Corps reserve, prepared to counterattack Northwest, North, or Northeast on Corps order; (c) Selection of exact OPLRs and MLRs was left to the discretion of commanders concerned, defensive plans and overlays showing battalion positions, AT positions, minefields, tactical wire and artillery capabilities to be forwarded to the Corps Commander as soon as details were evolved 191/.

28 December

1. During 28 December, the Corps front continued inactive with both the enemy and Corps troops consolidating and further strengthening defensive positions. Dispositions of the previous period remained relatively unchanged although minor adjustments were made in the central sector. Aided by good visibility, ground and air OP's directed Corps and division artillery on many profitable targets. Harassing missions on enemy positions and rear installations - including the city of KARLSRUHE, East of the RHINE River - were fired with good effect. It became increasingly evident from PW identifications that the bulk of the German 256 VG and 245 Inf Divisions had been withdrawn from the Corps front for much needed rest and refitting - being replaced by a variety of static defense formations.

2. In the heavily wooded country on the Corps left flank, Task Force HUDELSON passed a quiet day. Positions remained unchanged and contact with the enemy continued light across the entire front, only a few scattered engagements taking place during the period. The outstanding bit of action took place when enemy tanks were heard moving into BITCHE under cover of darkness. Artillery fire was called down with good effect and no further movement was heard after the barrage had lifted. Patrols of the 117th Cav encountered a strong force of well dug-in enemy at Q-794498 and Q-797495, but did not engage them. The program of strengthening defenses, laying tactical wire and constructing obstacles continued through the period and contact with elements of XV Corps on the left was maintained without interruption. On the remainder of Task Force HUDELSON sector in the FORET DOMANIALE HANNSTEIN area patrols continued aggressive reconnaissance and discovered that the enemy was devoting his time to the strengthening and improvement of old positions and the construction of additional defensive works; well dug-in positions were seen at Q-900471, Q-903469 and Q-903467. The enemy road block at the junction Q-872471 was improved and American patrols that approached the obstacle drew machine pistol fire 192/.

3. The 45th Division zone continued to be the most active, with most of the activity centered on the division west flank. In this particular sector the 157th RCT maintained close contact with enemy following its attack of the previous period. Early in the day, reinforcements were pushed up close to the company that had been cut off the day before. The pressure exerted by these reinforcements caused the Germans to withdraw and restored the RCT front line, which ran generally from OBERSTEINBACH to SCHONAU. In the SCHONAU area, elements of the 157th RCT were not in the town, but occupied positions on the hills surrounding it. 40-50 enemy dug-in at strong positions atop the hill at R-005516 continued to resist, while a mopping up campaign was conducted against an unestimated number of German troops dug in on hills in the vicinity of Q-992510 and Q-979503. The task of strengthening and improving newly acquired

191/. Annex No. 9.

192/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 136 - 29 Dec; WRJ, 28 Dec - Entries #12, 44 and 83.

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positions was well underway as the period ended. Almost without exception, the situation in the 180th and 179th sectors remained static and quiet throughout the period. With a strong, continuous OPL running across the sectors from R-036540 - R-050545 - R-058544 - R-055545 - thence along the south bank of the LAUTER River to R-089530 - R-095534 - R-108547 - R-123539 - R-135540 - R-143534 - R-153530 - R-166526, work on MLR to the rear of these positions continued. The lone bit of activity worthy of note in either sector occurred on the 179th Inf front when a 15-man enemy patrol stumbled onto a forward position. Effective mortar and small arms fire killed seven of the Germans and forced the remainder to retreat 193/.

4. In the BIEN WALD area, from WISSEMBOURG to the RHINE River, the 79th Division remained in position on its inactive front and devoted the day to patrolling and improving fortifications. Enemy mortar and artillery fire remained sporadic and exceptionally light in contrast to the normal firing missions of division artillery units. The 315th and 313th RCT sectors - the WISSEMBOURG - SCHEIBENHARD area - were especially quiet during the period. Only the most vigorous patrolling resulted in contact with enemy forces and that was of a minor nature. Improvement of OPL's and MLR's by the laying of tactical wire and mines continued in both regimental sectors without letup. On the Division right flank in the LAUTERBOURG-BERG area, the 314th Inf managed to remain in closer contact with the enemy forces by aggressive reconnaissance. One strong patrol made contact with an enemy patrol at R-317436, encountered defended road blocks in the vicinity of R-346439 and an unknown number of well entrenched enemy at R-348440 in the woods just North of BERG 194/.

5. South of the 79th Division, along the RHINE River between MARCKOLSHEIM and the 20 Northing, Task Force HARRIS passed a quiet period. With the 253d Inf in the left sector and the 255th on the right, the entire Task Force front remained inactive although light harassing machine gun fire from the East bank of the RHINE was received throughout the period. By mutual agreement with Task Force HEUREN, the right boundary was extended to encompass the 20 Northing grid slightly North of DALHUNDEN (R-190195). The 354th Inf assembled in the vicinity of CAMP D'OBERHOFFEN and prepared to move the next day to the 3d Division zone of action (under operational control of the First French Army) 195/.

6. As the period opened, Task Force HEUREN completed relief of the 232d Inf (Task Force LINDEN) in position and assumed control of the RHINE River sector generally from DALHUNDEN to just North of STRASBOURG. With elements of the 274th Inf protecting the left sector, elements of the 275th Inf protecting the right sector and the 276th Inf in reserve, Task Force HEUREN spent a quiet period. Patrols and outposts were maintained, but no enemy ground activity was observed 196/.

7. Protecting the zone bordering the RHINE River between STRASBOURG and the VI Corps - II French Corps boundary, Task Force LINDEN passed the period patrolling and making slight adjustments in positions. The 232d Inf, having moved into the Task Force sector after its relief by elements of Task Force HEUREN, assumed defensive positions in the STRASBOURG area at W-032970, W-023936 and W-003941. The 242d Inf commanded the right flank sector while the 222d Inf remained in reserve with no change in dispositions. The situation across the front continued static as only brief exchanges of small arms and automatic weapons fire with enemy forces on the far banks of the river took

193/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 136; WRJ, 28 Dec - Entries #27, 34, 45, 52, 61 and 102.

194/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 136; WRJ, 28 Dec - Entry #43.

195/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 136; WRJ, 28 Dec - Entries #10, 66, 84 and 88.

196/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 136; WRJ, 28 Dec - Entry #46.

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place 197/.

8. The 14th Armd Division continued in Corps reserve during the period. Component artillery units were utilized to support fire missions of the Corps Artillery. In accordance with Hq Seventh Army OI No. 46, dated 28 Dec and VI Corps OI No. 36, CC "A" commenced movement to vicinity of PHALSBOURG (Q-6519), being attached to XV Corps upon arrival 198/.

9. VI Corps Operations Destruction No. 36 was issued at 1600A directing in general: (a) the attachment of tank and tank destroyer elements to Task Forces HERREN and LINDEN to support them in their mission of protecting the Corps flank along the RHINE; (b) the relief of Task Force HARRIS by Task Force HERREN and its subsequent assembly in Corps Reserve; (c) the detachment of one combat command from the 14th Armd Division and its movement to the XV Corps zone; (d) the attachment of Hq 33d FA Brig, the 132d, 155th, 935th, 59th Armd and 69th Armd FA Bns to VI Corps Artillery to support Task Forces LINDEN and HERREN; (e) the attachment of Hq 5th AAA Group, the 62d AAA Gun and 533d AAA AW Bns to the 35th AAA Brig to support the two task forces along the RHINE 199/.

29 December

1. The VI Corps front remained static and comparatively quiet during 29 December, except for the usual vigorous patrolling, as defensive positions were improved on both sides of the line. The only aggressive action by the enemy occurred in the zone of the 45th Division where strong patrols attempted to infiltrate positions of the 157th Inf. Almost no contact was recorded along the rest of the long WISSEMBOURG - LAUTERBOURG - RHINE River front as all elements continued to strengthen positions. Relief of Task Force HARRIS by Task Force HERREN was started during the day, and a general reshuffling and regrouping of forces along the RHINE had commenced.

2. One minor incident occurred on the Corps left flank in the Task Force HUDELSON sector. A small enemy group which had occupied one of our OPs (Q-784490) during the night ambushed a patrol moving to man this position at 0700A and succeeded in capturing two men and forcing the patrol to withdraw. This OP was later reoccupied in greater strength with the assistance of artillery support. During the afternoon patrols found WALDBOK (Q-8446) and EBERSHARDT unoccupied, but were taken under machine gun fire from a heavily defended enemy road block at Q-377475. Sporadic enemy mortar fire fell in the NEUNHOFFEN area throughout the day 200/.

3. The zone of the 157th Inf on the left flank continued to see the most activity on the 45th Division front. Persistent attempts by small enemy groups to infiltrate the west flank of the 157th Inf were made during the afternoon and evening, but all were repulsed. Subsequently, the enemy resumed his defensive attitude in this area. Indications of a German build-up in this area were seen when an estimated 200 Germans were observed moving South from R-050605 to BRUCHWEILER in the early afternoon and immediately taken under artillery fire. There was no change along the rest of the Division front, both the 179th and 180th Infs continuing to take advantage of the

197/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 136; WRJ, 28 Dec - Entries #65 and 92.

198/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 136; WRJ, 28 Dec - Entries #62 and 103; Annexes No. 9 and 11.

199/. Annex No. 9.

200/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 137 - 30 Dec; WRJ, 29 Dec - Entries #46 and 52.

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hill to improve their defensive positions 201/.

4. There was no significant change along the 79th Division front from WISSEMBOURG to the RHINE, as defensive positions were improved during the day. Continued improvement of enemy positions was noted by patrols, but hostile activity was limited to light artillery fire on the sectors of the 314th and 315th Infs and minor patrolling 202/.

5. Sporadic machine gun fire from the east banks of the RHINE fell on the Task Force HARRIS sector during the day and a six-man enemy patrol, attempting to cross the River in a boat shortly after sundown, was repulsed by small arms fire. Otherwise, this sector was quiet as relief by Task Force HERREN got underway in accordance with Operations Instruction No. 36, Hq 2000A, the 253d Inf had been relieved by the 276th Inf (TF HERREN) and was preparing to assemble at CAMP D'OBERHOFFEN the following morning. The 255th Inf continued to maintain its defensive positions along the RHINE 203/.

6. Only scattered mortar and small arms fire from the eastern banks of the RHINE broke the general quiet existing along the Task Force HERREN front during the day. No enemy patrols attempted to cross the river in this sector, but plans were made to trap any future hostile patrols on the west bank instead of repulsing them and allowing a withdrawal. Main activity centered on the relief of Task Force HARRIS elements to the North, and the subsequent regrouping of forces to cover the extended front. By early evening, the 276th Inf had relieved the 253d Inf (TF HARRIS) in position, while the 274th and 275th Infs maintained screening positions along the RHINE 204/.

7. A similar quiet reigned in the sector of Task Force LINDEN, from STRASBOURG to the South. Occasional small arms and mortar fire from across the river fell in the area, but the enemy employed no artillery and did not send any patrols across the RHINE in this zone. Task Force elements limited their activity to patrolling along the west banks and directing occasional small arms and mortar fire at definitely located targets on the other side. The Task Force boundary was shifted to the North above STRASBOURG as the 232d Inf relieved elements on the right of Task Force HERREN, while the 222d and 242d Infs regrouped to encompass the longer front 205/.

8. Combat Command "A" 14th Armd Division closed in assembly area in the vicinity of SIEWILLER (Q-6127) and [illegible] XV Corps control at 0500, and the Division Artillery moved to KUTZENHAUSEN (R-0063T2) at 0935A to reinforce fires of the 45th Division Artillery in accordance with Operations Instruction No. 36. The remainder of the 14th Armd Division remained in Corps reserve 206/.

9. Early in the evening approximately fifteen enemy planes were reported scattered over the entire Corps area, but only one committed an hostile act - dropping three bombs near the 222d Regimental CP in the Task Force LINDEN sector. The 436th AAA AW Bn and Co A 84th Engr Cam Bn were attached to VI Corps during the day 207/.

30 December

1. The left flank continued to be the most active portion of the VI

201/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 137; WRJ, 29 Dec - Entries #46, 52 and 67.

202/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 137; WRJ, 29 Dec - Entries #37 and 67.

203/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 137; WRJ, 29 Dec - Entries #17, 67 and 73.

204/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 137; WRJ, 29 Dec - Entries #31, 67 and 83.

205/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 137; WRJ, 29 Dec - Entries #56, 67 and 82.

206/. G-3 Rpt No. 137; WRJ, 29 Dec - Entry #39.

207/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 137.

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] before they were driven off by mortar and artillery concentrations 208/.

3. Along the 45th Division front the enemy's attitude remained entirely defensive with the exception of a platoon size patrol of the 157th Inf patrolling near R-1353h at 2045A which was overlaid without loss of ground. This area continued to be the most active of the Division front. During the afternoon one patrol of the 157th was engaged by an E-10 enemy group in the vicinity of R-177540 and another was taken under machine gun fire at Q-937678. Close contact was maintained throughout the entire period. In contact were the sectors of the 179th and 180th Infs to the Southeast, where activity was limited to the continued improvement of defensive positions 209/.

4. Ground activity along the 79th Division front remained negligible - limited to active patrolling which developed only minor contacts, and the improvement of positions. However, hostile air activity was extensive in the Division zone - four P-47s with German markings attacking the area in the early afternoon. At SURBOURG, these planes destroyed two buildings, killing seven soldiers and wounding many more; at BOUXZE they hit a FW Clearing Station, causing 15-18 minor casualties. Along the front from WINGENBURG to the RHINE, the 315th, 313th and 314th Infs continued to improve their defensive positions and patrolled extensively to their front 210/.

5. Relief of Task Force HARRIS by Task Force HERRON was completed when the 275th Inf finished taking over positions of the 255th Inf along the RHINE by 1500A, and by 2030A the 255th RCT had assembled in the CAMP D'OBERHOFFEN area in Corps reserve. Early in the period the 254th Inf had moved from CAMP D'OBERHOFFEN to an assembly area in the vicinity of GRUNDHOFF (Q-5544) and passed to operational control of the XV Corps in accordance with VII Corps Operations Instruction No. 37 211/.

6. Except for some harassing mortar fire on elements of the 276th Inf, there was no enemy activity on the quiet front of Task Force HERRON along the RHINE North of STRASBOURG during the day. After the 275th Inf had completed relief of the remaining elements of the 255th Inf to the North, the Task Force

208/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 138 - 31 Dec; WRJ, 30 Dec - Entries #46, 77 and 79.

209/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 138; WRJ, 30 Dec - Entries #30 and 72.

210/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 138; WRJ, 30 Dec - Entry #48.

211/. G-3 Rpt No. 138; Annex No. 9; WRJ, 30 Dec - Entry #53.

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assumed control of that sector 212/.

7. In STRASBOURG and to the South, Task Force LINDEN readjusted its positions and continued to improve defenses along the RHINE River throughout the day with the 232d, 242d and 222d Infs situated along the west banks from North to South. Although the enemy made no attempts to cross the river during the day, they harassed Task Force elements with small arms fire from pill boxes on the east banks. At 2110A one low-flying enemy plane dropped three bombs near the 222d Inf CP, but caused no casualties 213/.

8. The 14th Armd Division (-) began movement to a new assembly area in the vicinity of INGWILLER (Q-8130) - BOUXWILLER (Q-8125), remaining in Corps Reserve 214/.

9. Aviation activity accelerated during this period over that of 29 December. At 1210A, twelve P-47's bombing and strafing in the vicinity of SOULTZ (R-1238) were engaged by AA after yellow smoke had been shown and this identification signal had no particular effect. Reports differ as to the identity of the planes; some observers reported that the aircraft had German markings and others that they had American markings. When Spitfires investigated this activity, the P-47's took off and disappeared over enemy territory before the Spitfires could make contact. At 1430A, five ME-109's entered the Corps area and strafed a motor column vicinity of NIEDERSEEBACH (R-1939) and HAGUENAU at tree top level and two of them were shot down by light AA. At 1526A, four ME-109's were engaged by light AA as they strafed along the RHINE River vicinity R-2831, but none were reported destroyed 215/.

10. Seventh Army Field Order No. 9 of this date was received, directing the VI Corps to continue reinforcement of present defensive positions and to prepare plans for a counterattack to the Northwest to threaten flank of a major enemy attack in the XV Corps sector 216/.

11. At 1700A, VI Corps Operations Instruction No. 37 was issued to regroup Corps forces in better defensive alignment, and generally directing (a) Task Force HERREN to move one infantry regiment to the 45th Division zone by 010800A January and to be prepared to assemble another on order in the CAMP D'OBERNHOFFEN area as Corps Reserve; (b) The 45th Division to extend its boundary to the left to relieve Task Force HUDELSON elements by 030300A January; (c) Task Force HUDELSON to relieve and move the 117th Cav Rcn Sqdn to MISTESHEIM (Q-9331) for reorganization and rehabilitation; (d) 14th Armd Division (-) to prepare plans for counterattacks to the South or Southwest against enemy penetrations on that flank 217/.

31 December

1. While activity was relatively light all along the front during 31 December, and close contact was maintained only by dint of aggressive patrolling, there were indications of a decided shift of enemy dispositions on the Corps front. Hostile armor and troop activity showed an increase on the left flank in the Task Force HUDELSON zone, particularly around BITCHE. A considerable number of enemy aircraft were active over the Corps zone through-

212/. G-3 Rpt No. 138; WHJ, 30 Dec - Entry #10.

213/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 138; WHJ, 30 Dec - Entries #7, 10, 64, 77 and 90.

214/. G-3 Rpt No. 138; Annex No. 9.

215/. G-2 Rpt No. 138.

216/. Annex No. 16.

217/. Annex No. 9.

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out the day and in the evening a drop of 25 paratroopers in the BISCHWILLER area along the RHINE was reported and apparently [illegible] by subsequent hostile patrol and sniper action.

2. While there was little actual contact with the enemy in the Task Force HUDELSON sector on the Corps left flank, there was a decided increase in hostile activity and movement behind the lines, indicating a strong build-up in the BITCHE area. During the morning 50-75 enemy troops were observed in the vicinity of Q-782511, and a group in a house at Q-788507 and a wire crew at Q-789508 were taken under artillery fire. On the front of the 6th Armored Infantry Bn, heavy vehicular movement, believed to be that of tanks, was heard near the lake at Q-785480 and tracked vehicular movement was also heard moving Northwest from BITCHE. In the afternoon, Air OP picked up small groups of enemy moving into BITCHE from the North and an estimated platoon of bicycle and foot troops on the road running from Q-792519, Southeast to Q-799514 218/.

3. Enemy activity on the 45th Division front continued on a minor scale except in the central zone facing the 180th Inf where considerable movement in the BUNDENTHAL area indicated a substantial build-up of his forces. During the afternoon groups of 10-75 enemy on the road between R-049599 and BUNDENTHAL were taken under artillery fire and later a group of thirty enemy was observed going North in BRUCHWEILER at 1315A. In this same 180th Inf zone, fifteen enemy were observed digging in on a wooded hill crest at R-101546 and hostile machine gun fire was placed on a patrol near R-128540. After several days of considerable activity, the enemy facing the 157th Inf on the Division left flank became quiet, and patrols entered the eastern part of OBERSTEINBACH without making contact, although some enemy were observed in the western end of the town. After dark, an enemy patrol set off trip flares in front of positions at R-055539 and another enemy patrol of squad size was observed entering houses in NEUNHOFFEN, but the sector was generally as quiet as that of the 179th Inf on the Division right flank where work on defensive positions continued unabated 219/.

4. The 79th Division had another quiet day, strengthening positions along its three regimental fronts as patrols pushed out to maintain contact with the enemy. An estimated enemy platoon observed in OBEROTTERBACH at 1000A was quickly dispersed by artillery fire and a 315th Inf patrol took two prisoners from the 481 GR at an enemy outpost Northeast of BERG at R-347439. A few rounds of flat trajectory fire on positions of the 315th Inf was the extent of hostile harassing artillery during the day 220/.

5. After another quiet day along the western banks of the RHINE, there was a decided increase in enemy activity in the Task Force HERREN sector after dark. An estimated 25 paratroopers were reported dropping in the vicinity of BISCHWILLER. Although immediate search of this area failed to reveal any trace of either paratroopers or parachutes, these reports appeared to be borne out later when: an enemy patrol of seven man fired on a road block between BISCHWILLER and KURTZENHAUSEN; other enemy were observed along the road South of KURTZENHAUSEN; sniper fire was reported in ROPPENHEIM (R-2027); and two soldiers disappeared from a listening post at R-270254 about 2245A. In view of these incidents and Air OP reports of numerous vehicular tracks in

218/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 139 - 1 Jan; WRJ, 31 Dec - Entries #37, 63 and 87.

219/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 139; WRJ, 31 Dec - Entries #62 and 74.

220/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 139; WRJ, 31 Dec - Entries #37 and 75.

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[illegible]

6. [illegible]

7. The 14th and Division (-) closed in its new assembly areas in the vicinity of [illegible] on 0200A, remaining in Corps reserve.

8. Hostile aviation remained active. During the morning several planes thought to be P-47s, [illegible] were in the vicinity of [illegible] and engaged fighters with French markings and was reported [illegible]. At the same time, ground troops reported strafing by 4 [illegible] and P-47s. At 1453A, six Me-109s and six more P-47s were reported in the area. After each 14 hostile planes, mostly in single flights, were reported over the area. In view of the enemy's apparent attempt to assess conditions among ground troops by his use of P-47s, orders were issued to fire on any plane which constituted a hostile act 223/.

9. VI Corps Field Order No. 20 was issued at 1700A outlining the Corps plan of defense for its present area along the MAGINOT line, and directing immediate reconnaissance and organization of reserve positions in the eastern fringes of the VOSGES Mountains by all major elements except the 14th Armd Division which was to be prepared to counterattack against enemy penetrations - on the right flank of XV Corps, in the STRASBOURG area, or from the SIEGFRIED area to the South 224/.

10. After being notified by the Army Commander that he expected an attack on the Seventh Army front during the early morning hours of 1 January 1945, the Corps Commander had issued a directive at 1305A to all subordinate commanders that there would be no New Year's celebrations of any kind, and that all security personnel and installations would be particularly alert during the night of 31 December and the morning of 1 January. The importance of this warning and the preventive measures immediately taken was borne out when the enemy launched a heavy offensive against the left flank of VI Corps at 0230A on 1 January 1945 225/.

CONCLUSION

Measured in miles, the December advance of VI Corps was not outstanding compared with progress of the previous months following 15 August 1944. However, after turning its efforts from the COLMAR pocket sector and striking North for the borders of GERMANY, VI Corps had cleared ALSACE of all hostile forces between the Corps left boundary and the RHINE River in its attack on the general HAGUENAU - WISSEMBOURG axis, had crossed the frontiers of the THIRD REICH and had made some penetrations into the main SIEGFRIED Line fort-

221/. G-2 and G-3 Rpts No. 139; WRJ, 31 Dec - Entries #37, 40 and 88.

222/. G-2 Rpt No. 139; WRJ, 31 Dec - Entries #38 and 40.

223/. G-2 Rpt No. 139.

224/. Annex No. 17.

225/. Annex No. 8

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ifications before orders were received to halt the advance and establish strong defensive positions generally along the line then held - as a result of the Army's aggressive offensive. More than 6700 Prisoners of War had been taken during the month - the majority from the 363 VG, 85 Inf and 256 VG Divisions which were the major forces opposing the Corps advance toward the SIEGFRIED Line.

EDWARD H. BROOKS,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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ANNEX 20 VI CORPS HISTORY - DECEMBER 1944

#1 - Combat Troops List
#2 - Casualty Report of VI Corps Troops
#3 - Roster of Officers
#4 - Changes in Officer Personnel
#5 - Report of Strength, Battle Casualties, Decorations and Awards - December 1944
#6 - Commendation to VI Corps from Lt Gen PATCH (7th Army G.O. No. 128, 26 Dec 44)
#7 - VI Corps Order of the Day, 6 Dec 44
#8 - Photocopies (with orig only)
#9 - VI Corps Letter, 31 Dec 44, Subject: New Year's Celebrations
#10 - VI Corps Operations Instructions Nos. 18 thru 37, inclusive - December 1944 (with orig only)
#11 - 7th Army Field Order No. 7, 2 Dec 44 (with orig only)
#12 - 7th Army Operations Instructions Nos. 27, 29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45 and 46 - December 1944 (with orig only)
#13 - VI Corps Field Order No. 9, 5 Dec 44 (with orig only)
#14 - VI Corps Operation "GATHER", 6 Dec 44 (with orig only)
#15 - 7th Army Field Order No. 8, 21 Dec 44 (with orig only)
#16 - VI Corps Operation "THUNDERBOLT", 23 Dec 44 (with orig only)
#17 - 7th Army Field Order No. 9, 30 Dec 44 (with orig only)
#18 - VI Corps Field Order No. 10, 31 Dec 44 (with orig only)
#19 - Map of VI Corps Route of Advance - December 1944
#20 - Photocopies of G-2 and G-3 Situation Maps, 13 thru 31 Dec 44, inclusive (with orig only)

INDEX SEPARATE COVER: (1 copy only)

#21 - G-1 Journal - Dec 1944
#22 - G-2 Journals (Including G-2 Reports) - Dec 1944
#23 - War Room Journals - Dec 1944
#24 - G-3 Reports - Dec 1944
#25 - G-4 Journal with Supporting Papers - Dec 1944
#26 - AG Journal - Dec 1944
#27 - QM Journal - Dec 1944
#28 - Ord Journal - Dec 1944
#29 - IG Journal - Dec 1944
#30 - SPA Journal - Dec 1944
#31 - Fin Journal - Dec 1944
#32 - [illegible] Journal - Dec 1944
#33 - Chap Journal - Dec 1944
#34 - CWS - LS Journal - Dec 1944
#35 - Surgeon Journal - Dec 1944
#36 - Signal Journal - Dec 1944
#37 - Engr Journal - Dec 1944
#38 - TM Journal - Dec 1944
#39 - G-3 Reports, S-3 Reports, etc. of VI Corps Troops and Other Headquarters.

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CASUALTY REPORT OF VI CORPS TROOPS

Date for pd ending 24:00	Killed	Captured, Missing and Interned	Wounded	Non-Battle Casualties	Enemy PWs Captured
1 Dec	60	104	270	156	539
2 "	18	14	147	145	468
3 "	29	37	183	149	370
4 "	11	18	61	125	304
5 "	15	100	110	262	369
6 "	13	45	78	220	48
7 "	7	16	66	215	59
8 "	7	17	103	243	174
9 "	16	35	230	154	288
10 "	29	9	210	196	478
11 "	16	3	85	166	312
12 "	8	2	84	184	170
13 "	6	2	111	184	236
14 "	23	18	107	172	417
15 "	16	1	185	184	211
16 "	37	14	149	213	285
17 "	14	15	178	281	117
18 "	40	20	244	288	83
19 "	22	22	304	174	107
20 "	34	132	155	234	73
21 "	16	74	111	282	67
22 "	10	34	47	186	49
23 "	2	3	28	107	14
24 "	7	6	42	123	8
25 "	2	5	21	133	8
26 "	3	5	18	130	29
27 "	7	2	31	122	20
28 "	0	4	36	133	41
29 "	1	0	20	107	21
30 "	17	7	44	110	27
31 "	3	0	12	82	13
TOTALS	505	771	3347	5821	5775

ANNEX #2.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO [illegible], U. S. Army

17 December 194[illegible]

[illegible]

Major General [illegible] L. Brooks, 06657, U. S. A.
Capt Mal[illegible] 01010197, Inf (ADC)
Capt William J. [illegible], 01013799, Inf (ADC)

[illegible]

Col [illegible]19, GSC

[illegible]

Lt Col Paul de [illegible], 0[illegible]39, GSC

[illegible]

Lt Col John M. [illegible]
Maj Robert D. [illegible], GSC

[illegible]

Col Joseph E. [illegible], 0[illegible]40, GSC
Lt Col Don W. [illegible], 01[illegible], [illegible]
Maj Dwayne S. [illegible], 0[illegible], [illegible]
Capt [illegible] L. [illegible], 0[illegible], Inf
Capt Joseph Haines III, 01[illegible], Inf

[illegible] SECTION

Lt Col Albert G. [illegible], 02[illegible], GSC
Lt Col Michael G. Davison, 022051, GSC
Maj John L. Cooper, 0351994, Cav (DS, C & GS Sch)
Maj William R. Ross, 0[illegible], CAC
Maj John Schadler Jr, 0383957, QMC
Capt Hieber W. [illegible], 01[illegible], Inf (In O)
Capt Edward M. Murray, 0[illegible], Inf (S-2 & E O)
Capt Leo M. Armstrong, 0[illegible], Inf
Capt Daniel T. Fogarty, 01822550, FA (In O)
1st Lt Kenneth D. Fleta, 0130522[illegible], Inf

S-4 SECTION

Lt Col Burton E. Miles, 0[illegible]7690, GSC
Maj Robert E. Clark, 0910[illegible], GSC
Maj Ralph L. Harper, 0303227, Inf
Capt William H. Ferguson, 01165013, FA
Capt Orris R. Evers, 02[illegible], CMS

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ANNEX #3A

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ADJUTANT GENERAL SECTION

Col Michael L. Connors, 0309882, AGD
Maj Harry S. Alcorn, 01000079, AGD
Capt Courtney L. Vallentine, 01000884, AGD
1st Lt William F. Rickett, 02055429, AGD
WOJG George T. Smith Jr, W-2108260

CHAPLAIN SECTION

Lt Col William E. King, 0268277, Ch Corps
Lt Col Jordan E. Brown, 0402849, Ch Corps
CWO Francis M. Mugavin, W-2109915

CHEMICAL SECTION

Lt Col William C. Hammond Jr, 0270407, CWS
Capt Floyd B. Mitman, 025330, CWS

ENGINEER SECTION

Col William N. Thomas Jr, 07648, CE
Lt Col Robert H. Darling, 0316638, CE
Capt Joseph M. Devine, 0421809, CE
Capt Harry A. Morris Jr, 01285090, CE
Capt Edgar D. Lee, 0456581, CE

FINANCE SECTION

Col Howard L. Leighton, 0124567, FD
Capt Frederick H. Dietz, 01280038, FD

INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION

Col Hyal L. Adams, 07471, IGD
Lt Col James M. Pennycuick, 03C7472, IGD
Capt William L. Mosher, 0409568, IGD

JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION

Col Robert L. Lancefield, 018037, JAGD
Capt Jack M. Cotton, 0293310, JAGD

MEDICAL SECTION

Col Rollin L. Bauchspies, 017819, MC
Lt Col Walker Stamps, 0357847, MC
Capt Carlson B. Henkel, 0347838, MC
Capt Sigfrid G. Kinkopf, 0454084, MAC
Capt James L. Rounds, 0490026, MAC
WOJG Donald L. Sutliff, W-2108239

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ORDNANCE SECTION

Col Walter G. Jennings, 0174217, Ord Dept
Maj John P. Merrill, 0181405, Ord Dept
Maj Stanley M. Smolensky, 025333, Ord Dept
Capt Henry J. Egal, 01549932, Ord Dept
CWO Edward C. Kelly, W-2114233

PROVOST MARSHAL

Capt Mario T. Villanti, 0427369, CMP

QUARTERMASTER SECTION

Col Lawrence L. Skinner, 015325, QMC
Lt Col James G. Hattex, 0276850, QMC
Maj John A. Bradish, 0284157, QMC

SIGNAL SECTION

Maj Wilbur D. Vincent, 0378299, Sig C
Capt Willard W. Jensen, 0454648, Sig C
Capt Luther D. Bridgman, 01635621, Sig C

SPECIAL SERVICE SECTION

Maj Gale A. Mathers, 0310331, Inf

BEACHHEAD NEWS

Capt James C. Grimes, 0391443, FA

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

Maj Leonard C. Cooke, 0316938, CAC

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

1st Lt Paul B. McGuire, 01285788, Inf (Comdg)
Capt Robert M. Ferrell, 01697057, MC
Capt Isidore Nemerowsky, 01690212, DC
1st Lt Guy E. Norbury, 01031352, Cav
1st Lt Edmund A. Bogart, 01015527, Inf

MILITARY POLICE PLATOON

Capt Sam F. Doering, 0409112, CMP
1st Lt John J. Mulhorn, 01308680, CMP

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SECTION II ATTACHED FOR CURRENT OPERATIONS

G-1 SECTION

Capt, P. R. Whiston, 254533, (Br)
Capt John F. Rieger, 01013512, Inf
1st Lt Lauren C. Kingman Jr, 0363398, AC
1st Lt Charles F. Marshall, 01014422, AC
1st Lt Alfred G. Pundt, 01052530, CAC
1st Lt Arthur J. Petersen, 01103354, AC (Photo Int)

LIAISON OFFICER

Capt J. William Arnold (French)
2d Lt Pierre-Etienne de Viel Castel (French)

CIVIL AFFAIRS

Maj Campbell Dickson, 0521004, (Spec Res)
Maj Enrico Dell'Osso, 0257793, Inf
Maj Pierre Lantz (French)
1st Lt Richard Hall, 01797639, CMP

G-3 AIR

Capt William N. Davidson, 0427311, AC
Capt Joseph Barr, 0729304, AC
Capt Chester H. Wright, 0729399, AC
2d Lt Wayne R. Sarton, 0705537, AC
2d Lt Robert E. Page, 0322245, AC

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CHANGES IN OFFICER PERSONNEL

DECEMBER 1944

I - ASSIGNMENTS; ATTACHMENTS

Date	Officer	Remarks
2	Capt Mario T. Villanti, CMP	Asgd & Jd fr 206th MP Co
3	2d Lt Claude E. Burton, AC	Atchd fr 64th Ftr Wing as of 30 Nov
4	Capt Floyd B. Mitman, CWS	Asgd & Jd fr 2d Cml Bn
6	Maj Benjamin A.G. Fuller, FA	Asgd & Jd fr 601st TD Bn
7	Capt Henry Jacobsen, Inf	Atchd as of 23 Nov
9	1st Lt Richard Hall, CMP	Atchd fr 36th Inf Div as of 7 Dec
11	Capt William H. Ferguson, FA	Asgd & Jd fr 45th Inf Div
12	Lt Col Paul A. Chalmers, GSC	Asgd & Jd fr 11th Armd Div as of 11 Dec - Announced as Deputy Chief of Staff
14	Lt Col William E. King, Ch C	Asgd & Jd fr 2d Repl Depot as of 13 Dec
	2d Lt Robert L. Page, AC	Atchd fr 64th Ftr Wing
21	2d Lt George V. Mc Clintic, AC	Atchd fr 64th Ftr Wing
22	1st Lt John W. Frahm, AC	Atchd fr 64th Ftr Wing
25	1st Lt William J. Stopple, Sig C	Atchd fr 57th Sig Bn
26	1st Lt Robert P. Head, Cav	Asgd & Jd fr Hq 7th Army
28	Brig Gen John S. Winn, Jr., USA	Asgd & Jd fr 100th Inf Div
	1st Lt William I. Jacobson, FA	Atchd fr 2d FA Obsn Bn
30	1st Lt Roy E. Robertson, AC	Atchd fr 64th Ftr Wing as of 10 Sept
31	1st Lt Kenneth J. Edwards, Jr., FA	Asgd & Jd fr 100th Inf Div as of 28 Dec
	2d Lt Donald A. Michela, AC	Atchd fr 64th Ftr Wing

II - RELIEF FROM ASSIGNMENT; DETACHMENTS

5	2d Lt Bert D. Gilden, Cav	Rld fr Atchmt - Ret to 756th Tk Bn
7	Capt Henry Jacobsen, Inf	Rld fr Atchmt - Atchd 14th Armd Div as of 23 Nov
9	Capt Philip Broadhead, Inf	Rld fr Atchmt - Atchd 36th Inf Div as of 7 Dec

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ANNEX #3B

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Date	Officer	Remarks
17	Maj Benjamin A.G. Fuller, FA	Reld fr Asgmt - Asgd 601st TD Bn
	2d Lt Claude R. Burton, AC	Reld fr Atchmt - Ret to 64th Fighter Wing
28	Capt Chester H. Wright, AC	Reld fr Atchmt - Ret to 64th Fighter Wing
25	Capt Carlson B. Menkel, MC	Reld fr Asgmt - Asgd 504th MP Bn
31	2d Lt Robert L. Page, AC	Reld fr Atchmt - Ret to 64th Fighter Wing
	Capt Albert Duvernois (Fr)	Reld fr Atchmt - Ret to Alsace-Lorraine French Mission as of 1 Dec

III - PROMOTIONS

17	Maj Robert H. Darling, CE	Prom to Lt Col, eff 16 Dec
	Capt Harry S. Alcorn, AGD	Prom to Major, eff 16 Dec
	Capt John Schadler, Jr., QMC	Prom to Major, eff 16 Dec
	1st Lt Orris R. Evers, CWS	Prom to Captain, eff 16 Dec

IV - MISCELLANEOUS

NONE.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO #46, U. S. Army

DECEMBER 1944

REPORT OF STRENGTH, BATTLE CASUALTIES, DECORATIONS AND AWARDS

I. STRENGTH:

Hq VI Corps:

		Assigned	Attached	Total	Net Change
Officers	1 Dec 44 -	60	18	78	
	31 Dec 44 -	67	20	87	+9
Warrant O's	1 Dec 44 -	4	0	4	
	31 Dec 44 -	4	0	4	0

Hq Co VI Corps:

Officers	1 Dec 44 -	6	0	6	
	31 Dec 44 -	8	0	8	+2
EM	1 Dec 44 -	324	47	271	
	31 Dec 44 -	275	34	309	+38

II. BATTLE CASUALTIES:

Hq VI Corps: NONE.

Hq Co VI Corps: NONE.

III. DECORATIONS AND AWARDS:

Hq VI Corps: NONE.

Hq Co VI Corps: NONE.

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO 758 US Army

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 133)

26 December 1944

COMMENDATION FOR OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT

OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE VI UNITED STATES CORPS: I desire to commend you for outstanding achievement in a most difficult task—that of dislodging the enemy from his Vosges defenses and driving him to the Rhine.

You overcame a supposedly impregnable mountain position by frontal assault. Having captured St. Die, you advanced through the Saales Gap, secured Lutzig and made contact with the XV United States Corps. By this juncture you sealed the fate of thousands of enemy troops in the central Vosges.

The divisions under your command, skillfully and courageously led, have cleared the enemy from the west bank of the Rhine in the Army sector. Enormous quantities of supplies and many prisoners have been captured.

Although terrain and weather allied themselves with the defending German, you planned and won a memorable victory. I congratulate you.

Alex Patch
A. M. PATCH,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding.

DISTRIBUTION: "B"

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 464, U. S. Army

6 December 1944

ORDER OF THE DAY

Since the beginning of the military history of Europe, to force a successful passage of the Vosges Mountains has been considered by military experts an operation offering such small opportunity for success as to forestall consideration of such effort.

To march, supply and maintain a large body of troops through these natural obstacles, without hostile opposition, is a major problem in itself.

To fight cross-country, in the face of unreasoning, stubborn Nazi resistance, at times supplying over snow-covered mountain roads and trails, through this region and at this season of the year, is a military achievement of which all who participated can be justly proud.

To those men of the 100th and 36th Divisions who battered the flanks, to those of the 3d and 103d Divisions and of the 14th Armored Division who poured onto the Alsatian Plain, to those supporting combat troops of the Corps, and to those indispensable elements of supply, maintenance and evacuation, I extend my thanks and my congratulations. Teamwork, without which there can be no success in battle, has been yours to a superlative degree.

It is with pride and humility that I realize the pinnacle and the magnitude of this concerted achievement of American soldiery---your achievement. I have every confidence that the future of the VI Corps rests secure and bright in your capable hands.

Edward H. Brooks.
EDWARD H. BROOKS,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 446, U. S. Army

AG 001 31 December 1944

SUBJECT: New Year's Celebrations.

TO : Commanders, All Units.

1. It is directed that there will be NO New Year's celebrations of any kind whatsoever, either tonight or at anytime tomorrow.

2. All security personnel and all installations will be particularly alert this afternoon, tonight and tomorrow morning.

By command of Major General BROOKS:

Michael L. Connors

MICHAEL L. CONNORS,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

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"A"

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

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

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

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OF THE AAF
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VI Corps

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RESTRICTED 13 JUN 1946
by authority of AC of S, G-2, War Dept.
Ray M. Strawpe
Capt., Inf

R5-12 2752

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For GO #[illegible], Hq VI Corps, 24 May 1945, the following [illegible] awarded the Bronze Star Medal:

Capt Henry J Landry Jr	S/Sgt Adolph F. Lee
1Lt [illegible] J Hartsoud	S/Sgt Charles Mangiaforde
[illegible] J [illegible] Jr	S/Sgt Milton J [illegible]
[illegible] J [illegible]	S/Sgt Vernon G. [illegible]
[illegible] J [illegible] Jr	S/Sgt Robert R. Hightower
S/Sgt [illegible]	S/Sgt William G. Gregg
S/Sgt [illegible]	S/Sgt John J. [illegible]
1Lt [illegible] John J. [illegible]	S/Sgt Jesse A. Ross
S/Sgt [illegible]	S/Sgt Elmo O. Stafford

For GO #[illegible], Hq VI Corps, 26 May 1945, Capt Robert L. Gibson was awarded the 2nd [illegible] Oak Cluster to the Air Medal.

The following men were transferred to the United States on the orders indicated:

For GO #[illegible], Hq VI Corps, 17 May 45. TDY

S/Sgt Adolph F Lee
Pfc Kenneth Snyder
Pvt John G. Knight

For GO #[illegible], Hq VI Corps, 17 May 45, redeployment:

Capt Theodore E. Franklin
S/Sgt Jesse J. Wright
Pfc John R. Gibson

For GO #[illegible], Hq VI Corps, 25 May 45, redeployment:

Capt Leo Snyder
S/Sgt Harold E. Delaney
S/Sgt Eric F. Rabenhorst

For GO #[illegible], Hq VI Corps, 26 May 1945, redeployment:

S/Sgt William G. Hancock
S/Sgt Paul V. Marshall
Capt Willis F. Gilliam
Pfc Vincent A. Walkowiak

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

[illegible]
Colonel, FA
[illegible]

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By Authority of
CC, TS FET
Initials: JEW
Date: 7 SEP 1945

HEADQUARTERS
THEATER SERVICE FORCES
EUROPEAN THEATER

(Rear) APO 887
7 September 1945

AG 319.1 HIS-AGO

SUBJECT: After Action Reports.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Historical Record, Headquarters, VI Corps, for the month of May 1945, and Unit History, VI Corps Artillery, for the month of May 1945, are inclosed.

2. Copies of and supporting documents to the inclosed reports, together with Annexes 25, 29, 30 and 32 to 51 to Inclosure 1, are being retained by this headquarters for further study.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

B. M. Cagle
B. M. CAGLE
Captain, AGD
Assistant Adjutant General

2 incls: less copies and supporting documents.
w/d: Annexes 25, 29, 30 and 32 to 51 to Inclosure 1.

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Headquarters VI Corps Artillery
APO 464 U. S. Army

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Opr. Rpt.

20 May 1945

SUBJECT: Unit History 1-30 April 1945.

To : Commanding General, Headquarters Seventh Army, APO 758, U. S. Army. Attention: Historian.

At the beginning of this period the attack E of the Rhine River by units of VI Corps was in its early stages.

100 Inf Div, attacking E and SE from Mannheim, was supported by 552 FA Bn (105 H), attached, and 6 FA Gp, with 938 FA Bn (155 H) and 976 FA Bn (155 G), reinforcing, in addition to the Div organic arty.

E of the Neckar River, the 63 Div, attacking E, was supported by 89 AWA Bn (105 HP), attached, and 35 FA Gp with 17 FA Bn (155 H), 36 FA Bn (155 G) and 995 FA Bn (8" H), reinforcing, in addition to the Div organic arty.

10 Armd Div, spearheading the attack, had as additional arty 93 AWA Bn(105 HP), attached, and 405 FA Gp, with 141 FA Bn (155 H), 634 FA Bn (155 H) and 939 FA Bn (4.5" G), in the reinforcing role.

46 FA Gp, with 194 FA Bn (8" H) and 696 FA Bn (240 H), in general support of the attack, and 2 FA Obsn Bn were in the process of displacing to assembly areas on the E side of the Rhine River.

Communications relied principally on the use of radio since the action was too fast and the Corps front too wide to warrant extensive use of wire. Corps circuits were used when possible for communication with Div Arty Hqs.

Due to the rapid advance of leading elements in all sectors, firing at this time was generally light and intermittent. On occasions, when small pockets of resistance were encountered, ammunition expenditures for individual units would be quite high for short periods of time.

46 FA Gp was relieved from attachment to VI Corps Arty and reverted to Corps control on 3 Apr. The Bns which had been attached to 46 FA Gp were taken under direct Corps Arty control.

In order to give long range support to the forward elements of the armor, "B" Btry, 976 FA Bn, was attached to 405 FA Gp on 3 Apr.

On 4 Apr, 194 FA Bn was attached to 6 FA Gp in order to more effectively support 100 Inf Div at Heilbronn.

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[illegible]

[illegible] 10 Amd Div in the SCHLIERSEE [illegible] 7 Apr [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] 63 Inf Div [illegible] 7 Apr. Withdrawal from the salient was [illegible] without incident [illegible] the enemy's evening fire from [illegible] Army, which were at times nearly [illegible] by the AF.

[illegible] 7A Bn was relieved from attachment to 63 Inf Div and attached to 10 Amd Div on 8 Apr.

With the difficulty of moving Army arty to suitable fire positions in a fluid mobile situation and the necessity for the 10 Amd Div to follow over great [illegible] 695 FA Bn was relieved from attachment to VII Corps Army and reverted to control of Seventh Army on 9 Apr.

141 FA Bn and "F" Btry, 976 FA Bn, were relieved from attachment to 405 FA Gp and attached to 35 FA Gp on 12 Apr.

With the collapse of organized resistance at Heilbronn the Corps moved forward to the E and SE towards the Bavarian Alps and Danube Pass. Advance only by roadblocks and blown bridges, generally undefended, isolated pockets of resistance and the length of our own supply lines. Arty units displaced constantly in an effort to keep within range of the ty but firing was generally light.

On 14 Apr, 141 FA Bn was attached to 405 FA Gp and "F" Btry, 976 FA Bn, reverted to control of its parent unit. The next day, an elements of 10 Amd Div passed over 63 Inf Div routes. 141 FA Bn was again attached to 35 FA Gp and 17 FA Bn was attached to 405 FA Gp, thus effecting an exchange of fire support without the necessity of displacing the heavy equipment.

On 19 Apr, 63 Inf Div was relieved by 44 Inf Div. The mission of 35 FA Gp was changed by this relief to reinforcing fire of 44 Inf Div.

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69 AFA Bn was relieved from attachment to XV Corps and attached to VI Corps on 19 Apr. During the move of the Bn to VI Corps sector, Service Btry was ambushed by the Gy. 1 Officer and 13 enlisted men were reported missing in action and 6 enlisted men were wounded during the action.

17 FA Gp was attached to the Corps on 20 Apr. With the Gp came an 8" How Bn, 741 FA Bn. 976 FA Bn was attached to the Gp on 21 Apr. 17 FA Gp was given the mission of general support.

To alleviate the desperate shortage of supplies a truck company was formed from units of Corps Arty to work under the supervision of Corps. This company hauled gas and rations from rear dumps to dumps in the Corps area.

103 Inf Div rejoined the Corps on 21 Apr. The Div was given reinforcing fires by 6 FA Gp. 69 AFA Bn was attached to 44 Inf Div the same day.

242 FA Bn was relieved from attachment to 100 Inf Div and attached to 103 Inf Div on 23 Apr. 17 FA Gp was released from VI Corps control and attached, along with 741 FA Bn, to XXI Corps. 976 FA Bn was attached to 35 FA Gp.

As 100 Inf Div was pinched out of the line vic Stuttgart the Div was relieved from VI Corps. This relief changed the mission of 6 FA Gp to reinforcing fires of 103 Inf Div.

On 23 Apr, 69 AFA Bn was attached to 103 Inf Div making the main effort down the left of the Corps sector.

939 FA Bn was relieved from attachment to VI Corps and reverted to Army control on 27 Apr.

With the lack of targets for Corps Arty becoming more and more apparent, 242 FA Bn and 939 FA Bn were relieved from line duty and employed as PW guards. 2 more truck companies of approximately 50-2½-ton trucks each, were formed from Corps Arty units, thus practically demobilizing all of the Corps Arty.

At the end of the period, as the Corps advanced into the Alps along two main axis, Corps Arty units were grouped in assembly areas generally around Fussen and Ober-Ammergau. 59 AFA Bn was attached to 103 Inf Div and 93 AFA Bn was attached to 44 Inf Div.

Lt Col Charles F. Williamson was transferred to duty at the office of AS of S, G-2, War Dept, Washington, D.C. on Apr. 23, as per TWX order, ASGNA, AG 300.4, D-926, dated 16 Apr 1945.

G.O. #34, VI Corps, dated 5 Apr 1945, awarded the Bronze Star Medal to Captain Charles L. Perrin.

There were no promotions in Hq & Hq Btry VI Corps Arty during the period.

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FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

PAUL G. EVANS
Captain FA
Adjutant

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[illegible]

[illegible] 12 April 1945

[illegible]

[illegible] Headquarters Seventh Army, APO 758, U. S. Army.

[illegible]

[illegible] the 6th day of the month the VI Corps attack continued [illegible] 103 Inf Div, [illegible] 3 Inf Div [illegible] Alsen Creek. [illegible] [illegible] 2 Inf Div [illegible] 3 Inf Div [illegible] 2 Inf Div [illegible] 3 Inf Div [illegible] 2 Inf Div [illegible] 3 Inf Div

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a. 13 FA Brigade
(1) Attchd: 9 FA Gp
[illegible] FA Bn (105 H)
[illegible] FA Bn (105 H)
[illegible] FA Bn (105 H)
[illegible] FA Bn (105 H)
[illegible] FA Bn
[illegible] FA Bn (3" G Mount)

(2) Missions
(a) General support.
(b) Reinforce Elms of 34 Inf Div and 3 HDA.
(c) To provide an [illegible] to ensure [illegible] for counterbattery and long range harassing and [illegible] of the 34 Inf Div [illegible] boundary.
(d) Establish liaison with 13 (FR) Corps on right.
(e) Provide observation and survey control in right (West) Corps sector.
(f) Furnish meteo messages (Theodolite) to attached units and army of reinforced Div.

b. 35 FA Group
(1) Attchd: 33 FA Bn (155 H)
[illegible] FA Bn (155 H)
976 FA Bn (155 G)

(2) Missions
(a) General support.
(b) Reinforce Elms 42 Inf Div with 2 Med Bns.

c. 36 FA Gp
(1) Attchd: [illegible] FA Bn (155 G)
[illegible] FA Bn (4.5 & 5 Howts) (8" G)
[illegible] FA Bn (240 H)
[illegible] FA Bn (8" G)
939 FA Bn (8" G)

(2) Missions
(a) General support.
(b) Provide counterbattery and long range harassing and interdiction.

d. 105 FA Gp
(1) Attchd: 363 FA Bn (155 H)
257 FA Bn (155 H)
[illegible] FA Bn (8" H)
6 Bty 991 FA Bn (155 G SP)

(2) Missions
(a) General support
(b) Reinforce Elms of 103 HDA with 2 Med Bns.

e. 2 FA Chem Bn
(1) Missions
(a) Provide observation and survey control in left (West) Corps sector.
(b) Furnish meteo messages (Theodolite) to be broadcast on Corps Fire Direction Net.

f. Attchd 42 Inf Divs 69 AFA Bn (105 H SP)
g. Attchd 103 Inf Divs 242 FA Bn (105 H)
h. Attchd 34 Inf Divs 59 AFA Bn (105 H SP)

Also on this date the 13 FA Brigade relinquished VI Corps Arty for the first time since the Italian campaign.

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During the hours of darkness on nights 13 and 14 March all Corps Arty units moved forward into battle positions and for the old units only normal registrations within old fire possibilities and for new units only one registration per 24 by flash the night of 14 March was allowed. The arty kept up their normal harassing and counterbattery during this period and all caution was observed to keep the intentions of the Corps a complete surprise to the enemy. All new enemy battery locations were recorded but not fired upon prior to the attack. The enemy was restless during this period and sent numerous combat patrols probing in the Corps sector for prisoners in order to obtain our intentions. During this period the 36 Inf Div obtained and maintained a small bridgehead across the MODER river in the MAGUENAU area, and this bridgehead was the scene of some very severe fighting as the Germans attempted numerous times and in strength to wipe out these troops. Complete photo coverage was obtained along the entire Corps front on 13 and 14 March which gave the counterbattery section a complete check of the enemy arty facing the Corps. Also the weather took a turn for the best as it was warm and completely clear and all was set for 150645A March which was set as D day, H hour.

At 150645A March the long awaited attack on the MODER river line began with well organized arty accompanying fires on all enemy known installations. The attack went well as all infantry divisions moved forward and PW's stated that attack came as a complete surprise. The 42 Inf Div captured MARIENTHAL (8842) with little opposition over Div sector. The 103 Inf Div encountered heavy AP and SA fire but was steadily moving forward, the 36 Inf Div. cleared MIESENHEIM (9330) and MERTZWILLER (9629), and the 3 DIA was encountering heavy resistance via CAMP D' OBERHOFFEN. The counterbattery program fired immediately after the preparation on all known enemy batteries kept German artillery fire at an absolute minimum. With the ammunition restriction thrown off the number the Corps Arty units fired on many lucrative targets including horse-drawn artillery, vehicular columns, tanks, and large groups of personnel and caused considerable confusion and destruction to the enemy.

The attack continued on 16 march as all Divisions continued to move forward but advances were not as spectacular as the first day because the Divisions had to regroup and enemy mine fields were plentiful. The Corps Arty units displaced forward in order to give sustained support to the attack and during the day while visibility was excellent the Corps Arty caused the following casualties to enemy equipment: 6 vehicles destroyed, 5 tanks destroyed and one damaged, and 3 field piece destroyed. The CP of VI Corps Arty moved to vic MOMMENHEIM at 160700 at 1630A.

The enemy defenses South of the SIEGFRIED line appear to be useless as the enemy is in headlong retreat on 17 March for refuge on "super soil". The 42 Inf Div captured PHILIPSBOURG (8742) with no organized resistance in sector, the 103 Inf Div occupied GUNDERSHOFFEN (9434), ERGERSHOFFEN (9436), and [illegible] (9337) with no contact with enemy or artillery fire, the 36 Inf Div met stubborn resistance via DURSTEL (0124) where they were attempting to cross the river and only encountered resistance in rear of sector, and the 3 DIA encountered light resistance and captured BRUMATH (1625) and [illegible] (0828). All units of the Corps Arty displaced forward in an effort to keep up with the retreating Germans. Due to the fast moving situation the 33 FA Bn gained responsibility for counterbattery in the 36 Inf Div and 3 DIA sectors.

On 18 March against light resistance VI Corps Divisions cleared the left of the French territory of enemy occupation. At the end of the day 42 Inf Div elements were in Germany at DONNENHEIM (0463) and SONNAM (8005), 103 Inf Div was on high ground West of KIRCHBOURG, 36 Inf Div vicinity KIRCHBOURG,

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14 Armd Div was approaching the LAUTER river, and 3 DIA in LAUTERBOURG (N3241). The arty with the Corps was principally engaged in displacing forward and firing observed missions on pockets of enemy resistance. VI Corps Arty CP opened vic WISSEMBOURG at N0 5369 at 1720A.

Heavy resistance increased on 19 March as the Divisions approached and contacted the SIEGFRIED line. The 42 Inf Division found enemy resisting with strong SA, MG, and mortar activity N of HOCHFELDWEILER (N9554), 103 Inf Division found the enemy fighting a delaying action in SIEGFRIED positions and increased resistance vicinity EINSCHERWEILER (N8854) and EINSCHOW (N3154). 36 Inf Division occupied GRESSWEILER (N1436) without contact after clearing KIRCHBOURG (N1548) without resistance. 14 Armd Division captured ALTLAUF (N1747) against light resistance, and 3 DIA cleared out all opposition South of LAUTER river in area. For the third straight day practically all the Corps Arty displaced forward in preparation to support the assault of the SIEGFRIED line. Visibility remained good throughout the daylight hours and numerous missions were fired on enemy personnel, vehicular convoys, tanks, strong points, and Bkrs. VI Corps Arty CP opened vicinity BRACHMUHLE at N0 4425 at 1530A. The 752 FA Bn was relieved of attachment to 35 FA Gp and attached 105 FA Gp. The 257 FA Bn was relieved of attachment 105 FA Gp and attached 13 FA Brigade.

The 20th day of March found a thinly spread but determined enemy holding strong defenses in the SIEGFRIED line all along the Corps front. The Corps Arty moved well forward into position during the day so that they could give maximum support to the doughboys in their attack on the SIEGFRIED line. The 498 FA Bn, 511 FA Bn, 575 FA Bn (-A & C Btry), and 939 FA Bn were relieved of attachment to 16 FA Gp and attached to Groupement Hilton, commanded by Lt Col Chester Hilton, with the mission of general support. The 16 FA Gp was attached to the 13 FA Brigade. VI Corps Arty CP opened vicinity WEILER at N3 1491 at 1400A.

During 21 March the ay continued to defend his heavily fortified positions in the SIEGFRIED line and VI Corps troops found it necessary to eliminate one pill box at a time. The Corps continued to exert all possible pressure in order to find a vulnerable spot. In an attempt to case the enemy firing on our front line elements a total of 265 counterbattery missions were fired in the 24 hour period. AOP observer reported the KARLSRUHE bridge across the RHINE river intact and being used by the Germans; therefore, after registration on approaches by 938 FA Bn and 630 TD Bn an interdiction program at the rate of 300 rounds per hour was commenced. During the night the enemy blew the bridge and dropped the Wash span in the RHINE. The 13 FA Brigade was relieved of responsibility for counterbattery in the 14 Armd and 36 Inf Div sector but will retain responsibility for counterbattery in Groupement Hamilton sector.

22 March found close contact and heavy resistance in the Central and East sectors but troops of the 42 and 103 Inf Divisions advanced against only scattered resistance, consisting mainly of mines and roadblocks. It was noticed during the day that the enemy was attempting to evacuate the RHINE population as long columns of enemy traffic was observed vicinity RUSTHEIM (N0759) and our arty was adjusted on them with devastating results. In order to harass and interrupt the enemy, the arty with the Corps delivered 163 rounds of harassing fire on the enemy forced roads. The 630 TD Bn was relieved of attachment to 13 FA Brigade and VI Corps Arty and returned to Corps Arty. The 17 and 778 FA Bns were relieved of attachment to 35 FA Gp and attached to 13 FA Brigade for employment in the 3 DIA sector.

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The 23 day of March found the complete collapse of enemy organized [illegible] the middle Rhine front opened in the 11 and 12th Armies around [illegible] [illegible] the 10 and Eighteen Corps [illegible] (4869) and [illegible] (4869) the 10 and Eighteen [illegible] (4869) and [illegible] (4869) and the 11 [illegible] (4869). As the end of [illegible] the enemy [illegible] on the Corps front with 103 and 36 [illegible] the [illegible] and attempting to cut off the German [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] on available [illegible] roads in and [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] the remnants were attempting to get back of the [illegible]. The war score for the day was as follows:

- 7 vehicles with guns attached were hit and abandoned.
- 10 [illegible] vehicles with guns was hit and abandoned.
- 2 guns were destroyed with direct hits.
- 15 vehicles were destroyed and left burning.
- Large number of dead personnel on roads and fields.

Sergeant Clifton was discharged and the 35 FA Gp took over their attachments and missions.

All organized resistance in VI Corps sector ceased on 24 March as all units moved forward with almost speed and the enemy surrendered in large groups. The 1A and Eighteen was heading for the GERNSHEIM bridge (4669) which was the only German without route left open. The army did very little firing as they were attempting to get road clearance and displace forward. The 6 FA Gp was relieved of attachment to VI Corps Army and attached XV Corps. The following units were relieved of attachment to VI Corps Army and attached 6 FA Gp: 257 FA Bn, 524 FA Bn, 575 FA Bn (-A & C Btry), 752 FA Bn, 995 FA Bn and C Btry 994 FA Bn. Due to the loss of the above Bns the entire Corps Army was regrouped as per GO #9 Hq VI Corps Army and as follows:

a. 33 FA Brigade
(1) Attchd: 46 FA Gp
[illegible] FA Bn
[illegible] FA Bn
[illegible] FA Bn
930 FA Bn

(2) Mission: General sup.crt, reinforce fires of 36 Inf Div with 2 Med Bns.

b. 405 FA Gp
(1) Attchd: 976 FA Bn
[illegible] FA Bn
[illegible] FA Bn

(2) Mission: General sup.crt, reinforce fires of 103 Inf Div with 1 Med Bn.

c. 35 FA Gpt
(1) Attchd: 634 FA Bn
36 FA Bn

(2) Mission: General sup.crt.

d. 1 FA Chem Bn
(1) Mission: Establish survey control and sound and flash observation in Corps zone South of East - West line through GERNSHEIM (4796).

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a. 1 FA Obsn Bn
(1) Mission: Establish survey control and assist at first observation in Corps area north of Hue, and then through [illegible] (Map).

[illegible] provided some assistance. Most of the [illegible] moved in [illegible] and [illegible] were [illegible] with [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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Action on 26 March consisted mainly of infantry patrolling and arty fire on enemy supply routes across the RHINE. The 36 and 498 FA Bns were relieved of attachment to 35 FA Gp and attached to 46 FA Gp. The 46 FA Gp and 939 FA Bn were relieved of attachment to 13 FA Brigade and the 939 FA Bn was attached to 46 FA Gp. The 69 AFA and 242 FA Bns relieved of attachment 71 Inf Div and attached 103 Inf Division.

The VI Corps Arty CP opened vicinity LIMBURGERHOF at R478913 at 261600A March. The 103 Inf Div relieved elements of 71 Inf Division in sector and 71 Inf Div returned to control of Third Army. The 36 Inf Division was relieved in area by elements of the First French Army. The 71 and 938 FA Bns were relieved of attachment to 13 FA Brigade and attached to 35 FA Gp. The 1 FA Chem Bn was attached to 13 FA Brigade.

The 31st day of March found the Corps Artillery units principally engaged in displacing to position areas East of the RHINE river. The 10 Armd Division and 63 Inf Division joined the ranks of VI Corps on this date. Also the 6 FA Gp, 995 FA Bn, and 93 AFA Bn were attached to VI Corps while the 13 FA Brigade, 1 FA Chem Bn, and 69 AFA Bn were relieved of attachment to VI Corps. Due to the regrouping of Divisions and artillery the following attachments were made effective.

a. 405 FA Gp
   (1) Atchd: 634 FA Bn
   241 FA Bn
   939 FA Bn
   (2) Missions: Reinforce fires of 10 Armd Div

b. 35 FA Gp
   (1) Atchd: 17 FA Bn
   36 FA Bn
   194 FA Bn *
   (2) Missions: Reinforce fires of 63 Inf Div.

c. 6 FA Gp
   (1) Atchd: 938 FA Bn
   976 FA Bn
   995 FA Bn *
   (2) Missions: Reinforce fires of 100 Inf Div.

d. 93 AFA Bn: Atchd 10 Armd Div

e. 59 AFA Bn: Atchd 63 Inf Div

f. 242 FA Bn: Atchd 100 Inf Div.

* Atchd 46 FA Gp on arrival of Gp Hq East of RHINE river. The CP of VI Corps Arty opened vicinity BRUCHSAL (R575966) at 1500A.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

WILLIAM D. ADDISON
1st Lt, FA
Adjutant

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HEADQUARTERS
THEATER SERVICE FORCES
EUROPEAN THEATER

AG 319.1 HIS-AGO

(Rear) APO 887
5 September 1945

SUBJECT: After Action Report.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Letter, Headquarters, VI Corps Artillery, subject: "Unit History 1-31 March 1945", dated 12 April 1945, is inclosed for your information.

2. Copies of and supporting documents to the inclosed report are being retained by this headquarters for further study.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

RECORDS AGO BRANCH
SEP 7 1945
RECEIVED

Combat + analysis

B. M. CAGLE
Captain, AGD
Assistant Adjutant General

1 Incl: As stated, less copies and supporting documents.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

4 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Unit History. Feb. 45

TO : Commanding General, Headquarters Seventh Army, APO 758, U. S. Army. (Attention: Historian).

The organization for combat and location of Corps Artillery at the beginning of the period was as follows:

Headquarters VI Corps Artillery	vic OTTERSTHAL (Q715173)
2 FA Obsn Bn	vic SAVERNE (Q716167)
33 FA Brigade	vic MONDIKHEIM (932176)
(Mission: G/S, reinforce fires 36 Inf Div, 101 A/B Div, and 79 Inf Div with two (2) med bns)	
194 FA Bn (8" H)	vic BRUMATH (Q931142)
698 FA Bn (240 H)(-C Btry)	vic HOCHFELDEN (Q880175)
6 FA Gp	vic WAHLENHEIM (Q963153)
36 FA Bn (155 G)	vic BRUMATH (Q931143)
634 FA Bn (155 H)	vic WITTERSHEIM (Q942203)
939 FA Bn (4.5" G)	vic BRUMATH (Q880140)
975 FA Bn (155 H)	vic GUNDERTHEIM (R015135)
35 FA Gp	vic BRUVILLER (Q756250)
(Mission: G/S, reinforce fires of 45 Inf Div with one (1) med bn)	
17 FA Bn (155 H)	vic GRENDOULTZBACH (Q789281)
976 FA Bn (155 G)	vic GRIESBACH (Q752239)
995 FA Bn (8" H)(-B Btry)	vic WEITERSWILLER (Q765281)
C Btry, 698 FA Bn	vic BOSSENHEIM (Q758226)
405 FA Gp	vic BOUXWILLER (Q810250)
(Mission: G/S, reinforce fires of 103 Inf Div with one (1) med bn)	
938 FA Bn (155 H)	vic BOUXWILLER (Q810242)
977 FA Bn (155 G)	vic LIXHAUSEN (Q863217)
B Btry, 995 FA Bn	vic ALTBICHENDORF (Q903212)
99 AFA Bn (105 H SP)(Atchd 36 Inf Div)	vic GUNDERTHEIM (R015135)
242 FA Bn (105 H T)(Atchd 79 Inf Div)	vic REIDERSCHAENTZOLSHEIM (Q999193)
693 FA Bn (105 H T)(Atchd 45 Inf Div)	vic WEINBOURG (Q784303)

VI Corps Artillery, during the period, supported the defense of the Corps along the general line REIPERTSWILLER (Q8037), LA WALCK (Q9027), HAGUENAU (Q9424), BISCHWILLER (Q9918). Activity during the period was generally light, with only local, small scale attacks being attempted by either side. Poor visibility prevailed throughout the month, effected by low hanging clouds and continual ground haze. The weather was cool with light intermittent rains.

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A Bn then in continued support of the Corps by employing one battery in the eastern portion of the Corps front and the other battery in the western half. Each battery established a second base and a flash base in its zone to best cover the enemy artillery in that sector.

On 6 Feb, 71 Inf Div was relieved from attachment to VI Corps. 33 FA Brigade was given the mission of general support, reinforcing fires of 36 Inf Div and 101 A/B Div with one (1) medium bn in each. 942 FA Bn was attached to 101 A/B Div. 995 FA Bn was attached to 405 FA Gp.

575 FA Bn was relieved from attachment to VI Corps and moved to XV Corps on 7 Feb. In order to support the 36 Inf Div attack in the [illegible] (XLZ17) - [illegible] (XLS16) area, 938 FA Bn was relieved from attachment to 405 FA Gp and attached to 33 FA Brigade effective the same day. 405 FA Gp was given the mission of general support only, and 35 FA Gp assumed the additional mission of reinforcing fires of 103 Inf Div.

A trade of light battalions was made on 10 Feb when 693 FA Bn moved to XV Corps area and 69 AFA Bn was attached to VI Corps. 69 AFA Bn was further attached to 45 Inf Div.

141 FA Bn was assigned to VI Corps on 10 Feb. The bn was further assigned to 405 FA Gp, which was given the additional mission of reinforcing fires of 103 Inf Div. 35 FA Gp was relieved from this mission at the same time.

575 FA Bn (8" H)(-A & C Btries) moved into VI Corps sector on 14 Feb. The bn was attached to 35 FA Gp.

On 16 Feb the 413 FA Gp was assigned to VI Corps. Due to its relative inexperience, the Gp was assigned only one bn, the 698 FA Bn (-C Btry), effective 17 Feb. The mission of 413 FA Gp was general support.

14 Armd Div was put into the line via [illegible] (QS027) on 18 Feb. 33 FA Brigade was given the mission of reinforcing fires of this Div.

46 FA Gp was attached to VI Corps and moved to vic [illegible] (QS317) on 21 Feb. The following day 413 FA Gp and 977 FA Bn were relieved from attachment to VI Corps and 23 Feb, 33 FA Brigade was also relieved from attachment to VI Corps. This made a shuffle of attachments, and missions imperative. Effective 241200A Feb the following status took place:

6 FA Gp: Mission: G/S, reinforce fires of 101 A/B Div and 14 Armd Div with one (1) med hov bn. Atchd: 36 FA Bn, 634 FA Bn, 698 FA Bn (-C Btry).
46 FA Gp: Mission: G/S, reinforce fires of 36 Inf Div with one (1) med hov bn. Atchd: 194 FA Bn, 938 FA Bn, 939 FA Bn.

Relief of the 101 A/B Div by 36 Inf Div was completed late on 23 Feb. Effective on completion of the relief 6 FA Gp was relieved of reinforcing fires of 101 A/B Div.

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In order to more effectively cover the SOULZ (R1037) - NEUFEN (R1536) area the 575 FA Bn was moved to vic ECHEMERT (Q8520) and attached to 6 FA Gp.

Strict ammunition limitations imposed by higher headquarters, combined with poor visibility and reduced activity on the Corps front throughout most of the period, served to make this a comparatively quiet month for Corps Artillery. The only concentrated action initiated by the Corps and supported by heavy artillery fire was a local attack by 36 Inf Div to consolidate the ground east of BISCHWILLER (R0918) to the RHINE River.

90mm Btries of the 72 AA Bn and 216 AA Bn were employed at various times as their locations made possible firing into enemy territory. They performed excellently on missions assigned them, both observed and unobserved. The principal missions assigned to the 90mm btries were either of harassing or counterbattery nature. However, they were often called on to shoot on personnel and vehicles, and to thicken the fires of TOT's by Div Arty as well as Corps Arty.

The counterbattery section had its problems when a series of shellings from heavy caliber RR guns was directed at the Corps CP in SAVERNE (Q7216). The first shelling occurred on the night 14/15 Feb. One PW, captured later in the month, indicated that counterbattery fire, laid down on an offending piece on the night 17/18 Feb, caused severe casualties in the gun crew and considerable damage to the piece.

Sgt Franklin, a member of a POZIT fuze team, did an excellent bit of work in lecturing on the development, construction, function and capabilities of the fuze to each FA Bn in the Corps.

Colonel Kermit L. Davis was awarded the Legion of Merit, per G.O. #17, Hq. MEUSAA, dated 23 Jan 45. Colonel Kermit L. Davis, Asst Arty Officer, and T/Sgt George Raymond departed 24 Feb on S.O. #30, Hq. VI Corps, 22 Feb 45 for 30 days leave in the U.S. 1st Lt George H. Gilbert was transferred in grade to 10 Replacement Depot for trans-shipment to the U.S. for 20 days leave. He departed the 23 Feb on letter order, file AG 210.33, Hq. Seventh Army, dated 23 Feb.

For the Commanding General:

William D. Addison

WILLIAM D. ADDISON
1st Lt, FA
Adjutant.

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Initials:
Date: April 1945

HEADQUARTERS
THEATER SERVICE FORCES
EUROPEAN THEATER

(Rear) APO 887
4 September 1945

AG 319.1 HIS-AGO

SUBJECT: After Action Report.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Unit History, VI Corps Artillery, dated 4 March 1945, and Historical records, VI Corps, dated 23 April 1945, are inclosed.

2. Copies of and documents to the inclosed report, together with annexes 4, 7, 8, 10 and 11 through 29 to Inclosure 2, are being retained by this headquarters for further study.

FOR THE COMANDING GENERAL:

RECORDS AGO ACTIVE BRANCH

SEP 7 1945
Received
Combat + Analysis

B.M. CAGLE
Captain, AGD
Assistant Adjutant General

2 Incls: as stated, less supporting documents, annexes 4, 7, 8, 10, 11 thru 29, to Incl 2, w/d

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Date

HEADQUARTERS
THEATER SERVICE FORCES
EUROPEAN THEATER

(Rear) APO 887
4 September 1945

AG 319.1 HIS-AGO

SUBJECT: After Action Report.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D.C.

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FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Cont + Oral

B.M. GAGLE
Captain, AGD
Assistant Adjutant General

2 Incls: as stated, less supporting documents. annexes 4, 7, 8, 10, 11 thru 29, to Incl 2, w/d

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46 US ARMY

13 February 1945

SUBJECT: Unit History 1-31 January 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Headquarters Seventh Army, APO 758, U. S. Army.
(Attention: Historian.)

The VI Corps Arty Hq was located at KUTZENHAUSEN - la - HAUT (RD79381) at the beginning of the period. Organization for combat at this time was as follows:

Infantry
45 Inf Div
79 Inf Div
Task Force Rudelson
Task Force Herren
Task Force Linden
14th Armd Div (-)
117th Cav Rcn Sq

Artillery
(a) Div Arty
(1) T. F. Rudelson
Organic - 500 AFA Bn (14 Armd Div)
(2) 45th Inf Div
Organic
Reinforcing: 409 AFA Bn (14 Armd Div)
(3) 79th Inf Div
Organic
Attchd: 93 AFA Bn
(4) T. F. Herren & T. F. Linden
Direct Support: 55 FA Brigade
938 FA Bn (4.5 G)
69 AFA Bn (105 SP)
89 AFA Bn (105 SP)
188 FA Bn (155 M)
132 FA Bn (105 M)
(5) 14th Armd Div (-)
409 AFA Bn reinforcing fires of 45 Div.
500 AFA Bn attached T. F. Rudelson

(b) Corps Artillery
(1) 409 Bn Group
Attchd: 976 FA Bn (155 G)
936 FA Bn (155 M)
17 FA Bn (155 M)
991 FA Bn (8" M)

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Mission: General support; reinforce fires of 45 Inf Div Arty with two 155 How Bn (-1 Btry), & T. F. Radelson with one 155 How Btry.

(2) 6 FA Group
Atchd: 36 FA Bn (155 G)
634 FA Bn (155 H)
194 FA Bn (8" How)
Mission: General support; reinforce fires of 79 IDA with one 155 How Bn

(3) 35 FA Group
Atchd: 696 FA Bn (240 H)
975 FA Bn (-A & C Btrys) (8" G)

(4) 2d FA Obsn Bn
Mission: General support.

Mission of VI Corps: VI Corps defends and continues improvement of present positions; reconnoitres and organizes rearward defensive positions on MAGINOT line and along VOSGES foothills.

The front lines on the 1st day of the New Year were located generally along the German boundary. The New Year was welcomed in the proper manner by all guns in the Corps firing one round per gun on profitable targets at the first stroke of midnight.

The enemy on New Years Day launched their first main effort to retake ALSACE; it was along the line BAMBACH (Q8244) - BITCHE (Q7650) - SARREGUEMINES (Q8167) with the enemy First army employing some eight divisions (256, 361, 6 SS, 257, 559, 17 SS, 36, 19) with the 21 Panzer and 25 PG Divisions in reserve. The initial assault in the sector of 117 Cav Rgm Sq, T. F. Linden and T. F. Radelson made good progress, overran our MLR and achieved a minor breakthrough.

The 155 FA Bn was relieved of attachment to 33 FA Brigade and attached to 405 FA Group with the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 45 IDA. The 500 AFA Bn & 17 FA Bn were forced to withdraw to alternate positions due to the success of enemy attack. All artillery units were able to get many observed missions by AOP's and SOP's and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and were very instrumental in slowing down the progress of the attack.

During the morning of 1 Jan the 2nd FA Obsn Bn received the following order: Withdraw to VOSGES position and establish observation in Corps zone and be prepared to furnish maximum transportation as soon as possible.

On 2 Jan an artillery preparation was fired in support of counterattack launched by the 45 Inf Div designed to relieve the heavy pressure in T. F. Linden & Radelson sectors. The attack gained limited objectives but did not relieve pressure on our other units as enemy attack continued in full force.

In order to redistribute our artillery to meet this ever increasing threat the following changes were made: 69 AFA relieve attachment 33 FA Brigade and attached 79 Inf Div; 93 AFA Bn relieved attachment 79 Inf Div and attached 45 Inf Div; 128 FA Bn relieved attachment 33 FA Brigade and attached 79 Inf Div.

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During the day of 3 Jan the VI Corps OI #1 was received which ordered withdrawal of all units to MAGINOT line positions by daylight 3 Jan and a subsequent withdrawal to VOSGES positions on a time schedule. All artillery units completed the withdrawal in an orderly manner and by the time designated, VI Corps Arty CP moved to FALTENHOUSE (9027).

With the ammunition restriction cast aside the artillery with the Corps fired continuously to break up enemy attack on our left (West) flank. During 3 Jan the 45 Inf Div assumed control of enemy attack sector and were rapidly getting the units organized into a formidable fighting force. The 69 AFA Bn was relieved attachment 36 FA Brigade and attached T. F. Herron. The 155 & 158 FA Bns relieved of attachment to VI Corps and returned to parent unit (36 Inf Div) vicinity HOUTKNOCK (0844). During the latter part of the day and after some units had completed withdrawal the VI Corps Arty received the biggest morale booster of the New Year when General Haislip announced that VI Corps will defend in MAGINOT line positions indefinitely and to stop withdrawal to VOSGES positions immediately.

By noon of Jan 4 the main threat to our left flank was over as the enemy had been repelled with heavy casualties but had managed to gain considerable territory when enemy forced the withdrawal to MAGINOT Line positions. The 608 FA Bn (-C Btry) was relieved attachment to 35 FA Gp and attached 6 FA Group with mission of general support in Corps Zone.

The enemy launched a bold attack across the Rhine river in the vicinity of GAMBSHEIM bridge site (XL209) during the night of 4-5 Jan while continuing to keep pressure in the MEIPERSWILLER - DAHLBACH area. The enemy used boats and barges to make the crossing as the AGP's were unable to find any bridges. In order to combat this enemy threat the 69 AFA Bn was relieved attachment T. F. Herron and attached 36 FA Brigade and 17 FA Bn relinquished attachment 406 FA Group and attached to 36 FA Brigade. Both units to be used to support the defense of the Rhine river bridgehead.

The AGP's gave continued surveillance during the day of 5 Jan and kept all informed concerning activity in the bridgehead area. They located many Rhine crossing sites and adjusted artillery on them and also blazed a trail for dive bombers.

VI Corps issued OI #6 on Jan 6 which ordered 79 Inf Div to assume control of the Rhine river bridgehead which now included, the towns of MERKLIGHEIM (XL24A), OFFENDORF (XL23) and GAMBSHEIM (XL110) and definitely became a serious threat to the Corps. The 17 FA Bn was relieved of attachment to 36 FA Brigade and attached to 36 FA Group. The 548 FA Bn was attached to VI Corps and attached to 36 FA Brigade.

On Jan 7 the enemy 36 Panzer Division launched an attack in the ASCHBACH (XL707) - HUNDSWILLER (XL704) area while maintaining pressure on the left flank of the Corps and employing armor in an attempt to make a breakthrough in the Rhine river bridgehead. The 17 FA Gp and the 977 FA Bn attached to VI Corps with mission of general support. The 978 FA Bn was attached to VI Corps and subsequently attached to 36 FA Brigade.

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On Jan 7 the 194 FA Bn initiated its personal war to destroy the XI Panzer Division by destroying 3 enemy tanks with precision adjustment and dispersing tanks employed in the attack during the day.

GI "A" of the 12 Armd Div was attached to 79 Inf Div with the mission to reduce the Rhine river bridgehead.

A preparation was fired by the artillery in the bridgehead area the morning of 8 Jan for the attack launched by the 12 Armd Div and XIX Inf Regt. Minor gains were made and consolidated; however enemy reinforced their bridgehead with artillery and tanks and offered savage resistance to our advance. The 968 FA Bn was relieved of attachment to VI Corps and passed to the control of First French Army. The 194 FA Bn destroyed 4 tanks and 2 probables during the day.

The XI Panzer Division along the newly identified 25 PG Div launched a big attack in the NIEDERMODERN - MATTEN (XL733) area on 9 Jan; gains were made in this area and forced a temporary withdrawal but counter-attack was successful in restoring MLR. The artillery accounted for six German tanks during the day and were largely responsible for stopping the enemy attack with small gains. The 69 AFA Bn was relieved of attachment to 35 FA Brigade and attached to 406 FA Group with mission of direct support of 36 Engineer C Regt.

On Jan 9 Capt Cloyd V. Taylor, O1166960, Ass't VI Corps Air Officer was relieved of assignment to Hq VI Corps Arty and assigned to 44 FA Gp as air officer.

Jan 10 offered no let up to the bitter battle raging in three critical sectors of the VI Corps front. The artillery with the Corps continued to be very active by firing on numerous personnel and vehicles and keeping the enemy supply and communication lines "hot" with arty fire.

GO #1, Hq VI Corps arty was published on 11 Jan and attaches the artillery as follows:

<u>XI FA Brigade</u>
6 FA Gp
69 AFA Bn
36 FA Bn
634 FA Bn
243 FA Bn
975 FA Bn
194 FA Bn
Mission: Provide direct support in the right (East) sector of 79 Inf Div; reinforce fires of 79 Inf Div Arty with one Med Bn; General support in 79 Inf Sector.

<u>406 FA Gp</u>
69 AFA Bn
938 FA Bn
976 FA Bn
Mission: Provide direct support for 36 Engineer C Regt, with one lt bn; reinforce fires of 45 Inf Div Arty with one Med Bn; general support

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in right (East) sector of 45 Inf Div.

17 FA Group
977 FA Bn
406 FA Bn (-C Btry)
575 FA Bn (-A & C Btry)
C Btry 995 FA Bn
Mission: General support in Corps Zone.
36 FA Group
17 FA Bn
995 FA Bn (-C Btry)
Mission: Provide direct support for 276 Inf Regt with one Bnd Bn; general support in left (West) sector of 45 Inf Div.

The 6 SS Mtn Div again attacked on 11 Jan in the Corps left sector and made minor gains. Very poor visibility limited the artillery flying over the front. In an artillery barrage in MATZEN (N1788) 4 MK IV tanks were destroyed.

The enemy continued to apply pressure over the entire front on 12 Jan and our counterattacks to regain lost positions received the greatest amount of artillery fire yet experienced by VI Corps in France. Our counterattacks gained very little ground but it temporarily put the enemy on the defense in the Corps zone.

The battle continued with great fury on 13 Jan with enemy counterattack being launched in the MATZEN-BIRKENHOLZ area which was repulsed with the enemy losing 14 tanks. 406 FA Gp relieved of mission of direct support for 36 Engineer C Regt and given mission of supplying direct support for the 276 Inf Regt. At 1630 hrs an enemy jet propelled plane dropped an anti-personnel bomb into the area line of "C" Btry, 194 FA Bn destroying a 2½ ton truck complete with kitchen equipment and killing 4 and wounding (some seriously) 28.

On 14 Jan operation SCHOCKEN was born which was a plan to destroy the 280mm German RR gun firing into the MAUNDAU-BIRCHWILLER area and located near NUE (N910) by 2nd FA Obsn Bn flash section. A 240mm Howitzer from "B" Btry, 695 FA Bn and a gun from the 36 FA Bn was moved to a position where it could hit this location. The Air Corps was alerted and the stage was set; however, the big gun never returned to this location.

The 103 Inf Div rejoined VI Corps on 14 Jan to take over a sector between the 45 and 79 Inf Divisions relieving T. F. Herren. The 17 FA GP, 69 AFA Bn and 93 AFA Bn, were relieved of assignment to VI Corps and assigned XXI Corps upon relief of T. F. Herren. This change necessitated the following changes in the attachments and missions of the Corps Artillery:

(1) The 194 FA Bn, 995 FA Bn (-C Btry), 575 FA Bn (-A [illegible]) relieved attachment to 17 FA Gp and attached to 33 FA Brigade.

(2) The 977 FA Bn relieved attachment to 17 FA Gp and [illegible] to 406 FA Gp.

(3) The 406 FA Gp will reinforce the fires of the [illegible] Inf Div Arty with one (1) med Bn.

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The following limitation on daily expenditures of ammunition became effective on 14 Jan:

240mm How	--	0
8" Gun	--	0
8" How	--	40 rds/Bn
155 Gun	--	80 rds/Bn
155 How	--	180 rds/Bn
105 How	--	350 rds/Bn

Between 15 Jan and 18 Jan the enemy continued to be very aggressive in the HAGUENAU area; however all attacks were repulsed and the enemy lost heavily. On 18 Jan the 10 SS Panzer Div was identified in the bridgehead area.

On the 19th of Jan the enemy lashed out with a bold tank attack in the Rhine river bridgehead area and made some serious penetrations; however our counterattacks retained the enemy. Ammunition restrictions were impossible to maintain and the artillery with the Corps shot well over its allotment in repulsing the attack. The 696 FA Bn and 575 FA Bn began the initial withdrawal to the MODER river line.

Due to the intensity of the enemy attack along the Corps front, the 36 Inf Div was attached to VI Corps on 20 Jan and relieved the 12 Armd Div in Rhine bridgehead area. The 939 FA Bn was attached to VI Corps and attached to 33 FA Brigade; the 693 FA Bn was attached to VI Corps and attached to 45 Inf Div.

In a blinding snow storm during the night of 20/21 Jan the VI Corps withdrew to the MODER river line. This readjustment was due to the serious threat in the bridgehead area and enemy pressure from the COLMAR pocket. During the rearward movement the 977 FA Bn lost one (1) 155 Gun M-1 with sight complete, 2 tractors M-4, 2 trailers, 1 Ton, with luggage, 3 pyramidal tents, 2 rocket launchers and 175 rds of ammunition complete. The Hq VI Corps Arty moved to the town of ROCHFELDEN (Q8717).

Artillery support was given the French in the GAMBSHEIM area where enemy attacked in force on 22 Jan; attack was repulsed. The 59 AFA Bn and the 242 FA Bn were relieved of attachment to 33 FA Brigade and attached to 79 Inf Div. The 33 FA Brigade assumed responsibility for counterbattery in the 36 Inf Div sector.

The Hq. VI Corps Arty moved into winter quarters in the town of OBERSCHAEL (q7117) on 24 Jan. The second phase of the enemy's plan to retake ALSACE had now been completed.

The third phase began on 25 Jan when the enemy attempted to cross the MODER river around HAGUENAU (R0324) and MUHLHAUSEN (q8431) and were temporarily successful but counterattacks later restored the MLR in all sectors. The 905 FA Bn had a cub plane shot down by small arms fire in the MUHLHAUSEN area; pilot was hit in the leg but the observer escaped unhurt.

The 101 Airborne Div was attached to VI Corps on 25 Jan and was used in the HAGUENAU area between the 103 and 79 Inf Divisions.

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The MODER river line was completely restored on Jan 26 and thus ended the 3rd phase of the enemy's plans to recapture ALSACE. The mission of the 23 FA Brigade was changed to general support VI Corps, reinforce fires of 101 Airborne Division. 79 Inf Division, and 36 Inf Division with two (2) med Bns with priority to 101 Airborne Division.

The Division boundaries were readjusted on Jan 27 which necessitated the following changes in attachment:

89 AFA Bn and 242 FA Bn relieved of attachment to 79 Inf Div and attached to 36 Inf Div. The 575 FA Bn was relieved of attachment to VI Corps on Jan 27 and attached to XXI Corps.

A letter stating conditions under which air observation planes could continue to fly while Pozit fuze was being used was issued to all concerned on Jan 28.

On 29 Jan Lt Peters and two (2) enlisted men who constitute an MID team for interrogation of German Nationals joined VI Corps Arty Hq.

The 36 FA Gp Air Officer, Major Holcomb, was shot down by unknown machine on Jan 30 in the vicinity of BARENTHAL (Q8442) while attempting to adjust on a bridge well inside enemy territory.

For the last few days of the month the enemy showed a definite defensive attitude; ever since the unsuccessful attempt to cross the MODER river. Our plans turned offensive as the 36 Inf Div started a limited objective attack on 31 Jan to reduce the Rhine river bridgehead.

There were no changes in personnel, no promotions, no decorations and no casualties in Hq & Hq Btry VI Corps Arty during the month.

For the Commanding General:

William D. Addison

WILLIAM D. ADDISON
1st Lt, FA
Adjutant

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By Authority of
TAG
Initials
Date: 31 AUG 1945

HEADQUARTERS
THEATER SERVICE FORCES
EUROPEAN THEATER

(Rear) APO 887
31 August 1945

AG 319.1 HIS-AGO

SUBJECT: After Action Report.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Unit History, VI Corps Artillery, for the month of January 1945, dated 13 February 1945, is inclosed.

2. Copies of and supporting documents to the inclosed report are being retained by this headquarters for further study.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

B. M. CAGLE
Captain, AGD
Assistant Adjutant General

1 Incl: As stated and less copies [illegible] supporting documents.

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~~HEAD QUARTERS VII CORPS ARTILLERY~~
APO 46 U. S. ARMY

0

8 January 1945.

SUBJECT: ~~Unit History~~ A/A Rpt, 1-31 December 1944.

TO : Commanding General, Headquarters Seventh Army, APO 758, U.S. Army. (Attention: Historian).

The first of the month found the Corps Artillery CP at MUTZIG, ALSACE, the 3d Div taking over the city of STRASSBOURG from the 2d French Armd Div and the 103d and 36th Divs driving through the eastern part of the VOSGES MTS north of SELESTAT. On 2 December (FO #7) our dispositions were as follows: 6th FA Gp with 634th FA, 36th FA attached, reinforcing fires of 3d Inf Div; 17th FA Gp, with 995th FA, 141st FA, 977th FA attached, reinforcing forces of 36th and 103d Divs, priority to 103d Div; 35th FA Group with 194th FA, 698th FA (Btry B) attached, general support and 2d FA Obsn Bn, general support.

As 2d French Armd Div (250th FA and 975th FA attached) drove south along the RHINE River and across the Corps front, we had difficulty in answering calls for fire and establishing NFLs from them until we sent an SCR 193 radio with operators to the div arty to work in the Corps Counterbattery Net. Also, 17th FA Gp was directed to establish liaison with them to provide additional arty support to counter the stubborn German resistance forming up in the COLMAR pocket.

The Army plan did not contemplate a crossing of the RHINE vic STRASSBOURG but an attack by the Corps north through the WISSEMBOURG gap and our CP was moved on 4 December to BRUMATH. Our dispositions were then as follows: 6th FA Gp, with 36th FA (less A Btry)(plus 2 sections 155 G, SP, M-12), 634th FA, 575th FA (less 2 Btries), 698th FA, 194th FA (less C Btry), reinforcing the fires of the 79th Div with one medium bn; 35th FA Gp with 17th FA, 995th FA attached, reinforcing fires of 103d Div; 405th FA Gp (reverted to our control from XV Corps) with 938th FA, 976th FA, attached, reinforcing fires of 45th Div with one medium bn; Btry A, 36th FA Bn and Btry C, 194th FA, attached to 3d Div; 2d FA Obsn Bn, general support.

During this period we made efforts to secure detailed data on both the MAGINOT and SIEGFRIED lines since only overprint maps (1/25,000) of the SIEGFRIED defenses were available. Basic photo cover (12 inch) was far from complete due to poor flying weather, but, as we learned a month later, this was available -- in LONDON. Detailed information of the MAGINOT line was not received at Corps Hqs. until the day before the attack and at that time only engineers and arty had the opportunity to study the information. Fortunately, the Germans did not attempt to defend the MAGINOT positions (except the forts at LEMBACH and SIRCHE); these positions still face toward Germany, have elaborate underground facilities very little fire power in the casemated positions and a limited field of fire.

On 6 December we lost the 17th FA Gp with the 141st FA and 977th FA who were attached, to 1st French Army to support the attack of 36th Div on BELFORT.

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Due to poor weather conditions only 4 missions with high performance aircraft were completed, but the 8" guns and 240mm Hows were fired into LANDAU, KARLSRUHE, RASTATT, BADEN-BADEN, on RHINE bridges and other key points with interesting results. The shoot on KARLSRUHE was reported to have started a run on a bank; a PW reported our fire on 15 December in RASTATT hit the RR station and barracks and caused such damage to the marshalling yards they were not repaired although they had been after an air raid on 10 December; the shoot on BADEN-BADEN brought an immediate reaction in the form of a night fighter patrol over the btry position.

December 9 our CP closed at BRUMATH and opened at PFAFFENHOFFEN. The following day 34 Div Arty provided a demonstration near STRASSBOURG of the new proximity fuze for 105mm and 155mm How ammunition; it was agreed that this fuze would be used during designated periods when our Cub planes would be grounded and the codeword "SCRAM" radioed to all stations when an emergency necessitated its use. On 19 December this fuze was released for use and it proved reliable and effective on personnel targets.

During 12-13 December we advanced across the MLR of the MAGINOT Line without resistance and practically every gun in the Corps could now shoot on to German soil. On 14 December, 14 Armd Div, 103d, 79th and 45th Divs all crossed the German border between the high ground west of WISSEMBOURG and the RHINE River.

Our CP moved from MORSBRONN-LES-BAINS to SOULZ-SOUS-FORETS 14 December.

On 16 December two SP 155 Guns (M-12s), after an exhaustive ordnance check, and manned by crews from 36th FA and 977th FA, with two officers from 575th FA, were used in close support missions by 45th Div and 14th Armd Div. Although the crews had little, if any, opportunity to train in rapid occupation of and displacement from positions (this proved essential), several pillboxes were neutralized and the value of these guns demonstrated. To keep two M-12s serviceable, it is recommended two others be retained by ordnance for immediate replacement. Play in the traversing mechanism of one piece, preventing accurate laying, has not been remedied to date.

As we approached the SIEGFRIED LINE resistance increased noticeably. 2 captured 88mm DP guns were used by 93d AFA Bn in harassing missions, but were destroyed later during our withdrawal because of lack of transportation.

December 18 our CP moved to WISSEMBOURG, one half mile from the German border. The German attack in Belgium against the First U.S. Army affected us in the withdrawal of a division from our ever increasing salient and we were ordered to take up a strictly defensive position, which entailed elaborate defensive fire plans, plans of withdrawal as well as a cover plan. The cover plan (operation THUNDERBOLT) called for a crossing of the RHINE River south of LAUTERBOURG and several Corps bns prepared positions along the river and registered one gun to simulate preparations for such a river crossing.

On Corps order, our CP was closed at WISSEMBOURG on 22 Dec and reopened at SOULZ-SOUS-FORETS. At this time our dispositions were as follows (FO #9, 23 December 1944): 6th FA Gp with 36th FA, 634th FA and 935th FA attached, general support, reinforcing fires of 7th Div with one medium bn; 405th FA Gp, with 17th FA, 936th FA, 976th FA and 995th FA attached, general support, reinforcing the

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fires of 45th Div and TF Huddleson with one medium bn each; 35th FA Gp with 194th FA, 698th FA, and 575th FA (less 2 btries), general support; 2d FA Obsn Bn, general support.

At the request of XII TAC we fired an all call counterbattery program on 26 December on AA positions vic RASTATT; so successful was the shoot that the air corps reported the flak over the target area very light and all bombers returned safely. This same day 33d FA Brigade, commanded by Colonel Conder was attached to the Corps and given the mission of protecting the RHINE River sector vic MAGUENAU. Under its command were placed the 59th and 69th AFA Bns and 935th FA Bn.

Like all other Corps units, Hq Btry sent 9 men (10% of its enlisted strength) to the infantry reducing the assigned strength to 80. Especially short of personnel was our Air Section which has been providing rations and cooking facilities for 32 liaison pilots and mechanics from the air corps in addition to its own personnel. Also, our motor section was unable to provide drivers for all vehicles.

On 30 December our CP was dive-bombed by twelve P-47s who scored a hit on our message center and caused 32 casualties (See GO #1 1945 attached) in our headquarters, only four of which had to be evacuated. On the last day of the year we moved our CP to KUTZENHAUSEN where on the New Year came in we received the first reports of the German counteroffensive on our front.

December 5 Lt Col John M. Boyett, S-3, left for U.S.A. on a 30 day leave.

For the Commanding General:

William D. Addison

WILLIAM D. ADDISON
1st Lt., F. A.
Adjutant.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS ARTILLERY
APO 46

2 January 1945

GENERAL ORDER:

NUMBER 1:

AWARD OF THE PURPLE HEART

1. Under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, a Purple Heart is awarded to the following named individuals for wounds received in action:

HARRY M. FOOS, JR, 0[illegible]9772, Captain, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (Medal #2[illegible]241)

MAURICE W. DURHAM, 36015063, Master Sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. (Medal #218045)

WILLIAM C. HANCOCK, 6273735, Master Sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Seminole, Oklahoma. (Medal #2[illegible]9310)

ADOLPH F. LEE, 20109661, Staff Sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Adams, Massachusetts. (Medal #179045)

CHARLES MANGIOLARDO, 33010527, Staff Sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered Military service from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (Medal #218971)

PAUL V. MARSHALL, 36023735, Staff Sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Chicago, Illinois. (Medal #178127)

WALTER E. MCDERMOTT, 35163167, Staff Sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Patoka, Indiana. (Medal #209297)

JOHN H. PETERSON, JR, 34098049, Staff Sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Darlington, South Carolina. (Medal #301621)

NOLAN C. BRENEMEIER, 32076663, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters and Headquarters VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Camden, New Jersey. (Medal #194666)

ROBERT B. HIGHTOWER, 34055736, Technician Fourth Grade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Winter Haven, Florida. (Medal #294309)

HOWARD B. ASSANTE, 32309286, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Jersey City, New Jersey. (Medal #228655)

CHARLES P. GREBYK, 32011949, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from New York City, New York. (Medal #228656)

WILLIAM B. GREGG, 35331767, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Akron, Ohio. (Medal #294359)

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JAMES B. HOLOHAN, [illegible] and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. (Medal #214453)

LAWRENCE J. PHILIPP, 37161015, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters and Headquarters VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from St. Paul, Minnesota. (Medal #299320)

ARTHUR C. QUICK, 36508450, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Detroit, Michigan. (Medal #299261)

JAMES A. REES, 36116273, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Detroit, Michigan. (Medal #299301)

ELMO O. STAFFORD, 37396041, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Poplar Bluff, Missouri. (Medal #277993)

JOHN S. VAN HARLINGEN, 33075457, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (Medal #299308)

DONALD C. SATHER, 36204004, Private First Class, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from La Crosse, Wisconsin. (Medal #178195)

FLOYD W. CHRISTENBERRY, 35009619, Private, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Indianapolis, Indiana. (Medal #214425)

GEORGE W. THOUTWEIN, 33756654, Private, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Altoona, Pennsylvania. (Medal #299316)

JOHN G. KNIGHT, 6281525, Private, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Fort Bliss, Texas. (Medal #299321)

JOHN J. PITTAVINO, 39005265, Technical Sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from San Francisco, California. (Medal #178011)

THEODORE G. RIZOS, 36179867, Technician Fifth Grade, Headquarters Battery, 35th Field Artillery Group on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from New York City, New York. (Medal #262053)

WILFORD N. HAINES, 33323929, Private, Headquarters Battery, 35th Field Artillery Group on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Drain, Oregon. (Medal #215047)

CARL F. KRIEGER, 31007018, Sergeant, Company A, 57th Signal Battalion on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Westville, Massachusetts.

DONALD R. REEDER, 01170155, Second Lieutenant, 250th Signal Operations Company on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Upperdarby, Pennsylvania.

DOUGLAS K. SCHAEDEL, 33482047, Technician Fifth Grade, 250th Signal Operations Company on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Allentown, Pennsylvania.

HARRINGTON D. HAWKINS, 6426637, Private, 935th Field Artillery Battalion on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Greenwood, South Carolina.

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MART E. JONES, 35135392, Private First Class, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VI Corps Artillery on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Williamsburg, Kentucky. (Medal #214432)

[illegible], 35[illegible], Private, [illegible] on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Northampton, North Carolina.

TRAVIS D. MORRIS, 18005222, Corporal, 634th Field Artillery Battalion on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Dallas, Texas.

DENNIS S. SHEPPARD, 36125053, Private, Company B, 87th Signal Battalion on 30 December 1944 in France. Entered military service from Detroit, Michigan.

By command of Brigadier General BAER:

WILLIAM D. ADDISON
1st Lt, FA
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

William D. Addison
WILLIAM D. ADDISON
1st Lt, FA
Adjutant

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DOCUMENT TO ROLL INDEX

Frame Number	Classification Number	Date Period	Vol.	Pt.	Title	Security Classification	Remarks
4	585.51	June-Dec/44			After Action Rpts.	U	
591		Jan-Mar/45				U	
697	585.51	Apr-May/45			After Action Rpts.	U	
712	585.5607	Jan-Oct/43			Weekly Intelligence Summary	U	
913	585.6	Jul-Aug/44			6th Corps After Action Rpts.	U	
1134		Aug/44				U	
1140		Sept/44				U	
1202		Oct-Nov/44				U	
1214		Dec/44				U	
1309	585.6	Dec/44-May/45			6th Corps After Action Rpts.	U	
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